

# TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

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## HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

ON  
(H.R. 3299, H.R. 6082, H.R. 6294, H.R. 7340,  
H.R. 7531, S. 777)

BILLS TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
ACT IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE AUTHORIZATION FOR  
APPROPRIATIONS AND TO MODIFY THE PERSONNEL SECURITY  
PROCEDURES FOR CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

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AUGUST 29, SEPTEMBER 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18, 1963

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## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

THURSDAY, AUGUST 29, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., room H-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning in open session for consideration of pending bills relating to arms control and disarmament.

The Chair wants to state that a telephone check shows we will have a fairly good attendance so I think we will proceed.

Before each member are the bills pertaining to this subject introduced by Mr. Farbstein, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. McDowell, Mr. Morse, and Mr. Fraser.

Also attached is S. 777, a bill which passed the Senate on June 17, 1963.

(The bills referred to are as follows:)

[H.R. 3299, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]

(By Mr. Farbstein)

A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed \$10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate."

SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating subsection 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the following new subsection:

"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

## 2 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

[H.R. 6082, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]

(By Mr. Gallagher)

A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed \$10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate."

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"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof; provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

[H.R. 6294, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]

(By Mr. McDowell)

A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed \$10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate."

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"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

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[H.R. 7340, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]

(By Mr. Morse)

A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed \$10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".

SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating subsection 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the following new subsection :

"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

[H.R. 7531, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]

(By Mr. Fraser)

A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed \$10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".

SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating subsection 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the following new subsection :

"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

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[S. 777, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]

AN ACT To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "In addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1964 and 1965, the sum of \$20,000,000, to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act."

SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating subsection 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the following new subsection:

"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof: *Provided*, That security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than 'confidential' to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

SEC. 3. (a) Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended by striking out the words "this or any other law" and inserting in lieu thereof the words "this Act".

(b) In the proviso strike out the balance of the sentence after the word "except" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States".

(c) Such section is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any policy or action by any Government agency which would interfere with, restrict, or prohibit the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms by an individual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education, or training."

SEC. 4. Section 49 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(c) Not more than 20 per centum of any appropriation made pursuant to this Act shall be obligated and/or reserved during the last month of a fiscal year.

"(d) None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda in support of any pending legislation concerning the work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

SEC. 5. In section 31(2) before the word "private" insert the words "United States".

Passed the Senate June 17, 1963.

Attest:

FELTON M. JOHNSTON,

*Secretary.*

Chairman MORGAN. Our witness this morning is the Honorable William C. Foster, who is the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

With Mr. Foster is Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, and Mr. George Bunn, General Counsel.

Mr. Foster, do you have a prepared statement? You may proceed.



**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS  
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY**

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, I will read this statement since it covers most of the points I would like to start off with.

I hope it will be brief.

88TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege today to appear before you and the other members of the committee to review the legislative proposals to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. These proposals would increase the authorization for appropriations and would modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees. The proposals are reflected in a number of identical bills introduced in the House during this session of Congress.

TWO AGREEMENTS REACHED SO FAR

Since its creation, the Agency's research and negotiating efforts have contributed substantially to two arms control agreements.

Other agencies have naturally been part of the effort. But the concepts for both the "hot line" agreement and the limited test ban were formulated and largely carried out by ACDA.

In each case, the homework was done in advance and the proposal was put forward with the Agency quarterbacking the activity. Careful advance preparation produced quick agreement after the Soviet Union accepted each proposal in principle months after it was made. In each case, ACDA produced the first draft of the agreement in Washington, and then supplied staff and backup for the negotiators.

The Agency, however, should not be judged alone by the number of agreements it makes. It is likely that there will be long periods when no agreement which would serve our national interests will be possible. But there will be other agreements. And this committee ought to have some satisfaction because of the contributions of the Agency it helped to create.

THE APPROPRIATIONS AMENDMENT

With respect to the legislation now before you, the Agency is primarily concerned about the proposed amendment to increase the authorization for appropriations. Section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act contained an authorization ceiling of \$10 million. Of this amount, \$8.33 million has been appropriated and only \$1.67 million remains.

The budget request for fiscal year 1964 contained \$15 million for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Eleven million dollars of this was requested for contract and grant research. The remaining \$4 million is for research by Agency personnel, for administrative support of our program, and for utilizing the results of research and study through knowledgeable negotiations.

The bills introduced in the House in support of the Agency's legislative program would amend the act to authorize the appropriation of "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate." When originally introduced, S. 777 was identical to the House bills. As passed by the Senate, however, S. 777 authorized to be appropriated the sum of \$20 million to cover 2 fiscal years, 1964 and 1965.

If the Agency is to carry out thoroughly and effectively the functions assigned to it by Congress, it will need more than the \$20 million for 2 years authorized in S. 777.

