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FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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MR. ALLEN DULLES

ANNOUNCER: "Good afternoon, and welcome to Contemporaneous. Today we present a talk by Mr. Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was part of the Harvard Law School Forum devoted to this topic, which included participants, Professor Thomas Schelling, Department of Economics, and Harvard Professor Milton Katz, as well as Henry L. Stimson, Professor of Law. Mr. Dulles spoke at the Harvard Law School Forum held on the 27th of January, 1964. The moderator for this particular Harvard law school forum was Professor Arthur T. Von Mehren. The Professor will introduce Mr. Dulles."

VON MEHREN: "My functions for the evening are essentially of a housekeeping nature. I would like to introduce to you very briefly both the topic and our principal speaker. Our tonight's topic for discussion, the role of intelligence in policy making, is I think susceptible of a good many interpretations. I wondered when I was first called on the phone about it, just what was really involved. Within its ample contours, one could take up such problems as these. What is the optimum intelligence quotient for policy makers? Do the more intelligent policy makers reach in general, better decisions? Or, what are the relative roles of ratiocination and intuition in the decision making process?"

"However, and this will doubtless relieve many of you -- the name and career of our principal speaker for tonight suggests quite another emphasis."

(LAUGHTER)

"A man who served with the office of Strategic Services during World War II, and who was Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1951 through 1953, and the Director of that agency from 1953 through 1961 -- though certainly not uninterested in these more theoretical and philosophical problems, is doubtless here tonight to discuss with us some aspects of what, in simpler and cruder days was called espionage."

"If the year were 1923, and the closest counterpart to Allen Dulles that the United States had at that period were addressing us,

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we might be in for an evening of adventure and romance. At least to some one growing up in the 1930's, World War I espionage was symbolized by such romantic, and at least when portrayed by Greta Garbo, beautiful spies as Mati Hari. Perhaps Mr. Dulles will discuss among other things how much the world has changed in this respect since World War I. How large a component a modern intelligence work still has this flavor of romance and adventure, or has the world here too, as in so many other areas of life, become more routineized and less the stage on which soldiers of fortune play out individual dramas.

"Even if I am correct in assuming that Mr. Dulles will discuss tonight the theory and practice of modern intelligence activities, I'm not sure just what aspects of that topic will primarily concern him during the relatively short time that he has to address us tonight. Perhaps if I had had the opportunity to read his new book, 'The Craft of Intelligence,' I would be in a better position to guess. I suspect moreover that his co-panelists Professor Schelling and Professor Katz may view the problem from still other angles than those presented by Mr. Dulles.

"The role of intelligence in policy making could be approached essentially in terms of the intelligence process. What kinds of material fall under the jurisdiction of intelligence services? How is this material gathered? And how is it evaluated for presentation to the persons ultimately charged with formulating policy? What dimensions do they add to understanding? Do these materials do more than reinforce policies that would be reached on general analysis based on unclassified materials. Again, it will be interesting to consider the risks inherent in intelligence services. Do the services have a tendency to develop their own conceptions of national policy with the resulting danger of using intelligence materials in some degree to persuade, rather than merely to inform those who are charged with making policy.

"Is there any danger that those working within the Intelligence Agency, shielded as they must be from public gaze and criticism, will lose their balance in judgment and so impair the value of, or even render dangerous their work? One further aspect of the problem could be suggested. How effectively do those who make policy use intelligence materials? Do they know enough about the intelligence process? Its strength and weaknesses, to understand the end product and to use it wisely? Can this product be presented to them in sufficient detail, so that they are able to rely upon it as an element in reaching their conclusions. Indeed, to what extent can and do individuals make policy in the government of our modern, highly complex societies. Is policy making sometimes or often really a kind of corporate consensus, articulated through the policy maker? And if policy making has this corporate quality, how can the intelligence services participate in achieving and then refining the consensus that is policy?

