

November 27, 1960

DISCUSSION OF THE CARIBBEAN PATROL AND ITS BACKGROUND

Editor's Forum, at 1:00 P.M. over KTVU-TV (Oakland, Calif.):

Moderator: Leslie A. Nichols, KTVU-TV News Director

Panelists: Professor Ronald Hilton, Director of Hispanic American Studies at Stanford University and Editor of the monthly Hispanic American Report.

Dr. Austin S. McDonald, professor of political science at the University of California, specialist in Latin American affairs.

Herbert Cerwin, San Francisco public relations consultant, formerly of the U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro and one-time staff associate of Nelson Rockefeller.

SHOW OPENED SHOWING MR. NICHOLS ON CAMERA. THE BACKGROUND WHERE HIS GUESTS WERE SEATED WAS DARKENED THROUGHOUT NICHOLS' OPENING STATEMENT.

ANNOUNCER: "The discussion today, Patrol in the Caribbean. Now here is the moderator of Editor's Forum, Channel Two's News Director, Leslie A. Nichols."

NICHOLS: "Just 10 days ago the United States established a Navy patrol around the Caribbean coast of Guatemala and Nicaragua. An aircraft carrier and five destroyers were assigned to this duty at what was called the written request of Guatemala and Nicaragua, to help them seek out and prevent intervention on the part of Communist-directed elements in their internal affairs due to the landing of armed forces or supplies from abroad. In the six days prior to this action, there were two armed revolts in Central America. On November 11, rebel army units seized two garrisons in Guatemala. Two days later small bands of rebel

raiders seized army arsenals in two Nicaraguan towns. Now, both of these revolts were repulsed. The one in Guatemala after heavy fighting, because it was the better organized.

"What then are the bare details of immediate events leading to the dispatch of a U.S. Navy patrol assigned to guard the sea and air approaches to Guatemala and to Nicaragua? But as in all such developments, the story is not even one-quarter told, perhaps not even one-sixteenth told. We have the abortive revolt and the request for U.S. assistance (sic) is first the struggle of American, that is to say, U. S. leaders, to suppress mounting unrest in the Caribbean that might lead to Castro-type revolutionary governments in Central America and in North and South America. And second, the age-old fact that the Latin American regimes find it necessary at all to cope with these attacks and their overthrow."

A MAP OF CENTRAL AMERICA WAS SHOWN BRIEFLY ON THE SCREEN.

"Our discussion, therefore, cannot be wholly confined to Guatemala and Nicaragua, or even to the other four republics of Central America. Nor can it be wholly adequate if extended merely to Cuba and nations such as Venezuela and Colombia. We must touch upon U.S. policy toward Latin America generally, toward the position and perhaps the positive action of the new administration that it may adapt toward this region, toward the Organization of American States. And finally, toward a consideration of how this dovetails into the struggle with world-wide Communism.

"As a point of departure, suppose we return to the immediate developments in Central America. First, let me read several excerpts from a commentary on the relation between Fidel Castro and the situation in Guatemala. I quote: 'Guatemalans of all shades of opinion believe rightly or wrongly, that Castillo Ama's military campaign was planned and financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. There is now a wide-spread belief that the CIA is sponsoring a similar invasion of Cuba from Guatemala.'

"The commentary continues: 'Reliable observers in Guatemala say that without doubt there is in Retalhuleu a large and well-fortified base where Cuban exiles are being trained to invade Castro's fortress. It is generally believed among responsible Guatemalans that there is only one possible source for the funds necessary for such a major project, namely the U.S. Government operating through the CIA. Reliable sources from Cuba say that Castro is informed about this base and believes the plan is to seize the Isle of Pines and set up a U.S. sponsored government.'

"The commentary concludes: 'Hundreds of entries appear in the U.S. press daily about Cuba, but there seems to have been no mention of the Retalhuleu base. Is the explanation ignorance? If indeed a CIA sponsored base results in international conflict we could have another U2 incident on our hands.'

"Now, the author of these comments is one of our three guests today on Editor's Forum. He is Professor Ronald Hilton, Director of Hispanic American studies at Stanford University and Editor of the monthly Hispanic American Report. Our second guest is Dr. Austin S. McDonald, Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley and a specialist in Latin American affairs. And our third guest is Herbert Cerwin, San Francisco public relations consultant, former consular of the U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro and one-time staff associate of Nelson Rockefeller.

"Let us consider Professor Hilton's observations regarding U.S. policy toward Cuban exiles and his report about the alleged American sponsored counter-revolutionary activities centering in Guatemala and aimed at Fidel Castro. So, Professor Hilton, first, do you believe these reports yourself, and assuming you do, how would you equate such a development with another U2 incident?"

AS THE PANELISTS WERE INTRODUCED, THE LIGHTS CAME ON AND THEY WERE SHOWN SEATED BEHIND TWO DESKS. HILTON AND McDONALD WERE AT THE DESK ON THE LEFT AND CERWIN WAS ALONE AT THE RIGHT HAND DESK. DURING THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, EACH SPEAKER WAS SHOWN ON THE SCREEN IN CLOSEUP.

