

who were the first to practice democracy and independence in ancient times, declared their independence of Turkish rule on March 25, 1821, but did not emerge as a sovereign state until 11 years later, when their freedom was assured by the Convention of London.

Since that time Greece has become a valued member of the community of free nations and is one of our staunchest allies in the free world struggle against communism. We should be proud of the effectiveness of the cooperation that has existed between Greece and the United States in the entire history of our relations and which is especially strong at the present time.

In conformance with the historic friendship between the Greek and American people, the United States should certainly develop a practical foreign policy position on the question of Cyprus. The lack of leadership by the Johnson administration in this field is an international tragedy. Truly responsible leadership on the part of the United States should have produced by now Enosis of the island of Cyprus with Greece, while safeguarding the rights of all residents of the island.

Greece, which developed Western civilization as we know it, continues to provide an ever-increasing role of leadership in the preservation of our modern society.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to include their remarks in tribute to this anniversary of Greek Independence Day.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRAY] is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. BRAY addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

FARM POLICY

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. HANSEN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I have here in my hand the results of an independent survey which was conducted by a group of leaders in my home State of Iowa. I would like to share with my colleagues the results of this survey which is one of the clearest and most definitive statements for the direction of farm policy by a nonfarm group that I have ever seen.

The group which conducted the survey is an organization known as the "Iowa 99 Legislative and Advisory Group." This group is composed of one rural leader from each of the 99 counties in the State. They were assisted by the Statistical Department at Iowa State University in Ames.

Their objective is to spotlight and emphasize the problems of our rural economy and recommend necessary meas-

ures to legislative groups at State and National levels. In order to canvass the opinion and thinking of a major business group, this committee recently asked the State's 849 bankers to give their views on procedures for improving the farm economy and on a broad range of public policies.

So far there has been an unbelievable 50-percent response from the bankers, most of it from those of the smaller towns of the State where bankers are closest to people of the farms and have quick, continuing communication with them. I also feel this was indeed an excellent group to survey since all of us are most aware of the part financial institutions play in our economic stability. I, of course, am deeply interested in this activity and have more than a casual interest in the opinions of the bankers of Iowa, being a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee. Even more important, I represent the Seventh Congressional District in which 68 percent of the people live in the rural areas. This is why I am so vitally interested in what the bankers think about farm policy.

Certainly you need not be reminded of the depressed conditions of our family farmers as a result of the continuing downward trend in farm income. There is, of course, a growing appreciation of the relationship between income opportunities for the family farmers of our Nation and the economic well-being of people who live and work in the towns of our rural areas. I must admit that it was a pleasant surprise to find the degree of understanding that was expressed by bankers of Iowa in this vital survey.

At this particular time, as all of us anxiously await the President's farm bill, I think it is most appropriate that we carefully solicit the opinions of everyone and heed the needs of our family farmers which have such a great impact on the economic conditions of our main street businesses. I want to take this opportunity to commend the Iowa committee of 99 for their efforts in collecting these opinions. After reading them, all of you will, I am sure, agree that these were not leading but were most explicit and left no doubt as to the intentions of the individual answering them.

The failure of the great majority of our family farmers to receive parity of income equal to the incomes of other segments of our economy is being reflected in the unfavorable business conditions in the towns which provide farm families with goods and services. I want to point out and emphasize to both my rural and nonrural colleagues that unless action is taken soon to further improve the farm income situation the pinch will be felt in cities large and small across our Great Nation. They are directly or indirectly dependent upon farm and nonfarm rural customers for the products of their factories, plants, and mills. I am sure, therefore, that the opinions expressed by these Iowa bankers in this timely questionnaire will be of great interest to each of you. This is especially true since Congress will consider action

this session on a broad range of farm and food legislation.

Asked if they would favor a 4-year extension of the present or similar farm program, more than three-fourths of the bankers responding to the questionnaire, specifically, 77 percent answered "Yes."

In response to the question "will termination of all farm commodity price supports have a favorable or unfavorable effect upon your community," 63 percent said such termination would have an unfavorable effect—27 percent said "favorable."

Sixty-eight percent of the bankers responding to the questionnaire are against elimination of farm price supports, and 55 percent say that farmers cannot solve their problems without Government help.

In response to the question as to whether or not businessmen in their communities are doing better now than in the previous 4 years, 40 percent said business conditions had worsened this year, 26 percent said the situation is unchanged, and 30 percent said business was better.

The majority of the bankers responding to the questionnaire—namely, 60 percent—feel that farmers in their areas are now making some financial progress. In view of the answers to farm program questions, I think it only fair to conclude that farmer-Government cooperation is contributing to the modest progress that has been made since the start of the current feed grains program.

With figures reflecting percentages, a summary of the questionnaire returns are as follows:

1. Do you think farm price supports should be eliminated? Yes, 26; no, 68, no response, 6.
2. Can farmers solve their problems without Government help? Yes, 33; no, 55; no response, 12.
3. The Kiplinger letter stated that within 5 years most, if not all, commodity farm supports will be gone. If so, will it affect your community? Favorably, 27; unfavorably, 61; no response, 10.
4. In 1964, President Johnson sent a mission to Europe to promote high quality meat trade. Would you favor that our Congressional Agricultural Committee should further this type of meat promotion in major foreign cities? Yes, 96; no, 4.
5. As agricultural exports are the largest U.S. dollar earner, do you favor feed grain and soybean exports to Russia and satellites? Yes, 69; no, 30.
6. Do you favor agricultural exports to China. Yes, 34; no, 53.
7. Would you favor credit selling to expand our agricultural exports? Yes, 34; no, 60.
8. Would you favor helping shipowners so that we can equally compete with other grain exporting nations who have lower operating costs? Yes, 52; no, 41.
9. Would you recommend using foreign ships at lower cost? Yes, 35; no, 58.
10. Would you favor the present or similar farm program extension of 4 years? Yes, 77; no, 19.
11. What method would you favor to keep farm production prices in balance? More effective controls, 20; increased exports, 42; present system, 15; no response, 23.
12. Should there be a concerted effort to get major farm groups to join forces to gain more effective long-run benefits for agriculture? Yes, 85; no, 9.

13. Are businessmen doing better, worse, or the same as during the last 4 years? Better, 39; worse, 40; same, 36; no response, 4.

14. Do businessmen in your area feel their income is directly tied to agricultural income? Yes, 92; no, 5.

In his agricultural message to the Congress last February 4, the President of the United States said:

Farm policy is not something separate. It is part of an overall effort to serve our national interest, at home and around the world.

I am hopeful that when the major items of farm and food legislation come before the Congress the President's accurate observation of the widespread impact of agricultural policy will be remembered.

The family farms of the United States do far more than keep millions of Americans supplied with an abundance of top-quality foods at fair prices. They are customers for billions of dollars worth of goods and services that move out to the countryside from cities and towns. They can continue their fine record of production, and be increasingly good customers, only if Government gives them the cooperation essential to their achievement of earning opportunities comparable to those experienced by the other segments of our economy.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues for careful study the survey results contained herein, and call your particular attention to the understanding and sympathetic concern that has developed in the banking fraternity for the agriculturist and his problems.

It is my hope that this material will assist this Congress in developing an answer that will serve the best interests of our Nation through the improvement and continuation of a program that has proven its value during the past several years.

(Mr. HANSEN of Iowa asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

USE OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PUCINSKI). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KASTENMEIER] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the House of Representatives to discuss the subject of the use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Much has been said here and abroad in the last 72 hours as a result of the use of American-supplied tear gas-type chemical weapons by the South Vietnamese.

The facts reported in the press are these: On January 27, 1965, the South Vietnamese encountered a village in Phu Yen Province on the southern tip of the Vietnam peninsula that had been infiltrated by the Vietcong. The mission of the South Vietnamese was to capture the village. They had the choice of attacking the village on foot, by bombing

from the air or by shelling with artillery or mortar fire. This is virtually the same situation faced day after day in the war in Vietnam. In this case gas was used. The gas incapacitated all within the village permitting the South Vietnamese to enter the village, capturing Vietcong and gaining control of the village. The gas used is characterized by the Defense Department as a riot-control-type gas similar to tear gas, having no residual effect. As the Secretary of Defense has said, the gas was used for the purpose of saving lives.

Statements released by our headquarters in Saigon on Tuesday confirmed that gas was used by the South Vietnamese, that the gas was provided by the United States and that it was released from dispensers in helicopters provided by the United States.

Subsequent Defense and State Department statements confirm that three types of gases have been available to the South Vietnamese from our supplies and that these gases include the following three agents:

DM, a pepperlike irritant that causes sneezing, coughing, headaches, tightness in the chest, nausea and vomiting. It incapacitates a victim for a half hour to 2 hours.

CS, a recently developed tear-inducing agent that irritates eyes, nose and respiratory tract and causes chest pains, choking and vomiting. Its effects last 5 to 10 minutes.

CN, a tear-inducing irritant that also causes irritation to the skin. Its effects last about 3 minutes.

The Defense and State Department statements further indicate that the authority to use these riot-control-type gases had been delegated to area commanders, presumably for that purpose—riot control, and that the decision to use the gas had not previously been cleared with either the Pentagon or the White House. According to news reports, Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk first heard of its use in combat in news stories. The White House has stated that the President did not know of its use or approve of it in advance.

It is not clear from information available to me whether the South Vietnamese initiated the request for gas to use in such situations or whether our military authorities in the field pressed its use upon the South Vietnamese.

On September 3, 1959, in the face of growing interest then being shown by our military in the development of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological warfare weapons and techniques, I introduced a resolution, House Joint Concurrent Resolution 433, which reads as follows:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress hereby reaffirms the longstanding policy of the United States that in the event of war the United States shall under no circumstances resort to the use of biological weapons or the use of poisonous or obnoxious gases unless they are first used by our enemies.

At that time my efforts were attacked as providing the Communist world with an opportunity to twist my words to their advantage and to place the United States

in a bad light. My response to this charge then, and it is most relevant to the situation we find ourselves in today, was that we must reaffirm our longstanding position against the use of these weapons unless they are used against us first. Furthermore, President Eisenhower's supporting statement against first use gave all the support necessary on this issue.

Such has been our policy ever since President Delano Roosevelt first enunciated the policy in 1943 when he said:

Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.

Furthermore, the tone of all correspondence which I had with the State Department with regard to the concurrent resolution mentioned earlier confirmed that our capability was designed as a defensive effort and not for the first use. I read now from a letter from the Department of State dated January 15, 1960, which concludes with the quote from President Eisenhower:

With respect to U.S. policy governing the use of biological and chemical weapons in war, this is a matter in which any policy decision involving their use rests solely with the President of the United States. At his news conference of January 13, 1960, the President responded to a question bearing directly on this matter. When asked about U.S. policy with respect to being the first to use these agents in war, the President said in part that, "So far as my own instinct is concerned, is to not start such a thing as that first."

I hope you will find the foregoing information of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR.,

Assistant Secretary.

Both Houses have studied the question of the use of CBR weapons in warfare. A fine report was made by the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In its report, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, dated August 10, 1959, on "Research in CBR Warfare," commented on this aspect of the use of these weapons:

It must be made perfectly clear that the United States does not seek to find any opportunities for using these or other forms of warfare. The natural revulsion against the bizarre effects of both old and new CBR agents make them ready targets for international propaganda campaigns.

The great body of public opinion still adheres to this view of gas warfare. The New York Times in an editorial on Wednesday which ended with the sentence, "Gas is a wretched means to achieve even the most valid ends," begins with the following two paragraphs:

The United States, in steady escalation of the Vietnamese conflict, is now revealed to have employed a nonlethal gas. It is possible to argue, as American military and civilian spokesmen do, that military objectives can be achieved with fewer casualties by using a gas that does not kill.

This argument overlooks one vital factor; and it displays, at the very least, a lack of

imagination somewhere in the top echelons of the armed forces. People—ordinary people everywhere—have a strong psychological revulsion, if not horror, at the idea of any kind of poisonous gas, even a temporarily disabling type that only causes extreme discomfort including nausea and diarrhea when used against ordinarily healthy adults. But even this kind of gas can be fatal to the very young, the very old and those ill of heart and lung ailments.

The Washington Post in a similar vein commented bitterly in its lead editorial on Wednesday as follows:

The argument that the nontoxic gas is more merciful than antipersonnel weapons has some merit, but not much. The trouble is that although the gas may not be poison, the word is, and all the propaganda resources in the world cannot explain away its employment as an act of Christian charity and humanitarian mercy.