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"With such problems as these in mind, we can, I think, look forward to a most interesting evening with our three panelists. Our first speaker, Allen W. Dulles was born in 1893, educated at Princeton and then at George Washington University, from which he received his LL.D. His distinguished career in government service goes back to 1916, when he entered the U. S. diplomatic service. From 1922 through 1926, he served in the State Department as chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. In 1926 and 1927, and again in 1932 and '33, he was a delegate to the Geneva Disarmament conferences. From 1926 until World War II Mr. Dulles practiced law with Sullivan and Cromwell, as I've already mentioned he served during World War II with the Office of Strategic Services.

"From 1951 to 1961 he was Deputy Director and then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In this crowded career he has found time to write four books, all related to international affairs and intelligence activities. 'Can We Be Neutral?' 1935. 'Can America Stay Neutral?' 1939 -- he had become less optimistic with the passage of time. 'Germany's Underground,' 1947 -- I suppose a reflection of the fact that we did not stay neutral. And most recently 'The Craft of Intelligence,' -- I don't know whether this has any implication, either for the past or the future. Among his many honors are honorary degrees from several universities, including Columbia and Princeton. He is also an officer of the Legion d' Honneur. It is a great pleasure to introduce to you a distinguished member of a distinguished family, Allen W. Dulles."

(APPLAUSE)

DULLES: "Professor Von Mehren, distinguished panel, President, ladies and gentlemen. I wish I felt that I could meet all of the requirements that were placed upon me by the introduction. I will deal with some of these subjects. As to my topic, you know in intelligence, we often use what we call case cover, and this is really a cover topic. I don't really plan to discuss that subject very particularly, because I hope to persuade you that it is not the job of the intelligence services to make policy. It is the job to submit the information on which one hopes sometimes vainly, that a policy may be made.

"But I appear before you tonight in part, as a lawyer, because as you will note, I just want to make sure you did note in the introduction, it was indicated that I practiced law. Since now I'm on my own, and not supported by the government, I am out in the search of clients -- (LAUGHTER) and I don't wish to be known solely as an intelligence officer, but also as a lawyer -- a little out of date possibly, but still. I have been asked recently to go back on a sad and difficult task, as a member of the Commission the President has appointed under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice of the United States, to look into the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy, and to see whether we can contribute to an understanding -- a popular understanding -- of the facts when and if

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we can find them. And maybe, to contribute in some way to lessening the chances of a recurrence of these sad events that have struck down presidents in this country too often, and which have only narrowly failed on several occasions.

"Since this matter is more or less sub judice, I will not really go into it any further than to say that the panel is seriously starting its work these next few days and it will have to take some little time because we obviously cannot proceed with certain phases of it as long as the Ruby case is pending.

"I am going here tonight, to present the case for an American intelligence service, one patterned somewhat along the lines of the one that we have under the National Security Act of 1947. The panel and you will be sort of judge and jury. I expect to say some provocative things, and I hope that I shall be adequately attacked and given a further chance to defend myself and I can always say that if you don't agree with me, in what I have said, just please buy my book -- you needn't read it necessarily -- and therein you will find the answers to all of your problems.

"I want to start out, and as a lawyer and speaking to lawyers and their friends, at this great law school, that I admit that certain types of intelligence work are not tainted by any legality at all. And if one tries to fit them in to our ideas of international law, or in certain respects domestic law, one will fail. If we did not have a world which was almost one-third communist, and which was not guided by or considered itself subject to the principles of law that we respect and honor ourselves, maybe we wouldn't have to have an intelligence service. But in a world such as we have today, in a world wherein the Soviet Union -- they surround all their preparations for war behind a veil of secrecy -- we have to choose between trying to be informed as to what they are doing, or expose ourselves to possibly a sudden surprise attack with weapons, the danger of which we might not otherwise have realized.

"I admit -- and I shall give my credentials here, but cut it down a bit, because your chairman has already been very generous in what he has said about me -- I admit to being a very prejudiced witness. I believe firmly in an intelligence service. I worked in it not only in the last ten years, but I really started working in it many years before, even in World War I. I got into it in a way, because of the consequences of a rather tragic mistake that I made -- one of the mistakes I made -- that I may have profited from. Years ago in 1917, March, 1917, I was then in the diplomatic service -- I had been in Austria, the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Vienna -- and I was then transferred from Vienna to Bern, just before we went into the war in 1917 -- in April. I was then in Switzerland, and one day one of my colleagues, wiser than I, whose name unfortunately I can't remember, came up to me and said that he was going to Zurich, about

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two hours ride by train from Bern, he was going over there to see a man who had a new theory. About all he knew about him was that he was a little man in size, and had a beard. I asked his name, and he said it was something like Ilich -- something like Ilich -- but it was, better known as Lenin.