The main effect of limiting available funds to \$10 million per year for the next 2 years would be the impact on the Agency's research program. We had planned only small staff increases, in any event, but even if increases above the fiscal year 1963 level were further restricted, almost the same amount (\$3.7 million, as compared with the \$4 million requested) would be required for program operations in fiscal year 1964. Therefore, a \$10 million authorization for fiscal year 1964 would result in a 40-percent cut in requested contract research funds, from \$11 to \$6.3 million.

A cut of this magnitude in our research program would require us to reduce substantially some high priority projects. It also would require us to eliminate other projects which are important for a comprehensive, coordinated program. Such a limitation would have an even greater adverse impact in fiscal year 1965 when not only more advanced research and analysis will be valuable but in addition more costly operational proof tests will be required.

The importance of the research program was recognized by Congress when it created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We were directed to explore, develop, recommend and, if approved by the President, negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance our national security. As I have indicated, both the so-called hot-line agreement and the limited test ban were produced with this kind of effort. A broad background of technical information must be available to our negotiators if we are to participate most wisely at the conference table.

As the ACDA research program has acquired more clearly identified goals, contracts and grants have been let at an increasing rate. For fiscal year 1962 the Agency's budget provided \$600,000 for contract research, approximately one-third of its total budget. For fiscal year 1963 Congress provided \$4 million for contract research; this was roughly two-thirds of the Agency's total budget.

The Agency was, incidentally, limited in incurring contractual obligations during the first part of fiscal year 1963 because the bill containing our appropriation for that year was not enacted until October 18. The funds were not apportioned until November 16. This late date was the principal reason for the greater rate at which Agency funds were obligated during the latter part of fiscal year 1963.

There are sound reasons why the ACDA contract research program should be growing. The Agency is just under 2 years old. During much of this time we have been developing the basic concepts for the research program. Early work in this development was, of necessity, exploratory and conceptual and did not involve much detail. However, now more detailed research and analysis is required to provide technical support for sound U.S. negotiating positions.

To illustrate, it takes much detailed technical information to develop a good verification system. If nuclear weapon tests, for example, are what we want to limit or prohibit under an agreement, we must first identify the key indicators of foreign nuclear weapon tests. Second, we must design a verification system which will monitor those indicators. Third, we must devise means of testing the elements of that system. Fourth, we must conduct actual field tests. Generally speaking, each of these successive steps costs more money than the last. Because of what has been done, we have confidence in the present proposed treaty.

Most of the technical contract research on verification of this treaty has actually been done by the Department of Defense which was assigned that responsibility before ACDA was created. But ACDA has done a great deal of research on this subject since its establishment. Moreover, it has begun both inhouse and external contract work on several other areas of possible agreement, many of which require a detection system probably even more complicated than that required by a test ban.

This effort is expensive. This is particularly true as ACDA gets into the later stages involving "hardware" research and field tests. However, ACDA's budget of \$11 million for fiscal year 1964, which for the first time includes some research of a field test nature, is modest in comparison to similar research efforts by other agencies and industrial concerns.

The increased appropriation we have requested is neither inconsistent with our stage of development as an agency nor extravagant. Moreover, if we are to take the next steps forward from the limited test ban agreement, we must keep new ideas from contract and grant research flowing into the Agency. If we are to produce sound arms control plans consistent with the security of the United States, we must be able to plan verification systems and test them.

The trend in ACDA research, namely, greater detail and specificity, is evidenced by the contracts let in the latter half of fiscal year 1963. Even more indicative of this trend is the list of proposed contract and grant studies programed for fiscal year 1964. Both these lists are included in the appendix of the presentation booklet the Agency prepared for the use of the committee.

Included in the fiscal year 1964 list is the field test research project ACDA has programed in cooperation with DOD. Out of the \$11 million requested for research during fiscal year 1964, we planned to allocate \$2.4 million to cover ACDA's share of the cost of this field test program. The Department of Defense will support an equivalent share.

If the Agency were limited to \$6.3 million instead of \$11 million for fiscal year 1964 research, the inspection field test program would have to be substantially reduced.

In addition, the grant research program would have to undergo more than a two-thirds reduction. ACDA looks to this, in part, for new concepts for agreements that might follow the hot line and the limited test ban.

Parenthetically, I might say to the committee that the hot line will go into operation tomorrow. Before it had had field tests, it functioned perfectly and it will be in active operation as of August 30.

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A cut to \$6.3 million would probably require cutting out much of the contract work directed at steps toward decreasing tension and reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. Our presentation statement (pp. 19-20) lists some of the more valuable research endeavors which probably would have to be eliminated entirely if the Agency were limited to \$6.3 million for research in fiscal year 1964.

The importance we attach to these projects of more modest priority emphasizes the high degree of importance we attach to the projects we would retain even at an overall reduced level of research effort. However, the impact of the Senate cut in authorized appropriations cannot be measured solely in terms of individual project reductions and eliminations. Such a budget reduction also will result in reduced coordination of research projects. Many of these projects are related and depend upon the successful conclusion of other projects for maximum effectiveness.