Two principal arguments echoed in these editorials are made with some effect in favor of using nonlethal gases in a war of this kind. The first contention is that the use of gas is a humane means of accomplishing tactical missions which are otherwise very costly in terms of the lives of civilians as well as military. The second is that since the gas is nonlethal and without prolonged effect, it is a desirable weapon to use in guerrilla-type war where the guerrillas are intermingled with noncombatants.

The humaneness argument rings a little hollow since we are supporting the South Vietnamese at the same time with napalm and white phosphorous which are in themselves inhumane weapons. Horrible as these weapons are, however, they are an accepted part of the standard military arsenal. They were used in World War II and Korea. Whether they ought to be or not, they are not part of the forbidden CBR family.

More important, however, the humaneness and nonlethal arguments used in favor of these gases are beside the point.

This is the central issue. The use of gas by any nation creates a precedent for later use by other countries of other gases. Its use represents the first opening of the box in which humanity has kept the arsenal of these weapons sealed since the First World War. Any use of these weapons opens the door to the use of other more lethal and inhumane weapons. The questions we must ask before using these weapons are: Are we to unilaterally open up this box of horror weapons before all mankind? Are we to reverse our past policy of so long standing in such an offhand fashion? I believe our answer is and should be a resounding "No."

Let us look at some of the weapons or agents which have stayed locked up in a sort of Pandora's box. The agents available to us are presumably available to others including the Communist world.

I will first consider some of the chemical agents available today—others may now be available with other more bizarre effects:

Blister agents: These are cumulative poisons, such as mustard, nitrogen mustard and lewisite. They are rapidly absorbed through the skin. They not only

blister, but can cause blindness and attack many internal organs, including the lungs, bloodstream, and digestive tract.

Choking agents: Principally phosgene, it attacks the lungs so that the victim progressively moves from coughing to drowning in the liquid which accumulates in his own lungs. It also brings on nausea and vomiting and the victim goes into shock. With this gas and its attendant symptoms in the background, it is not surprising to have world opinion respond with indignation at the introduction of the use of gases, blithely dismissed as merely causing nausea.

Blood gases: These include hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen, chloride and arsine. These, in concentration, are very deadly. They travel via the lungs to the bloodstream to stop the transfer of oxygen in the blood with consequent severe effects, particularly on the central nervous system.

Tear gas and vomiting agents: These are considered harassing agents and their effects, while acute, pass in ordinary circumstances. Vomiting agents also may be used in combat in the hope of making men remove their protective masks to become vulnerable to more deadly attacks.

Nerve gases: These constitute the real significant change in weaponry in this field. They cause casualties before they can be detected by the human senses. Less than a minute of exposure is lethal. As gases, they travel via the lungs, although a liquid droplet will penetrate the skin. They disrupt nerve signals to the muscles. Symptoms begin with respiratory troubles, salivation and perspiration, vomiting, cramps, involuntary elimination and leading through convulsions to death.

I next turn to biological agents: Five classes of micro-organisms represent the primary classifications from which biological warfare agents can be drawn:

First. Fungi are most commonly usable against plants, although San Joaquin Valley fever is a fungus infection which attacks man.

Second. Protozoa are a possibility, but are difficult to grow and transmit. Malaria and amebic dysentery are diseases of this type.

Third. Few bacteria are harmful, but some important disease types exist. Potential biological warfare agents are anthrax, brucellosis, glanders, tularemia, plague, bacillary dysentery, and cholera.

Fourth. Another group are the rickettsiae, including typhus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever and Q fever.

Fifth. The next category consists of the viruses, such as influenza, psittacosis, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis.

In past wars, epidemics among men have often taken as many lives as the battlefield, even though the diseases were spread by natural rather than artificial means. The artificial introduction of diseases to populations not used to them can have a powerful effect. There is also the possibility some laboratory will come up with a new mutant strain which is more virulent than the normal forms.

Radiological agents are a less well-known and understood matter. They are classed in two groups: Those which may derive from a controlled reactor or ac-

celerator, and are disseminated by means similar to chemical or biological agents and those which are deliberately created by the explosion of a nuclear or thermonuclear device at the combat location.

A fourth category testifying to the capability of laboratories to widen the range of these heinous weapons includes the psychochemicals. These agents or incapacitating agents as they are known fall into two groups: first, those which produce temporary physical disability such as paralysis, blindness, or deafness; and second, those which produce temporary mental aberration. Unlike the lethal war gases or the more virulent biological agents, these incapacitants can produce purely temporary effects without permanent damage. In this respect they more nearly resemble the riot-control gases or some biological agents which are deliberately not killers. But in another respect, they are quite different. They act swiftly, and their arrival may not be heralded by any human senses except as to the effects realized.

The discussion of incapacitating agents brings us back to the use of gas by the South Vietnamese. The gas used there is described as a form of tear gas or nauseating gas used to incapacitate the victims. The step from tear gas to the use of the most modern psychochemical incapacitating agent, on close analysis, is a short one. The steps to the other gases are short ones, too, and not within our control, once the weapons have been used.

It must be remembered that nonlethal gases were used by both the French and Germans in World War I. With the precedent of the use of such gases established, it was not long before the lethal gases were employed with such long-lasting and anguished effects.

The use of gas in Vietnam is of grave concern to me, particularly in the light of a recent statement by our Ambassador to Vietnam, Maxwell D. Taylor. General Taylor, in a speech to the Saigon Lions Club on March 22, 1965, is quoted with reference to American employment of weapons in the area in an AP dispatch in the Washington Post, Tuesday, March 23, as follows:

What has been done thus far is public knowledge. What will be done in the future is something for Hanoi to worry about.

The significance of this statement, it seems to me, is not only that it portends a willingness on our part to use weapons and tactics which may or may not embrace the CBR arsenal—and I trust and hope it does not—but it also makes quite clear that these steps will be taken in secret, on the premise that these measures have been given the silent assent of the American people. This entire situation also emphasizes the risks involved in allowing our military commanders to take actions which may effect changes in policy. Of course, when we rely heavily on military action, this is one of the ever-present dangers that must be guarded against.

I feel the time has come to let the President know how we feel about these and other steps taken in the name of national necessity. I can recall the fate

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of another great nation which accepted the morally repulsive as a national necessity.

I personally feel there is time to take the action necessary to reaffirm our commitment to the traditional standards governing the conduct of war.

From all reports I have seen, including Secretary McNamara's statement describing the agents used, the decision to provide gas to the South Vietnamese for use in combat was made by our military commanders in Vietnam without consultation with the Defense Department, the State Department or the President. I believe an investigation is needed to determine how our military commanders are able to violate what is established national policy of long standing. I and several other Members of Congress have addressed a letter to the President containing a request for such an investigation. We have also called upon him to restore exclusive control and direction over the use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons to the Presidency and, in the light of prior Executive pronouncements of policy against our first use of such weapons, to provide the world with a statement of this administration's policy in this area.

In this way what clearly appears to be a unilateral violation of our policy of no-first-use can be rejected as a violation of policy rather than accepted as a reversal of policy. In this way our national prestige and moral standing can be maintained.

The **SPEAKER** pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. RYAN] is recognized for 15 minutes.

[Mr. RYAN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. KASTENMEIER, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. RYAN, for 15 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.

Mr. FEIGHAN, for 15 minutes, on tomorrow; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks, was granted to:

Mr. ASPINALL and to include pertinent extraneous material.

Mr. TODD and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. DULSKI and to include an editorial.

Mr. GRAY in two instances.

Mr. FINO.

Mr. CORBETT in two instances.

Mr. PHILBIN in eight instances and to include extraneous material.

Mr. FLYNT to revise and extend remarks to be made by him in Committee of the Whole today and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. LINDSAY during general debate on H.R. 2362.

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon and to include extraneous matter in the remarks she made earlier today.

Mr. GOODELL and to include extraneous matter at the conclusion of the debate in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. VIVIAN and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. CLEVELAND) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. MORSE in two instances.

Mr. AYRES.

Mr. SAYLOR.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN in six instances.

Mr. REID of New York.

Mr. ADAIR.

Mr. GROSS.

Mr. FINDLEY.

Mr. BRAY in two instances.

Mr. BROOMFIELD in three instances.

Mr. MACGREGOR.

Mr. HORTON.

Mr. COLLIER in two instances.

Mr. HELSTOSKI (at the request of Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD) to extend his remarks during debate on H.R. 2362.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. MULTER in three instances.

Mr. TODD in two instances.

Mr. DINGELL in two instances.

Mr. DELANEY.

Mr. FRASER.

Mr. POWELL in three instances.

Mr. HÉBERT.

Mr. DANIELS.

Mr. BANDSTRA.

Mr. HANLEY in two instances.

Mr. JOELSON in two instances.

Mr. PATTEN in two instances.

Mr. RYAN in two instances.

Mr. MCVICKER in two instances.

Mr. BRADEMAS in six instances.

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. MACHEN in six instances.

Mr. HELSTOSKI.

Mr. CALLAN in two instances.

Mr. COHELAN in three instances.

Mr. PURCELL in two instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of California in two instances.

Mr. PICKLE.

Mr. DULSKI.

Mr. PUCINSKI in six instances.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 46 minutes p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, March 26, 1965, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

801. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report on the audits of Government Services, Inc., and its employee retirement and benefit trust fund and supplemental pension plan for the year ended December 31, 1964; to the Committee on Government Operations.

802. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of unnecessary costs incurred for commercial protective service used for shipments of classified material, Department of the Army; to the Committee on Government Operations.

803. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a review of financial condition and operations, for fiscal years 1962 and 1963, U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico; to the Committee on Government Operations.

804. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of unnecessary costs incurred in the relocation of highways at the Amistad Dam project, U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico; to the Committee on Government Operations.

805. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of unnecessary costs resulting from inadequacies in the administration of the Inter-American highway program in the Republic of Panama, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce; to the Committee on Government Operations.

806. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of weaknesses in negotiation and administration of contracts for resettlement of Cuban refugees, Welfare Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; to the Committee on Government Operations.

807. A letter from the Archivist of the United States, General Services Administration, transmitting a report of records proposed for disposal pursuant to 63 Stat. 377; to the Committee on House Administration.

808. A letter from the president and national director, Boys' Club of America, transmitting an audited financial report of the club for calendar year 1964, pursuant to Public Law 84-986; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

809. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting a copy of the annual report of the Maritime Administration for fiscal year 1964; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

810. A letter from the Administrator, Small Business Administration, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled "A bill to amend the Small Business Act to authorize issuance and sale of participation interests based on certain pools of loans held by the Small Business Administration, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

811. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a report of the Governor of Guam for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1964, pursuant to section 6(b) of the Organic Act of Guam; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. DENTON: Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 6767. A bill making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 205). Referred

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There is, of course, no indoor plumbing. Until 2 weeks ago, she was able to draw water for cooking and washing from a well on her property.

But the pump broke and she can't afford to have it repaired.

Mrs. Moshokit said that her nearest neighbors refuse to allow her to use their well unless she pays \$1 per bucket of water. Her monthly income is \$58 from social security benefits.

She requires only one bucket of water a day. But the nearest neighbor who will let her have the water free of charge lives one-quarter of a mile away.

This can be an agonizing journey in the winter.

Several times last month, Mrs. Moshokit said, it was so cold inside her house that water she had stored overnight froze into ice by morning.

She doesn't own an automobile, and this adds to her hardship. There is no public transportation in Menominee County.

The closest store is 2 miles from her house. Unless she is willing to pay someone to drive her, she must hike to the store.

Several times a month, Father Marcellus Cabo, pastor of St. Anthony's Catholic Church in Neopit, stops by and serves as chauffeur.

The priest transports her to Keshena, 12 miles distant, to pick up her skimpy allotment of commodities from the food surplus depot.

"The hardest thing, though, is chopping the wood," she said. "After I chop the wood, I'm no good for the rest of the day."

The \$56 a week that Edward Kauquatosh, 41, earns as a laborer in the Menominee lumber mill doesn't stretch very far. It has to support his wife, Mary, 45, and their 10 children, ages 8 and 18.

"Last week," he said, "I had to spend my whole paycheck on shoes for the kids."

Edward doesn't smoke or drink. He can't afford such pleasures.

The family's diet mainly revolves around their food surplus allotments. Fresh meat on the table is rare.

The Kauquatoshes usually have to pay a neighbor \$5 to drive them to Keshena to pick up their monthly food rations.