"I said to him that I had that day a rather important tennis game that I was going to play, and I thought I'd get my information on the bearded man with a theory, later. I missed the chance then of seeing Vladimir Ilich Lenin. I never had another one. And I can assure you that since then I have seen all kinds of queer people, with and without beards. I didn't want to pass up another chance such as that, and on the whole I've profited from it. I've had my leg pulled from time to time, but it helped me to be able to judge people, and judgment of people is one of the great keys to intelligence.

"After that I worked really as an intelligence officer. I was technically a diplomat, but I really was an intelligence officer in World War I, working for Switzerland, I had to cover the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the reports of what was going on there, because I had been there. Then at Versailles, and just before the Versailles Peace Conference an opportunity to follow and do some modest bit of work on what I think was one of the great psychological warfare operations of all time, the negotiations of Woodrow Wilson leading to the Armistice of 1918.

"How different it was in that war than in the second World War. Here Wilson, before the days of radio, before the days of television, before the days when mass media could quickly have such an impact on people and peoples, Wilson by his doctrines, which he did get over to the German people, undermined the homefront, so that despite all that Ludendorff can do, and many complaints did he address back to the front, the home front, he said the military home front's all right -- we've had a few knocks, but still the front is intact. And in fact the war did end then, at a time when the German armies were in retreat but still intact. How different, as I say, World War II. I think Woodrow Wilson's policy was the wiser one, than that one we followed with unconditional surrender in World War II, but that is a matter that is subject to discussion.

"In any event, certainly we were influenced by an entirely false theory that was then spread abroad, that the reason that the Germans had, after Versailles, had turned and rearmed, and then reattacked Western Europe, because we hadn't really dealt with them in World War I. I think that's an entirely false theory. Maybe we didn't deal with them wisely in the Treaty of Versailles, and I don't think we did, but in any event that was not fully the reason, and I doubt whether we achieved by our policies at the end of World War II all that we had hoped or might have achieved with a slightly different policy. But I don't want to spend too much time on that.

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"Before the war, the days leading up to World War II, it seems to me there were three or four main failures that we had, of intelligence appraisal, and with 'we' I include of course, the Western European powers most immediately involved. We failed to understand the implications of the communist menace. I was at the Paris Peace Conference at the time of the Bill Bullitt mission. Bill Bullitt went to Russia, brought back some proposals -- pretty bad proposals, I may say -- from Lenin and Trotsky -- but still they were the only proposals that were available at that time, and when he came back to Paris that spring of 1919, nobody had the time even to talk with him, and he went down to the Riviera and shook the dust of the Paris Peace Conference off his feet. I think that was a mistake -- I think if he'd been a little more patient, maybe somebody would have listened to him, but they wouldn't listen to him -- although the leaders at Versailles had sent him to the Soviet Union.

"Anyway, in the early days we didn't have to -- we had too many problems to bother with, we couldn't bother with the communist problem, couldn't take it seriously, and that is a sad point of history. Then of course, except for Churchill and a few others, there was a great error in dealing with Hitler's intentions and his power, and that was one of the causes of the war. And turning to the East, we had not properly appraised the nature and effect of Japan's ambitions.

"All of these, in my opinion, were intelligence failures. I don't say they all could have been avoided -- they might have been mitigated, with proper intelligence appraisals reaching the high authorities, but at that time we had no intelligence agency that had the responsibility of doing that. We had a military intelligence, we had a naval intelligence, but it did not deal with matters of this character.

"In any discussion of intelligence, one has to go back to Pearl Harbor, because that was an outstanding example of a case where -- a case which was not a case of a failure to collect intelligence -- the failure there was to use intelligence. At that time maybe you will recall that we were reading the Japanese codes, not all of them, but a good many of them, and we were getting invaluable information as to Japanese policy, that we had every reason to believe was accurate. Now I do not say that anyone could have predicted and pinpointed that on December 7th that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked -- that was one of the alternatives we should have taken into account -- but I think all of the recent soundings on this show that we should have realized that a very great crisis was right around the corner, maybe only hours away, and we should have been prepared for a crisis in our relations with Japan, of a very serious nature.

