

subject to notice given by an immigration officer at any time that a person cannot enter, or cannot remain in the country. In such case, the person(s) must leave immediately. The Minister of Internal Affairs can, at any time, classify a person as prohibited. Immigrants must give security in such amounts as the Minister may prescribe (C, p. 22).

PANAMA

Gypsies and anyone who might lower the standard of living are prohibited. Immigrants must deposit repatriation sum of 250 balboas (D, pp. 54 and 55).

PARAGUAY

Encourages American and European immigrants—limits entry of Asians and Africans and others not included as American or European. Persons over 60 years of age are prohibited unless they have a child. Persons advocating change of society are barred (D, pp. 56, 57).

PERU

Immigration may not exceed the percentage of 2 per 1,000 of the total population of Peru. Gypsies, nihilists, and persons who profess doctrines or are members of parties or groups advocating the destruction of the established political and social order are prohibited. Immigrant must be able to read and write and must have documents proving affiliation of all children (D, pp. 58, 59).

PHILIPPINES

Will not accept more than 50 individuals of any 1 nationality for 1 year. Prohibits those who cannot read or write, and unskilled manual laborers (D, pp. 76, 77) (letter from Philippine Embassy).

SOUTH AFRICA

Immigration controlled by selective board with complete discretionary powers. Minister of the Interior has the right to refuse admission to any alien without giving any reason. Persons of those races which the selective board has determined are not easily assimilated to the European trades or professions are usually prohibited. Anyone who cannot read or write any European language is prohibited. It is almost impossible for Asiatics to enter the country (C, pp. 25, 26).

SWITZERLAND

Accepts no immigrants. Has agreement with several countries regarding visa regulations and working permits (letter, Feb. 17, 1965).

SYRIA

Will not accept persons who hold nationality of any Arab State (letter, Feb. 12, 1965).

TURKEY

Must have Turkish background to obtain citizenship. Immigrants who wish to engage in business or profession reserved for Turkish citizens are prohibited. Persons whose activities are not compatible with Turkish laws, usages, customs, and political requirements are also prohibited. Gypsies also prohibited (C, pp. 7, 8).

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Must reside in Egypt 10 years and know Arabic language to become citizen (C, p. 15).

U.S.S.R.

Accepts no immigrants except under exceptional circumstances.

URUGUAY

Failure to submit permit from Uruguayan consul stating that immigrant has a trade or profession results in prohibition. Immigrant must obtain entry permit, certificate stating that they do not belong to any social or political group advocating the overthrow of the Government, and proof of not being subversive (D, pp. 65, 66, 68).

VENEZUELA

Persons who are not of the white race are prohibited. Persons over 60 years old, persons who can not prove good record and

habits. Gypsies, peddlers, and persons who profess or advocate ideas contrary to the form of government are prohibited. Persons whose presence may disturb the domestic public order, persons who advocate communism, and any foreigners who the President of the Republic may consider inadmissible, are prohibited (D, pp. 69, 70, 71).

And now, gentlemen, I present the United States. Under the McCarran-Walter Act, none of the above restrictions or requirements are made.

John Laird
TRAVELER TO THE PACIFIC WARS

(Mr. LAIRD (at the request of Mr. McCLORY) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, a highly illuminating and deeply perceptive account of what is going on in Vietnam appeared in the August issue of Fortune magazine. Written by Fortune Editor Charles Murphy, the article raises some very serious and fundamental questions about our policies and actions in that beleaguered country. It is an interesting, disturbing, and thought-provoking account by an eyewitness whose background and journalistic experience entitle him to be heard.

So that all of my colleagues may have an opportunity to read Mr. Murphy's analysis, under unanimous consent I ask that the article, entitled "Traveler to the Pacific Wars" be included in the RECORD at this point.

The article referred to follows:

TRAVELER TO THE PACIFIC WARS

(NOTE.—Fortune Editor Charles Murphy has been making an extended tour of the South Pacific. His report on New Zealand ("Traveler in a Small Utopia") and Australia ("Traveler on the Rim of Asia") appeared in the May and June issues. From Australia he flew on to Singapore and Bangkok. A report on that area will be detailed in an early issue. This letter begins with his reflections as he approaches Saigon and the larger war in Vietnam.)

(By Charles J. V. Murphy)

Viewed in the perspective of U.S. strategy in the Pacific, the present war in Vietnam is only part, though a crucial part, of a much larger whole. The involvement of the United States and its allies stretches all the way from the Antipodes to Japan and Korea, and in fact four wars are presently going on in the Pacific area. The biggest, in South Vietnam, engages on our side some 580,000 South Vietnamese fighting men, at least 75,000 United States troops, very substantial fractions of United States tactical air and carrier task forces, and Australian, New Zealand, and Korean contingents. The other big war is the one launched by Indonesia against its neighbor Malaysia—the so-called confrontation war. This strange term was invented by President Sukarno for his so far unavailing effort to pitch the British out of Malaysia and most particularly off their commanding airfields and magnificent naval base at Singapore. This has drawn in some 50,000 British (including 14,000 Gurkhas), about 50,000 Malaysians (including internal security forces), and small Australian and New Zealand forces. A war collaterally related to the Vietnamese one is being fought in Laos against the Hanoi-directed Pathet Lao. Here the hitherto desultory neutralist Lao-tian forces, with assistance from the Thais, are attempting to block the Ho Chi-Minh trails into South Vietnam. The fourth war, between Taiwan and Red China, is in suspense except for occasional air and naval brushes.

Until recently the anti-Communist powers in the Pacific have tried to maintain the fiction that their wars were separate. Now, in a very real sense, the wars are beginning to flow together. It is plain that the United States, its partners, and friends, must rethink their Pacific strategy and alliances for the immense test in the making with Red China's power.

There was not much to see from 30,000 feet. In these near equatorial latitudes, the rainy season had begun rather earlier than usual, and much of the time the plane was either in or over soggy, heavy cloud layers. Soon after takeoff from Bangkok, however, I noticed that the pilot angled southward over the Gulf of Siam, so as to skirt the Cambodian delta. Some few days before, the left-leaning, somewhat frivolous Prince Sihanouk had noisily broken off such diplomatic business as until then went on between Cambodia and the United States. His displeasure embraced Thailand as well, as America's good and helpful ally, and it was therefore only common sense for the Thai commercial pilots to shy clear of the itchy-fingered gunners, friends and foes alike, who man the Cambodian-Vietnamese borders.

At this stage of my travels I was well up what I had come to think of as the Pacific ladder of trouble, which stretches from the Antipodes through Malaysia and Thailand into Taiwan and beyond to Panmunjom, across some 10,000 miles of land and ocean in all. In Borneo I had been shown what might in modesty be described as a VIP view of that other major Asian war—the so-called "confrontation war" between the new British-protected state of Malaysia and Indonesia. It's a bona fide war all right, although for cost and killing it doesn't begin to compare with the one that we Americans are in for in Vietnam, some 400 miles away, on the far shore of the South China Sea. Still, there were small but sharp running sea fights at night in Singapore Harbor while I was there, and shooting was going on in the rubber plantations of Johore and in the pepper groves of Sarawak and Sabah.

From Singapore, in due course, I had gone on to Bangkok. Alone among the SEATO partners and the American allies in the Pacific, Thailand occupies a physical bridge, or link, between the British war to save for the West the sea gate between the Pacific and Indian oceans and the American war to save for the West a political and military lodgment on the Asian continent. Though Bangkok itself is the capital of the SEATO alliance, Thailand is not yet formally a belligerent in the Far East. Nevertheless, it has become in a studied way a de facto power in both situations. It has bravely lent its geography to the Laotians and ourselves in manners it does not wish specified for military pressures against the North Vietnamese deployments that are a potential hazard to Thailand. It has also begun to give serious attention, for the first time, to the feasibility of a joint operation with the British and Malaysian forces for the purpose of cornering in the wild mountains of southern Thailand a band of Peiping-oriented guerrillas who are the last surviving cadres of the Communist movement that sought to take over postwar Malaya.

