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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

August 24, 1965

HUMPHREY CHIDES ANTIWAR PICKETS—BIDS COLLEGE STUDENTS AVOID "DESTRUCTIVE" PROTESTS

(By Donald Janson)

MADISON, Wis., August 23.—While pickets chanted outside, Vice President HUMPHREY urged college students today to replace destructive demonstrations with constructive social action.

"The right to be heard does not automatically include the right to be taken seriously," he told the opening session of the annual congress of the National Student Association.

"To be taken seriously depends entirely upon what is being said," he declared.

What was being said outside the University of Wisconsin's theater in the Student Union Building was that the United States should sue for peace in Vietnam.

Forty-two marchers greeted the Vice President when he arrived with signs saying "Get Out of Vietnam." The number had doubled by the time he finished speaking.

The students and townspeople, largely members of the Committee To End the War in Vietnam and the Student Peace Center at the university, sang freedom songs and chanted "peace now."

DEPARTS FROM TEXT

A group of convention delegates responded, in the staccato unison shouts of a football cheer, "rip 'em up, tear 'em up, give 'em hell, HUBERT."

Inside, Mr. HUMPHREY departed from his text several times to comment on the demonstration.

"I saw some signs that said get out of Vietnam," he asserted. "I agree. But in our getting out we don't want to let somebody else take over."

"If you can show us how to get out of Vietnam without the Communists taking over in Saigon without South Vietnam losing what freedom it has left, we'll put the placards that are around here in the Hall of Fame instead of the hall of shame."

"But the signs offer no alternative: just leave. I can promise you, we do not intend to just leave."

The audience of 1,000 responded with an ovation. The delegates are here from 300 colleges and universities affiliated with the student association. They frequently applauded the Vice President's explanation of administration policy on Vietnam.

There was no heckling inside the auditorium, where only delegates were permitted.

Mr. HUMPHREY praised the student union as one that knew how to "differentiate between constructive and destructive protest." He urged the students to direct their energies toward teaching and training and otherwise helping deprived people to profit by social and economic legislation recently enacted by Congress.

Outside the pickets were joined by W. M. Grengg, a physicist whose sign said "scientists, physicians, and engineers formerly for Johnson and HUMPHREY."

MOST VITAL U.S. WEAPON IN VIETNAM—AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO STICK IT OUT

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, the determination expressed by the Vice President in Madison, Wis., yesterday to stay in Vietnam until we can negotiate a settlement that protects the independence of South Vietnam is the kind of national determination that may be our most important weapon in this tough, perplexing contest.

Evans and Novak spell out the cautious optimism that realists are beginning to feel about our Vietnam prospects.

Not that the war will now be easy. The very opposite—the fact that it will be tough and long and hard—is true, and in spite of this our top officials are determined to see it through.

This idea seems to have permeated the understanding of leaders in Moscow. When it reaches the understanding of those in Hanoi and Peiping, the prospects for negotiation and settlement will be greatly enhanced.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Evans and Novak be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CLIMBING BACK IN VIETNAM

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

Although it would be a dangerous error to overplay the importance of a single localized action, the bloody marine victory over the Vietcong on the Vantuong Peninsula symbolizes an improved overall situation in Vietnam.

"We're still going downhill," says one top administration policymaker, "but we're bottoming out. Then we start the long climb back up."

By no means is the improvement strictly military or even mainly military. In the first place, evidence is now available that the Soviet Union, partly as a result of Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman's "vacation" in Moscow last month, is now fully convinced of the total U.S. commitment in the war. Presumably Moscow is passing this along to Hanoi.

Although the official Moscow word to the United States is that "you can't win," the growing evidence of the U.S. commitment has deeply impressed the Russians.

Unlike Moscow, Hanoi has never been faced with a U.S. commitment of the kind that forced the Russians to turn their missile-loaded ships away from Cuba in October 1962. Hanoi's knowledge of the West, instead, derives from the French experience of a decade ago. Under the influence of Communist labor unions, French dockworkers refused to load supplies for French battalions in Indochina.

Remembering the French experience, the North Vietnamese mission in Moscow stockpiles a daily file of every incident in the United States—newspaper editorials, signed advertisements, peace demonstrations—as proof that the United States, like the French, will tire of the war and "bug out."

But the weight of evidence the other way, coupled with Harriman's stern message to Moscow, is now for the first time forcing Hanoi to confront the truth—that the United States just won't be pushed out.

Several other factors must be fed into this new psychological equation. For more than 6 weeks now, the number of Vietcong attacks (called the "incident rate" in Pentagonese) has been lower than normal.

In addition, the tough-minded G-2 (intelligence) estimates the ratio of captured weapons has been running about 2 to 1 against the Vietcong—a radical switch from several months ago. The parallel Vietcong recruitment problem has been much publicized, with 15-year-olds being forcibly drafted in southern hamlets and made to fight the United States and Saigon.

Finally, evidence accumulates in the form of captured orders and prisoner interrogation that this year's feared monsoon offensive of the Vietcong so far has been a severe disappointment, perhaps even a flop. And the dry season is not far off.

None of this rules out a major Communist offensive in the vulnerable highlands, where the Vietcong has been gaining local victories,

to cut the nation in two. But with Vietcong supplies far lower than expected at this stage of monsoon operations, U.S. strategists now hope the highly touted offensive will end without the Vietcong having made a major breakthrough.

It is against that backdrop that the marine success on Vantuong must be viewed.

This was the first time a large U.S. force had located and engaged a large Vietcong force. Although U.S. strategists play it in low key, the fact is that the operation was conceived, planned, and executed by Uncle Sam. This prevented the leaks and fumbles that ruined similar efforts by the Vietnamese Army in the past.

With more and more U.S. ground troops available in widely scattered parts of the country, future operations on this relatively grand scale will increase.

This is important not just for military consequences as measured by dead Vietcong but even more so for morale: the morale boost for South Vietnam, the morale drop for the Vietcong (assured repeatedly that U.S. troops would cower in well-defended coastal positions, and never take the field).

Though far from comprising a bright picture, these improvements point the way toward eventual success and mock the gloom-and-doom critics of President Johnson on Capitol Hill.

BIG U.S. WEAKNESS IN VIETNAM: IGNORANCE

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, this morning's Wall Street Journal carries a brilliant article spelling out a serious U.S. weakness in South Vietnam: the intelligence gap.

Philip Geyelin writes of how substantial and rich is the information available and developed by our low-level officials. Listen to this:

Ultimately the richest lode is found at the bottom of the bureaucratic pile among a small but growing band of youthful American political warriors. Some are military officers, others budding diplomats, or foreign aid operatives, or U.S. Information Agency officers. Their diverse official auspices are less important than the qualities they share. At least some fluency in Vietnamese for example; deep dedication and a scholar's approach to the new arts of counterinsurgency; a real zeal for hazardous frontline duty in remote hamlets; a remarkable grasp of all the interrelating military, political, economic, and psychological elements of the Vietnam conflict to an extent unmatched almost anywhere along the chain of command except perhaps at the very top.

But, as Geyelin says, something happens to this intelligence on the way to the top.

The tough problem in Vietnam is that it is complex. It is not simply a matter of winning a military victory. Yes, it is that, but that is only the beginning. It is also a matter of winning economic victories and educational and social victories, and convincing the Vietnamese that we are on their side, hamlet by hamlet, village by village; and that will take time and intelligence and sacrifice, perhaps more of it than most Americans begin to realize.

I ask unanimous consent that the Geyelin article from this morning's Wall Street Journal be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

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solving the kinds of problems presented so acutely by the Northeast water crisis.

Hitherto, such water shortages have been primarily a problem for the arid West, except for the occasional, cyclical droughts such as created the "dust bowl" in the southern Midwest during the early 1930's.

In recent years, however, water shortages have become a truly national, rather than a regional, problem. The Water Resources Planning Act provides the machinery by which State, local, and Federal governments can cooperate in long-range planning to meet the ever-growing water shortage problem.

The September 9 meeting between the Council and the Interior Committee will be the first held under the new program established by the law, and on behalf of the committee I wish to invite any Member of the Senate to attend and participate in the discussion and review. The place will be the Interior Committee Room, 3110 New Senate Office Building, and the time 10:00 o'clock.

If any Senator wishes to make a statement or other presentation, I ask that he notify our committee and we will be happy to hear him. Otherwise we are limiting this informational hearing to departmental witnesses only.

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON NOMINATION OF WILLIAM O. MEHRTENS, OF FLORIDA, TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday, August 31, 1965, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2228 New Senate Office Building, on the nomination of William O. Mehtens, of Florida, to be U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, Vice Emmet C. Choate, retired.

At the indicated time and place persons interested in the hearing may make such representations as may be pertinent.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] chairman, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], and the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA].

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF NOMINATIONS BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I desire to announce that yesterday the Senate received the nominations of Barnard Zagorin, of Virginia, to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Dr. Gustav Ranis, of Connecticut, to be Assistant Administrator for Program Coordination, Agency for International Development.

In accordance with the committee rule, these pending nominations may not be considered prior to the expiration of 8 days of their receipt in the Senate.

ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, August 24, 1965, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills:

- S. 69. An act for the relief of Mrs. Genevieve Olsen;
- S. 97. An act for the relief of Lt. Raymond E. Berube, Jr.;
- S. 134. An act for the relief of Lloyd K. Hirota;
- S. 572. An act for the relief of Robert L. Wolverton;
- S. 1138. An act for the relief of Lt. Robert C. Gibson;
- S. 1196. An act for the relief of Wright G. James; and
- S. 1267. An act for the relief of Jack C. Winn, Jr.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House insisted upon its amendments to the bill (S. 618) for the relief of Nora Isabella Samuelli, disagreed to by the Senate; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. ASHMORE, Mr. SENNER, and Mr. HUTCHINSON were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the Vice President:

- H.R. 485. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Auburn-Folsom unit, American River division, Central Valley project, California, under Federal reclamation laws;
- H.R. 1481. An act for the relief of the estate of Donovan C. Moffett;
- H.R. 1763. An act to amend section 1825 of title 28 of the United States Code to authorize the payment of witness fees in habeas corpus cases and in proceedings to vacate sentence under section 2255 of title 28 for persons who are authorized to proceed in forma pauperis;
- H.R. 3750. An act for the relief of certain individuals;
- H.R. 3990. An act to amend section 1871 of title 28, United States Code, to increase the per diem and subsistence, and limit mileage allowances of grand and petit jurors;
- H.R. 3992. An act to amend section 753(f) of title 28, United States Code, relating to transcripts furnished by court reporters for the district courts;
- H.R. 3997. An act to amend section 753(b) of title 28, United States Code, to provide for the recording of proceedings in the U.S. district courts by means of electronic sound recording as well as by shorthand or mechanical means;
- H.R. 4719. An act for the relief of Josephine C. Rumley, administratrix of the estate of George S. Rumley;
- H.R. 5401. An act to amend the Interstate Commerce Act so as to strengthen and improve the national transportation system, and for other purposes;
- H.R. 5497. An act to amend paragraphs b and c of section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act; and
- H.R. 9544. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of approximately 620,000 long

tons of natural rubber from the national stockpile.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia: Article entitled "The Negro After Watts," published in Time magazine of August 27, 1965; and

Article entitled "Restoration of a Picturesque Landmark," published in the Sunday Gazette-Mail State magazine, of Charleston, W. Va., on August 22, 1965.

By Mr. THURMOND: Article entitled "Parallel Directions in Church and State," written by William C. Morris, and published in the News and Courier, Charleston, S.C., August 8, 1965.

Letter written by Mrs. Lillie Schuster, Hanahan, S.C., August 3, 1965.

By Mr. MUSKIE: Articles entitled "The Rambler Has Vacation Adventure," dealing with the writer's experiences on vacation in Maine, published in the Washington Star of August 16, 1965.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY AT UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN: OBJECT LESSON IN HOW TO HANDLE PROTEST

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Vice President of the United States spoke at the University of Wisconsin yesterday and did a magnificent job of showing how to handle demonstrating protesters and do so in the American tradition of full and free discussion and in the Wisconsin tradition of sifting and winnowing to determine the truth.

The Vice President did not come to the University to discuss Vietnam, but the presence of 42 protesters—nearly a hundred before he was through—persuaded him to remark on it briefly.

The Vice President contributed to the protest that has stirred academic communities over Vietnam an idea that should be pondered long and thoughtfully. He recognized the right to speak out, but added:

The right to be heard does not automatically include the right to be taken seriously. To be taken seriously depends entirely upon what is being said.

In answer to signs telling the Vice President that we should get out of Vietnam, he responded:

If you can show us how to get out of Vietnam without the Communists taking over in Saigon, without South Vietnam losing what freedom it has left, we will put the placards that are around here in the hall of fame instead of the hall of shame. But the signs offer no alternative, just leave. I can promise you we do not intend to just leave.

I ask unanimous consent that an article from the New York Times by Donald Janson, reporting the Vice President's appearance be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

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VOID IN VIETNAM: UNITED STATES KNOWS
LITTLE ABOUT ITS FOE, NOT MUCH MORE
ABOUT ALLY

(By Philip Geyelin)

WASHINGTON—One of the more disquieting discoveries made on a tour of South Vietnam is the amount of sheer ignorance about friend as well as foe upon which the most portentous decisions back here must, of necessity, be based.

President Johnson constructs a case with fine precision for each new move he makes; Secretary of Defense McNamara builds in detailed and dazzling statistical support; Secretary of State Rusk adds sturdy logic to the policy underpinnings. Yet it becomes increasingly apparent, as you dig deeper in, that much of this rests on shifting sands of uncertainties, unknowns, even unknowables.

The President and his war counselors have no end of secret intelligence data. But the bulk of it comes from Vietnamese—who have no end of axes to grind. Much of it is also belated, just because everything has to be double-checked, and the best of it is, in the words of one authority, "simply not good enough."

The top men have pile upon pile of combat reports. But the recent confusion over results of the bomb raid against North Vietnamese missile sites is but one index to the unreliability of even eyewitness accounts—at jet speed. Enemy casualties, for another example, remain a mystery; to penetrate it often invites guesswork so wildly theoretical that U.S. military commanders in Saigon privately scoff at the results. Even the regular "progress" reports from the South Vietnamese on their own "pacification" efforts must be examined with a fishy eye; their contents, more often than not, are calculated largely to please.

American war-watchers in the field are richly endowed with rumor. But much of it is false, often maliciously so. What the Vietcong doesn't spread around, to confuse and mislead, the South Vietnamese will cheerfully circulate about each other. "I used to think Washington was rough on character assassination until I heard the South Vietnamese Buddhists talking about the Catholics and vice versa," says one old hand.

Such striking exceptions as last week's big Marine victory on Van Tuong peninsula only reinforce the rule. There, a massive Vietcong concentration, backed up against the seacoast, seemed almost to be inviting attack; skillfully it was trapped by an even more massive force of Marines. Finding, encircling and crushing a comparable force inland is much more difficult; chasing down smaller, hit-and-run guerrilla units tougher still.

The decisionmakers can deduce, and estimate, and guess. In time they can usually catch up to the truth. Moreover, in their defense, it must be said that large aspects of the Vietnam war are unavoidably impenetrable: The true intentions of the leadership in Hanoi, for example, the identity of the Vietcong terrorist in the village or the Vietcong agent in the upper reaches of the government, the whereabouts at crucial moments of enemy forces, the designs upon each other of Saigon's coup-makers.

But the fact still is that in the main, and at the time that it matters most, the decisionmakers don't really know what they are talking about. They are largely in the dark about the enemy and not much more solidly informed about supposed friends. They have only a remote sense of the sentiment of the Vietnamese populace, a fleeting feel for the course the conflict is taking or may take.

"WE'RE BLIND"

Not that they seriously pretend, at least in private, to anything else. "We're blind," confessed one top military commander in

Salgon, speaking of the U.S. combat intelligence capability. "With all this power, we're like a man fumbling around in a dark closet trying to catch a mouse."

And not that a visiting reporter is necessarily any better off. What he may, however, be able to define somewhat more exactly than a visiting U.S. dignitary may be able to, on his formal, official rounds, is the dimension of the intelligence gap. In attempting to do so, what is also revealed are some of the bureaucratic idiosyncrasies and impediments that may be making the gap somewhat wider than it has to be.

What appears to have happened, in the course of escalating the American effort in this hideously complicated, many-faceted war, is that the United States has hastily jerry-built a hideously complicated, many-faceted behemoth of a bureaucracy. The men at the very top, who must make the big decisions, are removed not once or twice but many times from their lower-level minions whose firsthand, frontline contact with the shadowy, essentially local Vietnam struggle makes them uniquely sensitive to what's really going on.

To a degree, this can't be helped; intelligence is always a headache in guerrilla war; bureaucracy balloons whenever governmental activity grows rapidly. But it is hard to escape the conclusion that a real effort to streamline the multiple chains of command and channels of information might well make the policymakers a little less remote from the realities. Granted, the upshot then might sometimes be greater, not less, uncertainty at the top. But a greater willingness to concede uncertainty might be useful in itself, if it served to restrain those who would have the United States plunge into deeper involvement in the struggle.

As it is, a rough rule of thumb applies: The further you proceed from Washington's policymaking peaks, down through the bureaucratic jungle in Saigon, past the painstakingly prepared, richly documented "briefings" and on out into the countryside, the more you are likely to encounter candor, a questioning spirit, honest diversity of view. The more you also encounter genuine, close-up expertise.

Ultimately, the richest lode is found at the bottom of the bureaucratic pile, among a small but growing band of youthful American political warriors. Some are military officers, others budding diplomats, or foreign aid operatives, or U.S. Information Agency officers. Their diverse official auspices are less important than the qualities they share: At least some fluency in Vietnamese, for example; deep dedication and a scholar's approach to the new arts of counterinsurgency; a real zeal for hazardous frontline duty in remote hamlets; a remarkable grasp of all the interrelated military, political, economic and psychological elements of the Vietnam conflict, to an extent unmatched almost anywhere along the chain of command, except perhaps at the very top.

Thus, some of the keenest insights are the farthest removed, by rank or reach, from the men who need them most. Moreover, something funny happens to low-level expert counsel on its way up the bureaucratic heights. It gets tailored for political comfort, or to fit preconceptions. For example, last year U.S. officials built an impressive case against bombing North Vietnam on grounds that the war in South Vietnam was largely a homegrown affair, which probably would rage on even without Hanoi's outside help. This year, with the decision to "bomb north" already made, a new case was constructed, along the lines that everything would be quite manageable in the south were it not for Hanoi's outside help and guidance. The justification, however—stepped-up infiltration and other assistance from the north—was difficult to document and, at best, a difference only in degree.

CATCHWORDS AND CLICHES

As information makes its way inexorably toward the President's desk it also gets condensed for quick comprehension; it gets reduced to catchwords or cliches, or committed to computers for display in glib statistics or graphic charts. No matter how carefully qualified and unsusceptible to generalities the original judgment may have been, the end product may have the appearance of unquestioned truth.

Combat casualties are a case in point. According to military authorities, the Air Force estimates the effects of its bombing attacks by a highly involved computation based on the area hit, the number of people that must have been in it, the number of bombs that should have landed in it. "Then they put those two unknowns together, come up with an apparent 'known,' and ship the figure off weekly to Washington," says one Saigon officer despairingly.

The very nomenclature of the enemy tends to mislead. As the U.S. Government would have it, the Vietcong are all Red, all under Hanoi's thumb and not engaged in promoting anything remotely resembling revolutionary causes that might just have some measure of popular sympathy. Few people on the scene snare that view; but their careful qualifications, which might someday become the basis for coming to terms with at least some elements of the enemy, are, even if accepted privately, certainly not conceded publicly by policymakers here.

Oversimplification, for the sake of making a political case, is no novelty. Nor does the high command privately pretend, as one of their number puts it, "not to know how little we know." A veteran Saigon hand is the first to admit that he is sometimes "appalled at the sort of information on which I had to advise the President." But if this is frank, it's hardly reassuring, and a couple of caveats are suggested by a study of the Vietnam intelligence void.

First, the illusion of knowledge can be infectious. As the United States stakes more and more on the Vietnam struggle, it may be all too easy to forget the struggle remains a rather uncertain, unpredictable game of chance; the knowledge gap is not necessarily narrowed by the arrival of another division of U.S. troops. Advocates of caution, then, have every right to claim this as a compelling argument.

Second, the fundamental requirement for intelligence puts a very real and practical limit on any effort to Americanize the war. In Congress and elsewhere, there are increasing cries that the time has come for U.S. forces to elbow the South Vietnamese aside and take over. But even if this concept were practical on other grounds, it collapses when you consider the intelligence need. In the last analysis, a cooperative Vietnamese populace, and an army reasonably loyal to the Saigon government and committed to the conflict, together hold the key to "finding and fixing" the enemy; at that point, U.S. firepower can possibly be brought to bear. But language barriers, not to mention the simple fact of being foreign, make it quite impossible for the Americans by themselves to flush out the Vietcong, except by such indiscriminate force that popular support would be alienated irretrievably and the whole point of the exercise lost.

THE THREAT OF PASSIVITY

This, then, is the real key to turning the tide in this political war. In the opinion of almost every expert on the scene, one of the gravest threats to U.S. aims is passivity; most Vietnamese have no reason to care. They will bend with the wind, whether it be Vietcong terror or Vietcong blandishments. The only real hope is that they can somehow be persuaded to bend to Saigon, and this, in the judgment of most, will require some more tangible display of Govern-

ment interest in their lot than destruction of their villages in quest of Vietcong.

It will take a long, patient, difficult Government program of social and political reform, skillfully promoted and stage managed by the United States—but from the wings. Done convincingly, as an adjunct to military security measures, the theory is, this can break the vicious circle that now makes physical security a prerequisite of collaboration with the Government in furnishing intelligence and makes timely intelligence a prerequisite to security. This wouldn't settle the war; but it might help set the stage for settlement.

For the United States, this means a greater effort to develop the particular blend of political, military, diplomatic, and economic expertise required to work effectively with the Government—in Saigon, at province headquarters, at district and village level. And this, in turn, many U.S. authorities believe, can be done not only by pooling individual U.S. agency talents in cumbersome collective efforts but by encouraging expansion of that breed of American political warrior in whom all these special talents are combined.

How this is already happening, and why it may not be happening as fast as it could, will be the subject of another report on the question of how Washington's hard pressed policymakers might be brought into closer contact with the day-to-day complexities and realities of Vietnam's war.

GENERALS TAYLOR AND WHEELER: EXPLANATION OF U.S. MILITARY TACTICS IN VIETNAM

MR. PROXMIER. Mr. President, I have been asked repeatedly by Wisconsin constituents, when I have been in the State and in correspondence, why we have to make war on the Vietnamese, why do we burn villages, who do we use the terrible weapons of death—including liquid fire and bombing. These are sensitive, sincere people asking these questions. They deserve answers.

In the splendid CBS series on Vietnam, top correspondents Cronkite, Kalischer, and Reasoner interviewed two of the men most expert and responsible on these subjects: Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle Wheeler. The questions were tough and searching. They were based on firsthand knowledge of the CBS correspondents.

These television broadcasts are unfortunately transient. Their impact is more potent than any communication media had ever been but the message fades and disappears rapidly. To preserve the revealing replies of Taylor and Wheeler in this perplexing situation, I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of this broadcast be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT—VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: "HOW WE CAN WIN"

(As broadcast over the CBS television network, Monday, Aug. 16, 1965, 10 to 11 p.m., e.d.t.; participants—former Ambassador Gen. Maxwell Taylor; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; reporters—CBS news correspondent Walter Cronkite, CBS news correspondent Peter Kalischer, CBS news correspondent Harry Reasoner)

MR. REASONER. Across from me sit two men high on the councils of the Government and

they have played major roles in directing our military and diplomatic efforts in Vietnam. Recently back from Saigon, this is our former Ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor, whose distinguished career includes leading parachutists into Normandy and heading our forces in Korea. He was also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Next to him is Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the present Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff who was in charge of all U.S. military operations. And seated with me are two CBS news colleagues, Walter Cronkite, who is just back from Vietnam, where he reported on our forces in the field, and Peter Kalischer, who has covered Vietnam and Asia longer than any other correspondent.

We are talking today at the Pentagon and I'd like to begin by asking a basic question. How can our troops fight a jungle war against an unseen enemy on the Asian mainland and produce a traditional victory? Perhaps each general could comment briefly on this, before we go into detail on the current U.S. build-up. General Taylor?

General TAYLOR. I don't think you suggest by that question that our troops are taking over the jungle war in southeast Asia as their own war. We all know that our forces are going there to supplement and assist the Vietnamese forces who have been in this jungle battle for 10 to 11 years. There are 550,000 to 600,000 men under arms of the Vietnamese most of whom are thoroughly trained. They are accustomed to the environment. They know the problems of guerrilla warfare. They know how to get intelligence as well as intelligence can be procured in this difficult situation. So our people will go to assist in this guerrilla warfare according to their capabilities and according to the situation. Now I wouldn't suggest for a moment, also, that guerrilla warfare is contrary to the tradition of the American Armed Forces. Certainly our Army has been in guerrilla warfare in many situations; in the time of the Revolution, in the Civil War, in the Indian wars, so that the recognition of guerrilla warfare as an accepted form of combat for which we should be prepared is written into the—into the training of the American forces and has been for a century. Now I think your last point was how will we achieve a victory. I think we ought to hold that off until a later discussion, because what does one mean by victory in this very complex situation in South Vietnam. I think we could profit well by discussing that as a later topic. Now let me pass the rest of the question to General Wheeler.

General WHEELER. During World War II, the U.S. Army added some 45 battle and campaign streamers to the Army flag. Over half of those were won in the Pacific and some of them—a number of them—at such places as Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and in the Philippines. Admittedly, the guerrilla warfare during World War II was not a major portion of the war or a major aspect of the war. It was somewhat more formal. However, the enemy was busily engaged in being as difficult as he possibly could be and our troops operated, as you know, most successfully on those occasions.

MR. CRONKITE. General Wheeler, having just been out there and having had my first look at South Vietnam, it strikes me that this is really a lot of little wars through this entire area south of the 17th parallel. The jungles, the highlands, the rice paddies to the south, a Japanese garden of little sections through the whole thing. How do we go about, in our grand strategy, meeting the enemy over this wide terrain of—I know you've got a map back there. Maybe you could show us the general picture before we get into detail?

General WHEELER. Well, perhaps we ought to take a moment and examine the country that we are talking about. This is South Vietnam. This banana-shaped piece of ter-

rain. It's some 720 miles, I guess, sort of a big arc, from the 17th parallel down to the Gulf of Siam. Here at the demarcation zone, the 17th parallel, the country is about 40 miles wide. Down here, it runs up to such distances of perhaps 120 miles. The country is quite varied. You can see the mountain ranges through here. There are ridges and ranges up in this area which go over 5,000 feet. In this area, there's one peak reported, that's not verified, to rise to over 10,000 feet. Down in here, there are ridges that rise 7,000 feet. And you'll notice that in many places, the mountains march right down to, or close to the sea. The population of this country is about 14½ million people, divided ethnically by region and by religious sects, into many smaller groupings. You have the bulk of the population living along the coast in these green areas where the mountains do not exist, in the Saigon area and in the delta, in a broad belt across here. To the south down in here, you do have the low marshy lands cut by a great many waterways either natural or canals. As a matter of fact, I understand there are some 4,500 miles of navigable waterways for—some of them for quite sizable craft, in this area. Obviously then, you're going to have a different war in many areas. Up in here, you have a heavily wooded mountain area. In many places, you have a rain forest with two or three canopies rising 100, 120 feet into the air. Down here, it's relatively open and marshy, except over in the Plain of Reeds. You're going to have, I would say, Mr. Cronkite, a number of differences in how the troops on the ground will operate.

MR. CRONKITE. What is different about what we are doing, or planning to do, than what has been attempted there before by the French and the Vietnamese themselves before us? Why do we have any greater hope of success with our operations than they have had with theirs?

General WHEELER. I think that the French operation was somewhat different than ours in its basic concept. You had an expeditionary force which in effect was engaged in an attempt to hold or reconquer areas of the country to restore it as a part of colonial France.

General TAYLOR. In the case of the French, the French were the basic force trying to impose colonial rule upon South Vietnam. They had auxiliaries who were South Vietnamese. Just the reverse is true now. The main force—there were 500,000 South Vietnamese who are fighting this war and we are supplementing them.

MR. KALISCHER. Would you say though that this was their war, or isn't this getting more and more to be our war?

General TAYLOR. Not in the slightest. This is their war. We want it to stay that way.

MR. REASONER. It seemed to me, General Wheeler, that you were giving an almost classic description at the map of the kind of place you don't want to fight a war. Your predecessors, of both you gentlemen in your office, have said—well, General MacArthur said, "No sane man would get into a war like this" in general. Does this represent a change in policy that you're forced to live with, or do you—have you changed—is it possible you can win it?

General WHEELER. Mr. Reasoner, I would say this. I don't want to fight a war anywhere. Here, or elsewhere.

General TAYLOR. There are no good places for war.

General WHEELER. There are no good places, I agree, Mr. Ambassador. The fact of the matter is, the enemy is attempting—when I say this, the Vietcong, supported amply by the North Vietnamese and in the background by the Chinese Communists—he has decided to fight in South Vietnam and if we don't oppose him there, that is the South Vietnamese and ourselves, they're going to take over that area. Now—yes, if I didn't think that we could prevail in this

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war, I assure you that I would never have supported the increase in the American forces there—one man, or one weapon.

General TAYLOR. I think we ought to go back and find out really what we're trying to accomplish there, because I am always struck by the fact we're talking about the military aspect and that's only a small fraction of the overall problem.

Mr. REASONER. Nevertheless, the point is made again and again that before we can win the hearts and minds that we must give the people security. It's been mentioned already.

General WHEELER. Quite true.

Mr. REASONER. And if that's not possible, you can't—you can't proceed.

General TAYLOR. But related to this in the country program of so defeating the Vietcong that security can be restored is the question of how to stop the intervention from Hanoi and the flow of equipment, so that leads into the air aspect.

Mr. KALISCHER. How do you stop the flow of equipment? You've got 1,500 miles of coastline and you've got two bleeding borders with Laos and Cambodia. And as you know, General, Mr. Ambassador, in—in Korea, where you were in command, there was a three-quarters of a million-man army facing us on a conventional front of 130 miles, and we knew every road and every trail leading up to the Yalu River and we had complete domination of the air and we bombed it from hell to breakfast and that never stopped the supplies coming down to that army.

General TAYLOR. Well you're quite right. This is a very tough problem and we have not licked it yet. However, I am encouraged by the fact we are using different methods than what we did in Korea. There's no sanctuary north of the Yalu in this situation. That decision has been taken last February and the air campaign is having an effect, not a complete effect, of course, in suppressing infiltration, but it's certainly making it much tougher for that infiltration.

Mr. KALISCHER. How effective is that aerial war? And I understand that there's been a reevaluation of—been asked for on the bombing, north and south? I believe that's correct?

General WHEELER. Reevaluation by whom, Mr. Kalscher? This is news to me.

Mr. KALISCHER. Well, I had heard that and that—

Mr. CRONKITE. Well, we'll make news on this program even if Mr. Kalscher has to do it. [Laughter.]

General TAYLOR. Let me first—I'll answer the first part and perhaps he can have the other part.

Mr. KALISCHER. Yes—

General TAYLOR. Why are we having—why is the air campaign—what's the purpose of it? There are three purposes, duly announced, clearly thought through before embarking upon this program. The first was to give the South Vietnamese people the sense of being able to strike back for the first time against the source of all their evil, namely, North Vietnam. And I can assure you the psychological effect, the morale effect of this decision was most visible throughout all of South Vietnam—military and civilians alike. The second—the second purpose I've already alluded to—to reduce, not to eliminate infiltration. We know air can't eliminate infiltration any more than it could in—in Korea. On the third point, and perhaps the most important in the long pull, is to remind the leaders in Hanoi, the men who are making the decisions, who can stop the infiltration, that unless they do not cease their aggression, they're going to pay an increasing price to the point that the game is just not worth this kind of—this kind of loss.

Mr. CRONKITE. What does our intelligence indicate on that third point? What's happened in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Not clear. Obviously Hanoi very determinedly is saying nothing and making brave sounds. I would expect that. I would not expect to see any visible signs, but anyone who looks at the map and sees the destruction caused certainly would be convinced that this is having a vast impact. You might be wanting to talk about impact.

Mr. KALISCHER. What about the SAM sites?