Our experience suggests the importance of research prior to negotiations. The Department of Defense and ACDA research produced a draft for a limited test ban treaty which was tabled on August 27, 1962. This was available for inspection by the Soviets for 10 months before Chairman Khrushchev decided to accept it in principle on July 2, 1963. After that, negotiations went quickly because our homework had been done in advance.

Our research program as presently planned is designed to study problems in a systematic and timely way before they become critical negotiating issues. Only in this way can we have assurance that our negotiating policies and positions are sound and consistent with the security of the United States.

We believe that most of the research planned for fiscal year 1964 should be carried out in the near future. It covers a broad range of conceptual and detailed research projects in the field of arms control and disarmament. It is expected to provide us with the type of knowledge that will enable us to take negotiating initiatives and respond effectively, with foresight, to Soviet negotiating initiatives.

The field of arms control and disarmament is not an area of endeavor in which we can engage safely without making every reasonable effort to assure ourselves that our proposals and our responses to proposals would enhance our security if adopted.

Some changes, of course, will be necessary in our planned research as we proceed. These changes will reflect high priority needs that are disclosed by negotiation or by unanticipated results from prior research. We are currently evaluating the impact the test ban treaty may have on future research. However, we believe the overall research program planned for fiscal year 1964 is both sound and essential. I hope the committee will agree that it is a wise investment in the future security of the United States.

THE SECURITY AMENDMENT

The second amendment to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act proposed in the House bills would alter somewhat the security provisions of the act. This amendment was included in S. 777 as passed by the Senate.

Before I discuss the proposed amendment in detail, let me be quite specific about two things. First, the amendment pertains only to the

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employees of contractors; it would not in any way revise the security procedures or standards for employees or consultants of the Agency. Second, the proposed amendment is entirely consistent with the fundamental security criterion in the act; namely, that standards applicable to security clearances shall not be less intensive or complete than in the case of Government agencies having the highest security restrictions.

Under the act, as presently written, personnel of contractors may not have access to classified information until they have been investigated in accordance with the act, which provides for arrangements for full-field background investigation by either the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The amendment would permit the Agency to grant access to contractor personnel who had already received a security clearance from another Government agency, provided that: (1) the security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by the other Government agency on the basis of the same investigation and report that it furnished to the Director; and, (2) the Director shall have determined that the person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty under standards set forth in section 45 (a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

We request this statutory change because a number of cases have arisen in which our contractor employees have been required to undergo a Civil Service Commission or Federal Bureau of Investigation full-field background investigation, even though they have been cleared by another Government agency on the basis of a full-field background investigation conducted by an agency other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This procedure involves a costly duplication of effort, as well as delays, and is in our opinion unnecessary in the interest of security.

Each full-field background investigation now costs between \$350 and \$400. On just two of our contracts, for example, the procedure proposed by the amendment would have saved the Government over \$5,000.

Clearances based on full-field background investigations normally have taken around 60 days. When the load has become heavy, they have taken as much as 90 to 120 days. In the usual case, an Agency contractor cannot bring his full effort to bear on a study for 2 to 4 months after a contract with the Agency is executed. In instances where classified bidders' conferences are necessary to enable proposers to prepare fully responsive proposals, an additional period of delay is encountered to clear contractor personnel in advance of the bidders' conference.

Research work has been delayed by our security requirements. I fully appreciate that some delays are inevitable where strict security requirements must be observed in the national interest. However, these delays should be reduced to a minimum consistent with sound security practices.

The change I have been discussing would not result in investigations which are less intensive or less complete than the act presently requires. It would not relax the present strict standards for security clearance. It would merely permit the utilization of an investigative report prepared by an agency other than the Civil Service Commission or the

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Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a clearance by such other agency, as the basis for clearing contractor personnel.

If the investigative report of the other agency did not, in our opinion, fulfill our normal requirements with respect to thoroughness and completeness, we would obtain additional information on matters not adequately covered.

We have discussed this amendment thoroughly with security personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission. The proposed procedure would be on a parity with practices followed by our most sensitive agencies. Indeed, the language of our proposed amendment is based on a 1961 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.

Prior to 1961, section 145 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 also required an investigation by the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Atomic Energy Commission security clearances. The 1961 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act authorized the Commission to grant access to restricted data to any individual on the basis of an investigation made by an agency other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As I have indicated, our amendment is less far reaching in that it is limited to contractor personnel.

The last sentence in our security amendment would authorize the Agency to grant to contractor personnel access to information classified no higher than "Confidential" on the basis of something less than a full-field background investigation. Access to confidential information would be granted to contractor personnel on the basis of a check of agencies maintaining personnel security files, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and various intelligence agencies. If such a name check disclosed any question whatsoever, access to all classified information would be withheld pending a more thorough investigation of the individual involved. This portion of the amendment would simply authorize the Agency to follow a practice already commonly utilized by other Government agencies.

