

August 25, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I shall yield. But first, Mr. President, I thank my able colleague, also a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished senior Senator from Kansas. Knowing him, I am not surprised at his statement. I am grateful for what he said.

I am glad to yield to the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I join my distinguished colleagues in the remarks they have made about the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I, too, hope that he does not intend to give serious consideration—or any consideration—to the possibility of resigning as chairman of the committee which he now heads. He is the one Senator who is present at every meeting. He must undertake onerous responsibilities, but he faces up to them with independence, with vigor, and with knowledge.

I came to the Congress 23 years ago with BILL FULBRIGHT. I have watched him in those years with admiration and respect. I have also noted that in the press on occasion he takes unmerciful beatings because he has the temerity to express his independent thoughts on issues of great importance to the country. I point out that a Senator has a responsibility, and a chairman of a committee has a little added responsibility.

What Senator FULBRIGHT has done has always been in the best interests of the country, and what Senator FULBRIGHT has done in conducting the affairs of the committee has been fair and impartial to all concerned.

I believe he is one of the great chairmen of that committee in the history of the Republic.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the distinguished majority leader. In that he is also a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, what he says in this connection is of special significance.

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, at the suggestion of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE ADMINISTRATION CASE FOR THE VIETNAM COMMITMENT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the administration has assembled as persuasive a document on why we are in Vietnam and why we are staying there as I have seen. It contains concise statements by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary McNamara.

It also contains the letters from President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, which constitute the basis for our national promise to Vietnam to assist.

Since these documents are all relatively brief I ask unanimous consent that the monograph entitled "Why Vietnam?" be printed in full at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the monograph was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHY VIETNAM?

FOREWORD

MY FELLOW AMERICANS: Once again in man's age-old struggle for a better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people are being put to the test. This is the meaning of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.

In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people seek understanding and that our leaders speak with candor.

I have therefore directed that this report to the American people be compiled and widely distributed. In its pages you will find statements on Vietnam by three leaders of your Government—by your President, your Secretary of State, and your Secretary of Defense.

These statements were prepared for different audiences, and they reflect the differing responsibilities of each speaker. The congressional testimony has been edited to avoid undue repetition and to incorporate the sense of the discussions that ensued.

Together, they construct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict: the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all free men, the fullness and limits of our national objectives in a war we did not seek, the constant effort on our part to bring this war we do not desire to a quick and honorable end.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

AUGUST 20, 1965.

THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT

In the historic documents that follow, two American Presidents define and affirm the commitment of the United States to the people of South Vietnam.

In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1960, President Eisenhower describes the issues at stake and pledges United States assistance to South Vietnam's resistance to subversion and aggression.

And in December 1961 President Kennedy reaffirms that pledge.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, APRIL 4, 1954

(From Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change, 1953-56," New York, 1963)

DEAR WINSTON: I am sure * * * you are following with the deepest interest and anxiety the daily reports of the gallant fight being put up by the French at Dien Bien Phu. Today, the situation there does not seem hopeless.

But regardless of the outcome of this particular battle, I fear that the French cannot alone see the thing through, this despite the very substantial assistance in money and materiel that we are giving them. It is no solution simply to urge the French to intensify their efforts. And if they do not see it through and Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists the ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratios throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me. * * * This has led us to the hard conclusion that the situation in southeast Asia requires us urgently to take serious and far-reaching decisions.

Geneva is less than 4 weeks away. There the possibility of the Communists driving a wedge between us will, given the state of mind in France, be infinitely greater than

at Berlin. I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for 8 years. But our painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the conclusion that there is no negotiated solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would not be either a face-saving device to cover a French surrender of a face-saving device to cover a Communist retirement. The first alternative is too serious in its broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable. * * *

Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative. The preliminary lines of our thinking were sketched out by Foster [Dulles] in his speech last Monday night when he said that under the conditions of today the imposition on southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communists ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community, and that in our view this possibility should now be met by united action and not passively accepted. * * *

I believe that the best way to put teeth in this concept and to bring greater moral and material resources to the support of the French effort is through the establishment of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have a vital concern in the checking of Communist expansion in the area. I have in mind, in addition to our two countries, France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. The U.S. Government would expect to play its full part in such a coalition. * * *

The important thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to join the fight if necessary. I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part. * * *

If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson? * * *

With warm regard,

IKE.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT DIEM, OCTOBER 1, 1954

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of

resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT DIEM, OCTOBER 26, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My countrymen and I are proud to convey our good wishes to you and to the citizens of Vietnam on the fifth anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Vietnam.

We have watched the courage and daring with which you and the Vietnamese people attained independence in a situation so perilous that many thought it hopeless. We have admired the rapidity with which chaos yielded to order and progress replaced despair.

During the years of your independence it has been refreshing for us to observe how clearly the Government and the citizens of Vietnam have faced the fact that the greatest danger to their independence was communism. You and your countrymen have used your strength well in accepting the double challenge of building your country and resisting Communist imperialism. In 5 short years since the founding of the Republic, the Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector. I was particularly impressed by one example. I am informed that last year over 1,200,000 Vietnamese children were able to go to elementary school; three times as many as were enrolled 5 years earlier. This is certainly a heartening development for Vietnam's future. At the same time Vietnam's ability to defend itself from the Communists has grown immeasurably since its successful struggle to become an independent republic.

Vietnam's very success as well as its potential wealth and its strategic location have led the Communists of Hanoi, goaded by the bitterness of their failure to enslave all Vietnam, to use increasing violence in their attempts to destroy your country's freedom.

This grave threat, added to the strains and fatigues of the long struggle to achieve and strengthen independence, must be a burden that would cause moments of tension and concern in almost any human heart. Yet from long observation I sense how deeply the Vietnamese value their country's independence and strength and I know how well you used your boldness when you led your countrymen in winning it. I also know that your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independence while steadily advancing the economic development of your country. I am confident that these same qualities of determination and boldness will meet the renewed threat as well as the needs and desires of your countrymen for further progress on all fronts.

Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRESIDENT DIEM, DECEMBER 14, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your recent letter in which you described so

cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Vietnam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnaping, and wanton violence became clear.

Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva accords designed to insure peace in Vietnam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

The United States, like the Republic of Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR

(Press conference statement by the President, the White House, July 28, 1965)

Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something I don't understand. Why?"

I have tried to answer that question a dozen times and more in practically every State in this Union. I discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and golden with promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one. But it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety, and weakness does not bring peace.

The nature of the war

It is this lesson that has brought us to Vietnam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own gov-

ernment. But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

The stakes in Vietnam

And there are great stakes in the balance. Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of Asian communism. Our power, therefore, is a vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection. In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened. And an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict.

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend the small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Vietnam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We cannot now dishonor our word or abandon our commitment or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam.

Increased effort to halt aggression

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First: We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces, their attacks, and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time, to 35,000 per month, and stepping up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration. And I will give the country adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that they will take to substantially increase their own effort—both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with the appro-

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private congressional committees our plan in these areas. I have asked them to be available to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of his new cost until a supplemental measure is ready and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January.

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present Defense appropriations bill now to transfer funds, in addition to the additional money that we will request.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement. We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can foresee. Nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power.

But we will not surrender. And we will not retreat.

For behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources of all of the American Nation.

Toward a peaceful solution

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable. We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly, and many times, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions, with the help of 40 nations throughout the world. But there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposal. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected. For we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

The United Nations

In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask for, the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials—or any one of its 114 members—can, by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago.

Free choice for Vietnam

We do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision. And they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those

agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action.

As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life—to feed the hungry, to tend the sick—teach the young, shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to find a job.

Progress in human welfare

It is an ancient, but still terrible, irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are united in the simple elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction, not as the price of peace—for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost—but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

The difficulty of decision

Let me also add a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, in a hundred towns, in every State in this Union—working and laughing, building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

A nation which builds

There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. Education was something you had to fight for. And water was life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people. Now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.

As I have said before, that is what I have lived for. That is what I have wanted all my life. And I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of war. I am going to do all I can to see that that never happens.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—all swept away on the flood of conquest.

So this too shall not happen; we will stand in Vietnam.

THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY

(Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 3, 1965)

As the President has said, "there are great stakes in the balance" in Vietnam today.

Let us be clear about those stakes. With its archipelagos, southeast Asia contains rich natural resources and some 200 million people. Geographically, it has great strategic importance—it dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side, and Australia and New Zealand on the other.

The loss of southeast Asia to the Communists would constitute a serious shift in the balance of power against the interests of the free world. And the loss of South Vietnam would make the defense of the rest of southeast Asia much more costly and difficult. That is why the SEATO Council has said that the defeat of the aggression against South Vietnam is "essential" to the security of southeast Asia.

But much more is at stake than preserving the independence of the peoples of southeast Asia and preventing the vast resources of that area from being swallowed by those hostile to freedom.

The test

The war in Vietnam is a test of a technique of aggression: what the Communists, in their upside-down language, call wars of national liberation. They use the term to describe any effort by Communists, short of large-scale war, to destroy by force any non-Communist government. Thus the leaders of the Communist terrorists in such an independent democracy as Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation." And a recent editorial in Pravda said that "the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist Parties."

Communist leaders know, as the rest of the world knows, that thermonuclear war would be ruinous. They know that large-scale invasions, such as that launched in Korea 15 years ago, would bring great risks and heavy penalties. So, they have resorted to semi-concealed aggression through the infiltration of arms and trained military personnel across national frontiers. And the Asian Communists themselves regard the war in Vietnam as a critical test of that technique. Recently General Giap, leader of North Vietnam's army, said:

"If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world."

In southeast Asia, the Communists already have publicly designated Thailand as the next target. And if the aggression against South Vietnam were permitted to succeed, the forces of militant communism everywhere would be vastly heartened and we could expect to see a series of so-called wars of liberation in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

International law does not restrict internal revolution. But it does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in sending arms and men to bring about insurrection. What North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam flouts not only the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 but general international law.

The assault on the Republic of Vietnam is, beyond question, an aggression. It was organized and has been directed by North Vietnam, with the backing of Communist China. The cadres of guerrilla fighters, saboteurs, and assassins who form the backbone of the Vietcong were specially trained in the North. Initially, many of them were men of South Vietnamese birth who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French and gone North in their military units after Vietnam was divided in 1954. But that reservoir was gradually exhausted. During 1964 and since, most of the military men infiltrated from the North have been natives of North Vietnam. And near the end of last year they began to include complete units of the regular North Vietnamese army. In addition to trained men and political and military direction, the North has supplied arms and ammunition in increasing quantities—in considerable part of Chinese manufacture.

Between 1959 and the end of 1964, 40,000 trained military personnel came down from

the North into South Vietnam, by conservative estimate. More have come this year. Had all these crossed the line at once—as the North Koreans did in invading South Korea 15 years ago—nobody in the free world could have doubted that the assault on Vietnam was an aggression. That was the dividing line between North and South Vietnam was intended to be temporary does not make the attack any less of an aggression. The dividing line in Korea also was intended to be temporary.

If there is ever to be peace in this world, aggression must cease. We as a Nation are committed to peace and the rule of law. We recognize also the harsh reality that our security is involved.

We are committed to oppose aggression not only through the United Nations Charter but through many defensive alliances. We have 42 allies, not counting the Republic of Vietnam. And many other nations know that their security depends upon us. Our power and our readiness to use it to assist others to resist aggression, the integrity of our commitment, these are the bulwarks of peace in the world.

If we were to fail in Vietnam, serious consequences would ensue. Our adversaries would be encouraged to take greater risks elsewhere. At the same time, the confidence which our allies and other free nations now have in our commitments would be seriously impaired.

The commitment

Let us be clear about our commitment in Vietnam.

It began with the Southeast Asia Treaty, which was negotiated and signed after the Geneva agreements and the cease-fire in Indochina in 1954 and was approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 82 to 1 in February 1955. That treaty protects against Communist aggression not only its members but any of the three non-Communist states growing out of former French Indochina which asks for protection.

Late in 1954 President Eisenhower, with bipartisan support, decided to extend aid to South Vietnam, both economic aid and aid in training its armed forces. His purpose, as he said, was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Vietnam became a republic in 1955, was recognized as an independent nation by 36 nations initially, and is so recognized by more than 50 today.

Beginning in 1955, the Congress has each year approved overall economic and military assistance programs in which the continuation of major aid to South Vietnam has been specifically considered.

During the next 5 years, South Vietnam made remarkable economic and social progress—what some observers described as a "miracle."

Nearly a million refugees from the north were settled. These were the stouthearted people of whom the late Dr. Tom Dooley wrote so eloquently in his first book, "Deliver Us From Evil," and who led him to devote the rest of his all-too-brief life to helping the people of Vietnam and Laos.

A land-reform program was launched. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of new schools and more than 3,600 village health stations were built. Rail transportation was restored and roads were repaired and improved. South Vietnam not only fed itself but resumed rice exports. Production of rubber and sugar rose sharply. New industries were started. Per capita income rose by 20 percent.

By contrast, North Vietnam suffered a drop of 10 percent in food production and disappointments in industrial production.

In 1954, Hanoi almost certainly had expected to take over South Vietnam within a

few years. But by 1959 its hopes had withered and the south was far outstripping the heralded "Communist paradise." These almost certainly were the factors which led Hanoi to organize and launch the assault on the south.

I beg leave to quote from a statement I made at a press conference on May 4, 1961:

"Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units of the Government of Vietnam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Vietnam have increased to levels unprecedented since the Geneva agreements of 1954. During this period the organized armed strength of the Vietcong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Vietnam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area.

"During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnaped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against public works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers.

"This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of North Vietnam which called for the reunification of Vietnam by all 'appropriate means.' In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the liberation of South Vietnam. In retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining significant economic recovery in the 5 years between 1954 and 1959.

"Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of North Vietnam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a resolution which declared that the Vietnamese revolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the south from the 'rule of U.S. Imperialists and their henchmen.' This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam."

Next door to South Vietnam, Laos was threatened by a similar Communist assault. The active agent of attack on both was Communist North Vietnam, with the backing of Peiping and Moscow. In the case of Laos, we were able to negotiate an agreement in 1962 that it should be neutral and that all foreign military personnel should be withdrawn. We complied with that agreement. But North Vietnam never did. In gross violation of its pledge, it left armed units in Laos and continued to use Laos as a corridor to infiltrate arms and trained men into South Vietnam.

There was no new agreement, even on paper, on Vietnam. Late in 1961, President Kennedy therefore increased our assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. During that year, the infiltration of arms and military personnel from the north continued to increase. To cope with that escalation, President Kennedy decided to send more American military personnel—to assist with logistics and transportation and communications as well as with training and as advisers to South Vietnamese forces in the field. Likewise, we expanded our economic assistance

and technical advice, particularly with a view to improving living conditions in the villages.

During 1962 and 1963, Hanoi continued to increase its assistance to the Vietcong. In response, President Kennedy and later President Johnson increased our aid.

Hanoi kept on escalating the war throughout 1964. And the Vietcong intensified its drafting and training of men in the areas it controls.

Last August, you will recall, North Vietnamese forces attacked American destroyers in international waters. That attack was met by appropriate air response against North Vietnamese naval installations. And Congress, by a combined vote of 504 to 2, passed a resolution expressing its support for actions by the Executive "including the use of armed force" to meet aggression in southeast Asia, including specifically aggression against South Vietnam. The resolution and the congressional debate specifically envisaged that, subject to continuing congressional consultation, the Armed Forces of the United States might be committed in the defense of South Vietnam in any way that seemed necessary, including employment in combat.

In summary, our commitment in Vietnam has been set forth in the Southeast Asia Treaty, which was almost unanimously approved by the U.S. Senate; the pledges made with bipartisan support by three successive Presidents of the United States; the assistance programs approved annually, beginning in 1955, by bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress; the declarations which we joined our SEATO and ANZUS allies in making at their Ministerial Council Meetings in 1964 and 1965; the joint congressional resolution of August 1964, which was approved by a combined vote of 504 to 2.

Our commitment is to assist the Government and people of South Vietnam to repel this aggression, thus preserving their freedom. This commitment is to the South Vietnamese as a nation and people. It has continued through various changes of government, just as our commitments to our NATO allies remain unaltered by changes in government.

Continued escalation of the aggression by the other side has required continued strengthening of the military defenses of South Vietnam. Whether still more American military personnel will be needed will depend on events, especially on whether the other side continues to escalate the aggression. As the President has made plain, we will provide the South Vietnamese with whatever assistance may be necessary to ensure that the aggression against them is effectively repelled—that is, to make good on our commitment.

The pursuit of a peaceful settlement

As President Johnson and his predecessors have repeatedly emphasized, our objective in southeast Asia is peace—a peace in which the various peoples of the area can manage their own affairs in their own ways and address themselves to economic and social progress.

We seek no bases or special position for the United States. We do not seek to destroy or overturn the Communist regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. We ask only that they cease their aggressions, that they leave their neighbors alone.

Repeatedly, we and others have sought to achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam.

We have had many talks with the Soviet authorities over a period of more than 4 years. But their influence in Hanoi appears to be limited. Recently, when approached, their response has been, in substance: You have come to the wrong address—nobody has authorized us to negotiate. Talk to Hanoi.

We have had a long series of talks with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw. Although Peiping is more cautious in action than in

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word, it is unbending in its hostility to us and plainly opposed to any negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

There have been repeated contacts with Hanoi. Many channels are open. And many have volunteered to use them. But so far there has been no indication that Hanoi is seriously interested in peace on any terms except those which would assure a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

We and others have sought to open the way for conferences on the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia, where progress toward peace might be reflected in Vietnam. These approaches have been blocked by Hanoi and Peiping.

The United Kingdom, as cochairman of the Geneva conferences, has repeatedly sought a path to a settlement—first by working toward a new Geneva Conference, then by a visit by a senior British statesman. Both efforts were blocked by the Communists—and neither Hanoi nor Peiping would even receive the senior British statesman.

In April, President Johnson offered unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping called this offer a "hoax."

Seventeen nonaligned nations appealed for a peaceful solution, by negotiations without preconditions. We accepted the proposal. Hanoi and Red China rejected it with scorn calling some of its authors "monsters and freaks."

The President of India made a constructive proposal for an end to hostilities and an Afro-Asian patrol force. We welcomed this proposal with interest and hope. Hanoi and Peiping rejected it as a betrayal.

In May, the United States and South Vietnam suspended air attacks on North Vietnam. This action was made known to the other side to see if there would be a response in kind. But Hanoi denounced the pause as "a wornout trick" and Peiping denounced it as a "swindle." Some say the pause was not long enough. But we knew the negative reaction from the other side before we resumed. And we had paused previously for more than 4 years while thousands of armed men invaded the south and killed thousands of South Vietnamese, including women and children, and deliberately destroyed schoolhouses and playgrounds and hospitals and health centers and other facilities that the South Vietnamese had built to improve their lives and give their children a chance for a better education and better health.

In late June, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers established a mission of four of their members to explore with all parties concerned the possibilities for a conference leading to a just and lasting peace. Hanoi and Peiping made it plain that they would not receive the mission.

Mr. Harold Davies, a member of the British Parliament, went to Hanoi with the approval of Prime Minister Wilson. But the high officials there would not even talk with him. And the lower-ranking officials who did talk with him made it clear that Hanoi was not yet interested in negotiations, that it was intent on a total victory in South Vietnam. As Prime Minister Wilson reported to the House of Commons, Mr. Davies met with a conviction among the North Vietnamese that their prospects of victory were too imminent for them to forsake the battlefield for the conference table.