Nations and people of like minds in the western and southern Pacific, it seemed to me, were finally beginning to come together out of a realization of a growing common danger. A year ago the United States, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Malaysia were pursuing their separate interests in the Pacific with sidelong glances at each other to see how the other was faring. Then, in a matter of months, the Australians and New Zealanders became engaged. Australians are now fighting in Malaysia; both Australia and New Zealand have taken the hard decision to send combat troops into South Vietnam. And so the alliances are converging.

There was no mystery about the circumstances that had finally begun to pull the Pacific alliances together. It was, first, the sudden appalling realization that the fragile structure of South Vietnam was on the verge of falling apart and, next, the spectacle of the United States striking with its too long withheld airpower at North Vietnam and moving tens of thousands of combat troops across the Pacific into South Vietnam. But it was not simply the agony of Vietnam, heart rending as that is, that finally galvanized the non-Communist powers into action. What happened was that tardily but unblinkingly the politicians in power in these Pacific nations finally recognized and faced up to a still distant but ultimate danger.

THE TIME TO STOP MAO

Most certainly the danger does not rest simply with a fear that if South Vietnam should go down, then that wily septuagenarian Ho Chi-Minh will fasten communism on a primitive community that does not really want communism. The central danger is that if the Vietnamese social structure should finally dissolve, in the face of the now quite desperate American efforts to hold it together, then the Red Chinese will have stunningly proved the case for the so-called wars of national liberation, wars waged in the guise (to borrow the jargon of the original Soviet handbook) of "anti-imperialist national-liberation movements."

It may come as a surprise to some, but the fact is that few understand this rising danger more acutely than do the politicians and intellectuals of the non-Communist socialist left. In Auckland and Wellington, in Canberra and Melbourne and Sydney, in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, one man after another said as much to me. Their shared reasoning went something like this: "You Americans must never give up in Vietnam. Red China is the enemy. Now is the time to stop Mao. Only you Americans have the military power to do the job." Then, after a pause, this sotto voce apology: "Of course you will appreciate why we can't say this publicly. Politics, you know." All the politicians in the Pacific knew that even Prime Minister Shastri of India, while publicly deploring the American air bombing of North Vietnam, had privately spoken admiringly of the American resolution. And the diplomatic grapevine vibrated with the news that even Prince Sihanouk and the somewhat anti-American Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yu of Singapore were agreed in their private conversations in May at Phnompenh that American military power had entered the battle none too soon.

What the Pacific leaders are finally braced for, while still finching from openly acknowledging its inevitability, is a decisive contest between the United States and Red China. There can be no real peace in their world of non-Communist Asians—a community of 1 billion people—until the power question has been settled one way or another. I pondered what this judgment involves for us: can the United States even hold on in Vietnam without pressing the war home directly against North Vietnam and the power center in Hanoi itself? Judgment on this was to be made soon enough on my arrival in Saigon. What I was sure of, already, was that a whole new experience, a test, a struggle, possibly even some fantastic ordeal, is unmistakably in the making for the United States in the Pacific, and a new and formidable chapter has opened in U.S. history. There is no mistaking the character and meaning of one fundamental happening. It is that the U.S. strategic center of gravity has moved west of the 180th meridian, into the Asian Pacific. It is almost certain to stay there for years to come.

The pity, the folly, is that the famous men who have been manipulating the American tactics and strategy in the struggle for South Vietnam let the rot and collapse there go

on so long. Indeed, I was hardly back in Saigon before I began to wonder whether all of Lyndon Johnson's men have grasped the full seriousness of the new situation. After getting settled in the Caravelle Hotel in the center of the city, and sharing a meal with several colleagues in a tiny bistro run by an expatriate Frenchman with a perhaps exaggerated reputation for occasional murder, I took a walk in the direction of the Saigon River. My path led me past the American Embassy, which had been all but demolished in March by terrorists' bombs. With the reconstruction not yet finished, it put me in mind of the bridge structure of a battleship. The outer walls had been heavily reinforced; the once tall windows had been contracted to narrow turret-like slits; shatterproof plastic was being substituted for glass, to reduce the danger from lethal flying splinters in the event of another bombing; and the street approaches to the building itself had been closed off with upended sections of sewer pipe weighted with concrete to form a barricade.

These defensive dispositions I noted with approval. Then I was taken aback to hear my companion, an officer of fairly senior rank, say that on orders from Washington construction of a new Embassy, to cost about \$1 million, was to be started immediately in a residential area. The design had been chosen some years ago, during the false lull that followed the French defeat and withdrawal; it calls for a handsome 3-story office building with spacious windows and wide entrances appropriate for a tranquil garden setting. The site was further attractive at the time of its acquisition, because of its close proximity to the Premier's office. In the current mood of Saigon, however, this handiness no longer is an advantage. There have been 10 changes of government since November 1963—or were there only 9?—and the mobs have got into the habit of demonstrating in front of their Premier's windows every few months, usually in protest over his supposed subservience to the American Ambassador. To put up the new Embassy more or less on the direct line of the mobs' accustomed march struck me as a heedless action. Indeed, the whole scheme seemed most untimely; our diplomacy, my friend and I were agreed, might be most prudently conducted for the time being in the present bunker and the million dollars invested in ammunition.

OUR LONGEST LOSING WAR

If I appear cynical about the conduct of American business in South Vietnam, it is because in the course of my visit here I find it hard to be anything but distressed and shocked by the American management of what has become a large and costly war. With the end nowhere in sight, it is already the longest losing war that Americans have been engaged in since the French-Indian wars of the middle 18th century.

In President Eisenhower's last year, U.S. military aid to Vietnam came to only \$65 million, and our military mission there totaled 773 officers and men. Within a year our military aid to that country was more than doubled, rising as it did in fiscal 1962 to about \$144 million, and the military mission was increased some twentyfold, the strength rising to nearly 17,000 men. As this article went to press, early in July, something like 75,000 U.S. troops were already deployed, in one role or another, in South Vietnam. This figure does not take into account some 27,000 flyers and sailors who man Carrier Task Force 77 of the 7th Fleet, and who are wholly in the fight. Nor does it include the general support being provided the forward forces by the large permanent Air Force and Navy establishments in the Philippines, Japan, and on Okinawa. Very substantial fractions of the Tactical Air Command and the Navy's fast carrier task forces have been concentrated in the Pacific, and the west-

ward, or Pacific, tilt of our military resources is generally much more pronounced than most Americans realize.

The capital input has also soared, although its true magnitude has been to some degree concealed. As the battle went against "McNamara's war" (as he himself described it), he was able to absorb the rising costs without a stiff boost in the defense budget by drawing upon the emergency-reserve stocks of the U.S. forces and by reducing or deferring their less urgent normal operations. As a former controller, the Secretary appreciates, of course, the eventual perils of such a practice for a defense strategy that stressed a high degree of readiness for both general war and simultaneous limited wars oceans apart. The running costs of the Vietnamese operation appear to have risen to about \$2.2 billion annually. These costs break down roughly as follows:

Continuing economic aid to keep the Saigon government afloat and to pay the bureaucracy: about \$300 million annually.

Other economic support for the Vietnamese infrastructure: about \$70 million.

Military assistance program (weapons, pay for the Vietnamese forces, overhead cost of the U.S. military advisory establishment): about \$330 million annually.

Indirect costs represented by other forms of U.S. participation—including the combat forces, day-to-day military operating costs—that are absorbed by the U.S. defense budget: an estimated \$800 million annually.

Extraordinary additional U.S. military costs, chiefly for port and airfield construction, and for replacing reserve stocks of ammunition, fuel, and so forth: \$700 million, to be financed by the supplementary appropriation that President Johnson asked for in May.

And we are in for an eventual bill for the war that will be much stiffer than the Pentagon cares to divulge just now.

