

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE**

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

**SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES**

OCTOBER 24 AND 30, 1956

PART 45

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III

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:55 p. m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Karski, will you be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that you will truthfully translate the questions and answers put to the witness, so help you God?

Mr. KARSKI. Yes, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name?

Mr. KARSKI. Jan Karski, professor, Georgetown University.

Mr. MORRIS. You have acted as interpreter for Mr. Bialer; have you not?

Mr. KARSKI. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Now, Senator, will you swear in Mr. Bialer?

Senator JENNER. Do you swear the testimony given at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BIALER (through interpreter). I do.

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER (THROUGH JAN KARSKI, INTERPRETER)

Mr. MORRIS. Your name is Seweryn Bialer.

Mr. Bialer, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, in connection with its activities in trying to understand the full nature of Soviet activity, Soviet and Communist activity here in the United States, is particularly interested in knowing something of the developments that are now taking place in Poland.

Among other things, we noticed that the American Communist Party, through its official organ, the Daily Worker, is applauding the activities of Gomulka and other Polish Communists who are taking what appears to be an independent course of action from the Soviet Union.

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Now, because events abroad and events here in the United States are so closely interrelated, as you well know, we would appreciate, for our official record and under oath and based on your own long experience in the Polish Communist Party that you have related to us, we would like your interpretation of these events.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the subcommittee recessed.)

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building.

Present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

TESTIMONY OF SERWYN BIALER—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, I think you have made clear to us that there are two forces at work in Poland today. One is a force generated by the people and the workers for a liberalization, a relaxation of the heavy control on the part of the Soviet-controlled Polish Communists that has existed.

That is one trend; is it not?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, basically, although I would add to it that this force wants not only a liberation from the Soviet Union but is also basically anti-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you have also told us, have you not, of a second force, and that is a force that operates within the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party, which tends to bring the Polish Communist Party more and more away from the tight central control that has existed in the past?

Have I stated that accurately?

Mr. BIALER. Basically, yes; but I would add too that it is not only within the Politburo but within the whole party.

Mr. MORRIS. The international party, you mean?

Mr. BIALER. The Communist Party in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. From the Politburo down?

Mr. BIALER. Yes; down.

Mr. MORRIS. At the present time, Mr. Bialer, which is the predominant of those two forces?

Mr. BIALER. I think that the direct cause of the present situation in Poland was the first cause, the popular movement, the popular feeling; and because of the strength of that force the present party leadership could emerge.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have testified to that effect in your previous appearances before the Internal Security Subcommittee, have you not?

Mr. BIALER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And since your last appearance you find that the trend which you forecast at that time is becoming even more pronounced?

Mr. BIALER. Yes; except that I was not so sure that Gomulka would come to power.

The fact that he came to power means a basic change in the reality in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Since your last appearance, then, the change that has emerged has been the growth of Gomulka?

Mr. BIALER. Yes. The most important event which took place in Poland in the last month was that the popular movement became even stronger and gave opportunity to Gomulka to get power within the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Gomulka has always been a hard-core Stalinist Communist, has he not?

Mr. BIALER. I don't think one could say this. I think that in the years 1945-48 Gomulka held views which later on were strengthened, and those views could not be branded as Stalinist views.

At that time, in the years 1945-48, there was no possibility for his views to be implemented.

Naturally, basically he was always a Communist, always he was for dictatorship; but on very many issues he held views which could not be branded as Stalinist.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I noticed the other day, Mr. Bialer, that there was a reported phone conversation between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gomulka on relations between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government. Isn't it an unusual development that they should have released the text of a phone conversation between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gomulka?

Mr. BIALER. It is a very extraordinary event and I understand it in this way: Gomulka, realizing the anti-Soviet feelings among the Polish masses, wanted the Polish masses to learn about the tenor of the conversation, knowing that it would strengthen his prestige and power.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it equally possible that Mr. Khrushchev would have had to assent to the making public of this telephone conversation before it would be done?

Mr. BIALER. One should not exclude any possibility, although as far as I know this is basically against the rules, which are that this kind of relation between the Communist leaders should not be known to the general public.

Now, the second proof is that, although the text of the conversation became known in Poland, it was withheld from the Soviet public opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. You have prepared for us, have you not, Mr. Bialer, a short paper, 9½ pages of which I would like to make reference to at this point, and that is a sort of a sketch, a historical sketch of events leading up to the present crisis?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to place in the record at this time this paper which I now show you, and let it appear at the conclusion of the witness' direct testimony.

You have prepared this; have you not?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, I know that you are uniquely qualified to testify about events in Poland because of your long experience in Poland, but in view of the fact that you also are a student of Communist affairs generally I wonder if at this time you would be willing to answer a few questions on the Hungarian situation?

Mr. BIALER. If I can, naturally it would be my pleasure to.

Mr. MORRIS. In your opinion has there been a trend developing in Hungary similar to that you have outlined in this paper here today?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, I am convinced that it applies also to the situation in Hungary, and this I say on the basis of my acquaintances with the Hungarian Communist leaders, as well as my status with respect to present reality.

Naturally, the basic difference is that in Hungary at the last moment, in the last days, a bloody revolt took place which did not take place in Poland.

And, of course, I would like you to keep in mind the basic difference between the two situations. I would put it in this way: In Poland the present Communist leadership got to power half an hour before the revolt was to take place, and in Hungary half an hour after the revolt actually did take place.

If Gomulka had not taken power in Poland exactly at that time, most probably the same revolt would have taken place in Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying, in other words, that the accession of Gomulka prevented a revolt in Poland, whereas the accession of Nagy followed a revolt in Hungary?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir, exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, it would seem to have the effect—the imposition of the Gomulka government on the one hand and the Nagy government on the other hand were really attempts to put, as it were, a stove lid on this uprising that has taken place?

Mr. BIALER. Yes; both Gomulka and Nagy, identifying themselves with the anti-Soviet feeling among the masses, were a form of isolation against anti-Communist movements.

Mr. MORRIS. And in the case of Hungary the thing got completely out of hand; did it not?

Mr. BIALER. Yes; in Hungary Nagy came to power too late, you might say.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this device of keeping the lid on a popular insurrection succeeded in Poland and did not succeed in Hungary?

Mr. BIALER. I would say that in Poland it worked and in Hungary apparently it did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you feel that this trend, which you have told us about in your previous testimony and again here today, as well as in this short paper that you prepared for us—would you say that this trend is still operative in Poland?

Mr. BIALER. Yes. You mean independence from the Soviet Union?

Mr. MORRIS. No. By "this trend" I meant this drive on the part of the people to demand a certain amount of freedom and relaxation of controls.

Mr. BIALER. Not only am I sure, that this continues, but it will gain in strength in time because there are better conditions for it.

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Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean that as more relaxation of controls is granted to the people, the stronger will be their demands?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir, you are correct.

I would add this, that the Polish people for the first time have learned that they are strong, that they can win certain of their demands.

Before they were as if asleep under the Communist terror. Now they are as if awakened.

And I do believe that, once being awakened, they will continue this process.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you feel that this device of, as it were, a stove-lid government, used to keep this thing under control, was something initiated by Khrushchev?

Mr. BIALER. I don't think so.

As far as I understand the situation it worked this way: Indeed after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership wanted certain minor changes which would deceive world public opinion as to the nature of the Soviet methods. However, once they started this, it got entirely out of their control and assumed such proportions that I could not identify the present state of affairs with their original initiative.

I would go further. I think that the present Soviet leadership will have to recognize the developments in Poland and in Hungary, although certainly it will not mean that they are satisfied with it.

They realize that they are too weak to put it down.

Mr. MORRIS. But they do have, as it were, the situation under control in Poland?

Mr. BIALER. I don't think that they have the situation in Poland under control presently.

I believe that Gomulka has under his control, at least partially, the situation in Poland. This does not mean, however, that it is the Soviet leadership which has it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If, as you have described them, both Gomulka and Nagy are a sort of prophylactic against freedom, or as Mr. Morris has said, stove lids on the flame, if Khrushchev did not apply the prophylactic or put on the stove lid who did?