Such a practice would facilitate the Agency's contract research program. In many cases, such as bidders' conferences, a prompt clearance for low-classification material is all that a contractor needs. The Government's interest would be better served by providing for a low cost, expeditious national agency check rather than an expensive and lengthy full-field investigation.

OTHER AMENDMENTS ADDED BY THE SENATE

A number of other amendments to the act were included in S. 777 as passed by the Senate. Among these was an amendment to prevent any action under the act that would restrict the right of individuals to possess firearms for "the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education, or training."

While we believe it unnecessary, the Agency has no objection to such an amendment. It should alleviate concern along this line that has developed. The congressional intent that the prohibition apply only to light, private firearms for personal use is, of course, clear.

None of the Senate amendments would have a major impact on the Agency, although the one limiting contractors to domestic concerns

seems unduly restrictive. There seems no good reason for closing ourselves off from certain useful sources of information abroad. However, the occasions when we could not get most of the information at home will probably be rare.

I might add, in conclusion, that both our present and projected external research programs contain contracts and grants that have a direct and essential bearing on agreements which could follow in the wake of the limited test ban. I don't know what the next such agreement will be. As the President has said:

No one can predict with certainty \* \* \* what further agreements, if any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack or on numbers and types of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.

Many of the contracts and grants listed in our presentation material are directly related to the possibilities mentioned by the President. Our outside research projects dealing with inspection and verification problems have a bearing on many possible areas of agreement. I believe these studies must be continued if we are to obtain maximum assurance that particular agreements are in our national interest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Mr. Foster, I gather from your statement you feel that the authorization in the bill passed by the other body, which provided a \$10 million authorization for fiscal year 1964 and \$10 million for fiscal year 1965, puts restrictions on your Agency.

Mr. FOSTER. I feel, sir, that it has a very large impact on our planned research program which I think has been well developed. It is now making constructive knowledge available to us and I think that this disproportionate impact on the research program is unfortunate. I think that the budget which the President approved and which was presented to the Congress of \$15 million was a good budget.

I think it was, as I said in the statement, based on a very small increase in our personnel, an increase which was designed only to take care of an increasing research program. I think that the terms of the act, not only to undertake research in a series of fields but also to coordinate all such research in the U.S. Government does put on us a real responsibility to do a good job in the field. A cut of this amount, in my opinion, will have a harmful effect on the progress of that program.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, a review of research projects of the Arms Controls Agency, either already contracted or now in the stage of being contracted raises a question whether these matters have been studied or worked on by the Department of Defense or the CIA, and whether they should not have been more properly studied by such an organization. How does your Agency approach this problem? Is there any duplication in the type of studies going on in the Department of Defense and CIA with those financed by your Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. We do not believe there presently is. The act was supplemented by an Executive order which gave to this Agency the job of making sure that duplication would be minimized or eliminated entirely, if possible.

Before any contract is placed by other agencies—these would be primarily Department of Defense, AEC, and CIA to a lesser extent; also the Space Agency—they are in touch with us under the responsibilities of that act and that Executive order and would keep a running inventory of those research projects—they would make a report semiannually to the Bureau of the Budget of the contracts undertaken by those agencies. One of those is due September 15 and the last one was made March 15.

My reply to you is that to the greatest possible extent we can and with the full cooperation of those other agencies, are eliminating or minimizing any duplication.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, on page 12 of the green book in paragraph (a) you say:

A study to develop techniques for monitoring declared production and for detecting clandestine production of strategic delivery vehicles within the framework of an Arms Control Agreement to discontinue or limit such production \* \* \*.

Presumably such delivery vehicles would include aircraft and missiles. It would appear that the production of aircraft and missiles would be a principal subject for intelligence operations whether it was clandestine or not or whether production was increasing, or being phased out.

My question is, Why should not the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency rely on the Department of Defense and various other intelligence agencies for this kind of research?

Mr. FOSTER. We do clear very directly and regularly with both the Department of Defense and CIA in this type of investigation. But those two agencies have a slightly different approach to a limitation of this sort. We are charged with looking at this from the viewpoint of, Are they attempting to evade an arms control agreement which has been entered into by both sides?

The Department of Defense, obviously, in doing this has a reconnaissance interest perhaps in what the other side is doing but not the actual attempt to evade a limiting agreement.

In placing such a contract, however, it is done in complete cooperation with these two departments. We utilize the information they have and the contractors we have used for this type of activity have been contractors who are working with the Department of Defense, or in some cases the Central Intelligence Agency. So, a contract of this sort is essential from the viewpoint of an arms control agreement and a possible violation. That is an approach that is different than that of those other agencies and the stated objective of the study.

