


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OSD review completed

DIA review(s) completed.

MINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 18 FEBRUARY 1949

25X6 GEN. WRIGHT: I want to apologize for the Director not being here. He had to go for a few days. I understand the primary business today is this question of the IAC's report on the Dulles Report. Since that was circulated, however, General Irwin has asked that we discuss a telegram from the Military Attache at Rome. I suggest we do that first. Would you like to go ahead and discuss this?

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GEN. IRWIN: I have one other cable, if you can spare the time, that I would like some help on. This was received today from Huebner to the Military Attache in Warsaw.

OSD review
completed

"German language newspaper Berlin report now published world wide states in effect that extensive Soviet Mil, Naval and Air activity taking place in Baltic Sea and on Baltic Coast including large scale secret troop movements at night with troop concentrations in Northern Pommerania and Mecklenburg. Important we receive any information you have in confirmation or denial plus your estimate. Also appreciate summary recent troop movements Western Poland and across border. We have some reports of troop movements in and out Rostock, Stettin, and Frankfurt/Oder but detailed study indicates shifting of classes 28 and 25 plus arrival some equipment rather than new units. No concentration Northern Mecklenburg discovered. Possible some sham effort will be made to influence Scandinavian political thinking."

I wondered if anyone had anything that would bear on this particular thing that would help us.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We have seen nothing that I know of, General.

GEN. IRWIN: We have had information that there was quite a lot of movement and the arrival of M-24 tanks. We are working on our attaches in all of the Curtain Countries. I have cabled them to pull their ears in and cut their travel. But the affect of the action in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania as being curtailed areas, which all happened simultaneously to this.

GEN. TODD: On the negative side - a couple of days ago, I think from Warsaw, there was a report that these 22 year old Russians are returning to the Soviet Union on leave. You recall seeing that?

GEN. WRIGHT: I remember.

GEN. TODD: And it was evaluated A-1 by someone in the Embassy. I forgot how many.

GEN. WRIGHT: In connection with that, there was an indication the class of '25 were only being given three weeks leave, where before they were given months, or they were being held back entirely.

ADM. INGLIS: New classes are being brought in.

GEN. IRWIN: The class of '28 are being held over. There are about 40 or 50,000 in the class of '28.

GEN. WRIGHT: That AP report stated there was a movement of 50,000 troops from the North down into the Soviet Zone, but that seemed to be

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cleared up on the basis it was the same group that had been sent up for winter maneuvers which had never taken place.

GEN. IRWIN: They are getting ready for spring maneuvers. They are taking advantage of the weather.

GEN. WRIGHT: Another point on the negative side - the AP repeated the same date from Paris and the people here seemed to feel that that was a little more pressure with regard to the Atlantic Pact.

GEN. IRWIN: Of course, the reports from Paris or rather remote or odd places appear exaggerated.

ADM. INGLIS: Is there something about movements in Finland?

GEN. WRIGHT: Yes.

GEN. IRWIN: It is rumored there are three divisions near the Finnish Border, but that sounded like propaganda. In other words, it has been verified in some remote places.

GEN. TODD: It originated in Sweden.

GEN. IRWIN: But is it a fact they can go into Finland because of their Treaty - in North Finland?

GEN. WRIGHT: I am not so sure about troops.

ADM. INGLIS: I think in a case of attack or threatened attack. Aren't we about due for another review by CIA of the possibilities of war? I think about six months ago we all agreed that we would re-estimate the possibilities of war from time to time and it seems to me the six months are about up.

GEN. WRIGHT: How much time, Admiral, would you like to suggest for your people to gather with ours and the rest of the agencies to do that?

ADM. INGLIS: We haven't gotten very much information. I think the Army has most of it. I think my people could be ready on short notice - by the middle of next week.

GEN. IRWIN: I think we have very little. What we had this morning in our briefing indicated they had no major change.

GEN. WRIGHT: It is an advantage to have a meeting of the minds, of everybody who is working on it. That worked out pretty well on the last one. Any suggestion on that?

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MR. ARMSTRONG: The political aspects have undergone some change since we last agreed. I think it would be very useful to have another roundup and meeting of the minds.

GEN. IRWIN: How about next Friday?

GEN. WRIGHT: Suppose I ask our people to coordinate the idea of meeting next Friday some time with whoever you designate?

GEN. IRWIN: What do you want? Our individual estimates?

GEN. WRIGHT: Yes, but I think in addition to the individual estimates there ought to be the people there who can discuss them.

GEN. IRWIN: To coordinate the thing?

GEN. WRIGHT: Yes, because there will be some little change.

GEN. CABELL: Hardly estimates, just bringing basic material in.

GEN. WRIGHT: That is right and come out with the estimate of the group.

GEN. IRWIN: Is there anything new since the last one?

GEN. TODD: We may be able to get some estimates from the field. I mean from Moscow, Warsaw -

GEN. CABELL: I would suggest we don't ask them for estimates, but for evidence.

GEN. TODD: Essential elements.

GEN. WRIGHT: Is there any other new business to bring up before we go into this Dulles Report? Park?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I have one other item, not an IAC, but after the meeting is concluded I would like to speak to the IAC members, but go ahead with the business of the meeting.

