

THE SCIENCE OF SPYING

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May 4, 1965

NBC NEWS

OPENING

AUDIO

This is a Russian PT 76, the current model Red Army amphibious tank. It is now the property of the United States Army. It was not given to us by the Russians; we didn't buy it; nor did we capture it in battle. You could say the tank -- all 15 tons of it -- was obtained through intelligence channels; or, you could say, we stole it.

Once upon a time, spying or espionage was a fairly straightforward game. But we have come a long way, rather quickly, from Mata Hari. There is something new in the science of spying. It's not just stealing military hardware and secret plans, but using tanks and plans and men to promote our policies and sometimes to overthrow governments which we don't like. Both sides in the cold war deny it: both sides do it.

In the spy business, the dagger is replacing the cloak, and that is what this program is about.

John Chancellor reporting.

VIDEO

John Chancellor on Russian tank

## ACT I

Self-protection is a primary function of any organism. That is as true of the green grass as it is of continental nuclear powers. Since the beginning of man, tribes and clans and nations have spied on one another, across the valleys, across the oceans, and now across the world.

We watch for the electronic imprint of the enemy's bombers; we listen for the whine of his missiles.

We send beautiful, sophisticated machines over his territory to monitor his coded talk, to tally his gantrys, to make inventory of his weapons. The very air is full of information, for the spies of today. Much of this, for Americans, begins and ends in this building located at Langley, Virginia. This is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, of the United States Government. Everybody knows it, although the sign on the gate reads "Bureau of Public Roads".

It might have been designed by Ian Fleming: row upon row of serried, secret cubicles, rooms of codes and computers which translate Russian to English at 30,000 words an hour. They burn their documents in a hundred-thousand-dollar furnace.

This is the Pentagon of the secret war. It is a depot for subversion, and a kind of clandestine university. For many years its kindly, scholarly headmaster was a super-spy in the classic mold named Allen Dulles.

Montage of overseas' listening posts and radar stations, starting with Formosa

U-2 in flight

Views of CIA Building

MR. DULLES: Intelligence is nothing really other than information and knowledge. In the days of Socrates, by various methods, and even before that, mankind has been seeking knowledge of everything that influences his own life or the life of a nation to which he belongs. But the idea that it is necessarily nefarious, always engaged in overthrowing governments, that's false. That's for the birds.

Dulles-Chancellor  
Interview

Now there are times . . . there are times when the United States government feels that the developments in another government, such as in the Vietnam situation, is of a nature to imperil the safety and the security, the peace of the world, and asks the Central Intelligence Agency to be its agent in that particular situation.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Mr. Dulles, I know you have heard this many times, that there are people who say that we - with regard to the CIA - are waging a secret war with an invisible government.

MR. DULLES: We are obviously engaged in many facets of what is generally called the cold war, which the communist policies forced upon us. No use denying that. That's a fact of life.

But may I say this, and I do it with all solemnity, at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Whatever you say about it, the CIA has kept busy for the past 18 years. This is Laos, in Southeast Asia, not so much a kingdom as a political playing field for the great powers.

Scenes of warfare in  
Laos

Some Laotian warriors are supplied by the Russians, some by the Americans. The United States supplies a hundred thousand tribesmen with rice and bullets, through a sort of "Air CIA": secret contracts with small so-called "private" airlines. One is called Air America. In all, a fleet of 50 aircraft is involved, all flown by civilians, who are often the target of communist gunfire.

We found two of the pilots in a Hong Kong bar, a New Zealander named Len Cowper and an American named Chuck Bade, reminiscing about their secret flights.

Pilots in Hong Kong bar

So as we were flying along I heard pup-pup-pup into the aircraft, so I looked out the side there and the PL's were lined up there about 15 or 20 on each side practically at point blank range. One of the boys quit the next day. He was a little green.

The men that you knew down there and the length of time you spent there . . . how many guys were killed?

Well, there was R., Campbell, Chet Brown, Woody Baker, Jerry Riley.

What kind of missions actually were you flying down there?

Quite often I didn't know what I was going to do. I just know I had a load to take up there. I didn't know what they were for. I wasn't paid to know. All I was paid for was to take them up there.

Really. . . I really never knew who I was picking up. I never knew who was watching me. Just like a blind date.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: A "blind date" in 1953 involved the over-throw of the Premier of Iran. The CIA was clearly involved.