THE MONSOON OFFENSIVE

Although McNamara has demonstrated his ability as an administrator of a vast bureaucracy, the primary job of the Pentagon is to conduct war—and the only war McNamara has so far been called upon to conduct has gone very badly from the outset. When President Johnson finally decided in February to put North Vietnam below the 20th parallel under the U.S. air counterattack, and to bring U.S. jets to bear for the first time in the battle for villages and roads inside South Vietnam, it was an act of desperation. The South Vietnamese Army was actually disintegrating. To the extent that a government remained in Saigon, it was the thinnest kind of film over the American presence.

The U.S. air counterattack achieved all that was expected of it, up to a point: it did check the Communist offensive. It had the effect of driving home barely in time a bolt to hold a door that was swinging widely on its hinges. But by reason of the very limitations that the political direction of the war in Washington imposed upon the air counterattack, the blows have only impaired, without paralyzing, the Vietcong's capacity for further heavy fighting. There is excellent reason to believe that the North Vietnamese buildup was well advanced before the February air attacks on the principal supply lines to the Vietcong forces in the battle zone. Enough trained troops were by then already deployed inside South Vietnam, and enough battle stocks had been laid by or were within its reach, for the enemy to decide that it could still continue to sustain a powerful offensive by its standards through the monsoon season—i.e., into our autumn. Certainly, it is acting as if it had such means.

The Communist guerrilla forces are the lightest kind of infantry. Once armed and equipped, they do not need much replenishment other than ammunition. They live off the country. U.S. Army intelligence meas-

ures the Communist military strength at present inside South Vietnam, in terms of organized forces, at more than 100 battalions. It further hypothesizes that this force, with a daily average aggregate consumption of from 100 to 150 tons of supplies, could fight from 20 to 30 sharp 2-battalion-size actions every month. Ho's fitting battalions do not need much in their supply wagons, because they are not required to hold ground. The Marines and the U.S. Army in their redoubts and strongpoints are not the targets. The target is the exposed hamlet or district or provincial capital, or the column vulnerable to ambush.

So, the U.S. air counterattack notwithstanding, the critical phase of the 1965 monsoon offensive remains to be fought. No knowledgeable officer that I talked to in South Vietnam was sanguine about the outcome of the summer's fighting. It is not a question of our Marines', or our airborne troops' getting overpowered. Ho Chi-Minh is much too smart to send his light infantry forward to be mowed down by American firepower. The U.S. military problem at this late hour consists in finding some way to lift the pressure from the exhausted Vietnamese village and district garrisons. And if the struggle continues to go as badly against the South Vietnamese in the rest of the monsoon season as was the case in May and June, a force of from 200,000 to 300,000 American troops will be none too many simply to shore up a sagging Vietnam Army for the elementary tasks of holding Saigon, the major ports and airfields, the strategic provincial capitals, and the main highways.

AN OLD SOLDIER'S ADVICE

This is an outcome that was never meant to be. U.S. ground forces fighting Asians in Asia? Until the other day, the idea was all but unthinkable. At the White House, for example, whenever the question arose of how U.S. military power might best be used in Asia, President Johnson used to tell about his last talk with Gen. Douglas MacArthur at Walter Reed Hospital. "Son," the President quotes the dying soldier as saying to him, "do not ever get yourself bogged down in a land war in Asia."

MacArthur's view has been an article of faith with U.S. military men and notably of the Army Chiefs of Staff ever since the bloody island campaigns against the Japanese. It was a view shared by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor before he was sent to Saigon as special U.S. Ambassador. Once there, and with Vietnam falling apart around him, Taylor reversed his position. He was not happy about it. He was confronted with the testing of a military policy by which he himself, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and McNamara had reshaped the Armed Forces over a period of 3½ years: making a great point of preparing U.S. troops for limited and counterinsurgency wars. The truth is the Army's investment in these particular skills was nothing like what it was cracked up to be. Nevertheless, in the absence of decision in Washington to aim the U.S. air attack primarily at North Vietnam, Taylor had no choice but to ask the President for combat troops to be directly committed in the south.

THE MORNING THE B-57 BLEW UP

As I looked around, I could not help feeling that the condition of our forces left much to be desired in the most elementary respects. One of the major military air bases in Vietnam is at a place called Bien Hoa, 18 miles northeast of Saigon. At the time of my visit there, in May, jet operations were possible only from three runways in the entire country, and Bien Hoa had one of them. The original airstrip was built by the French Air Force, on a rubber plantation that occupied the north bank of the Dongnai River.

One can drive to Bien Hoa from downtown Saigon in half an hour over a new three-lane asphalt highway. Light-engineering plants have sprung up on both sides of the roads, and racing along with the crowded buses and the careening trucks and the honking and hooting motorbikes, one has the sense of passing through a thriving, prospering, mushrooming suburb. This impression is valid enough, as regards the construction indexes. But the area is also a genuine no man's land. Open to traffic and commerce with Saigon by day, it reverts to Vietcong control at night. The notorious War Zone D—a densely forested stronghold that the B-52's have been methodically bombing—begins just to the north of the airfield and, every few days or so, black-suited Vietcong in their outposts take potshots at planes on the final approach.

When I came this way a year ago, the Air Force contingent at Bien Hoa numbered only 400 men and they operated 40 light planes. When I returned this year, one blindingly hot Saturday morning, it was to find the Air Force unit swollen to about 2,300 men and they were operating 100 planes, including a number of light jet B-57 bombers. And that was not all. On the same field were jammed another 100 U.S. Army planes, mostly helicopters, plus another 100 planes belonging to the Vietnamese Air Force, mostly light, close-support, propeller-driven craft. This made a total of about 300 aircraft collected around a single strip. It was the dirtiest, most slovenly, ramshackle air operation I have ever visited. One can excuse a lot in war, but the confusion, disorder, and disarray here were beyond excuse.

For one thing, more than 6 months earlier, in the early morning hours of November 1, 1964, a handful of Vietcong mortar men who had penetrated the base's outer defense system laid down a fast and accurate barrage that destroyed, in a matter of minutes, five costly B-57 bombers on their hardstands. The chances of a return visit by the Vietcong were high and, indeed, shortly before my call, a brigade of the U.S. 173d Airborne Division was hastily taking up positions around the base to guard it from an expected attack in force. Yet even then, the costly planes, tens of millions of dollars' worth of them, stood wingtip to wingtip for want of dispersal room; and incredibly, dozen or so simple concrete and earth revetments to protect the planes had not been finished. Funds for new construction, I presently learned, were difficult to come by in Washington. So under the very eyes of the two-star Air Force theatre commander, the four-star Army general in command of the entire war, and even the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who sat in Saigon, the squalid, inefficient, and dangerous operation at Bien Hoa was tolerated and left to an overworked Air Force colonel to manage as best he could.

The poor chap didn't manage very well. Less than 24 hours later, from an angled distance of maybe 2,000 yards and a height of 4,000 feet, I was a chance eyewitness of Bien Hoa's second and far larger disaster. I was aboard a Navy plane, en route to Task Force 77 on station in the South China Sea. Our course took us past the base and, as it happened, while he was only 2 minutes or so away, our pilot saw a puff of smoke, then a swelling fireball, and he sent word aft that Bien Hoa seemed to be "blowing up." When the field came abeam, I saw that the entire block of B-57's was fiercely ablaze, and the conflagration had spread to long files of light piston-powered bombers, the A-1's. My first thought was that the Vietcong mortar specialists had done it again; then I realized that the recurring explosions were caused by bombs exploding in the racks of the burning planes. A careful inquiry by the Air Force failed to identify the root cause of the dis-

aster. Most likely, a defective fuse or the faulty stowing of an old 750-pound bomb aboard one of the B-57's—the bombers there still were being armed with 1944 vintage iron bombs—started the chain reaction. Twenty-two planes blew up, more were damaged; a loss of that magnitude in an air battle would have been cause for national anxiety. The penny-pinching that contributed to this episode and the timidity that impelled experienced officers to endure a scandalous situation did credit to no one.