Mr. BIALER. Well, I would put it this way: I think that the leadership of the Polish Communist Party, all the leadership of the Communist Party—and for that matter also of the Hungarian Communist Party—do not like Gomulka or Nagy. They probably consider them as precisely stove lids, in this situation which has emerged in Poland.

However, they are forced by circumstances to recognize them.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are using them for their own purposes, in other words?

Mr. BIALER. Yes. These people, they pushed Gomulka in order to save the situation, but they do not have any intention of indentifying themselves with what Gomulka really is.

I consider that Gomulka really wants more freedom from Russia presently.

Mr. SOURWINE. You make a distinction between wanting freedom and wanting freedom from Russia?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, yes, I think this is a big difference. What is freedom? It is freedom from communism.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead and explain that a little bit, will you?

Mr. BIALER. Gomulka is a Communist, but he wants the Polish Communist Party to be as much independent from the Soviet Union as possible. He wants to be a master in his own house and he wants his party to be a master in their own house.

However, this I would differentiate from giving freedom, since he wants communism to dominate in Poland, and this means the dictatorship of one Communist Party in Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that Gomulka is interested in Polish freedom from Soviet domination if it does not also involve power for Gomulka?

Mr. BIALER. Yes; I think that such is the reality, such was the development of events.

Although he came to power originally thanks to the support of the Soviet Union, finally he assumed the position which you defined.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am afraid I don't have an answer that I understand yet.

I am trying to find out if you think that Gomulka divorces his own ambition for power from his desire to have the Communist Party of Poland sever its ties with Russia.

Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir; this is as you say.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Nagy, the counterpart of Gomulka in Hungary, is the one who called on the Red army to keep himself in power.

Would not that reflect a relationship, if Nagy is the counterpart of Gomulka, which would be slightly at variance with what you have told us today?

Mr. BIALER. Well, I don't think that I am at variance with my previous statement, since I maintain that the problem concerns only power, and both Gomulka and Nagy are prepared to use Soviet forces in order to maintain themselves in power.

The best proof is that in the years 1945-48 it was exactly due to Soviet support that Gomulka got power in Poland.

But there is a difference of circumstances in Hungary and Poland. In the case of Nagy, in order to obtain power, he needed Soviet forces. Gomulka had a different situation. He got power without the help of Soviet forces, and having actually achieved power he does not need any more the Soviet forces.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are saying that the maintenance of themselves in power is the important thing, the most important thing to both of these men?

Mr. BIALER. Yes, undoubtedly.

Whatever differences they have with the Soviet Union, they have one thing in common: it means maintenance of communism.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the statement of Tito which is reported in the morning papers today?

Mr. BIALER. May I see it?

Yes, I read it before.

Mr. MORRIS. It would appear from the account of that statement which I have just shown you, Mr. Bialer, which appeared on page 20 of the New York Times for October 30, 1956, that Tito is opposed to the uprisings in Hungary.

Mr. BIALER. I understood it the same way.

Mr. MORRIS. The basis of his opposition to the developments in Hungary is that the developments, such as they were, in his opinion damaged socialism in general, as well as peace among nations.

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Mr. BIALER. Yes. As far as I understood Tito's statement he condemns everything which took place in Hungary which would undermine the position taken by Nagy, which means everything that would undermine basically the Communist regime in Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, did I understand you to say that Tito's position would be opposed to Nagy's position?

Mr. BIALER. No; Tito would oppose in Hungary all those forces which wanted to undermine basically the Communist regime as such—the national Communist regime.

Mr. MORRIS. But to speak concretely, the Nagy regime?

Mr. BIALER. The Nagy regime.

Mr. MORRIS. So that anything that went further than the imposition of the so-called stove-lid government of Nagy in Hungary was the thing that drew opposition from Mr. Tito?

Mr. BIALER. As I understand it, Tito realizes that in Hungary there are two streams—one powerful stream supporting a national communism independent from the Soviet Union, and represented by Nagy, and the second stream which opposes communism as such.

Tito supports the first force, which means national communism headed by Nagy, and violently opposes all other forces which would like to strive against communism.

This is what I understood from Tito's statement. Of course, I do not know if from one article we can understand the position of Tito as such, basically.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I understand the limitations, but Tito in the statement refers to "reactionary elements that use the present events for their antisocial aims. By those he means the people that would upset Nagy?"

Mr. BIALER. That is the second stream I was speaking about, against which Tito pronounced himself.

Mr. MORRIS. Yesterday afternoon I had a session with a person who was a very important Soviet official but who defected from the Soviet organization. His defection, however, considerably antedates yours. But he did know on a very personal basis all of the top functionaries of the present Russian Communist Party. He interprets the present developments in this fashion. May I present his views and get your comments on that?

He believes that the top councils of the Soviet Union decided that they would be more effective in their efforts to control the whole world if they use the device of independent Communist Parties. By using independent Communist Parties they would be able to carry on their insurrectionary work in the various countries of the free world without the stigma of Moscow. And it is his contention that a very small group being privy to this plan could carry on and accomplish the present results, whereas at the same time the rank and file of the party would not necessarily have to be privy to that development.

I wonder, Mr. Bialer, if you could give your view, in juxtaposition to this other view?

Mr. BIALER. I find one weakness in this type of speculation. This speculation takes it for granted that a kind of a plot in an elite group, a small number of people, can decide the issue, while as we know the masses came into play presently and of course the masses complicated entirely the picture.

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It does not work as that small group of people planned it to work, even if it was true that they did it.

However, I must stress that the gentleman is absolutely correct when he says that such were the plans of the Soviet leadership.

I remember in 1954, when still I was in Poland, that the official line was: Poland is an independent country. That means that we were required to say to the world that Poland is an independent country. However, the difference is that at that time Poland was not an independent country, while today there are certain changes in Poland.

So, I would conclude in this way: Whatever were the plans—and plans there were, as that gentleman told you—the reality developed in a different way. It got out of control. The masses entered the picture and now the situation is not as planned but as the masses dictate.

The strategy of Khrushchev basically wanted events to go in this direction, but the reality got out of control, new factors entered the picture, and things went much further than they wanted them to go.

This is why I doubt if what is actually happening behind the Iron Curtain could be called Soviet strategy.

Mr. MORRIS. We had an instance last week of a refugee, a Polish refugee, returning to Poland, and we noticed that the arrangements for that were handled by the Soviet Embassy here in Washington.

That situation, Mr. Bialer, points up the primary concern of the Internal Security Subcommittee with these developments. It is of prime importance to the subcommittee that we analyze the various activities of the officials in the Hungarian Legation, the Soviet Embassy, and the various delegations to the United Nations.

Don't you think that the fact that the Soviet Union handled the defection of a Polish immigrant was of some significance at this time?

Mr. BIALER. I couldn't give you, sir, any specific answer, since I would have to know who the immigrant was, what the circumstances were, and so on. Perhaps such a procedure was necessary.

I have not enough material to pronounce myself one way or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to ask this: First, as a preliminary matter, we all know it's very difficult to know what a political reality is. If Mr. Gomulka does something which we presume Mr. Khrushchev wants him to do, we never know whether he does it because Gomulka wants to do it or because Khrushchev wants Gomulka to do it.

On the other hand, there is a reality which we can look at, and that is the matter of military control. The Soviets control the military in Poland, and they control the military in Hungary. Their own forces are in Hungary. They have Rokossovsky in charge of the Polish Army. They massacred the flower of the Polish Army at Katyn.

The purpose obviously, or a major purpose, at least, was to emasculate the Polish Army as a Polish force and to create a situation in which Soviet officers would be in the top echelon. And that situation has been created.

Now, would you agree that as long as the Soviet Union controls the military with its own forces or, as in the case of Poland, with its own officers, there can be very little freedom in that nation from the Soviet Union, in the last analysis?

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Mr. BIALER. Yes, I understand your reasoning, sir, where you are driving at, and I am in full agreement with you.