Views of Mossedegh greeting Soviet diplomat

ALLEN DULLES: The government of Mossedegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny.

Allen Dulles

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Actually, the Shah had tried to fire Mossadegh, and had failed. With the vigorous help of CIA and British operatives, the coup was carried out, with Iranians doing most of the work. Mossadegh's crime had been his nationalization of the great pool of Persian oil, and his flirtation with the Russians. When it was all over, the west had held on to the oil, and Mossadegh had only his famous tears.

Scenes of disorder in Teheran

The CIA is alleged to have sent this P51 fighter against Indonesian President Soekarno in 1958.

View of American furnished aircraft and captured American pilot.

And later that year, Soekarno captured an American pilot named Allen Pope. Pope had been flying a B-26 bomber for anti-Soekarno rebels, while on CIA duty.

ALLEN DULLES: Well, all I can tell you is that we were not happy with Mr. Soekarno in 1958 and I don't think we are very happy with him in 1965.

Allen Dulles

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The Congo is a natural and deadly battleground for American and Russian agents. The latest CIA help to the central government is an air force piloted by Cubans.

Jungle execution in Congo

Is it possible that there may have been American agents in the Congo who later turned up in Laos? I mean are there men on both sides engaged in these battles around the world?

Chancellor-Dulles

ALLEN DULLES: Oh yes.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Do they meet?

ALLEN DULLES: Well, if they meet too much, are seen too much, they lose their utility.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: And as far away as Tibet where rebels fight the Chinese communists, there is CIA assistance. If it would benefit our side, the CIA would recruit the abominable snowman.

Tibetan guerrillas with weapons

ALLEN DULLES: I am not going into the Tibet situation because I would be going beyond what . . . even what I know about it. I do think there are times where the supporting movements . . . is one of the best ways of preventing the communists from taking over. And that has been done from time to time.

Allen Dulles

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Mr. Dulles, do the Russians have a CIA?

ALLEN DULLES: The KGB is one of the most sinister organizations that was ever organized.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Are the Russians good at this?

ALLEN DULLES: Oh yes. Oh, my yes. You take some of their operations. They are classic. Way back when we lost Czechoslovakia, that was a classic operation. You take their operation in Cuba. Great skill was shown in that. Take several things they are working on now, such as Indonesia, the Sudan, so forth and so on, because they have a marvelous apparatus.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Do they spend more on this kind of activity than we do?

ALLEN DULLES: Oh, they must.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Do we have an application of morality in our activities they don't?

ALLEN DULLES: Far more than they do, yes.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Could you talk on this subject?

ALLEN DULLES: Well, only as far as I know we don't engage in assassinations and kidnapping, things of that kind. As far as I know we never have.

As far as we know they have, and have done it quite consistently.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: In your years as director of the CIA, sir, did you apply a moral standard to the judgments you had to make on operations?

ALLEN DULLES: Yes, I did. Why? Because given the calibre of the men and women I had working for me, I didn't want to ask them to do a thing that I wouldn't do.

One or two said that even what I assigned them, they preferred not to do. That was alright with me. I didn't ask them to do it.

All that I can say is that I am a parson's son, and I was brought up as a Presbyterian, maybe as a Calvinist, maybe that may be a fatalist. I don't know.

But I hope I have a reasonable moral standard

END ACT I



## ACT II

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The man who created the U-2 also planned U-2 in flight  
the Bay of Pigs. One was a fantastic success, but the  
other wasn't; Richard Bissell is now a private citizen,  
and a thoughtful one.

Mr. Bissell, it is a truism in our society that moral ends *don't* Bissell - Chancellor  
justify immoral means. Children are taught that. It is in- Interview  
grained in the national character of this country. And yet  
you and your colleagues in the CIA must on many occasions  
have had to abandon that. How did you deal with it?

RICHARD BISSELL: I suppose the way people deal with this  
under all kinds of circumstances. . . and the one that occurs  
to me as the most prominent historically is warfare . . . in  
that they feel a higher loyalty and that they are acting in  
obedience to that higher loyalty. In my position in the CIA  
I had a chance to know of and remotely to observe many  
operations. And I will not deny that there were occasions  
when Americans involved in these, as it were, out in front,  
had - - as people do in wartime - - to undertake certain  
actions that were contrary to their moral precepts. But  
I will say that I think this happens a great deal less  
often, again, than one might surmise.