General WHEELER. I might talk about two points here if I may, as long as I'm up. First, the first being that we have, by our air strikes, broken the lines of communication where you see the X's on these roads and railroads. As you probably remember, the primary highway runs right up the coast and so does the—the railroad. The railroad, however, came only south from Hanoi as far as the town of Vinh, a little bit below. Now this doesn't represent all the disruption to the LOC's. Now the question—how successful has this been? Well I cite Soviet colleagues of yours, gentlemen, who apparently on a broadcast in Moscow the other night told of the disruption in the North and said, among other things, that the job of truckdriver in North Vietnam is regarded today as a heroic occupation. While I'm here, I might point out similar things that the Vietcong have done in South Vietnam, and one of the great problems out there which I'm sure the Ambassador would like to expound on a little further. These X's here also indicate where they have disrupted roads and railroads. The black dots mark provincial and district towns which are intermittently isolated from the rest of the country by ground line of communications. You can always get in by air. Sometimes you cannot get in by truck. The SAM sites are shown on this chart here, arranged in a sort of a ring around Hanoi—

Mr. REASONER. May I explain for laymen who might not remember, SAM stands for what, surface to air missile?

General WHEELER. Surface to air missiles.

Mr. REASONER. The Russian installed or Soviet built—

General WHEELER. They're Soviet built, they are the SA-2, which is a standard Soviet surface to air missile.

Mr. KALISCHER. How effective are they, and how effective could they be against our bombing in North Vietnam?

General WHEELER. Well, they're—they're a good weapon, as we know. As a matter of fact, we have lost a couple of aircraft to them. They are roughly comparable to our Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile. Incidentally, you might be interested in seeing a picture here of one of the Soviet surface-to-air missile sites, taken fairly recently. Down here you can see a missile, here you can see the cable crossings which connect the missile itself to the radars, the control radars, sitting back in—in a very lightly rebedded area, with the vans camouflaged. This is a sort of a standard configuration for this type of—of surface-to-air missile.

Mr. REASONER. We have bombed two of those so far, is that correct?

General WHEELER. That's right.

Mr. REASONER. And not since the second downing of the plane.

General WHEELER. That's correct.

Mr. KALISCHER. Is that one of them that we have bombed?

General WHEELER. This one is a recent picture.

Mr. CRONKITE. General, do we have any evidence as to who is operating those sites?

General WHEELER. Not at all, not at all.

Mr. CRONKITE. Is it possible the North Vietnamese could have been trained to do this?

General WHEELER. I would think that in the period of time that's elapsed that certainly they could have been trained for this purpose, or substantially trained for this purpose. We know that there have been

training programs both in China and in the Soviet Union for—for North Vietnamese personnel.

Mr. CRONKITE. What is the sum total of evidence today as to foreign aid, intervention, or what not in the war in Vietnam?

General WHEELER. Well, the evidence that we have indicates that the aid has been substantial. For example, the main force Vietcong units in South Vietnam, some 70,000 of them at least, in recent months have been completely equipped with a different family of weapons, Chinese made, incidentally from Russian models, and excellent weapons, automatic in many cases. They use a 7.62-millimeter ammunition, which is unobtainable in South Vietnam. It has to be imported, and is not made, as far as I know, in North Vietnam either and certainly the weapons aren't. Also, the surface-to-air missiles, which we were just discussing, came from out of country. And others—other items as well. I speak particularly of—of conventional triple A, antiaircraft artillery, tube artillery. None of this is made in—North Vietnam.

Mr. KALISCHER. Sir—

Mr. CRONKITE. Could I ask one more on that direct area? What about personnel in this form of advisers?

General WHEELER. We have—we have no evidence despite what you hear from time to time, that there are any advisers with the Vietcong in South Vietnam. The most frequent rumor that you hear, that there are Chinese there. Well, I forgot to say a moment ago, that of the about 1,800,000 people in Saigon, or in the Saigon area, about a third are of Chinese descent, and I would expect that you would find among the Vietcong, certain people of Chinese descent, who look Chinese. We've never seen a Chinese adviser in South Vietnam. Now, I accept that—that in North Vietnam, you undoubtedly have Chinese advisers, and no doubt a number of Soviet advisers or technicians of one kind or another.

Mr. KALISCHER. I remember that Secretary Rusk made a statement during the Cuban crisis of a few years ago, that we were eyeball to eyeball with the Soviet Union, and the Russians blinked. Who would you say we are eyeball to eyeball with basically in this confrontation, the Chinese, the Russians, the South Vietnamese Vietcong, the North Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. Well, of course, we are not eyeball to eyeball with anyone directly. It's really the question is, with whom is the South Vietnamese Government eyeball to eyeball with, and I would—my answer would be basically Hanoi, as Hanoi is the source of the Vietcong strength. The Vietcong provide the men on the battlefield, but the decisions, the basic strength comes out of North Vietnam, so it's the problem of convincing the leaders of Hanoi, rather than convincing leaders of the Vietcong of the impossibility of final success. Now, I recognize that behind Hanoi is Peiping, and to some degree Moscow, but their direct influence on the decisions in Hanoi are far from clear.

Mr. KALISCHER. Do you think that if we stepped up our military stake in this, that there—that the Chinese would come in?

General TAYLOR. I don't think so. Not as long as we do not actually attack Red China. I think what we're doing now is certainly within the ground rules of—of reasonable prudence insofar as inviting the intervention of either the Chinese or the Soviet Union.

Mr. WHEELER. I share that view; I share his view.

Mr. CRONKITE. What is keeping, or will keep Peiping out of this war, if we seem to be winning it?

General TAYLOR. Self-interest. Self-interest. Fear of consequences. They're very great, they are very great.

Mr. REASONER. This recurrent theme, which came up in this last answer, about supporting the South Vietnamese, and really merely being there as allies to help them out, brings up the question that concerns a lot of Americans, that we seem to have picked a loser. That under, as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned, the situation has steadily deteriorated, there's some question about how many people in the country even know there is a government in Saigon. Is this going to prevent us from winning or from gaining our kind of unconventional victory?

General TAYLOR. Of course, I don't think there's much glory in running to a cause that really doesn't need much help. It's quite true, we are on the side that has very tough problems, but they're problems that can be resolved, and we have the resources in my judgment to reach a final resolution. The attitude of the South Vietnamese people, I know, creates concern among many of our citizens. Are they really—is their heart really in their work? Well, I have no doubt—I have no difficulty in answering positively "Yes," they do have their heart in their work and I think the record speaks for itself. The fact that for 11 years, the South Vietnamese have been fighting against the Vietcong, and refusing to accept any—any accommodation with the Vietcong; the fact that the first—in 1954, you recall, they had the choice of either coming under Communist rule or being under free rule, and by a vote of 10 to 1, a ratio of 10 to 1, the North came South, rather than go to Communist rule in the North. In other words, about a million refugees came out of North Vietnam to be in the South, only about 80,000 went out of the South to be in the North. Now we have other indicators, which show the depth of commitment of the Vietnamese people; the internal movement of population. Throughout this period, whenever they—whenever the Vietcong pressure has mounted in a new region, there's been a flow of refugees out of that area to avoid falling under their domination. The total number runs 600,000 to 700,000, perhaps who have actually moved. And we see absolutely no sign of a similar movement from Government-controlled territory into Vietcong-controlled territory.

Mr. KALISCHER. Might there not be an explanation in the fact that when an area becomes completely under Vietcong control, we exercise rather unlimited aerial warfare against that section of the country, and it's just common sense for those people who don't—who are not particularly engaged in the fighting to get out and come over to our side, where the bombs aren't falling?

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't attribute this to the bombs. I would say that in any area where war goes on, and it's the ground war that is far more destructive than the air war, that any citizen is unhappy and for obvious reasons. And he intends to go some place, but he doesn't go deeper into Vietcong territory, he comes to the government side, which I think is a very important point.

Mr. CRONKITE. Now, last week we had this episode of the—of the burning of Cam Ne by the Marines up there. And, certainly, whether this was justified from a military standpoint or not, how are we going to win these people to our side, when this—this sort of thing goes on whether it's a military necessity or an unfortunate accident?

General TAYLOR. Well, first let me go back to a point you made at the outset, that bombing of villages. The bombing of villages almost never occurs. Villages are destroyed, yes, they suffer very severe losses, but it's generally from ground action. I can hardly think, I don't think offhand of any time we've deliberately taken a village as a bombardment target. Sometime, unfortunately, in the uncertainty of the—of the location, villages have been bombed, but it's

ground action of both sides which creates most of the destruction. That is a very unhappy situation, a most regrettable one, but it's been true in every war in history. I can just look back at Europe and think of the devastated, completely leveled cities, friendly cities, friendly cities in France, for example, devastated by the conditions of World War II. So this is not something new; it's just an unhappy fact of warfare.

General WHEELER. I'd like to expand on that, because you spoke of Cam Ne. Actually, on July 12, when the Marines first moved in there, the district chief urged the Marines to raze the ground—the town to the ground, because he said it was a known totally Vietcong hamlet. They didn't do it. They lost three marines killed and four wounded, I think, as they moved through the village and cleared it out. Now, to hear out what Ambassador Taylor said, there were some 51 buildings destroyed in the town of Cam Ne. Fifty of them were destroyed by ground fire. The tracer bullets, grenades and what not, set fire to things and they burned. So, this was not an air strike that destroyed this village, this was actually the ground weapons that destroyed it.

Mr. KALISCHER. General, I hate to—to quote our own correspondent against your information, which I'm sure is good. But on—there's been considerable flap over the Cam Ne incident, and Morley Safer has cabled in what I consider, and what we all consider, a pretty factual account. There were more, he said, than 50 huts burned, and he personally saw at least 20 of them put to the match by a cigarette lighter.

General WHEELER. That doesn't agree with my information, Mr. Kalischer. I'll rest on that.

Mr. REASONER. Well, certainly, whether—whatever happened in this particular incident, you're going to have problems in relations between American soldiers and marines, and the Vietnamese. Doesn't that again decrease the odds on victory?

General TAYLOR. You're going back to the point that we're alienating the population. I don't think so in a broad sense. I think these people, they're hard realists. They have seen war for 10 to 20 years. They know whose side is fighting for their cause, and while they unhappily take these, the inevitable losses that go with being in a position of an area of combat, nonetheless, we have seen no indication that our military action is alienating the population. In contrast, what are we saving them from? The intolerable impositions of the Vietcong. Intolerable in the sense they impress their sons in the military service, often against their will. They kill the officials in the villages; they kidnap anyone who might be of any use; they impose prohibitively high taxes and end up by confiscating large—large parts of the rice crop. Now, this is a pretty tough life and when you contrast that kind of—of unhappy existence with the casualties of battle, I think you'll find most of the peasants will say, I'd rather run the chance of battle if I can be free, and if security will last.

Mr. CRONKITE. General, just to put a period to the Cam Ne thing. Have any orders gone out that specifically forbid this kind of an operation such as Cam Ne? I mean, putting the torch to a village?

General WHEELER. In the first place, I don't agree that the village was deliberately burned. In the second place, General Westmoreland, a long time ago, a month and a half ago, recognized the problems that could possibly arise in this type of operation, and enjoined all of his senior commanders to exercise the utmost of judgment and prudence in dealing with situations of this kind. I think we must recognize that there are two sides to this as there usually is to everything. And I happen to be very much concerned about what happens to our troops in

a situation such as this. Remember, the Marines lost four men killed and a number wounded in this action; they were dealing with a hard-core enemy, determined again to stop them. They had several men wounded in the village. And I would say this: General Westmoreland, his senior commanders—I think you know General Walsh, the Marine commander up there—these are not only fine, fine officers, they happen to be fine men. They're not arsonists at heart, but they are—they are fighting a very difficult war, and they're trying to do it the right way, protecting their—their own men, letting their men defend themselves, and at the same time, taking due account of the hazards and the risks to the civilian population who unfortunately get caught in any war.

Mr. REASONER. In two areas I would like to get your estimate of the Vietcong: first, as a military estimate, and, second, what—this must be pretty rough on him. He's been fighting 20 years now. They can't all be trained agents of Moscow. How does this happen that they go on fighting so well so long Mr. Ambassador?

General TAYLOR. Well, as you suggest, there is a hard core which has been trained for 10 years, and knows nothing but this. They're beyond redemption. They represent some 40,000 of the so-called firstline units. But as guerrillas, as assistants—sometimes part time, too—they have many—many young men now frequently impressed into the service—ages down as low as 15—who do have very, very spotty morale. We find this out in interrogation of prisoners. We see also that the heavy losses is making it more and more difficult for the Vietcong to recruit locally. The evidence is that they're bringing more and more North Vietnamese, ethnic North Vietnamese—who have never set foot in South Vietnam. Now, their performance, both professional performance and their morale—reaction to the situation, is certainly going to be unfavorable to the Vietcong's cause.

We have a final indication of wavering morale. I wouldn't overstate it, but some deterioration in morale in the increased numbers of ralliers who come in in response to the open arms program. They desert, defect, and come to the Government's side. This is running something over a thousand a month. Now, very few of those are hard core, the old, tough type, but certainly those who are on the fringes, so to speak, they are coming across more readily than in the past.

Mr. KALISCHER. I hate to seem to be the devil's advocate on these questions all the time, but it's been my experience that in a straight-out battle in South Vietnam between Government troops, with the possible exception of a few elite battalions, it takes two Government battalions to stand up to a good, hard-core Vietcong battalion, and that is with the full complement of aerial support, which the other side hasn't got. Also, since we've been killing them at about the rate of 25,000 a year for the last 3 years, according to statistics, where do they recruit them from?

General TAYLOR. Let's go back to the first point and I will turn the second one over to General Wheeler.

We do need more than one battalion to fight one battalion because we are trying to box in and destroy this—the enemy. Hence, we need three or four to close all the avenues of retreat. Hence, we should have a very high preponderance of strength in terms of battalions, or in terms of individuals, to cope adequately with the situation. You can take over the question of casualties.

General WHEELER. Well, I would just say that military planning factors, if you are going to attack, you always want a preponderance of at least 2, and preferably 3 to 1 if you expect your attack to be successful; otherwise, you may get yourself a bloody nose.

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Where are these people coming from? We have evidence over the past several years of the infiltration of at least 40,000 from North Vietnam, and one element is—at least one regiment of about 1,200 to 1,400 men, I would think, of the 325th North Vietnamese Division.

You spoke of the casualty figures. The early casualty figures, going back to 1961-62, I, myself, discount very heavily. However, as the number of our own American advisers in the field with Vietnamese units has increased, our information is much better, and I believe that our latest figures are reasonably accurate. At least they show the trend. They give the difference in losses between the Vietcong and the Vietnamese. At the present time, these losses are running about 2 to 1 in favor of the Vietnamese forces.

Now, you can say that this is a function of mobility and a greater firepower, and I would agree with you. This is precisely what it is. There is a recruiting program going on in South Vietnam, as well as the infiltration from the north. Ambassador Taylor spoke of young men being impressed into service. As a matter of fact, this is one of the great dissatisfactions of the Vietnamese peasant with the Vietcong; the fact that he's hauled away from his family, from his village, and taken off into the boondocks, someplace to fight for people that he doesn't like anyway; and many of them desert, and when they do desert, as the Ambassador said, they usually desert to the government.

Mr. KALISCHER. What is the desertion rate? What is the desertion rate between the Vietcong and the government forces? How does that stand up?

General WHEELER. Well, as of right now, as Ambassador Taylor said, the ralliers coming to the government's side average about 1,000 a month. We have no way of estimating the number of Vietcong impresses who instead of coming back to the government, wend their way back to their native villages and hide out to escape the Vietcong. At one time, the desertion rate within the Vietnamese forces was running as high as about 10,000 a month. This has been somewhat better recently, and hopefully, it will continue to go down as they improve their programs to take care of the soldiers and their families. Some reforms, as a matter of fact, which have been long overdue, I believe, including an increase in pay.

Mr. KALISCHER. 10,000 a month from the Vietnamese forces versus 1,000—

General TAYLOR. Oh, no. Hold everything.

General WHEELER. Hold everything.

General TAYLOR. There's a very important difference here. The desertions from the Vietnamese forces is to go back to the farm. We have very little indication of desertion—defection to the enemy. We don't know the factor which corresponds with that desertion rate in the North Vietnamese forces. We know the defector rate, so we have to distinguish those two sources.

Mr. REASONER. What's your military estimate of the Vietcong as a soldier? One of your generals, talking to Walter Cronkite in Vietnam, said, I think, that he thought he was a "bum" and a "coward." Is that the U.S. Army estimate?

General WHEELER. No. I don't know what gentleman said this. To give you a quote, the captured Vietcong field order—I believe the battle of Dongxoi—regimental field order—and General Westmoreland told me that when he saw the translation, it might have been written by a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.

General TAYLOR. I saw the order; I agree.

General WHEELER. And you agreed, I believe. We have found, I think this is generally true, that the main force units are well trained, well disciplined, and that they plan well, and they attack vigorously in an effort to carry out their mission. They seem

to be brave, or as brave as most men are. I would say that the guerrilla forces, as you would expect—I'm talking now about the part-time types—you're not going to get this order of performance. You're going to get the spotty stuff of a group of men who will shoot at you from behind a wall and then disappear. You're not going to get the same type of planning, nor the same type of performance from them.

Mr. CRONKITE. General Wheeler, what is our grand strategy out there now as far as the employment of U.S. forces? General Cao Ky, the Premier, said a couple of weeks ago that he expected the Americans to get out and hold the perimeter while the mopping-up operations, the police operations, the pacification, will be carried on by the Vietnamese behind—I gather behind our perimeter defense. Is that the way you—

General WHEELER. Let me—let me turn to this map again, if I might because I think—as you know, and I know that Mr. Kalischer at least has visited several of these places, we are creating base areas here at Hue, Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and oh, one or two other smaller places. We have also a base area over here at Bien Hoa. Now why are we establishing these bases? In the first place, the line of communication by road, as we know, is subject to disruption at any time. Secondly, we have to support our forces throughout the country and preferably not by air, which is an expensive way of furnishing sizable support over a period of time. So we need these small ports—Da Nang, Quang Ngai and so on, and one at Cam Ranh Bay, in order to establish logistic complexes to support the forces that we have in the country. In conjunction with each of these places which I mentioned, these base areas, we have constructed, or are constructing, airfields: These for both combat and logistic purposes. Now General Westmoreland has organized—and I think Da Nang is a fine example—has organized these in such a way that the forces as they come in are disposed to protect these bases. This is the first charge against them. Thereafter, they begin to extend their area of influence out from the base area. As the forces have increased, he has started to use certain of his battalions, not needed for the purpose I have just mentioned, to act in support of the Vietnamese forces who are actually out finding and fighting the enemy. I think you will recall reading in recent weeks of two or three actions of which the 173d Airborne Brigade have performed this function. So I would say this. That, one, we must have our bases; we must have airfields; we must defend them. Thereafter, we can undertake cooperative action with the Vietnamese to defeat the main force of Vietcong battalions.

Mr. KALISCHER. Don't we, sir, also sometimes airlift American troops to certain strategic areas far from these bases in order to shore up a situation that is getting out of hand?

General WHEELER. You are absolutely right, Mr. Kalischer, and I should have made that more clear. This is a part of the cooperative effort with the Vietnamese of which I spoke. But, you are quite correct; that we do airlift these people into where the combat area is—where the combat is either occurring or is expected to occur, so that they can furnish support at need.

General TAYLOR. I think that this is probably going to be the most important and most useful employment of our troops. Certainly, we don't contemplate what I gather some people are talking about—sitting on the coast and sitting out this war. General Westmoreland expects to use his troops in the most advantageous way, to bring this thing to a close.

Mr. REASONER. That—that brings up a question. When President Johnson announced the buildup a couple weeks ago,

Walter Lippmann then read into what the President said a new choice or a choice of a new strategy; that we were not going to use a lot of troops; that we were going to sit in our enclaves and be a thorn in the side of the Communists and thus force them to a decision. Is that—is that a fair reading of what the President said?

General WHEELER. I didn't understand him to say that.

General TAYLOR. Quite the contrary.

General WHEELER. Quite the contrary.

General TAYLOR. Mobile use—Perer Kalischer just mentioned is one—probably the most important employment we are going to find for these forces.

Mr. CRONKITE. In addition to the mobile use, is this—from these bases we are establishing along there on the coast—is this the spreading-oil-spot theory that we are going to move out from those and continually press out in a search-and-clear-up operation?

General WHEELER. Well, you could liken it to that. Every time—for example, we were talking a while about about some marine actions in the vicinity of Da Nang. Now, what they were doing is they are going out really to protect their base because if the enemy is allowed to build up around your base and take you under fire at will you are in a very bad spot. So you could call this the oil spot theory, or the ink spot, I've heard it called that. In other words, you may actually occupy a certain area, but your military influence can be extended far beyond that by an active patrolling and by movement by helicopter and so on which Mr. Kalischer mentioned.

General TAYLOR. I will make one observation which I think you will agree to, that we are not going to try to hold terrain—

General WHEELER. No.

General TAYLOR (continuing). Per se. We are going to use our firepower and mobility to destroy, to assist in destroying the Vietcong units; but the clearing, the holding, the bringing in of the governmental agencies, to assure the continual protection and the growth, the reconstitution of a given area—that clearly is a Vietnamese function. We couldn't take it over and couldn't do it if we tried.

General WHEELER. I do agree; I do agree with that.

Mr. CRONKITE. What will constitute victory in this fight in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Well, I unfortunately started this question, so I'd better answer it. It will not, in my judgment, as I visualize it, not be as in Malaysia, where in the last months of the war they had reduced the guerrillas to individuals. They knew their names. They had their pictures. I went into the commanding general's headquarters and there were the pictures. These are the guerrillas and we're going to catch them and eventually did. The kind of operation we're faced with, something like 140,000 guerrillas in South Vietnam—obviously is not going to yield to that kind of tailored technique—hand-tailored technique. I would visualize this as rather something that will come to an end and victory should be defined as getting Hanoi to lay off its neighbors. Once that is accomplished, then a great deal of the internal problems of South Vietnam will fall away and leave something that can perhaps be taken on as a reduced police kind of operation. I could well visualize another, a second partition of the population as took place in 1954, where under a general amnesty, those who still wanted to go north could be allowed to go north again, and those who remained south could come forward and be accepted back into the citizenship of South Vietnam. I am thinking more in those terms rather than the kind of termination—kind of victory that took place before—

Mr. CRONKITE. Is there any reason why Hanoi should negotiate that kind of a set-

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tlement? Isn't it conceivable that Hanoi would simply say, "Let's lay off the battalion-size operations. Let's take our formal troops back along the Ho Chi Minh trail just the way we put them in and return this to a guerrilla war that could go on for 20 years?"

General TAYLOR. I don't think so, because the guerrilla war could not be supportable without the outside aid from Hanoi. I think the blow to the Vietcong—the Vietcong in South Vietnam—if, indeed, the aid of Hanoi disappeared, would be critical to them. I think there would be a great defection almost at once. I'm not suggesting that this can end all with the ringing of a bell, let's say, or the termination of negotiations, but the negotiations can create conditions which certainly would permit the justified hope in a final, reasonable settlement.

Mr. KALISCHER. Isn't it—

Mr. CRONKITE. Just a minute, Pete. You've had the floor for a minute. If the United States is not eyeball to eyeball, as we're getting back to where we were a moment ago, with the enemy, then would a South Vietnamese capitulation, since they're eyeball to eyeball with Hanoi, be acceptable to the United States?

General TAYLOR. The South Vietnamese—there isn't going to be a South Vietnamese capitulation. That's just unthinkable. The army—bear in mind, the army is the power in South Vietnam. The generals are completely committed. They've burned all their bridges behind them. They would never tolerate a government that was caught surreptitiously or overtly negotiating with Hanoi or with the Vietcong.

Mr. CRONKITE. Pete, the floor's yours.

Mr. KALISCHER. Well, I've almost forgotten what it was I was going to say. But one of the things—one of the objections that I foresee on a renewed partition is that North Vietnam will be getting more people again, and they've already gotten more than they can support, which is one of the reasons that they're trying to get down in South Vietnam. So that wouldn't solve any of their problems. If some South Vietnamese decided to go north, they'd have more mouths to feed.

General TAYLOR. Well, that's quite true, Peter, but I would envisage a peaceful adjustment of all southeast Asia where North Vietnam continues as a Communist member of the community; South Vietnam as an independent nation determining its own form of government and society, free exchange of trade back and forth. There's no reason why there should be a food shortage in Hanoi if Hanoi would be a good neighbor to South Vietnam. Many things could happen which now are not taking place.

Mr. CRONKITE. Gentlemen, Vietnam is just one country in southeast Asia.

General TAYLOR. True.

Mr. CRONKITE. We're getting rather heavily committed there, and I don't think there are many people that really accept the fact that we may be stopping at 125,000 men, perhaps, there. Are we going to be able to move in and help other nations in southeast Asia if the Communists decide to expand the area of the conflict?

General TAYLOR. Well, I think in point of fact we are, of course, at the present time. We have been helping Thailand very substantially. We have in the past helped Laos very substantially. I agree this is a single problem. But, fortunately, I don't see any excess strength available in Hanoi and North Vietnam to apply elsewhere. It's quite notable that the campaign in Laos has not had its annual offensive which characterized the past. My feeling is that the resources of North Vietnam are being stretched very much by the situation in South Vietnam, and unless the Chinese come in—and that would create quite a different situation—I can't—would not anticipate any expansion at this time.

General WHEELER. I would like to make a point there, if I might. I would think—in fact, I do think, and not conditional at all—that if we blunt this Vietcong-Hanoi supported operation in South Vietnam, the chances of you having to go into other countries with the same type of aid are very, very remote. I think it demonstrable that this is the first of Mr. Khrushchev's wars of national liberation. It's been seized upon by the Chinese Communists and by the North Vietnamese, and they have started to use this tactic in South Vietnam. If it's defeated, the chances of having another one soon in the same area, I think, are quite small. But the reverse, I'm afraid, is also true.

General TAYLOR. Yes. The importance of defeating this war of liberation is indeed very great, and it is recognized by the other side. I just happen to have a quotation from General Giap, the commander in North Vietnam, who phrases it from his point of view. He says, "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam (our resistance to wars of liberation—if that resistance on our part is overcome) then it (our resistance) can be defeated everywhere in the world." So he states it very clearly, his evaluation of the essentiality of victory in this situation. We have it on our side just as deeply.

Mr. REASONER. General Wheeler, to get back to what you might call the mechanics of the war or the problems you have now as your forces increase. There were a couple of incidents last week, I think one involving CBS, of information which you felt improper to be published. Is the voluntary censorship not working? Do you have cause for concern?

General WHEELER. No; I would say this, that obviously it didn't work on that particular occasion. I think it's too early for me to say that it cannot work under proper supervision and proper cooperation on all sides. I did express my concern yesterday and I expressed it to Mr. Kalischer the other day because to give information to the enemy, when your troops are in the face of the enemy, could really lead to a disaster. And I know this is something none of us want. So what I feel is that the situation certainly can and must be improved.

Mr. KALISCHER. Does that mean that you are going to impose some more concrete form of censorship than voluntary?

General WHEELER. Mr. Kalischer, I can't answer that at this time because obviously this is out of my purview. I can view with alarm and recommend. Others make governmental decisions and finally, but I think also most important, the Government of Vietnam must be brought into this. As you know better than I, the great number that are in the press corps out there from many nationalities, the numerous cable systems and what not, or means of communication that are available to them—all of these have got to be taken into consideration. I merely say this, that we have got to study the situation hard and I hope intelligently and arrive at something that is going to protect our troops.

Mr. REASONER. Gentlemen, the North Vietnamese have talked on occasion about a 20-year war. You have now had some experience with our new tactics and with the buildup. Speaking not about 20 years but just about the next year, what do you foresee if we did this same program a year from now? What would the change in the situation be?

General TAYLOR. First, let me sum up what I think our strategy is. I know what our strategy is. It is a four-prong strategy which is in effect at the present time. First, to strengthen our forces on the ground, by

building up the Vietnamese forces and by adding whatever is required of U.S. forces so that we can—to use General Wheeler's term—blunt and bloody the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam; simultaneously to conduct the war—the air campaign against North Vietnam to convince the leaders of Hanoi that this is a losing operation and they must change their tactic; third, an area which we unfortunately have not talked about—the vast effort which is going on in the political and economic field, to strengthen the Government in South Vietnam, to bring some element of stability into a scene where turbulence has been the rule, and at the same time maintain the economy, avoid inflation in South Vietnam, so there can't be an internal collapse which I am sure still is on the hope list of the leaders of Hanoi.

And finally, throughout all this, to maintain the open, clear position, we are ready to sit down and talk with any sincere searcher after peace. Now, that is the four-pronged program—strategy, I call it, going on. I think it is a sound strategy. I think it has a reasonable chance of success. I am sure it will not take 20 years to convince Hanoi that, indeed, this is a losing operation when each month that picture should be clearer in the minds of the gentlemen that sit in that country.

Mr. REASONER. Are we reasonably well informed about Hanoi? I was thinking in particular—particularly in your case, Mr. Ambassador. You helped study our intelligence after the Bay of Pigs I believe, and you must have been well aware of how our intelligence is doing in North and South Vietnam. Is it doing a creditable job?

General TAYLOR. Well, I never like to speak in public about intelligence. It's always a sensitive subject but there is an easy answer. Intelligence is never good enough; it's never adequate, whether it's in Cuba or whether it is in North Vietnam or elsewhere in the world. So the answer is we don't have a clear insight into what goes on in Hanoi but we see intimations which certainly convince us that the pressure of this war is being felt.

Mr. CRONKITE. General Wheeler, two questions on manpower; Are we going to have to extend the draft and call up Reserves in order to take care of this situation and, two, what do you anticipate in the way of aid from other nations?

General WHEELER. Insofar as the draft is concerned, of course, the callup by means of the draft is already being increased, as we all know. As to whether or not we will have to call up the Reserves, the future must speak for itself. We simply don't know. The—what was your third point?

Mr. CRONKITE. Do you anticipate any help in the nature of armed forces from other nations?

General WHEELER. We have gotten, of course, a contribution from the Australians, a contribution from the Koreans and a contribution from the New Zealanders.

General TAYLOR. It's interesting to note the numbers now, that there are some 34 nations who are making some contribution in South Vietnam, and 13 nations are actually represented by their nationals. I wouldn't overstate the magnitude of the individual effort. In many cases it's very, very small, but nonetheless, it is important as a token of the free world uniting to assist South Vietnam.

Mr. CRONKITE. General Ky is now in Taiwan. Do you anticipate his recruiting any Nationalist Chinese forces?

General TAYLOR. I would not anticipate that.

General WHEELER. I wouldn't either.

Mr. REASONER. Gentlemen, as kind of a final question, I have a—unlike my colleagues, I haven't been in Vietnam since 1954 when the Americans—

Mr. CRONKITE. That was a pretty good year. A vintage year.

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Mr. REASONER. Yes, it was a good year. The American officers there were explaining that if they could only get the French out and take over, they would end it in 6 months. But in spite of what we've said, there do seem to be some frightening similarities between what the French did and what happened to them and what we're doing. Granted that they had an expeditionary force and we're there to assist the Vietnamese. Can you candidly say with what you know about it, that we have any reason for optimism, or are we just headed on the same downhill trail that led the French out?

General TAYLOR. I certainly don't feel there is any inevitability in defeat which seems to be a strange obsession in some quarters here in Washington. We are in a tough fight. In many a battle that I have been engaged in there are moments when you are hitting the other fellow and he is hitting back and you can't say when this is going to end or exactly how it is going to end except you can be sure of one thing. You are not going to allow yourself to be defeated. Now if we have that attitude toward the problem in South Vietnam, sooner or later—I can't predict a date—we do have the resources to restore—to reach the objectives, the very broad objectives of allowing this country to continue its life without the continued aggression from the north.

General WHEELER. I would add to that that we have been sitting here largely this morning discussing our problems and the scene as we view it. I wonder how it looks to the planners and the policymakers in Hanoi from their vantage point? And I must say that with all of the problems I see and the problems that I have to deal with, I think I would rather be sitting in Washington with my problems than sitting in Hanoi with General Giap's problems.

General TAYLOR. I would certainly echo that point. I would say that there must be at least three overriding problems facing Hanoi. First, how to offset this American commitment in the south which they now see is unlimited. It's perfectly clear we're there to stay. No. 2, how to limit the devastation of the homeland which is going on daily from our aircraft; and, finally, how to do those things without inviting in the Red Chinese who are the traditional hated enemies of every Vietnamese whether it's in the north or in the south.

Mr. REASONER. Gentlemen, I can see that one thing we should do is extend this series of programs and get General Giap here because I would like to hear those answers. I would like to thank both of you for coming here. I am sure that your answers have given the American people a clearer understanding of what we are against in Vietnam.

