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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

MONTHLY REPORT

MAY 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: ORE Status Report: May 1948

I. THE CIA INTELLIGENCE PLAN

There has been no important change in the Intelligence Plan during May. Annex "C" below, showing the status of Staff Intelligence, includes such changes as were made during the month.

II. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

1. Current Intelligence

During May, the usual report of the CIA Series and the usual Daily Summaries were published. With the issue of 21 May, the Weekly Summary was changed in format, classification, and dissemination.

a. The new Weekly, with a **SECRET** classification, deals informally with developments in the world situation during the preceding week; the Summary now carries an opening review and analysis, highlighting general trends and most important developments of the past week; specific review of the world situation is covered by brief items within an area-country breakdown; and, if circumstances demand, an Appendix will serve for digests of studies, estimates, situation reports, and articles prepared by ORE or outside agencies.

b. Wider dissemination is permitted by the change in classification. Additional copies are being distributed to former recipients, and distribution has been broadened to include agencies which were not recipients of the former **TOP SECRET Weekly**.

c. The new Weekly permits greater continuity for each topic treated since the most important items from each region are carried instead of only the few most important items selected on a world-wide basis. In some cases, items in the old Weekly would be from one or two

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
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regions and items from other regions would appear only occasionally. Now all regions tend to receive more uniform coverage. A list of the various topics covering the Weekly Summary during May is attached as Annex "A".

2. Basic Intelligence

Three non-IAC agencies -- Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture -- have estimated the augmentation of production facilities that they will need in order to participate in the NIS program. The estimate of the Department of Agriculture is still under negotiation, but those of the other two Departments were acceptable as submitted.

A section on Propaganda has been added to the NIS in order to meet the requirements of those officials of the U.S. Government engaged in planning for psychological warfare.



Standard operating procedures have been fixed with the Board on Geographic Names for the execution of geographic name research by that organization.

The list of NIS priorities is to be resubmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for revision and recasting in terms of the NIS areas instead of the JANIS areas as soon as the IAC has taken final action on the NIS program. The IAC agencies have been requested to alert their JCS representatives so as to obtain prompt action on the revision.

The status of the basic intelligence studies now under way is shown in Annex "B".

3. Staff Intelligence

During May, four Special Estimates of the ORE series, two Situation Reports, and one report of the "M" series were published. A list of the scheduled and non-scheduled reports and estimates published or in process during May is attached as Annex "C".

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A discussion of problems related to the interdepartmental coordination of staff intelligence is included in section V 2a below.

4. Intelligence Presentations

During May, one presentation, thirty-four interrogations, and seven briefings were conducted. The presentation and interrogations were attended by sixty-nine representatives of the Department of State, seventeen from the Army, thirty from the Navy, and thirteen from the Air Force. A list of oral and graphic presentations is attached as Annex "D".

During May, only one outgoing attache from the Army was briefed and he came to CIA only after his presence was requested specifically by the CIA regional branch concerned. It would appear from the decline in the briefings of Army personnel that the Army has abandoned the practice of routing their outgoing personnel through CIA. This matter will be taken up with the Intelligence Division of the Army.

5. Scientific Intelligence

The production of scientific intelligence is continuing on a modest basis with most effort to date directed toward the establishment of basic working relationships with other Governmental organizations interested in scientific research. The exact role that ORE is to play in the production of scientific intelligence will not be fully determined until those relationships have been established.



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III. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

With the exception of the Office of Operations, which is cooperating closely in the matter of requirements, ORE is in no position to exert any substantial influence on the flow of information from the various agencies charged with collecting intelligence information. No reorganization of the Office of Collection and Dissemination can improve this aspect of the collection system since the actual collection priorities are still being set by the individual collecting agencies when they issue the ultimate collection directive to the field. This means that regardless of the requirements for intelligence information submitted and regardless of the urgency with which they are viewed by this office, the information will be collected (if at all) in accordance with the priority assigned by the collecting agency. This, in effect, places the collecting agency in the position of deciding the importance of the Special Estimate or other report for which the information is needed. At the same time this office is held responsible for the timeliness and adequacy of the intelligence that it produces for the National Security Council and other consumers. The present collection system places a limitation on the ability of this office as well as CIA as a whole to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

The new system for formulating requirements for intelligence information is improving both the quantity and the quality of the requirements originating in this office. A resume of the requirements submitted to OCD is attached as Annex "F".