We and others have made repeated efforts at discussions through the United Nations. In the Security Council, after the August attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, we supported a Soviet proposal that the Government of North Vietnam be invited to come to the Security Council. But Hanoi refused.

In April, Secretary General U Thant considered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to explore the possibilities of peace. But both those Communist regimes made it plain that

they did not regard the United Nations as competent to deal with that matter.

The President's San Francisco speech in June requested help from the United Nations' membership at large in getting peace talks started.

In late July the President sent our new Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, to New York with a letter to Secretary General U Thant requesting that all the resources, energy and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. The Secretary General has already accepted this assignment.

We sent a letter to the Security Council calling attention to the special responsibility in this regard of the Security Council and of the nations which happen to be members of the Council. We have considered from time to time placing the matter formally before the Security Council. But we have been advised by many nations—and by many individuals—who are trying to help to achieve a peaceful settlement that to force debate and a vote in the Security Council might tend to harden positions and make useful explorations and discussions even more difficult.

President Johnson has publicly invited any and all members of the United Nations to do all they can to bring about a peaceful settlement.

By these moves the United States has intended to engage the serious attention and efforts of the United Nations as an institution, and its members as signatories of its charter, in getting the Communists to talk rather than fight—while continuing with determination an increasing effort to demonstrate that Hanoi and the Vietcong cannot settle the issue on the battlefield.

We have not only placed the Vietnam issue before the United Nations, but believe that we have done so in the most constructive ways.

The conditions for peace

What are the essential conditions for peace in South Vietnam?

In late June, the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam set forth the fundamental principles of a "just and enduring peace." In summary, those principles are:

An end to aggression and subversion.
Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources."

As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Vietnam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam.

And effective guarantees for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam.

We endorse those principles. In essence, they would constitute a return to the basic purpose of the Geneva accords of 1954. Whether they require reaffirmation of those accords or new agreements embodying these essential points, but with provision in either case for more effective international machinery and guarantees, could be determined in discussions and negotiations.

Once the basic points set forth by South Vietnam's Foreign Minister were achieved, future relations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam could be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification.

When the aggression has ceased and the freedom of South Vietnam is assured by other means, we will withdraw our forces. Three Presidents of the United States have said many times that we want no permanent bases and no special position there. Our military

forces are there because of the North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam and for no other reason. When the men and arms infiltrated by the North are withdrawn and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance of the war in the South, whatever remains in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter for the South Vietnamese themselves. As for South Vietnamese fighting in the Vietcong or under its control or influence, they must in time be integrated into their national society. But that is a process which must be brought about by the people of South Vietnam, not by foreign diplomats.

Apart from the search for a solution in Vietnam itself, the U.S. Government has hoped that discussions could be held on the problems concerning Cambodia and Laos. We supported the proposal of Prince Sihanouk for a conference on Cambodia, to be attended by the governments that participated in the 1954 conference, and noted the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to the effect that both favored the convening of conferences on Cambodia and Laos. Subsequently, however, Hanoi appeared to draw back and to impose conditions at variance with the Cambodian proposal.

We look beyond a just and enduring peace for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the day when Peiping will be ready to join in a general settlement in the Far East—a general settlement that would remove the threat of aggression and make it possible for all the peoples of the area to devote themselves to economic and social progress.

Several of the nations of Asia are densely populated. And high rates of population growth make it difficult for them to increase per capita incomes. The solution to these problems cannot be found through external aggression. They must be achieved internally within each nation.

As President Johnson has said, the United States stands ready to assist and support cooperative programs for economic development in Asia. Already we are making available additional funds for the development of the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the lead in organizing an Asian Development Bank, which we hope will be supported by all the major industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union. We would welcome membership by North Vietnam, when it has ceased its aggression.

Those are our objectives—peace and a better life for all who are willing to live at peace with their neighbors.

The present path

I turn now to the specific actions we are taking to convince Hanoi that it will not succeed and that it must move toward a peaceful solution.

Secretary McNamara is appearing before the appropriate committees of the Congress to discuss the military situation within South Vietnam in detail. In essence, our present view is that it is crucial to turn the tide in the south, and that for this purpose it is necessary to send substantial numbers of additional American forces.

The primary responsibility for defeating the Vietcong will remain, however, with the South Vietnamese. They have some 545,000 men in military and paramilitary forces. Despite losses, every branch of the armed forces of South Vietnam has more men under arms than it had 6 months ago. And they are making systematic efforts to increase their forces still further. The primary missions of American ground forces are to secure the airbases used by the South Vietnamese and ourselves and to provide a strategic reserve, thus releasing South Vietnamese troops for offensive actions against the Vietcong. In securing the airbases and related military installations, American forces are pushing out into the countryside to prevent build-ups for surprise attacks. And they may be

used in emergencies to help the South Vietnamese in combat. But the main task of rooting out the Vietcong will continue to be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese. And we have seen no sign that they are about to try to shift that responsibility to us. On the contrary, the presence of increasing numbers of American combat troops seems to have stimulated greater efforts on the part of the fighting men of South Vietnam.

At the same time, on the military side, we shall maintain, with the South Vietnamese, our program of limited air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam. This program is a part of the total strategy. We had never expected that air attacks on North Vietnam alone would bring Hanoi to a quick decision to cease its aggression. Hanoi has been committed to its aggression too long and too deeply to turn around overnight. It must be convinced that it faces not only continuing, and perhaps increased, pressure on the north itself, but also that it simply cannot win in the south.

The air attacks on the North have also had specific military effects in reducing the scale of increased infiltration from the North. Finally, they are important as a warning to all concerned that there are no longer sanctuaries for aggression.

It has been suggested in some quarters that Hanoi would be more disposed to move to negotiations and to cease its aggression if we stopped bombing the North. We do not rule out the possibility of another and longer pause in bombing, but the question remains—and we have repeatedly asked it: What would happen from the North in response? Would Hanoi withdraw the 325th Division of the Regular Army, which is now deployed in South Vietnam and across the line in Laos? Would it take home the other men it has infiltrated into the South? Would it stop sending arms and ammunition into South Vietnam? Would the campaign of assassination and sabotage in the South cease? We have been trying to find out what would happen if we were to suspend our bombing of the North. We have not been able to get an answer or even a hint.

Those who complain about air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam would carry more weight if they had manifested, or would manifest now, appropriate concern about the infiltrations from the North, the high rate of military activity in the South, and the ruthless campaign of terror and assassination which is being conducted in the South under the direction of Hanoi and with its active support.

The situation in South Vietnam

Let me now underline just a few points about the political and economic situation in South Vietnam. For we know well that, while security is fundamental to turning the tide, it remains vital to do all we can on the political and economic fronts.

All of us have been concerned, of course, by the difficulties of the South Vietnamese in developing an effective and stable government. But this failure should not astonish us. South Vietnam is a highly plural society striving to find its political feet under very adverse conditions. Other nations—new and old—with fewer difficulties and unmoored by determined aggressors have done no better. South Vietnam emerged from the French Indochina war with many political factions, most of which were firmly anti-Communist. Despite several significant initial successes in establishing a degree of political harmony, the government of President Diem could not maintain a lasting unity among the many factions. The recent shifting and reshuffling of Vietnamese Governments is largely the continuing search for political unity and a viable regime which can overcome these long-evident political divisions.

And we should not forget that the destruction of the fabric of government at all levels has been a primary objective of the Vietcong. The Vietcong has assassinated thousands of local officials—and health workers and schoolteachers and others who were helping to improve the life of the people of the countryside. In the last year and a half, it has killed, wounded, or kidnapped 2,291 village officials and 22,146 other civilians—these on top of its thousands of earlier victims.

Despite the risks to themselves and their families, Vietnamese have continued to come forward to fill these posts. And in the last 6 years, no political dissenter of any consequence has gone over to the Vietcong. The Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the Cambodians (of which there are about a million in South Vietnam), the Montagnards—all the principal elements in South Vietnamese political life except the Vietcong itself, which is a very small minority—remain overwhelmingly anti-Communist.

The suggestion that Ho Chi Minh probably could win a free election in South Vietnam is directly contrary to all the evidence we have. And we have a great deal of evidence, for we have Americans—in twos and threes and fours and sixes—in the countryside in all parts of Vietnam. In years past Ho Chi Minh was a hero throughout Vietnam. For he had led the fight against the Japanese and then against the French. But his glamour began to fade when he set up a Communist police state in the North—and the South, by contrast, made great progress under a non-Communist nationalist government. Today the North Vietnamese regime is badly discredited. We find the South Vietnamese in the countryside ready to cooperate with their own government when they can do so with reasonable hope of not being assassinated by the Vietcong the next night.

At the present time, somewhat more than 50 percent of the people of Vietnam live in areas under shifting control. And about 25 percent live in areas under varying degrees of Vietcong control. But even where it succeeds in imposing taxes, drafting recruits, and commandeering labor, the Vietcong has not usually been able to organize the area. We have a good deal of evidence that Vietcong tax exactions and terrorism have increasingly alienated the villagers. And one of the problems with which the South Vietnamese Government and we have to deal is the large scale exodus from the Central Highlands to the coastal areas of refugees from the Vietcong.

It is of the greatest significance that, despite many years of harsh war, despite the political instability of the central government, and despite division of their country since 1954, the people of South Vietnam fight on with uncommon determination. There is no evidence among politicians, the bureaucracy, the military, the major religious groups, the youth, or even the peasantry of a desire for peace at any price. They all oppose surrender or accommodation on a basis which would lead to a Communist takeover. The will to resist the aggression from the North has survived through periods of great stress and remains strong.

The central objective of our foreign policy is a peaceful community of nations, each free to choose its own institutions but cooperating with one another to promote their mutual welfare. It is the kind of world order envisaged in the opening sections of the United Nations Charter. But there have been and still are important forces in the world which seek a different goal—which deny the right of free choice, which seek to expand their influence and empires by every means including force.

The bulwark of peace

In defense of peace and freedom and the right of free choice:

We and others insisted that the Soviets withdraw their forces from Iran.

We went to the aid of Turkey and Greece.

We joined in organizing the European recovery program and in forming the North Atlantic Alliance.

We and our allies have defended the freedom of West Berlin.

We and 15 other nations joined in repelling the aggression in Korea.

We have joined defensive alliances with many other nations and have helped them to strengthen their defensive military forces.

We supported the United Nations in its efforts to preserve the independence of the Congo.

We insisted that the Soviet Union withdraw strategic weapons from Cuba.

Had we not done these things—and others—the enemies of freedom, would now control much of the world and be in a position to destroy us or at least to sap our strength by economic strangulation.

For the same basic reasons that we took all those other measures to deter or to repel aggression, we are determined to assist the people of South Vietnam to defeat this aggression.

In his last public utterance, recorded only half an hour before his death, a great and beloved American, Adlai Stevenson said:

"There has been a great deal of pressure on me in the United States from many sources to take a position—a public position—inconsistent with that of my Government. Actually, I don't agree with those protestants. My hope in Vietnam is that resistance there may establish the fact that changes in Asia are not to be precipitated by outside forces."

I believe, with the President, that "once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable."

The great bulwark of peace for all free men—and therefore of peace for the millions ruled by the adversaries of freedom—has been, and is today, the power of the United States and our readiness to use that power, in cooperation with other free nations to deter or to defeat aggression, and to help other free nations to go forward economically, socially, and politically.

We have had to cope with a long series of dangerous crises caused by the aggressive appetites of others. But we are a great nation and people. I am confident that we will meet this test, as we have met others.

THE TASKS OF DEFENSE

(Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, August 4, 1965)

The issue in Vietnam is essentially the same as it was in 1954 when President Eisenhower said:

"I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future.

"We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of millions of people. * * *

The nature of the conflict

What is at stake in Vietnam today is the ability of the free world to block Communist armed aggression and prevent the loss of all of southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate consequences could drastically alter the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the grave detriment of our

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own security and that of our allies. While 15 years ago, in Korea, Communist aggression took the form of an overt armed attack, today in South Vietnam, it has taken the form of a large-scale intensive guerrilla operation.

The covert nature of this aggression, which characterized the earlier years of the struggle in South Vietnam, has now all but been stripped away. The control of the Vietcong effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and incited by Communist China, has become increasingly apparent.

The struggle there has enormous implications for the security of the United States and the free world, and for that matter, the Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have chosen to make South Vietnam the test case for their particular version of the so-called wars of national liberation. The extent to which violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments has been one of the most bitterly contested issues between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists.

Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khrushchev, fully endorsed wars of national liberation as the preferred means of extending the sway of communism, he cautioned that "this does not necessarily mean that the transition to socialism will everywhere and in all cases be linked with armed uprising and civil war. * * * Revolution by peaceful means accords with the interests of the working class and the masses."

The Chinese Communists, however, insist that:

"Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country. * * * The vanguard of the proletariat will remain unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle—peaceful and armed, open and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, and so forth." (Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.)

Their preference for violence was even more emphatically expressed in an article in the Peiping People's Daily of March 31, 1964:

"It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. * * * the proletarian party must never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road. Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. * * *"

"Political power," the article quotes Mao Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Throughout the world we see the fruits of these policies and in Vietnam, particularly, we see the effects of the Chinese Communists' more militant stance and their hatred of the free world. They make no secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test case, and neither does the regime in Hanoi. General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese Army, recently said that "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. * * * If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world." And, Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, pointed out that "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America."

It is clear that a Communist success in South Vietnam would be taken as proof that the Chinese Communists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement.

Furthermore, such a success would greatly increase the prestige of Communist China among the nonaligned nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world wherever the existing governments are weak and the social structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledges of support will be weakened and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe.

Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. Its loss would be a most serious setback to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world will be weakened and our national security directly endangered.

Conditions leading to the present situation in South Vietnam

Essential to a proper understanding of the present situation in South Vietnam is a recognition of the fact that the so-called insurgency there is planned, directed, controlled, and supported from Hanoi.

True, there is a small dissident minority in South Vietnam, but the government could cope with it if it were not directed and supplied from the outside. As early as 1960, at the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and General Giap spoke of the need to "step up" the "revolution in the South." In March 1963 the party organ Hoc Tap stated that the authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

Through most of the past decade the North Vietnamese Government denied and went to great efforts to conceal the scale of its personnel and materiel support, in addition to direction and encouragement, to the Vietcong.

It had strong reasons to do so. The North Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon the attention of the world its massive and persistent violations of its Geneva pledges of 1954 and 1962 regarding noninterference in South Vietnam and Laos.

However, in building up the Vietcong forces for a decisive challenge, the authorities in North Vietnam have increasingly dropped the disguises that gave their earlier support a clandestine character.

Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infiltrated from the North were old French and American models acquired prior to 1954 in Indochina and Korea.

Now, the flow of weapons from North Vietnam consists almost entirely of the latest arms acquired from Communist China; and the flow is large enough to have entirely re-equipped the main force units, despite the capture this year by government forces of thousands of these weapons and millions of rounds of the new ammunition.

Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the personnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and equipped in the North and ordered South, were former southerners.

But in the last 18 months, the great majority of the infiltrators—more than 10,000 of them—have been ethnic northerners, mostly draftees ordered into the People's

Army of Vietnam for duty in the South. And it now appears that, starting their journey through Laos last December, from one to three regiments of a North Vietnamese regular division, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam for combat alongside the Vietcong.

Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy, Hanoi's desire for decisive results this summer has forced it to reveal its hand even more openly.

The United States during the last 4 years has steadily increased its help to the people of South Vietnam in an effort to counter this ever-increasing scale of Communist aggression. These efforts achieved some measure of success during 1962. The South Vietnamese forces in that year made good progress in suppressing the Vietcong insurrection.

Although combat deaths suffered by these forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over the 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450), Vietcong combat deaths increased by 72 percent (from about 12,000 to 21,000). Weapons lost by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in 1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost by the Vietcong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The Government's new strategic hamlet program was just getting underway and was showing promise. The economy was growing and the Government seemed firmly in control. Therefore, in early 1963, I was able to say: " * * * victory over the Vietcong will most likely take many years. But now, as a result of the operations of the last year, there is a new feeling of confidence, not only on the part of the Government of South Vietnam but also among the populace, that victory is possible."

But at the same time I also cautioned: "We are not unmindful of the fact that the pressure on South Vietnam may well continue through infiltration via the Laos corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the possibility that the Communists, sensing defeat in their covert efforts, might resort to overt aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously, this latter contingency could require a greater direct participation by the United States. The survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all southeast Asia and to the free world that we must be prepared to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory."

Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early 1963 proved to be well founded. Late in 1963, the Communists stepped up their efforts, and the military situation began to deteriorate. The Diem government came under increasing internal pressure, and in November it was overthrown. As I reported in February 1964:

"The Vietcong was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Vietcong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup."

Following the coup, the lack of stability in the central government and the rapid turnover of key personnel, particularly senior military commanders, began to be reflected in combat operations and throughout the entire fabric of the political and economic structure. And, in 1964, the Communists greatly increased the scope and tempo of their subversive efforts. Larger scale attacks became more frequent and the flow of men and supplies from the north expanded. The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose rapidly and the pressure on the civilian population was intensified.

The deteriorating military situation was clearly reflected in the statistics. South Vietnamese combat deaths rose from 5,650 in

1968 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of weapons lost from 8,250, to 14,100. In contrast, Vietcong combat deaths dropped from 20,900 to 18,800 and, considering the stepped-up tempo of activity, they experienced only a very modest rise in the rate of weapons lost (from 5,400 to 5,900).

At various times in recent months, I have called attention to the continued buildup of Communist forces in South Vietnam. I pointed out that although these forces had not been committed to combat in any significant degree, they probably would be after the start of the monsoon season. It is now clear that these forces are being committed in increasing numbers and that the Communists have decided to make an all-out attempt to bring down the Government of South Vietnam.

The entire economic and social structure is under attack. Bridges, railroads, and highways are being destroyed and interdicted. Agricultural products are being barred from the cities. Electric powerplants and communication lines are being sabotaged. Whole villages are being burned and their population driven away, increasing the refugee burden on the South Vietnamese Government.

In addition to the continued infiltration of increasing numbers of individuals and the acceleration of the flow of modern equipment and supplies organized units of the North Vietnamese Army have been identified in South Vietnam. We now estimate the hard core Vietcong strength at some 70,000 men, including a recently reported increase in the number of combat battalions. In addition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 irregulars and some 30,000 in their political cadres; i.e., tax collectors, propagandists, etc. We have also identified at least three battalions of the regular North Vietnamese Army, and there are probably considerably more.

At the same time the Government of South Vietnam has found it increasingly difficult to make a commensurate increase in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000 men, including the regional and local defense forces but excluding the national police.

Combat deaths on both sides have been mounting—for the South Vietnamese from an average of 143 men a week in 1964, to about 270 a week for the 4-week period ending July 24 this year. Vietcong losses have gone from 322 a week last year to about 680 a week for the 4-week period ending July 24.

Most important, the ratio of South Vietnamese to Vietcong strength has seriously declined in the last 6 or 7 months from about 5 to 1 to about 3 or 3½ to 1; the ratio of combat battalions is substantially less. This is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even though the greater mobility and firepower provided to the South Vietnamese forces by the United States help to offset that disadvantage.

The South Vietnamese forces have to defend hundreds of cities, towns, and hamlets while the Vietcong are free to choose the time and place of their attack. As a result, the South Vietnamese are stretched thin in defensive positions, leaving only a small central reserve for offensive action against the Vietcong, while the latter are left free to concentrate their forces and throw them against selected targets. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Vietcong retains most of the initiative.

Even so, we may not as yet have seen the full weight of the Communist attack. Presently, the situation is particularly acute in the northern part of the country where the Communists have mobilized large military forces which pose a threat to the entire region and its major cities and towns. Our air attack may have helped to keep these forces off balance but the threat remains and it is very real.