I think the morality of . . . shall we call it for short  
cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality  
of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered  
this as a serious problem.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The distinction between cold and hot war  
morality became academic to the crew of this British Coaster  
on the 28th of June, 1954.

Beached hulk of British  
freighter Spring-Fjord  
in Guatemala.

Called the Spring-Fjord, she was lying off the coast of Guatemala that day, loaded with coffee and cotton.

That happened to be the time when the American government was overthrowing the communist-oriented government of Guatemala. A P-38 fighter, piloted and operated by the CIA thought the Spring-Fjord was carrying aircraft to the legal government of Guatemala, so the American pilot dropped three bombs. Only one went off, while the crew escaped unhurt, and all 2,000 tons of the Spring-Fjord now rest on the beach, testimony to a rather startling miscalculation.

This pained the CIA, but the whole Guatemalan episode pained other Americans, some of them influential.

One of them who was pained, and is pained is Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota.

SENATOR McCARTHY: If we believe what the Constitution says about the responsibility of Congress, to declare war for example; to have the CIA at the direction of the President actually formenting war or carrying on a war in a country; if we are to do this without any kind of congressional approval, I think we would put some real strain on the Constitution.

Senator Eugene McCarthy of  
Minnesota

It is interesting to note that people from small countries, Latin American countries, for example, greatly concerned by our CIA because a secret agency of this kind in a relative small country with a weak government can become the real force of government and operate as a kind of independent force of foreign policy in the extension of foreign policy

Views of present-day  
Guatemala

JOHN CHANCELLOR: And it did happen here: Guatemala City, the capital of a country where the rich are very rich, the poor very poor and the politics all mixed up.

Guatemala City

Guatemala is the kind of Central American country that used to be called a banana republic before people started talking about wars of national liberation. Most of the citizens of Guatemala are Indians, and most of them live in the shadow of a small wealthy class which owns most of the arable land. It is still a plantation society, plagued by the economic and political illnesses of such a society. For most of its history, it has been ruled by a dictatorship. But, as the 1950's began, the pendulum swung from right to left, and the winds of change swept across Guatemala.

Views of central square of Guatemala City

The pendulum swung very far left with the election in 1950 of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz as president. He confiscated the lands of the wealthy and filled his government with communists. He became, in local and American eyes, a menace. So the American government, thru the CIA, made an alliance with Arbenz's opposition, and as of that moment, he was doomed. An American who had been air attache at our embassy there, named Fred Sherwood, tells how the plot began.

Views of pro-Arbenz crowds in city square

FRED SHERWOOD: Several of us thought perhaps we could stop this movement by organizing something in the form of vigilantes or night raiders. For example, there was a group that tried to bring in some Puerto Rican and Cuban gangsters who made an offer, a package deal so to speak, to kill or assassinate any 12 communists within the country for \$50,000.

Arbenz addressing crowds.  
Fred Sherwood at his home in Guatemala

We went around trying to raise money, but we were only successful in raising part of this and so this never came off.

The American government threw in their forces with these small groups and helped organize these resistance groups. This help was forthcoming in all sorts of technicians, pilots, demolition teams, radio technicians, professional psychologists who organized rumor networks. These men provided the know how of organizing a successful revolution.

American Embassy in Guatemala City

Jack Puerifoy had been selected very carefully as Ambassador to Guatemala as he had just cleaned out the communists in Greece.

Picture of Jack Puerifoy

Whitey Wittaur named Ambassador to Honduras. Whitey Wittaur was General Chennault's deputy in the Flying Tigers and also formed the Chinese National Airlines. I am quite sure that if any of the pilots flying for the liberation army had been shot down, some of those pilots could have spoken Chinese.

Picture of Whitey Wittaur

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The most important pilot for the liberation army, however, spoke American. The liberation army was CIA sponsored and directed, but it didn't have an easy time in its overthrow of the Arbenz regime. The army had bogged down when an American freebooter named Jerry Delarm strafed the city and blew up the government oil reserves.

P-47 Fighter Plane

Delarm did that while flying a P-47 furnished by the United States. Now he flies his own Lodestar, owns his own charter service, and minds his own business.