But the situation in Poland, as I see it presently, does not respond to your description. Rokossovsky is no longer minister of defense and commander in chief of the Polish Army. He left. He left yesterday. His successor is definitely Gomulka's man.

The control of the Polish Army is no longer exercised by a man who is outside of the Polish Communist Party, as was Rokossovsky; it is directly under the leadership of the Polish Communist Party.

As far as we can suppose from Gomulka's statements, the so-called Soviet experts are in the stage of leaving Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that Rokossovsky is no longer commander in chief of the army?

Mr. BIALER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who took his place?

Mr. BIALER. Bordzilowski, and above all Spychalski, both Gomulka's supporters.

Spychalski was in jail several years for anti-Stalinism and Bordzilowski is a genuine Polish general—well that word "genuine"—I do not remember now exactly his past, but I am sure I could put it this way: he is not a Soviet general.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that this presages the withdrawal of the Soviet officer corps in the Polish Army and the turning over of top command throughout the army to Polish officers?

Mr. BIALER. I am deeply convinced of this.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that is done what would you say it means?

Mr. BIALER. I interpret it this way: that indeed Gomulka and his followers want a genuine internal independence from the Soviet Union and want to have full control of the Polish armed forces themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the same vein, do you foresee the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Hungary?

Mr. BIALER. I think that this is more than probable.

Mr. MORRIS. At any rate, a gage of your view will be whether or not there will be an early evacuation of Soviet forces from both those countries, will it not?

Mr. BIALER. I didn't understand.

Mr. MORRIS. A gage of your interpretation will be whether or not there is an early withdrawal of Soviet forces from those two countries?

Mr. BIALER. We are speaking about Hungary and Poland now?

As far as Poland is concerned, I do not believe that the Soviet divisions will be withdrawn from Poland.

But I believe that the leadership of the Polish Army will be taken by the Polish Communists.

As far as Hungary is concerned, it seems to me that the Soviet forces will indeed leave Hungary.

As for the degree to which the reality proceeds as I thought, I remember around 1 week ago there was a general conviction here that Rokossovsky would be Minister of Defense. I was stating publicly that he would not be Minister of Defense, that they would liquidate him completely. And it happened yesterday. Although I must say that I did not foresee that the process would take place so soon. I thought that it would take place 3 months after the general elections, which are supposed to take place in January. Well, it took place yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bialer.
Thank you, Professor Karski, for assisting us once again.
(Whereupon, the subcommittee adjourned.)
(The portion of Mr. Bialer's statement placed in the record by Mr. Morris at p. 3154 appears below :)

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS

The beginnings of the most recent events in Poland are to be found in the second half of 1953. The development of events during the years 1953-56 can be divided into the following periods :

First period: Second half of 1953 until the end of 1954

During this period, discussions within the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) began, regarding errors in economic policy and, above all, the police methods of ruling the party and the country. These discussions were not widely made public. There were not even mass discussions within the party. The party leadership was not personally attacked. The party leadership, following the example of the Soviet Union, began limiting the power of the secret police. Even in this period these limitations were greater in Poland than in Russia.

Second period: The end of 1954 until the beginning of 1956

This period saw the ideological crisis within the party develop with great force. Above all, this encompassed the party intelligentsia. The discussions in the Party Activ began to develop even at official meetings. The voices of criticism began to reach the press. The criticism was very frequently directed personally against individuals from the party leadership. The power of the security apparatus lessened even more. To a great degree it became isolated from the party itself, where the concealed aversion to the security apparatus began to break out to the surface. The party leadership was forced under the pressure of the Party Activ on the highest levels to declare democratization and a change in policies, but it retreated, only step by step and began to introduce these changes into life only with great delays and inconsistencies. Frequently the attempts made by the party leadership to restore calm to the Party Activ were unsuccessful.

During the period 1955-56, opposition to the party leadership grew significantly. Within the party, the Party Activ achieved a rather large measure of freedom of activity in comparison to Russia and the other satellite countries—this despite the wishes of the party leadership. The following convictions resulted in the Party Activ :

Either Russia takes a serious step ahead, on the road to de-Stalinization, and in the meantime that which has already changed in the party in Poland be sanctioned and develop further, or else nothing will change in Russia and in the meantime there will be a rightist-nationalist deviation in the Polish party. It should be stressed that both in the first and in the second period, the movement against the party leadership, and in part, against the Soviets, embraced in a mass fashion only the Party Activ and, above all, the party intelligentsia. The party masses did not emerge from their lethargy and the overwhelming portion of the bureaucratic party apparatus continued in its practical work forward, however, even to a lesser extent than was postulated in the speeches of the old leaders of the party. The people just began to feel certain changes in the situation. Most of all they began to become less afraid—this because of the great lessening of police terror. They, however, were still distrustful of these changes. They saw no conditions permitting action and they did not know how to overcome their many years of silence. The crisis which was developing within the party was concealed from the people by various means.

Third period: From the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until June 1953

Krushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign which developed in a controlled, predetermined manner in the Soviet Union, evaded the control of the leadership in Poland. The internal party crisis broke through to the top and encompassed the entire party. Bierut's absence increased the crisis. The chief force in the party stepping out against the leadership continued to be the party intelligentsia. For the first time, however, in the whole post-Stalin period the masses began to

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move. The distressing economic situation which resulted from the 6-year plan and the frequent promises of improvement after Stalin's death was especially felt as the police terror was fundamentally weakened.

Fourth period: June 1956 to October 1956

At the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the party in October 1956, the Politburo presented its resignation to the Central Committee. Personnel changes in the Politburo were not accomplished through the removal of certain members and co-opting new ones, but in the form of removing the existing Politburo and electing a new one in its entirety. This is a fact of great importance, characterizing the situation which unfolded in Poland from June to October 1956. The form in which the election of the new Politburo was accomplished is unheard of. With this it should be remembered that a party congress is to be held in March. Hence there was the possibility of a painless evolutionary changing of the Politburo. The change was accomplished, however, in the severest form. This in reality rules out an evaluation of these events which would state that this was a predetermined plan. This was a change resulting from a struggle and a critical situation.

What forced the Politburo to a collective resignation—in other words, what developed in the period from June to October 1956? It appears that the following were the factors:

(a) A basic undermining, and in many aspects, loss of control by the party over life in Poland: The most active strata of nonparty individuals ceased being afraid. The Poznan events were only a small example of the tremendously explosive popular sentiment which arose in connection with political and economic matters, and was approaching the point of explosion. The hatred of the Polish people existed even in past years but, for the first time, conditions arose which threatened its explosion. The decline of the authority of the State and of the leadership of the party among the people on the basis of the bankrupt policies of the leadership during the past 10 years, the weakening of terror as well as irresolution in its present policies, was tremendous. It appears that this was the basic fact, without which Gomulka's return as first secretary, in the fashion in which it was accomplished, would not have been possible.

(b) The decline of the Politburo's authority in the party itself: The dissolution of party discipline had gone so far that the principle which is the condition of the existence of the party, namely, the principle that, despite various views, once resolutions were made they must be followed, was undermined publicly. The dissolution of party discipline and the decline of the Politburo's authority led not only to the fact that the control of the party slipped out of the hands of the leadership but it also made the mastering of the situation among the people unusually difficult. The party was no longer a well-oiled machine executing orders of the leadership against the people. If we speak of the rank-and-file of party members, of whom the overwhelming portion was never Communist but entered the party either under force or for economic gain or for career purposes, then this mass of the membership diffused, so to speak, among the people and lost its separate identity.

(c) The decided opposition against the party leadership on the part of the party intelligentsia which, in many articles in the press expressed in reality a vote of no confidence regarding the leadership, did not recognize its leadership, and more important, passed from discussion to practical activity. The party intelligentsia transformed itself from being a connecting link between party leadership and the party and the people, to a group separating the Politburo from the party and nonparty individuals.