"The fact that we did not do that, and the facts as they were disclosed in all of these investigations of Pearl Harbor that took place, starting right after the event, and reaching on for many

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months, and the facts that are coming out in books that are being published today bear out, I believe, what I have said. I don't believe at all any of these theories that there was some treachery in this, or that we invited a Pearl Harbor -- that's all bunk -- but we did not use the intelligence wisely and effectively. Then as we came to the conclusion of the war, then we had in many ways better intelligence than we had when the war started, because all our intelligence services had been built up. The OSS, which was the stepfather of the CIA had been organized, and we were getting better intelligence. A very eminent professor of Harvard, Professor Langer, was doing very outstanding work with many others from this University and others, were doing outstanding -- you were there, weren't you, Milt, about that time? Were you responsible for that?"

KATZ: "I was there -- yes."

DULLES: "So that by the time the war was over, we did have a fairly effective intelligence service, but we proceeded immediately after the war to disband most of it, under the impression that we could cooperate with the Soviet Union if they really wanted to make a peace, and that we might not need an intelligence service. And for the period between 1945 and 1947, when the CIA was organized under law, we were as I say, in a process of disbanding our service, and many people were pressing for the pasteurization of Germany. We brought the Soviet into the war, invited them in to the Far Eastern war -- urged them in -- at a time when in my opinion, we couldn't have kept them out with wild horses, couldn't have kept them out, they were going to get into that Far Eastern war as soon as they possibly could anyway. We didn't need to pay them anything to get into the war.

"And when we thought, as I say, that cooperation with the Soviets in Eastern Europe, and in the Far East would be a possibility. All this proved to be a mirage. It was about 1947 that there began the awakening, and it was at that time that the Central Intelligence Agency was organized. It came under President Truman. You may recall that in 1947 he proclaimed what became known as the Truman Doctrine, and under this doctrine, the United States in a very general way, but in quite effective way, as far as Greece and Turkey was concerned, pledged itself to come to the help of any nation which was resisting communist infiltration and communist subversion, and which was prepared to put its resources to work together with ours, to see that that danger was avoided. The doctrine was based on the theory that we would be invited in, that we would be asked to participate, and not only that, but the country that invited us in would make its own resources available to work with us.

"Now that worked out quite well in the case of Greece and Turkey. Helped on by the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. But there, we were able to turn back what looked like a possibly imminent communist take-over. And at that time we passed the National Security Act which organized the Department of Defense, combined the services,



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created the Air Force -- I say combined them, combined them in a way, they were never entirely combined. And it also created the Central Intelligence Agency as one chapter in that legislation. This was all done under the impulse and the reaction to the awakening, our disappointment and deception at the fact that we had not been able to work with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had used its fears of influence, and its fears of military occupation as means for a communizing of countries -- it had taken over Poland, Hungary, later Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Roumania; the Chinese take-over by communism was under way. Czechoslovakia, even though not been occupied by any Soviet troops was taken over by communism without a shot being fired -- again a case of a minority government taking over power by the ruthless methods of subversion, just as earlier in 1917 Lenin had taken over power in Petrograd -- later Leningrad -- by doing away with the constituent assembly and which at that time the communists had only about 25 per cent of the representation.

"Czechoslovakia, as I say, the pattern was in the same general pattern -- take over a country when they only had the communists in the minority. In fact there is no case that I know of, with the possible exception of Kerala in India, and that was not really a true exception, where communism has been voted into power by the free votes of the people in any country, and it wasn't true in the Soviet Union itself. After the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, as a part of our awakening to the threat of communism, and in order to create an instrument which could help our government in the contest, the worldwide contest against communist -- growth of communism -- because that is one of its functions. What are its other functions?