Clearly, the time has come when the people of South Vietnam need more help from us and other nations if they are to retain their freedom and independence.

We have already responded to that need with some 75,000 U.S. military personnel, including some combat units. This number will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately with the deployment of the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces. But, more help will be needed in the months ahead and additional U.S. combat forces will be required to back up the hard-pressed Army of South Vietnam. Two other nations have provided combat forces—Australia and New Zealand. We hope that by the end of this year others will join them. In this regard, the Koreans have just recently approved a combat division for deployment to Vietnam, which is scheduled to arrive this fall.

Role of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam

As I noted earlier, the central reserve of the South Vietnamese Army has been seriously depleted in recent months. The principal role of U.S. ground combat forces will be to supplement this reserve in support of the frontline forces of the South Vietnamese Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces will deal with the pacification of areas cleared of organized Vietcong and North Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate for them than for our forces.

The Government of South Vietnam's strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve the initiative, to expand gradually its area of control by breaking up major concentrations of enemy forces, using to the maximum our preponderance of airpower, both land and sea based. The number of fixed-wing attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam will increase manifold by the end of the year.

Armed helicopter sorties will also increase dramatically over the same period, and extension use will be made of heavy artillery, both land based and sea based. At the same time our air and naval forces will continue to interdict the Vietcong supplies line from North Vietnam, both land and sea.

Although our tactics have changed, our objective remains the same.

We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese regime, seize its territory or achieve the unification of North and South Vietnam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Vietnam or for special privileges of any kind.

What we are seeking through the planned military buildup is to block the Vietcong offensive, to give the people of South Vietnam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures—to give them time to strengthen their government, to reestablish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Vietcong harassment and attack in recent months. We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined.

Increases in U.S. military forces

Fortunately, we have greatly increased the strength and readiness of our Military Establishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds of forces which we now require in southeast Asia. The Active Army has been expanded from 11 to 16 combat ready divisions. Twenty thousand men have been added to the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out their combat structure and at the same time facilitate the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force have been increased by 51 percent. Our airlift capability has more than doubled. Special forces trained to deal with insurgency threats have been multiplied elevenfold. General ship construction and conversion has been doubled.

During this same period, procurement for the expanded force has been increased greatly: Air Force tactical aircraft—from \$360 million in 1961 to about \$1.1 billion in the original fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft—from \$1.8 billion to \$2.2 billion; Army helicopters—from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and related equipment was increased about 150 percent in the fiscal years 1962-64 period, compared with the preceding 3 years. The tonnage of modern nonnuclear air-to-ground ordnance in stock tripled between fiscal year 1961 and fiscal year 1965. In brief, the Military Establishment of the United States, today, is in far better shape than it ever has been in peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie ahead.

Nevertheless, some further increases in forces, military personnel, production, and construction will be required if we are to deploy additional forces to southeast Asia and provide for combat consumption while, at the same time, maintaining our capabilities to deal with crises elsewhere in the world.

To offset the deployments now planned to southeast Asia, and provide some additional forces for possible new deployments, we propose to increase the presently authorized force levels. These increases will be of three types: (1) Additional units for the Active Forces, over and above those reflected in the January budget; (2) military personnel augmentations for presently authorized units in the Active Forces to man new bases, to handle the larger logistics workload, etc.; and (3) additional personnel and extra training for selected Reserve component units to increase their readiness for quick deployment. We believe we can achieve this buildup without calling up the Reserves or ordering the involuntary extension of tours, except as already authorized by law for the Department of the Navy. Even here the extension of officer tours will be on a selective basis and extensions for enlisted men will be limited, in general, to not more than 4 months.

The program I have outlined here today and the \$1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal year 1968 Defense appropriation bill now before the committee will, in the collective judgment of my principal military and civilian advisers and myself, provide the men, materiel, and facilities required to fulfill the President's pledge to meet the mounting aggression in South Vietnam, while at the same time maintaining the forces required to meet commitments elsewhere in the world.

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED

(Address by the President to the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, the White House, May 13, 1965)

The third face of the war

The war in Vietnam has many faces.

There is the face of armed conflict—of terror and gunfire—of bomb-heavy planes and campaign-weary soldiers. * * *

The second face of war in Vietnam is the quest for a political solution—the face of diplomacy and politics—of the ambitions and the interests of other nations. * * *

The third face of war in Vietnam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need. It is the untended sick, the hungry family, and the illiterate child. It is men and women, many without shelter, with rags for clothing, struggling for survival in a very rich and a very fertile land.

It is the most important battle of all in which we are engaged.

For a nation cannot be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the expectation by individual men and women that their future will be better than their past.

It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the

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dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can long-run stability and peace come to their land.

And there is another, more profound reason. In Vietnam communism seeks to really impose its will by force of arms. But we would be deeply mistaken to think that this was the only weapon. Here, as other places in the world, they speak to restless people—people rising to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope—people fiercely and justly reaching for the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge.

It is this desire, and not simply lust for conquest, which moves many of the individual fighting men that we must now, sadly, call the enemy.

It is, therefore, our task to show that freedom from the control of other nations offers the surest road to progress, that history and experience testify to this truth. But it is not enough to call upon reason or point to examples. We must show it through action and we must show it through accomplishment, and even were there no war—either hot or cold—we would always be active in humanity's search for progress.

This task is commanded to us by the moral values of our civilization, and it rests on the inescapable nature of the world that we have now entered. For in that world, as long as we can foresee, every threat to man's welfare will be a threat to the welfare of our own people. Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the perils of their neighbors at the risk of their own prospects.

Cooperative development in southeast Asia

This is true not only for Vietnam but for every part of the developing world. This is why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a massive, cooperative development effort for all of southeast Asia. I named the respected leader, Eugene Black, as my personal representative to inaugurate our participation in these programs.

Since that time rapid progress has been made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has met with the top officials of the United Nations on several occasions. He has talked to other interested parties. He has found increasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is already setting up new mechanisms to help carry forward the work of development.

In addition, the United States is now prepared to participate in, and to support, an Asian Development Bank, to carry out and help finance the economic progress in that area of the world and the development that we desire to see in that area of the world.

So this morning I call on every other industrialized nation, including the Soviet Union, to help create a better life for all of the people of southeast Asia.

Surely, surely, the works of peace can bring men together in a common effort to abandon forever the works of war.

But, as South Vietnam is the central place of conflict, it is also a principal focus for our work to increase the well-being of people.

It is that effort in South Vietnam, of which I think we are too little informed, which I want to relate to you this morning.

Strengthening Vietnam's economy

We began in 1954, when Vietnam became independent, before the war between the north and the south. Since that time we have spent more than \$2 billion in economic help for the 16 million people of South Vietnam. And despite the ravages of war, we have made steady, continuing gains. We have concentrated on food and health and education and housing and industry.

Like most developing countries, South

Vietnam's economy rests on agriculture. Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas of very rich and very fertile land. Because of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of the entire world. With our help, since 1954, South Vietnam has already doubled its rice production, providing food for the people as well as providing a vital export for that nation.

We have put our American farm know-how to work on other crops. This year, for instance, several hundred million cuttings of a new variety of sweet potato, that promises a sixfold increase in yield will be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has more than doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been eliminated entirely.

Disease and epidemic brood over every Vietnamese village. In a country of more than 16 million people with a life expectancy of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in the same ratio as the United States has doctors, they would have not the 200 that they do have but they would have more than 5,000 doctors.

We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7 million people against cholera, and millions more against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet health stations that America has built and has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites are scattered throughout the entire country; and the medical school that we are now helping to build will graduate as many doctors in a single year as now serve the entire civilian population of South Vietnam.

Education is the keystone of future development in Vietnam. It takes trained people to man the factories, to conduct the administration, and to form the human foundation for an advancing nation. More than a quarter million young Vietnamese can now learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that America has helped to build in the last 2 years; and 2,000 more schools are going to be built by us in the next 12 months. The number of students in vocational schools has gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there and started helping with our program. Today it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million textbooks that we have supplied to Vietnamese children will rise to more than 15 million by 1967.

Agriculture is the foundation. Health, education, and housing are the urgent human needs. But industrial development is the great pathway to their future.

When Vietnam was divided, most of the industry was in the North. The South was barren of manufacturing and the foundations for industry. Today more than 700 new or rehabilitated factories—textile mills and cement plants, electronics and plastics—are changing the entire face of that nation. New roads and communications, railroad equipment, and electric generators are a spreading base on which the new industry can, and is, growing.

Progress in the midst of war

All this progress goes on, and it is going to continue to go on, under circumstances of staggering adversity.

Communist terrorists have made aid programs that we administer a very special target of their attack. They fear them, because agricultural stations are being destroyed and medical centers are being burned. More than 100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead. Our own AID officials have been wounded and kidnapped. These are not just the accidents of war. They are a part of a deliberate campaign, in the words of the Communists, "to cut the fingers off the hands of the Government."

We intend to continue, and we intend to increase our help to Vietnam.

Nor can anyone doubt the determination of the South Vietnamese themselves. They have lost more than 12,000 of their men since I became your President a little over a year ago.

But progress does not come from investment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the directives and the orders that we approve here in Washington. It takes men. Men must take the seed to the farmer. Men must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must help in harvest. Men must build the schools, and men must instruct the students. Men must carry medicine into the jungle, and treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And men—brave, tireless, filled with love for their fellows—are doing this today. They are doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled Vietnamese days and the sultry nights.

The fullest glory must go, also, to those South Vietnamese that are laboring and dying for their own people and their own nation. In hospitals and schools, along the rice fields and the roads, they continue to labor, never knowing when death or terror may strike.

How incredible it is that there are a few who still say that the South Vietnamese do not want to continue the struggle. They are sacrificing and they are dying by the thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy presence of personal physical danger should be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here in America, only have to read about it, or hear about it on the television or radio.

We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst of war. They toil unarmed and out of uniform. They know the humanity of their concern does not exempt them from the horrors of conflict, yet they go on from day to day. They bring food to the hungry over there. They supply the sick with necessary medicine. They help the farmer with his crops, families to find clean water, villages to receive the healing miracles of electricity. These are Americans who have joined our AID program, and we welcome others to their ranks.

A call for aid

For most Americans this is an easy war. Men fight and men suffer and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning, are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the Nation flourishes.

I will report to the Cabinet when I leave this room that we are in the 51st month of continued prosperity, the longest peacetime prosperity for America since our country was founded. Yet our entire future is at stake.

What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small fraction of our unmatched private resources—businesses and unions, agricultural groups and builders—if we could call them to the task of peaceful progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for freedom throughout the world.

I therefore hope that every person within the sound of my voice in this country this morning will look for ways—and those citizens of other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will find ways to help progress in South Vietnam.

This, then, is the third face of our struggle in Vietnam. It was there—the illiterate, the hungry, the sick—before this war began. It will be there when peace comes to us—and so will we—not with soldiers and planes, not with bombs and bullets, but with all the wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th century.

And then, perhaps, together, all of the people of the world can share that gracious task with all the people of Vietnam, North and South alike.

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U.S. DRIVE TO NEGOTIATE IN VIETNAM—RUSK, GOLDBERG, AND BUNDY SPELL IT OUT

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, the New York Times headlined the Monday night CBS news special on Vietnam as "U.S. Diplomacy by TV." This interrogation of Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, and Presidential Assistant Bundy once again contributed greatly to the understanding by the American people of our policies in Vietnam.

In the judgment of the New York Times, this broadcast may also have served another vital purpose. In that broadcast, as Max Frankel reports in this morning's New York Times, Secretary Rusk may well have imparted to Hanoi the fact that it could expect no military respite without negotiations, and that this country is ready, willing, and anxious to negotiate on the basis of the 1954 Geneva agreement and, again, of the 1962, Laotian agreements. The Secretary spells out in detail the nature of the self-determination, the free secret ballot election in South Vietnam to which we agree.

Mr. President, there is an unusually clear exposition of our will to negotiate expressed by Ambassador Goldberg and by Mr. Bundy. Let me read briefly from it:

Mr. HOTTELET. But can one not hasten this process somewhat? Can one not ripen the quiet diplomacy by creating circumstances in which the other side will find it necessary to come to the conference table, by, for instance, dramatizing a desire to return to Geneva, or perhaps some dramatic, substantive but dramatic, approach by President Johnson—a summit conference on this problem, which I think everyone recognizes is a most serious problem?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Hottelet, how more dramatic can the President of the United States be? He made a public declaration about this in Baltimore, "unconditional discussions," and then some critics said that the President did not mean "negotiations." So then in the letter that he sent down with me to the Secretary General of the United Nations, he used the word "negotiations" to put at rest this thing that people were talking about. Following which, we sent a letter to the Security Council, in which we said, "We call upon anyone, any member, not only of the Security Council, but of the United Nations, to participate with us in this effort."

The 17 nonaligned nations made a proposal. We said that they would form the basis for a negotiation. And then—I can't go through all of the 15 efforts that were made. Mr. Davies went to Hanoi. We said that we welcomed that initiative. The Commonwealth ministers made a declaration. We said we welcomed that initiative. Mr. Nkrumah has indicated some interest; we did not discourage it.

I personally feel that you never denigrate any party nor a great nation by indicating a desire for peaceful resolution of a conflict. The President has done this. He's gone all out for this purpose.

Mr. HOTTELET. The purpose of my question, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one could not do more than just indicate a willingness to accept, indicate acquiescence—

Mr. BUNDY. Well, we have done that, Mr. Hottelet, in the specific case that you mentioned. It seems to me that the fact is, and it's very clear, really, and increasingly recognized around the world, we are unconditionally ready for negotiations; we are

unconditionally ready to return to Geneva if others are; we are unconditionally ready for the good offices of the United Nations in any way that they can be made effective; we are unconditionally ready to meet with all interested governments and go to work on this problem, and we have said so in every sharp and flat, and the President is fond of saying, in every State of the Union. And I believe the message has been heard.

Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of this historic and significant interview be printed at this point in the RECORD, together with the fascinating interpretation of the significance of the interview by Max Frankel, published in today's New York Times.

There being no objection, the transcript and interpretation were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT—VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: "WINNING THE PEACE"

(Part III of four parts, as broadcast over the CBS Television Network, Monday, August 23, 1965)

Participants: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy.

Reporters: CBS News United Nations Correspondent Richard C. Hottelet, CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, CBS News White House Correspondent Harry Reasoner.

Produced by CBS News.

ANNOUNCER. This is the third of four special 1-hour broadcasts by CBS News, "Vietnam Perspective." In the past 2 weeks, the new decisions and the American military effort in Vietnam were examined. Tonight, "Winning the Peace."

The paths to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam will be discussed by three Government officials. Now here is CBS News White House Correspondent Harry Reasoner.

Mr. REASONER. Good evening. We're in the John Quincy Adams Room of the State Department in Washington for the third in our series of programs with the U.S. policymakers on Vietnam. Across from me are three distinguished officials whose task it is to pursue perhaps the most difficult and illusive of our objectives in Vietnam, the pursuit of peace.

We're happy to have back with us the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who with the President formulates our foreign policy and who heads our diplomatic offensive in southeast Asia.

This is our newly designated Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, who is exploring the avenues of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam through U.N. channels.

And this is McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, who has played a key role in the formulation of our policies in Vietnam and who, a few weeks ago on this network, defended the administration's position with some professors who disagree with it.

Seated with me are two CBS News colleagues, diplomatic correspondent Marvin Kalb, who regularly covers the State Department and who is just back from one of many trips to Russia. And U.N. correspondent Richard C. Hottelet.

Gentlemen, I'd like to begin with a fairly basic question. It's been quite a weekend in Vietnam. We bombed close to China again. We bombed for the first time some targets that could be described as less directly military than before, and there is a kind of new optimism about how the ground fighting is going. Is this the moment? Is this the time for negotiations? I'd like each of you to reply to that briefly. Secretary Rusk?

Mr. RUSK. Well, that depends on the other side in their assessment of the situation.

We have been ready for a long time to make peace in southeast Asia. Our problem is to get the other side to the conference table. We just don't know. The other side must make that decision.

Mr. REASONER. Ambassador Goldberg?

Mr. GOLDBERG. I think any time is a good time for negotiations. The only way to resolve conflict is to go to the bargaining table, to use a term that I am very well familiar with, and it seems to me that this is not determined by the calendar, or even by the course of military events. This is determined by the genuine desire of the parties to the conflict to remove the problem from the battlefield to the bargaining table. So for me, any time is a good time to negotiate.

Mr. REASONER. Mr. Bundy?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, it's certainly true that it is our position that now is a good time to negotiate. We have had that view for many months, have tried to make it clear in every way, public and private, at every level of discourse, from the President on down. It is also true that the response from Hanoi, still more from Peiping, has been consistently and powerfully negative. No later than a week ago, in an interview with the correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde, Ho of Hanoi made it very plain that they were not prepared to negotiate except on terms of all power to the Communists. I believe it to be true that military success of the kind which we have seen in recent days does help us bring nearer the day when there will be effective negotiation.

Mr. HOTTELET. It also reinforces the question that some people have asked of whether you ought to negotiate at all, or whether, if you find the tables turning your way, if you are gaining any kind of military ascendancy, whether you shouldn't use that advantage, press it to checkmate Communist aggression, which is the U.S. professed aim, not only in Vietnam, but all through southeast Asia and Laos and in northeast Thailand and Malaysia as well. In other words, Why should we negotiate? is the question.

Mr. BUNDY. I think all of us would agree, and I know this to be the position of President Johnson, that we are ready to negotiate and that we are not disposed to take the view that because the battle is going well we are unwilling to talk about it. In our view, the effort to end the aggression must continue, while the aggression continues, but we are prepared for discussion and for negotiation at any time.

Mr. KALB. There is in the air right now in Washington something which has not been here before, at least in the last couple of months, and that is a wispy kind of feeling that maybe there is some optimism here and some grounds for optimism. I'd like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, what are the grounds for optimism? What is the evidence that gives rise to this sense?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think the fact that President Johnson has made it very clear that we are not going to be pushed out of South Vietnam and that we shall meet our commitments to South Vietnam has made a big difference to this situation. I think also the fact that international opinion is not supporting the effort of Hanoi to take over South Vietnam makes a difference, because I think they were hoping at one time that there would be a buildup of international opinion that might cause the United States to change its attitude toward our commitment.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Gentlemen, may I make an observation on the Secretary's statement? New to diplomacy, I have been reading in diplomacy. Talleyrand made a statement about the Vienna Congress in which he said that the great powers there assembled were too frightened to fight and too stupid to agree. And I think in a very simple measure, we can say of American foreign policy in this situation, that it is clear from what the President has said, from what the Secretary

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of State has said, Mr. Bundy said in his teach-ins, that the United States very definitely is not too frightened to fight. That has been demonstrated.

Mr. RUSK. Let me come back, Mr. Kalb, if I may, to Mr. Bundy's reference to the interview—in Le Monde, Ho Chi Minh on August 14. He seemed to be saying there that a precondition for peace is the withdrawal of American forces. Well, under the circumstances, this is quite an unrealistic point of view, because those forces are there solely because of the intervention of outside forces from Hanoi in South Vietnam. Now one would suppose that peace requires that there be a withdrawal of those North Vietnamese forces that have penetrated into South Vietnam. If you don't like the word withdrawal, you can use the word redeployment, but it is that infiltration which is solely responsible for the presence of American combat forces in South Vietnam.