REFLECTIONS IN A HELICOPTER

The American officer corps is, needless to say, a good deal more competent than this incident may suggest. In Vietnam, though, the Army is up against a slippery, slithering kind of battle that it can't seem to get a hard grip on. Doubts about the Army's preparedness for such campaigning were amply confirmed—despite all the high-flown theorizing about counterinsurgency tactics. A morning's helicopter tour of a crucial war zone in the company of an intelligent, youthful operations planning officer, Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy, was highly informative in this respect.

A helicopter can't be beaten for enabling a general of infantry to get around to see what is going on beyond his headquarters. On this particular morning, General DePuy, at the cost of being only five hours away from his busy desk in Saigon as the senior U.S. military planner, made a swing in his clattering helicopter that took him into three provinces, afforded him a grandstand view of a helicopter attack in company strength, brought him into a quick conference with the staff of a Vietnamese division engaged in a "search and destroy" sweep on the edges of a Vietcong staging area, and finally put him down at the heavily barricaded headquarters of a great French-operated rubber plantation for a canvass of the tactical situation with the U.S. advisers to a Vietnamese battalion that was braced, behind its sandbags and slitted brick walls and barbed wire, for a night descent by the Vietcong.

Helicopter etiquette orders the seating of the noncombatant guest inside, between the escort officer and the port and starboard riflemen; their bodies are interposed between him and the open doors through which a sniper would sensibly aim. The guest must take his chances even Stephen, of course, with whatever ill-aimed shot might come up through the floor. DePuy sat alongside me, and as we flew west by north, he kept up a running commentary on places and events in the changing neighborhood in view. I was familiar with the region, having traveled over the same area the year before. But I marveled again at how close the swirl of battle remains to Saigon, and how vague and impalpable the enemy remains. From our altitude one could see 40 miles or so, and in this watery domain, north and west of Saigon, given over to rice paddies, rubber and tea growing, at least 1,000 sharp battles of one kind or another—ambushes, night rushes on sleeping hamlets, skirmishes—have been fought during the past 3 years. To the west, I had a fine view through broken cloud of Cambodia and the forested waterways over which the Vietcong come and go in sampans. We flew at 5,000 feet. But I never did see a Vietcong.

THE TROUBLESOME REDOUBT

The educational aspects of the flight included a skirting of the zone D area north of Bien Hoa. As described earlier, this is reputedly the major Vietcong base for their operations against Saigon itself. From the air, it put me in mind of the Louisiana river country, except that the forest here is much more dense, with the tree canopy reaching in places to heights of 200 feet. The forest redoubt covers about 150 square miles, and

from the accounts of defectors and prisoners it is both a maze and trap made up of secret trails, hidden strongpoints and supply dumps, and bunkers connected with deep tunnels impregnable to air bombing.

None of this can be seen from the air. I was shown a short, narrow gray swath in the forest left by the Air Force in its forlorn experiment some months ago to defoliate the region by saturating the tree tops with a mixture of napalm and chemicals. The chemicals were expected to dry out the trees and the napalm to set the forest ablaze. But, for various reasons, the hoped-for conflagration never got going, and the experiment was abandoned as being too costly and tricky. Now the Air Force is trying to reduce the forest to matchwood with B-52's.

I doubt even the B-52's will make much of an impression with TNT, unless McNamara wants to make tree-feeing a new career for SAC, or unless SAC has the extraordinary good luck to pinpoint and smash the headquarters area. But it was equally obvious that the job of prying the enemy out of the forest tangle was hopelessly beyond the competence and means of the troops we had committed. In recent major engagements the air attack has again and again finally turned the tide of battle. But it must also be said that, for the Vietnamese garrisons, the turn has usually come too late. Since the Vietcong time their assaults at night, and in the monsoon season at intervals when they can count on cover from rain and clouds, the Air Force's ability to react quickly has been sorely limited on occasion, and in consequence battalion after battalion of Vietnamese regional troops were cut to ribbons before help came. One doesn't have to look very far to observe that, except for the introduction of the helicopter, there has been little new invention to prepare the ground forces for the kind of war they are now being asked to fight. Indeed, the United States doesn't even yet have a satisfactory airplane to support this kind of action. We are therefore obliged to use planes that are either obsolete (A-1's and B-57's) or too valuable (F-105's and F-4's).

THE CASE FOR GOING NORTH

It is time that the E-ring in the Pentagon stopped kidding the troops, and that the rest of us stopped kidding ourselves. It makes no sense to send American foot soldiers, rifles and grenades at the ready, into the rain forests and the rice paddies and the dim mountain trails to grapple with a foe whom they cannot distinguish by face or tongue from the same racial stock whom they seek to defend. On every count—disease, tropical heat, and rain, the language curtain—the odds are much too high against their making much of an impression. When the question arose last year of sending U.S. combat forces into South Vietnam as stiffeners, serious consideration was given to the proposition of forming them into a line, a sort of cordon sanitaire, across the jungle and mountain approaches through Laos and Cambodia, with the object of thereby sealing off the Communist supply routes. This impractical scheme was discarded in view of the all but impossible cost of supplying the Army at anything like its desired standards, and the further consideration that nine-tenths of the force's energies and means would be consumed merely in looking after itself. The solution that was adopted and is being followed now is to settle the troops in garrison-like strongpoints along the coast. It has been romantically suggested that these places will in due course become sally ports from which our troops will issue forth into the hinterland, spreading in ink-spot fashion stability and hope among the hamlets. But such a process could take a decade or two short of forever. It also means military occupation, the last thing Kennedy, McNamara, Taylor and Company had in their minds when

they resolved in 1961 to risk a stand in South Vietnam. Taylor understood this perfectly, and the dreary outlook no doubt made it easier for him to leave Saigon.

THE U.S. ADVANTAGE

Is there an alternative strategy? There certainly is. It is one, however, that revolves around a different set of premises than the McNamara-Taylor strategy has so far favored. Most particularly, it means shifting the main weight of the American counter-attack from a ground war below the seventeenth parallel to an air offensive in North Vietnam itself, accompanied by a blockade of the North Vietnamese coast. Does this mean leveling Hanoi? No. It means, if necessary, the deliberate, progressive destruction of the North Vietnamese infrastructure—the plants, the railroads, and electric power systems, the ports—to a point where Ho Chi Minh can no longer support his aggression in the south. Will this cause Ho to capitulate? Not necessarily. Ho is an elderly Asian revolutionary whose education in communism began in Europe after the Bolshevik revolution. More of his adult life has been spent outside Vietnam than inside. His government will probably be wherever he chooses to hang his hat.

But if his capacity for mischief is reduced, then our object is served. That object, it seems to me, is to lift from South Vietnam, at all possible speed, the terrible pressure on its hamlets. Because that task is manifestly beyond the competence of the Army and Marine Corps, except in a prolonged and costly test of endurance, then we must pick up our weapons of technological advantage—the air arms, both sea and ground based. What has made the American fighting man better than his enemies is his higher technological proficiency. It seems folly for us to fight in Asia without drawing on this technological advantage. It may be highly desirable, for instance, to use our sea power and ground troops to a limited extent to establish a beachhead near Haiphong, thus threatening the enemy's main supply lines and forcing it to pull its troops out of southern Vietnam. Such tactics were immensely successful in Leyte Gulf and later at Inchon and had a salutary effect on equally stubborn enemies.

Would a truly stern attack on the North bring China into the war? Expert opinion splits sharply over the answer. High value would certainly have to be given to that possibility in any plan for enlarging the theater of action. We are already in an undeclared contest of power with Red China and the question that the President has to face up to is whether in the months immediately ahead he settles for a partial defeat or failure in a war one full remove from the major enemy, or risks a clash with Red China in order to bring the secondary war under control. My own view is that Mao, should he elect to engage, will do so reluctantly and within cautious limits. He is certainly not likely to force an engagement on terms that will compel the United States to employ its technological advantage à outrance (to use an old-fashioned term). And I find it hard to believe he would dare to send his infantry masses over the wretched roads to do battle in southeast Asia, while Chiang Kai-shek waits and watches hopefully close by on the sea flank, with a spirited army of 400,000 men and the sharpest, most experienced, small air force in the world.