Therefore, they are planned differently but in full cooperation with the other agencies.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, I notice on page 13 of your statement you discussed the amendment put in by the other body concerning small arms. As one Member of Congress, I have received a considerable volume of mail from organizations of sportsmen in my district concerning this amendment. I recognize that this amendment may have been initiated by people who are opposed to the Disarmament Agency. I am sure that it has many sincere supporters. You have indicated that there was no intention or authority in the act of 1961 to limit any ownership of small arms.



Mr. FOSTER. No intention; no authority was given to the Director. I can assure you that the Director himself is interested in sporting arms and ammunition.

I have seen no authority or responsibility given to the Director to do anything about limiting the use of such personal weapons.

As I say, we do not object to the redundancy, if you will, of the amendment but I can assure you that there was never any action taken that should have caused any concern in that direction.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, one further question and I will be through.

I notice in the Senate report on the hearings that were held there was some criticism on the letting of contracts by your Agency during the last quarter of the fiscal year. The amendment the other body adopted established a percentage limitation on the letting of contracts in the last month of the fiscal year.

Was the reason for this delay the fact that your Agency was just beginning to get into operation, or was the reason the long period of time it took to complete your investigations and security clearances in screening these contracts? What was the reason why the contracts were let in this increased number in the last quarter of this fiscal year?

Mr. FOSTER. I think you have touched on some of the reasons. Actually, we had just over 7 months to place these contracts because we did not get our money until November 16, 1962. Secondly, at that point, we were a small agency and we were just beginning to acquire competent personnel to investigate and to place contracts with the care which I insist on.

Thirdly, there were some delays, as I have stated in my statement, made in the clearance of contractor personnel.

I think that the combination of these factors made it very difficult to place them.

I might mention two other things that bear on this. Due to the shortness of the year, in some instances we would go right down to the final negotiation of the contract and find that we either disagreed on the amount or we disagreed on some of the conditions. Therefore, we had to start all over again and run a new set of negotiations.

That has happened this year, in 1963—fiscal 1963.

Actually we are coming to the Congress without having obligated some \$441,000, primarily because two contracts which we thought were all ready to go were not concluded. In one the contractor insisted on a provision which we were unwilling to accept.

In the other case the contract was placed by the Department of Defense for us. They were unable to commit all of the funds they said we would be able to commit. Out of the \$4 million that we had for research in fiscal 1963, we actually committed some \$3,559,000.

So, I think it is a combination of several factors. We will have some trouble again this year, Mr. Chairman, because this is practically the first of September and we are operating on a remaining authorization of \$1,669,000. We are operating at the rate of \$270,000 a month.

We have been unable to take the risk of placing any contracts because if we place some contracts we might not have enough money to meet our payrolls.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Mrs. Bolton?

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We are always glad to see you.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. On the subject of small arms, I live in an area that, until quite recently, has been considered a safe area, but within the week there was an inexcusable and horrible tragedy. It makes us all think a bit about the ease with which anybody can get small arms. Where do the two things tie in? Nobody is safe on the streets today. You are a hunter and my family has hunters, too, but can there not be some kind of regulation? Can anybody have a pistol?

Chairman MORGAN. You did not mean that such control was provided under this act?

Mrs. BOLTON. How does this tie in?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it does not tie in. Actually, I share with you the sorrow over this tragic accident in the Kalorama area. That is a frightful thing when someone cannot peacefully walk a dog without being brutally murdered, as he was.

Mrs. BOLTON. The second one in a year.

Mr. FOSTER. Our bill has no effect on this whatsoever. It has no intent of controlling arms for that purpose. We are directed to developing arms control and disarmament policies primarily in the international field and to promote international peace.

Mrs. BOLTON. You assure the sportsmen this does not affect their sport or anybody else's?

Mr. FOSTER. I am assuring the sportsmen and those who wish to have personal arms that our responsibility does not go in that direction.

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes; that is true and I see that perfectly, but where does the responsibility lie in this?

Mr. FOSTER. I think this is an individual community or State police responsibility. There are differing views on whether one is safer by having his own personal arms or whether one is safer by having a restriction on arms, such as the Sullivan Act in New York State. This is a highly controversial area.

I do think this is an individual community or State responsibility and a very important one. I hope that those who are charged with that responsibility, in view of this tragic accident and tragic murder, will take steps to at least minimize the possibility of that.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask you a question about the investigations? You will be accepting investigations from other departments?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. Do the departments have exactly the same standards upon which to investigate?

Mr. FOSTER. Not necessarily. What we are asking for is the ability, only in the case of contractor personnel.

Mrs. BOLTON. I understand that.

Mr. FOSTER. Most contracts we place are not at the highest security level at which our inhouse investigations are made. We are asking that there be, however, even in the case of contractor personnel, an investigation, for instance, by the Department of Defense or by the National Aeronautics and Space Agency. In other words, if a contractor is already working on contracts with one of these sensitive agencies and if the personnel are working on classified material and

have already been subject to a full-field investigation by competent agencies, such as the Air Force, Army, Navy, or the Department of Defense, or the Office of the Secretary himself, we think that, for contractors at least, that kind of a full-field investigation should be adequate in most cases to take care of the contractors working for us.