GEN. WRIGHT: Dr. Colby?

DR. COLBY: No, nothing.

GEN. CABELL: No.

GEN. TODD: No, sir.

GEN. IRWIN: No.

ADM. INGLIS: No.

GEN. WRIGHT: This draft of the IAC Report on the Dulles Report is one of three of the reports that will be sent in: this one, the IAC; the individual reports from the agencies; and the report from CIA. So this

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actually is an IAC matter and not a CIA matter. This particular draft was worked out with the Standing Committee. If there are no objections we will go down each paragraph and those that are approved by everybody can be made the final one and any suggestions you want to make as we go along we can put them in.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Before taking this up, I would like to explain the procedure that the Department has adopted as to its comments on the report, other than the IAC passages. The Department takes the position that the proper medium to the NSC is through the Secretary himself and he proposes to do it that way rather than to transmit them through the Director (of Central Intelligence). In order not to let it appear that that would have the purpose of concealing our views on the thing, I can say that our position will be generally favorable to the report and will constitute an endorsement of it in most of its aspects. There will be very few places where we will take exception. We feel the Report is a very competent and objective one and should receive very serious consideration by the NSC. We think that the time for it to be implemented is now, right away, and the Department is going to indicate every desire to cooperate fully in implementation of the Report. Our comments will be submitted to the NSC by the Secretary.

GEN. WRIGHT: Paragraph 1 of the draft. Has anyone a change they would like to make in that?

ADM. INGLIS: The Navy thinks this whole comment is somewhat watered down, that it doesn't amount to much. I am not at all enthusiastic about it. I think the only item in here that is positive and constructive is paragraph 5. The rest are "no objections," or "it is a good idea," or "agrees," or something. We agree with the obvious like we all agree we would like to have good weather. I think it is a pretty sad piece of work myself.

GEN. WRIGHT: I think that is a reflection of the Report. It is the obvious to the obvious. Would you go along with the Standing Committee working on another draft?

ADM. INGLIS: I think they have spent enough time on it myself.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: I would like to move the deletion of paragraph 2.

GEN. WRIGHT: Can we finish up with 1?

ADM. INGLIS: That is just a general comment.

GEN. WRIGHT: All right.

ADM. INGLIS: I might come back to paragraph 1.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I don't think paragraph 2 applies to the IAC. It occurs in a point in the Report where the IAC hasn't been mentioned or brought in. It is the relations between the Director and the two Secretaries. It does not seem to us that it is a matter for IAC comment.

GEN. WRIGHT: Admiral Inglis?

ADM. INGLIS: I have no feeling one way or another about paragraph 2. I will vote with the majority.

GEN. IRWIN: I agree with Mr. Armstrong, it is not an IAC matter. All he has to do is trot over there.

GEN. WRIGHT: When he is with the entire Security Council.

GEN. IRWIN: He is free to take things up with them.

GEN. WRIGHT: Dr. Colby?

DR. COLBY: I think so too. In fact I was a little in doubt about it when I read the Report itself.

GEN. TODD: I agree with Mr. Armstrong.

GEN. CABELL: I think that is perfectly all right. We are expected to make some comment, at least, on the obvious without attempting to go on record feeling that it is not yet close enough. Couldn't we just say that we agree with the necessity of having close relations with the Director and the two principal Secretaries?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Isn't that a matter for the individual agency to comment on rather than the IAC?

GEN. CABELL: Aren't we commenting on whether it is agreeable to have a close relationship with those two particular agencies without stating whether he is presently close enough or not?

ADM. INGLIS: He should have close relationship with all of them.

GEN. CABELL: But rather than just duck the issue, I would suggest that approach.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: That is the basic theory of the paper to comment upon those recommendations affecting the IAC, so there are a lot of other things in the Report that the IAC could very well endorse and affirm.

GEN. CABELL: I should think that the relationship between the Director and the Secretary of Defense and State is of concern to the IAC.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think it should be, but that would be a different type of comment.

GEN. WRIGHT: You don't hold a strong feeling on that? The majority thinks it has no real purpose.

GEN. CABELL: If the majority feels that way, I will go along.

GEN. TODD: We all realize particularly the comment means he will have closer liaison with the Offices of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and I believe because the Secretaries themselves can determine, usually regulate the degree of liaison with the Director, and in that case if it does mean that, it is rather meaningless as far as the Office of the Secretary of Defense is concerned because he has no intelligence agency within his Office. I was rather surprised when I saw it in the Dulles Report.

GEN. IRWIN: It doesn't make sense because it is not the Director making it. I agree with Mr. Armstrong. And when it comes to the Secretary of Defense, he hasn't any intelligence agency, he comes to the individual agencies.

ADM. INGLIS: Does the Director chiefly depend on the Secretaries of State and Defense or do they chiefly depend on the Director?

GEN. WRIGHT: You are agreeable to drop out this paragraph?

GEN. IRWIN: Absolutely.

GEN. WRIGHT: Paragraph 3?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I suggest a language change. In substitution: strike out "a good idea to have" and insert "concur in the recommendation that the FBI" and strike out "as" and insert "should be a member of the IAC as" and strike out "recommended" and insert "stated."