Flaming oil tanks

JERRY DELARM: I have been flying in Latin America for - - ever since 1939 on and off.

Jerry Delarm

I like it here. It's easy living. Siestas, and not much rushing. No rut. It's a nice place.

The first problem I had with communism down here started back in the time of Colonel Castillo Armas in Guatemala.

That's when I started.

And from then on. That's about it.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Two days after Delarm blew up the oil reserves, Arbenz resigned; however, his replacements hesitated to embrace Delarm's employers, so Delarm got back in his plane and blew up the main army powder magazine, which rather decided the question.

The replacement for Colonel Arbenz was Carlos Castillo-Armas, the entry backed by the USA. He arrived in the American ambassador's plane. Within about a month, there was little trace of the Marxist innovations of Colonel Arbenz.

Guatemala and what the CIA and the US did there came within your tenure at the CIA. Do you regard that operation as a success?

RICHARD BISSELL: I do.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Can you tell me a little more about it? Why do you regard it as a success?

RICHARD BISSELL: Well, I will give you an answer that may sound slightly bureaucratic in its tone, but in the case of that operation, notably as of other large operations, the whole policy making machinery of the executive branch of the government was involved. The CIA had an assigned role which was really in a major role in that operation. And I think it is a success because the assigned role was carried out substantially as assigned.

Views of ruined Fort Matamoros

Crowds welcoming Castillo-Armas.

Castillo-Armas arriving in Guatemala City in jeep.

Chancellor-Bissell

There was one sub-incident in that which I don't wish to identify, in which an action was taken that went beyond the established limits of policy. And I mention this only because you can't take on operations of this - - covert operations or overt, for that matter - - of this scope, draw narrow boundaries of policy around them and be absolutely sure that those boundaries will never be overstepped.

Hulk of British freighter Spring-Fjord on Guatemalan beach.

The overstepping in the case of Guatemala, the one case I am aware of, mercifully turned out to be of little significance and to do no political and minor financial damage to the US or, for that matter, anybody else. So I say that it was from the standpoint of an organization commissioned to do a job, just an unqualified success.

SENATOR EUGENE MC CARTHY: I think the basic question with regard to Guatemala is whether they carried it out with some kind of presidential direction; which if they did, would be subject to some question because an action to overthrow an established government is essentially an act of war and it is my judgment there ought to be some kind of commitment on the part of Congress to fully satisfy the Constitution.

Senator Eugene McCarthy

END ACT II

ACT III

JOHN CHANCELLOR: There is more to this story. The sanitized Guatemalan regime of Castillo-Armas lasted for 2 years, and then, he met his death in the presidential palace.

Views of Guatemala City and National Palace

The killer was a palace sentry, who took his own life. No one, therefore, knows for sure who murdered Castillo-Armas. Some of his associates had found him to be too honest and too liberal. His was a regime not without corruption and with considerable American aid.

Views of Castillo-Armas' corpse

Guatemala's next president was Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, progressive and pro-American. He was plagued by communist guerrillas but his downfall came from the right - - at the hands of his own defense minister.

Pictures of Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes addressing crowds in Guatemala City.

Fuentes is now an exile in Costa Rica. He tells how he allowed the CIA to use his country as a training camp for the brigade of Cuban refugees who landed in the Bay of Pigs to overthrow his old enemy, Castro.

Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes in exile in Costa Rica

MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES: It was very difficult to get the connection until the beginning of 1960. Then we talked with President Eisenhower. And then he sent some people to my country and, of course, they were not military men. They were civilians. They presented me some credentials. The credentials were with the CIA. I have never seen them before. They ask me not to ask for principal names, only first names as Peter, John, James. The most difficult of the program was to look for a place where no spies and press men went to see how they were doing. And Mr. Arejo offered his coffee plantation, a farm called Helvetia.

Views of training camp at Helvetia.

We denied as usual all this organization saying that it was only rumors and doesn't exist in any camp. And they built some roads in order to reach this hilly place, and they built some barracks of wood so that one year later they were rotten.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: This hilly place has just about been taken over by the forest. This was the camp-ground of the proud and optimistic Cuban brigade, recruited, paid, trained, supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency in perhaps the largest covert operation in the history of subversion.