(d) There was lack of unity in the Politburo, divergence of opinion, lack of a figure with sufficient authority and popularity who could unify the Politburo. In such an intense period, the Politburo did not have a clear program of action or a platform for change. The situation demanded—if everything was not to disintegrate—a decisive program, even a Stalinist one, which with the aid of terror could attempt to master the situation, or a program of far-reaching changes which would prevent an outburst and would eventually permit the recovery of leadership within and beyond the party. In the meantime, the policies of the party leadership during the period June to October was a policy of stabilization. Hence, a policy which was not one in favor of withdrawal, but at the same time one indecisive in regard to further developments. Hence this was not a policy of real power. It appears that the wavering and lack of a platform of action by the Politburo resulted among other things from divergence within the Politburo, indecision, the burdens of the past and lack of strength in its va-

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rious components. Beyond this, even if some group or individuals in the Politburo had a decisive program for change, perhaps one no different than the present platform of Gomulka, it is possible that they lacked authority to bring about its realization.

(e) The lack of unity in the Central Committee and the decline of authority of the Politburo in the Central Committee. The Central Committee could be persuaded but it could be no longer dictated to. A part of the Central Committee stopped believing that the situation in Poland could be mastered by the directorship of the then reigning Politburo.

(f) The actual situation in Poland and in the Soviet bloc had immense significance. First, the crisis of the Polish economy and the political forms of ruling Poland were revealed with great force. Secondly, the weakening of Soviet control and the decline of the authority of the Soviet leadership had developed to the point where publicly announced orders by the Moscow dictators were sometimes disregarded (for example, Bulganin's command, included in his speech of July 22, 1956, in Warsaw).

DYNAMIC FORCES BEHIND THE INCIDENTS IN POLAND

In the present situation in Poland, two dynamic forces led to the existing state of affairs.

The first force is the active pressure exerted for the first time since the war by large groups of people, especially factory workers and working and university youth. The basic character of this pressure is anti-Soviet, favoring full independence of Poland from the Soviet Union. It is also anti-Communist. It should be stressed, however, that the anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland is of greater strength than anti-Communist feelings. At the present time, the chief enemy is the Soviet Union.

The second force is the pressure exerted by a large segment of the party against the Soviet Union for the acquisition of independence from the Soviet Party in internal matters. Its aim is greater freedom within the party in public life and a serious reorganization of the economic structure of the country. The main stress is on internal reforms. The question of separation from the Soviet Union is only a necessary precondition for this.

The two dynamic forces came together and, in some cases, blended under the impact of present incidents in Poland. For a certain period of time, their interest became the same. In practice, a temporary alliance was concluded joining both forces in the matter of gaining a greater measure of independence from the Soviet Union. The degree to which both of these forces want independence from the Soviet Union is different. The reason why both of these forces want independence from the Soviet Union is also different, but for the present moment they have a common avenue of action.

The objectives of these two forces in internal matters are, generally speaking, completely different, but again the direction of their activity has, at the present moment, a number of common points. These are not opposed to the objectives of the people, that is, the internal changes in the economy and the political life which are desired by groups in the party who have come out in favor of changes. The people do not want to stop at these changes, because they are opposed to communism even if it is improved.

The two forces which were mentioned above are not isolated from each other. They mutually react on one another. The principal directions of this reaction could be described in the following manner:

The influence of the attitudes and activities of the people on the changes desired by groups in the party depends primarily on the fact that, as to date, the party is being forced in the direction of more responsible activity. Proposals are put forth which go further than the party itself would want. This favors putting forth at the lead the most radical elements in the party and in the leadership who, without the existence of the first force, would never so easily have obtained their present position and would not have so strong a position. As far as Gomulka is concerned, it would seem very unlikely that, without the existence of the tremendous pressure of the first force, he could have achieved his present position. Hence, with the existence of this first force, he found support not only from the side of his adherents in the party but also from the side of many opponents who saw in him a lightning rod which could absorb the more threatening incidents and could weaken the anti-Communist pressure of the first force. Parenthetically speaking, the difference between Hungary and Poland is based, among other things, on the fact that in Poland Gomulka achieved power before the rev-

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olutionary outbreak in the capital and fulfilled to a large extent the role of a lightning rod. In Hungary, on the other hand, Imre Nagy was brought to power in the course of the revolutionary outbreak and was incapable of mastering the situation. Beyond this, the influence of the first force results in the fact that the party has a stronger position in dealing with Moscow. (This applies, above all, to such a situation where the first force does not lead to mass anti-Communist uprisings.)

The opposite influence of the activity and work of segments of the party who desire change, on the activity and attitudes of the population is such that, if the desired changes favored by elements of the party come to the fore and are sufficiently radical, they will ameliorate the anti-Communist activity by the population. This is for the short run at the present time. By placating certain demands of the people and setting forth prospects of righting the political and economic situation, they help neutralize the anticommunism of the first group or, strictly speaking, defer its expression to the future. It seems, however, that the long-range effect of deferring the solution of this problem, can be different inasmuch as it will embolden the first force and create a better climate for its activity.

Inasmuch as in the present situation in Poland there occurred a temporary alliance of both forces, it is certain that, together with this development, a moment must come when the first force will press forward and the second force will not want to move ahead. And hence, the time will come when the permanent contradictory interests outweigh the temporary coalescence of interests. It seems that, given the situation which now obtains, it cannot be said that there must come at this moment a stoppage of further changes by the party. Under the constant pressure from the bottom and in strengthening the rightist forces in the party, it is possible that there will be an evolutionary development which will transform Poland into a country of ever-increasing elements of real democracy.

It appears that for the most desirable development of events in the future, that is, such which could harm a retrogressive trend and simultaneously press the leaders continuously forward in the direction of change, it would be necessary to have a situation where the uprising of the masses would be a primary potential threat but that the movement of the masses would take a peaceful form but in general. The following are a few of these views:

When one speaks of Gomulka's views in this period, a very important factor must be considered, namely, that those views were in reality just forming and absolutely not yet fitted into some kind of finished system. He did not yet state them in their entirety or, all the more, introduce them into life, nor, I am convinced, did he think them through himself. The entire period of his power in the party falls in the years of a fight for power, and building the very bases of Communist rule in Poland. It was only the last period of his leadership (the second half of 1947 and the first half of 1948) that there was a beginning in deciding how the economic structure and the political system in Poland would look. And Gomulka was not a theoretician. His views were primarily based on practice. Even then, however, there were in his views clear elements of contradiction not only with Soviet policies but also with the Communist ideology in general. The following are a few of these views:

(a) Gomulka had a negative attitude in regard to the activity of the Communist Party of Poland during the prewar period and to the activity of its predecessor, the SDKPIL. This negative attitude resulted from his critical evaluation of the fact that these parties subordinated the national Polish problems to the affairs of the international Communist movement. Gomulka thought that the policies of the Polish Socialist Party (an anti-Communist Party) were better in many regards, in any event, better from the point of view of national considerations. He wanted to separate the party he directed from the traditions of the Polish Communist Party. So far, that for the members of the party he did not want to use the name, "Communist," since this in Poland signified something Muscovite, something anti-Polish. This was not just a tactic with Gomulka. His colleagues in the Politburo and Moscow agreed to this in the early period because of tactical considerations since a battle was being waged for power where no political trick could be neglected. But in 1947-48, other leaders of the party and Moscow considered that it was time to end this tactic. Gomulka, however, regarded this matter seriously and not just as a tactic.

(b) Gomulka regarded the matter of alliance with Russia as a state problem. He explained the need for this alliance by the German question. He put national considerations at the forefront in this alliance saying practically noth-

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ing of a common-party ideology of both countries. The entire tenor of his speeches and views was permeated with caution in a positive evaluation of Russia, mistrust in relation to Russia as well as constant stressing of the unsuitableness of the Soviet example for Poland. In the meantime, the impression arose that he was for Soviet troops in Poland and for Russian intervention in Poland since this was necessary for him to come into power, but that after getting power he would gladly get rid of the protectors.

(c) Gomulka was an opponent of the collectivization of agriculture. He did not feel this suitable given Polish conditions. He did not have any positive program of transforming the Polish villages. He was concerned with retaining the status quo. Apparently he was an opponent of violent measures in the industrial field. He attached many hopes to cooperatives in trade.