Tonight we have examined the question of how we can achieve a victory in South Vietnam, but beyond an immediate victory lies the wider issue of peace in southeast Asia.

Next week at this same time we shall bring you part 3 of Vietnam perspective: "Winning the Peace," and among our guests will be the new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg. This is Harry Reasoner. Good night.

RESPONSIBLE CONSERVATISM

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr., in a series of recent newspaper columns, has touched a vital nerve—the John Birch Society.

In its thoughts about the John Birch Society, the American public tends to react in either black or white. Seldom are shades of gray permitted in the debate. Mr. Buckley has attempted to deal in the in-between gray area. He has

raised a serious and responsible question about how many members of the John Birch Society adhere to the positions of some of the society's leaders and publications.

For his efforts to air a vital question, Mr. Buckley has reaped a whirlwind of unreasoned attack and vilification from some society members.

Mr. Buckley happens to be a conservative. So am I.

As a conservative, I welcome responsible inquiry. The essence of conservatism is support for individual rights and beliefs. Responsible conservatism welcomes questions and respects their value in getting to the root of problems.

Mr. Buckley's columns graphically illustrate the gulf between responsible conservatism and unreasoning radicalism. I hope the columns' message will be pondered by all Americans.

I ask unanimous consent that the columns to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE BIRCH SOCIETY, AUGUST 1965

(By William F. Buckley, Jr.)

The John Birch Society is engaged in a nationwide drive to convince the skeptics of its responsibility. Thousands of members of the John Birch Society, who joined it eagerly as a fighting organization devoted to antisocialism and anticommunism, have been saying for years that the unfortunate conclusions drawn by Mr. Robert Welch about Dwight Eisenhower in 1958 are altogether extraneous to the society's mandate, purposes, and mode of thought, and should therefore be ignored in assessing the society, A.D. 1965.

I regret to say that it is in my judgment impossible to defend the leadership of the John Birch Society if one reads closely even its contemporary utterances. I should like to know how those members of the society who believe that it long since departed from the mania of Mr. Welch's conclusions about Dwight Eisenhower can justify the current issue of *American Opinion*, the society's monthly magazine, with its featured article about the extent (60 to 80 percent) of Communist influence in the United States (and elsewhere).

It is an unsigned, staff written article, given especial prominence. And the editor calls attention to it on the masthead page: "If you want to know what is going on in the world, we strongly recommend the next 144 pages to help you find out."

Mental health? "The attention of the American people was first drawn to the real problem of mental health on October 1, 1962, when, in obedience to the specific demands of the Communist Party, a gang under the direction of Nicholas Katzenbach (now Attorney General of the United States), kidnapped Gen. Edwin A. Walker in Oxford, Miss."

Medicare? "The principal object of Medicare is to destroy the independence and integrity of American physicians. It will inevitably create a 'pressing shortage' of physicians and nurses. Communist provinces are sure to have a surplus * * * they will be glad to export to the United States to relieve the shortage."

The death of Kennedy? "The Communists were able to exploit the assassination of Kennedy. (It is gossip in Washington that Earl Warren succeeded in destroying all copies of the pertinent part of a motion picture film which showed who escorted Jack

Ruby through the police lines so that he could silence Oswald.)"

Civil rights? Selma: "A horde of termites from all over the country, led by half-crazed ministers and professors, swarmed over the small town of Selma, Ala., in a typical demonstration of Communist activism." The Civil Rights Act of 1964: "(It was a) part of the pattern for the Communist takeover of America." In general: "(It is) an obvious fact that the whole racial agitation was designed and is directed by the international Communist conspiracy."

The economic situation? "The conspiracy can now produce a total economic collapse any time that it decides to pull the chain."

The lower courts? "Do not overlook the fine contributions made by the criminals whom the conspiracy has slipped into lower courts."

The Supreme Court? "The theory that the Warren court is working for a domestic, as distinct from foreign, dictatorship becomes less tenable every day."

The Federal Government? "Communist domination of many of the departments of the Federal Government is too obvious to require much comment."

Foreign policy? "As for Vietnam, one thing is certain: no action really detrimental to the Communists is conceivable or even possible, so long as Rusk, McNamara, and Katzenbach remain in power."

The Dominican Republic? "The policy that began with the landing of marines in Santo Domingo (came) under the direction of what often seems to be Communist headquarters in Washington—officially called the State Department."

Summary? "The important point is that Americans can expect only defeat so long as they are commanded by their enemies."

One continues to wonder how it is that the membership of the John Birch Society tolerates such drivel. Until the members rise up and demand a leadership whose programs and analyses are based other than on the premise that practically every liberal politician, every confused professor, every civil rights demonstrator, every ideologized judge, every bungling diplomat, every avid prosecutor; everyone who wants free medicine, and civil rights legislation, and Government control of the economy, is an agent of the Communist conspiracy—until then at least they ought not to go about the country complaining that the society is consistently misrepresented. Their own views are undoubtedly misrepresented. But their views aren't the voice of the John Birch Society. That voice you have just heard.

MORE ON THE BIRCH SOCIETY

(By William F. Buckley, Jr.)

One week ago I wrote a column expressing a dismay I felt sure was shared by the majority of the members of the John Birch Society at some of the positions being subtly advanced by the leadership of the JBS in its magazine, *American Opinion*, even while the society is spending tons of dough to appease public opinion and persuade the average American that the leadership is nonkooky. The response has been discouraging to those who (like myself) have steadfastly adhered to the position that between the opinions of Robert Welch and those of his votaries there is a great gulf: that the latter calmly disbelieve, or ignore, his enormities, remaining loyal to the society on the grounds that you need simply scrape off the barnacles of extremism and have left a trim seagoing hull bent on an upwind anti-Communist, anti-Socialist course.

I am troubled by the initial response to that column, and have decided to extend my inquiry into the nature of the support of the John Birch Society in an effort to answer several questions. One: Is there in fact sub-

stantial disagreement between the membership at large, and the leadership of the JBS? Two: Do the members of the JBS make any attempt to understand what it is that the leadership of the JBS believes; or do they simply ignore the zanier findings of the leadership, taking shelter in the argument that the society is anti-Communist, and that therefore all anti-Communists should support it?

Mr. Robert Welch, the founder of the John Birch Society, has often expressed his pride in the character and gentility of his members. I say it sincerely that I do not doubt that he is to a considerable extent correct. But I also doubt, to judge from the response to date, that he could easily explain away the manners of some of the more vociferous members of his society.

Mr. William Patten of St. Louis, Mo., for instance, suspects my motives. "So, the establishment has finally gotten to you. The word is comply—or else. Or else what? Your magazine will not be distributed by 'accepted' distributors. Cancel my subscription" (hereinafter, CMS). Mrs. Lenore McDonald of Los Angeles: "What Robert Welch wrote in the Politician (imputing procommunism to Dwight Eisenhower) is mild."

Mrs. W. D. Porter of Lexington: "Did you just have to do it? Couldn't you have left it to the Overstreets, Gus Hall, and perhaps Chet Huntley? CMS." Mr. William Gehrke of Denver, Colo.: "The same old smear method employed by the liberals is used; namely, condemn the man and what he stands for but don't dare try to refute his facts. (I.e., that the United States is 80 to 80 percent dominated by Communists, that being the conclusion of the article I quoted.) CMS."

Mrs. George Caldwell, of San Crescento, Calif.: "Since I have just so much hate in me I must parcel it out rather sparingly, and as I understand you I am now to love Russia and hate the John Birch Society." Mrs. Ruth S. Matthews of New York: "One more thing before you open your big mouth again, ask Congress to give a hearing to Colonel Golleswki." (Who will prove that Ike is a Communist?) Mrs. Monica Doeing of Santa Barbara, Calif.: "Do you mean that you don't think that the kidnapping of General Walker was a part of the Communist conspiracy? If so, you better get your head out of the sand."

Mr. and Mrs. John Dalziel of Brooklyn: "When you attack Robert Welch you attack every member in the society." Mr. Arthur Barksdale of San Mateo, Calif.: "I have always believed you to be a true conservative. However, since you seem categorically to accept most of the left wing programs I'm beginning to doubt your sincerity."

Mr. Robert Jonas of Oyster Bay, Long Island: "I am unable to understand whether in this latest attack, you are just being officious, or whether you periodically suffer from hot flashes, in some form of male menopause? CMS?" Mr. James Oviatt of Los Angeles and Beverly Hills: "I am just wondering what Zionist Jew wrote this article? Could it have been Lippmann, Goldberg, or even Abe—Johnson's attorney? * * * I have known Bob Welch for over 15 years; I think he told the truth about Eisenhower."

Miss Patricia Huster, of Baltimore, Md.: "I believe I heard that there was some \$95,000 involved in your last smear of the John Birch Society. How much did you get paid this time? And by the way, whose side are you on, anyway? CMS." Mr. Lee Adamson of Bellingham, Wash., writes: "I have heard a rumor that John Kenneth Galbraith is a majority stockholder in National Review."

And Mr. J. T. Timothy, of Willimantic, Conn., sums it up in a single word, in large red crayon: "Judas."

AND FINALLY ON JOHN BIRCH

(By Wm. F. Buckley, Jr.)

I have labored to find the answer to the question: Does the typical member of the

John Birch Society wince when the leadership makes spectacular remarks imputing procommunism to the highest officials of Government? I have received 200 (and they continue to pour in) letters since I quoted in this column from an article in the current issue of Mr. Welch's magazine, American Opinion. Of those 200 correspondents, only 2 joined me in deploring the article's excesses.

I quoted some typical reactions in an intermediate column. Today I quote from Mr. Frank Cullen Brophy, of Phoenix, Ariz., whose distinguished career as a gentleman, banker, rancher, and writer is well known in the Southwest. He is a member of the National Council of the John Birch Society. Let us see how his mind reacts on the questions at issue.

I quoted from the American Opinion article the following sentence: "The attention of the American people was first drawn to the real problem of mental health on October 1, 1962, when, in obedience to the specific demands of the Communist Party, a gang under the direction of Nicholas Katzenbach (now Attorney General of the United States) kidnapped Gen. Edwin A. Walker, in Oxford, Miss."

Whereupon Mr. Brophy writes me: "General Walker was kidnaped, or at least seized unlawfully, confined in a mental institution or prison without proper medical examination, and after some days released due to the patriotic pressures of thousands of outraged Americans. The oddest thing about this is that you think it odd that the John Birch Society takes a dim view of such totalitarian tactics and tries to arouse people before it is too late."

Here, preserved in formaldehyde, is a specimen of the utter hopelessness of communication with anyone suffering from advanced Birchitis. I happen to agree with every syllable of Mr. Brophy's dismay at what was done to General Walker, and am abundantly on record to that effect. But the operative words in the Birch article were that Walker was detained "in obedience to the specific demands of the Communist Party"—words to which Mr. Brophy does not even bother to allude.

Again, I had quoted American Opinion: "The theory that the Warren court is working for a domestic, as distinct from foreign dictatorship, becomes less tenable every day."

Mr. Brophy writes me, by way of justification: "The pro-Communist activities of the Court in recent years are so obvious that I find it hard to believe that you would find any comment to offer."

The vital difference between "pro-Communist in effect," and "pro-Communist in intention," it once again does not cross Mr. Brophy's mind to mention. When J. Edgar Hoover, by relaxing his vigilance, permitted several convicted members of the Communist Party to slip off to Mexico, the result was pro-Communist in effect; but hardly by design. When the Founding Fathers ratified the first amendment to the Constitution, they committed an act that was profoundly pro-Jacobin, and ultimately pro-Communist in effect; but was hardly such by design. When the Warren court interprets that first amendment in such a way as to grant license to the Communist Party, it is most certainly doing something that is pro-Communist in effect; but in the absence of evidence that the Justices are secret friends of the Communist conspiracy, hardly pro-Communist by design. One can deplore, as for instance Prof. Sidney Hook (and I) have done, the absolutization of the first amendment in such fashion as to help conspirators; without questioning the motives—as distinguished from the judgment—of the ideologies on the Court.

And besides, the Birch article suggests in plain English that the Warren Court is "working for," i.e., is hoping to bring into being, "a foreign dictatorship"; which is

to suggest, pure and simple, that the majority of the Court are pro-Communist traitors.

Why are such elementary distinctions lost on Mr. Brophy? And on other members of the National Council of the John Birch Society? Hasn't their position, to judge from Mr. Brophy's analysis, clearly come down to the following propositions: (1) Things are going poorly for the United States these days; (2) the reason why is because the people who are running things are Communists and Communist sympathizers; (3) anyone who believes in proposition (1) yet cavils at the derivative proposition (2) is either (a) naive, or (b) irrelevant; and in any event, (c) a clear and present nuisance.

In the absence of public disavowals of this reasoning from responsible members of the John Birch Society, one must henceforward conclude that the minority who object to imputing procommunism to such as Attorney General Katzenbach, and to Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan, are overruled: that the majority of the members of the society sanction the imputation of treasonable motives to such men as these: not to mention Dean Rusk, Allen Dulles, Robert McNamara, etc., etc.

Mrs. Michael Vaccariello of Glendale, Calif., writes me: "I have often quoted your sentence (in 'Up From Liberalism' decrying the liberals' toleration of some of Mrs. Roosevelt's enormities during the forties and fifties): 'The intellectual probity of a person is measured not merely by what comes out of him, but by what he puts up with from others.' It seems to me, having written that and then having read that issue of American Opinion, you could only have written what you did—to have remained silent would not have been discreet, but debasing." Mrs. Vaccariello is a member of the John Birch Society. She appears, alas, to be hopelessly outnumbered.

SENATOR MARGARET CHASE SMITH PRAISED FOR 25TH ANNIVERSARY PARTY HONORING SENATOR AIKEN

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, in the Bangor, Maine, Daily News, of August 21, was published an interesting story entitled "Senator SMITH Gets Praise at Party." A part of the article reads as follows:

Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Republican, of Maine, set the staid U.S. Senate on its ear Friday with a birthday party that attracted 110 notables, including almost two-thirds of the Senate and three-fourths of the Lyndon B. Johnson family.

The President, with his wife and daughter, Lynda, made a sentimental journey to the Capitol, at Senator SMITH's invitation, to join in a tribute to her longtime friend, Senator GEORGE AIKEN, Republican, of Vermont, on his 25th anniversary in the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

[From the Bangor (Maine) Daily News, Aug. 21-22, 1965]

SENATOR SMITH GETS PRAISE AT PARTY
WASHINGTON, D.C.—Sen MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Republican, of Maine, set the staid U.S. Senate on its ear Friday with a birthday party that attracted 110 notables, including almost two-thirds of the Senate and three-fourths of the Lyndon B. Johnson family.

The President, with his wife and daughter, Lynda, made a sentimental journey to the Capitol, at Senator SMITH's invitation, to join in a tribute to her longtime friend,

SENATOR TYDINGS REPLIES TO EVENING STAR EDITORIAL

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, yesterday the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], asked to have an editorial from the Washington Evening Star printed in the RECORD. The editorial suggests that there is some inconsistency between my opposition to the Dirksen constitutional amendment and my advocacy of an equitable congressional districting plan for Maryland. This is not the case.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the editors of the Evening Star, in reply to their editorial be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 23, 1965.

The EDITOR,
Washington Evening Star,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Your Sunday editorial criticized suggestions I have made with respect to the establishment of eight congressional districts in Maryland. Since my position has been distorted and misrepresented, I should like to use this opportunity to make my views absolutely clear.

Maryland faces a redistricting crisis. Our seven congressional districts were established in 1952. Since then, we have become entitled to an additional seat, and the population of the seven existing districts have become drastically disproportionate. Three times the Maryland Legislature has tried and failed to establish eight congressional districts. The first plan was petitioned to referendum and rejected by the people. The second plan was declared unconstitutional by the court. The third plan has also been petitioned to referendum and will presumably be on the ballot in the November 1966 election. Meanwhile, the State is under court order to redistrict prior to 1966.

This crisis has been one of the problems discussed by the Maryland congressional delegation. At my request, and with the encouragement of Senator BREWSTER, weekly meetings of the entire delegation—Republicans and Democrats, House and Senate—have been initiated to work jointly on Maryland problems. This cooperative effort marks the first time in 15 years that the delegation has functioned effectively as a team.

It is well known that the Maryland Congressmen have been unable to agree among themselves upon a fair and practical redistricting plan. This is unfortunate. At a delegation meeting last month, it was decided that a committee of three would try to prepare a redistricting plan which could receive the enthusiastic support of all members of the delegation. I was appointed to the committee, primarily to act as a mediator.

From the beginning, I have insisted that we approach the problem with three basic considerations in mind:

1. The districts must be substantially equal in population.
2. The districts should be as homogeneous as possible in composition.
3. The districts should be drawn, if possible, so as not to require two incumbent Congressmen with substantial seniority to run against each other.

There is no truth in the charge that I have deviated from the fundamental concept of fair and equal representation. I advocate the principle of "one man, one vote" for both the State legislature and for the U.S. House of Representatives.

One of the primary reasons I agreed to help formulate a new districting proposal was my deep concern that the most recent

plan enacted by the legislature did not create districts of substantially equal population. That plan allowed deviation of over 29 percent in population between the largest and the smallest district. While this is more satisfactory than our present districting, I think we can do better.

The major problem lies in the Baltimore area. If we can decide how to district Baltimore City and the surrounding suburbs, the rest of the pieces will fall into place. Baltimore City is entitled, on the basis of its 1960 population, to two and one-half Congressmen. It now has three Congressmen. The alternatives that face us, therefore, are: (1) to create two districts wholly within the city and one district half in and half out of the city; or (2) to create three districts each of which is substantially inside Baltimore City, but which extend into an adjoining suburb.

I have never advocated three districts wholly within the city of Baltimore. I have never advocated districts of unequal population.

I have advocated that we seriously consider establishing three districts that are anchored in Baltimore City, but take in part of the adjoining counties. Such a plan—in addition to providing districts of substantially equal population—would have the advantage of creating homogeneous districts and of preventing two incumbent senior Congressmen from running in the same district.

Although the districts created under such a plan would cross the city line, they could be homogeneous and include the same basic interests, backgrounds, and environments. There is no magic in city boundaries for congressional districting purposes. Forty years ago, my father represented a district that included Harford and Baltimore Counties and a substantial segment of East Baltimore. Today, thousands of residents of Baltimore City have crossed the city line and now reside in the suburbs of the Baltimore metropolitan area.

Finally, the districts created under the type of plan I suggest would enable our most senior Congressmen to run in separate districts. It would be foolish to force them to run against each other if we can avoid it. GEORGE FALON has just become chairman of the House Committee on Public Works. Every Federal dredging and public works project, including those involving the Chesapeake Bay, comes under the jurisdiction of his committee. ED GARMATZ is the ranking member of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. He could soon become chairman. Every piece of legislation in these fields, which are so vital to tidewater Maryland, comes before his committee.

I did not create the seniority system, but since it is an important fact of congressional life, I think we would be remiss to ignore seniority in drawing boundaries of congressional districts. On the other hand, seniority is not the only factor to be considered. There is no effort on my part to create "safe seats" for the three Congressmen from Baltimore City, or for anyone else. Each incumbent Congressman will have to justify his renomination and reelection to the voters of his district, and I reserve the right to support the best qualified candidate in any future election.

Despite the suggestion of some critics, I would not support a plan that underrepresented any area of the State just as I would not support a plan to overrepresent Baltimore City. The suburban counties near Washington are entitled to equal representation, just as is Baltimore and its suburbs. Any acceptable redistricting plan must provide at least two districts for the Washington metropolitan area similar to those proposed in the legislature this year.

To summarize: I have never advocated three congressional districts entirely within Baltimore City, or any other deviation from the principles of one man, one vote. I have advised the Maryland delegation to try and agree on a redistricting plan which would contain eight districts of approximately equal population, which would, to the extent possible, contain citizens of like interests and background, and which would seek to avoid placing two senior incumbent Congressmen in the same district.

I appreciate the opportunity to restate my position.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH D. TYDINGS.

MIGRANTS—EDUCATION AND COOPERATION

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, all of us from Utah are proud of an excellent record of community cooperation and when local efforts are coordinated into highly successful programs I believe the accomplishments should be recognized.

Recently citizens of Cache County, a scenic, northern Utah county, provided the formal classwork and supervised recreation for a group of children of migrant workers from three local camps. These fine Americans independently financed and carried out this worthwhile experiment in close cooperation.

The funds were obtained through donations and proceeds from benefits throughout the valley.

Mr. President, I feel this fine example of Utah cooperation and commendable community effort deserves widespread recognition and I ask unanimous consent that an editorial from the Salt Lake Tribune further explaining the project be printed in the RECORD as an example for others to follow.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EDUCATION FOR MIGRANTS

Over 150 citizens have been involved in the Cache Valley Migrant Council's project to provide 4 weeks of formal classwork for children of migrant farmworkers in the valley. The volunteers transported children from the three migrant camps in Logan, Amalga, and Lewistown, prepared lunches, supplied materials, and made donations.

The school, for 40 students in two classroom units, was financed entirely through local efforts. Its budget of less than \$500 was obtained through donations by churches and individuals, proceeds of a rummage sale and a dessert bridge party. The Cache County Board of Education made possible use of the Hyde Park School and the Cache and Logan City boards supplied books and other materials.

A number of high school and college students helped the special teachers in the classrooms and in supervised recreation.

The project grew out of the United Church Women's efforts to provide some summer schooling for migrant children at Logan in recent years. It is a fine example of church and educational cooperation for which Cache County and its people are to be commended.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM POLICY—PRESERVATION OF LIFE AND HEALTH—VOTING RIGHTS

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, two leading Missouri newspapers have

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formity anyway so long as our Government continues to pay allowances and differentials now paid to Federal employees in foreign areas.

It seems to me that the geographic distance existing between these four areas and the 48 contiguous States is, in itself, adequate reason to think them different, particularly with reference to Alaska with its extremely high cost of living and long, cold winters.

The second premise underlying the bill is apparently that since people can presumably be hired without paying a cost-of-living allowance, the allowance ought to be ended. In other words, if people can be hired more cheaply, they ought to be hired more cheaply. This, in my view, is an unsound concept upon which to build a pay system or, more broadly, upon which to build a career service of efficient and able civil servants. It is also an unworthy philosophy for our Government to pursue.

The U.S. Government does not seek to hire as cheaply as it can those persons who will serve as foreign posts, and it should not seek to hire as cheaply as it can in any other place.

A second objection I have to the entire bill is that it would produce consequences that none of us want.

If H.R. 8390 was enacted, there would be widespread dissatisfaction among the civil servants affected. The Civil Service Commission agrees that this would be a consequence—explaining that no employee likes to have his pay cut—but the Commission suggests that this is only to be expected and indicates that its a matter of little importance. I disagree. It is a matter of real importance, as manifested by this stack of letters from Federal employees who are my constituents, and who are opposed to this bill. They believe it is a matter of real importance.

They also believe that, if the Commission's proposal is to be seriously considered, hearings ought to be held in Alaska.

If we look to the likely effect of dissatisfaction, it becomes plain that it is a matter of real importance. The likely effect would be the movement away from the nonforeign, noncontiguous areas by our present classified employees, especially those in Alaska. Some might leave in anger—not having been told upon their recruitment that the cost-of-living allowance was to be temporary, and they'll correctly conclude that they've been unfairly treated. Others will leave because the monthly commitments they have made on purchases of homes and cars and in other credit transactions were based upon contemplation of a tax free allowance that is no longer paid. And others will leave because they simply cannot afford to stay.

In Alaska we have been fortunate in attracting and keeping the highest caliber of Federal classified employees under the system in effect under law for 17 years. We don't want to lose them. And if we must lose them, we don't want them replaced by any who are less able. The Federal Government has succeeded, under the present system, in adequately staffing its multiplicity of departments and agencies operating in Alaska with competent, dedicated and loyal people of high morale. Let us not take action now which will seriously shake if not shatter this Federal establishment in Alaska, and cause our agencies in Alaska more headaches than they can count. A solution to what was a difficult recruitment problem has been found. We have a winning combination. Let's not change it.

Although I believe these to be adequate reasons to reject the bill, I want now to comment on two problems of this proposal of the Civil Service Commission as it relates specifically to Alaska.

The first of these problems is that associated with the principle of comparability—the principle that the Commission says

should be the basis of the higher salary schedule that would replace the cost-of-living allowance if H.R. 8390 were enacted. Though I agree with the principle of comparability in establishing governmental pay systems, that principle cannot be effectively applied in Alaska. There are two reasons for this:

1. Since the population of Alaska is small, there are many government positions that have no counterpart in private industry that might be used for comparison. In the 1963 survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, private industry counterpart salaries to three classification act grades were left blank in a chart of salaries with the footnote that there was "insufficient data to warrant presentation of an average."

2. Since the higher salary schedule that would be proposed by the Commission would be based upon an average of salary differentials between all grades found in private industry counterpart positions, comparability in salaries would be at best only a very rough approximation of true salary differences.

Let me explain. By the 1963 survey, the private enterprise counterpart to a classified grade 1 earned 39 percent more in Alaska than he earned in the contiguous 48 States; the private enterprise counterpart to a classified grade 11 earned 14 percent more in Alaska than he earned in the contiguous States. These specific salary differences would not be applied to these specific classified grades in Government under the Commission proposal. Instead, an average would be struck that would take into account all of the grades and the differences.

One final observation on this matter—since the population of Alaska is small, and the smallness of any sample reduces its reliability, I think the present system is more nearly based upon the comparability principle that what is proposed. What we have, of course, is a nationwide comparison of salaries between private industry and Government that is used as the basis of the salaries in Alaska and elsewhere. Then the cost-of-living allowance is added to this salary schedule—a schedule that is basically sound.

The second problem that I want to comment on specifically as it relates to Alaska is one I touched upon earlier—the reduction of take-home pay that the Civil Service Commission desires to effect for all Federal classified employees in Alaska and the other nonforeign areas. In my earlier remarks I offered several reasons why such reduction should not be brought about. Now I want to elaborate on one of them—that the cost of living is so high in Alaska that Federal employees will not be able to afford to stay in Alaska as Federal employees if their take-home pay is reduced. They will leave Fed-

eral employment for private jobs, or they will leave Alaska.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I request that these letters from Federal employees in Alaska—all in opposition to this proposal, with emphasis upon the cost-of-living aspect—be made a part of the record at the conclusion of my statement.

According to the Civil Service Commission, once the 25-percent tax-free cost-of-living allowance is terminated a new basic schedule of salaries 27 percent over mainland salaries would be instituted. Since all of the salary under the new schedule would be taxed, the effect would be a substantial reduction of take-home pay.

Attached to this statement is a chart showing the scope of reductions that typical employees would suffer.

These are very substantial reductions to inflict upon any group of dedicated employees. They are very substantial reductions—especially in view of the fact that the 25-percent cost-of-living allowance presently paid in Alaska does not fully cover the higher cost of living in Alaska.

The most recent figures quoted by the Civil Service Commission itself show the cost of living in Alaska to be higher than the allowance now paid. According to these figures, compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, living costs are higher than Washington, D.C., by 29.3 percent in Juneau, Alaska, 37.8 percent higher in Anchorage, Alaska, and 42.4 percent higher in Fairbanks, Alaska.

To reduce take-home pay by repealing COLA—as the Commission proposes—would work a severe hardship on Alaska's civil servants and be a grave injustice to them. As I have said, it would result in the loss of many competent and dedicated Federal civil servants from their Alaskan jobs. Such would be a tragic consequence for the Federal service and for Alaska.

The Civil Service Commission has failed in its advocacy of H.R. 8390 because of unavoidable contradictions within its case.

1. The Commission claims that it is seeking a uniform pay system for U.S. areas, but admits that a special schedule would be necessary for Alaska.

2. The Commission claims that comparisons of Government salaries with private salaries in Alaska ought to determine salary levels, but fails to show that there is an adequate number of comparable private positions in Alaska to enable reliable comparisons.

3. The Commission indicates that substantial savings would be realized with termination of the allowance to Alaska's Federal civil servants, but agrees to a special higher schedule in Alaska that would cancel out a large portion of the alleged savings.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I urge you to reject H.R. 8390.

Effect on take-home pay of conversion of 25-percent cost-of-living allowance to salary

Grade	Base pay	Cost-of-living allowance	Total income	Taxes	Loss in take-home pay
GS-4 (S/1) single:					
Present	\$4,480.00	\$1,120.00	\$5,600.00	\$487.00	
Proposed	5,600.00	0	5,600.00	617.00	\$180.00
GS-7 (S/1) 1 dependent:					
Present	6,050.00	1,512.50	7,562.50	480.00	
Proposed	7,562.50	0	7,562.50	1,001.25	571.25
GS-9 (S/1) 1 dependent:					
Present	7,220.00	1,805.00	9,025.00	989.00	
Proposed	9,025.00	0	9,025.00	1,264.50	324.90
GS-9 (S/1) 2 dependents:					
Present	7,220.00	1,805.00	9,025.00	501.00	
Proposed	9,025.00	0	9,025.00	1,144.50	643.50
GS-11 (S/1) 1 dependent:					
Present	8,650.00	2,162.50	10,812.50	1,197.00	
Proposed	10,812.50	0	10,812.50	1,623.94	426.94
GS-11 (S/1) 2 dependents:					
Present	8,650.00	2,162.50	10,812.50	1,077.00	
Proposed	10,812.50	0	10,812.50	1,482.94	405.94
GS-13 (S/1) 1 dependent:					
Present	12,075.00	3,018.75	15,093.75	1,920.63	
Proposed	15,093.75	0	15,093.75	2,680.31	739.68
GS-13 (S/1) 2 dependents:					
Present	12,075.00	3,018.75	15,093.75	1,779.83	
Proposed	15,093.75	0	15,093.75	2,499.31	719.68

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editorialized this month in three areas of great importance to our national interest.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch carried a thoughtful and penetrating assessment of some of the more recent developments in our Vietnam policy. President Johnson's call for a settlement of the conflict there on the basis of the 1954 Geneva accords has reminded the world once again that the U.S. harbors no territorial ambitions in this strife-torn country. It has given notice to the peoples of all nations that we seek only a just peace for southeast Asia. The Post-Dispatch editorial recognizes the great support of the American people for this peaceful administration objective.

In the field of national health, the Post-Dispatch has noted Federal determination to provide Americans with all possible protection against disease. It is gratifying that the President's goal of preserving life and health is given favorable attention by one of Missouri's nationally circulated papers.

In still another major area of concern, civil rights, the Springfield Leader-Press has voiced its strong support for the President's efforts to guarantee all Americans their most basic right in our democratic system. Mr. President, I am sure this outstanding south Missouri newspaper speaks for a very great majority of Missourians when it praises the administration's Voting Rights Act, and urges all citizens to make a wise and responsible use of the constitutional privilege it assures for them.

Mr. President, so that all of my colleagues may read the opinions that these two newspapers hold in three vital areas, I ask unanimous consent that these three editorials be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1965]

A UNITY FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

President Johnson has embarked on a new round of Vietnam discussions with Members of Congress designed to show, as he says, that "there is no substantial division" over American policy there. Evidently he feels a need to convince Hanoi that debate and differences of opinion in Washington do not signify a willingness to pull out of Vietnam.

It is right and proper that he should make this clear. There has never been any substantial body of American opinion in favor of abrupt, unconditional withdrawal. There is, however, a large body of opinion in favor of limited objectives rather than the unlimited ones of a major land war in Asia.

The unity which the President seeks to demonstrate is a unity behind limited objectives. It is a unity behind a negotiated settlement. It is a unity in favor of an honorable end to the fighting. If it is important to let Hanoi know that we will not be thrown out of Vietnam, it is also important to let everybody know that our purpose in maintaining a military presence is not conquest of the Vietcong but to bring about a peaceful settlement under which the people of South Vietnam can determine their own future.

This, we take it, is the meaning of the President's press conference statement of July 28, at which he announced a limited buildup of American ground forces rather than the all-out war which some had ex-

pected. He said then, as he had said before, that a military decision is not possible, and "a peaceful solution is inevitable." He called for unconditional discussions with North Vietnam, and indicated strongly that ways could be found to include the Vietcong itself in the talks. He urgently asked for the assistance of U.N. officials and all U.N. members in getting talks started for "an honorable peace."

Even more important, the President on July 28 gave some hint of the kind of settlement the United States would accept once negotiations are started. He advocated for the people of South Vietnam "the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision." He declared that the purposes of the 1954 Geneva agreements "still guide our action"—and those purposes were military neutralization, ultimate unification through free elections, and the withdrawal in due time of all foreign troops.