What remains now is only the outdoor altar at which the Cubans prayed for victory.

The CIA's Richard Bissell, author of the invasion plans, reflects on the lessons learned.

RICHARD BISSELL: I think this is an unlearnable lesson. In any future operation of this kind, again, there is going to be an operator. His eyes are going to be fixed on the success of the operation.

So far as he is concerned, it is going to be desirable to do things that from the standpoint of others in the government will involve major risks in a quite different dimension. There is always going to be this incredibly difficult choice and if it is an important issue, it is going to be in every case, as it was then, the President's choice.

Richard Bissell voice over views of Helvetia training camp. Cuban Brigade altar in midst of jungle clearing.



I think one of the few things that can be said pretty much as fact about the Bay of Pigs is that although it might have failed, the invasion might have failed in any number of ways, it did, in fact, fail because the battle was lost in the air.

Views of crashed CIA plane on Guatemalan beach.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Truth is the most fragile commodity in the secret war - - this CIA transport is a relic of our Cuban crusade - - shot up while dropping supplies over Cuba, its American crew crash landed on this Guatemalan beach. At about this time, Washington was insisting that no Americans were involved.

Another criticism is that we always seem to end up supporting right-wing dictatorships. Guatemala today - -this is it's military academy - - has reverted to the jungle of a military dictatorship. The present regime was recognized by the United States less than a month after the overthrow of Ydigoras Fuentes, who was the CIA's Guatemalan landlord.

Views of cadets marching at Escuela Polytechnica, Guatemala's West Point

We find ourselves in the United States supporting governments of the right-wing all around the world?

RICHARD BISSELL: I think it is characteristic of much of the under-developed world that there is no responsible competent center, or even left of center. All too often there is either an oligarchy regime, tribal in some areas, or more feudal in parts of Latin America and others, and by confronting it, an opposition that is hopelessly far to the left, explicitly communist allied.

Richard Bissell

I take it that a part of our national political objective is to elicit, to bring into being, to encourage the creation in much of this part of the world of a responsible center, or even left of center, and perhaps we are succeeding,

for instance, in some parts of Latin America.

But I think in this sense it has to be admitted that in many places we find ourselves supporting the right, not because we are rightest, but because there are literally no other alternatives to chaos, or to encouragement of those who have made themselves explicitly our enemies.

JOHN CHANCELLOR: There are people in Guatemala today who are explicitly our enemies, and this is their handiwork. This is what used to be the United States AID Mission Garage, in downtown Guatemala City. On New Year's Eve it was invaded by communist terrorists. They destroyed twenty American automobiles, and a travelling library donated by the citizens of Montgomery, Alabama.

The same night the guerrillas touched off an explosion at the American Military Mission, and tried to set fire to an American refinery. Thus Guatemalan politics continue following a melancholy routine. The pendulum is still swinging, and the new insurgents want it to swing away from our side. To them, the Alliance for Progress is a capitalist abstraction.

Burned US AID Mission garage  
in Guatemala City.

Scorched Alliance For  
Progress Posters on  
floor of bombed building

END ACT III

ACT IV

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Guatemala today is in a state of seige: since February all its civil liberties suspended, it is subject to terrorism from serious insurgents. They have come close to killing Colonel Harold Houser, Chief of the American Military Mission; they have blown up a truckload of soldiers on a downtown street; they have assassinated the chief of the secret police; they have held up the office of the United Fruit Company ( for an 18-thousand dollar haul); the CIA says Fidel Castro contributed 200 thousand in 1963 alone; and it is estimated that the guerrillas now number 500, many in these hills.

Their chief is a former Guatemalan army officer, one of the leaders of an unsuccessful revolt in November, 1960; since then Guatemala's police and army have been hunting him, but they can't catch him.

NBC's Robert Rogers, not without difficulty, did. Rogers found him and interviewed him. His name is Marco Antonio Yon Sosa.

ROBERT ROGERS: Commandante Yon Sosa, why did you take to the hills in 1960?

YON SOSA: One of the main reasons we began our struggle was the presence of the United States base at Helvetia Plantation, near Retahuleu. There American officers were training anti-Castro Cuban mercenaries with the cooperation of the Ydigoras Fuentes government. That is the one and only thing for which we are grateful to the Central Intelligence Agency. If it were not for their interference in Guatemala at that time we might not be fighting in the mountains today. They gave our movement its determination.