HILTON: "Ah, you summarized the commentary, leaving out some of the things which I introduced. You read the section that said that hundreds have appeared in the U.S. press about Cuba, but there seems to be no mention of the Retalhuleu base. Ah, since this was written, things have changed in the sense that the observations I brought up from Guatemala spread like wildfire around the country and I began getting phone calls from all over the place. And I have had long conversations with the New York Times. The net result of that was that they did publish a brief report on what they could find out, which wasn't very much. Now, you asked very pointedly do I believe these reports. What I also said was '... responsibility demands that an impartial journalist or observer be sent to Guatemala to investigate these reports so that we may know how much truth there be to the story which is accepted beyond question by so many responsible Guatemalans.'

"Now, the situation in brief is that these reports which are circulating in Guatemala, not as barroom chatter, but among very responsible observers, have come to the attention of the United States press. But the United States press still has done a very miserable job of reporting, even in the New York

Times, a paper for which I have a great respect. My contention in this whole thing is that the reporting on the whole Cuban and Latin American situation has been abominable. I came to this conclusion when I visited Cuba in the winter. What was going on in Cuba didn't correspond at all to what the U.S. press said, which told only part of the story. We've had people in Cuba and in Latin America constantly since then and I still have this complaint.

"So to get back to your question, I do think that there ought to be better reporting. And what I'm saying is tentative. I believe myself the report is not without a good deal of substance. In addition to the report from very reliable people in Guatemala, I've been in contact with an experienced and respected U.S. journalist who's been a specialist in Cuban affairs who has been in the Miami area sitting on this whole story. And in our phone conversation I was able to supplement what he knew, because he didn't know the Guatemalan end, and he informed me about what he knew concerning the Florida end. It's a fantastic story. Ah, we have a lot of details which are hard to deny, including the names of the bases from which soldiers of fortune have been flown out from Florida.

"It's really a funny story. You could write a comic short story about it. They were operating out of one base in Florida. The neighbors became suspicious at seeing these planes flying out with U.S. markings badly painted out. They called the FBI. And the FBI then apparently requested the CIA to move its operations elsewhere because of expected public interest. And so they moved to another airport. I have the name here. And they've been operating out of there. And the descriptions we've had of the pickups seem to be from perfectly reliable sources. They have been gathering soldiers of fortune, some Cubans, some not, in Florida. And they've told them to be ready at night with nothing but their clothes and a card which was given to them to identify them to a chauffeur. They are taken in plane cars into the airport and shipped down to Guatemala. All this end of the story comes from an extremely reliable reporter who has been studying the Florida end of the case."

AS HILTON TALKED, HE SHUFFLED THROUGH AND READ FROM SEVERAL PAGES OF NOTES LAID OUT BEFORE HIM.

"Now, for what it's worth, and I think it's worth a good deal, I'd like to point out a piece of evidence, and that is that the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, spoke to the Commonwealth Club very recently, Friday, November 18, and at the end of the address in which he talked about Cuba and Fidel Castro and Latin American Communism, someone in audience -- I heard the program on the radio. I just happened to turn on the radio. And someone in the audience, I don't know who he is, I've got his name, but I don't know him, asked this question: 'Professor Hilton of Stanford appears to

believe a training base in Guatemala is financed by the U.S. for attack on Castro. He says if the CIA is behind it and gets caught it will be a black day for the United States. Is this true?' Then there was a long and painful silence and Mr. Kirkpatrick replied, 'It will always be a black day for the United States whenever the CIA gets caught.'

"Now, this evidence is cumulative. I should point out very clearly that whatever demands I may make for responsible reporting, and I make this demand very vehemently, for vis-a-vis especially San Francisco press, which in general does a dreadful job, except for the Palo Alto Times, which is a good newspaper. Ahhh, and I make this demand because I think we have a right to ask the question. It doesn't imply in any way a lack of respect for the Central Intelligence Agency, which like the FBI is (?) and in general is doing a very good job. But we do have the precedent of the U2 incident and I think that we were just a little careless there, and I'm against carelessness on principle. Such is the story in brief treatment."

NICHOLS: "Thank you, Professor Hilton. Now, Professor McDonald, have you any information to support or, let us say, even contradict Professor Hilton's views?"

McDONALD: "No, I have not. I am most happy to accept Professor Hilton's statements on the matter, which I am sure are very accurate. I think, however, at this point or at some point during this hour we have to consider at some length the question of whether this is good or bad or, for that matter, indifferent -- certainly not indifferent as far as we are concerned. Now, we should remember always that we have two policies, we the United States. We have two policies and to some extent they are contradictory. We have agreed definitely and specifically by treaty that we will not intervene in the affairs of another Latin, of a Latin American nation. And certainly we are expected to honor this agreement. On the other hand, by the Eisenhower amendment to the Monroe Doctrine, which was just a very short time ago, we will not accept -- and I think the word is accept, accept or tolerate, accept I believe -- the establishment in the Western Hemisphere of a government dominated or controlled or influenced by international Communism. Now the ..."

HILTON: "Wait a minute. The Monroe Doctrine didn't talk about international Communism."