GEN. WRIGHT: Is that satisfactory to you, Admiral?

ADM. INGLIS: I don't care.

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DR. COLBY: Yes.

GEN. CABELL: Yes.

GEN. TODD: Yes.

GEN. IRWIN: Yes.

GEN. WRIGHT: Paragraph 4. Park?

MR. ARMSTRONG: No comment.

GEN. WRIGHT: Your comment is that at least your working committee is.

ADM. INGLIS: Yes.

DR. COLBY: I have not seen a dissenting comment.

GEN. WRIGHT: That will be the Navy's own answer and not pertinent.

ADM. INGLIS: The gist of our comment is that the IAC is not soundly conceived. The composition is all right, but not its charter.

GEN. WRIGHT: As written now, General Irwin, is it all right with you?

GEN. IRWIN: Yes.

GEN. CABELL: I would like to see the comments. Maybe Admiral Inglis has got something there. Maybe he might convince me by his comments.

GEN. WRIGHT: You can go back to the minutes of the other IAC Meetings and pick them out.

ADM. INGLIS: I can show you a draft which has not yet been signed. I think it pretty well gives our position, but the general idea is that we don't think that the IAC has sufficient authority or sufficient responsibility at present. That its charter is strictly as an advisory committee which the Director of Central Intelligence can accept or reject the advice as he sees fit and he is not even obligated, and often does not submit the views of the IAC to the Security Council.

GEN. CABELL: Are you suggesting that the Law be changed?

ADM. INGLIS: No, but that NSCID No. 1 be changed, and we have prepared in first draft form a new NSCID No. 1.

GEN. TODD: Wouldn't it be desirable to have an IAC agreement on all of these agreements if possible and have the balance of the IAC support your suggestion, rather statement, to that effect.

ADM. INGLIS: I have understood that some effort has been tried by the Standing Committee and no agreement can be agreed to.

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CAPT. OCKER: It was mentioned, but not enthusiastically discussed.

GEN. WRIGHT: With that explanation, is it satisfactory to leave the paragraph as written?

GEN. CABELL: Yes, but I kind of like the idea that when we have a joint report that we have all the comments in at one time as a matter of principle so that eventually this body should be called upon to comment upon their comment.

ADM. INGLIS: You see, State Department isn't doing it that way. They are sending theirs in through their Secretary, which technically bars this Committee from those comments.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is on the non-IAC items.

GEN. IRWIN: Mr. Forrestal's Office came down to see me -

GEN. TODD: You are not making additional comments as pertain to the IAC?

GEN. IRWIN: The Secretary of Defense's Office came down to see me and asked me how we were going to coordinate our comments - comment through the IAC or through the Secretaries. That was a pretty good question at that.

ADM. INGLIS: That is the trouble. We get all fouled up.

GEN. IRWIN: My comments are in here. If the Secretary of the Army wants them, I will send the same. Of course, he may not agree.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Isn't it true that if these comments are adopted by the IAC we will be rewriting NSCID No. 1 anyway, to incorporate the changes in NSCID No. 1 that would be called for by these comments in a draft to go forward, possibly with the Navy's version as a parallel?

GEN. WRIGHT: What you have to have then, in effect, is unanimous agreement on the Navy's idea, or you would have to have, maybe, an additional non-agreement attached here as an appendix and again it would appear in an original paper. It would seem better to me administratively to go along with the Navy's dissent and let them put in their proposition as a separate paper. If it was understood that everybody would adopt the Navy's plan and idea, then it would be attached as an appendix. That would take some

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time to work out because there is not too much indication that everybody would agree.

DR. COLBY: It implies that all the rest disagree with the dissent.

GEN. CABELL: That we haven't seen.

ADM. INGLIS: I will be very happy to provide any member of the Committee with our paper, either in the present form, or in its final form, or both.

GEN. CABELL: I might like to buy part of it.

ADM. INGLIS: I can't produce the copies now, but I can within 24 hours.

GEN. TODD: It seems to me the reader would be at a loss to know how the members of the IAC were going to participate more actively under the terms of the present NSCID directive, but it doesn't say how it is going to be achieved.

ADM. INGLIS: That is the gist of our recommendation. It beats all around the bush. It speaks of better coordination and a greater measure of responsibility, but never comes down to brass tacks where the responsibility parallels the authority.

GEN. IRWIN: Did you propose, Admiral, that the IAC should report to the National Security Council rather than through the Director?

ADM. INGLIS: If you don't mind my answering in a different way - we propose, in effect, this body have its name changed from Intelligence Advisory Committee to Intelligence Coordinating Committee and, in a few words, that expresses our concept of the term or reference to this Committee.

GEN. CABELL: What would be the statutory authority?

ADM. INGLIS: It would stem from the National Security Council. There is nothing in the statute that prohibits that. It doesn't mention the IAC or ICC or otherwise.

GEN. CABELL: It authorizes the Director to create such a body, to have such advisors as he may need to have, or words to that effect.

GEN. WRIGHT: That does not appear in the Law.

CAPT. OCKER: That is in NSCID No. 1. That is where it all comes

in.