Now, obviously, we and others have been giving a good deal of thought to the basis on which peace can be achieved. I think the entire record of the United States since 1945 shows that we want peace and not war and that all of our effort in this postwar period has been directed to that end. Well, now, in South Vietnam, the cessation of outside aggression, the cessation of this infiltration from the north is certainly fundamental because that would make it possible for American forces to come home. We should like to see full performance on all sides of the military clauses of the 1954 agreements. We have said repeatedly, time after time, that as far as the United States is concerned, we have no interest in military bases or a permanent military presence in southeast Asia. Well, now, that is in accord with the 1954 agreements and that should be one of the essential elements of a peaceful settlement.

Now as far as South Vietnam internally is concerned, we have a deep commitment to the simple notion of self-determination. In the 1954 agreements, it was anticipated that there would be elections, through secret elections—through secret ballot, and that the peoples of Vietnam, north and south, would have a chance to express their opinions, and we are prepared for elections in South Vietnam to determine what the people of that country want in terms of their own institutions.

And then the question of reunification which has been troublesome over the years. Again, it is instinctive with the United States to say, What do the people want? What do the people want? And there again, to find out in North Vietnam and South Vietnam what the people themselves really want on this matter is important. Now, this isn't very simple. And it doesn't mean that both are going to want reunification. The people in the north would want reunification only if there were a Communist regime throughout the country. The people in the south don't want reunification on that basis, but it is for the people of Vietnam to decide that at such time as they have a chance to express their views freely on that point. So what we are talking about here are the simple elements of a settlement which were reached basically in 1954 and again in 1962 in the Lao agreements.

Mr. HOTTELET. Mr. Goldberg, you sit at probably the most sensitive listening post in the world. Do you get any indication from the—your colleagues at the United Nations that the other side has gotten this message of—that we are not too frightened to fight, not too stupid to talk?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Not yet. Not yet in all candor. We have to persevere with patience, and experience and hope. Our message is loud and clear. The signal that the Secretary has referred to on occasion, saying that negotiations will take place when you hear

a signal, has been made by the United States. Our President has stated publicly to the world that we are prepared to sit down in unconditional negotiations, discussing the points that Hanoi has made, discussing the points we have made and to arrive at a durable settlement, a durable settlement. I am hopeful—I am hopeful—and I continue in this hope that we will get a similar signal from the other side. It's very simple to make that signal. The President did it at Baltimore. He did it on other occasions. He has done it since. He armed me with a letter to the Secretary General when he said very plainly that we are ready to negotiate unconditionally all problems and to negotiate on the basis of their position and our position, and I think we are looking for a signal from the other side.

Mr. REASONER. Mr. Secretary, I think that there's some confusion in this country about these 1954 agreements which are mentioned so often. For instance, I don't know how many Americans realize it's an agreement that we didn't sign. Does—could you outline why we did not sign that and if we would sign a similar agreement now?

Mr. RUSK. Well, we did not formally sign those agreements, but Gen. Bedell Smith, who was then Under Secretary of State, made a statement at the time which in effect embraced those agreements on behalf of the United States, and said that any attempt to violate those agreements by force would be looked upon by the United States as a threat to the peace. So that we do believe that the 1954 agreements, in their essential principles, do provide a basis for peace in southeast Asia. What we do not believe is that the settlement of 1954 can be upset by force by any party.

Mr. REASONER. Mr. Bundy, for reasons which you've explained, and the President has explained, the war in Vietnam has gotten bigger. Our participation in it has increased. How do we know that it won't continue to escalate until eventually we have world war III? Is there some kind of a tacit understanding on how far both sides go?

Mr. BUNDY. I know of no tacit understanding, Mr. Reasoner, but I think it is fair to say that all parties—and all those concerned—are aware of the danger of enlargement of the conflict. We certainly are on our side. We have lived with crises large and small over a 20-year period now—in Berlin, in Greece, in Korea, in Cuba, and elsewhere—and I think Americans can be proud of the care and the prudence and the restraint which their government has shown in this generation of effort. Under the leadership of President Johnson—a man of peace if there ever was one—we are conducting our affairs in that tradition and with that purpose of restraint. We believe that there is a similar recognition—although not always a similar recognition of the rights of others—there is a similar recognition of the hazards of any great enlargement of the conflict on the part of the parties interested on the other side. We cannot be sure of what they will do. We can be sure, and we must be accountable for what we do, and that is why our entire effort has been directed at things related specifically to what is being done to and in South Vietnam. That's what we are concerned with; not the fate of any other regime elsewhere; not the safety or security of any larger power nearby which we do not threaten. We are concerned with the fulfillment of our obligations in South Vietnam, a limited objective, and the nature of those limitations we've made just as clear as we know how.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Bundy, could you convince us, and thereby provide us with the evidence that leads you to feel that the American bombing of North Vietnam is specifically related to acts of terrorism in South Vietnam, and that this will convince the Vietcong

operation in South Vietnam that they must stop what they're doing?

Mr. BUNDY. No, the bombing in North Vietnam is not—I would not relate it specifically and directly to any one action in South Vietnam, but to the campaign in South Vietnam, and to the program pursued by Hanoi against South Vietnam it is related and related most directly. The targets are military targets: military lines of communication, military barracks, military depots. There has been no miscellaneous bombing of any old target in North Vietnam or anywhere so far as we can avoid it. The targets have been directly related to a campaign of infiltration, a campaign of military control, and a campaign of organized terror where the heartbeat of that campaign is in Hanoi.

Mr. HOTTELET. Getting back to China, I've heard the assumption expressed that China will not intervene directly in Vietnam as long as the regime—the Communist regime of North Vietnam—is not in danger of being overthrown, and as long as there is no massive incursion of American power on the ground. Is this, in fact, an assumption that guides your policy?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think we are at some hazard in trying to think like the members of the Politburo in Peiping. It is my impression that the Communist world does not want a general war over southeast Asia. Unfortunately, some of them want southeast Asia. Therefore, we cannot be completely sure at the end of the trail which desire on their part will predominate. But, the authorities in Peiping must know that they have undertaken to support an effort in South Vietnam right up against an American commitment of which they were fully informed. Therefore, they must recognize that there are very large hazards if they themselves elect to pursue this by direct intervention. Now we, therefore, have been acting with a combination of firmness and prudence in an effort to keep wide open the doors of peaceful settlement. This has characterized American policy in all of these postwar crises to which Mr. McGeorge Bundy referred, and we would hope very much that the time will come when it will be recognized on the other side that pushing this matter militarily is not worth the risk at the end of the trail, and therefore, that they will bring this to the conference table for settlement.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, there are a number of people in Washington who study the China problem who believe that, on the contrary, it is precisely a war in southeast Asia that the Chinese want. It is precisely the bogging down of an enormous number of American troops in southeast Asia that the Chinese want, both for internal political reasons as well as a justification of their position in terms of their quarrel with the Russians. What evidence can you provide that, indeed, the Chinese—I'm not talking about the Russians now—do not really want this kind of—of a larger and deeper American involvement, even running the risk of war with America?

Mr. RUSK. Well, one can only judge by their actions thus far and by impressions one gets from those who have been in touch with Peiping. There is a comment going around in the Communist world these days that Peiping is prepared to fight to the last Vietnamese. There is a certain caution and prudence in their action, more so than in their words, but when you analyze these matters from the point of view of basic national interest, objectively in terms of what can be at the root of their thinking, I myself cannot believe that it is a rational idea that the principal powers involved in this business could look with favor upon the outbreak of a general war. It doesn't make sense from anyone's point of view.

Now, that means that it is important to do what we can not to let events take con-

trol; to try to keep some sort of control over the situation so that contacts among the capitals might have a chance to find a way to a peaceful settlement. And that is one of the reasons why, one of the principal reasons why President Johnson has tried to act with the combination of the firmness and prudence that he believes the situation requires.

Mr. BUNNY. Could I pick up from what the Secretary said for one moment and say that, in the first place, that nothing is more important than the maintenance of prudence and of effective control of our own operations by our own Government. That's the meaning of the insistent, direct surveillance which the President maintains over major military decisions, and specifically, over decisions which affect military action against North Vietnam. This is a matter which he keeps under his own control by the consent and with the support of the senior military commanders concerned.

And just one more point. Obviously, the Chinese would be delighted to have us mismanage our affairs in South Vietnam and in southeast Asia so that we got more and more engaged in something less and less successful. It is our object and our purpose and our responsibility to do a better job than that, and to do that job within the limits of prudence, restraint, and decency which we are trying to follow.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Could I summarize American policy in this area by quoting an ancient Greek wise man, Polybius, who said that "the purpose of war"—and I would describe it in terms of our attitude toward Hanoi—"is not to annihilate the enemy, but to get him to mend his ways." And this, in fact, is what we have been attempting to do, prevent aggression, and this has been made clear time and time again. We—the President said, my distinguished predecessor at the United Nations said, we don't covet any territory, we don't seek to establish any military bases; we are acting the way we do to stop aggression. And when you move only to stop aggression, not to promote aggression, I think the dangers of a general war are minimized.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Ambassador, the—everything that you said is certainly true, and this is precisely what the administration is saying. At the same time, people said in the Chinese capital, who have to view it from the point of view of their national interest—you can say that we're not building bases around China, but when the Chinese leaders look out at the map, they can see the presence of American military forces from one end of the Chinese border to the other. When you bomb, as we did today, to within 31 miles of the Chinese border, people responsible for Chinese national security probably would look with some great concern about that. I am trying to understand what makes you feel that they're not that deeply concerned, or that they don't feel that bombing 31 miles on this side of the border might not lead to 31 miles on the other side of the border.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Kalb, for a very simple reason: because we have stated as a matter of direct public policy to the world, a commitment which America has made to everybody, that if aggression ceases from the north, our activities in South Vietnam will likewise cease. This is a pretty broad statement, quite different from statements that were made by other powers at other points in the history of South and North Vietnam.

Mr. HOTTELET. There was a time in the Korean war after the cessation of fire, and before the armistice was signed, when—as President Eisenhower revealed not long ago—he got tired of waiting for the Chinese to sign the armistice and threatened or promised to use all American power, including nuclear power, against the Chinese. He said

they got the message and they came to the conference table. Can you envisage any similar circumstances in Vietnam?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think we'll have to let that question ride for the future. There already was a negotiation going on at that time, and the problem was to bring it to a final conclusion. In a major sense, the fighting had already been brought to a conclusion by the earlier discussions of the cease-fire. We may get to a point where a cease-fire gets to be the crucial element there in Vietnam.

Mr. KALB. If I could return to your point for a second. I don't believe that ideological differences are as profound as to cause Peiping to be concerned about what they see around their borders when they know that we would come home if Hanoi would leave South Vietnam alone, and that we would not have bases or troops in southeast Asia if these countries could live in peace. Now they can pretend, given their ideological commitments, that they somehow are afraid that we have in mind a major attack on China. There's nothing in the record to show that. Nothing in the conduct of the last 15 or 20 years to give any support to that idea.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, you are suggesting then that the American confrontation—if I can use that large word—in southeast Asia is really the United States and North Vietnam, and not the broader confrontation of the United States and Communist China?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think, in the first instance, it is clear that what Hanoi is doing is our principal problem and explains why we're in South Vietnam with military forces, the purpose of which, on our side, is to destroy the regime in Peiping. We have two divisions in Korea, because, among other things, several hundred thousand Chinese came into the Korean war in 1950-51, and this posed a problem of the security of South Korea. But throughout this postwar period, force has been initiated by the other side. The free world has had to meet that force with determination, but the free world has also met it with the kind of prudence and restraint that keeps open the doors of peaceful settlement. And all I would say on that to our colleagues in Peiping, if they want to test whether or not the United States is aggressive, then let them live at peace with their neighbors, and they would find out that the United States is not aggressive with respect to mainland China.

Mr. KALB. We're talking in a kind of a shorthand, though, sir. Isn't it more direct in some way at this stage, given the dimension of the danger, to have a more direct link of communication with the Chinese Communists? I'm aware of the Warsaw conversations, but we've had enormous political differences with the Russians; we've been able to establish a hot line to Moscow. What about some kind of line directly to Peiping?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think we've had more discussions with Peiping over the last 10 years on more important subjects than has any government that recognizes Peiping, with the possible exception of Moscow. Our problem with Peiping is not communication. Our problem is that when we have talks with them, they begin by saying that there can be no improvement in the situation until we are prepared to surrender Formosa to the mainland, and that means turning over 11 million people against their will to Peiping, and we make it clear that this is not possible, and I must confess, the conversation gets to be implacable and harsh and takes well-known lines as represented in the public statements of the two sides.

Mr. BUNNY. Going by their own conversations, Mr. Kalb, and their own—what they say to journalists, the few and rare ones

whom they receive, the Peiping government itself has said over and over again, framing the matter in its own terms, that what is at issue in Vietnam is fundamentally a matter for the Vietnamese people to decide. This is exactly what we think. We believe that the center of this question is in what is being done to and in South Vietnam. It is not in Peiping, except as they may be engaged in support and assistance to those who are attempting to destroy a given society and replace it with one fashioned in their own image. And I believe the people in Peiping know that, and I believe they understand clearly that it is only by their action and by their decision that there can be the kind of enlargement which would involve direct danger to them.

Mr. REASONER. This question has come up several times about letting the people of Vietnam decide what they want to do. Is this, indeed, the case, or is it a case, as in other U.S. policy, where there are limitations, where there are certain options denied them? Suppose South Vietnam decided that it wished to make a separate peace. Would we accept it?

Mr. BUNNY. Well, I think when you asked that question earlier to Ambassador Taylor he said that he just didn't think that was a realistic possibility. My own judgment is, on the basis of one short visit and innumerable reports and a great many discussions with others who have been there much longer, that there is no problem, from our side, of confidence in the ability of the people of South Vietnam, given a free choice and conditions of reasonable peace, to frame their own future in ways with which we would be happy to live; that it is an unreal question to suppose that they would freely choose to cast their lot with the Communists.

Mr. REASONER. Nevertheless—

Mr. BUNNY. There is a great deal of—

Mr. REASONER. It is not an unreal question, to this extent: that some intelligence estimates this spring indicated this would be a possibility. Now, if—even if it is unlikely—

Mr. BUNNY. I am not aware of those—

Mr. REASONER. It must be something we consider.

Mr. BUNNY. Intelligence estimates, Mr. Reasoner. Really not—

Mr. REASONER. Well, then put it on a purely hypothetical basis. To think through the unthinkable, what would be our attitude? Would we accept it?

Mr. BUNNY. Well, let me put it the other way around, and say that the United States is obviously not in a position to make the kind of effort and to make the kind of sacrifices which we are making if there were not effort and sacrifice by the people and government of the country to which we are giving assistance. There is that kind of effort. There is that kind of sacrifice. Our attention focuses most naturally upon the battles in which Americans are heavily engaged, and we feel, most naturally, American casualties. But the rate of casualties and the rate of effort is running many times to one on the Vietnamese side as between us.

Mr. HOTTELET. Are there any points on which the peace aims of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam do not coincide?

Mr. BUNNY. Well, there's a constant problem of discussion over the exact ways in which we would state our peace aims, but the current situation is that—and the Secretary can speak to this better than I can—that the Foreign Minister of the Government of South Vietnam, and the Secretary himself, have made closely parallel statements about our peace aims.

Mr. REASONER. I don't mean to be offensive, and I certainly recognize your right to decline to answer this question, but in Santo

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Domingo we retained a possibility of a veto over a government. This was clear. This denied certain options to people in the way of self-determination. Do we retain similar veto over possible decisions out of Vietnam?

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, you're talking about an island I love. I was down there. And the point that I think needs to be made is rather that these two situations are closely parallel. Our action there, first to save lives, then to prevent a particular kind of Communist hazard, has developed into an action designed precisely to give a reasonable opportunity for the people of the Dominican Republic to make their own choice about the kind of government and the kind of society they want to have. Now, a small island in the Caribbean, and a newly-independent country operating within international agreements which somewhat affect its international position on the other side of the world—these are two very different situations, but my own belief is that the fundamental purposes of the United States in both areas can be defined in the same broad terms.

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Reasoner, there's a very deep commitment of the American people to the simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and we have not seen a government, a Communist government, brought to power by the free election of its own people. Now, we have overwhelming evidence from all sections, sectors, areas, groups, in South Vietnam that they do not want what Hanoi is offering to them in South Vietnam. Therefore, I do not believe that we need fear, from the point of view of freedom, that we need to fear what the effect would be of genuinely free elections among the people of South Vietnam. I've heard some people who were not, I think, in a very good position to know the details, speculate that 80 percent of the people in South Vietnam would elect Ho Chi Minh or accept Hanoi if they had a free election. That just doesn't fit any of the evidence that we have about the attitude of these people.

Mr. REASONER. I was thinking not so much of elections as of a coup which would put into power, without reference to the people—as essentially the present government is, without reference to a majority of the people; it's not established that way yet; they don't know how, Ambassador Lodge says—but if they had a government which wanted to make peace, do we retain veto power over that peace?

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, the coup-making power, to put it in those terms, does rest, as Ambassador Taylor was suggesting last week, primarily with the military. There's no hint of this in the military. The people underestimate the degree of the commitment of all factions, not the Communists, to a non-Communist solution in South Vietnam. One of the principal Buddhist leaders said to one of our people the other day on a point that comes up occasionally with respect to negotiation, that he hoped very much that we would not give any international diplomatic recognition to the Vietcong. The Vietcong did not represent the South Vietnamese people, but only an agency of the Communists in the North. This is a—there are divisions and difficulties, many, varied and fascinating, among the non-Communist forces in South Vietnam, but not on this issue.

Mr. HOTTELET. The Vietcong has been treated as a monolithic force, which is really not human, because human beings are different and even if they are bound by a discipline or bemused by an ideology, they do have their own antecedents and they do have their own tastes. How much is being done now and what will be done more in the future—to insert a wedge into the differences that must exist inside this theoreti-

cally monolithic Vietcong—the nationalists, the patriots, the people who are just peasants wanting to live a life of their own?

Mr. RUSK. Well, there are various elements in the national liberation front. I think it is true that not all of them are Communists, although the Communists have, in even recent weeks, declared that they are the dominant factor and they must themselves be the ones to give the orders. I think there may also be some tensions between some of the southerners and some of the northerners within the liberation front. But basically, they are united on the notion that the program of liberation front must be accepted as a solution for South Vietnam and that the liberation front itself must have a dominant role in the government there, regardless of the fact that this is not the wishes of the overwhelming majority of 14 million South Vietnamese.

Mr. GOLDBERG. May I add a word in this connection? I was looking at the Geneva agreement last night. The Geneva agreement, despite what is said in Hanoi, did not contemplate, nor does it say anything about a coalition government in which the liberation front would occupy the dominant role that Hanoi would like to accord it. The Geneva agreement says that "the Vietnamese people, north and south, should enjoy fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions"—I am reading—"established as a result of free, general elections by secret ballot." Now, it's very interesting to see the contrast in positions. When we talk about returning to the essentials of the Geneva agreement, which Hanoi says it wants and which we say we subscribe to, we rely upon the fact that there shall be self-determination. Hanoi relies upon the fact that they should take over the Government in their image before there are free elections. Well, we all have had a bit of history in this since the war. I don't recall after that has been done elsewhere that there have been any free elections. Now, surely the acid test is whether you are willing to subscribe to the principle of free elections. That, we have said, we are ready to subscribe to. If we are ready to subscribe to it, it must reflect a considerable degree of confidence—confidence which is lacking on the other side.

Mr. BUNDY. To put it another way, the Geneva Conference included as a participant the State of Vietnam. The current position from Hanoi is that there is no question of Saigon authorities. This is the very language of Ho Chi Minh, so what they wish to do is to foreclose the question of choice by the establishment as the only authentic representative, again his own language, their agent, controlled from within by a clearly Communist Party, the Vietcong.