Guatemalan newsboy hawking paper with "State of Seige" headlines.

Views of Guatemala City and mountains.

Mountain top

Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and his lieutenant "Otto" being interviewed by Robert Rogers

ROGERS: There have been constant rumors of your people being trained in Cuba. This is not true?

YON SOSA: No. At least for the present, there are no people who have been trained in Cuba fighting with us in the mountains. There might be such people in other countries, but not in Guatemala.

ROGERS: Where did the officers in your guerrilla movement become such expert fighters?

YON SOSA: Well, the best training is combat itself. But we have some officers who were trained in the United States at Fort Benning. The training they received there was excellent. With that training and the support they received from the Guatemalan people, they are invincible.

ROGERS: How much military support is the US giving to the government here?

YON SOSA: During the past two years they have completely equipped four battalions, more than a regiment.

ROGERS: Commandante, in the last few weeks your organization has burned the American AID garage here, tried to blow up the American Military Mission, and tried to kill the chief of the American Military Mission.

YON SOSA: Colonel Houser was attacked not because he is an American - - a gringo - - but because he represents the United States forces fighting in Vietnam. Also he is one of the American officers advising the government forces, helping them repress the peasants in the areas where our guerrillas operate. As for the attack on the Military Mission, these Americans are instructing the government forces in how to fight our movement. It is only right that we should attack them - - not because they are Americans - - but because of what they are doing in our country.

The attack on the AID vehicles was for the same reason.

We oppose United States policy in Guatemala because it is an interventionist policy. The Americans come here and put presidents into office and remove them.

ROGERS: Commandante, last week your men blew up an army truck right in the center of Guatemala City and over the past months have assassinated a number of high government officials. Do you consider yourself a terrorist?

YON SOSA: I know that anyone can feel indignant when a truckload of soldiers is blown up in a city street. But you must consider the reason for our attack. About three weeks ago the unit to which those soldiers belonged went into the mountains of Izabel. They tortured and murdered the inhabitants. They raped a young girl before her whole family. It was to avenge these atrocities that we killed those soldiers. To destroy a truckload of soldiers or to execute an enemy does not give us pleasure. But we must do these things. They serve a higher political purpose.

ROGERS: Why are you opposed to US policy and to the Alliance for Progress?

YON SOSA: I believe the Alliance for Progress was inspired by good intentions but it is too late. In order to function at all the Alliance needs certain basic preconditions -- the tax reform, agrarian reform. But as soon as these reforms are attempted the ruling classes, the oligarchy, the large landowners begin to maneuver against them. They stop all progress. How then can we make progress peacefully. It is impossible.

RICHARD BISSELL: Poverty doesn't yield to short term solutions.

Political disorder doesn't yield to it. Situations like the one that, in fact, historically obtained in Guatemala where a small minority in a small under-developed nation, situations of this kind really cannot be countered by an combination of actions that I can think of, at least, in the short run that can be assumed under the heading of "working to remove the soil in which communism grows".

Views of Guatemala City  
slums

There just come moments and, unfortunately, quite a lot of them, in world affairs, where power has to be exerted.

And I have long felt that many of the criticisms that are leveled at this one agency of the government are in fact the criticisms of those who hate to admit to themselves or anyone else that power must sometimes be used, and, as I implied a moment ago, they choose to level their criticism at one piece of the US government in order to make these criticisms more acceptable.

Close up of Bissell

END ACT IV

ACT V

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The activities of the CIA must be secret,  
but the debate about its role in our lives must be public:

Views of CIA  
Building

here are the views of three men who know a lot about it.

Mr. Bissell, why do we need the CIA and covert political  
operations in addition to a State Department and a Pentagon?

RICHARD BISSELL: It is perfectly clear that most of our  
conflict with the USSR, and perhaps this is true of China, is in  
the non-military dimension. We are rivals in ideas, we are  
rivals in economic activities, we are rivals in diplomacy,  
we are rivals in the threat of use of power. But we are also  
rivals in a whole variety of activities that are not public,  
that are not open. They include espionage, they include sub-  
version, which more precisely I suppose, could be described  
as the effort to influence the course of events in other  
countries covertly. If we are not prepared to meet all of  
these challenges at their own level, I think the consequence  
is that we may gradually find ourselves forced to meet them  
at a level of escalation that we would not choose.