Their home is 2 miles from the lumber mill. To save money, Edward eats lunch at home. This means he has to walk to and from work four times a day.

The medium-size farmhouse in which Laura Wayka and Harriet Waukau live is bursting with humanity. It is home to 22 people.

The girls, sisters, each with three children, are supported by welfare aid.

The house, owned by their parents, is occupied by their grandfather, brothers and sisters, and acres of assorted children.

The youngest member of the clan is Laura's 1-month-old baby. The oldest is their 75-year-old grandfather.

The sour fragrance of cabbage and unwashed diapers permeates the house.

Laura, 23, was abandoned by her husband. She has no idea where he is.

Harriet, 24, divorced her husband.

The women tried living by themselves for awhile, but soon learned that their anemic welfare checks made such an arrangement practically impossible.

Because the family owns no car, they rarely go out. There are no movie theaters or any type of commercial entertainment in Menominee County. (There aren't even any doctors in the county.)

Entertainment consists of watching, in staggered shifts, the one television set.

William La Rock, Jr., 30, and his wife, Mary, 32, live with their three small children (ages 3, 2, and 1) in a shabby two-room shack which contains running insects instead of running water.

Each day La Rock drives to a small stream 3 miles from his house to fill a bucket

with water. Often there are others at the stream with similar purposes.

La Rock was laid off from his job at the lumbermill last year and has been on welfare since. He occasionally works part time with the highway department.

The La Rocks said they were planning to leave Menominee this fall and move to Milwaukee.

"This is my home and I'll always love it, but there's nothing here for me anymore," he said. "At least I'll be able to find work in Milwaukee."

La Rock said that in the last year, 15 of his relatives moved to other cities in the Midwest.

More and more, the young Indians of Menominee County are leaving the land of their ancestors in order to survive.

BELOIT DAILY NEWS PRAISES SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF AMERICAN COLLEGE STUDENTS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Beloit Daily News, which is an outstanding Wisconsin newspaper, has commented on the sense of responsibility of the Nation's students. In view of all the criticism that has been leveled at the students of the Nation, this kind of thoughtful and objective praise by a highly respected newspaper should be called to the Nation's attention. It reads:

GOOD WORD FOR STUDENTS

Much is being said and written about young people going to the dogs in a handbasket, especially on college campuses. Perhaps college presidents are in the best position to know how college students are behaving, and one of them thinks he detects "an increasing maturity in the Nation's students." He is Vernon R. Alden, president of Ohio University at Athens.

"Today's students," he says, "regard college not as a haven from responsibility but as a training ground for citizenship. They see themselves as the conscience of the Nation; they are supplying the energy for needed social change."

One thing is certain, stresses Alden: More students are going into teaching, social work and politics, fewer into business. The reason is that they can live comfortably in almost any career they choose. Satisfaction, then, not money, becomes the deciding factor.

"As I look at today's students," says Alden, "I am deeply moved by their maturity. It is fortunate that they are accepting responsibility at such an early age, for already the torch of leadership is being passed to them."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield to me, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM—THOUGHTFUL COMMENTS BY STUDENTS OF THE HISTORY CLASS OF CUSTER COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL IN MILES CITY, MONT., AND REPLY BY SENATOR MANSFIELD

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the members of Mr. Gray's junior year American history class in Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont., have written me recently to present their views on the situation in Vietnam and to ask me to state mine. These young men and women and their teacher, Mr. Gray, are to be commended for encouraging serious discussion and analysis of this issue.

Their thoughtful comments in these letters give reassuring evidence that as the years go by Montana and the United States will continue to be blessed with an informed and responsible citizenry.

My reply to their request may be of some interest to others, and I therefore read it, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER,
Washington, D.C., March 10, 1965.

DEAR _____: I have received your letter and a number of other letters from your classmates concerning Vietnam. You express your views and you ask me to express mine on this very serious question.

First, I want to commend your teacher, Mr. Gray, for encouraging this discussion and I want to compliment you for participating in it in a most intelligent and mature way. I have gained a great deal in understanding from reading your letters.

Now let me state my views to you on Vietnam, as you requested.

The war in Vietnam is a war among Vietnamese but Americans are becoming more and more involved in the fighting. Scarcely a week goes by without a report of several American soldiers being killed or wounded. Each life is precious and each death a tragedy. But if we look at this situation fully, we will see that we are still not involved in the kind of conflict which we experienced in World War II or even in Korea. The casualties among Americans in those other conflicts would sometimes equal or surpass in 1 day what we have borne in Vietnam over the past several years.

In other words, the American involvement in the conflict in Vietnam is still far short of what it was in those other recent wars with which you are familiar, I am sure, from your class studies or the experiences of your own families.

Yet, the fighting in Vietnam could grow into another Korea or another world war. Some people say: "Well, why not? Let's go in and get it over with quickly." The answer is that that is not an answer at all. A war in Asia could last for many years, spread further and further and bring millions of casualties and cause widespread devastation and destruction. In my view, we owe it, not only to the rest of the world, but to our own people to do whatever can honorably be done to prevent that kind of tragedy and suffering.

But it is going to take two sides to prevent a larger war from developing out of Vietnam. And it is going to take two sides to bring to an end even the small war which is now in progress in Vietnam. If it is going to be an honorable end, it means that the people who live in South Vietnam have got to have reasonable security and a reasonable opportunity to decide what they want for themselves.

That is the reason why Americans were sent into Vietnam in the first place—to help the Vietnamese people. It is their country and it is still their war and I hope that it can be kept that way. I would not like to see the United States involved in Vietnam any longer than it takes to help bring about a just solution which secures the freedom of South Vietnam. I would want to see the fighting, not extended, but ended just as soon as possible on that basis.

That is the way the situation looks to me. Once again, I would like to compliment you and your classmates and your teacher for pursuing this discussion and to thank you for bringing me into it by your letters.

With best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

MIKE MANSFIELD.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at this point a list of the Custer County High School students who wrote letters to me on the situation in South Vietnam.

There being no objection, the list of students was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Jim Beardsley, Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont.

Linda Bergerson, Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont.

Jerianne Chezum, Box 119, Miles City, Mont.

Virginia Clendenen, 809 South Sewell, Miles City, Mont.

Susan Enghusen, Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont.

Bill Hildenbrand, 216 North Eighth, Miles City, Mont.

Laura Jan Huntzicker, 412 South Center, Miles City, Mont.

Robert J. Kelley, 908 Woodbury, Miles City, Mont.

Rick Kouba, Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont.

Pat Mackenzie, Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont.

Barbie Petersohn, 1910 North Jordan, Miles City, Mont.

Lynn Ronning, Custer County High School, Miles City, Mont.

Carol Shook, 713 South Cottage Grove Ave., Miles City, Mont.

Linda Sterling, Route 1, Box 274, Miles City, Mont.

Anita Strub, 811 Wells, Miles City, Mont.

Jack Whitten, 2115 Main, Miles City, Mont.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO ON THE COLORADO SALINITY PROBLEM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the friendly and sympathetic atmosphere which exists between the Republic of Mexico and the United States has helped to make it possible to work out a solution to another long-standing irritant in our relations. It has just been announced that an agreement between the two nations covering the Colorado salinity problem has been achieved. It follows a 1963 treaty on the El Chamizal and ranks with it as an outstanding example of a solution to a complex and long-standing international difficulty worked out by the processes of reason in a setting of mutual accommodation and mutual respect.

The water salinity problem on the Colorado River has caused considerable economic hardship to Mexican farmers who live near the border areas in the Mexicali Valley and who depend on the waters of the Colorado to irrigate their fields. And, of course, the utilization of the river is of immense importance in the agriculture and other activities of the Southwest region of our own Nation.

The new agreement is an equitable answer to the difficulty. It is expected to make sufficient fresh water available to both Mexicans and Americans living in the area served by the Colorado River.

Many months of hard work by Mexican and United States negotiators have gone into completing this settlement. The Governors of seven American States were consulted at every step of the negotiations and each gave their cooperation in making a solution possible. Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall, Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann, U.S. Ambassador Anthony Freeman, U.S. Border Commissioner Joseph Freidkin and his staff, Terrance G. Leonhardy and T. R. Martin of the Department of State, and Robert Sayre of the White

House staff, represented the United States in the protracted negotiations. The main burden of the Mexican point of view was carried by former Ambassador Antonio Carrillo Flores, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Commissioner David Herrera Jordan. All of these men labored long and hard in working out a compromise. They have made a great contribution in the spirit of good neighborliness embodied in the Charter of Punta del Este. The Mexican-United States parliamentary meetings of the past several years have also made a profound contribution to this achievement not only by increasing the mutual understanding of the problem of Colorado salinity through discussions among the legislators of both countries but also by developing a high degree of reciprocal sympathy with respect to the whole range of relations between Mexico and the United States. The work of the distinguished Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], who has headed the Senate group of the U.S. delegation, the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the ranking Republican in the U.S. Senate, the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the Chairman of the Latin American Affairs subcommittee, and all the others on the delegation has been outstanding in this connection.

Still other problems exist between Mexico and the United States but the augury for their friendly and mutually beneficial settlement is encouraging. Needless to say if a similar spirit of reasonable amicability characterized our relations all over the world, the goal of world peace would be furthered immeasurably.

I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "United States, Mexico Reach Pact on River Water," published in the New York Herald Tribune on March 23, 1965, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SALT IN THE COLORADO: UNITED STATES, MEXICO REACH PACT ON RIVER WATER

(By Barnard L. Collier, Latin-American correspondent)

WASHINGTON.—The United States and Mexico reached final agreement yesterday on the touchy problem posed by the claim that the United States was pouring crop-killing salt water into Mexico's part of the Colorado River.

In a White House statement yesterday, President Johnson announced that he had approved an agreement worked out by the International Boundary and Water Commission. It will allow Mexico to control the salinity of the water flowing into irrigation ditches in the Mexicali Valley.

The agreement provides for a U.S.-built extension of an existing drainage canal which will divert salt-laden water from a U.S. irrigation project east of Yuma, Ariz., away from the Mexican irrigation system when the Mexicans choose to do so.

"The agreement has been considered by the Governors of the Colorado River Basin States and by the chairmen of the appropriate congressional committees," said the President, "and all have agreed to it."

The diversion project is expected to cost the United States about \$5 million. If Congress speeds additional appropriations, the

project will be finished by next October—the period when the Colorado flows least and saltiest into Mexico.

Among the nearly 300,000 Mexicans in the rich Mexicali Valley just below the California border, the angry cry of "sal"—salt—has long signified anti-Yankeeism. In the last 5 years, Leftists and Communists rallied peasants and farmers to protest and riot.

The dispute dates to shortly after the 1944 treaty between the United States and Mexico, which guarantees Mexico at least 1.5 million acre feet of the Colorado River's water each year. (An acre-foot is the amount of water needed to cover 1 acre of land to the depth of 1 foot.)

That quantity, the negotiators knew, was sufficient for future irrigation purposes in the cotton-growing valley. But even then they realized the quality of the water would some day become a sticky issue.

The Colorado River water that flowed across the border into Mexico then contained approximately 900 parts of salt per million parts of water—a little more than is tasty, but usable nonetheless. Then more and more irrigation projects using the Colorado's water were started on the U.S. side.

The project that caused most of the trouble was the Wellton-Mohawk farm development near Yuma. There the irrigation waters from the Colorado turned desert into lush farmland. But the relatively pure water that made crops grow in Yuma area was drained back into the Colorado via the Gila River and crossed the border into Mexico laden with leached out salt.

On occasion, the Mexicans insisted, the water flowing back out of the Yuma area contained up to 20,000 parts of salt per million parts of water. (Sea water contains about 35,000 parts per million.) The Mexicans were furious.

The salt crisis finally brought a joint United States-Mexican communique in the early summer of 1962, in which President Kennedy and Mexico's President Adolfo Lopez Mateos promised to reach a permanent solution by October 1963.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation opened 12 fresh-water wells that pumped clear water into the Gila and diluted the Yuma waste water down to 4,000 parts of salt per million. By the time it mixed with the Colorado water again the salt level dropped to about 1,800 parts per million.

Still Mexico claimed that the wells alone were no permanent solution.