This necessarily generalized statement of "peace aims" went considerably beyond the President's Baltimore speech of April 7, and we hope the difference has been noted in Hanoi. At Baltimore the President had not even mentioned the 1954 Geneva accords, and instead had called "an independent South Vietnam" one of the essentials of any final settlement.

Since an independent South Vietnam was not contemplated at Geneva, making it central to any settlement could be interpreted as demanding simply that the Vietcong movement lay down its arms and accept defeat. But now the President, as we understand him, is calling for something quite different. He is saying that the question of South Vietnam's independence should be left to the people of South Vietnam, as the 1954 accords contemplated. He is saying that we will not be driven out by force, but are willing to negotiate a settlement based on the 1954 principles, under which American troops would be ultimately withdrawn as part of an internationally sanctioned agreement.

North Vietnam and the Vietcong have repeatedly claimed that they seek the restoration of the 1954 accords. They are now on notice that they cannot achieve it by war, but only at the conference table. No doubt the negotiations would be long and strenuous, but in the meantime the fighting would have been stopped and some beginning could be made toward economic rehabilitation of a war-torn country. As Secretary Rusk has indicated, the bombing of North Vietnam would surely end the moment Hanoi gave "some clear sign of opening the road to peace."

The choice for Hanoi and the Vietcong is whether to continue the war in the hope of inflicting total defeat upon the United States, or to accept negotiations for a restoration of the principles of the 1954 agreements. The Communists would make a serious mistake to assume that the American people will accept total defeat. On the contrary, the longer the war goes on the more difficult it will be to satisfy the American people with limited objectives. Yet as of now limited objectives do unquestionably command overwhelming public support. It was when the President clearly adopted them that he gained in Congress and the country the high degree of unified backing he is now demonstrating.

Many mistakes have been made in Vietnam, on both sides, but the time has come to relegate them to the past and to turn a new page. The President with full popular consent has committed the United States to the purposes of the 1954 agreements, and the Communists proclaim those purposes as their own. Peaceful negotiation should be the next step.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 14, 1965]

FIVE YEARS MORE

We hesitate to relate too many of President Johnson's programs to politics, but we can hardly think of a better way of persuading citizens to join the consensus than to promise them an extra 5 years of life. This should certainly appeal to the far right, the far left, and everyone in between.

In signing a bill extending for 3 years Federal grants for immunization from disease, Mr. Johnson stated a number of "very ambitious, but attainable" goals. One is the extension of life expectancy for the average American from 70 to 75 years in the next decade. This will be a great boon if it can be brought about, and it will create problems, too, in caring for an increasing proportion of older citizens.

That is partly what social security and medicare and various allied welfare programs are all about, and it is well that the administration is moving forward in those fields.

[From the Springfield (Mo.) Leader & Press, Aug. 9, 1965]

QUITE A SHOW

Lyndon Johnson was highly conscious of the fact that he was making history last week when he signed the bill designed to insure voting rights of all Americans, regardless of color.

He went out of his way, as a matter of fact, to surround the entire ceremony with historical trappings—going to the rotunda of the Capitol for his speech and then moving into the historic President's Room for the actual signing. It was there more than a century ago that Abraham Lincoln signed a law freeing slaves who had been pressed into Civil War service for the Confederacy.

The President made of the signing a solemn occasion. In so doing, we consider that he was acting correctly. It should have been a solemn occasion—and we trust that the Negro population of the United States will regard it as such and will realize the great significance of the new law to members of their race.

Let them hear and take to heart the President's words—

"Today is a triumph for freedom as huge as any victory won on any battlefield."

This may have been a true statement of the importance of the measure Lyndon Johnson signed. It can be a true statement—but only if the principal beneficiaries of the voting rights bill accept the responsibilities as well as the privileges the bill grants them.

President Johnson went on to note that "through this act, and its enforcement, an important instrument of freedom passes into the hands of millions. But it must be used."

Presidents and Congresses and laws, he said, can open the doors of polling places to the wondrous rewards awaiting the wise use of the ballot. But only the individual Negro, and all others who have been denied the right to vote, can use that right and convert the vote into an instrument of justice.

Speaking directly to Negroes, the President said:

"You must register. You must vote. And you must learn, so that your choice advances your interest and the interest of the Nation."

To our way of thinking, this was the heart and soul of the President's speech. We would particularly emphasize these words: "And you must learn, so that your choice advances * * * the interest of the Nation."

These are truly words of wisdom. It would seem to us that what the President was saying, in effect, was that the signing

of the voting rights bill represented an important victory in the Negroes' long battle for first-class citizenship—but that that victory would be nullified unless the victors conducted themselves as first class citizens should.

The victory, the President pointed out, is "also a victory for the freedom of the American Nation. And every family * * * will live stronger in liberty, more splendid in expectation, and prouder to be an American because of the act I sign today."

This, too, can be true—but only, as we said earlier, if the new rights now guaranteed to all citizens are accepted by all citizens—and used by them—in a spirit of sober and thoughtful responsibility.

A GROWING PROBLEM—THE POPULATION EXPLOSION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on July 13, 1965, I submitted a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill H.R. 6453, making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966. In my statement, I included some comments concerning the need for family planning, not only in the District of Columbia, but also in the Nation and throughout the world. I have had so many requests for this statement as it pertained to the subject of family planning that I believe it worthy of again being brought to the attention of the readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I call attention to the additional position that was allowed by the Senate and accepted by the House conferees in the Department of Health. This is the position of medical officer, which position was needed to round out a full-time birth control clinic team. Also, in the Senate committee report, there is language to authorize the Director of the Health Department to utilize up to \$200,000 out of available funds for the establishment of three additional full-time birth control clinic teams, the Director having stated to the subcommittee during the hearings that four full-time teams were needed to meet the present needs in the District of Columbia. I believe that this is one of the most important features of the bill, the conference report, and the Senate committee report.

Mr. President, there are certain things that I think we would all like to have for America. Regardless of his political persuasion, I think everybody would like to see full employment, an end to slums, an end to the necessity for relief rolls, an end to the violent juvenile gangs in big cities, and an end to schools that are too crowded for real education. However, I submit that we will never achieve these goals until we learn to control our population growth.

Medical science has prolonged the average lifespan of man far beyond the wildest dreams of our pioneering grandfathers. Since 1900, we have cut the mortality rates of American children under age 1 from 16 out of every 100 to less than 3.

The plagues and famine which in former times brought their own form of cruel population control are mercifully a thing of the past in our country. It must be hoped that none of us wishes to rely, for a way out of our dilemma, on that final and most terrible of the four horsemen, war. Our own tre-

mendous progress in subduing some of man's most fearsome historic enemies has forced upon us the necessity of curbing his birth rate.

By our last census, the United States was shown to have a population of approximately 180 million. At our present rate of reproduction we will have, by the year 2000, 340 million people. One hundred and sixty million more people in only 40 years' time. From where will the jobs come for these people?

One of the American philosophers of our day is Charles Hartshorne, now at the University of Texas. In his most recent book, "The Logic of Perfection," he makes this statement:

"Men judge a philosophy or a religion by its practical application, its 'fruits.' Whatever our religion or philosophy of life, its fruits can hardly be judged adequate unless it can be used to illuminate two momentous practical questions of our times. These are: How can we have liberty with peace, or at least with the avoidance of totally destructive warfare; and how can we bring the human birth rate into reasonable relation to the unprecedentedly low death rate achieved by scientific hygiene?"

I think the coupling of these two problems by Dr. Hartshorne is significant and warranted.

The President is aware of the seriousness of the situation. As we know, in his state of the Union message to Congress on January 4, he stated that he would "seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources." That the President also understands this explosion is domestic as well as foreign has been well demonstrated within the past few months. The Office of Economic Opportunity has granted funds to Corpus Christi, Tex., for a birth-control clinic project; and applications from three other cities are reported to be pending. The President has appealed to Congress to double last year's appropriation to the District of Columbia for its clinic program, which in itself was a historic "first."

Indeed, there are many extremely hopeful signs that both public officials and the public themselves are becoming alive to the population problem and to the possibilities of solving it. But this has always been a delicate issue in the United States. Officials have been understandably reluctant, on all levels of government, to initiate a divisive controversy.

Despite the considerable change in climate surrounding the issue of birth control during the past few years, public officials are still hesitant to take the needed action. There are presently a number of Federal programs under which the States may obtain aid for family planning services. But in most cases a clarification of policy is needed. The President, as I have said, has taken the first steps. But I think—in view of the past history of this question—it is unfair to expect him to take all the political risk, if there in fact is a risk. The Members of Congress should speak out and give him the support he needs in effecting such a major change.

Certainly this is no time to maintain a golden silence. Children are being born every second. After they are unwanted. They, in turn, when the time comes, will produce more unwanted children. No war against poverty can ever be a victorious one if its wagers do not identify the real problems. And the problem is the spiraling birth rate among those who are incapable of adequately providing for their offspring.

Mr. President, my approach to the issue of birth control may be summed up by that one pivotal word in the official title of the Poverty Act: opportunity. The people in this country who, most of all, do not know how to space their children are those who are least able to adequately provide for children. They simply do not have access to the neces-

sary information. And if they do, they cannot afford the cost of practicing it. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal points out:

"Public health and welfare authorities contend the lack of access to modern, effective child-spacing methods is an important reason why more than half of the 7,800,000 persons on relief in this country are mothers and their dependent children. The lack of birth-control information, it's argued, also helps explain why this aid to dependent children (ADC) relief group has soared to more than 4 million persons from 2.2 million in 1955."

I do not believe that these people would be having all of these children if they knew how to prevent it. What we must do is give them a choice. Opportunities for the impoverished must include the opportunity to plan family growth. The hopelessness of the constant flow of children, often unwanted, to people already with little hope cannot be overestimated. And something can be done about it. The time to do it is now.

The subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee has responded to this responsibility, as has the Senate, and as did the House conferees.

Mr. President, that completes my statement on the conference report.

WEAK SPOT IN OUR DEFENSES

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, Jesuit Fathers of the United States and Canada publish weekly the national Catholic review, America, one of the notable magazines of comment and interpretation.

Indicative of the broad and growing concern over the tragic decline of our merchant marine is the leading article in the July 24 issue of America titled "Weak Spot in Our Defenses."

Written by Rear Adm. John D. Hayes, U.S. Navy, retired, it details the erosion of our merchant fleet since the Korean conflict, and pictures the effect that this may have in the event of enlarged future hostilities overseas.

Mr. President, the editors of America are to be commended for the prominence they have given to Admiral Hayes' warning. For the convenience of my distinguished colleagues who may not have ready access to this magazine, and with the knowledge that in reading it they will be impressed as I have been, I ask unanimous consent that the article "Weak Spot in Our Defenses," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WEAK SPOT IN OUR DEFENSES (By Rear Adm. John D. Hayes)

At the opening of the Korean hostilities, the U.S. merchant marine, although its ebb had already set in, was still the greatest the world had known. Its quiet, effective service made that war appear logistically easy and gave rise to the dangerous assumption that the United States would have little trouble conducting limited wars overseas. Today, it is difficult to see how the residue of that once great fleet can properly support our present commitment in Vietnam—soon to be 100,000 troops, the South Vietnamese forces and an enlarged 7th Fleet.

If military operations in Vietnam are allowed to expand even to the extent of the Korean war, we must be ready to accept severe and lasting strains on our economy and foreign relations. For we do not have now, as we had in the similar situation in 1950,

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Mr. LAUSCHE. My only answer to the question of the Senator from New York is that I seek to have equal applicability of a principle to all situations.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I am advised by the staff that, under the present language of the amendment, it probably does not affect the balance-of-payments situation to any important degree.

I agree very much with what the Senator from New York has just stated, that this is an area on which we have not really been fully informed as to how far it would reach. How far it generally applies, we do not know; but, under the circumstances, I would be glad to recommend that we take the amendment to conference at the present time, and then we will get the views of the Treasury Department on it, as to what they think of the amendment, and perhaps we may be able to solve the problem.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Let me say to the Senator from New York that I contemplated preparation of an all-embracing amendment, but I was told that we do not know how much the impact would be and, therefore, I limited it.

Mr. JAVITS. Let me say to the Senator from Ohio, who has a deep devotion to public service, that it is unlikely that the amendment will not affect the balance of payments. I believe that it will.

To show the Senator why: We have no illusions about what the conference committee will do to the amendment if the amount involved is negligible, because then it would affect the balance of payments only negligibly; but as to the overall perspective, we do a vast amount of advertising business with Canada in terms of Canadian companies advertising in this country. Therefore, other media could be clamoring for similar treatment.

It would affect the balance of payments, if only appreciably, because our exports involve not only the export of goods, for which we get back dollars, but also exports of services.

But I understand the dilemma of the Senator from Ohio. The amendment would go to committee, and with the understanding that the committee would approach this in conference as a matter of the first instance, because we really have not had an opportunity to consider it, I would have no objection.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Florida for his willingness to take the amendment of the Senator from Ohio, which I congratulate the Senator from Ohio in offering, and join the Senator in sponsoring, and hope that divine providence will be at work with the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio.

The amendment was agreed to.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the bill was passed be reconsidered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and request a conference thereon with the House, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. LONG of Louisiana, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware, and Mr. CARLSON conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 4750 be printed with the Senate amendments numbered; and that in the engrossment of the amendments of the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to make the necessary technical and clerical corrections.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we have just completed action on H.R. 4750, the extension of the interest equalization tax. It has been a very long time since I have seen such cooperation displayed in this chamber as that which was displayed today on the part of the Senators closely associated with this bill.

The Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] has again displayed his great parliamentary ability and leadership on this measure. He was more than ably assisted by the junior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG].

Equally great credit and appreciation are extended to the senior Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS], the ranking Republican member on the Finance Committee, for his cooperation and skill in assisting in the swift and satisfactory completion of the consideration of this vital legislation; to him and to the senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], who offered his proposals so succinctly and expeditiously, the Senate owes a special note of thanks. Again, this display of cooperation this afternoon renews my optimism that we shall be able to adjourn around Labor Day.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1966

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 608, House of Representatives bill 9221.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 9221) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

FUNDS FOR PROSECUTING THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, the defense appropriations bill, for which I voted in committee, carries all the funds requested by the President for the prosecution of our war in South Vietnam. We were informed that the special item in the pending bill for the Vietnam war is in the nature of a down payment, and we will be presented with a supplemental item early next year, when the military authorities can make a more actual appraisal of what will be required.

I shall make no effort at appraising the amount but some well-informed members of our Senate Armed Services Committee have placed the figure as high as \$10 billion a year. Before we become committed to expenditures of that magnitude, which inevitably will have an inflationary effect upon our domestic economy because they will be superimposed upon a regular budget of \$100 billion or more with anticipated revenue of less than \$95 billion, a serious effort should be made for us to gain complete control of a war in which we will pay all of the expenses and in the end do most of the fighting.

For instance, it is a well known fact that up until recently, we have permitted the Government of South Vietnam to have control of the war effort. Those government officials could tell our commanders what they could do and what they could not do. There were reports to the effect that when we stepped up our commitment to 70,000 men, we would insist upon taking charge of the war, but to what extent that promise has been carried out has not as yet been made public. One of the evidences that it has not been carried out is a news item today to the effect that local labor unions control the hours which dockworkers in Saigon are willing to work, and that huge supplies of both food and ammunition are piling up at that principal seaport because of the lack of stevedores to expeditiously handle them, and yet we have thousands of Marines in the jungles of southeast Asia whose lives will depend upon the supplies that we are shipping, for instance, to Saigon, and which cannot easily reach their destination because the Communists have destroyed all of the railroads and most of the main highways for at least half of South Vietnam.

Another problem that should be solved before we commit more men and more billions of dollars to this effort in the jungles of southeast Asia is the lack of accurate information on what is actually happening in South Vietnam. In a featured article in today's Wall Street Journal, entitled, "Void in Vietnam," by the well-informed correspondent, Philip Geyelin, the statement is categorically made that we know little about either foe or ally in South Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD, the full text of that statement.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1965]
VOID IN VIETNAM—UNITED STATES KNOWS
LITTLE ABOUT ITS FOE, NOT MUCH MORE
ABOUT ALLY

(By Philip Geyelin)

WASHINGTON.—One of the more disquieting discoveries made on a tour of South Vietnam is the amount of sheer ignorance about friend as well as foe upon which the most portentous decisions back here must, of necessity, be based.

President Johnson constructs a case with fine precision for each new move he makes; Secretary of Defense McNamara builds in detailed and dazzling statistical support; Secretary of State Rusk adds sturdy logic to the policy under-pinnings. Yet it becomes increasingly apparent, as you dig deeper in, that much of this rests on shifting sands of uncertainties, unknowns, even unknowables.

The President and his war counselors have no end of secret intelligence data. But the bulk of it comes from Vietnamese—who have no end of axes to grind. Much of it is also belated, just because everything has to be double-checked, and the best of it is, in the words of one authority, "simply not good enough."

The top men have pile upon pile of combat reports. But the recent confusion over results of the bomb raid against North Vietnamese missile sites is but one index to the unreliability of even eyewitness accounts—at jet speed. Enemy casualties, for another example, remain a mystery; to penetrate it often invites guesswork so wildly theoretical that U.S. military commanders in Saigon privately scoff at the results. Even the regular "progress" reports from the South Vietnamese on their own "pacification" efforts must be examined with a fishy eye; their contents, more often than not, are calculated largely to please.

American war-watchers in the field are richly endowed with rumor. But much of it is false, often maliciously so. What the Vietcong doesn't spread around, to confuse and mislead, the South Vietnamese will cheerfully circulate about each other. "I used to think Washington was rough on character assassination until I heard the South Vietnamese Buddhists talking about the Catholics and vice versa," say one old hand.

Such striking exceptions as last week's big Marine victory on Van Tuong Peninsula only reinforce the rule. There, a massive Vietcong concentration, backed up against the sea coast, seemed almost to be inviting attack; skillfully it was trapped by an even more massive force of Marines. Finding, encircling and crushing a comparable force inland is much more difficult; chasing down smaller, hit-and-run guerrilla units tougher still.

The decision-makers can deduce, and estimate, and guess. In time they can usually catch up to the truth. Moreover, in their defense, it must be said that large aspects of the Vietnam war are unavoidably impenetrable: The true intentions of the leadership in Hanoi, for example, the identity of the Vietcong terrorist in the village or the Vietcong agent in the upper reaches of the government, the whereabouts at crucial moments of enemy forces, the designs upon each other of Saigon's coup-makers.

But the fact still is that in the main, and at the time that it matters most, the decision-makers don't really know what they are talking about. They are largely in the dark about the enemy and not much more solidly informed about supposed friends. They have only a remote sense of the sentiment of the Vietnamese populace, a fleeting feel for the course the conflict is taking or may take.

"WE'RE BLIND"

Not that they seriously pretend, at least in private, to anything else. "We're blind,"

confessed one top military commander in Saigon, speaking of the U.S. combat intelligence capability. "With all this power, we're like a man fumbling around in a dark closet trying to catch a mouse."

And not that a visiting reporter is necessarily any better off. What he may, however, be able to define somewhat more exactly than a visiting U.S. dignitary may be able to, on his formal, official rounds, is the dimension of the intelligence gap. In attempting to do so, what is also revealed are some of the bureaucratic idiosyncrasies and impediments that may be making the gap somewhat wider than it has to be.

What appears to have happened, in the course of escalating the American effort in this hideously complicated, many-faceted war, is that the United States has hastily jerry-built a hideously complicated, many-faceted behemoth of a bureaucracy. The men at the very top, who must make the decisions, are removed not once or twice but many times from their lower-level minions whose first-hand, front-line contact with the shadowy, essentially local Vietnam struggle makes them uniquely sensitive to what's really going on.

To a degree, this can't be helped; intelligence is always a headache in guerrilla war; bureaucracy balloons whenever governmental activity grows rapidly. But it is hard to escape the conclusion that a real effort to streamline the multiple chains of command and channels of information might well make the policy-makers a little less remote from the realities. Granted, the upshot then might sometimes be greater, not less, uncertainty at the top. But a greater willingness to concede uncertainty might be useful in itself, if it served to restrain those who would have the United States plunge into deeper involvement in the struggle.

As it is, a rough rule of thumb applies: The further you proceed from Washington's policymaking peaks, down through the bureaucratic jungle in Saigon, past the painstakingly prepared, richly documented "briefings" and on out into the countryside, the more you are likely to encounter candor, a questioning spirit, honest diversity of view. The more you also encounter genuine, closeup expertise.

Ultimately, the richest lode is found at the bottom of the bureaucratic pile, among a small but growing band of youthful American political warriors. Some are military officers, others budding diplomats, or foreign aid operatives, or U.S. Information Agency officers. Their diverse official auspices are less important than the qualities they share: At least some fluency in Vietnamese, for example; deep dedication and a scholar's approach to the new arts of counter-insurgency; a real zeal for hazardous front-line duty in remote hamlets; a remarkable grasp of all the interrelated military, political, economic and psychological elements of the Vietnam conflict, to an extent unmatched almost anywhere along the chain of command, except perhaps at the very top.

Thus, some of the keenest insights are the farthest removed, by rank or reach, from the men who need them most. Moreover, something funny happens to low-level expert counsel on its way up the bureaucratic heights. It gets tailored for political comfort, or to fit preconceptions. For example, last year U.S. officials built an impressive case against bombing North Vietnam on grounds that the war in South Vietnam was largely a homegrown affair, which probably would rage on even without Hanoi's outside help. This year, with the decision to "bomb north" already made, a new case was constructed, along the lines that everything would be quite manageable in the south were it not for Hanoi's outside help and guidance. The justification, however—stepped-up infiltration and other assistance from the

north—was difficult to document and, at best a difference only in degree.

CATCHWORDS AND CLICHES

As information makes its way inexorably towards the President's desk it also gets condensed for quick comprehension; it gets reduced to catchwords or cliches, or committed to computers for display in glib statistics or graphic charts. No matter how carefully qualified and unsusceptible to generalities the original judgment may have been, the end product may have the appearance of unquestioned truth.

Combat casualties are a case in point. According to military authorities, the Air Force estimates the effects of its bombing attacks by a highly involved computation based on the area hit, the number of people that must have been in it, the number of bombs that should have landed in it. "Then they put those two unknowns together, come up with an apparent 'known,' and ship the figure off weekly to Washington," says one Saigon officer despairingly.

The very nomenclature of the enemy tends to mislead. As the U.S. Government would have it, the Vietcong are all Red, all under Hanoi's thumb and not engaged in promoting anything remotely resembling revolutionary causes that might just have some measure of popular sympathy. Few people on the scene share that view; but their careful qualifications, which might someday become the basis for coming to terms with at least some elements of the enemy, are, even if accepted privately, certainly not conceded publicly by policy-makers here.

Over-simplification, for the sake of making a political case, is no novelty. Nor does the high command privately pretend, as one of their number puts it, "not to know how little we know." A veteran Saigon hand is the first to admit that he is sometimes "appalled at the sort of information on which I had to advise the President." But if this is frank, it's hardly reassuring, and a couple of caveats are suggested by a study of the Vietnam intelligence void.

First, the illusion of knowledge can be infectious. As the United States stakes more and more on the Vietnam struggle, it may be all too easy to forget the struggle remains a rather uncertain, unpredictable game of chance; the knowledge gap is not necessarily narrowed by the arrival of another division of U.S. troops. Advocates of caution, then, have every right to claim this as a compelling argument.

Second, the fundamental requirement for intelligence puts a very real and practical limit on any effort to "Americanize" the war. In Congress and elsewhere, there are increasing cries that the time has come for U.S. forces to elbow the South Vietnamese aside and take over. But even if this concept were practical on other grounds, it collapses when you consider the intelligence need. In the last analysis, a cooperative Vietnamese populace, and an army reasonably loyal to the Saigon government and committed to the conflict, together hold the key to "finding and fixing" the enemy; at that point, U.S. firepower can possibly be brought to bear. But language barriers, not to mention the simple fact of being foreign, make it quite impossible for the Americans by themselves to flush out the Vietcong, except by such indiscriminate force that popular support would be alienated irretrievably and the whole point of the exercise lost.

THE THREAT OF PASSIVITY

This, then, is the real key to turning the tide in this political war. In the opinion of almost every expert on the scene, one of the gravest threats to U.S. aims is passivity; most Vietnamese have no reason to care. They will bend with the wind, whether it be Vietcong terror or Vietcong blandishments. The only real hope is that they can somehow be

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persuaded to bend to Saigon, and this, in the judgment of most, will require some more tangible display of government interest in their lot than destruction of their villages in quest of Vietcong.

It will take a long, patient, difficult government program of social and political reform, skillfully promoted and stage-managed by the United States—but from the wings. Done convincingly, as an adjunct to military security measures, the theory is, this can break the vicious circle that now makes physical security a prerequisite of collaboration with the government in furnishing intelligence and makes timely intelligence a prerequisite to security. This wouldn't settle the war; but it might help set the stage for settlement.

For the United States, this means a greater effort to develop the particular blend of political, military, diplomatic and economic expertise required to work effectively with the Government—in Saigon, at province headquarters, at district and village level. And

this, in turn, many U.S. authorities believe, can be done not only by pooling individual U.S. agency talents in cumbersome collective efforts but by encouraging expansion of that breed of American political warrior in whom all these special talents are combined.

How this is already happening, and why it may not be happening as fast as it could, will be the subject of another report on the question of how Washington's hard-pressed policymakers might be brought into closer contact with the day-to-day complexities and realities of Vietnam's war.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 50 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, August 25, 1965, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate August 24, 1965:

U.S. ATTORNEY

Richard E. Eagleton, of Illinois, to be U.S. attorney for the southern district of Illinois for the term of 4 years vice Edward R. Phelps, term expired.

THE JUDICIARY

Sidney O. Smith, Jr., of Georgia, to be U.S. district judge for the northern district of Georgia vice William Boyd Sloan, retiring.

John P. Fullam, of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. district judge for the eastern district of Pennsylvania vice Abraham L. Freedman, elevated.

CONFIRMATION

Executive nomination confirmed by the Senate August 24, 1965:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

J. Cordell Moore, of Illinois, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

House of Representatives

TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1965

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D.D., prefaced his prayer with these words of Scripture: Luke 17: 5: *Lord, increase our faith.*

Eternal God, whose mercies are without number, whose power is ever gracious and whose love is new every day, we give Thee thanks that Thy hand of blessing is always upon us.

Grant that there may be given unto us a new birth of faith, hope and wonder, and may our minds be touched to a more liberal distribution of our blessing in behalf of those who know the bitterness of want.

May our faith in Thee be more trustful and triumphant, and joyous in service, giving us the assurance that our vision of the moral and spiritual values are a prophecy of our high duty and destiny.

Inspire us to be numbered among those who live in Thy spirit and may Thy words ring in our ears, at once an invitation and a challenge and causing us to be partners with Thee in the building of a better world.

Hear us in Christ's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arlington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a resolution as follows:

S. RES. 141

Resolved, That the Senate has heard with profound sorrow the announcement of the death of Hon. Clarence J. Brown, late a Representative from the State of Ohio.

Resolved, That a committee of two Senators be appointed by the Presiding Officer to join the committee appointed on the part of the House of Representatives to attend the funeral of the deceased Representative.

Resolved, That the Secretary communicate these resolutions to the House of Representatives and transmit an enrolled copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

Resolved, That, as a further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased, the Senate do now adjourn.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill and concurrent resolutions of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 9544. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of approximately 620,000 long tons of natural rubber from the national stockpile;

H. Con. Res. 453. Concurrent resolution expressing the approval of Congress for the disposal of magnesium from the national stockpile;

H. Con. Res. 454. Concurrent resolution expressing the approval of Congress for the

disposal of diamond dies from the national stockpile and nonstockpile bismuth alloys; and

H. Con. Res. 455. Concurrent resolution expressing the approval of Congress for the disposal of hyoscine from the national stockpile.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 4152. An act to amend the Federal Farm Loan Act and the Farm Credit Act of 1933 to provide means for expediting the retirement of Government capital in the Federal intermediate credit banks, including an increase in the debt permitted such banks in relation to their capital and provision for the production credit associations to acquire additional capital stock to provide for allocating certain earnings of such banks and associations to their users, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 6007. An act to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the promotion of qualified reserve officers of the Air Force to the reserve grades of brigadier general and major general.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 9220. An act making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Delaware River Basin Commission, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendments to the foregoing bill, requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. HAYDEN, Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. HILL, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. McNAMARA, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota, Mr. MUNDT, and Mrs. SMITH to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendments to the bill (H.R. 5768) entitled "An act to extend for an additional temporary period the existing suspension of duties on certain classifications of yarn of silk", disagreed to by the House; agrees to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. LONG of Louisiana, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware, and Mr. CARLSON to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1966, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 10323) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, may I inquire of the distinguished gentleman from Florida, the chairman of the subcommittee, if this is the regular military appropriation act, other than military construction, and other than procurement of missiles, tanks, planes, et cetera?

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, if the distinguished gentleman will yield. This is the military construction appropriation bill. It has no other function and no other purpose.

Mr. HALL. Then, if the distinguished gentleman will answer further, this is an appropriation on a bill for which there is no authorization at this time; is that correct?

Mr. SIKES. If the gentleman will yield further, that is correct. The authorization bill has been vetoed. However, the subject of the veto is not carried in either of the versions of the military construction appropriation bill. Therefore, this item is not in disagreement insofar as our bill is concerned. It is my understanding that the Committee on Armed Services expects to bring a bill to the floor in a day or two which, it is hoped, will resolve the problem which prompted the veto. In the meantime, may I point out to the House that there are a number of matters of disagreement in the two versions of the military construction appropriation bill. We feel that we should get along with the conference in an attempt to iron out these differences. Then we will be prepared to bring an appropriation bill back to the House when there is an authorization. We realize at the moment there is no authorization but we are seeking to conserve the time of the House.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] for his, as usual, straightforward, informed, and adequate answers, plus the explanations. However, inasmuch as this matter involves a serious constitutional question and certainly the prerogatives of the

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ment. I hope to see the day when this Government might spend perhaps a tenth as much on music as it does on munitions. I am sure the rewards will be far greater.

AMERICAN HUMANICS FOUNDATION

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, per attached summary, a recent meeting was held in the heart of America at Kansas City, Mo., of the 18th Annual Convention of the American Humanics Foundation. In this day of those who claim no representation, in this day of emphasis on the minority, in this day of competition for survival, and in this day of turmoil, it is refreshing to see and read of those dedicated to training of the human element in the instruction of the youth of today for leadership tomorrow. Such in a nutshell is the mission and objective of the American Humanics Foundation. Formed by a group of those dedicated to youth, and principally by H. Roe Bartle, former Scout executive of the Greater Jackson County Council, Boy Scouts of America, and with the tacit consent of the Boy Scouts of America and other youth training organizations, a curriculum was developed in basic colleges distributed geographically toward the training of our executive directors and leaders of youth groups such as the Boy Scouts of America, YMCA, Campfire Girls, Girl Scouts, Boys Clubs, YWCA, and others; rather than using the sometimes excellent, but oftentimes untrained personnel from other vocations and jobs in life. Graduates now serve over the world with distinction in youth training organizations. The sterling success of this program, including its scholarship foundation—a rotating fund—and many of those who have been the prime movers in the program and its expansion to other colleges are summarized in the article by Secretary Russell S. Planck, which under unanimous consent I place hereafter:

HIGHLIGHT REPORT OF THE 18TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN HUMANICS FOUNDATION, HELD ON JULY 30-31, 1965, AT THE HOTEL MUEHLEBACH, KANSAS CITY, MO.

President Ralph W. McCreary convened the 18th annual meeting of the American Humanics Foundation at 2:30 p.m. on Friday, July 30. One hundred and sixty-six delegates responded to the call for the annual meeting making it, by far, the largest annual meeting in the history of the foundation. The administrators reported on campus accomplishments of the Missouri Valley unit, the Salem College unit, and the Oglethorpe College unit, as well as the pioneering work done at the new High Point College unit. The report was given about the important role our 416 graduates are playing in youth agencies such as juvenile courts, Junior Achievement, Boy Scouts of America, YMCA, Camp Fire, Boys' Clubs, and the YWCA. Humanics graduates gave personal testimonials on how the humanics program assisted them in their chosen career.