McDONALD: "No, no, no, no, this I said was an amendment to, just as the Roosevelt, Teddy Roosevelt corollary was a considerable extension -- this is a considerable extension of the Monroe Doctrine, you understand."

HILTON: "... before the Caracas conference voted on."

McDONALD: "Yes, exactly. And so, but he got it under the Monroe Doctrine. Well now, how can we say, ah, what can we do? We say we will not tolerate, we will not permit, so how are we going to prevent? Well, there are things we might do, but it would seem that anything we could do would come under the heading of intervention in one way or another. And how can we justify that by referring to the government as being dominated by international Communism. In other words, here is the thought that this is an international agency, an international organization that is playing the partner. And, therefore, this is in principle under the Monroe Doctrine. So, if we follow that policy and yet at the same time we follow the policy of non-intervention, in other words, we pledge ourselves to intervene while we are not intervening, we're going to have a rather difficult time to follow both policies."

NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald, you very nicely put those horns of the dilemma side by side with regard to policy. Now, Mr. Cerwin, what is your reaction to Professor Hilton's information and his evaluation of it?"

CERWIN: "I agree with Professor Hilton. I was recently in Guatemala, as recent as three and a half weeks ago. I think one of the problems that comes up is we have bases in different parts of Latin America and we established many years ago in Guatemala. As a matter of fact, Guatemala during the war was a second defense for the Panama Canal. Ah, the great mystery in Guatemala is the fact that nothing was said about this base at Retalhuleu. You can't get near it within 10 miles, I understand and as a result this mystery continues and people become more preoccupied with what is taking place. There is also another fear in Guatemala which Professor Hilton did not mention, and that is the fear that Guatemala is going to be invaded by Cuba. Ah, as you well know, Guatemala was at one time the first Communist stronghold in Latin America, and Guatemalans who were there under a Communist regime certainly fear any type of a Castro possible invasion of Guatemala. I do believe that one of the problems on this state of Retalhuleu is the fact that the Guatemalan government has not denied that such a base exists, has refused to comment except to the extent of saying that the United States is assisting to defend Guatemala from invasion from other sources. The embassy in Guatemala does not mention a word about it, and I do think that this is bad. Whenever we keep something shrouded in mystery it creates greater rumors and gossip about it and it's a very serious situation. Guatemala at the moment is going through certain economic crises, and the regime is somewhat shakey. I do think that besides the Retalhuelu air base there are other much more serious problems as to what has caused these problems in Guatemala and Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and how did it happen that Castro is in power in Cuba. I think perhaps later we might discuss that whole issue."

NICHOLS: "By all means, we shall certainly get around to this background. But right now, for the purposes of tying in this American patrol action that we have taken, we are going to go to the map here because we can return also later in greater detail to the Central American situation. Now to get to the map itself and to square ourselves around on the geography of the situation, Professor Hilton has very kindly brought one of his better maps of the Caribbean, and so, Professor Hilton, won't you orient us to the two geographic elements with which we are concerned here?"

HILTON: "Well, I'm going to tie in the geography with the current development because you simply can't understand the whole story unless you get the geographical picture straight. I'd like to say at this point that the reporting on the Guatemalan episode in the last few days -- there have been revolts there -- has been, again, dreadful. I say this with some knowledge of what I'm talking about because just yesterday I received not only press clippings, but confidential reports about what's going on in Guatemala. And it doesn't coincide at all with the story that's being put out and is apparently swallowed by the United States public."

THEN HILTON WAS SEEN STANDING AT TWO LARGE MAPS, ONE ABOVE THE OTHER. ONE WAS OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA IN GENERAL AND THE OTHER OF CENTRAL AMERICA. HE USED A SHORT POINTER TO SHOW LOCATIONS ON THE MAPS AS HE MENTIONED THEM.

"Now, here is Guatemala City, there is Retalhueleu, and here is Puerto Barrios. Here is the Isle of Pines, there is Cuba and here is Swan Island, which is very much a bone of contention because the United States claims sovereignty to it and there is actually a radio station there broadcasting anti-Castro propaganda to Cuba. The Hondurans, particularly the young Hondurans, are very angry about this abuse of what they regard as their sovereignty off the Honduran coast, and they recently staged a kind of mock opera invasion and they demanded that the Honduran government occupy Swan Island, which, of course, the Honduran government can't because it depends upon the good will of the United States.

"Now, there was a great deal of damage done to Puerto Barrios, which is the port here. And the plan apparently was to take these people being trained in Quezaltenango -- they are only half of them Cubans, the Cubans in exile. The others are soldiers of fortune, led apparently by a fellow called Avida (?), who is a Philippino who fought against the (?) in the Philippines. And then they were to come through Puerto Barrios and possibly attack the Isle of Pines so that they have a kind of Formosa of Cuba. All the reports add up to this. It seems to make some kind of sense. And the revolution in Guatemala, which failed, broke out for all kinds of reasons. Let me point out that the

report that this was an invasion by Cubans is simply not borne out. This is what the Guatemalan government and the Nicaraguan government would like to have you believe, but it isn't true. The State Department itself has admitted that there is no evidence of Cubans, either here or here.