Mr. RUSK. And without elections.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned before that—or Mr. Bundy did actually, that you and the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam have come out with statements that are rather similar as to what both countries want in South Vietnam. We have yet to hear what the Prime Minister of South Vietnam actually wants and there have been stories that there are possible differences already even in this early period of Ambassador Lodge's return, of differences between the two; the Prime Minister was not there when the Ambassador arrived. Do you feel, sir, that negotiations as we have been discussing them is in any way realistic, or possible, given the possibility of continued political instability in South Vietnam or the continued absence of statements from the new South Vietnamese governments that align themselves with us?

Mr. RUSK. Oh, I think the political instability in South Vietnam is itself directly related to violence in the countryside and the conditions of the war. During the Greek guerrilla operations, for example, there were

some eight Greek governments in the period of some 15 months of guerrilla operations. It isn't easy to sustain an orderly government based upon elections throughout the countryside when thousands of local officials are being assassinated or kidnaped and when the normal processes of the economy are interrupted by sabotage of routes of communication, so that there is a connection between the political possibilities of what we would call a democratic and constitutional government and peace throughout the country. I have no doubt that—that the South Vietnamese themselves would move toward a government rooted in popular support and that this could be easily demonstrated if the conditions of peace made it possible for them to proceed on that basis. A few weeks ago, as you will recall, they did have provincial elections, for a large number of those who were eligible to vote did in fact register, over two-thirds, and that some 73 percent of those who were registered did in fact vote, even though the Vietcong were opposing those provincial elections. There were multiple candidates. From our point of view, they were free elections and we can be—I think, take some confidence in the fact that if given a chance, if given some possibility of peace, these people in South Vietnam would know how to establish a government and base it upon popular support and get on with the main job which would be their first choice.

Mr. KALB. And yet, sir, the Prime Minister of the country, the air commodore, has expressed his impatience publicly with the politicians in South Vietnam. He's even expressed a certain admiration for dictators of the past. Do we really have a sense that this is the kind of government that we can go to the conference table with?

Mr. RUSK. Oh, I think that we go to the conference table with the government of South Vietnam. I think that their war aims and our war aims are basically the same and that if the country can get some peace, then there can be a rapid development of their political, economic, and social institutions in the direction which would cause all of us to applaud them and give them full support.

Mr. HOTTELET. You don't say, sir, that the war aims are identical. What are the points of difference?

Mr. RUSK. Well, perhaps I could say "identical" as far as my present knowledge is concerned. I'm not aware of any significant difference in the war aims of our two countries. The central thing, gentlemen, the central thing is that the aggression from the North, the infiltration of men and arms from the North, must be stopped and the South Vietnamese be allowed to work out their own problems themselves without the use of force from the outside. Now, this is the major, central, overriding point. The details are incidental to that central point and on that there's no difference between us and Saigon.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Can I phrase—rephrase the Secretary's remark in a simple way? I was writing it down as he said it. If we look at the public record, and the public record is not unimportant in this area, the goal of Hanoi policy as recently expressed is to wage a 20-year war to impose a Communist regime on South Vietnam. The goal of American and South Vietnamese policy is to determine their own destiny, by democratic means under conditions of peace.

Mr. RUSK. I think an examination of Hanoi's, Peking's, broadcasts in the last several months will indicate that they were leaning rather heavily on three points: One, that they could score a military success in South Vietnam—we know that will be denied to them; secondly, that international opinion somehow will build up in such a way as to put sufficient pressure on the United States to cause us to change our commitment to South Vietnam—we know that that will not occur. And, third, that divisions inside

the United States will cause us to change our view of this matter—we don't believe that will occur. Therefore, Hanoi, I think, must face the fact that three essential pillars in their policy are weak pillars and, therefore, we would hope very much that they would realize that this matter must be brought to some conclusion.

Now, I don't want to exaggerate the role of public discussion and public debate. You'll recall, for example, that the Greek guerrilla problem was not settled in debate. At a certain stage the guerrillas simply began to wither away. You'll recall that the Berlin blockade was not lifted through a debate in the Security Council. It was done through private contacts ahead of time by—between the Soviet Union and the United States. Similarly, the Korean war was not settled in a debate in the United Nations. It was settled by contacts among the parties. And, therefore, we believe that we're in a period where the real views of the various parties need to be explored by channels that are available, in order to see whether the basis for a peace exists. I've indicated myself earlier in this program what seemed to us to be the main lines of a peaceful settlement as far as we're concerned. There are many details which can't be elaborated, because we're not at a negotiating table. But I do believe that it is important for us to pursue the quiet diplomacy, whether in the United Nations or in other respects, because it is in that way that we shall, I think, get the key signals at some stage that might bring this to the conference table.

Mr. HOTTELET. But can one not hasten this process somewhat? Can one not ripen the quiet diplomacy by creating circumstances in which the other side will find it necessary to come to the conference table, by, for instance, dramatizing a desire to return to Geneva, or perhaps some dramatic, substantive but dramatic, approach by President Johnson—a summit conference on this problem, which I think everyone recognizes is a most serious problem?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Hottelet, how more dramatic can the President of the United States be? He made a public declaration about this in Baltimore, "unconditional discussions," and then some critics said that the President did not mean "negotiations." So then in the letter that he sent down with me to the Secretary General of the United Nations, he used the word "negotiations" to put at rest this thing that people were talking about. Following which, we sent a letter to the Security Council, in which we said, "We call upon anyone, any member, not only of the Security Council, but of the United Nations, to participate with us in this effort."

The 17 nonaligned nations made a proposal. We said that they would form the basis for a negotiation. And then—I can't go through all of the 15 efforts that were made. Mr. Davies went to Hanoi. We said that we welcomed that initiative. The Commonwealth Ministers made a declaration. We said we welcomed that initiative. Mr. Nkrumah has indicated some interest; we did not discourage it.

I personally feel that you never denigrate any party nor a great nation by indicating a desire for peaceful resolution of a conflict. The President has done this. He's gone all out for this purpose.

Mr. HOTTELET. The purpose of my question, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one could not do more than just indicate a willingness to accept, indicate acquiescence—

Mr. BUNDY. Well, we have done that, Mr. Hottelet, in the specific case that you mentioned. It seems to me that the fact is, and it's very clear, really, and increasingly recognized around the world, we are unconditionally ready for negotiations; we are unconditionally ready to return to Geneva if

others are; we are unconditionally ready for the good offices of the United Nations in any way that they can be made effective; we are unconditionally ready to meet with all interested governments and go to work on this problem, and we have said so in every sharp and flat, and the President is fond of saying, in every State of the Union. And I believe the message has been heard.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Bundy, at one time there was an unadvertised pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. I wonder, sir, if the administration might not—in following up Dick's line of questioning—might not consider that an advertised or unadvertised effort along these same lines might not be contemplated, because the leaders in Hanoi—and you keep making reference to the other side—have certain things that they must go on, too—

Mr. BUNDY. Well—

Mr. KALB. In addition to public statements, they have the fact that they are being bombed.

Mr. BUNDY. You talked about this matter in this series a couple of weeks ago, and I think the Secretary then made the point that at the time of the unannounced pause there was information about its existence was, in fact, conveyed to the governments most concerned, and in the first instance, to the government in Hanoi. They were in no doubt that this was happening. They were in no doubt that we would be watching to see whether there was any response or any secondary action.

Any time that we thought that there was a promise of action and response in terms of the reduction of the activities which had made this trouble, there would be no hesitation in the United States about making appropriate adjustments in our own military activity.

Mr. RUSK. Yes, I'd like to assure you that we have not been negligent in our business, and that hardly a week goes by that the other side doesn't have a chance to indicate what else would happen if the bombing ceased.

Now, I said in our earlier program that we would be willing to consider cessation of the bombing if it were a step toward peace. Now that remains open, that possibility. But what else would happen? Would the 325th North Vietnamese Division go home? Would there be a cessation of the bombing in South Vietnam, where it's occurring all the time among the South Vietnamese and against our own forces?

In other words, the target here is peace, and all of these incidental aspects of it ought to be fitted into a movement toward a genuine, permanent, peaceful settlement of this situation.

Mr. REASONER. There's a question here I'd like to address to Mr. Bundy. If, as we seem to feel, that we have some years ahead of us, or some weeks or months or possibly years, making South Vietnam strong, waiting for a signal, what happens to the war in the meantime? It seems to get a little bigger all the time. Our participation seems to get stronger. Is there a limit to that?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, our actions there—and this is a point which I think Secretary McNamara spelled out with some care a couple of weeks ago on this program—our actions there have been essentially actions in response and in reply, and what has enlarged the war has been the increasing commitment directed from, supplied by and coming from, very often and increasingly, coming from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Our own forces are there because of actions which have been necessary in response. That is why we feel so strongly that the question here as to whether it's going to get worse or better, the question as to when it will come to the peace table, is one in which one has to think about more than just the U.S. position.

Our determination is to assist and support a people who are defending themselves

against an effort to make them a Communist power—part of a Communist power. That effort has been the effort which seemed necessary and appropriate at each stage, and only that much. We are not in a position to say to our countrymen in this country when that will end. We think that the American people understand why they are there, why these sacrifices are necessary. We hope that it will not grow larger, the conflict in South Vietnam. We will do what we can to limit it. But we cannot be unwilling and unready to do our part.

Mr. HOTTELET. Looking ahead to the permanent peace settlement, you have stressed your adherence to the essentials of the Geneva agreement and you have stressed the need for self-determination. When the United States refrained from signing the Geneva agreement, Bedell Smith also suggested that free elections should be supervised by the United Nations. Do you see a role for the United Nations in making certain that any future Geneva agreement on Vietnam is actually honored by those recitals?

Mr. RUSK. Yes, I would hope that the United Nations could play an important part in connection with any settlement. But that would depend upon the attitude of all the parties, including Hanoi and Peiping, and thus far, both of those capitals have rather pushed aside and rejected participation by the United Nations. But if there could be organized an international inspection force, a police force, to supervise a peaceful settlement, if there could be a strong effort to build upon the capability of the United Nations to bring about economic and social development in the area, then I think there's a very important role for the United Nations in connection with the making and keeping of the peace, and I would hope very much that the other parties would make it possible for the United Nations to play that kind of role.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Before we leave this subject, may I make an observation on what Mr. Bundy just said. We are not the ones that are talking about a war that lasts 10 or 20 years. Ho Chi Minh has been talking about that. We are talking about a peace that should be negotiated here and now. Here and now.

Mr. BUNDY. That's a very important point. I'd like to just make one comment in finishing up on that. We don't know when, but the sooner the better, and we are absolutely sure that it is the order to all of us from our President, from our Nation's President, that we shall never be second, never be slow, never be without energy and imagination in trying to find ways of bringing a peaceful and decent settlement to this contest.

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Reasoner, it seems to me that each citizen in the United States has a special obligation in thinking about such a problem as South Vietnam. I think it really isn't enough just to worry about it and be concerned about it and be anxious about the future. Of course, all of us are concerned about it and anxious about the future. But each citizen might consider what he would do if he were the President of the United States, facing the choices faced by the President of the United States, to enter into the full agony of the question, what does the United States do in this situation? And I have no doubt that if each one of us should look very hard at the nature of the aggression, at the nature of the American commitment, the importance of the integrity of the American commitment, at the many efforts made to find a peaceful settlement; that the citizen would, thinking of himself as President for the moment, would conclude that we have to make good on our commitment, but at the same time we have to explore every possibility for a peaceful settlement. And that is what President Johnson is doing.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Mr. REASONER. Gentlemen, I'd like to thank you very much for coming, as we leave some millions of citizens considering what they would do if they were the President of the United States. You may have spoiled a lot of people's sleep, Mr. Secretary.

Thus far in our four-part series on Vietnam, we have examined the critical decisions that our country faces, the questions of how we can win the war there; and tonight, how we can win the peace. Two weeks from tonight, on September 6, in the conclusion of Vietnam Perspective, we shall take a close look at what kind of a war it is we're fighting there. Teams of CBS News correspondents and camera crews will film a single day of combat at different locations, to bring to you, in color, Vietnam Perspective: "A Day of War." This is Harry Reasoner. Good night.

[From the New York Times]

U.S. DIPLOMACY BY TV—JOHNSON'S AIDS BEGIN PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF HANOI'S PLAN FOR "BASIS" OF SETTLEMENT

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON.—The Johnson administration has begun a subtle effort to discover whether it can agree with North Vietnam on a broad but deliberately ambiguous statement of objectives for future negotiations.

Last night, before a nationwide television audience that was never fully briefed on what it was witnessing, leading U.S. policymakers in effect addressed the North Vietnamese Government in Hanoi and responded, point by point, to its 4-month-old proposal for a "basis" of settlement.

It was diplomacy by television, but elaborate files of earlier assertions were needed to follow the drama enacted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, the President's assistant for national security, and Arthur J. Goldberg, permanent representative at the United Nations.

The exercise was part of a new Washington peace offensive that is not, however, confined to peaceful means. Officials acknowledged today that their call for negotiations, "the sooner the better," was being reinforced by increased military pressure against the Communists in both North and South Vietnam.

The bid for a peace conference marked the biggest stride yet away from the administration's reluctance of last winter to move toward the bargaining table and its hesitation, as late as February, even to utter the word "negotiation."

A FATEFUL CHOICE IN HANOI

The change is being attributed here to the estimate that the rapid buildup of U.S. military strength should by now have persuaded North Vietnam that Americans will not be militarily pushed out of southeast Asia.

The accelerating offers of negotiation are also timed to coincide with what is thought to be a fateful choice in Hanoi between a major increase in its military effort and attempts to arrange at least a ceasefire.

"I think the fact that President Johnson has made it very clear that we are not going to be pushed out of South Vietnam and that we shall meet our commitments to South Vietnam has made a big difference to the situation," Mr. Rusk asserted.

"Military success of the kind which we have seen in recent days does help us bring nearer the day when there will be an effective negotiation," Mr. Bundy said.

By success, officials here are said to mean not only the Marine Corps victory over a large Vietnam force in a favorable coastal position near Chuoi but also mounting reports that the Communist guerrillas are short of food, medical supplies and ammunition and unable to mount the kind of summer offensives they had planned.

The essence of the administration's message to North Vietnam was that it could expect no respite in further military action but that it would find the United States prepared to reach an accommodation on the "basis" of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina.

Simultaneously, Secretary Rusk and his colleagues played heavily on the evidence that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China was eager to become involved in the fighting to help North Vietnam. Mr. Rusk went so far as to taunt Hanoi with the "comment going around in the Communist world these days" that Peiping was "prepared to fight to the last Vietnamese."

The heart of the developing diplomatic situation is the word "basis." In effect, both sides are now attempting to formulate not the conditions or terms of a final settlement, but the broad definitions of purpose and objective that will serve as the "basis" of negotiations.

Successfully framed statements of the "basis" of negotiation are customarily vague enough to allow each side to interpret them in its own way, so as not to foreclose genuine bargaining at a conference. But because they tend to reveal much about a negotiator's intentions, they are often contested with the same energy as a final settlement.

The origin of the present exchange is President Johnson's offer April 7 to consider "unconditional discussions."

North Vietnam replied April 13 with a four-point peace formula that has been widely misinterpreted as a set of "preconditions" for negotiation. Actually, the four points were followed by the statement that, if they were accepted as the "basis" for a settlement, North Vietnam would find it possible to "consider" the reconvening of an international conference.

Officials here thought at the time that many parts of the proposal were acceptable and that others could be refined to become acceptable. But it was not until July 28 that President Johnson offered publicly to discuss North Vietnam's proposals, among others.

Without actually saying so, his aids undertook that discussion last night.

The North Vietnamese formula stipulated the following:

Recognition of the sovereignty and unity of all Vietnam and agreement that, under the 1954 Geneva accord the United States must withdraw all military troops and weapons from South Vietnam and end the bombardment of North Vietnam.

Strict respect for these military provisions of the Geneva accord in the indefinite period in which Vietnam will remain divided into north and south.

Settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the Vietcong's political arm, the National Liberation Front, and without foreign interference.

Settlement of the question of the peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the people of both zones, without foreign interference.

Mr. Rusk dealt directly with the four points by stating that the Johnson administration wished to see "full performance on all sides of the military clauses of the 1954 agreements."

ONE MAJOR POINT OF DIFFICULTY

Whereas the Communists had stressed the need for the United States to agree to talk about its military withdrawal, Mr. Rusk said the Communists had to end their "outside aggression." On points 1 and 2, therefore, he indicated there need be no disagreement, provided that Communists military activities were halted in exchange for U.S. actions.

On point 4, about the eventual peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the Johnson ad-

ministration also indicated that it agreed with the Communist statement that this should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves.

This left point 3 as the major difficulty of the moment. Apparently, the Communists contend that a solution in accordance with the Vietcong's program requires some kind of coalition government in South Vietnam in which Communists and their sympathizers would play the leading role.

The United States has said it would never agree to this. Instead, Mr. Rusk reiterated the administration's offer to conduct free elections in South Vietnam.

Officials here say they will agree to bar "foreign interference" in these elections if North Vietnam, too, agrees not to interfere in them.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial entitled "Toward Vietnam Talks," published in today's New York Times, commenting on the welcome desire to negotiate now as expressed by Rusk, Goldberg, and Bundy, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TOWARD VIETNAM TALKS

The Johnson administration has followed the military success on Van Tuong Peninsula with a convincing demonstration of its desire for early negotiation of a Vietnamese settlement.

Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, and McGeorge Bundy in their hour-long CBS television interview Monday night made it clear that the Marines' extraordinary combat feat has not revived old Washington dreams of military victory. On the contrary, the entire tone of the discussion underscored Mr. Bundy's assertion "that now is a good time to negotiate."

In substance, what President Johnson's top advisers had to say was new only in bringing together many of the bits and pieces of American policy that have emerged gradually since President Johnson's April offer of "unconditional discussions." But that very process clarified the opening position the United States is taking in informal peace contacts and showed how far Washington has moved in its readiness to facilitate peace talks.

Washington and Hanoi seem to be within negotiating distance of each other now except on two significant points: Hanoi's insistence that the Vietcong represent South Vietnam at the conference table and that Saigon be excluded; and Hanoi's demand for a coalition government in South Vietnam with Communist participation, if not dominance. On the first, Washington proposes that Saigon represent South Vietnam and that the Vietcong sit in Hanoi's delegation. On the second, the United States has countered with the challenge of free elections to choose a South Vietnamese Government.

Ways undoubtedly can be found to narrow these differences: once Hanoi decides, as Washington clearly has, that it too wants a negotiated settlement. The real question is whether the Van Tuong battle has moved Hanoi in this direction.

LIVINGSTON CLARIFIES RELATIONS OF LIQUIDITY TO CORRECTION OF U.S. PAYMENTS BALANCE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, one of the Nation's most pressing economic problems is the persistently adverse balance of payments. It has a serious effect on the policies of Congress. It should affect the judgment of Congress

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on how big a defense budget we can afford—a judgment which will be made by the Senate this very day. It should enter into our decision as to how much to spend on foreign aid—a decision on which this body will pass in a few days. Even in our domestic spending measures, the balance of payments has real relevance.

The Joint Economic Committee and the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency have both had a series of hearings on the balance of payments, and I expect to say much more on this matter in the next few days. Unfortunately, in spite of the unavoidable responsibility of Congress for policymaking decisions that go to the heart of the balance-of-payments problem, many Members of Congress have little opportunity to learn the real nature and significance of the problem.

It is not only a matter of adopting policies that will decrease our spending of dollars abroad and increase the spending by foreign countries here. It is also a matter of the correction of the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments in such a way that the growth of free world economies is not restrained, and particularly so that trade is not choked and limited.