At the annual banquet, Dr. Delmer H. Wilson, vice chairman of the board, impressively unveiled the findings of the yearlong study by the long-range planning committee. The committee recommended the adding of the humanics program on one additional campus each year for the next 5 years; of adding a new faculty member when each unit is started, and a second professor after the second year at each new institution; of serving 100 students in each college unit by the time of the third year in each unit, bringing our total students within the next 5 years to 555 at a time; of supporting this vital work with the necessary annual budget reaching \$265,000 for the 1969-70 academic year. Annual awards were presented by Founder H. Roe Bartle to Dr. Delmer H. Wilson, as life member, No. 12; to Dr. K. Duane Hurley, president of Salem College, as life member, No. 13; to Mrs. Harper J. Ransburg in recognition of her election and service as honorary president of the foundation. Appreciation plaques were conferred upon Mr. Harold Ransburg, who was elected as vice president of the foundation, and Prof. Weaver Marr who has been an administrator for the foundation for the past 12 years at Salem College. The 166 delegates at the banquet were treated to a mountaintop experience by the eloquent and stirring address of the Reverend Thomas Stephens Haggal, of High Point, N.C., as he proclaimed our challenge for the future in terms of accomplishment on the campuses of America and in our mission of spreading love and leadership upon the American scene.

Committees conferred and planned Saturday morning bringing their recommendations to the business session. Dr. Morris Thompson, president of Kirksville College of Osteopathy and Surgery, reported for the curriculum and expansion committee that the invitation of Indiana Central College at Indianapolis, Ind., had been accepted for the establishment of the next unit of the American Humanics Foundation. Students will be accepted for the opening in September, 1966. Dr. Thompson also reported that the committee was interested in next moving to the Far West, then the Southwest, and then the Eastern portion of the Nation for ensuing units. He also reported that the committee was interested in investigating a possible program of graduate study with particular interest in our own grads receiving the graduate work that would help prepare them for service as resident administrators in the humanics program. The finance committee proposed a budget for 1965-66 of \$143,200 which was adopted. Dr. Harry McGavran, chairman of the finance committee, provided one of the high points of the annual meeting in presenting a dramatic program for the financial undergirding of the American Humanics Foundation. Dr. McGavran presented the plans for a \$4 million development campaign, providing for expansion projects for endowment of certain phases of the program, and for current needs and operations. Dr. McGavran mentioned gifts of \$100,000 and \$80,000 which were offered during his feasibility study for this development campaign. President McCreary asked only those to vote in favor of the development campaign who were willing to work and support it. Development campaign proposal adopted unanimously.

The luncheon featured two addresses. Dr. K. Duane Hurley, president, Salem College, who indicated that the presence of the American Humanics Foundation on the Salem campus had helped bring to that campus the distilled essence of the spirit of service that now permeates the entire campus. Aiden Barber, Scout executive of the Chicago Area Council, BSA, indicated the personal regard he had for the dozen Humanics graduates that he had employed and

volunteered of himself to visit each college campus in eagerness to aid the students in seeing the need for youth agency administrators.

The closing business session saw Spurgeon Gaskin, outlining a pattern of student recruiting as tailored by the student recruiting committee, heard a telephone call report from England from the Honorable Charles Wright, Jr., mayor of Topeka, Kans., and chairman of the public relations committee reporting on accomplishments of the committee and of projected plans for the coming year. By acclamation and ovation the annual meeting reelected Ralph W. McCreary to once again serve as president of the foundation. The annual meeting adjourned upon the conclusion of the installation of officers by Dr. H. Roe Bartle, founder of the American Humanics Foundation.

Respectfully submitted,
 RUSSELL S. PLANCK,
 Secretary.

DISCHARGE PETITION ON HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(Mr. MULTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, there was placed on the desk this morning petition No. 5, to discharge the District of Columbia and the Rules Committees from further consideration of the administration bill for home rule for the District of Columbia, making in order the bill for the same purposes passed in the other body. My bill is H.R. 4644. The Senate passed bill is S. 1118.

I urge all of the Members of the House to sign the discharge petition which is at the desk. By so doing, I assure them, there will be no offense intended or tendered to any member of the Committee on the District of Columbia.

The fact of the matter is that no matter how long the hearings may continue before that committee, no such bill will be reported to the House from that committee because, unfortunately, a majority of the members of the committee are opposed to bringing a home rule bill to the floor.

The only way that Congress will be able to act on home rule for the District of Columbia is by Members signing the petition and bringing the bill before the House under my resolution. It provides an open 5-hour rule, which will give the House an opportunity to work its will on this subject.

Again I urge all Members to sign the petition.

AN AMERICAN MARINE WHO KNEW WHY WE ARE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

(Mr. ALBERT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, the recent news from Vietnam heralding the success of our marines in the fighting at Chulai must not be allowed to obscure the fact that we still face a long, tough struggle in Vietnam. The Vietcong and its comptrollers in Hanoi have not yet

demonstrated any intention of abandoning their efforts to overcome the people of the south by military force and to communize them.

Even more importantly, perhaps, such reports of the fighting strength of the South Vietnamese soldiers and their American counterparts in the current battles should not obscure the kind of reports that come to us of the personal understanding which our fighting men have of the necessity of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the dedication which they have to the basic purposes of our commitment there. I have been preoccupied for some time, Mr. Speaker—concerned—at the difference between dedicated soldiers in the rice paddies and highlands of Vietnam and some placard-carrying objectors here in the United States far from the field of conflict. The former want to press ahead, believing that the reality of the situation requires Communist force to be met by force in order for peace and the chances for stability and development to come to southeast Asia. The latter, unhampered by a direct, personal experience in the situation and by the kind of thinking a man has to do when his own life is at stake, want to withdraw.

There are, no doubt, some American soldiers in Vietnam who feel uncertainty about our goals in Vietnam and skepticism about the chances of achieving them. I do not mean to say that they do not exist. But I do not believe they are characteristic either—they are the exceptions to the rule. In this regard, I would like to insert in the RECORD an excerpt from Monday's White House press conference which discusses a letter Marine M. Sgt. George A. DeLuca wrote home shortly before he died:

Question. Bill, a marine sergeant in Vietnam was killed and the family received a letter after he had died saying he was sorry for people in the United States who felt that the Vietnam war was not their war?

Mr. MOYERS. Well, the President reads a number of letters like this, Helen:

"I feel sorry for those Americans who are saying the Viet war is not their war," wrote Marine M. Sgt. George A. DeLuca of Hammononton 3 days before he was killed in the southeast Asia war.

"If you ask the fighting men who are there, the tragedy of Vietnam is indeed necessary, DeLuca told his sister-in-law and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Willard Ehrke of Folsom in his last letter.

"If China takes South Vietnam, she has control of the Indian Ocean and from there she can put her tactics into Africa, Australia, Japan, and just keep moving," said the marine.

"If we don't stop them, now Georgie and Mike will be fighting 10 or 15 years from now." George, 7, and Michael, 2, are DeLuca's sons.

"When I read or hear about those demonstrations and people saying this is not their war, I feel sorry for them," he wrote.

As I said, the President reads a number of letters like that almost every day from servicemen, some of which are directed to him, others of which are directed to officials of the administration. And to those to which he replies, and in the replies from others from within the administration, the President tries to express his appreciation and his gratitude for their understanding of the importance of why they are there.

The President feels very strongly that those of our sons who are fighting in South Viet-

nam should be supported by unity and accord at home and he thinks it is very important that this kind of national unity exists. He thinks it is extremely urgent, in fact, that those fellows know that this country supports them and, in fact, the President does believe that this country is supporting their efforts—all of the efforts of all of our troops in South Vietnam.

I think it is just one of the reasons why the President continues to stress the importance of unity and accord and understanding back home. That is the reason for our fellows knowing that while they are fighting and dying they have the solid support of the American people.

The key point here, Mr. Speaker, is that this U.S. marine not only knew why he was fighting in Vietnam and believed in it, but that he felt sympathy for those back home who didn't understand. Many other such soldiers are actually discouraged by the failure of some protected citizens safe at home to believe in the cause for which others are risking their lives and to give it full support. We have other reports, such as that of the first American soldier to escape captivity of the Vietcong, 45 pounds thinner after 20 months' confinement in a jungle prison, expressing disappointment in fellow Americans back home who have protested the U.S. role in Vietnam. He remarked that this was disheartening to the troops over there facing death. I have no doubt that this is so.

This should give pause to those who appear blind to anything but the complexity, the difficulty of our course in Vietnam—those who are too quick to shout for withdrawal. The Army informs us that 2,000 GI's stationed in Germany have taken pause—and applied for transfers to go to Vietnam to fight beside their buddies there.

I believe a little more thoughtfulness and selflessness is called for in order to give our soldiers the sustaining knowledge of unified support back home.

MICHIGAN PICKLE GROWERS ARE IN A PICKLE

(Mr. CEDERBERG (at the request of Mr. SKUBITZ) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Speaker, the Michigan pickle growers are in a pickle. I am advised that unless labor is provided at once for the harvest of this crop the loss to the farmers of Michigan will be in the millions. Yesterday, I wired and wrote the Secretary of Labor indicating the urgency of the need for additional workers now. I have received the following telegrams from my district indicating the seriousness of this problem:

Mr. Orbie J. Swartz, of AuGres, Mich., wires:

As a farmer and pickle grower we are experiencing a crop loss because of a shortage of qualified laborers for picking our pickles. Much of the labor available is unsatisfactory. The problem will be further crippling as school opens.

Victor Lutz, of Lutz Brothers Farms, Turner, Mich., says in his wire:

Pickle picking labor shortage is critical. Must discard half of pickle crop if no more

labor is available next week. Please bring this to the attention of Department of Labor. Labor from cities work 3 hours and quit.

Mr. Edwin Swartz, of Turner, Mich., sent the following telegram:

Due to the fact that qualified pickle pickers are not available, we, the farmers, are suffering crop loss. Some of the help available is proving very unsatisfactory such as the high school students.

In response to requests from my district, I have sent the following wire and letter to Secretary Wirtz:

Hon. WILLARD WIRTZ,
Secretary of Labor,
Washington, D.C.:

Shortage of labor threatens Michigan pickle crop. Urgently request you provide additional labor at once. Farmers cannot stand additional losses.

Congressman ELFORD A. CEDERBERG.

Hon. WILLARD WIRTZ,
Secretary of Labor,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am advised that the shortage of labor in the pickle industry is threatening the ability to harvest the crop in Michigan. The farmers tell me that unless additional help can be provided this week they will lose a large portion of their crop.

It is urgent that you promptly investigate this matter and try to provide the needed help before it is too late.

I would appreciate it if you would advise me at once the possibility of locating labor that can be promptly used in Michigan.

Sincerely yours,

ELFORD A. CEDERBERG.

Mr. Speaker, it is absolutely necessary that these pickle growers receive relief now. We wait anxiously for action by Secretary Wirtz.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Mr. DERWINSKI (at the request of Mr. SKUBITZ) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, in due time the administration will announce that the OAS has finally solved the problem in the Dominican Republic. This announcement, when made, will be the "big lie." The facts of life are that the administration has completely bungled the situation in the Dominican Republic and will, in effect, promote the placement of Communists in a so-called coalition government.

I insert in the RECORD at this point a story in the Sunday Chicago Tribune by Jules Dubois:

REDS STRENGTHEN DOMINICAN POSITION UNDER GUISE OF NEGOTIATION—REVEAL HOW OAS, UNITED STATES PLAY INTO RED HANDS

(By Jules Dubois)

(Jules Dubois, the Tribune's Latin America correspondent who was the first mainland reporter to arrive in Santo Domingo at the outbreak of the April rebellion, in this article, sums up his conclusions to developments on the island, with particular attention to the role played by the U.S. Government.)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, August 21.—After 4 years of the Alliance for Progress, a program devised to contain the advance of communism in Latin America, the Reds are stronger than ever here.

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untarily to place the drug on prescription basis, change the labeling, and issue warnings to the medical profession, FDA decided to assemble an ad hoc committee whose decisions, while not binding, would be useful support for the agency's position in any regulatory action that might arise. It appears that, at the time, medical opinion within FDA strongly favored restricting use of the drug.

An advisory committee met in April 1964 and made several strong recommendations:

1. That meclizine and cyclizine be removed from over-the-counter sale and be made prescription items only.

2. That labeling of meclizine and cyclizine be revised to include the following general statement: "Safety in early pregnancy has not been established. Animal studies indicate (name of drug) causes congenital malformations. Clinical studies to date are inconclusive."

3. That further studies on these drugs be made, with reference to efficacy and teratogenicity.

Up to this point, FDA's record is clear. It is what happened subsequently that aroused Fountain's interest. For 9 months, nothing happened at all. On January 18, 1965, Medical Director Sadusk transmitted the recommendations to Commissioner Larrick, stating that they were endorsed by the Bureau of Medicine. Two or three days later, Sadusk changed his mind and asked that the recommendations be withdrawn. The following month, Sadusk set about to reconvene the advisory committee. When it met again 1 year later, in April 1965, its recommendations were startlingly different. According to the hearing transcript, three motions (and evidently only three) were placed before it. The first, that the status quo regarding the drugs in question be maintained—that is, that they remain freely available, no mention being made of possible hazards in pregnancy—was voted down. The second, that the committee be reconvened to review "other selected drugs that may have teratogenic effects in lower orders," was passed. The third was a motion to the effect that "the over-the-counter preparations of meclizine, cyclizine, and chlorcyclizine may continue to be so distributed providing that their labeling include the warning statement, 'this drug shall not be taken during pregnancy without the advice of a physician.'" That one also passed, and it appears that it will become the basis of FDA policy.

Now, the logic of this decision can be criticized in many ways, and will be. Many medical scientists point out that the time a drug is most likely to harm the fetus is in the first few weeks of pregnancy, frequently before a woman knows she is pregnant. This is the time she is most likely to go to a pharmacist and ask what is available for nausea—and be given one of these familiar products. One Government physician who has followed the arguments closely feels it is "medically indefensible" to assume that a label on an over-the-counter product offers adequate protection. "The only people this decision can possibly benefit are the drug people," he said. Fountain, however, was interested not so much in the medical arguments as in the way the decision was reached to overturn the first committee's recommendation and supplant it with a far weaker recommendation. He questioned Sadusk closely on why he had changed his mind on an issue of such potential public importance. Sadusk's reply was essentially that he had never agreed with the stringent recommendation in the first place, but had passed it up the line because it represented the conclusions of respected scientists. Fountain wanted the tape largely to discover what had transpired in the meeting to induce this body of scientists to alter its recommendations. A draft of an edited version of the tape had previous-

ly been received by the committee in manuscript form, but Fountain and his staff evidently felt it left key mysteries unresolved.

TWO SIDES

Thus, whatever else can be said about the Fountain-FDA dispute, it must be said in fairness that there are two sides to it. Fountain's request for the information with which FDA was so reluctant to part grew out of his need for data concerning two cases that have very clear and imminent consequences for the public interest. In the light of past and present FDA policies, neither request was unique or extraordinary. Why some segments of the scientific community have responded so emphatically is a somewhat puzzling question. One factor seems to have been that Fountain has been a favorite villain of the scientific community since his investigation of NIH a few years ago, and there was probably a preexisting readiness to believe that if Fountain was involved in it, it couldn't be a very good thing for scientists. Another factor is a natural response to signals of distress from a fellow scientist—in this case Sadusk, who has done more in a year to put FDA on the scientific map than any other official accomplished in a lifetime. It is likely that many scientists also sympathize with Sadusk's view, as reported in an article in an industry trade publication, that "he and his bureau should be left alone until he can get his staff to the point where it can do a genuinely effective job"—a point he estimated to be around fiscal year 1967 at the earliest. While this notion may fit in with the views of many scientists who believe that Congress should not interfere with the conduct of scientific agencies, it makes little sense from an administrative point of view. By the same logic, one could say that no new Government programs should be reviewed at all until they had been operating for several years. In addition, it is an uncomfortable fact that a good many of the decisions with which Fountain was concerned—including the remarketing of Parnate and the reversal on meclizine—took place after Sadusk assumed stewardship. And it is another uncomfortable fact that, in terms of its potential consequences for public health and safety, the subject of Government drug policy is of far more importance than the subject of research-grant administration. When a congressional committee has reason to believe that a particular situation may be dangerous, it takes pressures far more powerful than the dismay of civil servants or the complaints of scientists to make it change its course.

Two more points should be noted. The first is the fact that at least some of the scientific and medical groups who have petitioned Fountain did so on the basis of reports of the hearings which appeared in the trade and regular press, and did not study the proceedings themselves. The second is the possibility, reported in the trade press, that, in an effort to blunt the impact of the forthcoming Fountain committee report, FDA Commissioner George Larrick may retire. Larrick, 64, has been head of the FDA since 1954 and, under Government policies, is now free to retire. His retirement would make the report something of an anticlimax.

**MAJ. GEN. EDWARD G. LANSDALE
TO GO TO SOUTH VIETNAM**

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. ROOSEVELT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I am exceedingly pleased to see that Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale is being sent to South Vietnam as a special assistant to

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. I include the announcement in the Washington Post of August 20 as a part of my remarks.

General Lansdale's appointment is being regarded—and properly so, I think—as a clear indication of President Johnson's desire to meet the challenge of Communist subversion and aggression on the political front as well as on the military front. I share his hope that the military situation will improve as rapidly as possible so that more and more emphasis can be given to the political struggle in Vietnam—to the contest for the allegiance of the individual Vietnamese citizen.

It is also my hope, Mr. Speaker, that we will push the political initiative outside of Vietnam—in the rest of southeast Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. I believe we could find a nation in each of these areas whose leaders would be willing to have our help in moving rapidly toward social justice and a broadly based economic prosperity. Such a country, with our aid, could become a showcase of progress, an example and a challenge to the leaders and people of surrounding countries. And such an example in another country in southeast Asia could have a profoundly favorable effect on the course of the struggle in South Vietnam, by showing the people of that area what the United States could help them accomplish once the Vietcong were rejected militarily and politically.

We need not wait for military action to create a new environment for such an initiative in another southeast Asian country. We can expand our political offensive against communism now and I think we should be as willing to support this effort financially as we are to provide whatever may be necessary in the way of funds to support our military effort.

**LANSDALE TO VIETNAM: STRESSES A POLITICAL
SOLUTION**

(By Stanley Karnow)

The administration has appointed Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale as special assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at Saigon in what is regarded here as a reflection of growing concern that the U.S. approach to Vietnam has become too militarized and too Americanized.

An unorthodox and controversial figure, Lansdale is to aim broadly at essential political, social, economic, and psychological factors that, many specialists feel, have been neglected in the recent American buildup in Vietnam.

"In several ways we're missing the point out there," a source close to Lansdale claims. "The Communists are waging revolution in all its dimensions, while our side is merely fighting a war."

TO SEEK CLOSER BONDS

One of Lansdale's initial efforts after his arrival in Vietnam next week will be to establish closer bonds between Vietnamese leaders both in Saigon and in the countryside.

Ties with the Vietnamese were thin during the tenure of former Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, whose mission tended to plan programs without consulting local authorities.

Lansdale is said to believe that little progress can be achieved, particularly in the

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On the first point, officials of the agency, including Commissioner George Larrick and medical director Joseph Sadusk, claimed that handing over the tape "would interfere with cooperative relations between FDA and scientists, would prevent frank and open discussions at such meetings, and would destroy our attempt to set up good procedures." If scientists knew the tapes would be made public, Sadusk said, the result would be "stilted discussions, and our efforts to handle advisory committees would be interfered with."

On the second point, it was argued that submitting the names of doctors and patients violated the confidentiality of that relationship, and that it would hamper the efforts of the agency to elicit cooperation from doctors in reporting adverse drug reactions. Resistance in the agency was so strong that the FDA officials are known to have taken the case to Secretary Celebrezze for final decision, where they were overruled, reportedly on the basis of "conversations with the White House." The material has now been sent over to FOUNTAIN.

On the face of it, of it seems likely that almost every trained scientist would support the position taken by Larrick and Sadusk. A good many already have. Fountain's efforts to obtain this material have elicited critical mail from the National Academy of Sciences, the Greater Philadelphia Committee for Medical-Pharmaceutical Sciences, and the Mid-West Committee on Drug Investigation; the communication from the Mid-West Committee was reportedly signed by 80 well-known scientists. There has also been correspondence from one unit of the American Medical Association, though no formal word from the AMA's top leaders. While none of this correspondence has yet been made public, an apparently steady theme is that this kind of activity would end by interfering with clinical investigation of drugs in general. A hostile editorial making that point has appeared in "Medical World News," an influential medical weekly edited by Morris Fishbein, a former editor of the "Journal of the American Medical Association." "If patients are to be faced with the threat that their illnesses and their names may be revealed in congressional testimony," Fishbein said, "it will intensify the difficulty of securing competent clinical investigators to assess new remedies." Finally, the newly functioning medical advisory board¹ of the Food and Drug Administration met in July and supported the agency's position in several resolutions, including one on confidentiality of records and another on advisory boards. These two resolutions read as follows:

"One of the foundations of the practice of medicine is the confidentiality of the doctor-

¹ Members of the board are as follows: Mark W. Allam, dean University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine; Harry F. Dowling, professor of medicine and head of the Department of Medicine, University of Illinois; Sidney Farber, professor of pathology, Harvard Medical School, and director of research, Children's Cancer Research Foundation, Boston; William M. M. Kirby, professor of medicine, University of Washington School of Medicine, Seattle; Norman Kretschmer, professor and executive head of the Department of Pediatrics, Stanford Medical Center, Stanford University; William R. Mann, professor of operative dentistry, dean of the School of Dentistry, and director of the W. R. Kellogg Foundation Institution, University of Michigan; John G. Morrison, practicing physician, Oakland, Calif.; Arthur T. Richardson, dean of the Emory University School of Medicine and professor of pharmacology, Emory University; and Wesley W. Spink, professor of medicine, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

patient-hospital relationship. Furthermore, the reporting by doctors and hospitals of information concerning the effects of drugs to the Bureau of Medicine is extraordinarily dependent upon the preservation of this confidential relationship.

"We are deeply concerned, therefore, at the recent insistence of a congressional committee that confidential records containing specific names of doctors, patients, and hospitals, be released.

"It is our belief that the purpose of the congressional committee could have been properly met by obtaining records in which actual names of patients, doctors, and hospitals had been deleted.

"We therefore recommend that steps be taken through appropriate channels so that in the future the confidentiality of these records will be preserved."

"Whereas the kinds of decisions that scientists are called upon to make in advisory committee meetings are not open-and-shut and therefore require free, unrestricted and often contentious discussion in order to reach a final decision which will represent the consensus of informed opinion, and

"Whereas since such free discussion requires further review by the individual members of the committee after the meeting, in order that a proper permanent record may be made, it is often necessary that the proceedings be recorded or verbatim transcripts made which will later be edited by members of the committee in establishing the final report, and

"Whereas scientists would, in general, be unwilling to indulge in such free discussion if the detailed discussions were to be made available to a third party: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That such recordings and transcripts be held confidential and that they be used only for the purpose of arriving at minutes and recommendations which would then be approved by members of the committee, after which the recording and transcripts would be destroyed, and that under no circumstances would they be transmitted to a third party; and be it also

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the office of the President of the United States through appropriate channels."

PRINCIPLES AND CASES

There is little doubt that, as the writers of letters and resolutions evidently believe, the principles that have been associated with this dispute are of some importance to the scientific community. Unfortunately, it is not altogether clear that the principles and the immediate case are related as purely as some of the critics believe. First, some relatively minor points. In fairness to Representative FOUNTAIN, it must be said that there is absolutely no reason to believe that the confidentiality of the material would be violated through display in public hearings. It was intended for the background information of FOUNTAIN and his staff. Indeed, there is one circumstance which makes a joke of the whole issue of privacy: representatives of the drug companies marketing the antihistaminic preparations were permitted to sit in on the very meeting recorded on the tape to which FDA wanted to refuse FOUNTAIN access. (The company representatives left the room in the final hour of a 6-hour session in which the recommendations were being drawn up.) The fabled "confidentiality" of the doctor-patient relationship also has its limits: names of patients suffering adverse reactions are routinely solicited by drug companies as well as by the FDA, and in fact have been frequently seen by congressional staff investigators studying the agency, including FOUNTAIN's investigators. The agency doesn't like this, but it has been going on for several years. Why FDA tried to draw the line on Parnate remains unclear.

More important than these circumstantial arguments is the fundamental fact that FOUNTAIN did not simply invent his requests to give the agency trouble. They emerged, first, from a general feeling, which FOUNTAIN evidently shares with every other Senator and Congressman who has ever studied the agency, that, like other units with regulatory functions, FDA has a difficult time disentangling the public interest from the private interests of the industries it is supposed to regulate. Many critics have felt that there are times when agency decisions do not fulfill the objective of protecting the public from some of the self-interested actions of the industry. FOUNTAIN's requests also grew out of a particular context, and dealt with points on which FOUNTAIN's knowledge of the agency's activities had led him to become skeptical.

The Parnate case has an extremely complex history. Full discussion of it should await publication of the FOUNTAIN hearings, which will provide much supporting documentation. Briefly, however, the situation was this. Parnate, a monoamine oxidase inhibitor used in treatment of severe depression, was withdrawn from the market (under protest of its manufacturer, Smith, Kline & French) in February 1964, after being implicated in many instances of high blood pressure and stroke, and in some fatalities. Subsequently it was permitted back on the market under new ground rules, which called for its use only in hospitalized patients or in patients under close observation. Warnings were added against its use in combination with other drugs, and the recommended dosage was reduced. FOUNTAIN wanted to know why the decision to remarket the drug—known to have been a matter of some controversy within FDA as well as outside it—was made, and what adverse reactions had been reported since it returned to the market. FDA offered some data, which the FOUNTAIN staff evidently had reason to believe were incomplete—a contention supported by the fact that FDA has found it necessary to make several changes in the statement initially submitted during the hearings. Little that had gone on in the hearings before made for an atmosphere of trust between the two parties, and the FOUNTAIN staff apparently felt that, without access to the names of patients and physicians, it had no way to verify FDA's assertions or interpretations.

AN ECCENTRIC CASE HISTORY

In the case of the antihistaminic drugs, FOUNTAIN's interest was aroused by what appeared to be the drugs' eccentric recent history. The basic drugs in question are meclizine and cyclizine, which have been available for many years both on prescription and on an over-the-counter basis. They are used for treatment of motion sickness, nausea, and vertigo. A related drug, chlorcyclizine, is available on the same basis, and offered for allergies, colds, hay fever, and insect bites. In the aftermath of the thalidomide episode and the increased interest in the possible teratogenic effect of drugs that it engendered, reports began to come in from various European countries linking meclizine with a number of cases of birth deformities. Several countries, including Sweden, Australia, Denmark, and Germany, placed the drug on a prescription basis, and Italy put a warning on the label. Subsequently, animal studies conducted at the National Institutes of Health showed meclizine to be teratogenic in rats, causing cleft palate and incomplete calcification of the vertebral column, femur, humerus, and skull.

In the light of these discoveries, the Food and Drug Administration began seeking out ways to limit the possible harmful effects of the drug in this country. After having failed in efforts to persuade the manufacturers (Pfizer and Burroughs Wellcome) vol-

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political realm, unless a sense of trust is restored between Americans and Vietnamese.

He will also strive to contact Vietnam's wide variety of political and religious factions in hope of helping them find some common ground for unity.

TO BUILD UP RED FOES

Some analysts submit that Lansdale's longer-term objective is to strengthen anti-Communist elements should future negotiations prescribe elections in Vietnam. The Geneva Accord of 1954 scheduled nationwide elections, which were postponed, largely because anti-Communist forces felt too weak to contest them.

To assist in his operation, Lansdale has recruited a "political action team" comprising a dozen specialists. Like Lansdale himself, some fought the Communist-led Huk rebels in the Philippines in the early 1950's. Others include officials of the U.S. Information Agency, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence Agency.

One member dates his familiarity with Vietnam back to World War II, when he parachuted into the area to help form an anti-Japanese guerrilla force. On and off he served in Vietnam until September 1964, when he was dismissed by Admiral Taylor for what was unofficially described as "unconventional conduct" in the line of duty.

Commenting on that dismissal at the time, one U.S. official in Saigon said: "We don't want Lawrences of Asia."

Like Col. T. E. Lawrence, who rallied the Arabs to the Allied cause in World War I, Lansdale has inspired admiration, ridicule—and above all, controversy.

As a CIA operative in Saigon in 1954, he backed Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem against President Eisenhower's special representative, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, who favored a coalition of Vietnamese leaders.

In their transparently fictitious novel, William Burdick and William Lederer depicted Lansdale as a sensitive, selfless "Ugly American" who sympathized with Asian aspirations. However, British author Graham Greene personified him as a naively idealistic "Quiet American."

Early in 1961, President Kennedy sent Lansdale back to South Vietnam to assess the growing insurgency there. Lansdale returned considerably disillusioned by the Diem regime's incapacity to motivate and mobilize its people.

Lansdale believed that U.S. involvement in Vietnam had to stress political and social activities to win popular support. This view was particularly contested in the Pentagon by officials who argued: "Let's fight first and worry about politics later."

Sharp disagreements led to Lansdale's retirement in 1961. In recent years he has publicly criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam, reiterating his theme that military action alone cannot improve the situation.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEA

Writing in Foreign Affairs last October, for example, he expressed doubt that bombings of the kind now carried out in South and North Vietnam would be effective. He wrote: "The Communists have let loose a revolutionary idea in Vietnam, and it will not die by being ignored, bombed or smothered by us."

These strong opinions reportedly irritated Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his military advisers. It is understood that they opposed Lansdale's present assignment to Saigon but were overruled by President Johnson.

Lansdale's views, however, caught the attention of several legislators, among them Senator THOMAS DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut. Early this year he proposed to the President that Lansdale and other experienced Americans be sent to Saigon to estab-

lish liaison with the Vietnamese Army, Buddhists, intellectuals, and local leaders.

Acting on that counsel, President Johnson instructed Ambassador Lodge to include Lansdale in his mission. As far as is known, Vietnamese leaders were not consulted on Lansdale's appointment.

Americans familiar with the stresses within the U.S. mission in Saigon believe that Lansdale's unorthodox manner may incur the opposition of certain American officers in Vietnam.

A far greater worry—said to disturb Lansdale as well—is that he may be expected to perform miracles in Vietnam. "If he doesn't produce a miracle," says one U.S. official, "his friends will be disappointed and his enemies delighted."

STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS ON VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PUCINSKI). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. COHELAN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, in a speech to the House on July 29 concerning the war in Vietnam, I raised a number of questions which have been of deep concern to many of my constituents. I stated that I believed these questions deserved to be discussed and I indicated that I was asking the Department of State to comment on each of them.

I have now received the responses which I requested. I include them for the attention of our colleagues and all who are interested in this most critical problem:

Question 1: What did the 1954 Geneva accords provide with respect to the future Governments of North and South Vietnam with respect to free elections?

Answer: By the terms of the 1954 Geneva accords, Vietnam was temporarily divided into two separate zones, each to be administered by the authorities in North and South Vietnam respectively until the country could be unified peacefully. Thus, although the provisional military demarcation line established by the Geneva accords is not a "political or territorial boundary," it was established by an international agreement. The accords, then, endowed both North and South Vietnam with separate and distinct status. For example, diplomatic or consular relations have been established by various governments with Saigon or Hanoi or both.

At the same time, the provisional military demarcation line established by the Geneva accords, although not a "political or territorial boundary," is still an international frontier that must be respected under international law. In this respect the division of Vietnam is similar to the division of Germany or Korea. It is obvious that if a state is divided by an internationally recognized demarcation line, each part of that state must refrain from the use of force or hostile acts against the other. Thus, an attack by North Korea on South Korea or East Germany on West Germany would be illegal. Such attacks are no less "aggression" or "armed attack" than an attack by one state against another.

As far back as 1955, South Vietnam was recognized, de jure, by 36 nations, and North Vietnam had full relations with 12 countries.

A separate declaration of the Conference, not signed by any of the participants, stated that the truce line should not be considered permanent and called for free nationwide elections by secret ballot in 2 years under the supervision of the International Control Commission (ICC).

Question 2: Why did the United States not sign the Geneva accords? Did the United States state that it would follow the Geneva accords?

Answer: The Geneva accords include the Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. It was signed by the parties to the hostilities: France and the forces of the Vietminh. Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith, the U.S. Government's representative to the Geneva Conference, made the following statement at the concluding plenary session of the conference on July 21, 1954:

"As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

"DECLARATION

"The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations take note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954, between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Vietnam; (b) the Royal-Khmer Army Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Vietnam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Vietnam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

"In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."

"With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

"We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future."

Question 3: Was a government representing South Vietnam a party to the Geneva accords? How did the first South Vietnamese Government come to power? Has there been any government in South Vietnam chosen to any extent by a democratic process? If so, when and how?

Answer: The State of Vietnam was represented in the discussions in Geneva in 1954, but did not sign the accords, and indeed issued a formal protest that the proposal of its delegate had been rejected without examination, and the final agreement included political provisions formulated without the consent of their Government. The specific agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam was signed on July 20, 1954, by representatives of France and the Vietminh.