"Moreover, the revolt in Guatemala was a very tangled affair and it's a gross over-simplification to make it appear that it was the Guatemalan President, Ydigoras Fuentes, was sending his country against Cuba. On the contrary, it seems to have been a revolt led by some moderate pro-U.S. junior army officers against the old man, Ydigoras Fuentes. And the, ah, I have this evidence, and there is also factual evidence in print, which arrived yesterday, that the newspaper in Guatemala, which is looked upon as being vitually sold out to the United States, Imparcial, 100 percent pro-U.S., would tie in with this. And the assistant editor of the paper, Ramon Blanco, was in Puerto Barrios and when Ydigoras Fuentes succeeded in the suppressing the revolt here he went into hiding. Ydigoras Fuentes then suspended the publication of Imparcial, which as I say is 100 percent pro-U.S., and the editor of the Imparcial, David Verra, again very pro-U.S., protested and finally after its being out of publication for eight days, it's been allowed to reappear. So the people staging this supposed Cuban revolt, Castro revolt, in Guatemala were pro-U.S. elements. The whole thing is terribly painful and the press reports were simply abominable. That's why we are constantly trying to get people to take a serious interest in Latin America and that's why we work on Hispanic American Report every day. But I'm afraid that the press won't learn a lesson. Now, does that answer your question?"

NICHOLS: "Certainly does, thank you. Let us then take from this discussion of the geographic aspects of it, and here is the Hispanic American Report, which Professor Hilton edits (HOLDS UP A COPY). Let us go on from there to this matter of whether there should be any validity to the fact, I should not say the fact, to the widely supposed assumption that is currently general here in the United States -- by whom it is fostered we can't be sure -- that Fidel Castro himself is arming with Soviet weapons, tanks, planes, rifles, is arming the largest militia in the history of Cuba, would have any purpose other than self-defense in so doing. Now, have you any suggestion on that, Professor McDonald?"

McDONALD: "If you mean any inside knowledge on the subject, I do not. May I first say just a word that will perhaps set Professor Hilton's mind somewhat at rest. I don't know, Professor Hilton, whether you have seen the current issue of Time magazine which came out a few days ago. If you did not ..."

HILTON: "What did it say?"

McDONALD: "It says almost exactly what you said, that there is no evidence whatever of any Cuban activity in this matter. Nor indeed, for that matter, should anyone suppose that it is at all necessary to discover Cuban activity in revolutions in Latin America."

HILTON: "That's a great danger. Whenever anything happens in Latin America we immediately start thinking about Communism, and this, of course, is what the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua would like to have us do, because then our bile goes to work and a biological consequence follows. But the story is, and I didn't really complete the story, that somehow we got ourselves tied up almost fatally with the shabbiest characters in Latin American history. We've got ourselves tied up with Batista, of course, with Perez Jimenez, with Stroessner of Paraguay and Ydigoras Fuentes is generally looked on as kind of a clown.

"And don't forget that this isn't the first time that he's produced an international scare really to get the people of Guatemala behind him. First he tried the good old trick of raising the issue of British Honduras, Belize they call it, and in perfect comic opera style he staged a one-man invasion. He walked across the border into British Honduras, and a police officer at the border stopped him and told him to go home. And so he went home. That didn't produce the results he desired, so then he tried trouble with Mexico. Now, the Mexicans were sending fishing boats into Guatemalan waters, and for a time Guatemala broke relations with Mexico and actually made war preparations to fight Mexico. Then this faded out. And just at the time when it looked as though he might be overthrown -- because Guatemala is in an awful economic mess and there is a great deal of corruption there. The country reminds me, unfortunately, of Cuba under Batista. Just at this time he pulled another rabbit out of the hat. I'm afraid he's going to run out of rabbits very soon. Now, do you want to say anything about that?"

NICHOLS: "Mr. Cerwin?"

CERWIN: "Well, I think that the problems of Guatemala are very deep. They've been going on, the revolutions, for some time. Although we must not forget the fact that Guatemala did have a very strong Communist regime, similar to the one of Castro, and that the Guatemalans are afraid of that. And I think that one of the reasons why the present government continues in power is the fact that they fear that a change in government might bring a government that would be more leftist than the one which is there at present."

NICHOLS: "As a matter of fact, Mr. Cerwin, is not the man who led that pro-Communist regime in Guatemala, is he not now in Havana or reputed to be there?"

CERWIN: "Yes, he is supposed to be. That's Colonel Arbenz."

HILTON: "There is an angle on this that should be brought out. No doubt about it that Arbenz is in Havana. There's no doubt about it that he and his gang are just aching to be avenged. But you couldn't forget that the Guatemalan revolution went through really two phases, just as the Cuban revolution went through two phases. The first phase, which was not really pro-Communist; the second phase, which was pro-Communist. And in Guatemala the (?) phase was not strictly a Communist phase. It was just a kind of leftist Betancourt style government, and that, of course, was replaced by Arbenz. Now, in Guatemala today, as far as I can tell, and Mr. Cerwin's opinion on this would interest me, there's not much sympathy for Arbenz. He's just not a charismatic character, to use the term that social scientists like to use. Whereas Arreljo (?) does seem to have a tremendous following among many Guatemalan people. His name evokes an emotional response, which makes him very dangerous. But I don't think Guatemalans, except for a very small minority, seem to have much use for Arbenz, who was definitely pro-Communist."