"The CIA was to coordinate intelligence work in the government. It was to collect secret intelligence. Your chairman referred to that as espionage, and that's a perfectly good name for it -- a more exciting name than secret intelligence. That is in addition, of course, to all the overt intelligence that's collected by the State Department, the military services, and others, and you should only use secret intelligence when you can't get it any other way, and it's only one part. It's often advertised as being the chief function of the CIA, but that is not the case -- it's only one of its functions. Then the CIA was to develop counter intelligence abroad. The FBI is the counter intelligence agency in the United States, and that has been one of its most successful missions, and if you read about spies being picked up here and there, not only in the United States, which is mostly J. Edgar Hoover's work, but in various countries abroad, it is because this country has developed one of the best counter intelligence services in the world, and we have penetrated the Soviet system in many areas, and they know it -- and we have been able to catch their agents, some of them who have been working in various European countries for well over a decade.

"That is the third function. The fourth function, and a very important one, of the Central Intelligence Agency is the analysis



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and preparation of national estimates. There's a section of the Central Intelligence Agency which is devoted to the collation of all information that's received by all departments of government, including the CIA, and then working together with the other intelligence services which are represented on the United States Intelligence Board, trying to produce for the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the policy making organs of government, trying to produce for them intelligence in a coordinated, collated, and readable form, so that as the various issues come up, they can turn to the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Intelligence Board and get a statement of the factual position.

"So going back to my title, which I said was somewhat of a cover title, CIA has no business whatever to suggest what the policies should be. It can give its estimate of what it thinks the facts are, and then it is up to the President, the Secretary of State, and Defense to determine what the policy should be. Sometimes we may have to work against what appeared to be the facts, for other reasons of national security, but in any event those facts should be available for the policy making. And then as I have indicated, the CIA has certain functions in meeting the cold war's subversive threat of international communism. I'll discuss that a little but further.

"The work of coordination, of course, is to try to see that all the target areas are covered, and we're getting information on the most important things to our national security, and that the particular agency best qualified to do the work is assigned the task. Sometimes it may be the Army, Navy or the Air Force. Sometimes it should be best done by the State Department -- overt means. Sometimes, as happened at the time of the U-2, and you may want to talk about that in the question period, at the time of the U-2, the only way we could get information on what was going on with regard to Soviet missiles was to fly over and see them. The question of the legality of that as I say, was not tainted particularly with legality, but neither is any espionage operation.

"When the Soviet documents of one of their subjects with false papers, gives him a false identity, sends him into the United States, that is just as much a violation of our security in our territory as sending a plane over, and it's a much messier way of doing it. The plane up there, far away, nobody sees it -- doesn't make any noise -- doesn't get involved with other Americans at all, but if you let it alone it'll stay right there. So that it's hard for me to see why, if one looks at this from the legal angle, a U-2 is more of a violation of law than sending agents in. You might say well a U-2 might have a bomb. So could anybody coming in here, might carry a small bomb, and neither the U-2 nor a traveler could carry a very large bomb because there was not a space, nor could they bear the weight of it.

"I've mentioned the work of collecting secret intelligence, and then counter intelligence. I don't think I need to develop those functions any more. The estimative function I've also discussed. The cold war functions I have not yet discussed. But they're very

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important, and in that the CIA has a role. Why is that? It is because a great deal of the communist subversive work directed against free countries, concentrating on those countries that are least able to govern themselves, those countries where there is the greatest economic difficulties. Most of their work is done on a covert basis. They have great advantages in this field, because they have a type of apparatus that we could not duplicate -- we wouldn't want to duplicate. First they have the worldwide Communist Parties. For a time they hid those parties under the veil of the 'Cominform' the 'Comintern' and now that veil has been sundered and is no longer necessary. Most of the Communist Parties of the free world -- not all, because some are directed by Peking -- but most of the Communist Parties of the free world are directed from Moscow through the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and practically every country of the world, including this country, has its Communist Party.

"We have nothing of that kind, and that Communist Party in the United States and all these other countries is a subversive weapon. In some countries it's a very important element. It's one of the largest parties in France, in Italy, Indonesia, and a great many other countries. It is important even in those areas where its voting is small -- not very important in the United States -- but in many countries where it does not have a large vote, there's a hard core, because when you're doing subversive work, you're far more interested in the hard core than in all the voters. When you want to come and take over a country, then the voters would become very important, because the Soviet Union uses our free institutions, in order to -- and because they're free, tries to turn them against us, and use them to take over power, and of course once power is taken over by the communists then there's no more voting, and there's no way to make a change.