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ADM. INGLIS: We had a row on that with the legal people in CIA. They said the Law doesn't direct it. We think because the Law doesn't prohibit it, we could do it. We still stand by that interpretation of the Law. We felt that the National Security Council has sufficient authority to organize and charter such a group as this to have some responsibility and some authority rather than act in a purely advisory capacity which the Director is free to accept or reject. That view was not accepted by the Director, or by the National Security Council, and that is the reason we are now operating under the present charter. And to my mind from that stems the criticism from which this Report is made and we thought it was timely to raise the issue again.

GEN. WRIGHT: The point is, the Director has always held, and the Security Council agreed by issuing the Directive, that if the IAC became the coordinating group, then the Director of Central Intelligence becomes a secretariat for the IAC. That is the opposite side. In the interest of making this an agreed report, I suggest we take the paragraph which has this disagreement and eliminate it. It doesn't seem much to me as it is.

GEN. CABELL: Isn't that actually one of the principal points of the Dulles-Jackson Report?

GEN. WRIGHT: Yes, but it will appear in the Navy-Army-State-Air reports. In other words this is only one of many papers that is going in on this Report.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think it should remain in. It is a cardinal issue and the NSC is entitled to know there is disagreement on the present arrangement of the IAC.

GEN. CABELL: I still think it would be helpful if we had the benefit of the dissenting opinion before we act.

ADM. INGLIS: I'll be happy to send a copy of this to you in its present form almost immediately. I can't give it to you now. The matter was discussed at some length in the Standing Committee.

CAPT. OCKER: Not at great length. It was brought up and I expressed my views generally, but we felt the matter would be too lengthy and in the minutes of the Standing Committee meeting we left it as a matter for this

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Committee. The comments are, more or less, as they are written there, and the individual comments by the agencies about what their thoughts were.

GEN. WRIGHT: I make the suggestion we go by this paragraph 4 and wait until Admiral Inglis gets a copy of his proposal to you. And as a result of that you send in a proposed rewording of paragraph 4, which ought to be fixed so that the Standing Committee, when it is brought in, will all agree to it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

ADM. INGLIS: Yes. I have just been informed that advance copies of our comments have been furnished.

GEN. CABELL: Which I now have in my hand.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't want anyone to think we are holding out on them.

GEN. WRIGHT: Is that agreed - to leave that paragraph out?

GEN. CABELL: Yes.

GEN. WRIGHT: After they have read this.

ADM. INGLIS: Does anyone else want a copy of our comments?

MR. ARMSTRONG: If we don't have any. I am informed we do not have it.

GEN. WRIGHT: We will go to paragraph 5.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Again I suggest a rewording. I don't know whether this would be an improvement. It seems to me that was a little lacking. Strike out the paragraph and substitute the following:

"The IAC does not agree with the recommendation as to its membership contained in paragraph 6 on page 63, which would omit the JIG and AEC as regular members. In addition to adding the FBI, the IAC believes the JIG and AEC should continue as regular members."

(EVERYONE CONCURRED)

GEN. WRIGHT: Paragraph 6.

GEN. IRWIN: What does the word "reconstituted" mean here?

GEN. WRIGHT: I think that is a repetition of the word used in the Report. "As reconstituted."

GEN. IRWIN: They wanted to omit, in the Report, the JIG and AEC so you had better make it clear.

GEN. CABELL: Isn't that redundant here?

GEN. WRIGHT: As far as this draft is concerned.

GEN. IRWIN: They want to omit two and add one.

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ADM. INGLIS: There again we don't know whether it means a change of membership or charter. That gives more or less, if possibly less, authority to this Committee.

GEN. IRWIN: I think the word "reconstituted" -

GEN. CABELL: It is a quote there.

GEN. WRIGHT: It is a quote all the way through.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Leave the word out and run dots along.

GEN. CABELL: Write the rest of the sentence without it.

GEN. WRIGHT: How about putting it in brackets?

GEN. IRWIN: Put a line of dots and omit the word.

ADM. INGLIS: We again take objection to assuming any responsibility over which we have no authority.

DR. COLBY: Do you think, Admiral, if you included that sentence here -

ADM. INGLIS: That was our idea. A new charter as well as a new list of members, if that is what they mean. We would agree there should be collective responsibility, but only contingent on collective authority. The other members of the Standing Committee didn't agree with our interpretation of the word "reconstituted." They said it applied only to the term "membership."

GEN. CABELL: Any reconstitution proposed in the way of charter change?

ADM. INGLIS: No. That is what is wrong with the Report. It has a lot of fancy words and I don't know what they mean.

GEN. WRIGHT: Well, is it agreeable to leave that in by striking out the word "reconstituted" and indicating by dots that a word has been left out?

ADM. INGLIS: I would have to dissent unless there was some qualification. I would agree if it were added that authority was invested in the Committee.

GEN. IRWIN: I would like to ask you a question. It probably covers your trouble. Suppose we do make a collective report and I dissent? You put in the report and you are under no obligation to include my minority report. CIA has a right to object to an opinion?

GEN. WRIGHT: The rejection, however, is noted and the reason for it is written right in.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: Your dissent must accompany the majority report.