The State of Vietnam came into existence in 1949 under Emperor Bao Dai as an associated state within the French Union. In 1950, Great Britain and the United States extended de jure recognition to the State of Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Diem, who came to power on July 7, 1954, was the last of the Bao Dai appointed Prime Ministers. The basic decision on the form and leadership of the new South Vietnamese Government was taken in a referendum on October 23, 1955. As a result of this referendum the country was declared a republic, Diem replaced Bao Dai as Chief of State, and national elections were held on March 4, 1956, for a Constituent Assembly, which was transformed into a National Assembly after promulgation of the constitution it drafted.

Question 4: What happened to prevent the 1956 "free election" contemplated by the 1954 Geneva accords? Did the United States oppose such election? If so, when and with what explanation?

Answer: South Vietnam's position on elections was made clear by President Ngo Dinh Diem in a nationwide broadcast to his people on July 16, 1955.

"Our policy is a policy for peace. But nothing will lead us astray of our goal, the unity of our country, a unity in freedom and not in slavery. Serving the cause of our nation, more than ever we will struggle for the reunification of our homeland.

"We do not reject the principle of free elections as peaceful and democratic means to achieve that unity. However, if elections constitute one of the bases of true democracy, they will be meaningful only on the condition that they are absolutely free.

"Now, faced with a regime of oppression as practiced by the Vietminh, we remain skeptical concerning the possibility of fulfilling the conditions of free elections in the north."

At the 1954 Geneva Conference, the United States supported free elections throughout Vietnam supervised by the United Nations to insure that they were conducted fairly. The proposal was not adopted by the conference and partly for this reason the United States refused to become a party to the Geneva accords.

In the period from 1954 to 1956, it became obvious that conditions of freedom did not exist in North Vietnam and that it was impossible to envisage really free elections by secret ballot, as required by the 1954 Geneva accords. North Vietnam was already a police state, and it was evident that Hanoi was counting on an election that would be rigged in their favor.

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, of North Vietnam, admitted this in October 1956, when as the Communist Party's spokesman, he read a long list of errors to the 10th Congress of the Party Central Committee. With unprecedented Communist candor, he admitted that in carrying out their land reform, the authorities had gone too far and had executed and tortured many innocent people. He also confessed that there had been religious persecution and repression of minority groups.

Question 5: To what extent has there been objective verification of interference by the North Vietnam Government (as distinguished from participation by individual North Vietnamese) in the affairs of South Vietnam?

Answer: The war in South Vietnam is the result of the announced attempt by the Communist regime in North Vietnam to conquer South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. In Communist propaganda this form of aggression masquerades as a "war of national liberation." In reality, the war which the Vietcong are waging against the south is directed politically and militarily from Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam. It is commanded primarily by leaders and specialists infiltrated from north of the 17th parallel. It is supplied by weap-

ons and equipment sent by North Vietnam, which in turn is supported by Red China. Its aim is to win control of South Vietnam for communism in violation of solemn agreements and with no reference to the wishes of the South Vietnamese people.

In December 1961, the State Department thoroughly documented North Vietnam's efforts to conquer South Vietnam in its white paper entitled "A Threat to the Peace." The February 1965 State Department white paper entitled "Aggression From the North" adds documentation on how Hanoi has masterminded the Vietcong campaign in South Vietnam. The 1962 report of the International Control Commission for Vietnam spelled out North Vietnam's aggressive actions in flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords and the 1962 agreement on Laos.

What Hanoi was up to then is even more apparent now. In the minority ICC report of February 13, 1965, the Canadian delegate to the ICC, Mr. J. B. Seaborn, says that " * * * the events which have taken place in both North and South Vietnam since February 7 are the direct result of the intensification of the aggressive policy of the Government of North Vietnam." He points to "the continuing fact that North Vietnam has increased its efforts to incite, encourage, and support hostile activities in South Vietnam, aimed at the overthrow of the South Vietnamese administration."

In a recent network television interview, Mr. Seaborn said that perhaps even more significant than the actual numbers of North Vietnamese infiltrators is the quality and type of people Hanoi has been sending, in that they are essentially the trained officers and specialists who serve as the backbone of the Vietcong movement.

Question 6: In terms of international law, what is the basis for our present activity in South Vietnam?

Answer: Although Congress in fact has not made a formal declaration of war, the sense of Congress has indeed been expressed. Congressional leaders have been consulted continuously by the administration, and many Senators and Congressmen have made their views known both in private discussions and public speeches in Congress. A joint resolution (Public Law 88-408) was passed in August 1964 by a combined vote of 502 to 2, which stated, among other things: "That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" * * * and that "the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia" * * * and that " * * * the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." It has not been considered desirable or necessary to declare war in the Vietnam situation. Should a declaration of war become necessary or desirable, Congress would, of course, make such a declaration, since it is recognized that the power to declare war is solely within the province of the Congress.

Article II of the Constitution makes the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and vests in him the executive power. This article has also been interpreted by the Supreme Court as making the President the "sole organ of the Nation" in the field of foreign affairs. Thus the President has authority to deploy U.S. military personnel abroad.

Furthermore, the United States and Vietnam are parties to the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950, which was concluded pursuant

to Public Law 329, 81st Congress. This agreement provides for the furnishing by the United States to Vietnam, inter alia, of military assistance in the form of equipment, material and services.

The Manila pact, ratified in February 1955, which established SEATO, included South Vietnam as a protocol state. This treaty was approved by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1.

A Presidential decision was made in 1954 to extend aid to South Vietnam. President Eisenhower said in a letter to the President of South Vietnam: "The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Prior to our stepped-up assistance to South Vietnam in 1961 in response to increasing aggressive actions against the south, U.S. military aid to South Vietnam was carried out within the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva accords.

It was in response to North Vietnamese violations of the accords (documented in 1962 by the ICC in Vietnam and reconfirmed by the February 13, 1965 report of the Canadian delegate to the ICC) that the United States responded to the Government of Vietnam's request for stepped up assistance to help defend itself. We believe our aid is justified in view of North Vietnam's flagrant violations of its obligations under the 1954— and 1962 (Laos)—Geneva agreements.

Our air strikes are justified as an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter. They are a limited and fitting response to the aggressive campaign being waged by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. The Saigon Government has requested our assistance in defense of South Vietnam, and air elements of both United States and South Vietnam have answered Vietcong attacks by striking at North Vietnam—the source of the Vietcong campaign. The kind of Communist aggression that we see in Vietnam today—a so-called "war of national liberation"—amounts to an open armed attack within the meaning of article 51.

Question 7: Is there a legal basis for asking the U.N. to take action in relation to Vietnam? If so, are there practical reasons for our not having made this request up to this time?

Answer: The United States has attempted more than once to use the machinery of the United Nations to help solve various aspects of the Vietnam situation. When in May 1964, Cambodia complained to the United Nations Security Council of South Vietnamese military incursions into Cambodian territory, the United States proposed that a United Nations peacekeeping body be established on the border. The Security Council sent a mission of three of its members (Brazil, Ivory Coast, and Morocco) to examine the border situation and to make recommendations as to how these incidents could be avoided. Hanoi and Peking condemned even this limited United Nations initiative in southeast Asia. The Vietcong warned that they could not guarantee the safety of the mission and would not accept its findings.

In August 1964, the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation created by the North Vietnamese torpedo boat attacks on two United States destroyers in international waters. After hearing the United States report of the defensive measures taken in response to these attacks, the Council stated that it would welcome such information relating to this issue as North or South Vietnam desired to make available either by taking part in the Security Council discussion or in a form they might otherwise prefer. The Republic of Vietnam expressed its readiness to offer the Security Council its

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full cooperation. However, the North Vietnamese maintained that the Security Council "has no right to examine the problem" and replied that any "illegal" decision on the United States complaint by the Security Council would be considered null and void by the North Vietnamese authorities.

In recent weeks, the President has taken several steps to engage the resources and prestige of the United Nations in an attempt to move the Vietnam problem from the battlefield to the conference table. These efforts followed upon 15 earlier attempts by the United States and other governments to arrange a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

On June 25, 1965, President Johnson, speaking in San Francisco, called upon members of the United Nations to "use all their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the table those who seem determined to make war."

During his July 28 press conference, the President renewed this appeal to the members of the United Nations, noting that "if the United Nations and its officials, or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and gratitude of the United States of America." The same day President Johnson requested Ambassador Arthur Goldberg to deliver personally a letter to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant requesting that "all the resources and the energy and the immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam."

On July 30, in a letter to the United Nations Security Council President, Ambassador Goldberg noted that responsibility to persist in the search for peace weighs especially upon the members of the Security Council. He went on to emphasize that the United States stands ready, as in the past, to "collaborate unconditionally with the members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security" in southeast Asia. The United States, he said, "hopes the members of the Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the state of affairs" in that area.

By these actions the United States intended to engage the United Nations and its members in serious efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. We believe that these actions represent the most constructive way possible, under present circumstances, of seizing the United Nations with the pursuit of peace in Vietnam. The United States is actively continuing consultations with U.N. members. We hope that in time these U.N. efforts or others will lead to talks designed to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Meanwhile, the United Nations is also deeply involved in international economic and social development programs in southeast Asia. President Johnson, in his speech of April 7 in Baltimore, expressed the hope that the U.N. Secretary General could initiate with the countries of southeast Asia a plan for increased regional development, and pledged \$1 billion in support of this undertaking. Mr. Eugene Black has been designated as the President's special representative and has already held consultations with officials of the United Nations and the Asian countries concerned.

Secretary Rusk further summarized the problem of United Nations involvement in the Vietnam situation during a recent television interview by stating:

"Well, we have been in touch with the Secretary General and the members of the United Nations many times on many occasions on that matter. The problem is relatively simple. As you know, the General

Assembly has not been functioning in the last year or so because of a very difficult constitutional issue involving the financial problems of the U.N. The Security Council is the principal agency in which this matter might arise. In the Security Council nothing could be done except by agreement among the Big Five. There is a veto in the Security Council. Now, the question is really whether it is desirable to have a highly acrimonious, eye-gouging kind of debate there if at the end of the trail there is going to be no action by the Security Council. It would be far better to sound this out quietly behind the scenes, as is going on and has been going on for a long time, to see whether there is some action which the United Nations can take that would help the situation.

"Now, we could easily, I suppose, meet the views of those who say, 'Oh, take it to the U.N.' by putting on one or two demonstrations. Let it go there. Let a resolution be vetoed. Have the U.N. break up with no capacity to do anything about it, no agreement and then come away and say, 'Well, they have had their fling at it.'

"Well, this is a little irresponsible to deal with it that way. What we would like to do is to find some way in which the United Nations can contribute positively and constructively to the solution of the problem in South Vietnam and not necessarily just to a further inflammation of the issues involved."

Question 8: What efforts have been made by the United States to substitute negotiation for military action? By others?

Answer: During the last 4½ years the United States has made repeated attempts with Communist countries to reach reasonable solutions in southeast Asia. The results to date have in all cases been negative or unsatisfactory. The following summarizes the main efforts of the United States along these lines.

1. Bilateral talks with U.S.S.R. and Peiping: The United States has frequently held bilateral talks with the Soviets and Chinese Communists on southeast Asian problems over the past 4½ years. The most important talk with the Soviets was between President Kennedy and Chairman Krushchev at Vienna, in June 1961, where the United States thought that it had Soviet agreement that Laos would be effectively neutralized. Intervening events have shown that the United States expectations have not been realized.

The United States has also had continuing talks over the years at the ambassadorial level with the Chinese Communists at Warsaw without finding any intention or desire on the part of the Chinese Communists to arrive at a fair and reasonable settlement—or indeed any settlement at all other than on their own terms, which called for the withdrawal of United States influence from the area.

2. Geneva Conference on Laos: In 1961-62 the United States entered the Geneva Conference on Laos and accepted in good faith the agreement negotiated there to neutralize Laos. The United States withdrew all its military personnel (who were advisory only) from Laos within the time limit set by the agreement.

However, Communist North Vietnam did not withdraw its combat military personnel who have consistently numbered several thousands and who are reinforced from time to time as Communist operational needs require. These personnel have supported Pathet Lao offensives against the neutralist and conservative forces. North Vietnam has also consistently continued to use southern Laos as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in violation of a specific commitment in the Laos agreement not to use the territory

of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. Further attempts to reach a Laos settlement: After the Communist seizure of the Plain of Jars in May, 1964, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma called for consultations among the Geneva Conference powers as envisaged by the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. The United States participated in these consultations, but the Communist signatories refused to take part.

Subsequently Poland put forth a proposal for preliminary discussions among the three Laos factions, the Geneva cochairmen and the members of the International Control Commission to see whether the conditions for a wider conference could be established. The United States supported the Polish proposal but after the Pathet Lao, Hanoi and Peiping opposed the plan, the Soviets failed to pursue it.

The United States then supported discussions among the three Lao factions, and these are still continuing in desultory fashion. In these discussions the Pathet Lao have claimed that the charges Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has made in the cabinet over the past year are illegal, thus challenging his authority to act as Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Laos. The Communist side has also blocked the entry of, and effective investigations by, the International Control Commission in Communist-controlled territory.

These attitudes on the part of the Communists have made pursuit of the Lao negotiating track exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The United States continues to back the Lao Government acceptance in principle of a new Geneva Conference on Laos provided the Communist side first demonstrates, by removing the roadblocks discussed above, that the conference will be fruitful.

4. Consultations under article 19 of the 1962 Geneva accords on Laos: The United Kingdom approached the Soviets in February for discussions as foreseen by article 19 of the Geneva accords on Laos with respect to the future activities of the International Control Commission in Laos. The countries participating initially would be the cochairmen, the Laos Government and the International Control Commission powers. The Soviets have thus far not responded. The article 19 discussions, if held, might also lead to further talks which could involve South and North Vietnam as well as Communist China and the United States as signatories, and this might provide opportunities for quiet contacts on the Vietnam question.

5. Cambodia: The United States has always supported the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. From 1962 to 1964 the United States sought to work toward a resolution of the problems between Cambodia and her neighbors, Thailand and South Vietnam, as a necessary prelude to international reaffirmation of Cambodia's desired status. In February 1964, Cambodia proposed a four-power conference (Thailand, South Vietnam and the United States, with Cambodia) to consider the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. The United States and South Vietnam responded favorably to the call for a conference, but the proposal came to nothing when Prince Sihanouk formally withdrew it in March 1964.

In 1965, following a renewed Cambodian proposal for a formal conference on Cambodia, the United States and South Vietnam indicated their willingness to accept invitations to such a conference, and in April the United States informed the British Government, in its capacity as a Geneva Conference Cochairman, that the United States would agree to attend a conference of the 1954 Geneva powers on Cambodia as proposed by the Cambodian Government in March.

The Cambodian Government subsequently specified that the conference must be confined to Cambodian questions and, shifting from its earlier position, stated that the South Vietnamese Government could not be permitted to participate. Chou En-lai, on behalf of Communist China, endorsed the position of the Cambodian Government that only the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia might be discussed and, twisting the Cambodian Government's statement excluding participation of the South Vietnam Government, added that at any international conference on the Indochina question only the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam" can represent South Vietnam. North Vietnam, through an editorial May 5 in the official Nhan Dan, expressed support for Prince Sihanouk's rejection of a conference on Cambodia which would be broadened to include discussions on Vietnam.

Apparently shifting its position once more, Cambodia sent a message May 15 to the United Kingdom stating that Cambodia desired a conference if only the Cambodian problem is dealt with there and if the interested powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France and Communist China) agree in advance on South Vietnamese representation. Regarding the issue of the South Vietnamese Government versus the "National Liberation Front," Prince Sihanouk said Cambodia is willing to accept either, neither or both.

On the basis of Prince Sihanouk's message, the United Kingdom then approached the Soviet Union to have invitations issued to the 1954 Geneva conference powers. To date the Soviets have not replied.

Such a conference could provide an opportunity for corridor contacts with the Communist powers on Vietnam if they so desire.

6. United Nations: The United States raised the Tonkin Gulf events last August in the Security Council. The President of the Security Council invited North Vietnam to furnish information relating to the complaint of the United States, either through participation in the Security Council discussions or by other means. The Foreign Minister of Communist China in an August 12 letter to the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, emphatically pointed out that the United Nations had no right at all to consider the Indochina question. North Vietnam responded August 19 to the President of the Security Council, stating that the war in Vietnam does not lie within the competence of the Security Council and that any Security Council decision would be considered null and void by North Vietnam.

In early April 1965 the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, considered visiting Peiping and Hanoi on the Vietnam question. Communist China, through the medium of the People's Daily, commented on April 12 that U Thant was knocking at the wrong door and should spare himself the trouble since "the Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations." The Prime Minister of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, in a statement on April 8, said that "any approach tending to secure United Nations intervention in the Vietnam situation is * * * inappropriate."

7. Exploration of a Vietnam Settlement: On February 20 the United Kingdom proposed to the Soviet Union that the British and Soviets undertake as Geneva cochairmen to explore the bases of a possible Vietnam settlement with all the Geneva Conference countries. The United States supported this approach. The Soviets—obviously under pressure from Hanoi and Peiping—were, however, not even prepared to cooperate in seeking the views of the parties concerned regarding the grounds for settlement.

8. Gordon Walker mission: The British then undertook to send Gordon Walker to

visit interested countries and explore the bases for a Vietnam settlement. Walker visited South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma in April. Peiping, however, informed the British Government in a note, responding to the proposal that Walker visit Peiping, that in present circumstances it was not suitable for a special representative of the British Government to contact the Chinese Government on the problems of Vietnam and Indochina and that he would not be welcome. Hanoi also declined to receive a visit from Walker.

9. U.S. readiness for unconditional discussions: On April 7, President Johnson stated that the United States remains ready for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. He noted that we have stated this position over and over again to friend and foe alike. Hanoi and Peiping have refused to respond, calling the proposal "a hoax," "a big swindle," "a lie covered with flowers."

10. Appeal of 17 nonaligned nations: In responding April 8, to the appeal of 17 nonaligned nations for a peaceful solution through negotiations without preconditions, the United States reiterated the statement in President Johnson's April 7 speech that it remains ready for unconditional discussions. The United States also stated that, as soon as the aggressive acts of North Vietnam stop and the obstacles to security and stability in South Vietnam are removed, the need for American supporting military actions will come to an end. The United States further noted that, when conditions have been created in which the South Vietnamese people can determine their future without external interference, the United States will withdraw its forces from South Vietnam.

Communist China, through the medium of the People's Daily, rejected unconditional negotiations, declaring that the Vietnamese people will never agree to negotiations without any preconditions. Marshal Tito and other unspecified backers of the 17-nation appeal were labeled "monsters and freaks."

North Vietnam likewise rejected the non-aligned appeal through an authorized statement by the Vietnam News Agency saying that any approach contrary to Pham Van Dong's four-point conditions for a Vietnamese settlement is inappropriate. Since Dong had stated that reconvening the Geneva Conference could be considered if the basis outlined in his four points is recognized, it appears that North Vietnam was not prepared at that time to accept talks other than those conditioned on its position for a settlement.

11. Indian proposal on Vietnam: The Indian Government has proposed (a) the cessation of hostilities by both sides, (b) the policing of boundaries by an Afro-Asian patrol force, and (c) the maintenance of present boundaries so long as the people concerned desire it.

The United States has publicly stated that it has noted this proposal with interest and is giving it very careful consideration. The United States is continuing discussions with the Indian Government on this proposal.

Communist China has denounced the Indian proposal as a plot to use Afro-Asian countries to serve U.S. aggression against Vietnam, and accuses the Indian Government of betraying the Afro-Asian countries' stand of opposing imperialism and colonialism and supporting the National Liberation Front movement.

Hanoi has also rejected the Indian proposal, calling the "erroneous viewpoints of Indian ruling circles" an offense against the South Vietnamese people. Hanoi says the proposal is aimed a finding a way out for the United States which will help it rule over South Vietnam.

12. Bombing pause: During the period May 13-17, the United States suspended

bombing operations against North Vietnam. This fact was obviously known to Hanoi, but there was no response indicating an intention to move toward a settlement. The Vietnam News Agency in Hanoi called the suspension "a wornout trick of deceit and threat." The New China News Agency in Peiping characterized the suspension as "a peace swindle," "an American hoax," "a despicable trick," and "war blackmail."

13. Canadian approach to North Vietnam: At the end of May the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission in Vietnam proceeded to Hanoi to discuss the reaction of North Vietnam to the bombing pause. As reported by Canadian Foreign Minister Martin, the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam stated that "four conditions" stand in the way of the negotiations urged by the United States. The Canadian Foreign Minister has, therefore, concluded that North Vietnam and Communist China do not support peace overtures at this time. This conforms to the United States view that Hanoi is not prepared for unconditional discussions, but instead insists on the recognition of clearly unacceptable conditions for discussion.

14. Commonwealth initiative: Most recently, the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London issued a statement June 19 proposing that a special Mission composed of British Prime Minister Wilson and four other Commonwealth heads of government visit the capitals of the countries involved to "explore the circumstances in which a conference might be held to end the fighting in Vietnam." The United States and South Vietnam immediately welcomed the Commonwealth initiative. Peiping's response was to call Prime Minister Wilson a nitwit making trouble for himself"; Hanoi turned down the proposed visit in a statement July 1; and the Soviet Union indicated it was not interested in this effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

In addition to the 14 attempts mentioned above, four additional ones were made during the month of July and early August.

15. Tito-Shastri joint appeal of late July.

16. British Parliamentarian Harold Davies appeal and visit to Hanoi in late July on behalf of British Prime Minister Wilson.

17. President Johnson's appeal and letter to the Secretary general of the United Nations on July 28.

18. Ghanaian Prime Minister Nkrumah's appeal in early August.

Question 9: It is often said that we must stay in South Vietnam to prevent the spread of communism in southeast Asia. Is the main purpose of our policy to forestall a Communist government in South Vietnam? Or is it to enable the people of South Vietnam to establish whatever kind of government they want, whether Communist or otherwise?

Answer: First, the problem of Vietnam is Communist aggression. The United States is certainly there in force now, but the South Vietnamese asked for our assistance only when the Communist assault reached such proportions as to imperil the very existence of South Vietnam. Second, we have no desire for a military presence or base in Vietnam. Our goal is precisely to create a situation in which we can withdraw from a peaceful, secure, and free South Vietnam. That will be possible whenever the Communists decide to leave their neighbor alone. Third, until the Communists call off their assault, our withdrawal would simply mean turning over 14 million people to the Communists. A political settlement is possible only when the Communists are convinced they cannot win by force. Finally, the situation in Vietnam cannot sensibly be isolated from the general world situation. Vietnam is not the end of Communist ambition. After Vietnam there is Laos, and Cambodia, and Thailand, etc. And if we permit Com-

minist armed subversion to succeed in southeast Asia we will surely see it again—and soon—in Africa, in the Middle East, and in our own hemisphere.

We do not find any significant body of people or opinion in South Vietnam among these 14 million people, other than the Vietcong themselves, who are looking to Hanoi for guidance. The Vietcong use the old instrument of terror to induce passivity. As a result, in those areas which have been secured and cleared, there is no problem about the cooperation of the people in South Vietnam when they can be given reasonable assurance that their cooperation will not lead to their throats being slit on the following night. In addition, when one speaks about the attitudes of the villagers, one must remember that these people want to live their lives in decency and security, grow their own crops, raise their families, and improve their land if they can. And they are not asking the north for the answer.

The attitude of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam toward communism is unmistakable: even though there has been a series of governmental revisions since the fall of the Diem Government in November 1963, every administration has operated from a basic policy of anticommunism, and a staunch determination to continue the struggle against Communist aggression. The South Vietnamese people themselves have given undeniable evidence of their allegiance by "voting with their feet"—since the beginning of this year, approximately 600,000 have become refugees, choosing to abandon their homes and leave the Vietcong-controlled areas in the north central portion of South Vietnam. The close to 1 million persons who fled from North Vietnam to the South after the Communists assumed control are more impressive testimony still to the allegiance of the Vietnamese people.

The President has made it perfectly clear that we are ready for "unconditional discussions" at any time. However, he has made it equally clear that our objective is a South Vietnam able to determine its own future without external interference. The United States has also stated, in its reply to the 17 nonaligned nations, that it would be prepared to withdraw its forces once the external interference—really, the aggression—from the north had stopped and the south was free again.

Hanoi has not agreed to any sort of discussions. Its public speeches continue to refer to the necessity that we stop our bombing attacks—in other words, a unilateral cessation by our side—or that we withdraw our forces from helping South Vietnam, or both.

More basically, North Vietnam has defined its idea of a peaceful settlement very carefully. It calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and then for determination of the future of South Vietnam "in accordance with the program of the liberation front." That program means that the Liberation Front would be admitted to a dominant role in a new government within South Vietnam as the first step. The so-called Liberation Front is of course nothing but the puppet of Hanoi, led by Communists and directed by Hanoi. If it were put into a dominant role in South Vietnam, the result would obviously be a Communist takeover, exactly along the lines of the Communist takeover in Poland, to give one example. In short, Hanoi's terms amount to turning over South Vietnam to communism. There is absolutely no sign that they are now prepared to settle on any other basis.

Question 10. Assuming that what we are doing in Vietnam is morally and legally justified, is it wise and sound from the viewpoint of effectiveness? Can we, within reasonable and practicable cost considera-

tion, achieve a military victory, or are we, in effect, repeating Napoleon's disastrous march to Moscow? Would we be more likely to achieve the ends we desire if we were to let the people of South Vietnam struggle with this problem by themselves and in the process perhaps develop enough nationalism to resist control by China?

Answer. In considering whether the U.S. support to South Vietnam is effective, it is necessary to consider the objectives of the U.S. policy in South Vietnam and also the objectives of North Vietnam. The purpose of North Vietnam, backed by Communist China, is to expand control over the peoples of the independent nations of southeast Asia, and to use this as a test of their method of expanding control over independent peoples throughout the world in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The leaders of North Vietnam and Communist China on numerous occasions have stated this as their purpose. For example, General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese military forces, said that South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation front movement of our time. Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of North Vietnam, said recently: "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of Latin America.

The national security of the United States is at stake in South Vietnam. The objective of the United States is to preserve South Vietnam's independence in the face of some 50,000 personnel and quantities of supplies that the north has sent into South Vietnam to subvert and take control of the south. The source of the commitment of the United States derives out of the southeast Asia Treaty, out of the bilateral arrangements that President Eisenhower made with the Government of South Vietnam, out of regular authorizations and appropriations of the Congress in giving aid to South Vietnam, out of the resolution of the Congress of last August, out of the formal resolutions of the Congress of last August, and out of the formal declarations of three Presidents. If our allies, and more particularly if our adversaries, should discover the American commitment is not worth anything, the world would face dangers of which we have not yet dreamed.

The effectiveness of our policy can be dramatically seen in the fact that North Vietnam, which has coveted South Vietnam ever since the Indochina War, was unable to absorb it by political means and finally, by 1959 and 1960, had to resort to terrorism and guerrilla warfare to subvert it. North Vietnam's political efforts to absorb the South were thwarted because the South Vietnamese, with our assistance, had made considerable progress in strengthening the basic economy of the country and improving the economic position of the villagers. Since the North Vietnamese have attempted to take over South Vietnam by military means the South Vietnamese have incurred tremendous losses of both civilian and military personnel and in the destruction of property; yet they continue to resist and fight. This, too, attests to the effectiveness of our policy and aid programs.

The choices are not all up to the U.S. Government. We have made the decision because of our longstanding commitment to help the Vietnamese. Hanoi has decided, in the face of this, to increase its help to the Vietcong. This is a measure of the tenacity of the enemy—not our ineffectiveness. To withdraw our assistance because the conflict cannot be resolved quickly would mean nothing other than the abandonment of the South Vietnamese, who have counted on our backing, to certain takeover by the North

Vietnamese Communist regime, whose record of repressions and denial of basic freedoms is public.

Question 11: President Kennedy stated on numerous occasions that the war in Vietnam was a Vietnamese war; that it must be won or lost by the people of South Vietnam themselves. Does our increasing commitment of troops, planes and supporting material mean that we have embarked on a new policy?

Answer: No. Our policy still remains the same. Our goal is an independent Vietnam, free to choose its own path, free from outside interference—a military base for no other country. A nation and people free to decide their own future for themselves. The only thing that has changed is that which we think is necessary to reach this goal. Our outlook has changed over the past 2 years because the action of the North Vietnamese has changed during that period of time. They (North Vietnam) have vastly increased the number of men that they have infiltrated into South Vietnam. They have vastly increased the amount of equipment and material which they have infiltrated into that country. As a result of this increase in the strength of the North Vietnamese, occurring especially in the last 12 months, the United States has been forced to supplement the forces of South Vietnam with increased amounts of men and material. The South Vietnamese are still bearing the brunt of the fighting and suffering, and they will continue to bear the brunt of the fighting. The defense of South Vietnam is being directed by the Government of South Vietnam and it will continue to be that way.

Question 12: What is our policy in Vietnam? What are the alternatives realistically available to us at this time? What values and risks does each involve?

Answer: President Johnson once summarized our policy toward southeast Asia in four simple propositions.

1. America keeps her word.
2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole.
3. Our purpose is peace.
4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

When President Johnson talks about our national honor, he is not using some empty phrase of 18th century diplomacy. He is talking about the life and death of the Nation. The essential fact from which we start is that North Vietnam has sent tens of thousands of men and large quantities of arms into South Vietnam to take over that country by force. We have a very simple commitment to South Vietnam. It derives out of the Southeast Asia Treaty, out of the bilateral arrangements that President Eisenhower made with the Government of South Vietnam, out of regular authorizations and appropriations of the Congress in giving aid to South Vietnam, out of the resolution of the Congress of last August, out of the most formal declarations of three Presidents of both political parties.

There is no need to parse these commitments in great detail. The fact is that we know we have a commitment. The South Vietnamese know we have a commitment. The Communist world knows we have a commitment. The rest of the world knows it.

This means that the integrity of the American commitment is at the heart of this problem. We believe that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal structure of peace throughout the world. We have 42 allies. Those alliances were approved by overwhelming votes of our Senate. We didn't go into those alliances through some sense of amiability or through some philanthropic attitude toward other nations.

We went into them because we consider these alliances utterly essential for the security of our own Nation.

If our allies, or more particularly if our adversaries, should discover that the American commitment is not worth anything, then the world would face dangers of which we have not yet dreamed. And so it is important for us to make good on that American commitment to South Vietnam.

As to the basic alternatives, so long as South Vietnam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954 accords and thus an independent and secure South Vietnam would of course be an answer, indeed the answer. But negotiations would hardly be promising that admitted communism to South Vietnam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South Vietnam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with only nebulous or remote guarantees.

As for enlarging our own actions, we cannot speak surely about the future, for the aggressors themselves share the responsibility for such eventualities. We have shown, in our reaction to North Vietnam's attacks against us in the Gulf of Tonkin and elsewhere, that we can act, and North Vietnam knows it and knows its own weaknesses. But we seek no wider war, and we must not suppose that there are quick or easy answers in this direction.

As a great power, we are now and will continue to find ourselves in situations where we simply do not have easy choices, where there simply are not immediate or ideal solutions available. We cannot then allow ourselves to yield to frustration but must stick to the job, doing all we can and doing it better.

In sum, the President stated on July 28: "We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. We will stand in Vietnam."

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. FLYNT (at the request of Mr. STEPHENS), for today, on account of business.

Mr. KEE, from August 23 to September 13, 1965, on account of surgery.

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey (at the request of Mr. KREBS), for an indefinite period, on account of illness.

Mr. HAGAN of Georgia (at the request of Mr. BOGGS), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. HANNA (at the request of Mr. BOGGS), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. KORNEGAY (at the request of Mr. HENDERSON), for the remainder of the week, on account of illness.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. PELLY, for 20 minutes, on Monday next, September 30.

Mr. O'HARA of Michigan, for 30 minutes, on Wednesday, August 25, 1965; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. WYDLER (at the request of Mr. SKUBITZ), for 30 minutes, on August 26.

Mr. BROCK (at the request of Mr. SKUBITZ), for 30 minutes, on August 25.

Mr. COHELAN (at the request of Mr. ROOSEVELT), for 5 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. CLEVENGER and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. DENTON and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. RIVERS of Alaska in five instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. KREBS in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. MADDEN and to include an editorial.

Mr. FINO.

Mr. HOSMER in three instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. MICHEL in three instances.

Mr. MCCORMACK (at the request of Mr. UDALL) and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. MACGREGOR and to include extraneous matter during his remarks on the rule on House Resolution 533.