" In addition to the parties, there are the communist labor unions. The largest labor union in France is communist-dominated. The largest labor union in Indonesia is communist-dominated. Italy also. And these are all underground, or have an underground to them. It takes intelligence work to penetrate these organizations, and you've got to know about them, you've got to know what they're up to. It's no secret at all, the extent to which the FBI has penetrated the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the Communist Party of the United States rather -- that has been pretty well publicized. The extent to which the CIA has penetrated the communist parties of other countries is still a secret. It's perfectly doable -- it's very important to do it, and I hope that work will continue.

"And then in addition to the party and the labor unions, as a part of this orchestra of subversion, they have all these popular fronts -- the bomb movement, generally it's communist infiltrated if not dominated. They have their youth organizations which meet in various parts of the world. They have their peace organizations. It

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met not long ago in Mexico, and it meets from time to time. It's a communist front, and they can multiply these fronts according to the nature of the situation in each country. And then as paymaster, director, supervisor, you have the Soviet Secret Service operating directly under Khrushchev -- the 'KGB' -- as it's known today, which is a lineal descendant of the Cheka, the OGPU, the NKVD. In fact every year they have, and they advertise this, they have a ceremony celebrating the anniversary of the organization of the Soviet Secret Service, one of the most important organs of the whole Soviet Union, and they take as their beginning point, the first year that the Cheka began to operate in the days of, just after the take-over in Petrograd. So that to meet this type of subversion that we have it's absolutely essential that we have a Secret Service, that learns everything possible about this underground, because while that cannot be advertised, it helps to give our policy makers an idea of the countries that are threatened, the nature of the threat, the persons who are being subverted, and what is going on, and without that, we would have one hand tied behind our backs in meeting the policy of Khrushchev, which goes on in time of thaw, and in time of stress, the time of coexistence and time of non-coexistence.

"The policy that he proclaimed on January 6th, 1961, of wars of liberation -- that meant, as defined by him, that anything that could help undermine free governments, non communist governments, would have appropriate support from the Soviet Union. That doesn't mean that they're going to the point of war, or the threat of war, they're going to use the covert, rather than the overt means of giving help. I have now talked as long as I should, and I want to give the panelists chance. I will skip here, just to give you a few more provocative things to get the panelists to get their teeth into.

"I want to refer to several types of attack on the CIA. Fortunately for the CIA the greatest attack that comes on it is from the Soviet Union. I have a tremendous collection of compliments they've addressed to me over the years, and they make very interesting reading. One of them though, I really did appreciate. You may have, it was (Ilia Ehrenberg?) who's a little out of favor now, because he has a sense of humor, and he wrote about ten years ago, and he said 'If that spy Allen Dulles should ever pass the pearly gates, or approach the pearly gates, and then get allowed in, he would be found mining the clouds, shooting the stars, and slaughtering the angels.' I really appreciated that particular attack.

"But we get a good many attacks from this country that are more worrying, by journalists of note and repute -- some of them say that an intelligence service is not in the American tradition. All I can say is that George Washington was one of our great leaders who understood intelligence and who during the Revolutionary War spent a great deal of time on intelligence. Well, the critics would say intelligence is all right in time of war, but it's not, you shouldn't have it in time of peace. Well there's an old Latin phrase, isn't it

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in tempore pax para bellum, you can't have -- you can't turn intelligence organizations on and off. If you want to have them in time of war, you've got to prepare them in time of peace. But we don't have a time of real peace. There never was a time, in my opinion when we had greater need for developing our intelligence service as right today, because of its role in the cold war.