The Bureau of Reclamation, however, contended that the water going to Mexico was usable. If the Mexicans would lay tiles along their irrigation ditches, keeping much of the water from draining through salty soil and getting even saltier, the farms at the end of their irrigation network would have little to complain about, the Bureau said.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I should like to comment briefly on what has been said by the distinguished majority leader. One of the plus signs that we can put against our foreign relations these days—and we have had too few of them—is the relationship which now exists between the United States and the Republic of Mexico. At no time in history has the relationship between these two countries been more amicable and more understanding than it is today. That is because the officials of our executive branch of the Government and the representatives of our legislative branch of Government and their counterpart of the Mexican Government have been considerate and understanding in dealing with the problems which have confronted us.

March 25, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

5667

I submit today a plan for reorganization in the Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury.

At present the Bureau maintains 113 independent field offices, each reporting directly to Customs headquarters in Washington, D.C. Under a modernization program of which this reorganization plan is an integral part, the Secretary of the Treasury proposes to establish six regional offices to supervise all Customs field activities. The tightened management controls achieved from these improvements will make possible a net annual saving of \$9 million within a few years.

An essential feature will be the abolition of the offices of all Presidential appointees in the Customs Service. The program cannot be effectively carried out without this step.

The following offices, therefore, would be eliminated: collectors of customs, comptrollers of customs, surveyors of customs, and appraisers of merchandise, to which appointments are now required to be made by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Incumbents of abolished offices will be given consideration for suitable employment under the civil service laws in any positions in Customs for which they may be qualified.

When this reorganization is completed, all officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs will be appointed under the civil service laws.

All of the functions of the offices which will be abolished are presently vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 1950 which gives the Secretary power to redelegate these functions. He will exercise this power as the existing offices are abolished.

The estimate of savings that will be achieved by the program of Customs modernization and improvement, of which this reorganization plan is a part, is based on present enforcement levels, business volume, and salary scales. Of the amounts saved, approximately \$1 million a year will be from salaries no longer paid because of the abolition of offices.

The proposed new organizational framework looks to the establishment of new offices at both headquarters and field levels and abolition of present offices.

This results in a net reduction of more than 50 separate principal field offices by concentration of supervisory responsibilities in fewer officials in charge of regional and district activities. In addition to the 6 offices of regional commissioner, about 25 offices of district director will be established. The regional commissioners and district directors will assume the overall principal supervisory responsibilities and functions of collectors of customs, appraisers of merchandise, comptrollers of customs, laboratories, and supervising customs agents.

At the headquarters level, four new offices will be established to replace seven divisions. A new position of Special Assistant to the Commissioner will be created and charged with responsibility for insuring that all customs employees conduct themselves in strict compliance with

all applicable laws and regulations. Up to now this function has been one of a number lodged with an existing division.

After investigation I have found and hereby declare that each reorganization included in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965 is necessary to accomplish one or more of the purposes set forth in section 2(a) of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended.

It should be emphasized that abolition by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965 of the offices of collector of customs, comptroller of customs, surveyor of customs, and appraiser of merchandise will in no way prejudice any right of any person affected by the laws administered by the Bureau of Customs. The rights of importers and others, for example, before the customs court, arising out of the administration of such functions will remain unaffected. In addition it should be emphasized that all essential services to the importing, exporting, and traveling public will continue to be performed.

This reorganization plan will permit a needed modernization of the organization and procedure of the Bureau of Customs. It will permit a more effective administration of the customs laws.

I urge the Congress to permit Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965 to become effective.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 25, 1965.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. KUCHEL:

Transcript of interview of Senator DIRKSEN by Joseph F. McCaffery over WMAL-ABC-TV, February 7, 1965.

By Mr. METCALF:

Address entitled "The Liberal Spirit and the Liberal Task," delivered by Dr. John Kenneth Galbraith at the biennial convention of the National Farmers Union in Chicago.

By Mr. MUNDT:

Address delivered by Dr. James K. Pollock, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, before the Cleveland Welfare Federation on March 2, 1965, on the subject of public welfare and intergovernmental relations.

Address entitled "The Great Plains Wheat Organization," delivered by Andrew Brakke, chairman of the board of directors of Great Plains Wheat Organization, at Denver, Colo., on February 25, 1965.

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia:

Address of the future of the United States and what its citizens can do to influence it, delivered by Don L. Jordan to the Halifax County Chamber of Commerce, at South Boston, Va., on March 18, 1965.

Editorial tribute to Robert A. Taft, "The Missing Man," published in the Wall Street Journal of March 25, 1965.

Article entitled "Voting Rights Bill Constitutes a Revolution in American Law," written by David Lawrence.

By Mr. MCINTYRE:

Editorial on abandoned automobiles along the highways, published in the Concord (N.H.) Shoppers News for March 11, 1965.

By Mr. THURMOND:

Article entitled "Seriousness of Gold Situation Made Clear by Martin," written by Henry J. Taylor, and published in the Nashville Banner of March 12, 1965.

Article entitled "Johnson Arts Bill Lacks Limits," written by James J. Kilpatrick, and published in the Washington Evening Star of March 18, 1965.

By Mr. INOUYE:

Article entitled "Foreign Trade—Exporter To Use Trade Zone in 3-Way Transactions," published in Hawaii Business and Industry for March 1965.

Resolution in support of voting rights for all citizens, adopted by board of directors of Hawaii Education Association.

By Mr. SIMPSON:

Prize-winning essays on the Bill of Rights, by sixth-grade students of Cheyenne, Wyo.

THE USE OF GAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the use of even a nonlethal gas in South Vietnam is shocking. It cannot be justified—despite all the protestations of Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk—on moral or practical grounds.

Morally, the use of any gas rests on extremely tenuous ground. As the Geneva Protocol of 1925 pointed out, "the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases" has been "justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world."

The protocol made no distinction between lethal and nonlethal gases. Nor, for that matter, have we. During World War II—the most widespread and deadly war in history—and all of the Korean action we refrained from chemical warfare. Recently, there have been increasing reports of the use of chemical warfare by the Egyptians in Yemen. Will we now condone such actions on the basis of our own?

We cannot escape the consequences of our actions by legal sophistries. We may not have ratified the 1925 protocol, but we have effectively bound ourselves to its terms by our actions. There is no question but that the use of gas is wrong. More than that, it is just plain stupid.

The use of gas in South Vietnam has accomplished nothing, at a very great risk to our interests. This is scarcely a sound rule of conduct in international affairs.

The gas was used three times. Twice there were no Vietcong in the area. On the third occasion, a strong wind prevented the gas from being effective, and the "people were not very ill."

It is claimed that the gas is a humane weapon for use when the Vietcong have mingled with the civilian population and we cannot tell friend from foe. If we cannot tell before we use the gas, I fail to see how we can tell after the victims have recovered from its effects.

Moreover, I understand that we have even failed to provide effective protection to the South Vietnamese troops who use the gas. We have issued them gas masks designed for the bigger boned and larger stature American soldiers, and the loose fitting masks present a real hazard to the South Vietnamese.

Still another tragedy of the use of gas in Vietnam is the effect on our allies.

President Johnson has painstakingly put together a growing consensus of world opinion that he is right in resisting aggression. His policies have been receiving overwhelming support at home and increased understanding abroad.

Now that support has been placed in jeopardy. A constituent of mine sent me a telegram today which asks a very appropriate question: "Do we not take diplomatic soundings beforehand?" From what information I can gather, the answer is "No." Expressions of shock and outrage have come from around the world.

We have opened Pandora's box. We have begun an action which never should have started. Let us end the use of gas in South Vietnam now.

Mr. President, in yesterday's New York Times Mr. James Reston discussed the use of gas in Vietnam. I think everyone should read this article carefully and ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON: JUST A LITTLE OLD "BENEVOLENT INCAPACITATOR"

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, March 23.—The Pentagon's main argument for using nauseous gas in Vietnam is that it is better in some cases to gas the Communists than to maim or kill them. The officers here even have a wonderful phrase to describe the new instruments of chemical warfare: "benevolent incapacitators."

This, of course, was the defense for using poison gas in the First World War. It wasn't very benevolent and it often incapacitated a man for life, and it sent such a shudder through the world that even in so savage a conflict as the Second World War it wasn't used.

Secretary McNamara was careful to explain that he was not supplying poison gas to the South Vietnamese Army. He almost sounded as if he was doing the Communists a favor by treating them like rowdy race rioters in Rochester, but the thing is not quite as innocent as he made it sound.

WHAT NEXT?

The trouble with reverting to the use of any kind of gas in war is that it opens up so many other possibilities of chemical warfare. The use of gas on the battlefield has almost stopped in the last two generations, but the art of chemical warfare has not.

There is now a whole new arsenal of gases that not only nauseate, but stun and paralyze the enemy. The military correspondent of the Evening Star in Washington, Richard Fryklund, for example, recently reported on the latest and best—a gas called BZ by the U.S. Army.

He tells of recent tests of BZ at the Army's Chemical Warfare Proving Grounds at Dugway, Utah. Volunteer soldiers were submitted to the effects of BZ while they were executing simple battlefield operations.

"In one case," he reports, "a soldier on guard duty was gassed. He was approached by a strange soldier who said he did not know the password. The guard tried to remember what to do about it, couldn't, got tired of the whole problem and sat down and went to sleep. * * *

Secretary McNamara emphasized that the only gas that was used in Vietnam was the same as the gas than can be purchased at a store. But the same argument made for nauseous gas could also be made for BZ or even for some of the paralyzing gases. After all, it is more benevolent to paralyze a man than to kill him with a machinegun.

Where do you draw the line on the McNamara argument? And even if you draw it at nauseous gas, how do you know what gas the enemy will use after you start this devilish business?

The national policy on the use of all chemical weapons has been that the United States would consider using them only if the enemy used them, but the Pentagon's reaction to the criticism of using nauseous gas was merely to express surprise that anybody would be disturbed.

Nobody concerned has even claimed that the use of the gas was effective. The military spokesman in Saigon said it proved of little value on the three occasions it was used. In two cases, according to United Press International in Saigon, it was discovered that no Reds were in the area. In a third, a few Communists may have been "demoralized," but "there was a fair wind that day and the people were not very ill."

The main effect was merely to nauseate a lot of people all over the world with the thought that gas could be used merely on the authority of the South Vietnamese soldiers concerned.

One unfortunate aspect of the incident was that it occurred precisely at the moment when the United States was beginning to gain a little more understanding in the world for its policy in Vietnam.

Ever since the United States started bombing North Vietnam and dropping napalm firebombs on Communist targets, there has been a considerable outcry for negotiations to end the war. President Johnson has insisted from the start, as he told 42 State Governors at the White House this week, that he would go anywhere at any time if he thought he could serve the cause of peace, but that there was simply no evidence that the Communists were interested in negotiating a settlement in Vietnam.

This view is now being confirmed by the principal foreign offices of the world. The British Foreign Secretary underscored the point at the White House today. He told the President that the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, had said in London a few days ago that it was useless to talk about negotiations.

REBUFFED ON TALKS

The French, who have been the principal agitators for a negotiated settlement, now concede that their explorations in Peiping and Hanoi have been rebuffed, and the Canadians report that their official on the International Control Commission in Vietnam was not even given the opportunity to discuss negotiations with the North Vietnamese Communists.

Accordingly, the propaganda over Vietnam was beginning to turn a little to the American side, when the gas incident was disclosed, incapacitating our own propagandists, and not very benevolently either.

GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, today, March 25, 1965, marks the 144th observance of Greek Independence Day. Throughout history, the Greeks have been leaders in man's endless quest to secure for himself the blessings of liberty. It is to their courage and indomitable spirit that all those who value freedom pay tribute on this occasion.

Few people in history have had to undergo the hardships which the Greeks have endured for the sake of freedom. From the age of the city-state when they stood fast against the Persian invasions, through their 6-year long battle against Ottoman domination, the victorious outcome of which we observe today, until the present when Greece stands as a proud bulwark of democracy on the

very threshold of a nation dedicated to the eradication of popular government, their fight has been long and often bitter. But seldom in history has the noble cause of liberty had as determined an adherent.

The concept of democracy which lay at the foundation of the government at Athens more than 2,000 years ago has had a most profound effect on the development of Western political theory and practice. The Greeks' emphasis on the dignity and rights of the individual, and on the rule of law, are the most basic and important components of democratic governments today.

A year ago our feelings of joy on this occasion were saddened by the news of the death of King Paul. The loss of this man, so strongly committed to the lofty principles of his Greek heritage, was keenly felt. Today, however, more than a year after the reins of government passed into the capable hands of his son and successor, King Constantine, people of Greek ancestry have even more reason to take pride in their nation's history and accomplishments. Today Greece continues as living, positive proof of a people's dedication to democracy.