THE BIG BLUE-WATER CHIPS

It is, I suggest, the looming struggle with Red China that we Americans must keep in the forefront of our minds as we grope for the right mixture of political and military strategy for ending the mischief in Vietnam. This is why the map shown at the start of this report now grows luminous with meaning. Now, while hoping for a satisfactory

outcome in the going war, we should be sensibly preparing the dispositions we shall need if it turns out badly.

The huge naval base at Subic Bay with its fine runways and the Air Force's runways, repair shops, and storage facilities at Clark Field in the Philippines are indispensable for any forward strategy in the Pacific. It stands to reason that the British air establishment and truly superb naval base at Singapore, all greatly refurbished in the past decade, are also crucial for the control of the Pacific sea routes and the approaches to Australia and New Zealand. Hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars have been invested in air and sea facilities in Okinawa and Japan. And Japan must itself be persuaded to become the north hinge of any grand strategy scheme in the Pacific.

Then, too, there is Thailand, which has generously opened its geography for new jet airfields. This to me is the most stunning recent development of all. It could have the effect of transforming Thailand from being a weak ground flank on the U.S. position in South Vietnam into becoming the main airstrike position, of which South Vietnam becomes the weak ground flank. And, finally, there are South Korea and Taiwan, the only other friendly countries in the area with large, ready, experienced forces. It seems to me our diplomacy should be cultivating this vast garden with more assiduity than it has shown.

HE MISUNDERSTOOD

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (at the request of Mr. McCLORY) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, there is growing clarification in the Nation's press of an unfounded verbal attack made against Minority Leader GERALD R. FORD by President Johnson. It has been proven that Mr. Ford is innocent of charges that he divulged so-called confidential information to reporters following a White House conference with the President. Among strong repudiations of the unwarranted attack against Mr. Ford was a letter from Newsweek writer Samuel Shaffer which described the President's criticism as unfounded and as "wholly unfair."

One of the most respected newspapers in the world has come to the defense of Mr. Ford. The Detroit Free Press in an editorial published August 5, 1965, articulately explored the incident.

This is the Detroit Free Press editorial titled "He Misunderstood":

HE MISUNDERSTOOD

Now it's Lyndon Johnson's turn to plead a misunderstanding.

After royally chewing out Representative GERALD R. FORD, of Grand Rapids, Sunday for leaking information from a White House skull session on Vietnam the previous Tuesday night, it turns out not to have been Ford at all.

The key point of the leak was the report that Johnson had planned to call up the reserves for duty in Vietnam until he was dissuaded by a memo read by Senate Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD. MANSFIELD said the move wouldn't be popular among congressional Democrats.

Since this kind of a report would, indeed, be embarrassing to the Democrats, Johnson would, indeed, not want it known, and would deny it. And since it got to be public knowledge, Johnson felt some enemy—a Republi-

Bolivia Celebrates 140th Anniversary**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 9, 1965

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, on August 6, 1825, a congress of delegates meeting in the city of Chuquisaca formally declared the independence of Upper Peru, later to be renamed Bolivia. A review of this action, which climaxed years of struggle in that country and throughout all of South America, can help us renew our faith in the desire of all men to obtain freedom from outside control. So on the 140th anniversary of that historic date, which was celebrated last Friday, I rise to pay tribute to the courageous men of Bolivia who fought and gave their lives so that their offspring could enjoy the benefits of a national state.

Bolivia has always been a country rich in natural resources, but before 1826 it was not free to use them herself. The Spanish conquered Bolivia in 1532, and it quickly became one of their most valued possessions. The discovery of silver around Potosi made the area known around the world. In 1559 Bolivia was made part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but the seeds of unrest were already growing. Creoles—Spaniards born in the New World—were denied the right to hold high office, while the Indians were assigned tracts of land to cultivate and were forced to work in the mines.

The first uprising, which began in the year 1661, was unsuccessful, but they continued fairly steadily through the years after that. At first the uprisings were headed solely by the Creoles, but the Indians were included later on. The Spaniards were able to defeat the rebellions until trouble in Europe set the stage for a successful one. In 1808 Napoleon tried to force a French ruler on Spain and the Americas but his plan met with failure. The Audiencia of Charcas advocated freedom from Spain for the New World in 1809, and the fight began in earnest.

But Bolivia did not gain its independence easily; it was not until Bolivar's great general, Antonio Jose de Sucre, won the decisive battle of Ayacucho in 1824 that the complete independence of Bolivia was assured. The extraordinary length of this fight for freedom is certainly a great tribute to the spirit and unquenchable thirst for liberty of the people of Bolivia.

Over the years since the congress of delegates met in Chuquisaca, Bolivia has had its share of turbulence, but its exports have always contributed greatly to world trade. Tin has long been a very important Bolivian commodity on the world market. Growing petroleum and rubber industries are sure to aid in the further development of the Bolivian economy. As a member of both the O.A.S. and the United Nations, and with increasing government stability, it now appears that we can now look forward

to Bolivia's taking an even greater responsibility for improving the lot of her people and the welfare of the hemisphere.

And so, Mr. Speaker, it is with a feeling of deep pride and admiration that I rise to honor the Independence Day of our neighbour to the south, and to extend to Bolivia my every best wish for future growth, prosperity, and progress.

Je
What To Do in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 26, 1965

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, much is being said about what position the United States should assume in Vietnam.

I should like to call attention today to an excellent survey which appeared in the Lerner newspapers published throughout my district. This survey reflects what the people in Chicago feel should be done about Vietnam.

The Lerner newspapers and Mr. Leonard Dubkin have performed a most significant public service by compiling a grassroots opinion on what the people feel should be our position in Vietnam.

I am aware of the flow of comments by self-styled experts being published daily in the large metropolitan newspapers and national magazines, but the Lerner newspapers have taken the trouble to see what the people themselves feel on this very important subject.

The combined circulation of the Lerner newspapers in Chicago exceeds most of the larger newspapers of America, and so we can readily see the impact that the Lerner survey has on a significant area of our Nation.

I am particularly inspired by the fact that this cross-section of public opinion clearly indicates that while the people are deeply concerned about our involvement in Vietnam, there is an almost unanimous decision at the grassroots level for the United States not to abandon our position in Vietnam.

This mature and deeply understanding attitude by the American people should be of the greatest comfort to President Johnson in his present deliberations.

I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the publishers of the Lerner newspapers for this most significant contribution toward a better understanding among Americans regarding the difficult decision in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, the Lerner survey follows:

WHAT TO DO IN VIETNAM

(By Leonard Dubkin)

What do you think we should do in Vietnam?

We asked 20 north-siders this question, and we got as many different opinions as there were answers. People seem to feel very strongly about our involvement in Vietnam, but they are mostly undecided about what we should do there.

Mrs. Carleton Emry, 2165 Giddings, said

her husband was in the First World War, and therefore she knew how bad a war can be. "I hope the President can find some solution in Vietnam before it becomes a full-scale war. But I don't see what he can do about it. It seems to me the matter is out of our hands."

Miss Catherine Berggren, 6976 North Ridge, thinks we should never have gone into Vietnam. "I have a nephew going into the Army, and I hope he doesn't get involved in it. But what can we do, we have to fight it out. I am sure President Johnson will do the right thing."

Mrs. Ronald Niznik, 1614 Balmoral, does not think we should back down in Vietnam. "We can't let the Communists take over the whole country, that would be cowardly. We are only defending our rights, but it looks like we are headed for war."

Miss Linda Abrams, 6917 North Rockwell, believes the whole situation is tragic. "My brother is going to be called up soon, so I have a personal involvement. Still I can't see us backing out of Vietnam. We have to go on until a solution is reached, one way or the other."