CERWIN: "I agree again, Professor Hilton, with the fact that there is a fear of a Communist regime taking over in Guatemala and the fact that there are certain elements of Communism in these countries. But I think it's a problem that's a lot deeper, and I'd like to see what Professor McDonald thinks about this. Ah, what is the cause, what has brought about the problems in Latin America that did not exist 25, 30 years ago. Certainly Latin America, in the days when I lived there as a youngster, there was a very strong pro-American feeling. This is not true today. Latin America and most of Latin America looks upon the United States with a great deal of fear, with a feeling of imperialism. There is a lack of feeling that this is a country that they can depend on. Only during the period when Franklin D. Roosevelt was president was there a feeling that here is a leader looking out for the underdog, for the people that were not well off financially. I wonder how Professor McDonald feels about what is the cause of the unrest. Why are people so restive in these countries?"

NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald, you have the floor."

McDONALD: "It seems to me that the unrest in Latin America is really, as a matter of fact, nothing new. This is something that's been there for a long time. It's based, to a very large extent, on the poverty. There is, however, this that today the Latin Americans have perhaps more hopes, greater hopes, than they had before. They have been inspired by a number of things. They have been inspired, among others, by their discovery of the American standard of living, by the United States standard of living. And this to them seems very very important. They have a feeling that somehow if they can only wave a magic wand they can attain this. Now, of course, this as a matter of fact, is not so. There are so many factors that make it virtually impossible for most of the nations of Latin America -- lack of natural resources primarily -- to accomplish anything of that sort within a reasonable time at all, because you have this difficulty none the less."

"Now, Professor Hilton says that we have been involved with some of the shadiest characters in Latin America, and this is perfectly true, I think we have been. And one of the major reasons for this is that some of the shadiest characters in Latin America happen to have been the people who were in power in Latin America."

HILTON: "Yes, but the unfortunate thing is that they're the people who make the greatest show of pro-Americanism, pro-U.Sism. And this is precisely what's happening now. I told you, and you know well, the attitude of Latin America in general toward Ydigoras Fuentes. Somoza, the Somoza brothers are looked upon as the heirs to a very corrupt dictatorship, and my own impression is that they are strong because they received vast amounts of money and don't want to lose it. And money is involved in this on the part of a small group of Latin Americans who seized power in order to get money. And we do the silliest things, ah, we simply can't explain some things in terms of any knowledge of Latin America."

"For example, when we tried to justify the sending of the fleet to the shores, ah, well to the Caribbean in general, President Eisenhower said that we'd done it at the written request of the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan governments. Now, this can make most Latin Americans just go into gales of laughter and very bitter laughter, because neither of those nations evokes any respect among Latin Americans. If it had been done at the request of a respected president or a group of presidents, it might have been tolerated. But it's simply going to reinforce the attitude of Latin Americans that the United States is following the dictatorial policy, pro-dictatorial policy, and the reaction in Latin America has been that any more or less informed person could have foreseen even most of the pro-U.S. papers have foresaken us. For example, Novidades in Mexico, ah, even Las Noticias in Mexico, both have strong articles condemning the U. S. action. And El Tiempo Bogata, which is a very good newspaper, better than any newspaper in San Francisco by far, has an editorial in which it condemns this unilateral action which didn't even go through the Organization of American States."

"So, ah, and there have been demonstrations all around Latin America. So you have to believe that the people in Washington, who are running out of, just don't know what they're doing. And when I go back to Washington and talk with the people there, and I just finished with some business groups in New York, they maybe are very good as to their particular field, say electric power or coffee or pushing papers around. But when it comes to a grasp of what makes Latin America tick they just don't have it."

CERWIN: "I agree with Professor Hilton to a certain extent. I'm reminded of a comment made many years ago by Diaz when he was dictator of Mexico. He said, 'Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States.' And I think that's one of the problems in Latin America is the fact that the United States has been a sort of a big brother to Latin America, and lending it money, helping out in many other ways. And I think it's done in a way, in an unrealistic way, and has incited a certain amount of resentment. One thing that

we haven't touched upon is this, and I think it's very important, being in the public relations business, ah, the fact that the United States, when a corporation, a company, is in trouble they usually discover that the image to the public is wrong. Something is basically wrong, and they start to correct it. There is no question that the image of the United States in Latin America is wrong, and we have made no effort to correct that image. Our information program of the United States government is very ineffectual. Our State Department people in Latin American countries, as well as in Europe, are ineffectual. I think that if you bear in mind that our State Department people are the eyes and ears of the government, and when they do not report to Washington correctly and accurately such conditions occur as Castro. They should have known exactly what the situation was going to be and should have taken effective measures.

"Also it might be borne in mind too that the United States, Castro has attacked it from all angles. Very seldom, except, strangely enough, of all publications, Saturday Evening Post about a year ago gave a rather well-rounded picture of Castro, ah, that there was very little correction and that he was doing an effective job agrarian reform and other methods of that type. Now, I think that in the early stages if Washington had acted effectively I think there would have been a possibility of running Castro over."