I have long valued the friendship and counsel of the large Greek community in Massachusetts. I also value my friendship and associations with the Greek Ambassador here in Washington, Mr. Alexander Matsas, who has served his country well.

To these friends, and to their Hellenic brothers throughout the world, I extend my sincere best wishes on this important anniversary.

RETIREMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS DILLON AS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I think this is an appropriate time to speak of the retiring Secretary of the Treasury, the Honorable Douglas Dillon. I should like to read from an editorial entitled "Changing Guard at Treasury," published in the Washington Post of March 20, 1965, in which the following statement is made about the retiring Secretary:

In embracing the modern theory of fiscal policy, in reforming the depreciation guidelines, in dealing vigorously and imaginatively with vexing balance-of-payments deficits, Douglas Dillon wrote a brilliant record at the Treasury. He was by far the best Treasury Secretary of the postwar period, and it is, indeed, doubtful whether he has a peer in this century.

The judgment expressed by the Washington Post is held by many in the Congress and the country, and I cannot add to it. In every post that Douglas Dillon has held, whether it has been Ambassador to France, Under Secretary of State in the administration of President Eisenhower, or Secretary of the Treasury, under President Kennedy and President Johnson, he has brought to all of these important positions unusual ability, courage, the sense of duty, a patriotic desire to serve his country, and an unflinching sense of humor. He is uniquely fitted for public service, and I have no doubt that in the future he will be called upon again to serve our country. He 30-

Mr. CARLSON. Yes; as the Senator has said, there will be a great debate all over the world. I have no doubt about it.

I had the privilege of serving as a delegate to the United Nations in the 19th session of the United Nations, which was the last session. I am somewhat familiar with the problem which the distinguished Senator from Vermont has mentioned. The problem of financing is a difficult one. While my service at the United Nations was most interesting, it was also frustrating. The problem of financing must be solved. It will be solved, as I see it, through the future actions of the Congress, particularly the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, of which the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is a member.

One of the privileges of serving on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is to sit next to the Senator from Vermont. There I have the privilege of enjoying his sound and constructive advice time and time again. He has again demonstrated to the Senate and to the country the problem which is confronting us in the United Nations.

Very frankly, as one who spent the entire month of December at the United Nations, to which we contribute \$29.3 million—32 percent of the cost of the United Nations aside from the special fund—I should like to say very frankly that we shall either have to increase that amount or we shall have to decide what the future of the United Nations shall be. In my opinion, the answer to that question will be determined in this very body. The groundwork has been laid this afternoon for weeks of discussion of that question. We should get at it.

I agree that we must have some international organization where nations can meet and discuss world problems. Such an organization is necessary in an age in which the world has shrunk so in size, both in communications and in transportation, so that it is important that we act. It is best that we get underway soon.

The proposal may not be the best way to handle the problem. But the determining factor will be the financing. I well remember the occasion on which the Senator discussed the \$100 million bond issue. Having served in the United Nations, I should like to say, if I remember correctly, that \$85 million of those bonds have been invested, used, and the funds carried into other countries.

Mr. AIKEN. We have put in approximately \$80 million.

Mr. CARLSON. \$80 million?

Mr. AIKEN. About that.

Mr. CARLSON. If I remember correctly, the indebtedness of the United Nations for peacekeeping operations is around \$154 million at the present time.

Mr. AIKEN. The amount is not insurmountable if we get at it now.

I have purposely refrained from saying today how I would do it. That is the business of the executive branch. The members of the executive branch have enough brains to do it. It remains to be seen whether they have enough wisdom and determination to do it.

But if those in authority desire a strong United Nations, we can have a

strong United Nations. If the great powers get together we can do so. I am inclined to think that that is entirely possible. Those of us who make the appropriations must decide whether we shall appropriate money to sustain a growing concern or whether we shall appropriate money to sustain a growing rathole.

Mr. CARLSON. And also whether we shall appropriate money to support an ineffective organization.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CARLSON. There has been some talk about sending the problem of Vietnam to the United Nations. What could the United Nations do in relation to that problem when they will not even pay for the peacekeeping operations in the Congo? In that respect it has been ineffectual.

Mr. AIKEN. My major reason for speaking as I have today is to put the United Nations in such shape that we can look hopefully toward a cessation of bloodshed in Asia and get away from the fear that some day, before too long, we might be engaged in total war.

I thoroughly agree with the Senator that this is the time when the United Nations will become a strong international agency or fall by the wayside.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Vermont will indulge me a moment before I start on my own address, I too would like to congratulate the Senator for a magnificently provocative address. I not only consider the Senator my senior in the Senate, but I honor and love him as a great American and a great friend. When he shows his eternal youth, as he did today, in so provocative a statement, it is a great joy to those like myself who are interested in these subjects. I should like, if I may, to clarify the point because I think I know the Senator's mind on this subject very well. It seems to me that what the Senator has said in effect is this: No matter what we do about the money, the important thing is the authority. In other words, the United Nations, having shown a certain capability through the General Assembly to do something about peacekeeping, is now denuded of a valuable authority because it handles its money business unwisely. This would be a great loss to the world, and even if we begin to recognize that article 19 is a nullity and, in reality, if we are to have money for peacekeeping operations it must be contributed voluntarily—even if we got to that point—preserving the authority of the General Assembly so it could authorize peacekeeping operations, even if financed voluntarily, is extremely valuable.

It seems to me that the Senator has separated the wheat from the chaff. It is the authority that we wish to preserve. We do not desire that to go down the drain because of the fact that the money equation has been badly handled.

Mr. AIKEN. As I said, I have some ideas, and, I know that the Senator from New York has some, as to what could be done. First, before it can be done, we must get away from obstinacy. If we wish to put the U.N. on the road as a going concern, I think we can do it.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am

grateful to the Senator from Vermont for his magnificent address today.

I ask unanimous consent that I may call for a quorum without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

~~THE USE OF RIOT GAS IN VIETNAM~~

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have in mind making a statement on Vietnam today. Before I address myself to that subject, I should like to say a word about the flurry over the use of so-called riot gas in Vietnam, which has dominated the news for the past few days.

It happens that on this particular subject I have a slight amount of expertness, because during World War II I served as an officer in the Chemical Warfare Service of the U.S. Army. I can attest to Senators that the gas used—and I have checked it—is a riot gas. It is not a lethal or asphyxiating or poison gas, as described in the Geneva convention, with which I had a great deal to do when I was in the Army, because I was Secretary of the Inter-Allied Committee on Chemical Warfare. So I can assure Senators that we are not involved in any undertaking which concerns the use of gas as described in the Geneva convention, even though we are not a party to that convention.

Second, the type of gas being used has been used in emergencies for many years in riot situations and, therefore, it is not a new or unusual preparation for this situation.

It may be that our officials all the way down the line, including those who did not inform the President, should have foreseen the propaganda outcries and should have avoided the use of this gas or not allowed others to have it for use. This would have been much wiser in the interests of our Nation, a more sound decision, and stronger evidence of responsibility.

But I do not see that this incident is more than a flurry. I hope we shall not be diverted from the main point by the commotion which is taking place and which is especially being boomed by Communist propagandists. I am quite confident that the gas clouds will shortly blow away. We should put the issue in focus and not allow it to divert us from the basic Vietnamese situation, which is so critical, and to which I shall now address myself.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, in order to incorporate in a definitive way my views on the subject of the war in Viet-

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nam, I submit a concurrent resolution and ask that it be received and referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 29) was received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

S. CON. RES. 29

Whereas the Congress by joint resolution approved August 10, 1964, declared that it "approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" and further declared that "the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom," and the President has exercised authority under such joint resolution; and

Whereas the Communist regime in North Vietnam continues its deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is continuing to assist the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way; and

Whereas questions have been raised at home and abroad as to the willingness of the United States to join in negotiations for an end to hostilities in Vietnam: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress (1) that the United States is determined to assist in ending aggression against South Vietnam by the Communist regime in North Vietnam; and the Congress approves and supports the actions of the President, including the use of the Armed Forces, in the defense of the territorial integrity and political independence of South Vietnam, as being in the national interest; (2) that the objectives of the United States are to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace, tranquility, and security in South Vietnam; and to assist South Vietnam in obtaining a full opportunity for self-determination, religious freedom, economic and social progress, the establishment and strengthening of free institutions, and the enjoyment of friendly relations with its neighbors; and (3) that the United States is ready, whenever there is any willingness by the other appropriate parties to do so, to undertake honorable negotiation to attain these objectives.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be listed as a cosponsor of the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, for many weeks now, along with other Senators, I have backed the President in the use of airpower against North Vietnam, while at the same time requesting that the President advance the general principles on which we are willing to negotiate for a cease-fire and peace in Vietnam. As a logical sequel to the resolution adopted August 10, 1964, to reflect subsequent events and a new phase of the situation following the attack on

U.S. ships in the Bay of Tonkin, and to express what I believe should be our policy in South Vietnam, I have today submitted a concurrent resolution concerning this issue.

I should like to read the operative part of it:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress (1) that the United States is determined to assist in ending aggression against South Vietnam by the Communist regime in North Vietnam; and the Congress approves and supports the actions of the President, including the use of the Armed Forces, in the defense of the territorial integrity and political independence of South Vietnam, as being in the national interest; (2) that the objectives of the United States are to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace, tranquility, and security in South Vietnam; and to assist South Vietnam in obtaining a full opportunity for self-determination, religious freedom, economic and social progress, the establishment and strengthening of free institutions, and the enjoyment of friendly relations with its neighbors; and (3) that the United States is ready, whenever there is any willingness by the other appropriate parties to do so, to undertake honorable negotiation to attain these objectives.

Mr. President, the concurrent resolution first confirms our determination to continue to help South Vietnam put an end to aggression from the North. In this, there must be no doubt that the Congress is behind the President.

Next, the concurrent resolution approves and supports the President's actions to date in defending the territorial integrity and political independence of South Vietnam.

Third, the concurrent resolution expresses our desire to restore peace.

Fourth, it states our interest in the self-determination of South Vietnam as well as in its religious freedom, economic and social progress, free institutions, and friendly international relations.

Finally, and most importantly, the concurrent resolution asserts our willingness to enter into honorable negotiations.

It in no way alters or supersedes the joint resolution of August 10, 1964; it is in the nature of a needed supplement to it. It is a supplement because if an honorable peace is not obtainable by negotiations—and let our fellow countrymen know this well—if an honorable peace is not obtainable by negotiation, the United States is committed to continue in the struggle with all that this implies. I say this with the greatest responsibility as a Senator of the United States who represents nearly 18 million people. We cannot pull out as we stand now. We can only honorably perform our commitments, unless the ground is washed out from under us and it becomes absolutely clear that there is no will to resist in South Vietnam.

My added purpose in submitting the concurrent resolution stems from an acute awareness of a grave danger that we face in our efforts to contain Communist expansion in southeast Asia, a danger that is too seldom mentioned, perhaps because it is the one that should most readily be dealt with.

I speak of the danger caused by an erosion of support among the American people themselves for the effort in South Vietnam which is so essential to our national interest, to freedom, and to peace.

One gage of the gravity of this danger is congressional mail, and a recent survey by U.S. News & World Report among the Senators of both parties and all political colorations shows this mail running heavily against our military action in Vietnam. For months, though it may sound extreme, my own mail has been running in some weeks as high as 50 to 1 against our Vietnam operation, and contacts with other sources of constituent opinion bear out the fact that much misunderstanding exists on this issue.

One factor which contributes to misunderstanding is the lack of authoritative information concerning the will of the South Vietnamese people. More and more, in recent weeks, the desire of the South Vietnamese to carry on the struggle and continue to receive our assistance has been questioned.

How can we find out what the South Vietnamese people really want? I certainly am not suggesting a Gallup poll in South Vietnam. I am suggesting an examination of all the evidence available, including evidence from areas under Government control, areas under Vietcong control, performance of the South Vietnam forces, ability or inability of the Vietcong to carry on their activities with the aid or consent of the people, the demonstrated ability or inability of nonregular, so-called militia forces to defend villages and hamlets against Vietcong attack, reports of U.S. forces in the field, and reports of correspondents and others who have traveled in the countryside and been able to observe the people and communicate with them.

I am sure the President has access to more facts and more reliable information than the rest of us, and can, therefore, come to a more considered and more accurate conclusion. I am also sure that the American people would like to hear that conclusion and the reasons for it. They would take his word for it, but they want to hear it from him.