Mrs. Joseph Schanes, 4443 North Maplewood, has a 19-year-old son who may be in the service soon. "I'd hate to see him sent to Vietnam. I don't like the situation over there at all. France was in there for 18 years, and it didn't do them any good; they had to pull out. We should do the same."

"I'm very sad about the whole thing," related Mrs. Thomas Chappell, 2635 Greenleaf. "I don't think it's necessary for us to fight in Vietnam. The powers that be want war, but the people want peace. Now we've got our foot in the bottom of the barrel, and we can't get it out. The truth is that we here in Chicago don't know what's going on behind the scenes in Washington."

Joseph Dickstein, 2832 Estes, told us he is 21, but since he is a student at the University of Chicago, he is not likely to be called to the Army. "But something has to be done in Vietnam, I see no solution the way things are going now. All the troops we have there now don't seem to be helping matters, but pulling our troops out would do no good, either. I guess we'll have to increase our forces."

Robert Carlock, 1744 Juneway, admitted that he was a pacifist, a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and active with the Voters for Peace:

"I am against all killing, whether it is done in Vietnam or in Stateville. I am 29 years old, but I will refuse to take part in this war, or any unjust war. I will not cooperate in any way, and I will not pay taxes to keep the war going. The Vietcong are native to all of Vietnam, not only the northern portion of it. There was supposed to be an election in Vietnam a long time ago, but our then President Eisenhower refused to allow it."

Miss Catherine O'Connell, 6356 North Paulina, thinks we shouldn't be in Vietnam at all. "I'm glad I haven't got a son, to go marching off to that place to fight. Why don't they use their own men, instead of expecting us to send our boys over? It won't be long before we'll be fighting China, too. I say it's all politics, rotten politics."

A woman who claimed to have some degree of intuition was Mrs. Raymond Allen, 6231 North Mozart. "The fighting will be ended before the end of the year," she prognosticated. "And we won't have to pull out, either, because they will surrender."

"I'm an old lady," said Mrs. Jack Schnur, 1971 Farragut, "and I'm lucky to be alive. I lost one boy in the last war, and I think war is a terrible thing. But we have to do something, we can't let the Communists take over the whole world."

Mrs. Gus Edelman, 6301 North Sheridan, says she views the situation in Vietnam with mixed emotions. "The South Vietnamese

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need help, but why should it be only us to help them? It should be all the nations of the world. There's going to be a war eventually, and after we've won it we're going to have to police the country forever.

"I have a son, 18, and to tell you the truth, I'm frightened. We're being polite to keep the other nations from stepping in. I go to bed at nights wondering what it's all about. I guess all we can do is hope and pray."

"I only know what I read in the papers," confided Mrs. Benjamin Brown, "but I think President Johnson is doing the right thing. I'm not happy about us sending more troops into Vietnam, but the aggressor must be stopped in time, or he will go on, taking one country after another, the way Hitler did."

We got the reaction of a 13-year-old when we talked to Blanche Wajda, 1807 Lunt. "Well," she replied, "the only thing I've got to say is, I hope too many people don't get killed, either ours or theirs."

Mrs. Irving Rubin, 1923 Lunt, was pessimistic. "Things don't look very good for us right now, but, as President Johnson said, 'We have to keep going.' I feel sorry for the poor boys who are going over there to fight, for what? We can only hope for the best."

Dorothy Becker, 5244 North California, thinks we should go along with the President. "He is planning things, so let's go along with him and see what happens. It doesn't look too good for us now, but those men in Washington know what they're doing."

Another woman who said she had mixed emotions was Mrs. Abe Siegel. "Everything that can be done is being done. We can't leave the South Vietnamese alone; they will be completely overrun by the Communists. I don't like to see our boys being sent over there, but we can't let the Communists take over."

Mrs. William Burns, 1438 Hollywood, told us she had nephews in both the Marines and the Army. "I don't like this whole business in Vietnam. I don't feel we have any business being there, because we don't really know what's going on. If we wanted to go in, we should have gone in full force, not the way we did it."

Mrs. Walter Anderson, 7410 North Winchester, declared, "We can't pull out, and we can't win the way we're going. It's costing us a fortune in lives and in money. France fought there for years and couldn't win. I say the only solution is to use the atom bomb on them."

Mrs. Leon Barazowski, 1619 Balmoral, thinks it would be useless to use the atom bomb in Vietnam because the people are scattered all over the countryside. "We should either get out, or go in and clean up, not diddle-daddle around. We are the strongest Nation in the strength to clean up a little world, and we have enough war like that one."

Benjamin R. Hanby—"The Stephen Foster of Ohio"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLARENCE J. BROWN

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 9, 1965

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, Hon. Earl R. Hoover, of Cleveland, Ohio, one of our State's most prominent jurists, on yesterday evening, Sunday, August 8, delivered an address at the National Presbyterian Church, well-known as the church of the Presidents, here in Washington, on the life of one

of Ohio's greatest sons, Benjamin R. Hanby, often called the Stephen Foster of Ohio.

Benjamin R. Hanby made history not only in Ohio, but for the entire American Republic during the dark days of the Civil War, and before and after them. I feel that the story of his life, as so well outlined by Judge Hoover in his address, should become a matter of public record, and for that reason I have asked unanimous consent that the same be printed in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The address is as follows:

BENJAMIN R. HANBY—THE STEPHEN FOSTER OF OHIO

An address given by Judge Earl R. Hoover, of Cleveland, Ohio, to the Sunday Evening Club, at the National Presbyterian Church, known as the church of the Presidents, Connecticut Avenue and N Street NW., Washington, D.C., August 8, 1965

Really now, that title doesn't sound very exciting, does it? To the contrary, the life of this young Ohio composer was one of the vital, exciting ones that challenged the American scene a hundred years ago. He was just a youth, he was completely obscure, and he lived at small places, just at crossroads, but he did something that more of us should do more often. He took an interest in the big problems of his time. Some hurled sermons and speeches at them. Some hurled columns of soldiers or columns of print. He did it in a different way. He hurled his songs at them with unbelievable historymaking effect. I challenge you to listen and not be inspired by this amazing life.

This is the story of Ohio's bard. The youth whose music has now become so world famous that he is called "The Stephen Foster of Ohio." Indeed, this is a gripping saga of Ohio, of the whole United States, and of the world.

It begins in that typically American way. The year is now 1833. In a humble cottage a half mile from the village of Rushville, near Lancaster, there in southeastern Ohio, proud parents—the Reverend and Mrs. William Hanby—look down into the cradle of a new son. They christen him Benjamin—Benjamin Russell Hanby. Born in 1833 near an Ohio crossroad, Ben dies prematurely in Chicago in 1887, but I'd like to prove tonight that what he crowded into those 33 short years can never die.

In this epic story move Generals Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Lee, and Pickett; slavery; the underground railroad; the War Between the States; the Battle of Gettysburg; the siege of Vicksburg; the march from Atlanta to the sea; politics; political campaigns; Negro minstrel troupes; Col. Robert G. Ingersoll and James G. Blaine; Dwight L. Moody and Ira D. Sankey; Robert Todd Lincoln and Teddy Roosevelt; folk song and folk dancing; the Kentucky mountains; the Church of England; a young principal of an Ohio academy who had to resign because he wrote a song; a young Ohio minister who was forced to give up his pulpit because he brought musical instruments into the church; a youth whose music swerved the course of history, helped to bring on the War Between the States, enlivened the campfires both of the Confederacy and of the Union, of the pioneer traveling West in his covered wagon, and of cowboys driving cattle on that Old Chisholm Trail from Texas to Abilene; music—immortal music that encompassed the globe and still, after a century, is sung on every continent.

Yes, almost 100 years have gone since that premature death at the age of 33, but the printing presses still grind out more than four of his songs. Three are sung around the world. Two are so generally known that

they are sung by schoolchildren, yours and mine. One song, a Christian hymn, is famous throughout the British Empire and is heard wherever British men lift their voices to God, from the most stately cathedrals of the Church of England in that little rock-ribbed Isle to the most rustic missions in the far-flung reaches of Empire. And one song, written when he was only 23, stirred this Nation, made history.