Our deficit dollars and our loss of gold have supplied the ready cash that has fueled free world and especially trade expansion in the long and fortunate postwar economic boom in the free world. Precipitate and indiscriminate choking off of this deficit could provoke a free world deflation and recession as the ready cash disappears.

Yet we must correct our adverse balance of payments. The relation between the recondite term "liquidity" and our balance of payments is spelled out clearly and simply in a remarkably revealing article written by Columnist J. A. Livingston and published in this morning's Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LIQUIDITY IS A MATTER OF NATION'S STANDING
(By J. A. Livingston)

Damned if we do and damned if we don't. That's the American dollar dilemma—yours, mine, and, as a matter of high policy, President Johnson's.

The President is caught between the industrialized nations of Europe which now have more dollars than they want and the underdeveloped nations of the world which need more dollars than they have.

Most European countries are no longer capital short. They no longer rely on the United States to prime their investment pumps. President Charles de Gaulle of France doesn't want French companies and markets taken over by American money.

Underdeveloped nations, especially those in Latin America, are capital poor. Their gold reserves are low. Their principal asset in international commerce is the dollar. If the United States slows down the outflow of dollars, they'll be distressed: "What will the world do for liquidity?"

A strange recondite word is liquidity? What is it?

To an American businessman, it's dollars in the bank or a line of credit to get dollars; to a French businessman it's francs in the

bank or a line of credit to get francs; to an Englishman it's pounds, and so on.

But to a finance minister or central banker, it's gold, or the equivalent of gold. Five and ten years back, the dollar was liquidity plus. It was not only as good as gold, but even better.

Why? Because gold is an inert metal. It takes up space. It has to be guarded. It doesn't earn money. Dollars do.

A decade ago central banks invested their dollar holdings in U.S. Treasury bills or certificates of deposit with commercial banks at 2½ percent or so. They were happy with the return.

Today they can earn nearly 4 percent on their dollar holdings and are uneasy. Thus, central banks of Europe have reduced their dollar holdings from \$8.3 billion at the end of last year to \$6.8 billion at the end of May. Again why? Arithmetic.

Total potential claims—I O U's—outstanding against U.S. gold have climbed to more than \$27 billion, but the gold stock has dropped to less than \$14 billion, as you can see:

Year	Claims	Gold	Gold to claims
	Billions	Billions	Percent
1955.....	\$13.6	\$21.75	160
1960.....	21.3	17.80	84
1965.....	27.4	13.88	51

Any central bank can convert dollars to gold by presenting a check to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Bank of France has been doing this regularly of late. But there's a difference between having \$1.60 of gold for each dollar of potential claim and only a half dollar.

That explains the commitment of the President and Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to equilibrium in the U.S. balance of payments. They seek to curb the outflow—the increase—in claims against the dollar. These claims are, in effect, foreign credits to the United States. And we've exhausted our line of credit.

But many economists and central bankers, especially the central bankers of underdeveloped nations, feel that this commitment cramps international commerce. World liquidity—gold plus dollars—won't rise rapidly enough to support trade expansion.

To reconcile the differences between rich and poor nations, Secretary Fowler has issued a call for an international monetary conference.

The objective: To assure the liquidity the world needs to grow on by reaching agreements on new techniques and flats to supplement—buttress—gold and the dollar. For this purpose, he leaves this week to visit the leading finance ministers of Europe.

THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Nos. 620, 621, 622, and 401.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objections, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT OF PART II OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE, RELATING TO DIVORCE, LEGAL SEPARATION, AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 948) to amend part II of the District of Columbia Code relating to divorce, legal separation, and annulment of marriage in the District of Columbia,

which had been reported from the Committee on the District of Columbia with amendments on page 1, line 8, after the word "least", to strike out "six months" and insert "one year"; on page 2, line 18, after the word "for", to strike out "one year" and insert "two years"; and, on page 3, line 4, after the word "the", where it appears the first time, to insert "legal".

The amendments were agreed to.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 638), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of this bill is to amend existing law relating to the residence requirement for divorce, legal separation, annulment of marriage, and maintenance of children and former wives in the District of Columbia.

H.R. 948, as amended, if enacted, would amend existing law so as to provide:

1. Divorce:

That where the cause for divorce occurs within or without the District, either party to the marriage may bring the divorce action if either party has been a resident of the District of Columbia for 1 year next preceding the commencement of the action.

Existing law requires the petitioner to have been a bona fide resident of the District for a period of 1 year when the cause arose within the District, or a resident for 2 years when the cause arose outside of the District.

2. Annulment:

An action for annulment of a marriage performed outside of the District of Columbia may be maintained if one of the parties to the action is a bona fide resident of the District at the time of commencement of the action. In case of a marriage performed within the District of Columbia, either party may bring an action for annulment and the residence of the parties at the time the action is commenced shall not be a factor in determining whether the action shall be maintainable.

Existing law requires that the petitioner must have been a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia for a period of 1 year, in order to maintain an action in annulment, regardless of whether the marriage was performed within or without the District of Columbia.

3. Affirming validity of a marriage:

An action to affirm the validity of a marriage, whether performed within or without the District of Columbia, may be maintained if either party is a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia at the time the action is brought.

No residence requirement relating to the affirmance of a marriage is stated in existing law.

4. Grounds for divorce:

(a) An absolute divorce may be granted on the ground of actual or constructive desertion which has continued for a period of 1 year.

Present law provides for absolute divorce on the ground of desertion only after a period of 2 years.

(b) Voluntary separation without cohabitation is a ground for an absolute divorce after a period of 2 years.

election results where Negro citizens were excluded from the polls.

This challenge involves more than the immediate question of unseating the Mississippi Congressmen. It is a testament of courage and a declaration of determination on the part of many Negro citizens. By bringing this challenge they affirm their belief that ultimately, through the orderly process of law, the U.S. Constitution will be upheld. The Members of the House must be given the opportunity to prove that they are right.

On the opening day of Congress, 149 Members of the House voted against administering the oath to the Mississippi congressional delegation. What has since been revealed only confirms the judgment that Mississippi has trampled upon the U.S. Constitution by denying American citizens the right to vote.

We cannot condone the election of U.S. Representatives who gained their seats through an unconstitutional election. There are those who risked their lives to present this challenge to the House in order that we may exercise our solemn obligation to the Constitution of the United States. On September 21 we are determined that the House will have that opportunity.

The following Members of Congress have agreed to support the resolution of September 21 discharging the House Administration Committee from further consideration of the Mississippi challenge and declaring the contested seats vacant:

John Brademas, 3d District of Indiana.
George E. Brown, Jr., 29th District of California.

Phillip Burton, 5th District of California.
Jeffery Cohelan, 7th District of California.
John Conyers, Jr., 1st District of Michigan.
Emilio Q. Daddario, 1st District of Connecticut.

Charles C. Diggs, Jr., 13th District of Michigan.

John G. Dow, 27th District of New York.
Ken W. Dyal, 33d District of California.
Don Edwards, 9th District of California.
Leonard Farbstein, 19th District of New York.

Donald M. Fraser, 5th District of Minnesota.

Jacob H. Gilbert, 22d District of New York.
Seymour Halpern, 6th District of New York.

Augustus F. Hawkins, 21st District of California.

Charles S. Joelson, 8th District of New Jersey.

Paul J. Krebs, 12th District of New Jersey.
Joseph G. Minish, 11th District of New Jersey.

Patsy T. Mink, at large of Hawaii.
Robert N. C. Nix, 2d District of Pennsylvania.

Adam C. Powell, 18th District of New York.

John A. Race, 6th District of Wisconsin.
Ogden R. Reid, 26th District of New York.
Joseph Y. Resnick, 28th District of New York.

James Roosevelt, 26th District of California.

Benjamin S. Rosenthal, 8th District of New York.

William F. Ryan, 20th District of New York.

James H. Scheuer, 21st District of New York.

Charles A. Vanik, 21st District of Ohio.
Weston E. Vivian, 2d District of Michigan.
Lester C. Wolff, 3d District of New York.

PLAYING POLITICS WITH MANKIND'S FUTURE

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, the Republican leadership of this House has exhibited once more its inclination to play politics with the peace of the world—rather than join in a serious effort to bring about a just peace in Vietnam. Constructive criticism is to be encouraged in a democracy, but political demagoguery aimed at dividing this country for the sake of their own warped conception of their domestic advancement endangers our national security and directly abets the Communists in their effort to pit American against American.

There was not a single constructive thought on how to bring about peace in Vietnam in the Republican White Paper. We were instead treated to a political diatribe aimed at dividing the most respected of our national leaders. We have a commitment in Vietnam—it is a commitment to peace and to that end we are engaged at this very moment in maximum resistance. But the true colors show through today—they reveal a commitment to political harangue while the future of mankind hangs in the balance, and the security of our country as well. They reveal a dedication to a trigger-happy former candidate who still breathes strong in the Republican breast. They reveal that the Republicans have never quite understood why we are in Vietnam.

Perhaps if they would get out from under the weighty tomes of their erudite research into the present for a moment, they would realize that the real problem facing the world is how to bring about peace in Vietnam—and not how to get elected next year.

VIETNAM

(Mrs. MINK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today out of grave concern that our dialogs for peace are being smothered by partisan efforts to cast upon our present administration and upon the Democratic administrations of the past, the sole responsibility for the crisis that now exists for us and for the world in Vietnam. Let us not forget that since the Geneva agreement of 1954, until 1960 this country was led by the Republican Party and much could be said about things that could have been done then which might have prevented this painful situation in that part of the world today. But of what use is hindsight when what we must seek today is a means to end this war and to bring the parties to the conference table? We must be looking to the future and working through every possible means to bring an end to this conflict.

I am thoroughly convinced that our President is earnestly doing everything within his power and resources to seek the peace in Vietnam. I am equally certain that few are completely satisfied with the progress of our efforts to bring this matter to the stage of constructive negotiation. However, I believe that just as we are impatient that the talks

begin, still in our anxiety to end this war we must be willing to allow the President the fullest degree of flexibility to bring about the desired result. We can continue to urge that he seek the involvement of the United Nations, but he has told us that he is doing everything possible to take this matter to the United Nations. Where bombs failed to bring the necessary conciliatory attitude, the President called for a temporary cease-fire, to no immediate avail. He has agreed to negotiate without precondition, but still he has had no affirmative response.

The critical period of the monsoons is nearly over and we have been able to hold our lines. I am firmly of the opinion that Hanoi will, if not already, begin to understand that the peace conference is the only course left to take.

Being of this belief I do now urge the President to persist in his repeated efforts to draw Hanoi to the conference table in an ever-increasing demonstration of good faith and determination that negotiations will in fact begin.

Let us stop this dialog of war and more war preparations, of blame and accusations, and begin in earnest our preparation for peace. Certain of our goal, why should we wait? Let us ready the conference site. Let us send to Geneva our country's foreign policy technicians and statesmen now. Let us commit our course for peace immediately. Let us invite our allies to journey with us once again to Geneva to resolve a new peace treaty for Vietnam. Let us hasten to sit as a nation determined that our will for peace shall be done. Let us wait upon Hanoi in Geneva and in so doing win this war with utter and complete faith that our President is right in his great expectations for peace.

And finally let us promise now without reservations that the bombs shall cease to fall from the very instant that the negotiations begin.

Let us be prepared to match every military dollar that we have spent these past 11 years in Vietnam with a like dollar for peace, for the restoration of this war-torn country, for its economic development, for education, for food and medical care for its desperately poor people.

Let us produce a lasting peace and credit ourselves as a nation with faith that peoples everywhere liberated from the fear of hunger and deprivation will choose the way of freedom.

HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(Mr. CONTE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, through all of my career in public life, both in this great body and in the senate of the Commonwealth which I am pleased to represent here, I have never felt compelled to support any action which would circumvent established procedures. Although I have been asked from time to time to support procedural shortcuts, I have always tested the question against my commitment to the rules of normal leg-

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

21013

Matthews	Roudebush	Tuten
Mills	Satterfield	Utt
Mcarris	Scott	Waggoner
Murray	Secrest	Walker, Miss.
Natcher	Selden	Walker, N. Mex.
O'Neal, Ga.	Smith, Calif.	Watson
Passman	Smith, Va.	Watts
Poage	Steed	White, Tex.
Purcell	Stephens	Whitener
Quillen	Stubblefield	Whitten
Randall	Taylor	Williams
Rivers, S. C.	Teague, Tex.	Willis
Roberts	Tuck	

NOT VOTING—19

Andrews,	Cramer	O'Brien
George W.	Harvey, Mich.	Rogers, Tex.
Andrews,	Holland	Rumsfeld
Glenn	Kee	Sisk
Bonner	Kornegay	Thomas
Burton, Utah	Landrum	Thompson, N.J.
Cabell	Mathias	Toll

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Mathias for, with Mr. Cramer against.
 Mr. Thompson of New Jersey for, with Mr. Bonner against.
 Mr. Toll for, with Mr. Kornegay against.
 Mr. Thomas for, with Mr. Rogers of Texas against.
 Mr. Holland for, with Mr. Landrum against.
 Mr. Cabell for, with Mr. George W. Andrews against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Kee with Mr. Rumsfeld.
 Mr. Sisk with Mr. Glenn Andrews.
 Mr. O'Brien with Mr. Harvey of Michigan.

Mr. HALPERN changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2580, as amended, is almost wholly a Republican bill. Its substantive content represents more of H.R. 9136 than any other proposed bill in this field.

The most significant changes made by the subcommittee a. it completely rewrote the administration bill all came from H.R. 9136, the Moore immigration bill. These are:

First. Abolition of the national origins system after 3 years—not immediately or after 7 years, allowing for a reasonable period of adjustment.

Second. Reallocation of unused quota numbers during the transition to over-subscribed countries during the 3-year interim—a provision that will result in a complete clean up of the backlogs of qualified intending immigrants.

Third. Elimination of all delegation of authority to the executive branch of control over immigration policy and retention of complete authority in the Congress.

Fourth. First emphasis in the preference schedule upon the reuniting of families—not to the importation of skilled labor as proposed by the administration.

Fifth. A numerical limitation upon the number of refugees to be admitted.

Sixth. Stricter controls and restrictions upon immigrants entering for gainful employment—nowhere found in the administration or any other bills, in this area.

Seventh. A limit upon admissions from colonies and dependencies.

Eighth. Provision that in the event immigration from the Western Hemisphere increases by 10 percent over a 5-year average, the President must report to the Congress, with his recommendations if any.

Additionally the Republicans are responsible for the elimination of a long list of provisions which would not have been in the best interests of the United States.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. ALBERT]. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York? There was no objection.

STATUTORY CHALLENGE TO THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM MISSISSIPPI

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, today 31 Members of the House announced that on September 21 we will bring to the floor of the House a privileged resolution with respect to the statutory challenge to the Representatives from Mississippi.

The statutory challenge is now pending before the House Administration Committee. Under rule XI, section 24, of the Rules of the House it should have been finally reported by July 4. Instead there has been inordinate delay.

The House must have the opportunity to confront this vital issue during this session of Congress. The facts are clear. There is no excuse for further delay. In the 1964 congressional elections a substantial number of American citizens were denied the right to vote. The unconstitutional denial of the right to vote makes these elections illegal, and the seats should be vacated.

Courageous citizens of Mississippi, members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and civil rights workers from other areas have risked their lives to present the testimony concerning the systematic intimidation, harassment, terror, and murder which has prevented Mississippi Negroes from voting.

I urge all Members of the House to join in support of this resolution which will be brought before the House on September 21.

Mr. Speaker, I include at this point in the RECORD the statement which I issued today concerning the privileged resolution which will be brought to the floor on September 21.

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM F. RYAN ANNOUNCING PLANS TO BRING MISSISSIPPI CHALLENGE TO HOUSE FLOOR ON SEPTEMBER 21

The statutory challenge to the seating of the Mississippi Congressmen is now pending before the House Administration Committee. This challenge is based on the deliberate and unconstitutional disenfranchisement of American citizens in the 1964 con-

gressional elections in Mississippi. We are determined that the House have the opportunity to confront this vital issue during this session of Congress.

We therefore plan, under the rules and precedents of the House, to bring to the floor on September 21 a privileged resolution discharging the House Administration Committee from further consideration of the challenge and declaring the contested seats vacant, unless the committee reports to the House before then.

We are convinced that Members of the House should have the opportunity to vote on this challenge before the session adjourns. That is clearly the intent of rule XI, section 24, of the Rules of the House, which states:

"The Committee on House Administration shall make a final report to the House in all contested election cases not later than six months from the first day of the first regular session of the Congress to which the contestee is elected except in a contest from the Territory of Alaska, in which case the time shall not exceed nine months."

The 6-month time limit expired on July 4, yet the matter has not yet come before the House.

There has been great delay.

In complying with the statute governing the challenge, (title 2, U.S. Code, sec. 201 et seq.) the contestants obtained over 600 depositions supporting their case. These depositions were filed with the Clerk of the House on May 17. The Clerk promised to print the depositions as required by the statute, then reversed his position. It was not until July 29 that the Clerk transmitted the printed record to the Speaker who then referred the record of the challenge to the Committee on House Administration.

During the delay in printing the record, the contestants filed their briefs, pursuant to the statute. These briefs were filed on June 28, and copies were served on that date on the contestees. In spite of this fact, the Clerk has taken the position that the contestees brief does not have to be filed until September 1.

Despite the delay in printing, the challenge has been before the committee since July 29. To date, the committee and its Subcommittee on Elections have not scheduled a single meeting on the challenge.

The facts supporting the challenge are clear. There is no substantive reason for further delay. There is no question that in the 1964 congressional elections a substantial number of American citizens were denied the right to vote in Mississippi because of their color. This unconstitutional denial of the right to vote has been accomplished by a deliberate policy of intimidation, harassment, and terror, and even murder.

Mississippi's deliberate policy of disenfranchisement has been overwhelmingly documented. The U.S. Department of Justice has lawsuits in no less than 30 of the 82 Mississippi counties. The Civil Rights Commission has issued reports concerning the terror tactics used to stop Negroes from voting in Mississippi. There have been at least five murders since 1961 directly connected with the effort to register Negroes. In fact, just this week a minister was critically wounded because of his involvement with voter registration. In addition, the 2,932 pages of depositions filed in support of the challenge constitutes a vivid record of the almost unbelievable brutality perpetrated against Negroes who try to exercise their basic constitutional right to vote. Never before has any issue been so thoroughly documented prior to action by the House.

The current challenges, moreover, do not present new and untested questions to the House. They are thoroughly supported by a long line of precedents. In over 40 election contests in the past, the House has set aside

Not only is the citizen entitled to fair representation he is also entitled to full representation. When we deal with fair representation we are concerned that each man's vote shall be equal to his neighbor's. When we deal with full representation we are concerned with the quality of that representation. I believe we have solved the problem of fair representation and that we should now address ourselves to the problem of proper representation.

Consider the almost impossible burden that is placed on a Member. The bulk of the work of the Congress is in committee and logically previous congressional experience plays a large role in a Member's ability to perform as well as eventually serving as a committee or subcommittee chairman. But to develop seniority he must get reelected.

With an election scheduled every 2 years he must be campaigning constantly. For his survival he must keep "one face" back in the district ready to meet the demands for constant service by the people. He must answer thousands of letters, as well as telephone, wire and personal requests on varied and sundry subjects. He is faced with endless demands on his time, effort and money for political activities.