ADM. INGLIS: It must. That is, where we have been consulted. It is a general practice, but I believe the Director is quite sensitive about that and insists he doesn't have to unless he wants to.

GEN. CABELL: Isn't it provided for in NSCID No. 1? This dissent must be forwarded.

CAPT. OCKER: A dissent must be indicated.

ADM. INGLIS: He can distort it or misquote it. I am not accusing him of having done that, but he has, I think, made his position clear that he can do whatever he pleases.

GEN. WRIGHT: This may be the one. NSCID NO. 1:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and Agencies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the National Military Establishment, the Director of Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council."

As far as I know that has been followed in each case.

GEN. CABELL: It is a case for the interpretation of concurrence and non-concurrence.

CAPT. OCKER: The statement "I do concur" or "do not concur" are included in the remarks which accompany that.

GEN. WRIGHT: "Transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence."

ADM. INGLIS: "Giving advice," which is not the same as drafting an estimate. As a matter of practice, these ORE's, I guess that is what they are, coming out on special situation, other than what is sometimes called spot intelligence, will have a statement down below: "Army, Navy, Air, State concurs," or so and so concurs and the dissent is included in the back. But you will notice always in the Daily Summary and in the Special spot reports issued casually from time to time that it is usually indicated that the matter has not been referred to the Departments at all. Now, perhaps those are things that should have and we have no control. It is left to the decision of the Director whether he wants to or not. We were

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successful in having that statement made so the customers wouldn't be left with the idea that we had endorsed something we hadn't even looked at. So the CIA does state whether or not the other Departmental agencies concur.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That goes to the question of uncoordinated intelligence rather than recommendations and advice to the NSC, and the Report is quite specific in its attack on that problem. They have strongly recommended against the continuation of that practice. So that if an estimate were to be coordinated by the IAC, I would suppose that the procedures called for in NSCID No. 1 would have to apply to that in the same way as if it were advice to the Council.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't believe there is anything in that directive that speaks of estimates.

GEN. WRIGHT: Yes, in paragraph 5:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent."

ADM. INGLIS: What do you mean by agreed? What does agreed mean?

MR. CHILDS: Between the one that produces it in your shop and the ones in our shop. Not 100% agreement. If there is a dissent then they agree that that will go in.

ADM. INGLIS: "An agreed statement of substantial dissent."

MR. CHILDS: That statement will be agreed to in that our fellows and others that are working on it with your fellows cannot get 100% agreement, so the Navy takes a certain stand. Then the group agrees that the others will let it go in and the Navy will submit a dissent.

ADM. INGLIS: National Intelligence, is that the same as they are talking about here? These estimates?

GEN. WRIGHT: I think they mean the same.

ADM. INGLIS: You interpret, I suppose, the defined National Intelligence to be these ORE Reports, but you don't interpret the Daily Summary to be National Intelligence?

GEN. WRIGHT: No.

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ADM. INGLIS: I don't know whether they are talking about the kind of intelligence that is contemplated in paragraph, or all of it.

GEN. WRIGHT: I don't either.

ADM. INGLIS: I am confused.

GEN. WRIGHT: Now, practically, of course, the Director is always faced with this situation - every paper that is put out here, if the time element allows at all, is worked out with all the agencies and any dissent is put in, when the agency wants the dissent put in. But if the President or Secretary of Defense wants your opinion by 9:30 in the morning on so and so, there just isn't time to do it that way and that is what we are running into. It is not the desire of this Agency to circumvent the intelligence products of the other agencies at all.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't know what all the shouting is about when they are recommending something we already do, if you look at it in that light.

MR. ARMSTRONG: No, we don't as I read it.

ADM. INGLIS: If you look upon these estimates, to use the words of the Dulles Report, as being identical with National Intelligence, as used in NSCID No. 1, they are recommending we do something we are already doing, including reports like the Daily Summary. That is impractical to get concurrence.

GEN. CABELL: Let us actually do what theoretically is possible under NSCID No. 1.

MR. ARMSTRONG: If you look at the text of the Report on page 81, in the preceding paragraph: "There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the Departmental Agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates," I think that would be the antecedent for these estimates in the next paragraph. My understanding of this, the purpose here was to require the IAC as a body of persons to take more individual responsibility and to have a collective responsibility for the coordinated intelligence estimates.

GEN. WRIGHT: I think their idea is for you and Admiral Inglis and General Irwin to sit around this table from nine in the morning until five

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at night and make up intelligence estimates.

ADM. INGLIS: I have neither the time nor the competence to do it. That is what I am afraid of.

GEN. CABELL: Your point can be met if at the end of the present paragraph 6 we added: "For such estimates as have been referred to the IAC."

ADM. INGLIS: Also get the words "responsibility and authority" bracketed together. It is all right to give us responsibility, but we have no authority.

GEN. CABELL: Whichever reports are referred to you, which you have responsibility for are the only ones which you can assume any responsibility for.

ADM. INGLIS: You have the same idea, as expressing it, as putting a tail on that sentence. "Assume collective responsibility commensurate with their authority."

GEN. CABELL: I think that is rather ambiguous. Say "for such reports as have been referred to that body."