HILTON: "I'd like to emphasize that point, and I can do it from my own experience. I went down to Cuba last winter to see what was going on, just after Castro had come to power. I immediately observed two things. One, that what was happening was not what the press was reporting. What the U. S. press reported was only a part of the story, that Castro was being given no credit at all for the good things he was doing. And I sat at the Cuban Foreign Office in Havana and spoke to the propaganda chief, who was putting out a lot of anti-American propaganda of a very violent character. And I said, 'How can you justify this propaganda you're putting out.' And he said, 'Oh, look what they're saying about us.' And he produced bales of clippings from all over the United States. He had an excellent clipping service showing what the U. S. press was saying, and much of it was fair, and most of it was distorted. Now, his reaction was a perfectly normal reaction.

"Then, I happen to have once worked for a radio station, so I could lie honestly, and I went to some meetings, one of them a meeting of the American Radio Association in Havana. I got past without having credentials. When they asked me who I was I just said 'radio' and that satisfied them. And I went to these meetings and I found there a delegation of people who were urbane and suave and spoke pretty good Spanish, and they were buttering up the Cubans when (?) was simply out to get Castro. And in fact we were out to get Castro.

"This station isn't affiliated with any network, so I can tell one story that's well known in New York. And that is that a program appeared on one network which was balanced and favorable, at

least mildly favorable to Castro. And immediately orders went out from above to do a real job on Castro. Another program came along which was completely corrupt. So we simply don't know what's going on. People don't realize that studying Latin America is an exacting job, just as exacting as being a surgeon or being a lawyer. They realize they've got to have a trained surgeon to do an operation. You've got to have a trained lawyer for a law suit. But it seems that anyone with kind of a general educational background can be an area specialist. You can't! It's just as exacting.

"Now, I blame not only the U. S. State Department and the U. S. Government and (?), but I blame our American universities. I say this with a good deal of feeling because we at Stanford have got what is about the only institute of its kind in the United States for study of contemporary Latin America. But it's extremely hard to get anywhere. We've got somewhere largely because of persistence and general cussedness. But the whole departmental structure in American universities makes it almost impossible to produce an advanced picture of any area of the world, and until we do something about our whole university structure we're not going to train the right kind of specialists. The result is, for example, that we do not have in the United States one specialist in Cuban affairs. We have 10 specialists in (?), we have, I don't know how many specialists, 200, in Hebrew, we have specialists in anything you'd like to name, but you simply can not name in an American university one specialist in Cuban affairs, except for a young fellow, one person, who writes the Cuban section of the Hispanic American Report. So our American universities have this built-in interest, a vested interest within the various departments, have been a major obstacle to our understanding of what's going on in the world. Now, so this all corroborates what you said about the lack of understanding. I saw it recently in Bogata. I stopped off in Guatemala after attending a meeting of political leaders of the Americas in Bogata. A very important meeting, which was attended by leading politicians from all over Latin America explaining what their policies were. And there were only two U. S. delegates invited, myself and Professor Tannenbaum from Columbia University. There was no evidence of interest on the part of the State Department. No one was present. The State Department showed no interest. The American embassy made no attempt to get in touch with me. The Canadian embassy did. The Canadian embassy asked me to dinner because they wanted to know what was going on. But the American embassy showed not the slightest interest, nor was the American press represented. So until we can correct this we're not going to have cordial relations with Latin America. It's going to be difficult anyhow. But we've simply got to do something about dreadful job which we are doing, as far as information is concerned. And while the Latin American press is often corrupt and very frequently inaccurate, and therefore we live in glass houses and shouldn't throw stones, yet when they say the American press is inadequate they have a point."

NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald."

McDONALD: "It seems to me perfectly valid to say that we need

to do a much better job than we're doing at the present time of selling ourselves to Latin America. That does not necessarily mean however, that we should follow a very different policy in Latin America. That's an entirely different question. And, of course, when you come to that we again are, to some extent, on the horns of a dilemma because we find that there is a tendency on our part, a very natural, human tendency, as it is on the part of all peoples, to favor those who favor us."

HILTON: "That's right."

McDONALD: "It's a very reasonable thing."

HILTON: "Naturally."

McDONALD: "After all, here is a fellow who says the United States is the great enemy and there's another fellow who says the United States is a good friend. Which one are we going to favor? There's a natural tendency, at least, for us to -- well now, under those circumstances it may well be that the fellow who is a dictator at the moment will be a fellow who doesn't like us. It may be the reverse. Or it may be that the fellow who is a democrat does like us, or it may be the reverse."

HILTON: "But usually it's the dictators who try to make us feel that they're pro-U. S. and depend upon U. S. support of one kind or another to keep in power. And of course when they fall then we're in for trouble. This is what happened in Cuba, and it might happen in Guatemala if Ydigoras Fuentes falls. What will happen with the next government I don't know."

McDONALD: "When any government takes over, if we follow the policy of supporting the government because it is the government then when it falls we're sure to be in trouble. I am reminded of a story that you probably have heard many times, but I think it's a good story anyway of the time that Governor Stevens was at a committee hearing in Congress. And he sat there dozing (?), and finally the hearing was still going on and he leaned over and said, 'What's this all about?' They were referring to a fellow who was to have a seat in Congress, there were two candidates, two contingents. And someone said to him, 'It doesn't make a particle of difference, they're both scoundrels.' 'Oh no doubt, said Stevens, but which one is the Republican scoundrel? I want to vote for the Republican scoundrel.'"