All this is vital to survival but has little to do with the legislative business of the House. He is expected to know the complex parliamentary maze of the House, to consider thousands of bills, and hundreds of major items of foreign and domestic legislation, to study the committee reports, the messages from the President and from the departments. He must keep up with the work of his office, receiving delegations and reading and answering an ever increasing volume of mail. Running for office every 2 years takes him away from his legislative work. Before he can learn the duties and obligations of his office during the first term, it's time for him to go back home to seek reelection.

The framers of our Constitution were concerned that the Members of the House should be responsive to the people and believed that the 2-year term was the answer. They believed that a Member could take care of the work of the House with plenty of time left to spend in his district. The demands on his time for legislative work extended from 4 weeks to 12 weeks a year. It was possible then, when Government was small. No one could foresee that the time would come when our Government would be so large, its operations so complex, our military strength so mighty, our financial, military and moral commitments so extensive, and our economic influence so pervasive, that the business of the House, if it were to be wisely attended to by its Members would require great exertions and intense dedication and time without limit. Last Congress was in session until December 31.

Democracy is dedication of our elected representatives to their jobs, and what we must never forget, it is also the freedom of those representatives to do their job. Anything less is not democracy. A Member is not able to do the job, or at least to do it effectively when he must turn his energy for a large part of every 2 years to campaigning back home.

It is true that in a democracy every elected officer must periodically give an account of his stewardship to the people who may then either accept or reject him, and this is as it should be. But to ask a Member of this House to do this every 2 years impairs his effectiveness in office.

I know there are some who will say we urge this change for self-gain and for self-perpetuation in office. If they would but stop a moment and think, they would see that this is not true. To change the term of a Member of the House of Representatives requires a constitutional amendment

and we know that this could take several years. By the terms of the resolution it cannot take effect until more than 1 calendar year after its ratification, and then only in the year in which the President's term begins. That means not before 1968.

The effect is to synchronize the terms of the President and the Members of the House. By the time this amendment becomes effective many of the Members of this House—and that does not exclude this speaker—may no longer be Members. But that should not change our position. If we can improve the effectiveness of future Congresses we should do so, even if we will not be part of them.

I would like to make one other important point about the 4-year term. I firmly believe that when you elect a person of one party as President, he ought to have the majority of his party in the Congress so that the responsibility is on the party, if we believe in the two-party system.

I know that it has occasionally happened that the President has been elected from one party and the majority from the other party are elected to Congress. In off years very frequently the control will change in the Congress so that we had a majority party different from that in the White House. But if we really want a strong two-party system and we believe in it, then the responsibility should be on the party and there shouldn't be this device of denial of responsibility when it comes to election time. The man in the White House and the majority should be of the same party.

Then if they don't live up to their pledges, if they don't do the job the people expected they can turn them out 4 years later. You avoid this divided responsibility. You don't give the Members the opportunity to say, "We don't have a member of our party in the White House," and you don't give the man in the White House the opportunity to say, "Those Members in the majority are of the opposite party and they are not going along with me." I think it would make for a stronger Government.

I urge this committee to favorably report House Joint Resolution 78.

THE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson has made it unmistakably clear time and time again that the United States seeks peace—peace with honor—in Vietnam.

No one can deny that we face a most complex situation in southeast Asia. The answers are not easy.

The President, however, has been very frank in informing the American public of the problems we face there.

The result of Mr. Johnson's forthright leadership is overwhelming popular support throughout the Nation for our policies in Vietnam.

A fine editorial from the August 13, 1965, edition of the American Jewish World recently came to me. I think it reflects what most Americans feel.

The editorial pointed out:

It is our belief, and we state it here without reservation, that the great, vast body of American opinion is with the President in his conduct of this difficult, complex, frustrating, and misunderstood campaign in Vietnam.

The editorial went on to recall the dread lessons freemen learned in the past from the Hitler era. That lesson, as President Johnson so aptly said in his report to the Nation recently, is that aggression and tyranny breed on softness.

America must stand up to communism. America must uphold its commitments. America must defend freedom in its hour of need.

President Johnson is doing all of this. For this, every American should be thankful.

The editorial from the American Jewish World follows:

OUR NATION'S ROLE IN VIETNAM

"We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table." These are theme words—a credo symbolizing America's essential stance in the Vietnam struggle and expressing this Nation's thoughtful and resolute determination to fight for the sake of peace.

For 8 tense days late last month the Nation waited while President Johnson deliberated America's immediate course of action. The announcement, when it came, told of his program for a significant troop build-up in Vietnam, but the even keener significance of his statement lies in the limited nature of the increase, the limited objectives he set forth, and his heartening, profoundly responsible emphasis on a search for a peaceful solution "at the conference table."

It is our belief, and we state it here without reservation, that the great, vast body of American opinion is with the President in his conduct of this difficult, complex, frustrating, and misunderstood campaign in Vietnam. It is our corollary belief that, by and large, the American people feel and understand that what we are engaged in, in Vietnam, is a defense not of the Vietnamese alone—valid and vital as that is—but it is an action of commitment in defense of the very concept of life free of the grisly Communist embrace and the threat of its pressures.

One aspect of the situation that make us most responsive to our President's leadership in the Vietnam situation is that its action springs from the dread lessons of the Hitler era. It was silence and inaction on the part of the West that kept strengthening Hitler to the point of no return. We are grateful that we have a President who reads history aright—who has both the wisdom and the creative courage to avoid the Scylla of a Munich, the Charybdis of Ethiopia.

We, too, must look at contemporary events with an intelligent eye; discerning that where we have stood up to Communist aggressions—as in Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Korea, and Cuba—we have succeeded in stemming the tide. This is our role and responsibility in today's boiling world—and thank God we have a leader who sees it so clearly, who knows so deeply that there is no hope for a world of reason and sanity, of peace and growth, until the forces of wanton aggression and brazen lawlessness are checked and defeated.

America's difficult role in southeast Asia has been a severe testing time. We are speaking to the world in tones unmistakable; if they have been misinterpreted, it may be because here in America the voices of criticism have been amplified way out of proportion to the numbers they represent. And their loudness, in fact, is what may be persuading Hanoi and Peiping that the American President is pursuing an unpopular course. It is not one we can contemplate with pleasure, but we Americans have shown that we know how to confront unpleasant and hazardous situations with determination and how to proceed from resolve to victory.

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ice by telegram, minute service by telephone, and most of my people know they can call me collect—and they do. If they are anywhere within 400 miles, every Member knows that you never know when a constituent is going to walk in on you without an appointment.

So, in addition to our getting home frequently, we know how they are thinking, and they let us know how they are thinking by their constant contacts with us.

My district, like Mr. CHELF's, has over 600,000 population, and I tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I know how they are thinking, because they keep me advised, and I make it my business to know how they are thinking. Only recently, without any political campaign in progress we had 8 legislative days during a 2-week period. I was home 7 nights of the 8 legislative days, because it was necessary for me to be there to know how these people were thinking and keep the engagements that I had made to meet with them.

We are closer to our people today than ever in the history of the country. We could not be any closer.

New, with reference to the legislative problem, or the state legislative reaction, the point that Mr. CORMAN raised: Our experience out of New York State, and we have 41 Members today out of New York State, is that most of our Members who come here to the House have served in the State legislature, either as an assemblyman or as a senator, and more frequently they serve first in the so-called lower house or assembly, then elected to the senate and then came here as Members of Congress. One of the reasons why we have had difficulty in increasing salaries of the Members of the Congress and increasing terms of office is that some of our colleagues say this is going to increase the competition for our seats. I think one reason the State legislators will vote for a 4-year term for us, while theirs may be 1, 2, or less, is because they have an eye on coming here. I say this is good, because we need experienced legislators coming here. The best men, I think, by and large, and this is not intended to be as any reflection because the gentleman sitting to my right, Mr. TENZER, is a first term—he never served in the State legislature. He is one of our best Congressmen and one of our best representatives. But by and large the man who comes here with legislative experience on the local level makes a better Member of Congress.

So, if these men have an eye on our seats, so much the better. It will keep us on our toes, and the day that anybody in my district can take my seat by an election, good luck to him. If the people are tired of me, then it is time they retired me, and sent a better man here, or a man whom they thought was better.

This also brings me to the point about my distinguished friend's recommendation that in order to get the Senate to go along with this, let's not give them any competition. I said before the Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Congress the same thing I now say to this committee: If the only way we can get the Members of the body to go along with this recommendation is to assure them of no competition, then let's not have the amendment. I say, if there is a man in that body who does not want to or who is afraid to meet his constituents and stand for reelection, because a Member of the House may be able to beat him and take his seat away from him, he does not deserve to be there. If that is what is going to stop this amendment from going through, then let's not have it. They have this competition now, because men who are running here every 2 years would rather run there for 6 years. They will have more competition that way than they will get by going along with a 4-year term for the Members of the House.

I can say this and say it so vigorously and forcefully, because I have no desire to stand for election to the other body, and this is not sour grapes, because nomination to the other body has been offered to me twice in my State, and rejected by me. I intend to continue and to complete my political service to my country in the House of Representatives if God spares me. So, this is entirely without any selfish interest on my part. I think this is the most undignified thing to say to any Member of Congress, present or future, that you come to the House of Representatives, and by doing it, you forgo your right to run for any other office. If a man, because of his service here, thinks that his people feel he will make a better public official in some other office, we ought not to, and certainly not by constitutional amendment, deprive him of that right to prepare himself for other office by his work here. I think this is basic to our democracy, that any man who stands for office, when elected should have a right to have his eye on a higher office or another office.

Now, if this means that he does not serve his constituency as well in the House of Representatives, they will catch on to it and they will very soon retire him. On the other hand, if by his service here he earns another office, they will give it to him.

The reason I oppose a staggering of the terms, or a 3-year term, is because I feel that if we believe in a two-party system, the only way you strengthen the two-party system is by having the term of office of the Member of the House coterminous with that of the President. I say the President should have a majority of the Members of the House of his party, and I say the majority of the Members of the House should have in the White House a member of their party. I do not go for this business of saying as it is so often said, that campaign planks or platforms are something to run on during election time and run away from after election time. I say that pledges made by way of platform planks and as pledges during a campaign are promises that are binding upon us, and if we do not keep those promises when the time comes for reelection, the electorate should turn us out. We should not have this division as we have had so many times of a President being able to run for reelection and saying: "Now, look, give me a House this time of my party. I did not have it in the last session of Congress, and, therefore, I could not give you what I promised you." And do not let Members of the House run for reelection on the pretense, or making the pretense, "Well, we do not have a man of my party in the White House and, therefore, I could not give you the legislation that you should have had." If we believe in the two-party system, then the man in the White House and the majority of the Congress should be of the same party to the fullest extent that the people want it, and then 4 years later they could go before the people and there would be no excuses that we could not deliver on our promises because there was an opposite party that was in control of the other branch of the Government.

This, gentlemen, I say is the reason why we should have a 4-year term coterminous with that of the President, and I do hope that when your deliberations are completed in executive session, you will bring forth a resolution or an amendment which will be submitted to the States for ratification which will give us a 4-year term. I personally will vote against a 3-year term. I personally would vote against any provision that would call for staggering of the offices. I personally would vote against any provision that would deprive a Member of the House of Representatives of the right to run for any other office because he is a Member of the House.

I know that those who have different opinions, whether it be Mr. CHELF or Mr. TENZER, or other Members, are voicing these opinions

and putting forth their considerations just as conscientiously and with the same high motives as I am. When that is done and the resolution is brought before the House, and the House votes, I will bow to the majority, whatever it may be.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DONOHUE (presiding). Thank you.

Any questions?

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Chairman, I must say that I am somewhat persuaded by Mr. MULTER's argument about the 4-year term being coterminous with the President's election. I did not mean to indicate in my exchange with Mr. CHELF that I did not think that the State legislators ought not to be allowed to run for Congress. I would pose the question again, and I think it is a reasonable one. I do not believe three-fourths of the State legislators will approve of this constitutional amendment. I believe 50 of the States would, if the people themselves voted on it, and that is why I think we should give some consideration as to the method of ratification. And, of course, there is no question, though I did not come from our State legislature, our best Members are those who did. And that is a good training ground. But I seriously question whether State legislators, so many of them with 2-year terms, would ratify a 4-year term for us and whether we might be better off in getting public expression from the voters in a secret ballot.

Mr. MULTER. Frankly, Mr. CORMAN, I think this matter of ratification by State legislators is outmoded. This should be submitted to the people, whether it is this kind of a constitutional amendment, or any other.

Now, I agree with you that if this were submitted to the people of the 50 States, it would carry overwhelmingly. I am not sure that it would carry in the State legislatures, too, in the State legislative bodies, also, but if we can bring forth an amendment which will bypass the State legislative bodies, I am for it, not because I do not trust them, on the other hand, I feel that if we send this to the States, there will be enough pressure from the people on the State legislators to do this job, and they will be in fear of being confronted with a situation of "Look, if you do not go along with us, maybe you will not get elected next time." This is a matter that affects the people and I think they will take an interest in it. It is unlike some amendments where the legislative bodies may freely express their own opinion and disregard the opinions of the people in their States. This is not that kind of an issue. This is one where the people are going to be interested, and I think they will put the pressure on their State legislative bodies.

Mr. DONOHUE. Thank you, again.

We will include in the record at this point the prepared statement of Mr. MULTER's.

(The prepared statement submitted by Mr. MULTER follows:)

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate and thank you for the opportunity to come before your committee today in support of my resolution House Joint Resolution 78, which would amend the Constitution of the United States to provide that the term of the Members of the House shall be 4 years instead of 2 years.

At the outset you ought to know that the majority of the Members of the House favor this resolution. I have been in this fight a long time. I have introduced a bill for this purpose in every Congress, except one, since I came to Congress in 1947. Back in 1949 I took a poll of the Members on the issue of a 4-year term—319 Members voted in favor of the proposal and 110 against. I believe the support of this measure by Members and nonmembers alike is overwhelming.

The Nation is properly devoting much thought and discussion to the problem of fair representation in the House. I suggest that it is time we think about the problem of meaningful representation.

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The world, and particularly the Communist masters, would do well to pay heed to the American character and to American history.

HIGHWAY TUNNELS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(Mr. CLARK (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Speaker, along with construction of the rapid transit system recently approved by the House of Representatives, completion of the interstate highway system in the District of Columbia is a matter of urgent necessity. The rapid transit system will provide the best conceivable means of carrying great volumes of people into and out of the downtown area during the rush hours. The highway system, on the other hand, in addition to its many other uses, represents the most efficient means of routing motorists around the downtown area, away from surface streets.

Though all signs are that construction of the rapid transit system will forge ahead, the District highway program is in deep trouble. In part its problems are financial and these can only be solved by the passage of legislation increasing District gas taxes and borrowing authority. In part its problems are esthetic and social and the solution of these is far more complex.

Some people are against the District highway program because it represents change. In my view, those people are misguided for change is bound to occur and properly constructed highways are one means of assuring that the change is for the better.

Others resent the program because they fear it will destroy the appearance of the city and uproot thousands from their homes, in too many people who can afford to be uprooted. These fears, I am sorry to say, are all too well-founded, for the present District highway program is bound to mar the appearance of the city. And the sole blame rests with the highway engineers who have shown an appalling lack of imagination in designing and locating proposed sections of the Interstate Highway System in the District.

This is a period in which all of us are taking an increasing interest in the appearance of the National Capital. Our First Lady is leading a campaign to beautify the Capital. She has the solid support of all of us.

It is scarcely consistent with this campaign to inundate Washington with miles of surface and depressed multilane freeways. It does not require a great deal of esthetic sense to realize that such highways are bound to be ugly. And just as disturbing is the fact that they are bound to move thousands of low-income families out of their homes at the very time when Government at last has the tools to provide a much-needed increase in low-income housing.

In urban areas throughout the Nation, increasing attention is being paid to highway tunnels as a means of avoiding ugliness and the destruction of homes.

San Francisco and New York are considering major highway tunnels. This kind of construction is bound to become increasingly popular. This is especially true because modern technology has substantially reduced the cost of constructing tunnels and additional technological advances are in sight which should reduce the costs still further.

Unfortunately, the District Highway Department does not seem to be able to read the signals. I know of only two occasions in recent times where it has been willing to construct highway tunnels and in both cases it was forced to do so by other units of Government. The first was the Lincoln Memorial tunnel which is being constructed at the insistence of the Department of the Interior. The second is the inner loop center leg tunnel which Congress itself demanded.

Otherwise the District Highway Department has been dragging its heels. I note that the Engineer Commissioner has stated recently that he opposes a tunnel for the south leg of the inner loop on grounds of cost.

It seems to me that when we talk about costs we ought to include the cost of lost parklands and of damage to individuals and neighborhoods. And we ought to talk about the cost to the Nation of having the appearance of its National Capital seriously damaged.

As dedicated as I am to the proposition that the interstate highway system must be completed in the District, I am equally committed to the view that this can and must be done without harm to the city. And I cannot be a fervent supporter of the District highway program until I am persuaded that the highway engineers have objectively considered ways of avoiding such harm, in particular through tunnel construction. I believe the House District Committee will do the Nation a just service by insisting that this be done.

The highway program is much to valuable to go down the drain because the engineers lack imagination. But that is precisely where it is headed and it is time the Highway Department woke up to that fact.

SPECIAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE FOR SURVIVORS OF SERVICEMEN KILLED IN COMBAT ZONE

(Mr. HANSEN of Iowa (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HANSEN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I introduced H.R. 10630 which is a bill to provide special indemnity insurance for the survivors of servicemen killed or who die as a result of injuries suffered in a combat zone.

With the involvement we now have in world affairs, it is apparent that we will be called upon many times to give assistance to nations that are threatened by a Communist takeover. At the present time we are moving toward the commitment of 100,000 troops in Vietnam. These men are being called upon to place their lives on the line in the fight for

freedom. It is not too much to ask their Nation to assure them that in the event of their death the family which they leave behind will at least be provided with a small amount of security.

I am aware that the whole matter of insurance for servicemen was given a long study and it was concluded that a compensation program would be more feasible than an insurance program. However, I feel that with the hazardous duties given these men and the fact that some insurance companies have a cancellation clause in their policies that we should do everything possible to remove a heavy mental strain now being imposed on these men. It is my hope that the Members of this body will support the passage of this bill.

OBJECT OF A SEARCH

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, few things give us more pleasure and inspiration than to see the development and the unfolding of the mind and spirit of a young man or a young woman; to see them wrestling with the great mysteries and challenges of life, to see them groping for truth through the maze which surrounds life, and to see them find their way through the labyrinth and come to the high, clear ground of a better understanding of life and of God with feet firmly planted upon this good earth.

I have seen the unfolding of such a story in my own family in a nephew, Branson H. Willis, Jr., son of my only sister. He, as an 18-year-old boy wrote, as a theme while he was a student at Fort Lauderdale Junior College, his story of search for the meaning of life, for truth, for God. He revealed his difficulties and his doubts as a searching boy, maturing into manhood, would do. This is what he wrote:

INTRODUCTION

This is my story. It is a story of search. It is a search of meaning, of value, of placement according to relativity. Time will bestow on me my goal. Will others be as fortunate? Others live with it and perhaps never realize their questions and wonderings. If they had the courage to realize their doubt and unsureness then they too would be searchers and ultimately finders of truth and knowledge.

I am a vagabond lured on by the vision of a splendor land somewhere; a maverick immune to any brand that accepts fences; the driftwood that knows only change is constant; the searcher who knows that treasure found is less than treasure sought. Something bigger, finer, and more wonderful than anything I have ever known awaits me somewhere, somehow, sometime.

These are my ways of saying I am searching. I am trying to find. I must find.