ADM. INGLIS: That goes back to my views in paragraph 4, if they would be accepted. I think we are spending a lot of time on this. Navy agrees to this, subject to the expression of its views in connection with paragraph 4.

GEN. IRWIN: Wouldn't it be incorrect to assume responsibility except where specific dissent is stated. If you agreed with all the papers you are willing to accept the responsibility.

ADM. INGLIS: I think the paper should say very specifically that you agree with it, or that you don't agree with it. I don't think it should be left to the imagination. If nothing is said then you agree.

GEN. CABELL: I, for one, wouldn't be concerned that somebody is going to charge me with responsibility for a report which wasn't given to me to review. So with, or without that escape clause I would feel safeguarded.

GEN. IRWIN: There is nothing that would indicate on the report that you had discussed or approved it.

GEN. WRIGHT: Yes, the point here worth noting is that these estimates

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should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted IAC. That means, as we read it here, that everyone of these estimates, and which have been worked on by your working committee, whether they agreed or disagreed, should come up to this body for approval.

ADM. INGLIS: According to Mr. Armstrong they are different. They are departmental estimates and must be thrown into the hopper. If that is the meaning of sub-paragraph 4, I am inclined to agree with you. It is a new thought to me.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think their position here as taken in the light of their recommendation that CIA discontinue departmental intelligence and that, you see, would eliminate those reports to which you are referring, which are not coordinated other than in the type of research and reports by agreement on matters of common concern.

ADM. INGLIS: Following paragraph 3: "specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies." I might have a specialized intelligence product that would be so highly specialized that it would be absolutely of no interest to any one else, yet if I follow that literally it has to go to the IAC and the IAC has to meet on it. Was that your idea?

MR. ARMSTRONG: No, only where two or more departmental specialized estimates are involved in the preparation of what is defined as national intelligence. Because under the concept of the Committee, the Dulles Committee, CIA, other than in the areas of common concern where they are delegated responsibility for both operations and production of that kind of intelligence, wouldn't produce departmental intelligence. As in our view, their Daily Summary and many of their situation reports are today.

ADM. INGLIS: In other words, you go back to sub-paragraph 1: "there has been confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates and responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting activities. I am confused.

GEN. WRIGHT: If you accept the principle, when they say estimates they mean all intelligence reports, CIA becomes an assembly area. You take everybody's material and put it in a paraphrased version, then CIA is an assembly, not a production Agency. To go back here to DCI 3/1 under normal

procedures of handling these estimates it tells how they are submitted to the various agencies. "After receipt of all replies, the CIA will publish the statements of concurrence or substantial dissent with the final paper. And as far as I know it has been done in every case, except on an emergency paper. I don't know what they are driving at myself.

GEN. IRWIN: Let's say so.

ADM. INGLIS: Well, it seems to me this is a very far reaching recommendation that we have got hold of here. Now if we are going to decide whether we are going to have the CIA as a small brain trust which does nothing but pass judgment on the departmental estimates, or whether we want to have CIA the kind of an organization with a couple of thousand people producing its own material from the ground up, its own intelligence from the ground up with its own reference files, cross indexes, etc. etc. - that is a big question.

GEN. IRWIN: Go further than that - preclude the IAC from coming over here.

ADM. INGLIS: Yet we are asked to concur with this procedure. I didn't know it meant all that.

MR. ARMSTRONG: It has become clearer - the recommendation affecting it. The recommendation is not separable from the other recommendations in the report, but they are based on the accomplishment of other changes that affect internal organization in CIA and interdepartmental relations. I wonder if it is too late to suggest that we drop the whole idea of IAC comments on an agreed basis .

ADM. INGLIS: I would go along with that.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Because you can't go into the consequences and implications of some of these recommendations at least without having to go back to the ones that affect CIA's organization.

GEN. IRWIN: Or to put it another way, it is not possible to make any IAC comments unless it is determined what they meant in the Report.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That affects it too.

GEN. CABELL: That applies to anyone not only the IAC.

GEN. WRIGHT: But it does indicate the fact that the Dulles Report

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is not clear as to its intention. In other words, the wording - what does "reconstituted" mean? Dropping out certain people or a new charter?

GEN. IRWIN: And I still feel too this would completely bar you from making estimates. Probably 80% you make are your own.

ADM. INGLIS: I think 80%, or probably 100%.

GEN. IRWIN: You have nothing the IAC doesn't pass on, except when you get a hot one?

GEN. WRIGHT: Your people do pass on it.

GEN. IRWIN: Yes, but we don't see it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We think 80% they make they shouldn't make because it is strictly political.

GEN. WRIGHT: Again, suppose The White House calls and we tell them they will have to get a report from Mr. Armstrong. It is pretty hard to do, and that is where 80% of them start.

GEN. IRWIN: Unless it was an extremely important one you wouldn't have to assemble this group because you get your material from the several departments.

GEN. CABELL: What reports do they make that are not extremely important?

GEN. IRWIN: I don't know the answer on that one.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The theory of the Dulles Committee is that they shouldn't make any estimates except those that are truly national estimates, other than in the areas that are conceded to them as full control.