If the President concludes that a majority of the people are determined to resist and want our help—as I assume is implicit in the continuance of our presence there—the announcement of this conclusion and the evidence on which it is based would serve to gain further support for our policy.

But the principal cause of the danger of loss of support for our policy is that many Americans are worried and confused over our aims and our plans in South Vietnam. In short, they need reassurance that we do, in fact, have an attainable goal and are taking all proper measures to attain it.

This danger of erosion of American support can be met, in my judgment, if the President deals with this question: Since our aim is not unconditional surrender, what are the general principles on which we are willing to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnamese situation?

The President, in his press conference last Saturday, again restated the will of

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the United States to assist the South Vietnamese people in fighting aggression from Communist North Vietnam and to do all necessary to stop this aggression. He has the support of Congress—and he certainly has my support—for the actions taken so far to make good this commitment, including the air attacks against military targets in North Vietnam. But we all know that the retaliatory use of airpower alone is not a policy in a complex political and social, as well as military, situation. It is only a means to an end, and the more the people and the world know about that end, the greater the likelihood of attaining it.

It is clear that the political problems of the south will not be resolved only by military pressure on the north. It is also clear that we are not engaged in South Vietnam for an "unconditional surrender," which, as everyone knows, would be impossible at this time. And let us remember that historically we have made declarations to deal with this implication in World War I and II and Korea. The declarations at the time of World War I were contained in President Wilson's famous 14 points. In World War II, there were declarations of intent by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. In the Korean war, the general principles involved in achieving a settlement were declared. In my view, the general principles for honorable negotiations—and I state these specifically because we must get down to cases so that the American people are assured that we have an attainable objective in taking the tremendous risk which we are taking in South Vietnam—should include:

First. A cease-fire halting both the fighting in South Vietnam and the air strikes against North Vietnam.

Second. Establishment of an International Commission on Vietnam to supervise the cease-fire, a prohibition against infiltration of arms or insurgent personnel into South Vietnam or any compromise of the territorial or administrative integrity either of North or South Vietnam, withdrawal of North Vietnamese military and paramilitary personnel from South Vietnam with implementation guaranteed by a peacekeeping force of the International Commission or a composite force of the type utilized in the settlement in Korea, and withdrawal of such United States and allied forces as will suit the type of settlement arrived at.

Third. Establishment of a government in South Vietnam with free institutions, perhaps guaranteed by the United Nations or otherwise internationally guaranteed, and with provisions for implementing a program of social and economic reform, which is crucial to the peace and prosperity of South Vietnam.

Fourth. Normalization of trade and other economic relations between North and South Vietnam.

I point out with respect to this fourth point that South Vietnam is the traditional granary for North Vietnam and that there is a tremendous potential in the economic development of the Mekong Delta. What could be done by interna-

tional financing of the Mekong project could be of enormous value to both parts of Vietnam.

Of course, the give and take of real negotiations would temper any plan of this kind—elements would be added, subtracted, and modified. Nor do I assert that this is the only—or even the best—settlement plan. I put it forth merely as the kind of result which might be sought by negotiation.

The purpose of the concurrent resolution is to show our willingness to undertake negotiations. But it takes two to negotiate, and one side may have to be convinced by the firmness and determination of the other that the bargaining table is the best solution. This is why I, and other Senators, backed the firmness and determination manifested by the United States in recent weeks in our positive response to North Vietnamese belligerency. Coupled with this response, however, must be an indication that we are ready to negotiate.

There are dangers in such a course as there are dangers in every course. The world is not a safe and easy place, and we cannot act at all if we are unwilling to act boldly and wisely, with ultimate faith in our own strength and purpose.

The Korean settlement reached with the Communists after 2 long years of negotiation at Panmunjom was not, as was true of Laos—though we took a risk in both cases—a settlement we made only to have our hopes dashed.

A settlement in South Vietnam is, in itself, not contrary to our interests so long as it is not just the first step toward a Communist state. We have not had total success with such solutions, but we have not had total failure either.

Such a plan may contain disadvantages quickly evident to those who possess information not available to all, not the least of which may be that it is just not feasible. But it is not enough to respond to aggression, although that is required. It is not enough to express our determination to prevent the Communists from taking over South Vietnam, although that is our goal. We must also determine what kind of negotiated settlement we are prepared to consider and, without necessarily supplying the details, state its general principles to the world and, most important of all, to the American people.

I close as I began, on the proposition that the greatest danger which faces us with respect to our policy, is a dangerous erosion of the support of the American people because they are unclear as to our objectives and how our policy should be working to attain them. I believe—and I have suggested the way in which this can be done—that if we state our objectives, and they are limited and reasonable objectives, this will consolidate the American people behind the efforts of our Government, which I am convinced are right.

Certain historic confrontations have taken place in the recent history of our country. There was one in Berlin. There was one in Cuba. Today there is one in Vietnam. Each of these was tremendously portentous, containing the

potential of a great world conflagration which, nonetheless, must be risked in the interest of freedom.

If we are running great risks—and they are great indeed—the least we can do is solidify the support of our own people, and of the people of the world, by outlining limited objectives and sticking to them, even if we do not have complete and final success. Certainly we should stick to them as the basis of a settlement which we all know must be made to bring to a conclusion the trying situation in Vietnam.

I hope that these ideas will be considered by the administration and that we may soon clarify the issue and the development of our policy.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, is the Senator preparing ready to make a speech?

Mr. COOPER. I am.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator withdraw his request?
Mr. COOPER. Yes.

WILLIAM C. FEAZEL

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Louisiana, with the understanding that in doing so I shall not lose my right to the floor. I should also like to state that I intend to make a statement today on South Vietnam. It is not a long one. However, I have already yielded to many Senators, and I know that the Senator from Louisiana must make his claim, so I am glad to yield to him; but then I wish to make my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONROYA in the chair). The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I am grateful to the Senator from Kentucky for yielding to me at this time.

Last week, Louisiana lost one of its truly great citizens. I refer to my predecessor in this body, the Honorable William C. Feazel.

My admiration for Bill Feazel has been such that his picture has hung alongside my desk from the day I took the oath of office in 1948. Bill Feazel was of humble birth in Union Parish in North Louisiana. He knew what it was to want for the necessities of life. Yet he came up the hard way to become a member of the State legislature and an extremely successful businessman in the oil and gas industry. The thing that so much impressed me about Bill Feazel was that his successes in life never turned his head and his heart never ceased to beat in sympathy and understanding for those less fortunate than he.

Senator Feazel possessed a lifetime interest in State and national affairs. It seemed to many of us that he felt he could render a greater contribution to his fellow man by spending his money

supporting people whom he deemed worthy of public office than in almost any other way. He was a lifelong Democrat and he supported people whom he believed to be sincere in serving the interest of all the people, regardless of the cost to him personally.

I recall early in the year 1948 that Bill Feazel had been the principal financial backed of my uncle, the late Gov. Earl K. Long. His contribution during his campaign ran into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. At that time, he assured persons interested in the oil and gas business that Earl Long would be fair to the oil and gas industry.

When Earl Long became Governor of Louisiana, he was confronted with promises he had made which would require an increase in State taxes of a figure that exceeded \$60 million annually, to pay the cost of welfare payments to the aged, a veterans' bonus, free school lunches, and a major pay raise for all school teachers. Several of us advised the then Governor that it would be virtually impossible to finance such a program without an extremely heavy increase in taxes on the oil and gas industry, which accounted for about 40 percent of the industrial activity of Louisiana.

On that occasion, a number of outstanding representatives of the oil industry went to Bill Feazel, pointing out that the Governor's program would virtually treble the taxes they were paying. They contended that this constituted a breach of faith, particularly insofar as Bill Feazel was concerned. It was pointed out to him that the increase in taxes would cost him several millions of dollars. On that occasion, Bill Feazel told those good men that the new Governor should never have made such promises if he had not intended to keep them. He said that if the Governor thought it was necessary to levy such heavy taxes on the oil industry in order to keep his promises, he was prepared to pay his share of it. That is exactly what happened.

It was my privilege to enjoy the friendship and support of Bill Feazel throughout my entire political career. He had a great deal number of friends whom he had also favored with his friendship and loyalty. It was my experience that he never let any of them down. Nor did he ever turn his back on any friend, no matter what humiliation or misfortune they might have suffered. No man that I have met in my lifetime so consistently urged me to do what my conscience told me was right about public affairs, regardless of the consequences it might entail.

Bill Feazel is mourned by his widow, Cynthia Day Feazel, his loyal and devoted helpmate throughout life, and his two daughters, Lallage Feazel and Gertrude Feazel Anderson. He leaves behind him two fine grandsons, Hank Anderson and Bill Anderson, whom we hope to see continue in the tradition of their grandfather. To all the members of his family we extend our deepest sympathy.

In our moment of sadness in the loss of a dear friend and a good public servant, it is comforting for those of us who believe in the Almighty, to know that there is a reward beyond this place of

toil where the good deeds of men like Bill Feazel are not overlooked.

FF Cooper
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the situation in Vietnam and to make one chief point: That the President make it clear to the people of the United States, and to the nations of the world, that the United States is willing to determine through negotiations if a peaceful, just, and honorable settlement of the war in Vietnam is possible.

Let me emphasize the single point that I desire to make. It is that the President make it clear again that the United States is willing to enter into negotiations. I am sure that this is the President's intention, but I believe that many people in this country, many of our allies, and many other nations, are not certain.

I give my reasons for believing this to be true. I believe that our Government is prescribing conditions as a prerequisite to negotiations which will not be accepted.

The Communist Chinese and the North Vietnamese have announced as a condition of negotiation that the United States must withdraw from South Vietnam. This is a condition which the President rightfully says cannot, and will not be accepted. But our Government has imposed its own condition—that it is not prepared to enter into negotiations until the intervention and aggression of North Vietnam ceases. This is the object of our presence in Vietnam, but I think it unlikely that the Communists will agree to this condition for negotiations, as we will not agree to their condition that the United States withdraw. It is a kind of demand from both sides for unconditional surrender. I believe it more reasonable to say that we are prepared to enter into true negotiations, for in the course of negotiation, the United States could marshal its arguments and influence against the intervention of the Communists, and seek a settlement consistent with our objectives in South Vietnam.

We will remember that in Korea, and in Vietnam in 1954 and 1955, no such conditions were imposed by either side prior to negotiations, but a cease-fire was sought; then through negotiations, the effort was made to attain the objectives that we still seek today. We can never accept the conditions now imposed by the Communists, and it is reasonable to say that they will not accept ours. The result is that as long as both hold to these

conditions, there is little chance of negotiation.

There is no evidence that the Communists are willing to negotiate at all, or that they will agree to any settlement which would end their support of the so-called "war of national liberation" which they have initiated. The support of wars of national liberation has become a declared policy of the Communist world. Nevertheless, I make my proposal for a clearer statement of the willingness of the United States to negotiate, for two reasons.

First, it is my view that the strong action taken by the President of the United States has given notice to the Communists that we do not intend to be driven out, which I doubt can be made clearer. If our bombing is accelerated, it could reach a point where the resistance and intransigence of the Communists will be hardened, and the intervention of the Communist Chinese and Russia made more likely. And I must say that the use of harmless gas, while it could be justified in defense of our ultimate security, is wrong in the present situation, and is more likely to harden the position of the Communists.

My second reason for urging a clearer United States position with regard to negotiation is that it is the tradition of the United States, and one consonant with our system of government, that we take every reasonable step to reach a peaceful settlement without resort to war. We do differentiate our system of government from that of Communist China, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries in our willingness to make this effort.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it is constantly interesting and exciting to me that at times men's minds "zero in" in the same way. I did not in any way consult with the Senator from Kentucky. I did not know that he would speak today on the subject of Vietnam.

Mr. COOPER. I have had the same feeling about the Senator's statesmanlike speech. I did not know that he would speak today on this subject.

Mr. JAVITS. It gives one almost a creepy feeling to read words which express essentially the basic idea that there is something lacking; namely, our declaration that we are truly ready to negotiate—not on grounds of unconditional surrender, not on the basis of "You get out, or we will not get out; but let us stay where we are, and negotiate"—truly ready to negotiate.

I am grateful to the Senator from Kentucky. It is typical of the extraordinary qualities that he brings to the Senate.

It is interesting to know that men who are charged with this great responsibility, as we are, should come to the same conclusion; and this is an extraordinary example of it.