It is hard to put into words my reasons for searching and my object of search. Maybe it is easy to fill a darkened room with light by pulling on a switch, but, ah, finding the light switch in a darkened room! Maybe it is easy to open a door by turning a key in the lock, but, ah, finding the right key on the key ring in the dark!

I am searching for the meaning of God. Not so I can be a Christian. I don't believe there are many Christians in the world today.

There are, however, many acceptors. I am searching for God because he is the answer to truth, to beauty, and to peace. I'm not even sure if there is a God, or if I believe there is a God.

People believe that being a Christian means going to church, giving to their church, and believing in God. Therefore, they believe they will go to heaven (if there is a heaven—or hell). But, how many of these people have stopped to think and ask themselves, Is there a God? Is there? I have just always accepted it as something that is—and always has been.

Now I cannot just accept it. I have to know for sure what God means and who God is. Is God the crystal blue lake that sleeps peacefully at the foot of tall, strong pines? Is God the sunrise of a million breathtaking colors over a calm ocean? Is He the hands of a surgeon who delivers the small, fragile baby? Is He the darkling thrust who fills the desolate night air with blessed hope whereof he knows, and I am unaware?

Until I have the feeling, the realization of complete existence in God-consciousness, I am a separate entity appealing to a long-distance God, and am inclined to doubt whether my appeals can reach One who has so many sparrows to watch in their fallings.

There is a happy sequel to this story. Shortly after writing these words, my nephew joined the U.S. Air Force, of which he has been a part for more than 2 years. Now as a man—tall, straight, and strong.

He has not only found himself as a man, but he has found the things that make life meaningful to him. He is immeasurably proud of the Air Force, of America, and deeply dedicated to the service of his country and to the preservation and perpetuation of all that it stands for. And he has, too, found God, in church, in Sunday school, and in his private life.

I bring this matter to this RECORD somewhat to give encouragement to other boys who may be going through similar struggles but principally to pay tribute to the Air Force of our country for what it has done to make this troubled boy a strong, assured, God-fearing American man. For this additional contribution it is making in the spiritual realm to the strength of America, multiplied countless times, I am sure, in the lives of other boys and girls, we of this Congress and of this country who support this great Air Force, can take great pride.

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. PEPPER addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

SITUATION OF HUNGARIANS IN TRANSYLVANIA

(Mr. DENT (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, last Wednesday my distinguished colleagues from several States, under the leadership of the gentleman from New York [Mr.

HALPERN] have discussed in detail the discrimination and repression of the Hungarian minority in Rumania, some 1.75 million strong, by the present Communist Rumanian regime. They provide ample evidence by reference to articles, and by submitting voluminous witness material on the situation.

I would like to express my complete agreement with their conclusions and remind us that abridgment of human and civil rights, and the forcible assimilation process against national minorities are a matter of concern for all free peoples, because peace like justice is indivisible. Of course, we are aware that Communist governments whatever their present stripe have oppressed and continue to oppress their citizens and that the ultimate solution must be the creation of free elected and responsible governments in these countries where communism was imported from the Soviet Union under Stalin in violation of the intentions and desires of the peoples. Yet, in 1965, the naked oppression of a minority which is occurring in a Communist country which tries to improve its standing and economic and cultural relations with the Western powers should not and must not be countenanced by us.

Mr. Speaker, we must take firm and unequivocal action in condemning these Communist Rumanian discriminatory measures. Not only the Hungarian minority which is the particular target of the persecution, but all of the Rumanian citizenry is suffering under an unenlightened police rule and I am raising my voice against the abridgment of human and civil rights of all Rumanian citizens, particularly the Hungarian minority. I know that the Foreign Affairs Committee will take action soon on my resolution House Resolution 51, and that we will soon have the opportunity to vote on this issue as a body.

LABOR SHORTAGE FACING PICKLE GROWERS

(Mr. RACE (at the request of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RACE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday my distinguished colleague from Michigan [Mr. CEDERBERG], addressed this body and outlined an alleged crisis now facing the pickle growers of his State. Mr. CEDERBERG pointed out that he has been contacted by pickle growers in his State who allegedly will suffer severe losses from unharvested crops caused by a severe labor shortage. I am afraid that the Michigan pickle growers have not told my good friend, Mr. CEDERBERG, the entire story.

I know that it is somewhat unusual for a Wisconsin Member to be so concerned over the Michigan pickle industry, but in this instance many young men in my district have suffered financial hardship at the hands of this group. And I have doubt that other young men in other parts of this country have also suffered.

Before I go on any further, I would like to bring to the attention of the Michigan pickle growers at least 14

young men from Wisconsin have expressed their desire to work in the fields, harvesting the pickle crop. They are:

John Moser, Rural Route 1, Allenton, Wis.

Edward Schoenecker, Rural Route 1, Allenton, Wis.

Richard Schuster, Rural Route 1, Allenton, Wis.

George Beder, Route 3, Hardford, Wis.

George Schaefer, 121 Storck Street, Slinger, Wis.

Roger Millerman, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.

Thomas Ruetlen, 215 South Washington Street, Slinger, Wis.

Terry Cowan, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.

Kleth Cowan, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.

Warren Retzlaff, 214 Lawndale Avenue, Slinger, Wis.

Bert Hultman, 206A North Washington, Slinger, Wis.

Jim Killeen, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.

Charles Tennes, 218 Lawndale Avenue, Slinger, Wis.

Gerald Fries, 111 Buchanan Street, Slinger, Wis.

These young men were part of the A-TEAM program—athletes in temporary employment as agricultural manpower. This program was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor to relieve the anticipated shortage of the agricultural workers after the expiration of Public Law 78. On June 24, 1965, the D. & B. Pickle Growers of Unionville, Mich., agreed to provide employment for these 14 young men and other A-TEAM members from Wisconsin.

These youths were to report to work on July 29. The A-TEAM members were preparing to carry out their part of the contract. Other employment had been offered, but refused by these young men because the D. & B. Pickle Growers of Unionville had committed themselves by contract. But on July 27, the D. & B. Pickle Growers decided to break their contract with these young men.

Mr. Speaker, can you imagine the shock I experienced when I learned that these young men, many of whom need summer jobs to finance their education, were the wanton victims of an organization known as the D. & B. Pickle Growers.

I was even more shocked to learn that the D. & B. Pickle Growers canceled their contract because they "were not able to arrange satisfactory feeding arrangements as required for the use of A-TEAMS." I have further been advised by the Wisconsin Employment Service that:

Wisconsin A-TEAMS will not be used to harvest cucumbers (in Michigan). The various growers who previously used foreign workers to harvest their crops have either found sufficient local labor, interstate labor, or have reduced their acreage.

I contend, Mr. Speaker, that no labor shortage exists in the cucumber fields of Michigan. What there is a shortage of, is the type of labor that can be forced to live in shacks and eat substandard meals. With the expiration of Public Law 78, Mexican nationals are no longer available to be exploited. When the Michigan pickle growers finally come to accept this—I am certain the cucumbers will be harvested.

Tribute to the Honorable
Clarence J. Brown

SPEECH
OF
HON. WRIGHT PATMAN
OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 23, 1965

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I regret the tragic necessity of expressing at this time my deep sense of personal bereavement at the passing of my friend and colleague of many years in this House, the Honorable CLARENCE J. BROWN of Ohio.

When he passed to his eternal reward, he had completed 50 years of public service which began in 1915 when he assumed the office of State statistician of Ohio. He was elected his State's Lieutenant Governor 3 years later. At 23 he was the youngest elected State officer in Ohio's history.

He was elected Ohio Secretary of State in 1926, and was reelected to serve three successive terms. Under his leadership the election laws of Ohio were completely redrafted and have since served as models upon which other States have based reforms in their electoral machinery.

CLARENCE BROWN came to the Congress to serve Ohio's Seventh Congressional District in 1938, and was reelected to every succeeding Congress, often without opposition.

My hard-working friend, CLARENCE J. BROWN, dedicated to his district, his constituents, his State, and his country, rarely missed a rollcall and never neglected to answer a constituent's letter. His slogan in so many of his campaigns was typical of the man: "Stick to the man who sticks to his job."

He served his party long and faithfully, as a delegate to its national conventions, as a member of its national committee, and as a congressional campaign manager.

He was a successful businessman and farmer in private life. He was reared in Blanchester, Clinton County, Ohio, was graduated from the high school there, read law with a local attorney, and then attended Washington and Lee University. He was made an honorary member of Omicron Delta Kappa by that university in 1946. He also received an honorary LL.D. degree from Wilmington College in 1928.

His service on the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in his early years in Congress gave evidence of his ability and the seriousness which he brought to all of his congressional duties. His later service on the Government Operations Committee and the House Rules Committee was outstanding.

All who knew him will miss his outspoken integrity, his unfailing good will, and his informed counsel. The deepest sympathy is extended to his children in this hour of their grief. They have lost a beloved father, the House of Representatives has lost a dedicated and able senior Member, and the Nation has lost one of its most patriotic sons.

The Withered Arm—II

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD
OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 25, 1965

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I submit to my colleagues the second timely article from Newsweek by Ray Moley on our faltering merchant marine:

THE WITHERED ARM—II
(By Raymond Moley)

Above the din of jet aircraft, the news did not penetrate to the Senate Appropriations Committee that the future of our position in southeast Asia rests on sea transport. Simultaneously with the ominous weakening of Singapore in the defense of the crucial Malacca Strait, the committee canceled a cargo ship added by the House to the building program which is a vital part of our power to meet critical events in the Far East.

War in Vietnam, like the Korean War, is a maritime operation that rests on our capability of delivering men and equipment across thousands of miles of sea. For Korea we had "a bridge of ships" which is gone today.

In an article recently prepared for publication, Adm. John D. Hayes, U.S.N., retired, points up that in the Korean War, Japan was a base of operations not unlike Britain in the war against Germany. We have no such nearby base today and must depend on the more distant Okinawa, Guam and Philippines. In Japan there is virulent opposition to our Vietnamese policy and a political situation that is none too stable.

FINISHED WITH ENGINES

At Danang, Hayes points out, Marines landed from virtually the same ships that landed their ancestors on Okinawa in 1945 and at Inchon in 1950. The 173d Airborne Brigade was not airlifted from Okinawa to Saigon. It was transported in aging LST's, of which only a few now remain.

When the Korean war began, we had 2,868 fairly new and efficient dry-cargo ships. Today there are only 131 under 15 years of age. In the Government reserve there remain, along with the famous old Liberties finished with engines, a few hundred efficient World War II vessels. The Navy, calling last year for ships for an amphibious exercise, found that about 157 ships of the active merchant fleet could meet requirements of speed and cargo-lifting equipment and, of these, only 121 had an additional required feature in standard cargo rig.

In 1957 the replacement program of the subsidized lines began to take effect. The world's finest ships are among the 99 built at vast expenditure by those companies with the help of the Government's construction subsidy to the shipyards. They have very great speed, which is of the essence in wartime. Where shore facilities are inadequate for unloading, they are self-sufficient. Many ships of the subsidized fleet are already in service to Vietnam. But the building program in the face of developing demands in the Far East has been slowed down by budgetary decisions.

An air transport carries limited cargo, but this is a question of millions of tons. Besides, all aircraft are hungry consumers of fuel, which is transported by sea. There is great tanker tonnage available, but we are deficient in those of handy size for shallow ports. Only a few have been built.

THE LENGTHENING REACH

Equipment must go by sea not only to an increasing number of American troops but also to the South Vietnamese Army. Food must go to the population, and bases must be built with material brought by ship. Meanwhile, cargo ships must haul the supplies for Armed Forces elsewhere. There is the lifeline to Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. A number of vessels are committed by law to serve essential trade routes. We ship foreign aid and must also try to continue to carry the 5 percent of our commercial cargoes that go by U.S. ships—when they are not strikebound.

More than 99 percent of all American overseas transport is by ship.

May we look for help from our maritime friends? The price is rising, for they are busy and also carry for the Russians and Red China. Many of their ships have been thriving in the enemy supply line to the Vietcong. While the power of Britain falters at Singapore, her shipping companies—whining "Freedom of the seas"—lengthen the Communist reach toward the free world's British-protected jugular vein east of Suez. Japan, like Britain and West Germany, builds ships for the Communists, and demands that we return Okinawa—a staging base for the war in Vietnam. It is in that peculiar one world of international shipping that we must now shop around to supplement our fourth arm of defense.

Governor Scranton's Building Program

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JAMES G. FULTON
OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, August 19, 1965

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article from the Pittsburgh Press, August 24, 1965:

GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S BUILDING PROGRAM

Governor Scranton has proposed an increase of almost 50 percent in the borrowing power of the General State Authority, which borrows money to build State buildings and then gets the money back through rentals. And it is a recognition of the newly realized importance of higher education that fully two-thirds of the increase would be devoted to that purpose.

The 14 former State teachers colleges, now reconstituted as liberal arts State colleges, for instance, offer college courses at substantially less tuition cost than other institutions. They are reported now as having full enrollments and turning away qualified applicants. Mr. Scranton's program would invest \$137,500,000 in these institutions, and there is little doubt that such a program would accommodate more students.

Pennsylvania State University's growth for many years has been dependent on how much money it could budget. The proposed program would provide \$30,500,000 for facilities for this university. Another \$125,400,000 would go to buildings for State-aided universities, with Pitt getting \$19,641,561.

The next largest item in Mr. Scranton's program—largest of its kind to be suggested yet—would go toward a juvenile delinquency control program. Again, this is a known need; the Scranton program would build up to present and prospective requirements. Other projects, in "standby" category, would supply housekeeping requirements at various State institutions.

A word of caution may be in order. Desirable as these projects are, and assuming that they are within the financial capacity of the State government, it should be pointed out that if they are undertaken, they will swell the budget requirements for each of the affected institutions. If more dormitory space results in more students, it also will result in more teachers and more operating expenses. There is thus an assured additional cost, beyond the cost of the physical facilities themselves.

Before acting on the program, the legislature should check carefully the financial effects on each of the institutions that will be included. Growth to meet a need is highly desirable; but growth should be carefully planned to avoid a sudden outstripping of the financial abilities of the colleges.

We have had recently in Pittsburgh an example of what can happen when quick growth of a university outstrips its money resources. Undoubtedly, the University of Pittsburgh can use the facilities Mr. Scranton listed for it in his new program. The legislature should be sure that Pitt can afford them and that providing them will not disrupt the Pitt budget.

The Situation of the Hungarians in Transylvania

SPEECH
OF

HON. JOSEPH P. ADDABBO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 18, 1965

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, it gives me a real pleasure to join my distinguished colleagues, ably led by the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] in discussing the sorry plight of the 1.75 million Hungarians in Rumania who are the special target of Communist persecution by the Rumanian Communist regime. On March 25, 1965, I introduced a resolution together with many of them to condemn the discriminatory practices of the Communist Rumanian Government against the Hungarian minority.

Disconcern for human rights, denial of equal economic opportunity, forced settlement of those with professional diplomas into purely Rumanian areas several hundred miles from their place of residence, slow, but constant elimination of any instruction in Hungarian language in schools, police terror against those who dare to dissent even in a mild form denial of the freedom to attend the church services and let children attend religious classes, are all forms of persecution devised to break the will of the population to exist as an ethnic unit, and to "solve the Transylvanian question" by breaking up into atomized units the Hungarian minority.

This is not only contrary to what we believe in the West about human rights and dignity, and about equal rights to all citizens, it is even against Communist theories in this respect, though between theory and practice there are usually unbridgeable chasms in Communist states. But even international obligations are being violated by the Rumanian Communists. For in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which gave to Rumanian rule the

northern, more Hungarian-inhabited parts of Transylvania, there was a clause that the Rumanian Government will "not discriminate among its citizens on the basis of sex, religion, or language." The many witnesses, journalists clearly prove that such discrimination does exist in Communist Rumania in violation of the treaty pledge.

Rumanian Communist constitution even extends the equal rights to all citizens and also assures the free cultural and linguistic development of the nationalities in Rumania. All these guarantees are violated by the constant practices of discrimination, which are less in the form of statutes, but in the form of administering the statutes and ordinances. For example, there still exists an ethnically diluted "Mures-Magyar Autonomous Province," but though it was established as a reservation for Hungarian culture and self-administration, it has Rumanian police officials, most of the two councils are mixed or completely Rumanian, and in the theater at the capital of the province, Marosvasarhely—Turgu Mures—the plays are performed in Rumanian 5 nights, in Hungarian once or twice a week, and even those are usually translations from Rumanian. The place and street names are supposed to be, under law, bilingual; visitors report unanimously that there are no Hungarian place names left, and only a few old bilingual street names in some suburbs. Also even in the "Mures-Magyar Autonomous Province"—which never housed more than 29 percent of the Transylvanian Hungarians—railway, post and other officials either do not know or refuse to answer in Hungarian, and even the sales clerks in the cities only speak in Rumanian in order not to lose their jobs.

Mr. Speaker, under these circumstances it is our duty to solemnly protest these abridgements of human and civil rights and to make sure that when negotiations are conducted with the representatives of the Communist Rumanian Government these facts are also taken into consideration by our policymakers. Therefore, I am joining my colleagues in strongly denouncing this unjust discrimination which finds its immediate origin in the sympathetic attitude of the Hungarians in Transylvania toward the heroic Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956.

Farm Minimum Wage To Trigger Food Cost Rise

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. HAROLD D. COOLEY

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 25, 1965

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Speaker, the blanketing of farm labor for the first time under the minimum wage law, as proposed in the bill (H.R. 10518) approved by the Committee on Education and Labor, will certainly mean, if enacted, a rise in food and fiber costs of

substantial proportions throughout the Nation.

Moreover, the legislation could have devastating consequences for the workers themselves.

It certainly will hasten the substitution of machines for manpower on our farms, and eliminate thousands upon thousands of farm jobs. This would mean a new migration of unemployed farmworkers to our cities, to create poverty faster than it can be cured.

Mr. Speaker, the impact upon the majority of commercial farm operations may be severe indeed, for where profits do now exist in agriculture they are thin and these operators are unable, under present prices paid to farmers, to absorb the added cost of the wage levels contemplated by the new legislation. These costs must be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for food and fiber, or the farmers themselves will be forced into bankruptcy.

These are my conclusions, and I am sure this represents the judgment of other Members of this body, after attending this morning an informal meeting of House Members to review the provisions and evaluate the impacts of H.R. 10518, this new minimum wage legislation which soon will come into this Chamber for consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I am entirely in sympathy with all effort to improve the income and working conditions of farm labor. But I am convinced that a minimum wage law in itself, without other considerations and adjustments, could be disastrous to the farmworkers themselves. These questions first must be answered:

First. How will the consumer react to higher food costs?

Second. Where will the hard pressed farm operators get the money to pay the increased wages, unless there is an increase in food and fiber prices?

Third. What will prevent the movement of fruit and vegetable production just across the border into Mexico, where there is plentiful labor and vast areas of fertile acres now are being opened to irrigation? Such a movement already has begun.

Fourth. How many hundreds of thousands of jobs will be eliminated in agriculture by the substitution of labor saving machines?

Fifth. How will our cities cope with the problem of the new influx of unemployed farm people who are untrained for work in these cities, and must look to relief for sustenance?

Mr. Speaker, the Nation has just been agitated by the prospect of a small increase in the cost of a loaf of bread. An increase of seven-tenths of 1 cent in the price of wheat in a loaf was contemplated originally in the Omnibus Farm Bill that passed the House last week, as our Committee on Agriculture sought to improve the income of our wheat producers who have not had a raise in pay in 15 years. The millers and bakers told us the seven-tenths of a cent increase in the wheat cost would mean a 2 cents a loaf hike in the price of bread. The consumer resistance was such that we amended the farm bill to provide that the Government, instead of consumers,