GEN. WRIGHT: If they had included a list of such items that they thought were improper for CIA, we would have firm ground to go on. There is no indication here what they really mean.

GEN. IRWIN: If you let us talk 15 minutes more, you are going to be out of a job.

GEN. CABELL: What are you going to do as regards paragraph 3?

GEN. WRIGHT: Let me answer that another way. We have taken advantage of what we could pick out, the concrete points, and made a chart showing the organization proposed by the Dulles Committee and having made the chart and studied it, then you don't have to worry too much about answering the comments. The answer to your question - it is not too workable. Anything

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is workable, but there is no saving, no economy certainly. There is a loss of efficiency and we propose to make our comments on the basis of such an organization.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I certainly would have to register an objection to that statement.

GEN. CABELL: It kind of looks like if we take it out of context and deal with the IAC aspects of this report separately, we are not having a true point of departure in what changes are contemplated by CIA. We are sort of working in a vacuum, which leads me to say that your suggestion has merit. Not that we'd decline to comment, but we'd wait until we see the comments on the structure of CIA, see what form it takes.

ADM. INGLIS: I think that it is almost essential to have that because as you said a minute ago it becomes more and more clear that it is so interwoven that you can't comment on the IAC without commenting on the organization and procedures and principles of operating of CIA itself.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I would move, Mr. Chairman, that we address a letter to the Executive Secretary in response to his request, to the general effect that the IAC has considered the problem of commenting separately but has found it is unable to do so because of the inseparability of the recommendations affecting it from those affecting the organization of CIA and other matters. That the IAC will comment in the light of the comments submitted by the departments and agencies, including the CIA.

GEN. WRIGHT: You could do that. CIA, in view of that, of course, would have to send a letter ourselves to the Executive Secretary to involve the fact that we are to make a report as you have, separately. The original thought was that they would all go in at one time. Everybody agree to the assumption to stop work on this and prepare a letter to the Executive Secretary explaining why such a report cannot be made until such time as the intent or the draft of the report from the Central Intelligence Agency is available?

(EVERYONE AGREED)

ADM. INGLIS: Even though you get all of them, I am not at all sure you can restrict your comments to the IAC.

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MR. CHILDS: It would have to be included in the Navy report. You would make reference to the IAC in your report and each one would have to.

MR. TRUEHEART: The separate reports would be postponed until the CIA's comments were ready?

GEN. WRIGHT: No. In order to fill this bill, the CIA draft and the draft of the various agencies too.

ADM. INGLIS: I thought that was that was to close the door to any effort at any time, now, or any subsequent time to a coordinated IAC report.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I had in mind that we were kissing this to death and each Agency will submit its comments on the IAC items as well as all others.

MR. CHILDS: Pertaining to the organization of CIA, if it wishes.

ADM. INGLIS: Anything in the Report they wish to comment on.

MR. CHILDS: CIA and all the IAC would do the same thing.

GEN. TODD: It would seem to me that the National Security Council would end up with a barrel of fish that they couldn't possibly segregate or identify.

GEN. CABELL: Which was the purpose of the Dulles-Jackson Committee to prevent.

GEN. TODD: I don't see how they would deal with such a report.

MR. CHILDS: When I was over there the other day, in the Executive Secretary's Office, they were going to try to go through this and out of each paragraph select the concept of that paragraph and say to the NSC "do you approve of this concept"? You might try to select a few concepts from these paragraphs as they are written. I haven't seen how they are going to do it.

GEN. WRIGHT: Would it be a matter of interest to consider, inasmuch as the Department of State is going to submit theirs through the Secretary of State that the other interested agencies do theirs the same way.

ADM. INGLIS: I will have to consult my Secretary on that.

GEN. IRWIN: We don't know whether he will want it.

GEN. WRIGHT: In making our report if we had the intentions of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force we would like to consider them and get the parallel.

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ADM. INGLIS: What we are doing is preparing this comment which you will see from the Navy very shortly. I intended it largely to be comments on the IAC. In addition we are working on comments for our Secretary, trying to brief this book and make something out of it. Whether he will accept it or do anything about it, I don't know.

GEN. WRIGHT: There is a possibility of two Navy reports on it?

ADM. INGLIS: You may get one signed by me, addressed to the Executive Secretary and another one which the Secretary of the Navy will discuss with the National Security Council. Or it may wind up that you won't get either one of them.

GEN. WRIGHT: Would this be out of line, Park, to submit to CIA a copy of the report which you are going to send to the Security Council through your Secretary?

MR. ARMSTRONG: We have not reached that point of decision yet, because we haven't cleared any of this with the Secretary, except that he will take the comments to the Council. What his wishes in that would be - I wouldn't be very surprised if he makes our comments available to you and to the other agencies.

GEN. CABELL: I was hoping to avoid having to write out a long winded paper for my Secretary. It hasn't percolated down to me and I wasn't going to raise the issue. I would just like to close the door to further IAC references in here. Frankly, I am at a loss to see what time and occasion there would be for reopening it by this body. But I would just like to assume an obligation to comment upon either this or the entire Report.

GEN. TODD: Isn't he going to have to be in a position when the NSC considers whatever responses he gets as a result?