HILTON: "Unfortunately, this has a parallel in inter-American affairs and I will not use bad language on television, but I will come as close as I think I am permitted to. There is a famous story about Franklin Roosevelt who was idealized in Latin America. The story, which is verified by all kinds of people, is that someone said, 'Look, you're supporting Somoza. How can you support Somoza? He is an S blank blank, you see.' And so Roosevelt replied, 'He may be an S blank blank, but he's our S blank blank.'

Now, this hasn't done our public relations in Latin America much good. And, for example, Figueres, president of Costa Rica, and a good friend of the United States and a good friend of mine, took me up to his mountain house alone one evening. We had supper there and he talked about his problems. He has this (?) called Lucha Pinti. And he was terribly bitter about U. S. support of Somoza and terribly bitter about the fact that we keep Whelan there as ambassador. Now, all reports are that Whelan is an incredible character, and why does the U. S. State Department keep him there when tendency is to move their ambassadors at the fall of a hat. Paul Bonsell, he was until recently ambassador to Cuba, was in Colombia. He got on the wrong side of the dictator Rojas Pinea (?) and immediately the State Department sent him off to Bolivia. But when you get in the same kind of situation in Nicaragua when Whelan's efficacy is questioned all over Latin America we do nothing, we just leave him there."

NICHOLS: "May I break in here to get us straight on one point. What differentiation do you gentlemen make between recognition of a government or a regime and support? This I want you to nail down. Could you do that, Professor McDonald?"

McDONALD: "I think so. Recognition can, as a matter of fact, be a form of intervention. It all depends on just how much this country depends on, ah, how much it needs the recognition of the United States. If it is, let us say, the Dominican Republic, if it is Guatemala, if it's one of these countries either recognition or nonrecognition by the United States may spell the difference between collapse of the regime and maintenance of the regime. If, on the other hand, it's a country like Argentina the chances are -- it's a long distance away and it doesn't have its ties primarily with the United States and is a much more powerful country -- the chances are that our recognition or nonrecognition would have a very much smaller part in the maintenance of that government.

"But around the Caribbean area and the section we're talking about this can be very important and, as I say, can be a form of intervention. As a matter of fact, it's very difficult because the United States is so big, so rich, so powerful. Because it plays such a role in the lives of these little countries of the Caribbean, it's very difficult for the United States to avoid intervening. I have heard it said, and I have heard it said by President Figueres, as a matter of fact, ah, I heard it said that when the United States does nothing at all that is a form of intervention. And I think that's true."

NICHOLS: "Professor Hilton."

HILTON: "Yes, but I think that the question that Mr. Nichols asked is extremely valid, and if the United States is getting a reputation for being two-faced in Latin America, or three-faced, we have ourselves to blame, and I can report you some cases in point. Take Milton Eisenhower. Now, Milton Eisenhower, the President's brother, is a good, upright individual and I respect him as a man,

but as a Latin American specialist he's a menace. Even though he has considerable (?) in the field, he's essentially a cow man. He's a veterinarian or some kind of professor of agronomy, bless his heart. I'm all in favor of agronomy, but he's not a Latin Americanist. And so he goes down to Argentina at a time when Peron was about to collapse, and just at that time the United States decided to help Peron. We couldn't have timed it worse. And he said that Peron was a great American and a great friend. And of course, this remark got in the gullet of most Latin Americans, who are, believe it or not, very alert and very informed, even though they have passionate prejudices.

"It might not be inappropriate in a minute to show some of these cartoons I brought along to show the difference of attitudes. Now, I brought the first cartoon along -- it's one by Herblock (?) -- even Herblock who's a leftist, say, an extremely liberal cartoonist, a good one, but who's been grossly unfair to unfortunate Mr. Nixon. Nevertheless he swallows the idea that Castro is really responsible for invading Central America and that he is using the pretext of a possible attack on Cuba, the smoke screen. This is strange coming from a leftist cartoonist.

SCREEN SHOWED THE CARTOON AS HE TALKED ABOUT IT. IT WAS TITLED "THERE'S NOTHING LIKE A GOOD SMOKE, MEN." IT SHOWED CASTRO AND HIS MEN IN A LITTLE BOAT WHICH WAS TRAILING A SMOKE SCREEN. ON THE SMOKE SCREEN WAS WRITTEN, "THE U.S. IS PLANNING TO INVADE US."

"Now, I prefer to show the other cartoons. I brought one along from, oh yes that's a nice one, that's from Punch. Because there you can see, looking at it from Punch's viewpoint, the European viewpoint, why it is Latin Americans like Castro. (CARTOON SHOWED A LITTLE BULLFIGHTER STANDING UP TO A HUGE BULL.) You may not realize it, but in Latin countries when they want to say a man's politician they say he's a good bullfighter, and the United States plays the role of a bull. I've heard this comparison frequently.