Mrs. BOLTON. Your organization knows exactly what is involved in the other organizations?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes. We see the reports. The report would be submitted to us.

Mrs. BOLTON. Are you making any study? You do not mention it anywhere and, to me, this is one of the very serious sides in the anticipation of an eventual millennium, that we need to know what would happen when we stop some of our factories from making these military supplies.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; we have an Economic Bureau headed by an Assistant Director appointed by the President and affirmed by the Senate. The man in question is Archibald Alexander who is, or who was, an Under Secretary of the Army. His Bureau is concerned with the economic impact of arms control adjustments. It is our belief, and we have made two or three reports on this on behalf of the United States to the United Nations, that with good planning it would be possible to minimize the impact of the kind of cuts that would come under any program that is presently set forth to a degree that it can be met by the assistance of Government in giving due notice and by the enterprise of individual companies themselves.

We have established in the Government at least, on our initiative, an interagency committee; Assistant Council of Economic Advisers of the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense to take a look at these conditions and see what can be done about them.

We have also set forth in the 1964 budget several major studies; the economic impact on specific arms control and disarmament measures, both in the United States and in the U.S.S.R. (Presentation book, appendix, pp. 10, 29-30). It has another virtue, economic investigation, in that it also gives us some opportunity to verify. So, we plan to spend in that Bureau about \$500,000 if we get the budget.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is fine; but what confidence can we establish in the minds of our laboring people when we already have some 6 million people out of jobs? Where are all of those jobs coming from? What advice do you give where?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, may I first say that this is not a new experience for the United States of America, the impact of disarmament. We have gone through this before and I happen to have been a party at firsthand in the largest and most abrupt disarmament program man could conceive and that was after World War II. We did it without distortion for two reasons: one was, of course, there were accumulated consumer needs which needed to be met immediately; secondly, we had planned this from almost the day of Pearl Harbor. We had planned it in the Government. We had planned it in cooperation with businesses themselves. Businesses themselves are beginning to take it seriously and 15 of the largest contractors have set up disarmament divisions within their companies.

Those divisions not only plan what they will do, come the day, but they also are attempting to work with us as partners in some

of these studies. Labor unions are working with us and we are making field trips to check, for instance, with communities that have a very major share in defense contracts out of their total employment, to see what are the things that might be done to supplant the things they are now doing. For the immediate future, under an arms control agreement, probably expenditures will be almost as great, the world being as it is, because verification instruments and activities are very kindred to those used on the other side of the coin.

Many of those in electronics, for instance, who are now making defense items could turn their production to verification activities.

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes, but no actual effort is being made to establish centers where jobs can be found, and so on?

Mr. FOSTER. No; except that we do work with the Department of Commerce which has responsibility under this field.

Mrs. BOLTON. Retraining?

Mr. FOSTER. Retraining in the area of redevelopment activities. Our people are in constant touch with them and the Department of Labor. At this point in time, they are doing this simply to be sure that we are aware of what is being done and also under the research studies to make plans for what can be done.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, perhaps one other question?

Chairman MORGAN. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. Will you tell us exactly what we get from the "hot line"?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, I will tell you.

During last fall at the time of Cuba, a time of great tension, a time of near crisis, we were seriously concerned by the fact that the two heads of state when they had to communicate found it sometimes necessary to communicate by a broadcast which was subject to all misinterpretation of translation and otherwise. In this day of instantaneous discharge of totally destructive weapons, it has been thought, and we have studied this at some length, the ability to have a direct, dependable communication at times of crisis between those who have to make the decisions, would be a way to reduce the risk of a possible war by accident or miscalculation. So, for some hundreds of thousands of dollars only, it is possible, and we have now installed a direct telecommunications line which is dependable and constantly tested and which is backed up by a radio link of the same sort.

Mrs. BOLTON. What we get is conversation?

Mr. FOSTER. It is conversation but not by word of mouth. This is conversation in written form so that there is no chance of a misunderstanding due to the frailties of the human ear or translation. These are transmitted simultaneously in both Russian and in English.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you. I appreciate that very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I pass.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Burleson?

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, Do you anticipate that the Director will be back in executive session in consideration of this matter?

Chairman MORGAN. Nothing has been scheduled, Mr. Burleson, but if the committee wishes, I am sure the Director will come back.

Mr. FOSTER. At your suggestion, sir.

Mr. BURLERSON. Mr. Foster, I doubt that anyone can be accurate, but I understand we are now spending in the neighborhood of \$7 or \$8 billion in research of this general nature. Will you give us—

Mr. GROSS. Will the gentleman yield for a correction?

Mr. BURLERSON. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. According to the Bureau of the Budget it is more nearly \$14 billion.

