

CHILLICOTHE, OHIO
GAZETTE

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Cuban Questions

No sensible American can doubt that the ill-fated Cuban assault was inevitably an extremely difficult enterprise, involving a whole cluster of hair trigger choices.

But as the confused story continues to unfold, what can fairly be asked is why so many of those delicate choices seemed to fall the wrong way. There may be value in summarizing major criticisms. It is said:

1. We miscalculated the possible weight of Fidel Castro's armor and the prospect of a popular Cuban uprising against him.

2. A strong and perhaps controlling voice in the choice of landing spots and distribution of rebel forces was exercised by State Department officials backed up by President Kennedy's White House foreign policy advisers.

To an outsider, this sounds like contending that men who might never have seen a Cuban beach were telling military and intelligence officers where to land, and with what.

3. Cuban forces trained only for guerrilla warfare and intending to practice it in this instance were sent ashore in a coordinated, army assault-type landing without the air and naval cover such an attack demands, onto beaches unsuited for any fighting at all.

Military critics say guerrillas should hit the beach in darkness and vanish into ground cover within 15 minutes. These

rebels wallowed in swampland six to eight hours, under Castro's murderous fire, trying unsuccessfully to secure their hold.

4. They got their guerrilla training not from the Army but from the Central Intelligence Agency, which never before had been charged with such an assignment, having focussed on "small jobs with small groups" bent on sabotage, infiltration, more modest guerrilla effort.

5. The Cuban underground was never informed (evidently because mistrusted by CIA), nor were all the key rebels, nor was much of the populace whose rising was necessary to final success. And top revolutionaries were held incommunicado while U.S. officials issued statements in their name.

6. No serious consideration was given as to how to meet the consequences of failure.

We need to know what substance there is to these charges, and where there is substance, what the explanation is.

Obviously the administration sought to have its cake and eat it, too. It wanted to assist the assault, but manage it in a manner to play-down its intervention.

The question people want answered is whether, in pursuit of this tight-rope course, we did not doom the enterprise from the start by relying upon the judgments and labors of men and agencies not fully qualified for their particular part in the effort.

The above editorial also appeared in the following other newspapers:

ARDMORE ARDMOREITE, OKLA. - MAY 7, 1961
BRIDGEPORT TELEGRAM, CONN. - MAY 5, 1961
IDAHO FALLS POST-REGISTER - MAY 4, 1961
PUEBLO STAR-JOURNAL, COLO. - MAY 7, 1961
MUSKOGEE PHOENIX, OKLA. - MAY 4, 1961
POUGHKEEPSIE JOURNAL, N.Y. - MAY 4, 1961
POMONA PROGRESS-BULLETIN,
CALIF. - MAY 3, 1961
COLUMBUS REPUBLICAN, IND. - MAY 3, 1961
TERRE HAUTE STAR, IND. - MAY 4, 1961
DE KALB CHRONICLE, ILL. - MAY 4, 1961
SPRINGFIELD, LEADER PRESS,
MO. - MAY 5, 1961
GASTONIA GAZETTE, N.C. - MAY 8, 1961
TIFFIN ADVERTISER TRIBUNE,
OHIO - MAY 10, 1961
SUPERIOR TELEGRAM, WIS. - MAY 6, 1961
HOT SPRINGS SENTINEL RECORD
ARK. - MAY 7, 1961

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LAFAYETTE ADVERTIZER, LA.	-	MAY	7, 1961
WICHITA FALLS RECORD NEWS (TEX.)	-	MAY	6, 1961
BRISTOL VIRGINIA TENNESSEAN VA.	-	MAY	4, 1961
ABERDEEN WORLD, WASH.	-	MAY	3, 1961
COSHOCTON, TRIBUNE, ONIO	-	MAY	4, 1961
WEST PALM BEACH POST, FLA.	-	MAY	9, 1961
NORRISTOWN TIMES HERALD, PA.	-	MAY	6, 1961
KLAMATH FALLS HERALD & NEWS, ORE.	-	MAY	8, 1961
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WAYNESBORO NEWS VIRGINIAN, VA.	-	MAY	8, 1961
UNIONTOWN STANDARD, VA.	-	MAY	13, 1961
JACKSON NEWS, MISS.	-	MAY	13, 1961
ESCANABE PRESS, MICH.	-	MAY	15, 1961
ASHEVILLE TIMES, N.C.	-	MAY	4, 1961
SALISBURY POST, N.C.	-	MAY	4, 1961