Mr. COOPER. I appreciate the generous remarks of the Senator from New York. It is rather interesting to note that without any consultation we are expressing similar ideas. I am very grateful to the Senator.

I do not know that there is any substance to the statements that are heard, that we intend to accelerate our action in North Vietnam.

At times there are rumors also, of the old theory of preventive war. Knowing the President as a man of peace and honor, I say categorically that it is not his theory or purpose. But there may be some who hold to this theory. I do not believe it is consistent with the tradition of our country, or with our system of free government.

When I speak of a clearer statement of willingness to negotiate, I hope that our country will make it clear that we are willing to accept the offices of the Geneva Conference, of the United Nations, or perhaps a "community" of concerned nations, of which the Prime Minister of Canada, the Honorable Lester B. Pearson, spoke in New York City, on March 5, 1965.

I believe that Mr. Pearson's suggestion, that a community of responsible and concerned nations might be organized to participate in a settlement, and to police it, is worthy of the most serious consideration. I quote from his speech:

We need cool heads to assess the meaning of the struggle in southeast Asia. We need hard reason to guide our reactions and decisions. We should not permit either anger or anxiety to sway our judgment.

The first principle is surely that mankind can no longer afford war in the atomic age. This statement might seem a truism were it not for the fact that some Communist governments make an explicit reservation—that so-called "wars of national liberation" are exceptions and must be tolerated by human society as a permissible form of state action.

We have to scotch this dangerous illusion. Assistance given across frontiers in support of local revolts is as great a violation of basic rights of nations and basic concepts of international law as invasion by any other means. Every form of outside interference by force is aggression. Unchecked, it will lead by escalation to general war. Today, we cannot afford any "permissible" kinds of international violence. All must be outlawed.

Mr. President, this is very significant, because it indicates the support of Canada for our basic aims in southeast Asia. I quote further from Mr. Pearson's address:

As I see it, the struggle in southeast Asia today is basically an attempt to establish the principle that armed assistance from outside to "wars of national liberation" constitutes aggression and must be checked.

How to do this is the concern of the whole international community. It follows, therefore, that the whole community has a responsibility to see that such situations are brought under control. If a single power has to undertake this task, there arises the danger of widening the struggle into general war. So the nations of the world must be ready to produce an alternative.

Such an alternative could lie in the international community itself taking over the responsibility of sealing off frontiers against guerrilla infiltration and massively and effectively—and I mean effectively—policing and enforcing international agreements that aim to check and control local hostilities. If the Geneva Agreements of 1954 had provided for supervision and policing and enforcement in this way, the infiltration of Laos and South Vietnam from the outside could have been checked in time.

Today, therefore, the aim of the international community must be to secure condi-

tions in southeast Asia in which, under international control and international supervision and effective international policing, states in that area can work out their own affairs and conduct their own policies without interference from any neighbor or any outside power.

If out of the present awful risk of escalation, we can move to such an international settlement, then the United States can be spared the onerous and ungrateful task of acting alone against aggression, and the world will have taken one more step toward effective and impartial organization of international peace.

If diplomatic negotiations could be held on the basis I have just outlined, then resumption of the Geneva Conference of 1954 would be well worthwhile.

We must seize this opportunity, from the danger we face, before it is too late.

I am sure that we could consider seriously the suggestion of the Government of Canada, a good friend, and one which supports our basic purposes in southeast Asia.

Only a few weeks ago, February 13, the Canadian delegation of the International Control Commission in Vietnam, filed a dissenting statement to the majority report of the Commission. Stating explicitly that recent events, including American action, were the result of the intensification of the aggressive policy of the Government of North Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent to have this report printed in the body of the RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not believe that we would have anything to lose if the President of the United States were to say clearly again, and without the condition of which I have spoken, that the United States is willing to undertake negotiations. We do not have to enter into negotiations if the Communists impose the conditions of our withdrawal, and of course, if negotiations were undertaken, we would not be required to accept any settlement unless it were consonant with the objectives of our country and with standards of international decency and law.

In making this statement, I wish to make it clear that I am not recommending or suggesting that the United States withdraw from its commitments in South Vietnam. The SEATO treaty, approved by the Senate in 1955, committed the United States and all signatories to extend protection to South Vietnam upon the request of its government and upon approval of the signatory governments through their constitutional processes. In August 1964, after the attack on American naval vessels in the Bay of Tonkin, Congress adopted by an almost unanimous vote a joint resolution approving and supporting the determination of the President: "to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The second part of the resolution is very important in consideration of the present situation:

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution and the Charter of the

United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

South Vietnam along with Cambodia and Laos are protocol states.

It was my view at the time of the debate last August—and I said so in the debate—as it is my view today, that through the adoption of this resolution, the Congress supported the constitutional authority of the President, and extended to him any additional authority that he might need in order to take such steps as he might believe proper to defend the security of the United States and to halt the aggression against South Vietnam.

I believe that last August we expressed the condition that the Congress should act through its constitutional processes, and we confirmed to the President the authority that he is using today.

The statement that I make today is consistent with the position that I have held for years.

It has been a long time ago, but in 1954 I spoke in the Senate urging that negotiations be undertaken respecting the problem of Vietnam, rather than the use of our own troops.

Last April, I made the statement in the Senate that I thought it was time for negotiations. Last year, I supported the resolution which reinforced the authority of the President of the United States. I was glad that I did so. But in a speech in the Senate on August 6, I expressed my hope that the President of the United States would use all of the great powers of his office and of our country to find a peaceful and just solution in South Vietnam.

The problem of Vietnam is one of long standing. The United States has been engaged in Vietnam since 1954, and for 8 years before, we were providing assistance to the French. Today, except for the consideration of similar problems that might arise in the future, there is little point of talking about the past. We are required to deal with the existing situation.

I think it just and fair to say that the situation in Vietnam is one which President Johnson inherited. We have confidence in him. We know that he speaks truly when he says that it is not his intention, or the intention of our Government or its people to expand the war, and that we seek only to deter, and if necessary to prevent, the wrongful action of the Communists, which contravenes all concepts of international law. But it is right to continue to make every effort to find, difficult as it is, a just solution for the settlement of the situation in South Vietnam, without war.

Mr. President, I summarize the point of my talk. I recognize that it is difficult to find any avenue toward negotiations. I believe that it is necessary for the President to make it clear that we are willing to enter true negotiations without conditions imposed upon us by

the Communists. On our part, I do not believe that we can reach negotiations by imposing as a prerequisite that the Communist cease their intervention, rightful as our position is. For then we stand in confrontation, with a position of unconditional surrender and with the possibility of war as the only arbiter.

Finally, if negotiations are possible—and no one can say whether they will be, it appears to me that the proposal of Mr. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, a friend, and the leader of one of our best friends—Canada—that it might be possible to organize a community of concerned and responsible nations which would undertake responsibility toward negotiations and policing a just settlement.

I close by saying that, like many other Members of this body, I have had some experience in war—an experience which does not compare to that of those who were constantly in combat, but an experience which I value above all others. Anyone who has had such an experience knows, awesome as it is, that it does not make one less afraid or less courageous. It makes one determined to protect the security and honor of his country. But it makes one also more determined and thoughtful about seeking out every honorable course to avoid the possibility of war, perhaps the awful eventuality of a nuclear war, with all of the sorrow and disaster it would bring to our country and to humanity. If we cannot reach such a peaceful and honorable settlement in Vietnam, we stand together, supporting the President as we do now, to defend, at whatever cost, our security and our freedom.

STATEMENT OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION—VIETNAM

The Canadian delegation considers it necessary to append a minority statement to the foregoing majority report.

2. The Canadian delegation agrees that the situation in Vietnam continues to be dangerously unstable, and events since February 7 in North and South Vietnam have provided a dramatic demonstration of this continuing condition. The delegation believes, however, that the causes of this situation must be seen in context and, therefore, reviewed in the framework of the Commission's full range of responsibilities under the Geneva Agreement. By concentrating on a very limited aspect of the situation in Vietnam, the majority report runs the serious risk of giving the members of the Geneva Conference a distorted picture of the nature of the problem in Vietnam and its underlying causes.

3. In reporting on the events in North and South Vietnam since February 7, the Canadian delegation, therefore, deems it necessary to set these events in their proper perspective. In the view of the Canadian delegation, they do not stem from any essentially new factors in the situation in Vietnam, nor can they be seen in isolation; rather, they are dramatic manifestations of a continuing instability which has, as its most important cause, the deliberate and persistent pursuit of aggressive but largely covert policies by North Vietnam directed against South Vietnam. The Commission's special report of 1962 drew attention to the fact that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile ac-

tivity" and that "the PAVN has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South," thus showing, beyond reasonable doubt, violation of various articles of the Geneva Agreement by the People's Army of North Vietnam. This judgment by the Commission was based on conclusions reached by the Commission's Legal Committee after exhaustive examination of allegations and evidence pertaining to this problem. The final paragraphs of those conclusions read as follows:

"The legal committee concludes (reference paragraphs 742 to 746 and paragraph 754 in section VI) that it is the aim of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party (the ruling party in the zone in the North) to bring about the overthrow of the administration in the South. In September 1960, the third congress of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party held in Hanoi (in the zone in the North) passed a resolution calling for the organization of a 'front' under the leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party for the overthrow of the administration in the South. Such a 'Front for Liberation of the South' was, in fact, constituted under the sponsorship of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party. There are present and functioning in the zone in the South, branches of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party and the Front for Liberation of the South along with its armed branches, namely, the 'Forces for Liberation of the South' and the 'People's Self-Defence Armed Forces.' The Vietnam Lao Dong Party and the Front for Liberation of the South have the identical aim of overthrowing the administration in the South. The Vietnam Lao Dong Party, the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces have disseminated in the zone in the South propaganda seeking to incite the people to oppose and overthrow the administration in the South. There exists and functions a 'voice' of the Front for Liberation of the South and a 'Liberation Press Agency' which assist in the above-mentioned activities. It is probable that Hanoi Radio also has assisted in the said activities. Propaganda literature of the Front for the Liberation of the South and in favour of the activities of the Front has been published in the zone in the North and has been distributed abroad by the official representatives of the DRVN.

"The Legal Committee further concludes that:

1. The Vietnam Lao Dong Party in the zone in the North, the various branches of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party in the zone in the South, the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces have incited various sections of the people residing in the zone in the South, including members of the Armed Forces of the South, to oppose the administration in the South to overthrow it by violent means and have indicated to them various means of doing so.

2. Those who ignored their exhortation and continued to support the administration in the South have been threatened with punishment and in certain cases such punishment has been effected by the carrying out of death sentences.

3. The aim and function of the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South, and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces are to organize and to carry out under the leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, hostile activities against the armed forces and the administration of the South by violent means aimed at the overthrow of the administration of the South.

"The legal committee concludes also that the PAVN has allowed the zone in the North to be used as a base for the organization of

hostile activities in the zone in the South, including armed attacks, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South in violation of its obligations under the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam."

4. Since the date of its special report, the Commission has continued to receive from the South Vietnamese liaison mission complaints of an increasingly serious nature, alleging an intensification of aggression from the North. In these communications, the liaison mission has brought to the Commission's attention mounting evidence to show that the Government of North Vietnam has expanded its aggressive activities directed against the Government of South Vietnam and has infiltrated growing numbers of armed personnel and increasing amounts of military equipment into South Vietnam for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of South Vietnam by force. The liaison mission has informed the Commission that, as a result, the Government of South Vietnam has been obliged to request increased foreign aid for self-defense.

5. In its letter No. 383/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated January 27, 1965 (attached as app. I), for example, the liaison mission has provided the Commission with details of secret bases and related installations established in South Vietnam with the support of the Government of North Vietnam and other Communist countries. In the same letter, the liaison mission has provided the Commission with a recapitulatory list of arms, munitions, and equipment of Communist origin, the seizure of which has been reported to the Commission since the date of the Commission's Special Report of June 2, 1962.

6. In letter No. 539/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated February 12, 1965 (attached as app. II), the liaison mission has reported to the Commission that, during the period 1959 to 1964 more than 39,000 men have been introduced into South Vietnam from North Vietnam in violation of the Geneva agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. The liaison mission has provided details of the selection, training, infiltration routes, arms and equipment of these men, based on declarations obtained from prisoners of war, defectors, and captured documents.