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AND INTELLIGENCE****1. Reporting from the Field**

During May, the Department of State and the Army continued to supply the largest volume of written and cabled reports from all areas. The total volume of intelligence documents and cables handled by the various components of ORE during the month was as follows:

Eastern Europe/USSR Branch	6,574
Western European Branch	6,326
Near East/Africa Branch	4,309
Northern Branch	4,080
Far East/Pacific Branch	3,839
Latin America	3,573
Scientific Branch	1,461

Economics Panel	6,687
Armed Forces Panel	2,148
International Organizations Panel	2,135
Transportation Panel	2,003

*W. Stafford
more
papers*

There was no particular change in the volume or noticeable improvement in the general quality of the information received during May. Attention is invited particularly to the small volume of information received by the Scientific Branch.

2. Intelligence Coverage by CIA

Intelligence produced by this office continues to fall short of the desired maximum volume. Since the production of Current Intelligence must receive priority attention, it is still necessary to rely on Current Intelligence reports to cover some situations that should also be covered by Staff Intelligence Estimates but for which there is not sufficient research personnel available. It is hoped that the National Intelligence produced will more nearly approximate the actual needs of the makers of National Policy as this office increases its strength and acquires additional experience in planning and producing Staff Intelligence.

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The quality of the Estimates produced is still too variable to be ideal. This office is still encountering difficulty in finding the proper personnel for the high-level positions that most directly affect the quality of the analysis contained in Estimates. (For a resume of the ORE personnel situation see Annex "G".)

3. Intelligence Coverage by other IAC Agencies

From time to time Estimates made by other IAC agencies are discovered, copies of which had not been routed to this office. It would appear, therefore, that we are not receiving uniform distribution of estimates prepared by the other agencies. Since we cannot be sure of having seen all intelligence produced, no firm analysis can be made of the adequacy of the intelligence coverage by other IAC agencies. From the material available, however, there appears to have been no important change during May in the adequacy of such coverage.

The question of procuring IAC Estimates will be taken up with the Office of Collection and Dissemination.

V. EFFORTS TO FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION

1. Coordination and Liaison

During May, normal liaison was maintained with other components of CIA.

2. Relations with Other IAC Agencies

a. Dissents and Concurrences

During May, there were ten concurrences with comment, three concurrences after revision, and five cases of no comment by other IAC agencies on Special Estimates prepared by CIA.

A check indicates that about one-fourth of the Special Estimates published by this office have had dissents registered against them. With two exceptions, only a single agency has dissented on any one paper. In the case of the two exceptions,

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only two dissents were registered. The Department of State has been the most frequent dissenter. In general, it would be hard to show that the dissents represent a direct and unavoidable disagreement with a major conclusion of the paper. It is difficult to see how such dissents could be helpful to a person using the Estimates for official purposes. Sample extracts from IAC dissents are given below:

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- (2) ORE 9-48. "Cuban Political Trends" STATE. "...the somewhat alarming tone of the summary is not justified."
- (3) ORE 8-48. "Peron and the Argentine Congressional Elections" STATE. The paper leaves out an analysis of the Peronista party which is "central to such a study." (Whatever this estimate leaves out, its conclusion was that Peron would continue to cooperate with the US after the elections. This conclusion is not denied in the dissent.)
- (4) ORE 6-48. "Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means".




- (5) ORE 69. "Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of US Counteraction."

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
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
- (6) ORE 65. "The Venezuelan Elections of 14 December 1947."



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
- (8) ORE 63. "The Current Situation in French North Africa." STATE. Dissents because it believes that the "cumulative effect" of the paper is to overemphasize Communist strength.
- (9) ORE 22-48. "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action during 1948."



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b. Working Level Liaison

**Normal working-level liaison was maintained during
May with all IAC agencies.**



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