It would be interesting to ask the first 10 people you meet tomorrow: "Have you ever heard of Benjamin Hanby?" The nays would be almost unanimous. Yet, if you were to ask, "Have you ever heard of the old favorite song 'Darling Nelly Gray,'" the ayes would be unanimous. Then, shocked would they be if you were to tell them that "Darling Nelly Gray" was written, not by Pennsylvania's Stephen Foster, but by Ohio's Benjamin Hanby. Even few Ohioans know that "Nellie Gray" was written on Ohio soil by a native son and has been officially dedicated as "Ohio's Folk Song." And even so peerless an historian as Bruce Cotton has twice mistakenly credited it to Foster.

It would be unfair to ask this generation who "Nelly Gray" was, or how the song happened to be written, or what tremendous effect it had upon American history. That is the thrilling story time forgot. May we try to recapture it tonight?

The year is now 1856. Franklin Pierce is President. The Nation is in turmoil over slavery. In 5 years, the rumble of drums and the rumble of artillery will touch off civil war. Over in central Ohio, about 10 miles north of Columbus, upon what is now State route No. 3, the village of Westerville wallows in the mud and nurtures a small debt-ridden college that had been founded there only 9 years before by the United Brethren Church.

Small Otterbein College, with no historic prestige and only a handful of students, how could anything great or immortal come out of you. But wait destiny. You have yet to reckon with a young sophomore who is enrolled now. His name is Benjamin Hanby.

Of all the living creatures that remain in Westerville today that saw the young sophomore take his pen in hand, and, on a desk made by his own hands, write a song that he called "Darling Nelly Gray"—all that remain are those giant elms spreading their protective arms over the campus, keeping the vigil of a century that Otterbein celebrated 18 years ago in 1947.

Little does the young Otterbein College sophomore dream this day as he mails his manuscript to a Boston publisher, the great Oliver Ditson Co., that the words and melody from his pen will be so historymaking that some day, 80 years later, the great State of Ohio will come to the village of Westerville, and acquire, to preserve as a museum and shrine for all time, the humble little house facing the Otterbein College campus in which he lived and wrote "Darling Nelly Gray"—the first shrine established by the State of Ohio in tribute to a musician.

I submit that this is a singular tribute by a great State that has given such eminent songwriters to the world as Dan Emmett, born and buried in Mt. Vernon, Ohio, who wrote "Dixie"; Tell Taylor, of Findlay, Ohio, who wrote "Down by the Old Mill Stream"; Oley Speaks, of Canal Winchester, Ohio, who composed "On the Road to Mandalay"; and Cleveland's own Ernest R. Ball.

Who ever heard of Ernest Ball? Let me see your hands? Well, I get very few or no hands from a Cleveland audience either. Ernest Ball just happened to compose "Mother Machree," "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling," "Let the Rest of the World Go By," "A Little Bit of Heaven," "Till the Sands of the Desert Grow Cold," "In the Garden of My Heart," "I'll Forget You," "Love Me and the World Is Mine," "Dear Little Boy of Mine," "West of the Great Divide" and, in

With all strength, all sincerity I can command, I say, "Happy birthday WRIGHT PATMAN" or, in one of the languages of the border country, "Feliz cumpleaños, Señor PATMAN."

Carl T. Rowan

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 9, 1965

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, Carl T. Rowan recently announced his resignation as Director of the U.S. Information Agency. This is a great loss to the country and to the world.

I had the great pleasure of knowing Mr. Rowan when we both served as alternate U.S. representatives to the 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1962. At that time he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. He subsequently served with distinction as Ambassador to Finland until he assumed the directorship of the USIA in January 1964.

In the year and a half he spent at that post, Carl Rowan succeeded admirably in the crucial task of interpreting to the world the true quality of American life. The three chief mandates of the USIA are to encourage public support abroad for the goal of a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others; to identify the United States as a strong, democratic nation qualified for its leadership in world efforts toward this goal; and to counter hostile attempts to distort these objectives of the United States.

During Mr. Rowan's administration, the Agency attempted to provide accurate and balanced information on civil rights and racial issues in the United States. One of the Agency's films, "Nine From Little Rock," won an Academy Award in April 1965. The documentary illustrates civil rights progress by showing the successes achieved by the original nine students integrated into Little Rock High School in 1957. This marked the first occasion that the Agency won an Oscar for its productions.

The Agency's efforts to put our racial tensions into honest perspective are beginning to bear fruit. The worldwide reaction to events in and around Selma, Ala., was markedly better than reaction to earlier racial crises. The bulk of international attention to the Selma events gave less weight to the tragic events there than to the sweeping response of the National Government and the American people.

In addition to explaining civil rights progress to our overseas audience, much of Mr. Rowan's term was devoted to reassuring the world that the assassination of President Kennedy would not interfere with the orderly continuation of our form of democracy. The USIA dis-

tributed to 111 countries its documentary motion picture, "The President," which emphasized that the policies promulgated by the slain President would be carried out by his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. It is estimated that all USIA film attendance records were broken by this film, with the number of viewers at over 750 million.

During Mr. Rowan's administration, extraordinary progress was made in transmitting USIA broadcasts over television stations abroad. On August 29, Polish television will transmit a 45-minute program, marking the first occasion that USIA and Poland have collaborated on the production of TV documentary. The program will be divided between the visit of the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra to Poland and the visit of the Warsaw Philharmonic Orchestra to the United States. By the end of May, five communications satellite programs to Europe had originated in USIA's television studios.

Of the various issues faced by Mr. Rowan, none proved more troublesome than the struggle in Vietnam. Despite the great difficulties, it is my hope that the USIA will continue to rely on the truth as its best weapon. United States purposes in Vietnam, as the rest of the world, will be best achieved by following the advice Carl Rowan gave in a speech he delivered at Washburn University on May 31, 1964:

I have no weapon except the truth—the truth about what man can achieve in a society where the individual is respected and where men are free to worship and speak, free to be different, free to live by the dictates of their own consciences so long as they do not deny the same freedoms to others.

I want to join with Carl Rowan's many friends here in the House in wishing him well in his future activities. But he will be sorely missed in the U.S. Government.

The Honorable Wright Patman

SPEECH

OF

HON. JOSEPH G. MINISH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to join in paying well deserved tribute to the gentleman from Texas, the distinguished chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, the Honorable WRIGHT PATMAN, upon the occasion of his 72d birthday.

It has been a treasured experience to serve on the committee under Mr. PATMAN, whose wholehearted dedication to the welfare of the American people is an example and a spur to all his colleagues. He is eloquent proof of the adage that hard work never killed anyone—he has thrived under an incredible workload during his long and brilliant service in the House. The whole Nation has immeasurably benefited from his courageous, unyielding insistence that the rights of the people must prevail over

special interests. He has been a valiant warrior in behalf of those least able to defend their own interests, and he has the satisfaction of knowing that he has made a vital contribution to our Nation.

I am personally most appreciative of Chairman PATMAN's unfailing patience and consideration. His wisdom, endurance, integrity, devotion to duty, serenity and kindness have earned him the affection and admiration of all the members and have made service under his chairmanship most rewarding in all respects.

I congratulate Mr. PATMAN upon all his achievements and I wish him many more years of service.

Abraham J. Multer
In Reply to Mr. Lippmann

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 9, 1965

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following editorial from the July 27, 1965, edition of the New York Herald Tribune. Mr. Walter Lippmann, in his column of the same date, criticized the U.S. policy in Vietnam, calling it "the conception of ourselves as the solitary policeman of mankind." I agree with the editorial in taking exception to this criticism. The United States does not involve itself indiscriminately in any instance of conflict in the world. Southeast Asia is an area in which this country has been called upon to assume special responsibilities and obligations. Weakening now would only invite expanded aggression and label the United States an undependable ally. Our role in Vietnam is anti-imperialist, a role in which we need never fear being solitary.