In short, it can be said that in his views Gomulka differed from his colleagues in the leadership and in Moscow mainly in that he wanted to wield control over Poland himself without submitting reports to Moscow, that he wanted to develop communism in Poland in a more evolutionary manner, that he wanted to avoid those forms in the building of communism which in his opinion were contrary to the national Polish character. He wanted to feel less a leader of the party and more a director of the state.

GOMULKA AND HIS STRENGTH IN THE POLISH PARTY AT PRESENT

Both the movement within the party which began after the death of Stalin as decreed by Moscow, as well as the movement within the party which began to develop at the same time, went much further than Moscow wanted and was a kind of rebellion against the leadership of the party and the ideological dictatorship of Moscow. It was not a Gomulkaite movement inside the party and particularly in the Activ. The slogan "democracy" was not associated with Gomulka whom the Activ knew to be a dictator from 1945 to 1948. The attachment to Leninist tradition and outbursts of hatred toward Russia in conjunction with the revelation of the Polish Communist Party affair (KPP) (i. e., its destruction by Stalin after 1938) was also different than the attachment by Gomulka to the traditions of socialism and his nationalistic anti-Russian stand. As far as the leadership of the party is concerned, which to an overwhelming extent retained its leading functions up to the present within the scope of a Gomulkaite Politburo and government, it appeared a month or two ago that it maintained the basic accusations leveled against Gomulka in 1948 and did not intend to return the leadership of the party to him. It is doubtful that in the intervening 2 months that their basic views of Gomulka and his past errors could be so generally revised that the party high command would voluntarily relinquish to Gomulka the leadership of the party. I believe that it is more sound to say that a majority of the party high command was and is negatively predisposed to Gomulka and gave him power under the pressure of a threatening situation, of their own irresolution and the conviction that he is capable of mastering the situation. It appears that the initiators of this move was that more clever (or perhaps that supporting) group of the leadership who even before the Plenum (Ochab and Cyrankiewicz) had already come to an agreement with Gomulka and in this way saved themselves with the rest. However, it also appears likely that Moscow was warned by the stubbornly Stalinist part on the party leadership. It therefore appears that in the party leadership and present setup Gomulka has more enemies and wavering supporters than decided friends. This situation will however probably change.

First. Gomulka already has introduced some of his people into the Politburo and central committee, for example, Loga-Sowinski, Kliszko, and Spychalski.

Second. It will be easier for the Polish Socialist Party portion of the party leadership to work with Gomulka than with the former leadership. They have more points in common in the past as well as now.

Third. I doubt that the majority of the present members of the leadership, who were simultaneously favored in the years 1950-55, will long remain in the leadership. Gomulka has already proposed the creation of an impartial commission that will occupy itself with an examination of who is responsible for the crimes of the past; that is, crimes not committed by Gomulka.

Fourth. In March there is to be a party congress. Gomulka, who at the present time wields enormous authority and power, will undoubtedly utilize this congress for selecting a central committee favorable to himself.

As far as the Party Activ and the party intelligentsia are concerned, it appears that while supporting the main points which he accepted in his policy speech

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(independence from Russia, putting a brake on collectivization, production of consumer goods), they are not tied to Gomulka but approach him with many reservations. The main strength of Gomulka is the basic party organizations. It appears that his support here is enormous. This also applies, so it would seem, to the workers, youth, and military organizations. Their attitudes differ from the feelings of the people primarily, and sometimes only in that they want the party to continue to rule in Poland. For that reason their support of Gomulka will most probably continue as distinct from support of the people, who want independence from the Soviet Union, internal reforms, and are simultaneously anti-Communist.

EVENTUAL CHANGES IN THE PRESENT VIEWS OF GOMULKA COMPARED TO 1948

At the VII plenum of the central committee of the party, 3 months ago, when it was decided to reinstate Gomulka in the party, this was no doubt done on the condition that he accept the existent political platform of the party. However, Gomulka became the first secretary of the party despite the ruling of the VII plenum without accepting the party line which was confirmed at that time by the central committee and the politburo. From this first policy speech it is evident that he considers as improper the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 which condemned his position despite the fact that these resolutions are formally binding since they have never been revoked. Gomulka made it clear that he still maintains the position he held then in matters to which Moscow and the Polish central committee were opposed.

Second. Gomulka made it very clear that he considers the general party line not only in the years 1948-53 but also the years 1955-56 (and hence from Stalin's death until he (Gomulka) took power) as fallacious. This is at the same time a condemnation of the slowness and half measures of the changes which were accomplished in Russia since the death of Stalin.

Third. On the basis of Gomulka's first speech, it is difficult to estimate exactly what his general line will be, that is, how far he has progressed in the views he held in 1948. Such an estimate can only be made after the elections in January and the party congress in March.

The following factors might be of primary importance in influencing the difference in Gomulka's position and views as compared to his position and views in 1945-48:

In the years from 1945 to 1948 Gomulka ruled Poland under conditions of complete Soviet control over the life of the country. This control hampered the freedom of his moves and views. Presently, under conditions of basically weakened or perhaps even severed direct Soviet control, Gomulka has a freer hand to vent his views and bring them to life.

Second. The years 1945-47 were a period of struggle for power in Poland. At that time it was a question of life or death for the Communist Party in Poland. In such a period the differences of opinion between Gomulka and the Soviet Union as well as the pro-Soviet Polish Communist leaders had to give way to the more important pressing problem of getting and retaining power. The present period in this regard does not hamper Gomulka as it did then.

Third. After Gomulka personally experienced the full meaning of Stalinism and the Soviet system. He went to prison. He had the incentive and time to think through and examine the differences between Polish interests and those of the Soviets and traditional Communist ideology.

Fourth. In 1948 Gomulka did not have any support in the party. The party accepted his removal with hardly any resistance. At the present time Gomulka has certain groups of activists who support him because of his views. He has certain groups of activists who support him because of fear of the return of Stalinism. At the same time, he has strong backing among the mass of rank-and-file party members who for the first time in party history pulled themselves out of their lethargy and bonds of party discipline. This strengthens the position of Gomulka and should have the effect of making him stronger in his demands.

Fifth. In view of the fact that in the years 1945-48 Gomulka fought against the people, he did not have their support. At the present time however, he has their support. Thanks to this support, above all, he was able to achieve the position of ruler of the country. This support which at present is his strength and trump, simultaneously limits his freedom of movement and rather presses him to a position of supporting the most far-reaching changes in internal policies as well as in relations with the Soviet Union.

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Sixth. In the years 1945-48, Gomulka helped create the Stalinist system in Poland. He himself later became a victim of this system. In coming to power in 1956, Gomulka found a basically weakened and disorganized power of the secret police, an awakened active public opinion, and full discussions in the press. He rose to power on the wave of a general conviction that he will want to further develop these beginning elements of change. It is doubtful if in these conditions he will want or could return to such a system as he built in Poland in 1945-48. All of these above factors rather press Gomulka in a direction further differing from the traditional Soviet-Communist views than the views he held in the period 1945-48.

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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p. m., in the office of Senator William E. Jenner, Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Jenner (presiding).

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Rastvorov, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RASTVOROV. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, at the last appearance of Mr. Rastvorov before the Senate subcommittee, he told us in his testimony that he knew Sergei Tikhvinsky, a member of the NKVD, an official whose job it was, according to his own direct knowledge, to recruit Japanese prisoners into the Soviet apparatus and then send them back into Japan, and at the time of his appearance he said Mr. Tikhvinsky had just been appointed by the Soviet Government as the head of the official trade mission to Japan and it was thought at that time that he would be the Soviet Ambassador to Japan.

Now, from our point of view, it was an extremely important intelligence development, that we have the spectacle of a man that trains Japanese into Communist agents from among Japanese prisoners, sends them back to Japan after they are trained, and then that he is sent there as the head of a mission, so that he is in a foreign country working with agents of his own organizing and training.