Richard Bissell

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Senator, now that we have apparently  
acquiesced in immoral acts on the part of the CIA, does this  
imperil our liberties or effect us in any constitutional way?  
(McCarthy):

John Chancellor

I wouldn't go so far as to say it constitutes at the present  
time a great threat to our constitutional liberty or to con-  
stitutional government. But I do think it intrudes somewhat  
upon the traditional areas and channels of representative  
government and of constitutional government. As you know, you  
get charges and claims and counter-claims and counter-charges  
that the CIA makes its own policy.

Senator McCarthy

I think that perhaps in some cases it has, but whether it makes policy and then brings it back and has it approved and then goes on to carry it out, I don't know.

ALLEN DULLES: I know that criticism, but I can assure you that as the machine works no important decisions are made on CIA evidence alone as far as I know, not in any situation that I know. It certainly wasn't done in Cuba, Guatemala and these other cases.

Allen Dulles

SENATOR McCARTHY: You have charges that it has policies different from those which the State Department people in the same area may be trying to carry out.

Senator McCarthy

RICHARD BISSELL: I feel myself that some of the criticism of the CIA, some, perhaps quite a part of its reputation comes from junior officials who in all honesty learn of its activities after the fact and have no chance to participate in the decision that prompted these actions to be taken.

Richard Bissell

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Would these junior officials include ambassadors?

John Chancellor

RICHARD BISSELL: I have known of cases, the only ones I can remember are a good many years in the past, when ambassadors have been kept in ignorance of activities of the CIA in the countries to which they were accredited, in every case, and without exception, with the express approval of the Secretary of State at the time.

Richard Bissell

SENATOR McCARTHY: I don't think they give a full report to any one of the committees to which they report. They report to the armed services, I understand, or to some people on the armed services. We have had some statements from those who are supposed to receive this testimony that they really don't know and don't want to know what the CIA is doing.

Senator McCarthy



ALLEN DULLES: I can assure you that the CIA when I was there as director, and I am quite sure it is the same with Mr. McCone has given these committees full information about what it's doing, how it's spending its money and how it operates. When I appeared before them, again and again, I have been stopped by members of Congress saying, "we don't want to hear about this. We might talk in our sleep. Don't tell us this."

Allen Dulles

SENATOR McCARTHY: As I say, I do feel that the fact that you have some kind of congressional supervision in addition to the executive supervision would tend to keep a kind of moral hold against just what might become a kind of completely immoral or amoral operation. At the time of the confirmation hearings on John McCone, I raised the question as to what standards of judgment the director of the CIA was prepared to apply to the activities of the CIA and of its agencies. And I thought the response not generally very satisfactory. The defense, so far as there was a defense, was in the main that the CIA was primarily anti-communist. Well, this did not really go to the point which I was raising. Even when you are dealing with communists, again we have traditionally held that no matter who our enemy might be, we still insist on the application of some measure of moral judgment or moral standard.

Senator McCarthy

RICHARD BISSELL: Those who believe that the US government on occasion resorts to force when it shouldn't, should in all fairness and justice, direct their views to the question of national policy and not hide behind the criticism that whereas the president and cabinet generally are enlightened people, there is an evil, and ill-controlled agency, which imports this sinister element into US policy.

Richard Bissell

END ACT V

CLOSING

JOHN CHANCELLOR: As citizens of the United States in the second half of this century, we are learning to live with some uncomfortable realities. We live in a sort of ethical coexistence with our war heads and missiles, because we acknowledge the inevitability of their possession. Given the state of the world and our position in it, it was inevitable that we acquire these awful weapons.

What all of us may not realize, however, is that we have created another weapons system of secret and subversive action. This, too, given the state of the world, may have been inevitable.

We have created elaborate safeguards against the misuse of the warheads, but the warheads are in reserve. The CIA's on active duty in a constant, secret, dirty war. Safeguards in this area are less efficient.

The problem we have is how to reconcile the necessity of the CIA with its secret offenses against our public morality. These days, it's getting more and more uncomfortable to be an American, and there doesn't seem to be much we can do about it.

Thank you, and goodnight.

THE END