RESOLUTION ON VIETNAM

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I desire to make a supplemental statement. I wish to make two modest suggestions supplementing what I have said today about the situation in Vietnam. To introduce my discussion of the first suggestion, I submit a resolution and ask that it be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONTANA in the chair). The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The resolution (S. Res. 93) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. COOPER. I shall read the resolution:

That it is the sense of the Senate that the majority and minority leaders, together with the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, should use their good offices to arrange for meetings of Senators who are not members of the two committees to be briefed fully by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense concerning the situation in Vietnam, such groups to approximate 20 in number.

In past years I have urged this kind of procedure on the floor of the Senate in connection with defense matters before

the Committee on Armed Services; for because of the complexity of modern weapons systems and the limitations of security, it has become almost impossible for those who are not members of the Committee on Armed Services to obtain much information about matters of defense.

To the suggestion that we can always attend hearings and read the Record, I should like to say that it is not always practical to do so. If we do go, we cannot question those who testify. I have also found that often many portions of the transcripts of hearings are deleted on grounds of security. I remember that when I went to the Committee on Foreign Relations to read the record of the first Cuban episode, it was impossible, from reading it, to have any clear indication of what had happened because of deletions.

So I have submitted the resolution respectfully, but yet with the determination to call attention to this problem and as a means to urge the majority leader and the minority leader, and the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services—whom we respect and in whom we have confidence, to use their offices to urge the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to brief Senators who are not members of the two committees, in small groups not exceeding 20 in number. I believe we have the right and the duty to ask for this assistance because, as I have said, Congress has its responsibility concerning the most important situation that our country faces today.

My second suggestion concerns the Committee on Foreign Relations. The committee is made up of outstanding Members of the Senate—Members who, by reason of their experience, access to wide and detailed information, and their personal stature, have the best opportunity to advise Congress and, indeed, give counsel to the executive branch of the Government. I know that they have met many times with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and perhaps with the President, and that they are deeply conscious of their responsibility. Nevertheless, because Vietnam is presumably the most important, critical problem relating to our security, and because it is interrelated with our policy all over the world, and because it holds the danger of war, I take the liberty of urging the Committee on Foreign Relations to devote its time and its knowledge to continued discussions of this problem, to ascertain if, as a committee, it can make helpful, constructive suggestions to the executive branch and to give greater advice to the Senate.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thought the Senator from Kentucky might be interested to know that the Secretary of Defense recently issued an order that all persons who are serving in key positions in the Federal Government, including Members of Congress, are no longer eligible to be in the Reserve program, particularly the Ready Reserve program.

Prior to this time, many Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives were members of those units and were receiving regular weekly intelligence reports from the respective units to which we were attached. We have now been denied those reports by order of the Secretary of Defense.

I recently wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force, suggesting that even though we had been placed on the inactive list, he should supply us with the briefs, so that we, as Members of Congress, might know what was taking place, by means of a weekly, current reportorial style of briefing. I received an unequivocal answer that this could not be done within the reserve program, and that the Department was not organized to act in any other way.

I have just finished sending the same type of request to the Secretary of Defense, hoping that all three services together could give us briefings on a weekly basis, so as to keep us up to date.

In my opinion, it is absolutely unreasonable for the State Department to expect us to deal with the extremely important matters that we have before us all the time, as the Senator from Kentucky has made explicitly clear in his excellent speech, but at the same time say that we will not be given the information on which to base logical judgments. It seems to me to be the height of irrationality for the executive branch to take this stand; but it is one that, up to date, the Department of Defense has been taking.

Mr. COOPER. I appreciate the comments of the distinguished Senator from Colorado. I understand he is talking about information which would ordinarily be given the members of the Committee on Armed Services. I appreciate his statement. What I am discussing is an issue that I believe is larger.

We are here as representatives of our States and, in a larger sense, representatives of our country in the discussion of and consideration of questions which are larger than the concerns of any State.

I know that crisis after crisis has occurred since World War II. When a crisis occurs, it is the one which is most dangerous and most important. But I have thought that Vietnam is one of the most difficult crises that this country has faced because its many factors have not obtained in other situations.

We know what our commitments are in Berlin. We know that there is a wide source of support from some of the NATO countries and certainly from the people and government of West Germany. There are other situations in the world where we have made our position clear, and where the conditions are favorable to our support.

But considering the instability of government in Vietnam, its distance away, and the activity of Communist China, I believe Vietnam to be one of the most difficult situations our country has faced since World War II.

It is for that reason that I have made these suggestions. The first would provide fuller information to the Senate.

The second is a respectful suggestion that there is no more important duty for our Committee on Foreign Relations than to apply its great abilities and great intelligence to continued study and discussion of this problem in the quiet of its executive session, in an effort to assist the President and the executive branch in the solution of the problem and give the Senate its leadership.

In saying that, I do not want to divert attention from the chief point that I have wanted to make in my statement today. That point is that I believe it is incumbent upon our administration to remove impossible preconditions of negotiation as we reject the impossible conditions set by North Vietnam and Communist China and make the clearest signal possible that we are willing to enter true negotiations—to determine if a peaceful settlement, consistent with our honorable commitments and our security, is possible.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that request?

Mr. GORE. Yes.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION ON MONDAY NEXT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this request has been cleared with the minority leader. I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry be permitted to sit during the session of the Senate on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

FARM UNION SEEKS DISTRICTING STAY

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, there came to my desk recently an article from the New York Times of Thursday, March 18, 1965, reporting that the Farmers' Union has just had a national meeting and supported the proposed constitutional amendment on legislative reapportionment.

I ask unanimous consent that this article may be printed at this point in the Record, it being pertinent not only to the Senator who is now occupying the chair, but also being in conformity with my own opinion that it should be passed as soon as possible.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

March 25, 1965

5750

[From the New York Times, Mar. 18, 1965]
**FARM UNION SEEKS DISTRICTING STAY—
 BACKS A MODIFIED VERSION OF POPULATION
 FORMULA**

(By Donald Janson)

CHICAGO, March 17.—The National Farmers Union adopted today a policy of opposition to the Supreme Court ruling requiring reapportionment of State legislatures on the basis of population alone.

The vote, taken after more than an hour of spirited debate at the organization's annual convention represented a repudiation of the leadership in the Farmers Union.

The vote, weighted to reflect membership strength in the various States, was 112,540 to 89,947.

BATTLE FOR DOMINATION

Thus the Farmers Union joined the other major general farm organizations, the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau Federation, in the battle by rural interests to retain a dominant role in State legislatures despite declining farm population.

The legislative pattern in most States has long been for representation based on population in one house and such considerations as area in the other.

This has made it possible for rural interests to continue to dominate one house in many States in the face of a population shift to the cities.

Of the farm groups, only the Farmers Union has been sharply divided on the issue. James G. Patton, Farmers Union president, has publicly supported the Supreme Court decision of equal representation for all as consistent with democratic principles. He and Glenn J. Talbott, vice president, voted with the minority today.

During the debate in the Grand Ballroom of the Sherman House, a director of the Oklahoma Farmers Union, Leland Stanford, shouted from the floor that "if Jim Patton and these other leaders of ours don't have the guts to speak up for farmers let's get them out of here."

MODIFICATION IS ASKED

Other speakers said opposition to the "one man, one vote" principle enunciated by the Supreme Court would not square with the Farmers Union policy of support of the Constitution and might alienate friendly Congressmen and labor unions.

The policy statement adopted by the Farmers Union calls for a constitutional amendment permitting States to apportion one house without primary regard to population.

It expresses the fear that urban-dominated legislatures might ignore the interests of farmers in tax, school and other legislation.

Adoption of the policy puts the Farmers Union in a rare alignment with its much more conservative rival, the Farm Bureau.

The Farm Bureau is conducting a drive to encourage State legislatures to petition Congress to call a constitutional convention to draw up an amendment that would set aside the Supreme Court ruling.

Thirty-four such State petitions are needed to force congressional action. Then, to become law, the amendment drawn would have to be approved by three-fourths of the States.

President Johnson sent the convention a message of concern "that there is such a disproportionate share of poverty in rural America." He pledged to strive to "recapitalize rural America and strengthen our family farm system of agriculture."

AIRLINE SERVICE

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the development of air transportation has been one of the key factors in the eco-

nomie expansion we have experienced in recent decades. Technological progress in aviation has been achieved through the combined efforts of aircraft manufacturers, the airline industry, and the Federal Government. Cooperation of individual cities has contributed also. It has been generally recognized that such development is so affected with the public interest as to justify the expenditure of public funds.

Each year we spend millions of dollars of tax funds for the construction of airports and for the development and operation of safety equipment and control of the airways. Developmental costs for new aircraft are subsidized indirectly through the defense program, and we are now proposing the direct subsidization of development of a supersonic airliner for commercial application. In the area of operational costs the Federal Government has, through the direct subsidy program, in effect, guaranteed profitability of our certificated carriers, all in the interest of insuring service adequate for the public convenience and necessity.

We hear a great deal these days about the necessity of maintaining U.S. leadership in international air travel. It appears that we seek to maintain this leadership by concentrating our efforts on the development of bigger and bigger planes that will fly higher and faster and can stay aloft for longer and longer distances without having to land to refuel, or to serve passengers.

Much is made of new speed records between the east and west coasts and between continents—with the elapsed time always measured, of course, from takeoff to landing rather than in terms of the total elapsed time from departure from residence or office to arrival at destination.

Our major trunk carriers are operating in the black and, for the most part, are no longer dependent upon operating subsidies. This is a development which is naturally pleasing to the taxpayers. This has been achieved despite such innovations as first-run movies in flight and other extras which, according to the advertisements of at least one carrier, make air travel so plush that passengers refuse to get off the plane when it lands.

This is called progress. And, in a way, it is progress. The difficulty is that unless one is flying from coast to coast or from one of the Nation's largest metropolitan areas to another, he is likely to find that there is less air service available today than there was 8 or 10 years ago.

For the passenger from New York to Los Angeles or to Miami a flight is usually available at just about any time of the day he may wish to depart, many of the flights being nonstop. Unfortunately, the same is not true if one wishes to go from Little Rock to Louisville.

The fact is that most of our State capitals and other cities in the Nation, with the exception of the very largest metropolitan areas, are serviced by fewer and fewer flights as our planes get bigger and faster. With respect to the major population centers in the State of

Tennessee, this statement has been statistically confirmed by information supplied to me at my request by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

I asked the CAB to compile for me the scheduled flights from the airports of Memphis, Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville for the past 10 years. The CAB has furnished comprehensive information listing all scheduled flights at each of these airports to and from each of the 10 cities constituting the given airport's top-ranked origin and destination markets. Generally, this data confirms that the number of flights has declined substantially, notwithstanding the fact that the number of passengers has steadily increased.

It is true that larger planes, with more spaces, provide the same number of seats as do a larger number of planes with fewer spaces. But one flight a day to and from a given point simply does not provide service as adequate as would three flights even if the one flight were by a plane three times as large. The public convenience and necessity is better served by the wider choice of departure and arrival times.

Moreover, the larger planes at faster speeds do not necessarily cut down on travel time on intermediate range flights, for the simple reason that the large jets require larger runways at airports further removed from the actual points of departure and destination. I am not here suggesting that we should turn back the clock and scrap large jetplanes or such airports as Dulles International built to accommodate them. But in traveling from Washington to Nashville, Tenn., one does not save time by driving to Dulles to use a jetplane. Nor is Nashville served by the jet which departs from Dulles, or New York and passes over Nashville at 20,000 or perhaps 35,000 feet, to land at Memphis, or Dallas, or some place else.

To determine the degree to which service has declined at Tennessee airports I shall now refer to certain of the statistical data supplied by the CAB. Generally, the number of flights from the named Tennessee airports to and from their major markets increased from 1954 to 1957. But 1957 seems to have been the high water mark as far as the number of available flights is concerned. Since then, with some exceptions to which I shall refer, the trend has been steadily downward.

MEMPHIS

Memphis is the largest city in Tennessee and is often called the hub of the midsouth area. With a population of approximately 600,000 and growing rapidly, Memphis is a transportation and trade center for a large area, drawing from Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee.

Memphis' major air passenger markets, as measured by total number of origin and destination passengers are New York, Chicago, Nashville, Atlanta, St. Louis, New Orleans, Dallas, Washington, Little Rock, and Birmingham. Total passengers to and from these cities increased from 161,000 in 1954 to 206,000 in 1957, and to 300,000 in 1963. Its heaviest traffic is with New York. In 1957 there were 14 daily flights from Memphis