Now, in following up the particular point, we noticed here last week that the son of Prince Konoye died in a Japanese prison camp, and we asked Mr. Rastvorov if he knew anything about that particular development and he said he did, and we are asking him to give testimony on that particular subject.

What do you know about the son of Prince Konoye?

TESTIMONY OF YURI RASTVOROV

Mr. RASTVOROV. The Soviet Intelligence Service had a very special group organized in 1947, 1948, to recruit a number of Japanese prisoners of war held in prison camps all over the Soviet Union—

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. What position did you occupy at that time? You were then in the Soviet Military Intelligence?

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Mr. RASTVOROV. At that time I was an officer of the MVD. I myself was engaged in the recruiting of Japanese prisoners of war.

The Soviet Intelligence Service was interested in Japanese prisoners who occupied important positions in their country, as I testified before. All of those people were targets for recruitment. Among them were several prominent Japanese, including the son of Prince Konoye. Officers whom I know personally, for instance, Colonel Vashkin, participated in the attempt to recruit him.

The son of Prince Konoye, in spite of the persistent attempts to recruit him, did not collaborate, and refused to act as an agent of the Soviet Intelligence Service in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. There were offers that he would be repatriated if—

Senator JENNER. If he collaborated?

Mr. RASTVOROV. If he collaborated, but he would not. After they failed in their recruitment attempt, they tried him and sentenced him as a war criminal. I don't know what the sentence was, but he would get a long term in prison.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Rastvorov?

Mr. RASTVOROV. I know it from people who were engaged in this operation.

This man I mentioned, a Colonel Vashkin, participated in the attempted recruitment of the son of Prince Konoye. I know Vashkin personally; when he was in Tokyo I worked with him. He was chief of the MVD group in Tokyo, where he worked under the cover name of Volgin.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was his cover assignment?

Mr. RASTVOROV. His cover assignment was chief of consulate of the Soviet mission in Japan.

To continue, I learned from Vashkin and others that the Soviet Government refused to free the son of Prince Konoye, and decided to keep him in the Soviet Union in order to avoid revelation of all that had happened to him in connection with attempts to recruit him. The Soviets realized the reaction of the Japanese people and people of the free world if Prince Konoye revealed his experiences, so he was sentenced as a war criminal and, I assume, reduced to living conditions which would shorten his life, following the principle that "Dead men tell no tales."

Mr. MORRIS. That is an assumption on your part, that they deliberately shortened his life?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes, that is my assumption on this particular case, based on my personal experience in the MVD.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are there any developments since our last session about Sergei Tikhvinsky.

Mr. RASTVOROV. No; I don't know all the recent details about Tikhvinsky. I know only that he continued to stay in Tokyo in spite of the fact that the Japanese knew his real assignment is to expand Soviet intelligence operations in Japan, and to recruit new agents, to replace those who were uncovered by my defection.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Rastvorov, since your last testimony there have been reports that Col. Gen. Serov, who I think you told us is the ranking MVD officer now—

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; the press announced the appearance in Hungary of General Serov, chairman of the KGB, formerly called the MVD. He was appointed chairman of the KGB after the arrest of

Beria, and since then has held this position. Previously, in 1943, he headed the special task force which was engaged in the deportation of national minorities in the Soviet Union from the Caucasus area, such as the Kalmiks, Chichans, Ingushi, Crimean Tartars from their homeland to the interior of the country, mainly to Kazakhstan.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, in 1943 his assignment was to specialize in mass deportations and mass relocations of populations?

Mr. RASTVOROV. He was in charge of the operation.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Because I participated myself.

Mr. MORRIS. With him?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was his rank at that time?

Mr. RASTVOROV. At that time, he held the same rank, General, and was deputy of the minister of MVD.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your rank at that time?

Mr. RASTVOROV. At that time I was a captain.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were one of his assistants, and, therefore, you knew?

Mr. RASTVOROV. No; I was not one of his personal assistants. I was a member of a huge group established for the deportations of national minorities.

Senator JENNER. You were an officer in that?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And General Serov is now in Hungary?

Mr. RASTVOROV. According to newspaper reports, which have been confirmed several times.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Jenner, the Internal Security Subcommittee today took testimony from several Hungarians who have been in the country less than a week, that they witnessed and experienced the efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to effect extensive deportations from Hungary to the Soviet Union, and in view of that development and the reported arrival of General Serov there, we were particularly interested in getting Mr. Rastvorov's testimony about this specialty of Serov.

Mr. RASTVOROV. For that particular job—to continue my statement—after the successful deportation of the whole population from one area to another he was awarded several decorations.

Serov also was head of a special group which was organized after the defeat of Germany. The task of this group was to arrest and deport to the Soviet Union so-called Fascist elements and anti-Soviet persons. This also involved rounding up German scientists, especially nuclear scientists, who now are helping them to build atomic weapons in the Soviet Union.

For all of these operations he was decorated as a hero of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know all of this from your own experience.

Mr. RASTVOROV. From my own experience; yes.

Serov was also in charge of the liquidation of rebel groups in the Ukraine who fought against the Soviet regime during and after the war.

I can add also that Serov was called the master of deportation, because of his experience in this particular job. I also have assumed

because of my experience as a former NKVD officer, that the Soviet Government sent him to Hungary to liquidate revolutionary resistance against the Soviets who dominate Hungary and would like to add that special MVD divisions, called divisions of special assignment, were established during the war and participated in the liquidation of these nationalistic groups in the Ukraine and the deportation of minorities from their homelands. I assume that these divisions are now active in Hungary, along with Soviet Army units.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Ambassador Rodionov?

Mr. RASTVOROV. He is an admiral of the Soviet Navy. He was appointed as Ambassador to Sweden in 1948 or 1949.

Originally, he was one of the deputies of the chairman of the Committee for Information, and I worked under him at that particular time.

He went to Sweden as the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, and stayed there until recently, when he was forced to leave by the pressure of Swedish public opinion, in connection with his espionage activity in that country.

He started in this profession in the early 1940's, as one of the leading figures of the Navy Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union—

Mr. MORRIS. Was he head of the Navy Intelligence Service?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; at one time before the establishment of the Committee of Information.

In 1948, after the merger of all the military intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the intelligence service of the MVD, he was appointed a deputy of the chairman for the Committee on Information. At that time, the chairman of the Committee of Information was Molotov, who was succeeded by Vishinsky and then by Zorin, former ambassador to Bonn.

Mr. MORRIS. So Zorin, too, was an intelligence man acting under diplomatic cover?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; he worked as an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. And I think that you told us previously that Ambassador Panyushkin was, to your knowledge, a high-ranking official of the Soviet intelligence service.

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; I know him personally as a high-ranking intelligence officer.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his military rank?

Mr. RASTVOROV. He was a major general, and after he returned to the Soviet Union he was appointed as a deputy of the chief of the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. We can say that this directorate is the same thing as the Comintern—in other words, it functions as a clandestine comintern.

Senator JENNER. Was the Comintern dissolved during the war?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; it was.

Senator JENNER. Well, was it actually dissolved?

Mr. RASTVOROV. No; not actually. Only nominally.

Senator JENNER. It went ahead functioning?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; just the same, basically.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, is there any difference whatever in their activities before the so-called dissolution, and after dissolution?

Mr. RASTVOROV. No; they continued to work the same way, using the same methods.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rastvorov, it has been suggested that the present policy of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at this time should be one of assisting the Soviets in effecting a series of detachments of the satellites from the Soviet Union. The United States Government is being urged to lend its good offices to aiding the Soviet Union in negotiating these detachments of the satellites from the Soviet Union and that by so doing we would be contributing to the peace of the world. The reason for all of this being that the satellites have become a liability to the Soviet Union.

Mr. RASTVOROV. Well—

Mr. MORRIS. Let me finish.

Based on your long experience as a Communist and particularly as an officer of political intelligence, can you tell us what your analysis is of events in the satellites and generally the meaning of Soviet policies.