ADM. INGLIS: They are already seized with the problem. This memo dated January 24 from the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council enclosing the final report by the Survey Group was submitted to the NSC for consideration.

MR. HOWE: I wonder if one way out is for you to table this matter as far as the IAC is concerned until the comments of the several agencies are submitted. Then each agency submit theirs through the Secretary to the NSC and at that time reconsider what part can be considered by the IAC.

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GEN. WRIGHT: That doesn't quite suit your point.

GEN. CABELL: Mine, but not Mr. Armstrong's.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think it does.

GEN. CABELL: That is the original proposal I thought I was voting on.

ADM. INGLIS: We can't positively guarantee that our respective Secretaries will have their comments made available to the IAC. I can't promise it.

GEN. CABELL: They don't make them available to us.

ADM. INGLIS: We will probably draft them. I am perfectly willing to circulate my own comments from my little spot, but I can't promise the Secretary will.

GEN. WRIGHT: Of course, it is possible just to table this matter of submitting the IAC report regardless of when it will be reopened again. We could follow up by writing a letter to the Executive Secretary.

MR. CHILDS: Tell him we couldn't get an agree report, so will get individual reports.

GEN. CABELL: Not an inability to get an agreed report, but a report that we are concerned with. I would hate to have it noted that the reason we are not submitting a report is because we are doing a lot of wrangling around this table.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That wouldn't be the case.

GEN. WRIGHT: We can, of course, write to the Executive Secretary that it has not been possible to submit a report by the IAC due to the inability to clarify certain parts of the Dulles Report as to their meaning and intent.

ADM. INGLIS: I read the letter from Mr. Souers to the Director and we are not under any obligation to submit a coordinated report. "The Director of Central Intelligence is being requested by the Council for his recommendations, together with the individual views of the appropriate members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee." We are not required to do any coordinating at all.

GEN. CABELL: I would like a thorough investigation, but I can't do it until I see what CIA is going to put in their report.

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GEN. WRIGHT: I don't see why we have to send a letter. The desire of the IAC members is to refrain from commenting in view of the fact that the individual reports will cover the ground and that a report submitted now, which does not take cognizance of the CIA report, cannot be a good sound report. That is the intent, is it not?

MR. CHILDS: I don't think we have to write them a letter, we can just telephone them.

GEN. IRWIN: I don't think you can mention the individual reports. My Secretary hasn't said anything to me yet.

GEN. CABELL: If you can figure a way to get out of it you had better do it.

GEN. IRWIN: I probably will, but I can't commit myself here. In other words, it practically invites us to make comments for the Director of Central Intelligence. If we don't want to there are no obligations.

ADM. INGLIS: You can at least say "no comment." But you have to say something. I am talking to you as a member of the IAC.

GEN. IRWIN: I don't want to comment as a member of the IAC.

GEN. CABELL: I am not able to comment intelligently until I see the comments of the CIA Director.

ADM. INGLIS: You have got to make some response to this.

GEN. WRIGHT: Is it understood now that we are tabling this, and Mr. Childs will get the word back to Mr. Souers, until such time as the CIA report is forthcoming, no such report as this can be made?

ADM. INGLIS: I don't see why we have to tell Souers. I think you tell him nothing until you draft your comments and then we draft ours and then you toss it into Souers' lap.

GEN. TODD: This 25 February paper won't call for the information or the views of the IAC. It won't reflect your views as CIA, IAC, or individuals.

GEN. WRIGHT: I think individual, not IAC.

COL. TREACY: We are ready to give them to him where we see it to be appropriate.

GEN. IRWIN: I see no obligation to put it in as an IAC.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: Not IAC as a body. Table the matter so far as the Executive Secretary is concerned on the ground of the inseparability of the recommendations affecting the IAC from the report as a whole.

GEN. CABELL: Inability at this time.

ADM. INGLIS: The Executive Secretary has never directed that we restrict our comments to the IAC.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That was our interpretation.

ADM. INGLIS: We got ourselves into that in our discussion at the last meeting that we would make an effort to coordinate the comments of all the members of the IAC and those which pertain to the IAC, but it was just an agreement among this committee. It is not required by this directive as I read it.

GEN. IRWIN: I think I will submit my individual comment. I will put it up to my Secretary.

GEN. CABELL: I will have the same trouble in submitting an individual comment until I see the color of the eyes of the CIA.

GEN. WRIGHT: The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may take the position that he wouldn't like to write his comments until he sees the Agencies' comments passed through us before it goes directly to the Security Council.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I can't give you an unequivocal answer. I assure you it is my desire that our comments be circulated.

GEN. WRIGHT: The Director may take the stand he can't write his report until he does have the comments of the agencies.

GEN. CABELL: I spoke first.

ADM. INGLIS: You can have mine within 24 hours.

GEN. WRIGHT: Anything else?

MR. CHILDS: Why can't we get the individual comments of the members of the IAC and let everybody see them. Circulate them. Then the Director can write a comment on their comments apart from his CIA one. It is hard to divide them up between internal and general IAC matters.

MR. ARMSTRONG: And we will want to write a comment on his comment.

GEN. WRIGHT: Well, shall we adjourn?

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