"Then they attack CIA because it interferes in policy. And we may get to that in the question period. There never has been a political action, or an action of a political nature, Bay of Pigs, U-2, Viet Nam, and the security services, there never has been an operation of that kind that had not been approved from the very beginning, from its very inception at the highest level of government, and approved. Now when there's a failure, or something blows up, whether a plane or a Bay of Pigs, you're going to have criticism, and the CIA can't then run out and say, look here, we were backed on this by a --

(SOUND OF BUZZER RINGING)

"Does that mean I should stop? I'm going to very soon. The CIA can't get up and say, oh no we didn't have anything to do with this, and so forth and so on, you just keep your mouth shut. In both the Bay of Pigs situation and in the U-2 situation, the Chief Executive assumed responsibility, not because I asked him to -- not at all, but because he felt that not to assume responsibility of these particular actions -- and I think he was right -- both were right -- would have meant irresponsibility in government. If I was going to be allowed to sit around there and send airplanes over Russia, without policy approval, I ought to be shot pretty nearly, or certainly dismissed. Or if I were mounting a Bay of Pigs operation without approval, same thing should have happened. Well, it just didn't work that way.

"Well, take Viet Nam. This terrible uproar on the part of the press -- CIA making policy there, by supplying a security force to Mr. Nu. Well what happened was this. About three or four years ago, that's when I was still Director of CIA, after a great deal of thought, it was decided that we ought to try to help the Vietnamese police to develop a good anti-communist organ, so that they could spot the Viet Cong and so forth that were infiltrating into their very government and into their cities and towns. And we proceeded to organize such an organization, and it was very efficient. The trouble is the more efficient, the more danger comes -- and so I'll just tell you, -- it was so efficient that Mr. Nu and President Diem took it over and turned it against their own internal enemies to some extent. Now there's no way we could stop them -- they had the power there -- we didn't have enough military force at that time to stop this, and no arguments would change their point of view. The same thing happened in Cuba, before -- long before Castro took over, we had organized an effective force there, of FBI types in order to

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deal with communist penetration in Cuba. They got so efficient that Batista took them over and used them against his own political enemies, and you could argue with him until you were red in the face, but you couldn't persuade him not to do that. He felt his position was threatened, this was the best arm there was, carefully trained in the United States by Americans and others, and so he used it for that purpose.

"Well, that may raise the question of whether you should do that sort of thing, but all of that was done with full approval. The only thing that didn't have the approval was diverting it from the proper purposes for which it was organized to improper purposes. Then, you hear the argument against the CIA that there are no adequate controls. There are some people -- and some very responsible people -- that have urged for years that there be a watch-dog committee of the Congress. What it's going to do -- this is an Executive, not a Legislative function. Well in any event that has been voted down, and I don't think it's likely ever to be voted, but still there are many people and some very responsible journalists who are still urging that a watch-dog committee be established. The President -- President Eisenhower first and President Kennedy then followed on with it -- has designated a special committee -- kind of a watch-dog committee -- to report to him, because the CIA is directly under the President of the National Security Council. That committee was for many years headed by a very eminent citizen of this city, Dr. Killian of MIT. The representation on this committee is of the highest, and it's been very useful. I urged the President to -- President Eisenhower -- to appoint this committee, and it's been of very great value.

"Then they say, well, Congress hasn't any control. The CIA reports to four committees of the Congress, two in the House, two in the Senate. The Armed Services Committee, and the Appropriations Committee. Our budget is studied by a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, just as the State Department budget is, and the others. The only difference is the amount isn't published. We don't tell you how much is spent. Of course that irks some Congressmen, and it irks the press -- they would like to know, so they say we spend a billion dollars. That's a good sum. Everything is in billions in Washington now, so they couldn't possibly suggest that we spend less than a billion dollars. That figure is perfectly ridiculous -- it's out of all line, and has no relation to the reality of what is actually being spent.

"But these are the kinds of attack, and maybe some of the panel will want to take them up and carry them forward. I'm here as an advocate, and I don't admit they have very much validity. I feel now that we have in the CIA a skilled group of men and women, highly motivated. I don't know a finer lot of people that I've ever worked with in my somewhat long career, and I think they deserve your support, as the whole project deserves your support, and I'm not going to admit any shortcomings. There are certain -- haven't got time now -- haven't left time enough for that, so I'll leave that to the panelists to bring out, and then we can then possibly have a good argument. I've enjoyed being with you very much tonight. Thank you."