The editorial follows:

IN REPLY TO MR. LIPPMANN

In his column today, Mr. Walter Lippmann equates the Herald Tribune's defense of the American role in Vietnam with "the conception of ourselves as the solitary policeman of mankind," a conception which he calls "a dangerous form of self-delusion."

To recognize that the United States has a policeman's role to play in Vietnam—in the sense of enforcing the "laws" against armed aggression—is hardly to set the United States up as "the solitary policeman of mankind." This latter is a role the United States neither should nor could play; an ordinary border dispute between, say, two African states, or even the grueling contest between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus, doesn't command the dispatch of U.S. troops to keep or restore the peace.

Southeast Asia, however, is a corner of the world in which the United States has assumed special responsibilities, and thus special obligations: it is, furthermore, a fighting front in which the confrontation is directly with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, but indirectly with the Chinese Reds. This puts it in a very special light. There is no secret of the extent of Red Chinese ambitions. Neither can there be any illusion that a surrender in South Vietnam would satisfy the Chinese appetite. Quite the contrary, it would prove Mao's thesis that

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the United States is, when the going gets rough, an undependable ally, with the lesson lost neither on Peiping nor on its next-targeted victims.

When Mr. Lippmann asks how many Vietnams the United States can defend in Asia, perhaps the best reply is an indirect one. How many are there to be? And if we yield in the present confrontation, how much more difficult will be the next? The one thing as nearly certain as anything can be in that agonizing contest is that to weaken now would openly invite expanded aggression. For better or for worse, the United States is the "policeman" on which the threatened peoples in China's expansionist path depend for whatever hope they have of independence and freedom. And, unless and until the enemy shows a disposition to negotiate a settlement or to halt his incursions, this imposes a burden not lightly to be laid down.

Our role in Vietnam is not antirevolutionary; not merely a defender of the status quo or of an established regime. It's basically anti-imperialist, which is quite another thing entirely—and one on which we shouldn't fear for our company.

Repeal of Section 14(b)

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BASIL L. WHITENER

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 9, 1965

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker, recently there has been a great deal of concern on the part of many with reference to the activities of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America. This has been particularly true since the appearance of a representative of that organization before the Committee on Education and Labor when that committee was hearing testimony on the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.

On August 3, 1965, Bishop Earl G. Hunt, Jr., of the Western North Carolina Annual Conference of the Methodist Church wrote to me outlining the position of his cabinet on this very controversial issue. Since I was greatly impressed by the statement of Bishop Hunt and the cabinet, I hope it will be of equal interest to my colleagues. I, therefore, insert the letter in the Appendix of the RECORD:

THE METHODIST CHURCH,
Charlotte, N.C., August 3, 1965.

HON. BASIL L. WHITENER,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. WHITENER: It has come to the attention of the bishop and the district superintendents of the Western North Carolina Annual Conference of the Methodist Church that the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America on June 4, 1965, presented testimony at the hearing of the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor on the proposed repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. This testimony, offered by the Reverend J. Edward Carothers, associate general secretary of the National Division of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church, and also a member of the program board of the Division of Christian Life and Mission of the National

Council of Churches and secretary of its Commission on the Church and Economic Life, dealt with the National Council's declared belief in "the freedom of labor and management to bargain on issues of mutual concern" and espoused repeal of the law in question on the ground that it presently interferes with such bargaining freedom.

Widespread objection to this position has appeared in the more heavily industrialized areas of the South, based upon the conviction that the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act would be tantamount, in some instances, to compulsory union membership.

The cabinet of the Western North Carolina Annual Conference of the Methodist Church recognizes that, in harmony with the catholic dimension of the denomination, Methodism must always keep ample room within itself for authentic Christian representation of the viewpoint of both management and labor. The cabinet further acknowledges the full right of Dr. Carothers, both as an individual Christian and a duly authorized officer of the National Council of Churches, to appear before the Subcommittee on Labor.

However, because of its own intimate exposure to certain problems implicit in highly industrialized communities and because of its grave official concern that basic freedom for both management and labor shall at all times have adequate safeguards, the cabinet desires to reflect to you its conviction that the position taken by Dr. Carothers on behalf of the National Council of Churches in the testimony referred does not represent the point of view of large members of Methodists in this annual conference.

The cabinet also wishes to record its conviction that the position taken by Dr. Carothers on behalf of the National Council of Churches is weakened by the fact that it does not suggest the necessity of providing new safeguards in lieu of those which would be removed by the repeal of section 14(b). It is our judgment that union membership as a basis of continued employment should neither be required nor prohibited by law, or by contract resulting from union management negotiations. To compel a person to be a contributing member of any organization against his conscience is wrong, whether the vehicle of compulsion is legislation or a contract negotiated by representatives of management and organized labor requiring union membership as a condition of employment.

We appreciate the opportunity to present our point of view to you.

Sincerely yours,

BISHOP EARL G. HUNT, JR.,
Resident Bishop of the Charlotte Area.
R. HERMAN NICHOLSON,
Secretary to the Cabinet.

A Vacation for Congress

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 9, 1965

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, in my testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress on May 11, I voiced a plea for a congressional vacation each summer, particularly in view of the fact that the sessions seem to grow longer and longer each year, thus depriving those of us with children the pleasure of spending some time with our families.

In the Long Island Press of yesterday, I was therefore delighted to read its editorial proposing a permanent policy of summer vacations. I could not agree more heartily, and am taking the liberty of inserting the editorial in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the benefit of my colleagues.

The article follows:

A VACATION FOR CONGRESS

Congress is showing an increasing fretfulness commonly called adjournment fever.

It is a congenital ailment, but this year it seems more acute than usual.

The 89th Congress' symptoms became strikingly apparent around the Fourth of July. After the long winter through spring haul, the lawmakers expected a 10-day recess. They didn't get it because of the pressure of administration measures regarded as must legislation.

Since then there has been a noticeable effort to get long weekends whenever possible. That explains the rush-sessions on certain bills along about Thursday of the workweek.

Andrew J. Viglietta, manager of our Washington bureau, in his column today, tells how Congress is looking forward to adjournment by the Labor Day weekend.

Congressmen are like other human beings. When they work hard they tire. When they work too hard or for too long an unbroken period they get irritable. When they get irritable the pressure rises. If they get too irritable and done in, there's the danger we're not getting the best work out of them.

Like other people they wish they could take vacations when other people are taking theirs. They'd like to be free when their children are having vacations from school.

Who can blame them?

Congress should have a summer vacation. It wouldn't be too bad for the country if it had one right now, say until after Labor Day. Members could then come back fresh and finish up their work. But Congress, hungry as it is for a rest, wouldn't like that. It would rather grin and bear it, and push through until Labor Day, and then be free until January, barring emergencies.

A better idea perhaps would be to change Congress' schedule, giving it by law a summer vacation, say the month of August. Members then could plan their work accordingly.

Some years Congress dawdles, particularly in the early months. In election years—every 2 years—it puts the pressure on, if need be, by straining to get free to do their electioneering.

With the record it is setting this session, Congress should be able to look forward to surcease in 1966. The more work on administration bills accomplished this year, the better the chances of early adjournment next summer.

Congress has, indeed, made a remarkable record—with the President, of course, pushing. Medicare, voting rights, excise tax reduction, aid to education, progress on modernizing immigration laws—all are brilliant feathers in its cap.

Congress has not been shy about pay demands. Last year it voted itself \$7,500 raises bringing the pay to \$30,000 a year. This week a House committee voted to give Congress a raise along with other Federal employees, which could lift Congressmen's salaries to \$33,400 in the next 2 years.

Why it doesn't ask for a permanent policy of summer vacations is beyond us.

That would come under the heading of working conditions and what working man today doesn't regard conditions as important as pay guarantees in his working arrangement?