Mr. RASTVOROV. The Western world has welcomed de-Stalinization with a mixture of confusion and wishful thinking, the recent form of which may be more aptly termed an indulgence in "great expectations." The belief that the present Kremlin leadership has inaugurated a departure from Stalinist terror and brutality has been destroyed by the recent events in Eastern Europe.

A key to the present situation was Khrushchev's conditional condemnation of Stalin for such acts as the extermination of many leading old Bolsheviks, while conveniently ignoring the forced collectivization of the Russian peasantry through mass annihilation. The practical nature of the Communist system was thereby shown. A leader was condemned for certain errors alone, his general policy of oppression was not rejected, in either internal or external matters. As far as the latter is concerned, the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union were entirely in keeping with Lenin's philosophy, and certainly not attributable to Stalin alone. The present leaders of the Kremlin will continue to advocate the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, without the limitations imposed on them by the reactionary brutality of Stalin.

De-Stalinization can be considered as the basis of the policy being applied at present by the Soviet regime in its efforts to seek new, flexible political forms in relationship to its own people, the satellite populations, and the inhabitants of the Western World. This has been made necessary by the realization that there is evolving a growing opposition to communism and its leadership. The denunciation of Stalin was forced by the realization that his methods, essentially rigid and reactionary, were not consistently applicable in present circumstances. They have realized that a more elastic political form was long overdue, in which they could appeal to the wishes of the populace by the institution of temporary and artificial reforms. This must be recognized as not being a departure from the basic principle of control, the very essence of the Soviet system.

The entire program of de-Stalinization has been projected on a barrage of propaganda designed to create the illusion of the advent of a new era devoted to the pure form of communism. However, so-called de-Stalinization does not mean a departure from the central theme of communism, the basic tenet of which is "the dictatorship of the proletariat," or more correctly stated, "dictatorship of the party henchmen over the working masses." This dictatorship is impossible

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without the application of the identical methods of Stalin—terror and oppression. This same resort to violence will be found in the new, flexible political policies of the collective leadership. A perfect example of the application of this flexibility can be shown in the developments in Poland and Hungary. In the first case, control has been maintained by the application of this rapid political maneuvering called for in Leninism, the use of the principle of retreat in order to regroup and reorganize preparatory to advancing. The political and economic domination of Poland by the Soviet Union is unchallenged to this moment, despite the liberal reforms attributed to the Gomulka regime. Should the situation in Poland have presented an opportunity for the emergence of an opposition party, the Soviets would not have hesitated in the application of the violent elements of their new policy of flexibility.

In the case of Hungary, the world has witnessed a perfect example of the more practical aspects of the new Soviet flexibility. Unencumbered by moral principles, the Soviet regime set about systematically to liquidate an entire nation. The Kremlin leadership quickly recognized the appearance of new political forces, representing a fatal threat to the strategic position of the Soviet Union in Hungary. The end result was inevitable. Despite resolutions of condemnation, protestations, and appeals to moral principles, I believe that the Kremlin leadership under no circumstances will relent from its complete domination of Hungary. In reference to the possibilities of liberating Eastern Europe by peaceful means, may I quote Khrushchev, to the effect that the Soviet Union will depart from the principles of Marxism-Leninism when "the shrimp learns to whistle." The Western World must recognize that de-Stalinization is nothing more than a reaffirmation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, and is essentially a much more cynical and complete system, embodying both the ruthless oppression of Stalinism and the more subtle means of political manipulation.

Keeping this situation in mind, I believe that the Kremlin, in spite of its saber rattling, is genuinely concerned with the preservation of peace—for a limited time. It must be noted, however, that peace is desired by the Soviets and the Western World for completely different reasons. The high ideals of the West fit precisely with the practical considerations of the Kremlin. The biggest factor in the planning of the Soviet Union is time. They need time to build, time to consolidate, and time to establish a state of preparedness, from which they can enter the inevitable conflict with a reasonable hope of success.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all.

Senator JENNER. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record, following which, at 4 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)

(The following testimony by E. Andriyive, a Soviet defector, on May 16, supplementing a previous excerpt which appears in part 21 of Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, was ordered into the record by Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding, at a hearing on February 20, 1957:)

**CONTINUATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF E. ANDRIYVE ON MAY 16,
1956**

Mr. MORRIS. How do you interpret recent events in the Soviet Union based on your experiences as you have set them forth?

Mr. ANDRIYVE. You obviously refer to "de-Stalinization," sir, to the famous Khrushchev's speech of February 24, 1956. It seems that the meaning of the "new Soviet turn," as far as the West is concerned, has been correctly understood here. Khrushchev did not change a bit the old Soviet ultimatum to the West: Capitulate or perish. His "new" line is not to abandon the old Stalin policies but to make them more efficient.

On the other hand, the reasons why the "de-Stalinization" campaign has been launched are being explained here in various equally unconvincing ways. Yet, to understand the functioning of the Soviet system it is very important to know those reasons. I claim no patent for knowledge of the Soviet system, but still have a sort of my own theory.

Some experts say that the "de-Stalinization" is a consequence of acute internal troubles and that Stalin was sacrificed as a scapegoat in view of the prevailing well-known mass discontents in the Soviet Union and in satellites.

It is easy to expose the inconsistency of such explanations. The mass discontents have been deeply rooted in Russia and in the satellite countries; they are an inalienable part of the Soviet system. Unless the 300 million people were taken for morons, the Kremlin gangsters could not even dream of alleviating those discontents merely by using Stalin's corpse as a "scapegoat." Consumer's goods and some human rights could have done the job, nothing else. And precisely these things the Kremlin gangsters could not give the people without undermining the very basis of the Soviet system. On the other hand, unless they were suicides, the Kremlin clique could have never thrown their most valuable Stalin's icon overboard, and face innumerable (and easily predictable) difficulties just for try.

I know some of the Kremlin gangsters personally and know their modus operandi very well. There must have been some imperative reasons for them to do such a disadvantageous thing.

Let's establish a few basic points that could easily be proved by facts and on which most observers apparently agree:

1. The present Kremlin masters, as past accomplices in all Stalin crimes, are just criminals themselves, with characteristic absence of morals, honesty, conscience, or pity; they are guided by Communist expediency only.

2. Under Stalin they lived in constant fear of physical extermination by him. They are prepared to go to any length to prevent a reestablishment of that sort of personal terror.

3. There has been going on an acute struggle for the supreme power among them.

4. Being the disciples of the same Marxist-Communist school, they fear each other and distrust each other.

5. Terror has been the only principle of Soviet succession to the throne.

These features will help in discerning their motivations.

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Stalin used his secret-police machine for two distinct purposes: (1) As a weapon of his government against the people; (2) as his personal weapon against any of his henchmen. Historical facts as well as the structure and organization of Soviet police amply prove this assertion.

After Stalin's death, Beria, holding this dual weapon tried—quite logically—to seize the throne. Unfortunately for him, his comrades were alert enough to forestall the trouble by killing him off first. It is interesting to note in this connection that there is not a slightest proof to the official contention that Beria was tried in December 1953 and subsequently executed. On the contrary, many facts indicate that he was killed off on the spot in June 1953, and that the sham trial (in absentia) was staged half a year later for propaganda purposes.

Should Beria have grabbed the supreme power he would undoubtedly have liquidated some of his comrades as the latter would not have left his position unchallenged. That's why murder of Beria was an act of preventive self-defense on the part of his comrades.

The comrades jealously watching each other decided, for the sake of their mutual security, to truncate the secret-police machine so that it won't be able to perform its function No. 2. No. 1 function was left intact. As outward manifestations we saw reshufflings and shooting on the highest level of the police. Two chiefs of the Investigative Section of the Division for Protection of Leaders (Ryumin, Vlodzimirsky) were shot. Precisely this section was instrumental in liquidation of the comrades in arms by Stalin. V. S. Abakumov, one of the police chiefs, was shot for fabrication of cases against party leaders. Many lesser figures in the police were shot.