Mr. MATSUNAGA and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ROOSEVELT in six instances and to include extraneous material.

Mr. MAHON (at the request of Mr. ROOSEVELT) during debate on H.R. 10586 and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SKUBITZ) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. LIPSCOMB in three instances.

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. HANSEN of Idaho in five instances.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM in three instances.

Mr. DAGUE.

Mr. SCHNEEBELI in two instances.

Mr. BOB WILSON in three instances.

Mr. MORSE in three instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama.

Mr. BROCK in two instances.

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana in two instances.

Mr. BERRY.

Mr. ELLSWORTH.

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama in three instances.

Mr. CORBETT.

Mr. MCCLORY.

Mr. KEITH.

Mr. FINDLEY.

Mr. ADAIR in two instances.

Mr. ERLBORN.

Mr. SKUBITZ in three instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. ROOSEVELT) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. MURPHY of Illinois.

Mr. PEPPER in six instances.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina.

Mr. TOLL.

Mr. MOORHEAD.

Mr. LOVE.

Mr. WELTNER.

Mr. MULTER in three instances.

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. COHELAN in two instances.

Mr. O'NEAL of Georgia.

Mr. ROSENTHAL in two instances.

Mr. PATTEN.

Mr. DINGELL in two instances.

Mr. HOWARD.

Mr. MORRIS in two instances.

Mr. BRADEMAS in eight instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of California.

Mr. MONAGAN in two instances.

Mr. GRIDER.

Mr. JACOBS in two instances.

Mr. MARSH in two instances.

Mr. FASCELL in five instances.

Mr. VANIK in two instances.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee in six instances.

Mr. HANSEN of Iowa.

Mr. JENNINGS.

Mr. NIX in three instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. MCGRATH.

Mr. DULSKI.

Mr. ANNUNZIO.

Mr. HUNGATE.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Mr. BURLERSON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 485. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Auburn-Folsom unit, American River division, Central Valley project, California, under Federal reclamation laws;

H.R. 1481. An act for the relief of the estate of Donovan C. Moffett;

H.R. 1763. An act to amend section 1825 of title 28 of the United States Code to authorize the payment of witness fees in habeas corpus cases and in proceedings to vacate sentence under section 2255 of title 28 for persons who are authorized to proceed in forma pauperis;

H.R. 3750. An act for the relief of certain individuals;

H.R. 3990. An act to amend section 1871 of title 28, United States Code, to increase the per diem and subsistence and limit mileage allowances of grand and petit jurors;

H.R. 3992. An act to amend section 753(f) of title 28, United States Code relating to transcripts furnished by court reporters for the district courts;

H.R. 3997. An act to amend section 753(b) of title 28, United States Code, to provide for the recording of proceedings in the U.S. district courts by means of electronic sound recording as well as by shorthand or mechanical means;

H.R. 4719. An act for the relief of Josephine C. Rumley, administratrix of the estate of George S. Rumley;

H.R. 5401. An act to amend the Interstate Commerce Act so as to strengthen and improve the national transportation system, and for other purposes;

H.R. 5497. An act to amend paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act; and

H.R. 9544. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of approximately 620,000 long tons of natural rubber from the national stockpile.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. BURLERSON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on this day present to the President, for his approval, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 89. An act to authorize establishment of the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, and for other purposes;

August 24, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4727

Letter From Slain Vietnam Hero

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS C. McGRATH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, August 21, the following article appeared in the leading newspaper of New Jersey's Second District, the Atlantic City Press:

AREA MARINE DIES IN BATTLE IN VIETNAM

A Hammonton marine, who was to have been discharged next June after 20 years service, died on Friday the 13th in Vietnam during the battle of Chu Lal.

He was M. Sgt. George DeLuca, one of 15 marines killed in the engagement, one of the biggest so far for U.S. forces in Vietnam, the Defense Department said. More than 500 Vietcong were kill in the battle.

DeLuca, 37, was the husband of Eve Pinto DeLuca of 606 Middle Road, Hammonton. He also leaves two sons, George 7, and Michael, 2.

The family was last together at their home in California on May 21, the day he shipped out for Vietnam.

DeLuca was a career man in the Marines. He entered the service after he was graduated from Lower Camden County Regional High School in 1946.

DeLuca also is survived by a brother, Vincent of Hammonton; four stepbrothers, Aaron Parker of Princeton; Nelson, of Audubon, Ireland and Ellis, both of Trenton; three sisters, Mrs. Gussie Walker of Norfolk, Va., Mrs. Concetta Schmidt of Haddon Heights, and Mrs. Jean Robertson of Dallas, Tex.

DeLuca was assigned to G Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Division.

Sergeant DeLuca was the first Atlantic County man killed in the Vietnamese fighting. This husband and father, who volunteered for Vietnam duty despite the fact that he had served valiantly in the Korean action and would have been eligible for his discharge next June after 20 years of service provides inspiration enough.

However, Sergeant DeLuca, in his last letter home, provided even more inspiration to his fellow Americans as reported in the Atlantic City Press of Monday, August 23. Here is the article describing his last letter:

VIETNAM WAR NECESSARY, MARINE HERO
WROTE HOME

"I feel sorry for those Americans who are saying the Viet war is not their war." So wrote a battle-weary marine from Hammonton 3 days before he was killed in action this month on Friday the 13th.

In his last letter were the poignant reflections on an American soldier still shining with the zeal and ideals of his forefathers.

If you ask the fighting men who are there, the tragedy of Vietnam is indeed necessary, M. Sgt. George A. DeLuca told his sister-in-law and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Willard Ehrke, of Mays Landing Road, Folsom.

Master Sergeant DeLuca, the father of two sons about whom he obviously worried constantly, George 7 and Michael 2, explained in the final words heard from him:

MUST STOP THEM

"If China takes South Vietnam, she has control of the Indian Ocean and from there she can put her tactics into Africa, Australia, Japan and just keep moving.

"If we don't stop them now, George and Mike will be fighting 10 or 15 years from now."

Master Sergeant DeLuca supplied helicopters with food, water, and ammunition in their attacks on neighboring villages in the tangled network of infiltrating probes that make up the Viet battlefront.

Expressing his pride in being an American and a marine, Master Sergeant DeLuca, 37, said:

SORRY FOR THEM

"When I read or hear about those demonstrations and people saying this is not their war, I feel sorry for them."

Included in his final letters to his wife Eva of 606 Middle Road, Hammonton, and the Ehrkes, was a mimeographed 58-line poem dramatically illustrating the spirit of the marines in Vietnam, and written by the men in his outfit.

In part the poem read:

"The news comes on (TV) and then you hear.
The all-star game is drawing near.
Then you see a far-off land
Where men are dying in the sand.
A frown appears across your face
You're tired of hearing about that place."

The poem closes on a prophetically brave note:

"No wonder he's proud,
He's a United States marine."

The body of Master Sergeant DeLuca arrived in Hammonton on Saturday.

Requiem high Mass will be at 9 a.m. Tuesday at St. Martin's dePorres Church in Hammonton. Burial will be in Holy Sepulchre Cemetery.

I was gratified to read in today's Atlantic City Press that Sergeant DeLuca's last letter had been brought to the attention of President Johnson. The Press story noted that the President "believes very strongly that those who are fighting in Vietnam should be supported by unity and accord at home."

Mr. Speaker, I commend Sergeant DeLuca's last letter to his family as must reading to those of us in the United States who wonder why U.S. military forces are fighting in Vietnam.

This brave marine, who gave the ultimate measure of devotion to his country and the ideal of liberty that a tiny nation may remain free, has written a message to all of us, and I believe we can all gain by reading it.

Shackle Removed

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT N. C. NIX

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. NIX. Mr. Speaker, for several reasons, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is one of the most significant pieces of legislation emanating from the Congress of the United States in the entire history of the Nation.

First. It is so because it promises to contribute greatly to the fruition of one of world history's most important and most necessary revolutions.

Second. It is monumental because it

realizes the principal objective of the 15th and 14th amendments to the Constitution.

Third. It is essentially great because it is morally, politically, and constitutionally right.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is partial recognition that the lives of great Americans such as Medgar Evers, Harry Moore, James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, Jimmie Lee Jackson, Mrs. Luizzo, James Reeb, and Johnathan Daniels were shortened, however mercilessly and inhumanely, in a great and noble cause.

The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin deserves commendation, along with most of the Nation's press for its wholehearted and staunch support of the civil rights revolution. I take great pleasure in expressing the gratitude of many Americans for the excellent coverage and editorial commentary to which these remarks are addressed.

Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States, in his recognition of the basic significance of the suffrage privilege to a developing democracy, in signing this bill into law, has made clear his commitment and that of the Nation toward realizing full Negro equality in every sphere of American life. In this respect, the major thrust of American opinion rides the same tide. With your permission, the editorial follows:

[From the Philadelphia (Pa.) Evening Bulletin, Aug. 9, 1965]

SHACKLE REMOVED

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is now law, appropriately signed by the President in the august shadow of Abraham Lincoln's statue, and Department of Justice agents are already moving into certain States to enforce its provisions.

The Great Emancipator would surely have said, "Well done," for the act goes a long way toward establishing the equal political rights of which American Negroes long have been deprived, first as slaves, and for a hundred years after slavery, as citizens under limitations.

It will of course not end racism. America has lived with the color line since the beginning, and full equality must come through the quickening of individual consciences. Legislation can help roll back gross injustice. And it can do more, by provoking the soul-searching which is already well-advanced among Americans of every color and background.

This particular law strikes at the very heart of political equality by requiring that every county in every State permit all its citizens to be heard.

Had this voting equality been established long ago, many of today's racial problems would not have developed. What did happen was that the States in which the ruling groups were outnumbered devised techniques to keep the suppressed majority from the polls. The new law virtually eliminates this, especially by the automatic provision that the Government may take over voting registration in any county which, on the record, has not opened its books to all.

Literacy tests, which can readily be defended as right in principle, have long been abused in parts of the South. They no longer can be. A major shackle of complete democracy really has been cut away with the cold chisel of law. If not the last one, still an important one worth hailing in the name of freedom.

A4728

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

August 24, 1965

Rural or Urban

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. RALPH HARVEY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, while I rarely agree with the editorial policy of the Washington Post, this editorial of August 22 is a very timely and accurate one.

I include the editorial in the Appendix of the RECORD:

RURAL OR URBAN

Estimates that there has been a continuing migration of a thousand rural people a month into Los Angeles emphasize the extent to which the urban problems with which we now must deal are in part the consequence of rural problems with which we have not dealt in the past.

From 1929 to 1954 some 18 million farm people migrated to cities and towns. The rate of movement stepped up at the end of that period to reach 570,000 a year from 1935 to 1939 and in the 1950's the rate soared to 900,000 a year. There seems to be a worldwide, lemming-like exodus from rural areas of which the American movement is a part. Some of it may be due to the inherent attractions of city life. But some of it is due to the indifference of society toward a whole host of discriminations against rural areas. The urban masses and their political leaders have resisted paying adequate prices for the produce of rural society. Discriminatory wage laws have fixed minimum wages for city workers and left rural workers unprotected. Rural communities have found it difficult to avail themselves of national programs like the housing programs. On a broad front, we have neglected to give rural people a comparable standard of living. Incomes are about half those of urban dwellers. Beyond the economic disparity lie a hundred cultural discriminations running from education to entertainment.

Many of the millions who have left rural areas have not been educated, trained or equipped for urban life. They simply have been harried out of the countryside and dumped into an urban environment while still ignorant of its opportunities and unable to take advantage of them. These disinherited, disadvantaged, disfranchised and discontented people have jammed into already overcrowded urban slums and ghettos to multiply all the old problems of the cities and to add a dozen new ones. The cities have not dealt as skillfully with these migrants as they dealt with the emigrants from overseas. But it is doubtful if urban societies struggling with their preexisting problems of absorbing new peoples could have smoothly integrated such an influx even if the city governments and police forces were run by geniuses.

The cities have been confronted with one of the great migrations of human history and they have made little preparation for it. Many of the migrants, of course, were the people who stimulated the growth and expansion of the cities and furnished them with new leadership, talents and human resources. But many were just people who had no place else to go.

There are voices in this country demanding an even higher rate of annual emigration from the countryside than the incredible 4 percent of recent years. But they overlook social problems of both rural and urban America. The plain fact is that the cities have been getting more untrained rural labor than they can absorb. And the larger fact

is that millions of these people could be provided jobs and homes in rural areas with less economic and social strain than they can be furnished a decent life in the crowded cities. Our urban society now is finding that the rural labor surplus is the most formidable of all farm surpluses. It might have been cheaper if we had dealt with rural poverty in the countryside instead of moving it into the cities and transforming it into urban poverty. It might be easier to attack rural misery where it is rather than just to move it to town. We need now, tardily, to undertake a vast program of rural betterment for the economic and the social health of the whole country.

The Late Honorable Clarence Brown

SPEECH

OF

HON. BARRATT O'HARA

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 23, 1965

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, on my 83d birthday, CLARENCE BROWN spoke of our long and close friendship, remarked that he and I belonged to the rather exclusive club of former Lieutenant Governors serving in this body, and closed with these words: "I think you will finish the course all right."

Now the voice of my friend is stilled. Finished is the course of CLARENCE BROWN and in this Chamber is the heaviness of a grief that all Members feel in a deep personal manner. The nobility of his character, the cheer of his optimism, the strength of his faith in the simple virtues of hometown folks, all this runs through our minds and pencils into our saddened hearts as we come to realize that CLARENCE BROWN has finished the course of life.

How gallantly he ran that course. At 23, the boy Lieutenant Governor of Ohio, for 27 years a Member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, an outstanding statesman, a publisher, and editor in the finest traditions of American Journalism, a mighty power in the Republican Party, the close friend and manager of the presidential campaign of Senator Taft, all this and more, and in all these long years of achievement, of glory and applause, he never lost his head or bowed to vanity. His was the simple honesty of the country town, of which he was a product and an apostle. In CLARENCE BROWN there was complete absence of pretense.

Mr. Speaker, the months of the last year or so were weighed with sadness for CLARENCE BROWN. The deaths of an adored granddaughter, his mother, and his wife all came in a short period of time, and we who were so close to him could not fail to note the heavy toll they had taken. His beloved wife, to whom he was married in 1916, died in January of this year. Their life together for close to half a century was a classic of marital bliss.

My deepest sympathy goes to the children, grandchildren, and other loved ones of the great and noble man with whom it was our privilege to serve.

The Los Angeles Explosion

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. MASTON O'NEAL

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. O'NEAL of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, it is interesting to study the divergent viewpoints of our liberal politicians and sociologists as they attempt to explain the recent racial explosion in Los Angeles. They have advanced theories ranging from heat prostration to the absence of trees in the Negro community.

However, the most candid discussion of the situation, in my opinion, appeared in the August 18 edition of the Albany, Ga., Herald. The highly respected editor of that publication, James H. Gray, minced no words in placing the blame where it rightfully belongs. I commend the following editorial to my colleagues:

THE LOS ANGELES EXPLOSION

One of the oddities of the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots is the studied effort of the liberal political salvationists to explain the blowup. Some say that the hot weather brought about a natural combustion; others contend that dormant evils in American society suddenly surfaced with unusual velocity. Still others assert that a day of reckoning was due to come for the majority in this country and that general atonement must be made for the oppressed. But nothing at all is being said about a conflict between races, between divergent cultures, as though race, one of the most disputatious areas of human existence, no longer had to be reckoned with as a social, economic, and political force.

We find this not only to be a silly exercise, but a highly precarious one, in dealing with a national problem, which is worsening as the proposed solutions to it remain political in the extreme. In the name of compassion, the Negro mass has been cultivated by politicians and professional bleeding hearts to its own detriment; the soul of the Negro has been praised to the heavens—and his vote, whether educated or not, has been recklessly schemed for, even at the expense of traditional restraints in the U.S. Constitution. A political power grab is in the making, and the Negro, unfortunately, is the pawn, shifted here and there by his own leaders as much as by certain militant white groups. Not even President Johnson's fatherly masquerade as a latter-day Abraham Lincoln can disguise that ugly practice.

Indeed, our national political leadership is dealing in some dangerous fallacies with respect to the racial issue. The South is usually the whipping boy in this complex matter, but the fact remains that the most serious disturbances have occurred in the North where desegregation has been in effect for many, many years. Yet segregation has persisted. In several respects it resembles a phenomenon American cities have long known—immigrants from abroad forming their own racial or national enclaves, maintaining their own customs and languages, even their own newspapers. And the desires making for such clannishness have come as much from within as from without.

So it is with the American Negro—in the North and the South. The salvationists spread the fiction that segregation is a wholly artificial pattern enforced by unworthy prejudice. Some of it is like that. But much segregation comes about naturally through the same processes of selection which cause individuals to choose like-minded associates

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been employees, railroad employees, allied workers, and communities of the country."

The legislative director cited the deterioration of the mail service with the start of RPO elimination 15 years ago. He said, "The conception of providing the best possible service to the postal patron seems no longer to be the aim of the Department. It appears that a policy of reduction or curtailment of postal services was introduced regardless of patrons needs and without thorough and proper advice to the Congress and certainly without congressional approval. All this apparently done on the false premise of budgetary limitations, and our opinion, false economy."

Nilan noted, "That if the new programs would be the economic plans they are claimed to be the postal deficit would have been wiped out years ago, but the Department still operates in the red."

"The Post Office Department has a new program of giving the best warranted service and the UFPC urges that the Department give the best service possible."

Information was also introduced quoting regional bulletins ordering certain perishable goods to be dispatched to RPO's as sending them to sectional centers would tend to delay them. It was pointed out this kind of information is published quite frequently by different regions. This was giving the patron the best service possible and not the best service warranted according to Nilan.

Additional information was given which listed RPO cars withdrawn in the past 2 years and in also facts showing the subsequent removal of the passenger trains.

Four more UFPC officers testified following Nilan's testimony. Hank Anglim, administrative vice president; Clint Gross, vice president, St. Louis region; Carroll Rohr, vice president, Denver region; and Phil Dooley, Atlanta region. Each of these men listed delays to mail now and cited the possibility of future 24 hour delays under the sectional center concept.

Results of an Opinion Poll

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN N. ERLNBORN

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. ERLNBORN. Mr. Speaker, it is my firm belief that a U.S. Congressman should, within the limits of his conscience, make every attempt to represent the interests and opinions of the citizens who elected him. In keeping with this philosophy one of my first actions as a newly elected Congressman was to conduct an opinion poll of my constituents, the first poll of its kind in the history of Illinois' 14th District. My office received over 12,000 replies out of a distribution of 50,000. Many of the returned questionnaires contained extensive comments and additional views. While I have never made any attempt to conceal my opinion on any issue and accordingly felt that my election to Congress indicated strong support in my district for my philosophy of government, nevertheless, I was most pleased to learn from a study of the results of my poll that my record since election has been consistently in accord with the views of the overwhelming majority of residents in Will and DuPage Counties.

In the area of Federal aid to higher

education, 83 percent of those responding to the poll favored the tax credit proposal which I cosponsored.

Fifty-eight percent favored the Dirksen constitutional amendment, while only 23 percent opposed it. The other 19 percent had no opinion. I strongly support Senator DIRKSEN in his effort to allow individual States the right to apportion one house of their bicameral legislatures on factors other than population, if approved in a State referendum.

Sixty-four percent opposed repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Concurring in their opinion that States should be permitted to adopt right-to-work laws if they so desired, I voted against repeal.

In fiscal policy matters, 83 percent did not favor increasing the national debt limit beyond the present \$324 billion. I voted against the \$4 billion increase when it came before the House.

Eighty-two percent of those replying to my questionnaire disliked unbalanced Federal budgets and deficit financing. In my brief time in Congress, I have consistently opposed ill-conceived or extravagant programs which might further unbalance Federal expenditures. Eighty-five percent agreed with my vote in favor of repealing certain excise taxes.

On two issues, defense spending and the approach to the farm problem, my responding constituents were pretty evenly divided. Forty-four percent favored reducing last year's expenditure on defense of more than \$50 billion while 43 percent did not. I voted in favor of the defense appropriations bill which cut a number of nonessential expenditures without weakening our defense structure though I, like the Republicans who submitted a minority report, dislike certain aspects of the bill.

Fifty-one percent of the responders did not want Federal price support and crop control programs continued. Of the 42 percent who did feel they should be continued, 54 percent thought they should be gradually reduced.

The President should be pleased to learn that the people of the 14th district overwhelmingly support a firm U.S. position in Vietnam. While 61 percent favor negotiation, 79 percent are against any U.S. pullout at the present time. Of those favoring negotiation, many indicated that the United States should negotiate only from a strong position.

Concerning Red China, 73 percent opposed its admission to the United Nations and felt that the United States should not trade with her. Sixty-five percent were against increased U.S. trade with Communist-bloc nations while 90 percent were against expanded economic aid to Communist-bloc nations.

Morality and Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, in an editorial entitled "Morality and Viet-

nam," the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, a leading daily in the State of Hawaii, describes as "disturbing" the fact that hardly anyone in public life has raised the question of whether morality has any bearing on the U.S. position and its attitudes with respect to the war in Vietnam.

I commend for the serious consideration of my colleagues and other readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the Honolulu Star-Bulletin editorial, which follows:

MORALITY AND VIETNAM

As disturbing as any aspect of the war in Vietnam is the fact that hardly anybody in public life has raised the question of whether morality has any bearing on the U.S. position and its attitudes there.

The fact that nobody, or hardly anybody, has done so is a testament to an even greater conceit: that it is assumed that, since our country has taken a position, the position therefore must be right.

This is not quite the same as "My country, right or wrong." "My country, right or wrong" means support for one's country even when it is wrong. To assume that our country is right merely because it is our country is something else again.

It is, in fact, the sort of blind and unquestioning obedience that the Communist countries demand. It is Communist Party dogma that the party is right even when it is wrong. We have not come to that in America, and so long as our constitutional system survives, or rather so long as we believe in our constitutional system, we shall not come to this.

Msgr. Charles A. Kekumano touched on this theme in preaching at his St. Plus X Church Sunday. "We bomb and kill in Vietnam," he said, "as if the problems of Asia can be managed without God. We pay millions of dollars to the United Nations in a vague effort to bring peace into God's world without God's help."

The monsignor was, of course, making God's will the yardstick for what we do. But this is not too different from the concept of morality which most of us possess, or what a British foreign minister recently reminded us was in our own Declaration of Independence, "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." We should not, nor can we, proceed with the war in Vietnam as though victory through the use of sufficient force were the only end we seek.

All our history is against it. We did not destroy Japan or Germany once they were defeated and had surrendered; we helped them. Nor did we help them simply because helping them helped us to make a more secure world; American moral standards would not have permitted our leaders to do otherwise. We must, in the end, do what is right in Vietnam; and if it is less than some of our harsher leaders would have us do, it is nonetheless a requisite if America is to retain its position, earned through nearly two centuries, of a country with a conscience.

The Right To Choose

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, brevity in editorial comment is often a virtue. A very brief but pertinent editorial in the Southwest Messenger Press on Thursday, August 19, strikes me as being a

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Soviet claims being what they are, it is far too early to make a judgment on the claims. The boasts, however, do merit careful attention of the free world.

If the Soviet economy has indeed accelerated, it also means that the Communists can devote more money to world subversion and the arms race.

It also means that the Soviets will have to turn increasingly to the free world to obtain the necessary heavy equipment and plants to meet new demands. We would be ill-advised to assist this program for whatever short term gains could accrue from increased trade.

The important factor to remember is that the atheistic Communist plans for world domination have not changed, nor are they likely to do so.

Grand Canyon Being Threatened**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. E. ROSS ADAIR

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, at a time when conservation of our natural resources is in the minds of many of us, the following editorial from the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel is particularly timely:

GRAND CANYON BEING THREATENED

Dedicated conservationists across the country—an easily stirred group—are really in a lather over what they charge is a threat to the Grand Canyon, greatest natural wonder in the Nation.

And what has justifiably stirred them this time out is legislation pending in both Houses of the National Congress aimed at building two vast dams above and below the canyon on the Colorado River which, they insist, will flood major parts of the canyon.

Dream children of the Bureau of Reclamation, the dams would include one at Bridge Canyon, below the Grand Canyon National Monument, and the other would bracket Grand Canyon National Park to the north.

The conservationists fighting the projects contend that, if constructed, the lower dam would back the waters of the Colorado up the entire length of the monument and part way into the park, resulting in the inundation of what is described as some of the most spectacular canyon land in the world. It would also, they point out, drown out some of the oldest exposed geological formations in the national park system, whose age is estimated not in the millions, but in the billions of years.

These, then, are the dimensions of the catastrophe which could overtake a natural wonder which has been the vacation goal, at one time or another, of most Americans. And for what?

The grand design, it seems, would not make any additional water available. The conservationists say the river already is being bled of all the water it can give. Actually, water will be lost through evaporation from the large lake surface which would be built up by the dam.

Rather, the purpose is to build huge hydroelectric plants, resulting in yet another governmental excursion into the public power field. The theory is that the dam project would supply Government electricity for sale to pay for other phases of the Bureau's Pacific Southwest water plan.

Opponents to the plan say this is akin to sending coal to Newcastle. The facts are, they say, that enormous electric power

interties are now underway in that region which could supply huge excesses of power without either of the dams in Bridge Canyon or Marble Gorge.

The Indiana division of the Izaak Walton League is taking a lead in fighting this potential despoliation of the Grand Canyon. The Hoosier division passed a resolution attacking the plan and urging all interested citizens to write their Senators and Representatives in opposition to it. The Indiana division resolution will be presented at the league's national convention in Cody, Wyo., this June.

Certainly, we see no reason why there is a need for further hydroelectric projects in the Colorado, even if it might make some sort of economic sense. We would agree with an editorialist for the Indiana division of the league:

"Why should conservationists, or any living American, have to argue for the life of the Grand Canyon (and the last, unsubdued stretch of the Colorado River) on the basis of a benefit-to-cost ratio?"

Lest We Forget**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. PAUL J. KREBS

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. KREBS. Mr. Speaker, the senseless rioting that recently took place in Los Angeles, Calif., cannot be described as anything other than shocking. To those who have painfully followed these heartbreaking events, I recommend the following editorial from the New Jersey Herald News. The News is a statewide Negro publication and has a reputation for fairness and objectivity. While the editorial terms the rioting as "another example of hoodlumism and lawlessness at its worst," it also wisely counsels that "every effort must be made to build a future for the Negro, and help him forget his wretched past."

The editorial follows:

LEST WE FORGET

The Los Angeles riot is another example of hoodlumism and lawlessness at its worst. When men lose respect for law and order, then tyranny reigns and no man's life, limb, or property is safe. We saw this happen in New York, Philadelphia, Rochester, and now Los Angeles.

It is very strange that these riots spring from almost identical patterns. The Philadelphia riot grew out of a traffic incident as did the Los Angeles riot. In both incidents, it seems that there were forces waiting for the signal to begin their destruction and looting of property and places of business. It is to be noted that these riots lose their racial aspects when the looting begins; Negro stores are plundered just as badly as those owned by whites.

It is also a mistake to connect this organized lawlessness with the civil rights revolution. There is no connection and the sooner these people are prevented from operating under the guise of civil rights, and exposed for what they really are, the sooner the culprits will be brought to justice and law and order restored.

While these riots focus attention upon the injustices Negroes have suffered in the past, it also reminds us that every effort must be made to build a future for the Negro, and help him forget his wretched past.

This takes time, patient, and understanding and we have been so short on these in dealing with this problem. It is time for a change.

Congress Not Consulted**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. GLENN CUNNINGHAM

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, in recent years the Post Office Department has begun a series of major innovations in the postal service of this country. These programs have been and are being put into effect without any consultation with the Congress of the United States. I believe this is in violation of the implied powers that were granted the Congress in the Constitution and I am not alone in this belief.

I would like to call attention to the testimony of Mr. Patrick Nilan, the United Federation of Postal Clerks legislative director before a special Senate subcommittee headed by the Honorable GALE MCGEE, of Wyoming. His testimony appeared in the Omaha Postal Clerk.

DEPARTMENT FAILS TO CONSULT CONGRESS ON CHANGES

Pat Nilan, UFPC legislative director, charged that the implementation of new program by the Post Office Department is in direct violation of the Constitution of the United States. Nilan testified before a special Senate subcommittee, headed by Senator GALE MCGEE, Democrat, of Wyoming, on June 18.

Nilan testified, "The Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8(7) states the Congress shall have the power to establish post offices and post roads. It is our belief this grant of authority also gives Congress the specific authority and responsibility to determine major policy matters related to the post office and its operations, specifically in the elimination of post offices, including railway post offices."

Nilan continued, "Certainly if the Post Office Department refuses to recognize this direct Constitutional grant of authority to the Congress it cannot ignore the 'implied powers' granted to Congress to have the control of the elimination of established railway post offices. In our contacts with members of Congress it is our opinion that the Post Office Department has largely ignored this grant of authority to Congress, in making major policy decisions concerned with the elimination of railway post offices."

"In May 1958 when Congress enacted Public Law 85-426, the 85th Congress reiterated its constitutional right determining postal policy. In this instance, the Congress was expressing itself on the general questions of postal rate adjustments and compensation of postal employees. In Section 103(a) of Public Law 85-426 the Congress proclaimed a "declaration of policy" as follows: The Congress hereby emphasizes, reaffirms, and restates its function under the Constitution of the United States of forming policy."

Mr. Nilan attacked the controversial programs which will, in his opinion, result in economic chaos to communities and citizens. He also attacked the Department for failing to consult with Congress as required by the Constitution. He said, "also ignored have

considered as complete until some machinery is established for a continuing analysis of the effect of the tax cut. While certain tax reduction benefits may flow to the consumer for the short term, it is my belief that these prospects will not extend into the next year. There are strong indications that the new models coming into the 1966 model year will consider the advisability of continuing the excise tax reduction and minimize its effect.

It is my sincere hope that your Council will consider the advisability of continuing its inquiry into the next year and also make public the records which supported your report.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES A. VANIK,
Member of Congress.

In addition, I wish to reprint in the RECORD a copy of an editorial which appeared in the Washington Post of August 23, 1965, entitled, "Passing on the Tax Cuts." The last paragraph indicates a thesis which cannot be emphasized too greatly.

The editorial follows:

PASSING ON THE TAX CUTS

According to the second report of the Council of Economic Advisers about three-fourths of the \$1.75-billion reduction in Federal excise taxes is being passed on to consumers through lower retail prices. In accordance with expectations, Government surveys indicate that virtually all dealers lowered their prices on new cars. But elsewhere, compliance with the wishes of the White House was somewhat spotty. In the markets for refrigerators and freezers, 35 percent of the dealers failed to make any price cuts, and the figure for noncomplying dealers in cooking ranges was 45 percent.

It may be that many dealers in household appliances are awaiting manufacturers' new list prices before taking action, but there are good reasons for supposing that price cuts will be small in markets where discounting is widespread. Auto dealers, by virtue of market power, exert a greater control over prices and net profit margins than the more numerous dealers in household appliances. With attractive profit margins and the white heat of publicity, the price of new autos, although not for optional equipment, were uniformly reduced. Resistance is greater in markets where retail margins are slim, but it might well be broken down by the intensification of competition.

Retail dealers cannot, of course, be forced to pass on the excise tax cuts to consumers. But their voluntary compliance may assume greater importance over the next 4 years in which additional excise tax reductions are scheduled. For if an intensification of hostilities in South Vietnam leads to sharp increase in defense spending, compliance in passing on the excise tax cuts will be essential in the effort to check inflation.

Using Economic Power To Halt War

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, on August 19, 1965, columnist David Lawrence in the Washington Evening Star presented a number of cogent arguments on the use of economic power to halt the war in Vietnam.

We must constantly seek ways to prevent increased casualties and shorten the war. One obviously important consideration must be the economic factors for North Vietnam's war effort depends extensively on exports. There seems no doubt that reducing the flow of goods to North Vietnam would help significantly in reducing the Communist war capability.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I submit for inclusion in the RECORD a copy of Mr. Lawrence's article:

USING ECONOMIC POWER TO HALT WAR

(By David Lawrence)

The veterans who have served in three major wars in the last half century are well aware of the hardships of war, yet they are not pacifists. They do not favor the surrender of principle, because they know that wars too often come as the result of appeasement. Mingling with the Veterans of Foreign Wars last Monday at their 66th national convention in Chicago, one was impressed by the support that they give to the American position in the Vietnam war—a fight for a great principle.