Mr. BURLERSON. I will accept the figure.

I said I did not know the exact figure but if the Bureau of the Budget says it is near \$14 billion, I am sure it must be.

The figure I mentioned did not include the moonshot and things of that sort. Whether research that is already underway and that which is anticipated is included, I do not know, but I accept the figure.

Anyway, will you give us specifically some of the research programs in which your Agency is now engaged and explain what you mean by "hardware" and "field tests"? I do not know what that means.

Mr. FOSTER. I will take the second part first, the field tests.

For instance, if we were to achieve a limitation on the number of airplanes that were to be kept by a particular side under an arms limiting agreement, we would want to be able, in some fashion, either by ground inspection or by overflights, to find out whether they had more airplanes than were allowed under the agreement.

Now, how do you do that? What kind of instruments do you use? You have various kinds of detection instruments, but what can you see by flying over it at 500 miles an hour? We don't always know if an attempt is being made to evade the limitations so a field test would be one in which we actually take a look, by one group which doesn't know what's in a particular air command center, to see what you can see from the air or to see what you can see from passing through in a jeep or another vehicle with the kind of sensors we presently have: infrared, radar—

Mr. BURLERSON. What would your Agency pay for that operation?

Mr. FOSTER. We would be paying for the scientific means, the converting of a presently offensive airplane to one which would make this kind of observation.

Mr. BURLERSON. Do you mean you can do that sort of thing for \$15 million? Would you say that kind of research alone, without the other, would be a project of value?

Mr. FOSTER. We have planned one such for fiscal year 1964 and that is a look, in cooperation with the Department of Defense, in which they would provide the airplanes, they would provide the crews to fly them, they would provide the targets at which we look; they would provide the jeeps and so forth because we have no hardware of our own. Our part would be the conversion to help make this responsive to this new requirement and that particular thing has been estimated in this next year at just under \$6 million, of which we would pick up somewhat less than half.

Because this is not the responsibility presently of the Department of Defense, they do not have, even in their billions of dollars for research, money to do this kind of thing, and we were very lucky, we felt, to get them to agree to share in this activity to the extent of 50 percent.

Mr. BURLERSON. Would that be a part in the Senate report list of the studies of research contracts and grants? For instance item No. 10, "Development of Field Test Plan Regarding Reduction of Strategy Delivery Vehicles." The contract is with the Bendix Corp. it seems.

Mr. FOSTER. No, that is another field test. That is Bendix looking at a production plant to see whether, from observation of this sort, they can tell whether that company would be cheating in the number it was producing. The field test I have been referring to—it is nearly at the top of page 5, and that is "Research for inspection field test program, \$2,400,000."

Mr. BURLERSON. I see here in this report which I haven't had a chance to study, the subhead "Status of Research Contracts and Grants"—I suppose that is an example of the various categories of research.

Mr. FOSTER. Those are the ones that were missed in fiscal year 1963 and are presently in process, and that answers, I hope, the first part of your question.

Mr. BURLERSON. You have concept studies. No. 2: "Supporting Studies."

I suppose those are the principal headings. Quite a bit of this is farmed out to various colleges and universities?

Mr. FOSTER. Some of it is, Mr. Burlerson. I think probably one-tenth or possibly an eighth of it is to universities. It is divided fairly well between private manufacturing companies, most of whom are defense contractors, as I indicated earlier, universities, nonprofit research organizations such as Stanford Research, Aerospace, Institute of Defense Analysis, and various universities such as Yale, Rutgers, and MIT.

Mr. BURLERSON. Here is one at Princeton: "Psychological Factors in Soviet Disarmament Position (Institute for the Study of National Behavior, Inc.)."

I am just picking one out at random. Just what does that mean?

Mr. FOSTER. We are charged with investigating the scientific, technological, psychological, military, sociological concepts behind arms control and disarmament activities.

In negotiating, it is useful to find out what may be the psychological motivation of the Soviet negotiators and of the government of the other side. That is a very modest contract of \$10,704. I would submit, Mr. Chairman, for the record, the full details of it. I frankly don't know—I presume it is one or two specialists in this field who are making a particular study from the viewpoint of motivation under a set of specifics which we have prepared and on which they have made this proposal. It is a grant, I presume, and we are encouraging grants to scholars of various kinds in fields which bear on those basic responsibilities with which we have been charged.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

#### GRANT FOR STUDY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SOVIET DISARMAMENT POSITIONS

A grant of \$10,704 was awarded in May 1963 to the Institute for the Study of National Behavior, Inc., Princeton, N.J., for a 5-month study, (1) to identify underlying psychological factors influencing Soviet positions on arms control and disarmament and (2) to show how these factors affect the substance and conduct of negotiations. Dr. Bryant Wedge, a social psychologist who is the director of the institute, is principal investigator for the study.