"And then one last cartoon or two cartoons I'd like to show. The top one again is from Punch. I think it's a marvelous cartoon. You can see the fellow who's very intent on carrying out the revolution and someone down in the crowd below is shouting to him, 'Can't you forget the revolution a while? This is fiesta time.' (SHOWED A MAN WITH A GUN STICKING OUT OF THE TOP OF ONE OF THE BIG FIESTA BALLOONS.)

"Now, below that very lovely cartoon with a sense of detachment, ah, look at the cartoon below from Revolucion which depicts the United States as being a corrupt villain. Now, this is the picture which Latin Americans are getting. (SHOWED A VERY SIMPLE DRAWING FEATURING THE THEME "OF MICE AND MEN".) In other words, we're depicting Castro as a villain; the Latin Americans are frequently of all shades. I found in Bogata the most vitriolic attacks against the United States came from some of the Catholic leaders, believe it or not. Ah, now compare that with the, ah, compare the U. S.

Castro with the Latin American, especially the Cuban attitude and the attitude of detachment which I think Punch displays.

"Now, let's bring the story down to the present at the San Jose de Costa Rica meeting. We tried to get the Latin Americans to condemn Castro. They wouldn't do it. They went through a half-hearted resolution, so the United States then agreed to withdraw recognition from the Dominican Republic. And it was thought that it was at least a gesture to show that the United States was supporting democracy. Almost immediately we increased the sugar quota of the Dominican Republic of Trujillo, because Trujillo really owns the sugar, except for some foreign interests. And the reaction to this around Latin America has been violent. Now, they say what do you mean to talk one thing and practice another? So there's a very real difference, as Mr. Nichols pointed out, between simple recognition and all that it involves, and things that go above and beyond the call of recognition. I don't know whether you agree with that."

McDONALD: "Yes, I think that's an entirely fair statement of the matter. None the less, I do think that when a country like the United States, which has such a tremendous interest, by its very existence, the fact that it's there, and the little countries in the Caribbean, now, I think the mere fact of its existence means that it has a tremendous influence on these countries. So that what we do, so that what we do, as I said before, is very important to them. It may, as a matter of fact, as it has frequently, resulted in overthrow of some of these countries, or governments, or in the maintenance of some of these countries. But perhaps this or perhaps despite some popular opposition."

HILTON: "May I bring in a point there? Again to show how double-faced we are, not you or I or Mr. Nichols or Mr. Cerwin or the people who run the show. I think we ought to move the capital to California from back East. But that's another story. (LAUGHTER) Now, to be quite serious. I just pointed out the situation vis-a-vis Somoza, Ambassador Whelan and Nicaragua. But that goes on and never a peep is heard. Recently in El Salvador a government which is condemned as corrupt, that of Lemus, was overthrown, and a liberal junta has come in. Immediately we start saying, well we'll have to look at it very carefully before we provide recognition. And we aren't the only two-faced nation. Brazil is doing the same thing. You have the curious situation that while Brazil is vigorously supporting the Stroessner administration in Paraguay with every means at its command, and when it comes to the liberal regime in El Salvador (?), the foreign minister, says well, we don't want to recognize it until we've had a good look at it to make sure it's going to recognize proper democratic processes. Well, Mr. (?), in that case, for heaven's sake, withdraw your support from Stroessner, but don't support one story in Paraguay and another story in El Salvador. Your Spanish American colleagues are too bright to swallow that kind of thing."

McDONALD: "Would it be fair to say, in this case, that every

nation is looking out for its own..."

NICHOLS: "I'm sorry, I must break in, gentlemen. We could have gone on at least two more hours and still have not covered the whole matter. But I would like to have a view from each of you before we close in the remaining minutes, and you have only about 30 seconds each. I'd like to ask Mr. Cerwin to start first. In developing and reshaping U. S. policy toward Latin America, what would you emphasize?"

CERWIN: "Well I think one of the most important steps that should be taken is the appointment of a secretary for information with a cabinet rank. I think that's the most important step that you can take at the moment."

NICHOLS: "Professor Hilton, what would you emphasize?"

HILTON: "Well, unfortunately, in this debate we've left out the whole other side of the story, what to do about Cuba, and that's a terribly complicated problem. I would agree entirely that we must defend our interests. That's what a government exists for. I just ask we be a little better informed and a little brighter."

NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald."

McDONALD: "It seems to me that what we have said essentially is that we would do a much better job, from our own standpoint of things, if we had better information, if we saw to it that people understood better what we were doing, or at least understood our side of the story, and I don't think anyone could disagree with that point of view."

NICHOLS: "Well, thank you so very much, gentlemen. I do want to make one announcement at the request of Professor Hilton. There will be a conference on Latin America at Stanford University in Palo Alto this coming Saturday, and it may interest many of you who are seeking more information on it. These sessions are going to be held in the Bowman Alumni House from 10 to 12 in the morning and 2 to 4 in the afternoon. There is a two dollar luncheon which will be served there for those of you who wish to partake. That's this coming Saturday, and you can get more information on it, of course, from the Hispanic American Studies Group that Professor Hilton heads at Stanford.

"So, our thanks to our guests today in this discussion on Editor's Forum."