The propaganda line at the time was: "Beria—the Fascist dog and agent of imperialists," his police machine is being reorganized to provide better "justice" for citizens. Beria agents were extirpated everywhere. A typical Stalin pattern of handling the two lines—words and deeds—separately and independently.

Lacking legal successor and rivaling with each other, the comrades agreed on the idea of committee rule—the famous collective leadership. Reluctantly they agreed to recognize Malenkov as their No. 1 man. The choice of Malenkov could not be accidental, however. It meant that Malenkov was the most influential man at the moment; he had greater backing from the comrades themselves and from the Central Committee than any other member of the clique. He had strong and long-established connections with the party and its Central Committee, the fact dangerous in itself. So the comrades put the old blabber, demagog, and alcoholic Khrushchev between Malenkov and the party.

But Malenkov clearly was not satisfied with his position; he maneuvered further. He was first to condemn Beria and his inadmissible methods, and thus capitalized on the universal hatred against Beria and his methods. Then Malenkov offered a program of boosting the production of consumers' goods at the expense of heavy industry, thus striking at the most sensitive point of the people and gaining exceptional popularity. That was a real danger to the comrades and to the system. They began to realize that without the police Malenkov could demote them one by one and subsequently do away with them. By raising the real wages of Soviet workers from their normal below-

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subsistence level Malenkov could shatter the very foundations of the Soviet system. He became too dangerous.

Now, by all Stalin canons and by their own standards the comrades had to shoot Malenkov with or without a frameup. Yet he was only moderately disgraced and demoted. He publicly read his unfit-for-leadership confession, and was appointed as a minister of electric stations. Thus he disqualified himself for any future bid for the supreme power. Why the comrades spared Malenkov?

Apparently because by that time (February 1955) all comrades deeply realized that the committee rule in earnest was the only way out for all of them. No more killings among the members of the gang; there were enough enemies and capitalists around to be killed. They were watching with schadenfreude us and discussing our "struggle for power."

Each member of the Kremlin gang knew others as crooks and was suspicious of them. Each was equally determined to prevent any comrade from grabbing the throne. This was not a case of mutual rivalry so common in the Western cabinets. It was a case of survival for every member of the gang. This unusual situation has resulted in an unusual decision. Two least capable and least influential members of the gang were selected as outward representatives: Bulganin for the "government," Khrushchev for the party.

With all important governmental matters discussed in the Presidium and decided upon by majority vote, the rule of the two representatives could seemingly be reduced to that of announcers of the will of the Presidium, and the setup looked safe.

The two clowns we immediately recognized in the West as the Premier and the party boss. Conditioned by long years under Stalin the people at home have also recognized them as the head of the government and the head of the party. Perhaps unwittingly the clowns from the very start got more recognition than their comrades had planned. They began their extensive travels at home and abroad, for the first time enjoying some of the freedoms they had been denied by Stalin. Despite their buffooning, alcoholic blab, and tactless pranks, their prestige steadily rose as they were the recognized representatives of the all-powerful Communist empire. Such occasions as the Geneva Conference only boosted their prestige.

We do not know how far their personal feelings about their importance had gone, nor what sort of designs for the throne they had made, but we do know that their comrades in the Presidium got worried again. Besides, the safeguards already taken were felt inadequate anyway. A situation could easily develop when an influential member of the Presidium (say Molotov, or Mikoyan, or Kaganovich) using his personal prestige and connections and intriguing within the Central Committee could gain an exclusive support of that body. With no police support, without palace revolt, he still would eventually be able to climb the throne.

Additional safeguards were in order to repel early all such attempts. The Central Committee had to be permanently attuned for rebuff. Hence repeated denunciations of the cult of personality which the comrades had practiced in general terms for some time. But the comrades got themselves into an untenable situation. All right, the cult of personality was wrong. Was it wrong under Stalin? Presum-

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ably, yes. Then, what Stalin had done was wrong? Apparently no; because the post-Stalin changes were insignificant. Or a part of Stalin deeds was wrong? Which part? Or the cult was right under Stalin and wrong? Why?

Combined with the profound genuine hatred toward Stalin in practically all strata of Soviet society, such questions prompted anti-Soviet fermentation. Stalin's crimes against many party chieftains were fresh in the memory of their pals in the CC. Some of his victims were still alive in jails and camps. A number of slandered innocent victims were released. Cases of others were reviewed. Some were not released, not exonerated. Why? Were they Stalin's enemies or also the present gang's enemies? Unhealthy talks began at home and abroad. And what was most important, how could the CC positively react against a concrete carrier of the cult when the cult was so loosely defined? Was one-half of the Stalin cult OK? Was three-fourths of Khrushchev's cult and a little of Bulganin's OK?

Something unequivocal and drastic had to be done. Not only the departed leader had to be mentioned by name but a definite part of his crimes had to be clearly exposed and condemned; the exact degree of allowed criticism (for party members so-and-so much, for the rest so-and-so much) had to be clearly announced. That was a very difficult decision to make. Between February 1955 and February 1956, the comrades apparently discussed the burning problem many times, Pravda reflecting the situation by on-and-off references to the great leader or total omissions of the controversial name. January 23, 1956, Pravda used the term "party of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin" for the last time. Since then Stalin's name was dropped.

To be sure the adverse consequences of an anti-Stalin course loomed clearly on all sides. The comrades were to sacrifice the icon of their demigod which was most valuable for the central control of the empire. They could safely go on using the icon for justification of practically any policies; for, after all, what Stalinism was? Just anything designed or used to help the Kremlin and to destroy the West. Communist dialectics could explain away anything.

Yet in spite of the adverse forebodings the comrades decided to do away with the Stalin icon. Many facts indicate that the decision was not unanimous. Yet, the majority drive to enlist the full power of the CC against any member of the gang who might attempt to grab the power singlehandedly has finally prevailed. The cult of personality had to be condemned in theory and in practice in the strongest terms and at any price. Vital personal interests, bare instinct of self-preservation, not the supreme Communist motivations, lay at the root of the anti-Stalin campaign. Comrades, let's preserve our hides whatever losses to the cause. Should we lose our hides, the cause will be lost completely.

But there were some brighter aspects, too. Deep hatred toward Stalin could be conveniently exploited. Many little palliations (introduced for improving the operational efficiency of the regime) could be presented as a proof of benevolence of the new line. The approach to the neutralists and liberals in every noncommunist country seemed to become easier. As to the diehard imperialists, they won't bother us. Not only would they miss the opportunity to rout us at this critical moment, they will fail to comprehend the nature of our difficulties.

We need to recall only the words of our great leader and master Lenin: "The bourgeoisie is organically incapable to combat communism"; which the bourgeoisie has been beautifully proving the last 39 years.

Such were the reasons—as we see them—for the famous Khrushchev speech of February 24, 1956.

In the light of subsequent serious losses communism suffered throughout the world, was the Khrushchev speech a mistake? We do not think so. The partial exposure of Stalin had only one aim: To stabilize the Kremlin gang. So far that aim has been fully achieved. No external or internal vicissitudes have shaken the gang. And that is the main thing. Western press predicted many times a fall of Bulganin's cabinet, or a fall of Khrushchev, and so forth. Nothing of the kind happened. The reason has been simple: The Bulganin cabinet in the Western sense does not exist in nature. On the other hand, many powerful means that the West really possesses have never been used against the Kremlin gang.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The present Soviet regime is of necessity a genuine committee rule, the collective leadership. It has been successful, so far, and it may be successful for many years to come.

2. Khrushchev and Bulganin are not the bosses of the Kremlin gang, but only its outward representatives. They can be substituted by other members—the fundamental course of the regime will not change. The Kremlin crooks can abandon their great final plan no more than the Americans can abandon dollar.

3. Although there surely exist factions within the gang, they settle their differences by frank discussions and majority vote. It would be wrong to take reshufflings that sometimes occur in the Kremlin for indication of a major irreparable split.

4. The Soviet Armed Forces are organized on an entirely different basis from those in the West. The "army" (a favorite term of western columnists) did not and could not have any significant influence in the Kremlin changes.

I N D E X

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization in this index.

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