This correspondent does not make public speeches, but in accepting an award from the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he addressed the members on the subject of "international cooperation" and particularly cited economic power as a means of helping to end the war in Vietnam. Here is an excerpt explaining this very point:

"Perhaps the least used power to prevent war is economic power. Prior to World War II, attempts were made to put an economic embargo on trade with certain countries, but the Western allies did not cooperate with each other. Today every nation goes its own way seeking trade in pursuit of the dollar or the pound or the peso or the franc, as the case may be. This is not international cooperation. It is international anarchy.

"If the United States has a just cause, then why should not the other nations of the world support it? And if the only way to bring another nation to terms is to impose an economic embargo so that its trade will be disrupted and it will not receive economic aid from outside, then why should not those who say they are sympathetic with our cause maintain their alliance with us and actually cooperate on economic embargoes?

"We need to convince other nations—the free peoples who think as we do—that the cause for which we are fighting is just as important to them as it is to us. But certainly it is disheartening for the United States to be sacrificing the lives of its own boys while the allied countries, whose interests are so often aided by us, adopt a course which amounts to helping our enemies.

"We approve the idea of international discussion in any forum, including that provided by the United Nations. But it is more important that the major nations of the world shall take collective action as provided in the U.N. Charter itself. It does not always have to be military action, but it certainly requires economic cooperation.

"But while more than 150,000 Americans are fighting or are about to fight in Vietnam, we have not declared formally 'a state of war.' If we did, then, under the international law, other nations would be required to respect our request that no economic aid be given to North Vietnam—our enemy in the battle—and its co-belligerent, Red China. International law is firm on that point. It is not considered legal to trade with any belligerent power without subjecting such trade to seizure through the interposition of military and naval force. International law does not uphold the right of any country to

ship contraband goods to a belligerent power.

"The people of the allied countries do not seem much concerned. Yet, we have sacrificed the lives of our own young men to preserve freedom in these same nations, too. Today we are risking the lives of tens of thousands of Americans in Vietnam, and it is essential that our friends in the allied governments take a firm stand along with us and refrain from trading with the enemy."

One objection being raised to the declaration of "a state of war" is that hostilities would be expected against Red China. But this is not necessarily so, as an embargo on arms shipments can be imposed around a country which is the scene of a war without involving any use of force outside the area except to seize or turn back shipments of arms and military supplies.

Speaking of the human sacrifices involved in war, Vice President HUMPHREY, at the opening session of the VFW convention on Monday, made the following statement, which had had little, if any, public attention throughout the country:

"The South Vietnamese Army since 1961 has suffered 25,000 dead and 51,000 wounded—greater losses, in proportion to population, than we suffered in all of World War II; 10 times our losses in the Korean war.

"The South Vietnamese people, last year alone, lost 436 local officials to assassination, lost another 1,100 officials to kidnaping and an unknown fate, lost 11,000 civilians to murder, kidnaping, and forced labor—but, in face of intimidation, turned out to vote in recent elections in far higher percentages than we usually reach in our own American elections."

Voice for Cities

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, with final action expected soon in the Congress on legislation establishing a Cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban Development, I call the attention of House Members to an editorial published August 13 in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette:

[From the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
Aug. 13, 1965]

VOICE FOR CITIES

City dwellers are about to attain in the Federal Government the kind of special representation that rural residents have enjoyed for 103 years. It was in 1862 that Congress created the Department of Agriculture; in 1889 the departmental head became the Secretary of Agriculture and a member of the President's Cabinet.

This week the Senate, following the lead of the House, approved a bill to set up a new Department of Housing and Urban Development. Though the bill would create no new Federal programs, it would bring the new governmental emphasis to bear on urban problems by consolidating within one department various programs, such as housing and mass transit aid, now scattered through the Federal establishment. The new Department would propose policies dealing with the development of metropolitan areas and offer technical assistance to States, cities and counties.

Because of a Senate amendment designed to preserve the status and functions of the

Federal Housing Administration as an agency within the new Department, a conference committee will probably have to resolve Senate-House differences before the legislation can finally be approved. Within a short time, however, President Johnson is expected to have an 11th Cabinet member whose Department would, in his words, provide "a focal point for thought and innovation and imagination about the problems of our cities." This change in the Government will represent a welcome recognition of the changing character of American society.



Hanoi's Version of U.S. Protests

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, the right to dissent and protest is a fundamental guarantee of our democracy. It is a right which must be cherished and safeguarded, but it is also a right which must be exercised responsibly.

One of the consequences of irresponsible protest, and certainly some of the Vietnam demonstrations, though certainly not all, fall in this category, is well illustrated in the interpretation given by the North Vietnamese radio and press. The Washington Post on August 19 reprinted one example of how some of the recent demonstrations have been construed by North Vietnam and I include this article for our colleagues' information and attention:

HANOI'S VERSION OF U.S. PROTESTS

(NOTE.—Reprinted below is an account of events in the United States printed in Nhan Da of Hanoi and broadcast over Hanoi VNA. Much importance must be attached to such reports because the North Vietnam government and the National Liberation Front are confident that American opinion will force a reversal of policy and compel withdrawal from South Vietnam.)

Hundreds of American youths have prevented a ship from carrying weapons to South Vietnam. Hundreds of American women demonstrated with mourning arms. Scores of American youths have fasted to protest against the U.S. ruling circles. Many broke into Johnson's residence demanding that the U.S. President end the aggressive war in Vietnam.

Such acts, as well as the participation of hundreds of thousands of American students and youths in the teach-in held in U.S. universities to protest the U.S. Government's policy in Vietnam, prove that many American youths and people have realized the serious situation imposed on them by the aggressive war in Vietnam.

They have also realized that such a situation requires them to struggle for self-defense and to safeguard justice, freedom, and defend the honor of the United States.

That the U.S. authorities have been intensifying and expanding the war in defiance of the American people's genuine aspirations for peace has aroused a strong wave of protest among the latter. Demonstrations broke out one after another against the reactionary and warlike policy of the U.S. authorities.

On July 29, immediately after U.S. President Johnson made public the U.S. Government's decision to dispatch additional U.S. troops to South Vietnam, 400 American peo-

ple, who ranged in age from carriage-borne infants to gray-haired matrons, staged a stirring demonstration in New York to protest against the criminal decision of the U.S. Government.

Many American youths burned their draft cards in front of recruiting booths.

On July 31, numerous American youths in the same city again demonstrated before the recruiting booth to protest against Johnson's decision of an additional troop dispatch to South Vietnam.

On August 5, hundreds of youths in Berkeley, Calif., demonstrated at the Santa Fe railway station, holding placards urging an end to the piratical war. When a train carrying U.S. troops to South Vietnam moved by, the demonstrators put a placard across the rail reading "Stop the war machine."

On August 6, more than 3,000 Americans in Berkeley again held a stirring demonstration in strong protest against Johnson. The demonstrators carried with them streamers bearing slogans in protest against the aggressive war in Vietnam and sat down on the rails to prevent a train from carrying U.S. troops to South Vietnam. On the night of the same day, more than 100 American people staged another demonstration at a B-52 base in Ohio in protest against the Johnson government. Also on August 6 many other demonstrations broke out in Washington and other places involving American students, youth, and other people to protest against the Johnson administration's acts of war intensification in Vietnam.

The repeated demonstrations which broke out in the past few days in the United States just after U.S. President Johnson announced the decision to send another 50,000 U.S. troops to South Vietnam pointed to the high indignation and the spirit of resolute struggle of the American people in face of the U.S. imperialist's criminal acts. The U.S. ruling circles are seeking ways to repress the American people's struggle. They sent U.S. police to savagely suppress the demonstrators. They have also enacted a draft law imposing imprisonment and fines on those youths who refuse to join the Army. Resorting to such fascist measures, the U.S. ruling circles have shown their fright in the face of the protest movement which is rising in the United States against the aggressive war. But certainly they cannot prevent that movement from developing in the present world situation, any aggressive war will lead to a protest movement in the imperialist country which launches the war.

To defend their sons, brothers, and husbands and the peaceful life of their families, the American people cannot but resolutely struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggressors and warmongers, who are driving the American youth to die for their dirty purpose and sowing mournings among the American people.

Situation of Hungarians in Rumania

SPEECH

OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 18, 1965

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson many times has expressed this country's determination to continue the battle for freedom of the South Vietnamese. And his words have been carried around the world. But we hear little about this administration's intentions regarding the captive peoples of Eastern Europe who equally are vic-

tims of Communist oppression. I have in mind, particularly, the oppression of the human rights of the Hungarian and Saxon minorities in Rumania.

Mr. Speaker, I have introduced a resolution (H. Res. 459) condemning as the sense of the House of Representatives this discrimination. So far, no hearings have been scheduled and the session now is drawing to a close.

I submit this is no partisan issue. We have shown our hand in Vietnam. The whole world knows where we stand, or should know. Yet we give every appearance of having acquiesced in the enslavement of the captive peoples of Communist Europe.

The fact there is no actual combat there does not absolve us from clearly and forthrightly reminding the world that Communist imperialism has its tentacles in many parts of the globe. Let us make certain that this Congress does not adjourn without favorable action on this resolution to condemn the Communist oppression of minorities in Rumania and to urge the President to make appropriate overtures to the Rumanian Government to help bring relief to these minorities.

National Drum Corps Week

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLARENCE D. LONG

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, the past week has been a time designated for special emphasis on the efforts and accomplishments of the thousands participating in the activities of America's vigorous drum corps. This year's National Drum Corps Week has been a well-deserved tribute to the many outstanding young people and adults who have put so much time, dedication, an energy into these colorful, well-trained units.

It would be difficult to imagine a parade or public event without the spirited pageantry and stirring music which these groups contribute. Yet, few of us have stopped to consider the many hours of practice, private initiative, and organization that have made our enjoyment possible.

Private organizations, such as the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, as well as civic minded citizens and interested parents across the country are donating their time, finances, and enthusiasm to this wholesome activity. Hundreds of thousands of young people are giving many extra-curricular hours to the practice and drill which make precision units possible. It has been estimated that about 3 million people, both young and old, now compete annually in the United States and Canada is the growing number of drum and bugle corps competitions.

As a youth activity, drum corps offer an excellent opportunity for our young people to engage in an exciting and challenging project of action, music, and

August 24, 1965

**The Legislature of the State of Michigan
 Joins Other State Legislatures in Re-
 questing the Congress To Repudiate S.
 1592 and Other Similar Outrageous
 Legislation**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
 OF**

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to permission granted, I insert into the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD House Concurrent Resolution 115 memorializing the Congress of the United States regarding the antifiarms bill, S. 1592, by the Legislature of the State of Michigan, urging the Congress of the United States not to pass S. 1592 or similar legislation.

Thus, another legislature, that of the great State of Michigan, joins legislatures of other States, the Michigan Bar Association, and many other responsible citizens and organizations in opposition to this outrageous legislation, which would deny law-abiding citizens the privilege of purchasing and possessing firearms for legitimate sporting purposes.

The resolution follows:

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION No. 115
 Concurrent resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States regarding the antifiarms bill

Whereas the antifiarms bill currently before the Congress of the United States proposes Federal control of firearms in the hands of civilians, and as currently written, constitutes violation of the second amendment to the United States Constitution that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"; and

Whereas, admittedly, controls are necessary due to irresponsible or criminal elements in society illegally using firearms. That such controls should be the prerogative of State and local agencies of government, that such controls properly should not be a matter for Federal control are acknowledged and forthrightly stated by the Nation's foremost experts in government, including opinions publicly stated by men of the caliber of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover; and

Whereas the consensus of expertise in this field is that State and local laws imposing harsh and certain punishment for crimes committed while armed, combined with effective law enforcement, and firmly supported by no-nonsense courts and juries, provide the most certain combination for adequate control; and

Whereas as to statutes: laws should prohibit sale of firearms to felons, drug addicts, habitual drunkards, juveniles, and mental incompetents; laws should invoke strict penalties against the possession of firearms by criminals and irresponsible persons. Laws should permit responsible, law-abiding adults to own and use firearms for legal purposes; laws should not require law-abiding adult citizens to register shotguns and rifles; and laws should not grant authority to any jurisdiction, police or otherwise, at any government level, to prohibit the purchase or ownership of firearms by law-abiding and responsible citizens; and

Whereas in Michigan, alone, more than one and a half million sportsmen would be adversely affected by legislation proposed and

now before the Congress—a figure that applies substantially to most of the other States of the Union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). That the Michigan Legislature respectfully memorialize the Congress of the United States to defeat the currently proposed anti-fiarms legislation of S. 1592; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted to the President of the United States, to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to each member of the Michigan delegation to the Congress of the United States.

Adopted by the house June 21, 1965.

Adopted by the senate June 23, 1965.

BERYL I. KENYON,
 Secretary of the Senate.
 NORMAN E. PHILLO,

Clerk of the House of Representatives.



Pessimists Disproved

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
 OF**

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following article by Roscoe Drummond from the August 23, 1965, edition of the New York Herald Tribune.

There are growing signs that things are not going well for the Vietcong. Reports have been gathered recently, even from Communist correspondents assigned to North Vietnam, that conditions are worsening. Food shortages are becoming acute, the morale of Vietcong soldiers is declining, and the schedule for the achievement of Communist military objectives has not been met.

These reports serve to disprove those pessimists who bolster their opposition to our action in Vietnam with the claim that we are fighting a losing battle. The Vietcong are beginning to feel the effects of our firm action, and this should be an encouragement to us in our struggle.

The article follows:

**PESSIMISTS DISPROVED: VIETCONG BEGIN TO
 HURT AND EVEN REDS ADMIT IT**
 (By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—The Communist Vietcong are beginning to hurt.

Obviously they are not hurting enough yet to give up. But there are gathering signs all is not going well for the aggressor. Specifically:

1. The Vietcong's timetable of conquest has been arrested in the very period—during the monsoon season—when it was to succeed the most.

2. The Communist troops have been suffering mounting casualties and have been caught off balance in several recent encounters. The latest is their disastrous attempt to crush the U.S. Marines on the Van Tuong Peninsula. The opposite occurred.

3. Morale among the Vietcong soldiers supplied by North Vietnam is showing some raveling.

4. Hanoi's industry, always in a precarious plight, is suffering from shortage of labor and the workers are suffering from shortage of food.

None of this means that the aggression is about to collapse. There is no telling how

much more it will take. But these developments are beginning to disprove the plaintive pessimists who sought to fortify their opposition to the defense of Vietnam with the argument that it couldn't be done, that we were bound to fail, that all would soon be lost.

Not so. The bleakest news from South Vietnam is fully reported—as it should be. The bleakest news from North Vietnam is censored—as is normal under a Communist regime. South Vietnam's predicaments are well known. Hanoi's predicaments are just beginning to be exposed.

Ironically, they are being exposed in the news reports by Communist correspondents who are in North Vietnam covering for Soviet and East European newspapers. They are beginning to write cautiously about the "difficulties" which Hanoi is experiencing in carrying on the war. The Communists do not admit their "difficulties" until they have become so acute and so visible that they can't be ignored.

These dispatches cite "shortage of food," "disrupted production" caused by workers leaving their jobs, "rationing" of rice, sugar, meat, and cotton, a hasty scramble to build "air raid shelters," the employment of "70 percent women" in factories because of the need for male recruits, "sour rice" being fed to the Vietcong troops in South Vietnam, and the lack of medical supplies for the wounded.

Such disclosures are not coming only from word-of-mouth rumors and spotty intelligence. They are coming from Communist correspondents writing for Communist newspapers. They are confirmed by interviews with captured Vietcong.

Food shortages are a perennial problem in North Vietnam, as they are in mainland China and the Soviet Union. They are aggravated by the collectivization of farming, which has brought steadily reduced crops and by the mounting birth rate. In a report based on talks with escaped refugees from North Vietnam, Prof. P. J. Honey of the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, writes:

"One consequence of North Vietnam's rapid economic decline is to be found in the attitude of her people at the present time. Underfed, underpaid, and overworked, they have grown apathetic, and have to devote more and more of their time to remaining alive."

The aggression also remains alive. It may get worse. But it is significant that Hanoi is now having to draft 18- and even 15-year-old youths to keep the war going.

**What Is Behind the Campaign To
 Discredit the Police?**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
 OF**

HON. JAMES D. MARTIN

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, every law-abiding, decent American citizen should be deeply concerned with the bitter campaign that is now being waged across the country to discredit the police departments of our cities and to assail all law enforcement officials. The drive is so widespread and the attack is coming from so many strange sources, it seems to me that Congress and the people should ask, what is behind it?

August 24, 1965

Consider the events of just this past weekend. The leading story in the Communist official organ of the Soviet Union, Pravda, was an article attacking the United States for the riots in Los Angeles with special emphasis on police brutality as the principal cause. This line was echoed throughout the Communist world from Moscow to Peiping.

At the same time our own newspapers were carrying story after story on police brutality. No actual cases were cited, but in article after article, civil rights leaders, some politicians, and social workers were quoted as blaming all our problems on police brutality. Many of the writers of news stories injected their own editorial opinions without quotas, but carrying out the theme of "blame it on the police."

A news story in the Washington Sunday Star of August 22 shows the extent of the antipolice propaganda. I would like to include the article, "Riots Bring Pleas Across United States for Police Brutality Probes," at this point:

RIOTS BRINGS PLEAS ACROSS UNITED STATES FOR POLICE BRUTALITY PROBES

NEW YORK.—The cry of police brutality has resounded across the Nation once again in the wake of riots in the Negro section of Los Angeles.

Coupled with the accusation is a demand for a civilian review board to oversee the activities of the individual policeman, especially in his relations with Negro and other minority groups.

Leading the opposition to civilian review of police is FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who has written:

"It is a practice that could damage effective law enforcement and reduce the orderly processes of community life to petty bickering, suspicion and hatred. The police executive cannot become a mere pawn of bureaucratic committees. He must have full responsibility for the performance, discipline and control of his officers."

CALLED POLICE DETERRENT

Hoover obviously summarizes what many law enforcement officers contend, that police whose conduct is subject to civilian review will be virtually paralyzed in carrying out their duties.

Mississippi Attorney General Joe T. Patterson has called the pressure for civilian review boards "a well-planned, deep-seated conspiracy to undermine public confidence in law enforcement officials."

The Negro point of view is suggested by Mrs. June Smith, president of the Seattle Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which has unsuccessfully fought for a civilian review board. She says:

"There should be some agency outside the police department where the Negro can feel he will get an even break with the white man."

And Prof. Ernest Barth of the University of Washington sociological department told a city council hearing on the proposed Seattle board:

"Police brutality is a widespread problem."

POLICE CHIEFS POLLED

Salt Lake City also dropped the matter of a civilian review board after the city's public safety commissioner polled police chiefs around the country and got a consensus unfavorable to review boards. Race was not a factor in the discussion there, and Mrs. Harriet Brewster of the Utah American Civil Liberties Union, says:

"The police don't want a bunch of civilians telling them what to do, and I can under-

stand this attitude. But our suggestion for a review board is for the purpose of actually aiding them, by making their problems known and alerting the citizenry."

Most police departments review citizens' complaints against their officers. The argument advanced against this is that police superiors are inclined to defend the honor of the department by leaning backward to favor the accused policeman. Exponents of the civilian review board see it as a court of appeals outside the influence of the police department.

Philadelphia is one of the few cities with a civilian review board, known as the police advisory board. Set up in 1958, it has handled more than 500 complaints, making recommendations to the police department but lacking disciplinary authority. In a majority of cases, its nine members have cleared accused policemen and dismissed charges.

There were no sharp rises in complaints after last year's Negro rioting in North Philadelphia. Chief opposition to the board centers within police ranks.

Another city with a civilian review board is Rochester, N.Y., and its establishment in 1963 failed to head off civil rights disturbances that swept the city a year later.

The Rochester board is made up of nine nonsalaried members. They hear complaints and recommend action.

"The board has been good for Rochester, because it has brought better understanding for all people," says Mayor Frank T. Lamb.

However, the executive committee of Rochester Citizens for Abolition of the Police Advisory Board contends:

"The continued existence of this board constitutes an unhealthy restraint upon law enforcement in our community."

Since its founding, the Rochester board has acted upon only a handful of the hundreds of cases investigated by the police department's own internal review agency.

CAPITAL HAS BOARD

Washington, D.C., has had a complaint review board since 1948. It hasn't been very active. Recently, civil liberties groups complained that its procedures were weighted heavily in favor of policemen, and its membership was enlarged from three members to five.

New York City's 25,000-man police force has vigorously resisted extreme pressure by civil rights groups for a civilian review board, especially since the 1964 riots in Harlem and Brooklyn. They followed the slaying of a Negro youth by an off-duty patrolman, who later was exonerated by police superiors and a grand jury of any wrongdoing. He said the youth attacked him with a knife during a disturbance.

Springfield, Mass., currently is in the throes of a dispute over alleged police brutality. It stems from arrests July 17 of 17 Negro men and a white woman outside a night spot. Protest demonstrations led to wide-scale arrests last weekend. Police Chief John Lyons has been ordered by the police commission to investigate the charges of brutality, but there has been no demand for a civilian review board, as such.

Despite weekend riots also in Chicago, there is no civilian review board there and the city's 21-year-old commission on human relations says there has been no pressure for one.

Detroit, scene of a 1943 race riot that claimed 34 lives, has a citizens complaint bureau within the police department to review all cases where a citizen is shot by a police officer. Police Commissioner Ray Girardin and Mayor Jerome Cavanagh claim police relations with the Negro community are good and have rejected pressure for a civilian review board. However, the Reverend James Wadsworth, NAACP branch president in Detroit, disagrees, and declares:

"The Negroes in Detroit feel they are part

of an occupied country. The Negroes have no rights which the police have to respect. It appears that the average patrolman looks upon the Negro as being a criminal type."

St. Louis police have rejected a civilian review board, but carefully check each charge of police brutality.

BOARD IN PITTSBURGH

Pittsburgh has a civilian commission on human relations which investigates and makes recommendations on charges of police brutality, but has no formal power.

The Cincinnati City Council rejected a civil rights demand for a civilian review board about 18 months ago. However, a human relations commission has been set up to hear complaints of police brutality, although it has no power of review.

During the Danville, Va., racial unrest in 1963, the city council turned down proposals for a civilian review board. With the stepped up pace of racial integration there, the issue apparently has subsided.

Negro demands for a civilian review board in Baltimore were met by the establishment recently of a complaint evaluation board, which, however, has only advisory powers in police brutality cases. It is made up of State, city, and police department officials, and has drawn criticism from Negro, civic, and ministers' groups.

Mr. Speaker, typical of the subtle propaganda carried in news stories can be seen in an article by Associated Press writer, Jules Loh, also from the Washington Sunday Star of August 22. I will quote the first three paragraphs of Mr. Loh's article and then, so as not to be accused of quoting out of context I shall include the complete article at the end of these remarks.

The article states:

Six days after the simmering cauldron called Watts finally let go, a National Guard jeep crunched through the broken and burnt souvenirs of ghetto fury which littered the silent streets.

"What's gonna happen when you cats leave?" jeered a Negro from a fire-blackened doorway at the jeep's sullen driver.

What indeed? What does Los Angeles do now to put together its convulsed community after the worst racial eruption in the Nation's recent memory? How does a city official, or civil rights leader, or anybody, reach a youth who raged through the night crying "Burn, baby, burn," and now sits frowning in "the white man's jail"? How does he reach them? And how is his mother—who was widowed by a white policeman's bullet—reached? How can such deep-seated tension and bitterness be put to rest and by whom?

Would not it be sensible to ask this writer, Jules Loh, how he is helping to ease tensions and bitterness by inferring that all Negro widows have lost their husbands by a "white policeman's bullet"? And how is this Loh contributing to better understanding by calling the Los Angeles jail, "a white man's jail"?

Then on Sunday evening on WTOP-TV, channel 9 in Washington, Drew Pearson attacked the chief of police of Los Angeles and predicted that he would be fired.

Mr. Speaker, whether or not this concentrated attack on the police and law enforcement agencies of the United States is coincidental, the fact remains it is doing great harm to this country. Breaking down respect for law and order and for those charged with law enforcement is the first task of any who would destroy a nation.

August 24, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4775

Congress, and be resubmitted promptly for legal ratifications by three-fourths of the State legislatures or State constitutional conventions.



Letters From Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 24, 1965

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following article by Ralph McGill from the August 15, 1965, edition of the New York Herald Tribune.

It is inspiring to read a sample of the letters that the President receives from U.S. servicemen in Vietnam. President Johnson stated recently that he draws strength and comfort from these letters.

Although there is little sophistication in the letters, they are the most simple and direct statements of the reasons for our action in Vietnam. It is heartening to learn that the young men in the front-line of our battle understand the ideals for which we are fighting.

The article follows:

LETTERS FROM VIETNAM

(By Ralph McGill)

President Johnson said in a recent press conference he drew strength and comfort from letters he receives from men serving in Vietnam and from parents who send letters received from their sons.

A sample of letters received by the President adequately illustrates why he would feel emotionally stirred. There is little intellectual sophistication in the letters. They are from young persons trained to be fighting men. The letters are uncomplicated.

A marine, with a rest period on Sunday, May 23, wrote to his President:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I know you have a lot of problems on your mind. I am just writing to say I am behind you all the way. We are lonely for our loved ones back home in the States. But we all know we are here for a good cause. I can assure you of one thing, this is one marine that is proud to be an American. After what I have seen here I know what it is to have freedom. These people here in Vietnam need help and I am proud that you are giving them the help they need. I know some people think we should not be here. I cannot see how they (think we) should not be here. They don't even know what's going on. The Vietnam people are glad we are here and appreciate our being here. I feel I am here for a good cause. These people deserve freedom as much as anyone else. We are doing our best to give them a chance. May God give you the strength to stand up and keep on fighting for freedom. * * *"

Another was sent by the family of a marine who had just received word his regiment was being sent to Vietnam. The letter is as American as a peanut butter and jelly sandwich.

"DEAR ETHEL, BILL, and GRANDMA: I want to thank you for the cookies and candy. It was delicious. I am sorry you were not at home last Sunday night when I called. If I had had the money I would have called again, but I did not.

"We are leaving tomorrow. I cannot tell you how glad I am that the time has finally come. I have looked forward to this as much as a child waits for Christmas. I was afraid that during my 4 years in the Marines I would not have a chance really to do something for my country. It is a good feeling when you know that you can. We will be aboard ship for 14 days. No doubt will pull a day or so of liberty in Japan and then on to Da Nang. They will not tell us for sure, but it is taken for granted.

"I packed one seabag full of my stuff and sent it to Colorado Springs. Could you, please, pick it up for me at the Sante Fe Railway in about 3 weeks and keep it until I return. The paper work is enclosed."

A father in Oklahoma sent the President a letter from his son. The son, expressing his pride in being in Vietnam and engaged in a campaign in which he believed, was disturbed (and angry) about reports of Americans abusing the widows and parents of U.S. servicemen killed in Vietnam and of Americans sending money to the Vietcong. His lengthy letter concluded: "Those of us who are here are proud to be part of this struggle, and we know what we can do and we will win. * * * What we hope for and need is the total support of the American people."

As aforesaid, there is little or no sophistication in these sample letters—or the great number that come each week. But what they do reflect is the instant communication of our time—something missing in all our other wars. A young soldier, sailor or marine, looking at the dead members of his platoon, cannot think rationally about students, parading and shouting against the Government policy in the vocal street demonstration manner of our time. The beatnik type that demonstrated before the White House has his contempt.

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Everett, Robert A., Tenn.-----
Evins, Joe L., Tenn.-----5044 Klinge St.
Fallon, George H., Md.-----
Farbstein, Leonard, N.Y.-----
Farnsley, Charles F., Ky.-----
Farnum, Billie S., Mich.-----
Fascell, Dante B., Fla.-----
Feighan, Michael A., Ohio.-----
Findley, Paul, Ill.-----
Fino, Paul A., N.Y.-----
Fisher, O. C., Tex.-----Calvert-Woodley
Flood, Daniel J., Pa.-----The Congressional
Flynt, John J., Jr., Ga.-----
Fogarty, John E., R.I.-----1235 New House
Office Building
Foley, Thomas S., Wash.-----
Ford, Gerald R., Mich.-----514 Crown View
Dr., Alexandria,
Va.
Ford, William D., Mich.-----
Fountain, L. H., N.C.-----The Westchester
Fraser, Donald M., Minn.-----
Frelinghuysen, Peter H. B., 3014 N St.
N.J.
Friedel, Samuel N., Md.-----
Fulton, James G., Pa.-----
Fulton, Richard, Tenn.-----
Fuqua, Don, Fla.-----
Gallagher, Cornelius E.,
N.J.
Garmatz, Edward A., Md.-----
Gathings, E. C., Ark.-----
Gettys, Tom S., S.C.-----
Gialmo, Robert N., Conn.-----
Gibbons, Sam, Fla.-----
Gilbert, Jacob H., N.Y.-----
Gilligan, John J., Ohio.-----
Gonzalez, Henry B., Tex.-----200 C St. SE.
Goodell, Charles E., N.Y.-----3842 Macomb St.
Grabowski, Bernard F.,
Conn.
Gray, Kenneth J., Ill.-----
Green, Edith (Mrs.), Oreg.-----
Green, William J., Pa.-----
Gregg, Stanley L., Iowa.-----301 G St. SW.
Grider, George W., Tenn.-----119 7th St. SE.
Griffin, Robert P., Mich.-----
Griffiths, Martha W.
(Mrs.), Mich.
Gross, H. R., Iowa.-----
Grover, James R., Jr., N.Y.-----
Gubser, Charles S., Calif.-----
Gurney, Edward J., Fla.-----
Hagan, G. Elliott, Ga.-----
Hagen, Harlan, Calif.-----
Haley, James A., Fla.-----
Hall, Durward G., Mo.-----
Halleck, Charles A., Ind.-----4926 Upton St.
Halpern, Seymour, N.Y.-----
Hamilton, Lee H., Ind.-----
Hanley, James M., N.Y.-----
Hanna, Richard T., Calif.-----
Hansen, George, Idaho.-----
Hansen, John R., Iowa.-----800 4th St. SW.,
Apt. S-701
Hansen, Julia Butler
(Mrs.), Wash.-----
Hardy, Porter, Jr., Va.-----
Harris, Oren, Ark.-----1627 Myrtle St.
Harsha, William H., Ohio.-----
Harvey, James, Mich.-----
Harvey, Ralph, Ind.-----
Hathaway, William D.,
Maine.
Hawkins, Augustus F.,
Calif.
Hays, Wayne L., Ohio.-----3424 Barger Dr.,
Falls Church, Va.
Hébert, F. Edward, La.-----26 Cockrell St.,
Alexandria, Va.
Hechler, Ken, W. Va.-----
Helstoski, Henry, N.J.-----
Henderson, David N., N.C.-----
Herlong, A. S., Jr., Fla.-----
Hicks, Floyd V., Wash.-----
Hollfield, Chet, Calif.-----
Holland, Elmer J., Pa.-----
Horton, Frank J., N.Y.-----
Hosmer, Craig, Calif.-----
Howard, James J., N.J.-----
Hull, W. R., Jr., Mo.-----
Hungate, William L., Mo.-----
Huot, J. Olivia, N.H.-----
Hutchinson, Edward, Mich.-----
Ichord, Richard (Dick),
Mo.
Irwin, Donald J., Conn.-----
Jacobs, Andrew, Jr., Ind.-----
Janman, John, Okla.-----
Jennings, W. Pat, Va.-----
Joelson, Charles S., N.J.-----
Johnson, Albert W., Pa.-----
Johnson, Harold T., Calif.-----
Johnson, Jed, Jr., Okla.-----
Jonas, Charles Kaper, N.C.-----
Jones, Paul C., Mo.-----1111 Army-Navy
Dr., Arlington,
Va.
Jones, Robert E., Ala.-----
Karsten, Frank M., Mo.-----
Karth, Joseph E., Minn.-----
Kastenmeier, Robert W.,
Wis.
Kee, James, W. Va.-----5441 16th Ave.,
Hyattsville, Md.
Keith, Hastings, Mass.-----5906 Harwick Rd.,
Kelly, Edna F. (Mrs.), N.Y.-----
Keogh, Eugene J., N.Y.-----The Mayflower
King, Carleton J., N.Y.-----
King, Cecil E., Calif.-----
King, David S., Utah.-----
Kirwan, Michael J., Ohio.-----
Kluczynski, John C., Ill.-----
Kornegay, Horace R., N.C.-----
Krebs, Paul J., N.J.-----
Kunkel, John C., Pa.-----
Laird, Melvin R., Wis.-----
Landrum, Phil M., Ga.-----
Langen, Odin, Minn.-----
Latta, Delbert L., Ohio.-----
Leggett, Robert L., Calif.-----
Lennon, Alton, N.C.-----
Lindsay, John V., N.Y.-----