The study is designed to utilize the specialized analytical techniques of the psychologist and social scientist for a deeper understanding of basic Soviet

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attitudes, to provide insight into Soviet motivations and preoccupations, and the perceptions and misconceptions that the Soviets may have of Western objectives in the area of arms control.

The research is to include systematic content analysis of the verbatim records of the Disarmament Conference since its inception in March 1962 and of related public documents of the period. Although these will be the basic source of information, other materials pertinent to Soviet national psychology will also be studied and included in the final report.

Following an initial review of available documentation, a preliminary written report of the research was submitted to ACDA in July and made available to Sovietologists attending the ACDA-sponsored summer conference on Soviet attitudes. A final report is due in November 1963.

In sponsoring this research, ACDA felt that the findings could have direct application to the planning and conduct of arms control negotiations with the Soviets. The psychologist's knowledge of human behavior and specialized techniques of analysis would be used to broaden the political scientist's understanding of Soviet motivations, suggesting how most effectively to communicate with the Soviets and what in substance is most likely of acceptance, or non-acceptance, because of deeply held Soviet beliefs.

Mr. BURLERSON. Now, just to hurry on, here is one under (B), on page 3: "Summer Study of Soviet Attitudes (Columbia University)." I just wonder who in Columbia would know more than would our CIA? How authoritative is it and who depends on what they say?

Mr. FOSTER. Columbia University has a very excellent institute for Russian studies. The director of that institute made a proposal that he would, during the summer, be able to put together a group of Russian scholars to examine the current activities of the Soviet Union and to make a report which would bear on our problems. He put together I think some 14 or 20 scholars, outstanding scholars. They are outstanding scholars who are in the university—I understand some CIA men attended this thing—there is a good report on it, and it was a very useful summer study. They spent, I think, about 2 or 3 weeks, and our own people participated, to get the benefit of their discussions and thinking, and this was the way to bring together, in the summer when these professors were not teaching, to, in effect, pick their brains as to what their thinking was above and beyond what the CIA, which is burdened with day-to-day problems, is perhaps able to do.

Mr. BURLERSON. You have given us an example of "field test." Is that the same thing as "hardware"?

Mr. FOSTER. It is the same thing.

Mr. BURLERSON. Let me ask you hurriedly about the so-called Lausche amendment adopted by the Senate when they passed this measure.

Do you agree with the change that has been made in section 33 of the original law?

Mr. FOSTER. We were quite happy with the original law, Mr. Burler-son, as it stood. We can operate under the law as amended.

If you wish to have a discussion of the constitutional processes, my distinguished colleague, Mr. Fisher, was the former counsel of the State Department, and he is much better equipped than I to speak, but we can operate under either one.

Mr. BURLERSON. Do you have any serious objection to the language which the Senate put in section 33? I hope this committee will do at least as much. I think this is moderate. I would hope to produce such an amendment.

Just one more question, Mr. Foster.

We haven't abandoned the idea of onground inspection; have we?

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Mr. FOSTER. Not at all. Not at all. It is our continued philosophy that inspection and the ability to verify must accompany any reduction or limitation on arms and this is consistent with the environment test ban treaty, because we have in operation a fine detection system under national control and in doing things—well, for instance, the comprehensive test ban treaty which would also control underground tests, we believe we would require onsite inspections for that, if we were to take that further limitation.

Mr. BURLERSON. Would you have any objections to having the chairman designated as one of the team of inspectors?

Mr. FOSTER. This has some difficulties, with all due respect to the chairman. The questions are of availability, of present, precise skills that are required for particular kinds of observation, because this becomes a scientific and technical question.

There is also the problem of mingling of the executive and legislative branches in an administrative function.

Mr. BURLERSON. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is more than up. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOSTER, on the second paragraph, page 5, you say, "If nuclear weapon tests, for example, are what we want to limit or prohibit under an agreement, we must first identify the key indicators of foreign nuclear weapon tests. Second, we must design a verification system which will monitor those indicators. Third, we must devise means of testing the elements of that system."

First, I want to know, is there an arrangement in the test ban treaty for onsite inspections?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; there is not.

Mr. WHALLEY. Secondly, in answer to the three questions that you submit, do you have a system that will verify the test?

Mr. FOSTER. We do.

Mr. WHALLEY. Has the work been done, or what will it cost to complete it?

Mr. FOSTER. The work has been done and the system is operating every day. We have in the past detected and identified explosions in the atmosphere, under water, and there have been no tests in outerspace, so far as we know, but we have the capability of detecting such tests as well. And the national system which has been in operation for some years and which is one of high efficiency, is adequate for this kind of verification.

As has been said on the other side of the Hill, it is planned to expand that somewhat and those requests are already before the appropriations committees because we had already, before the test ban treaty was signed, decided that such improvements would be desirable.

Mr. WHALLEY. What objections were there to onsite inspections?

Mr. FOSTER. The basic objection is the fundamental and traditional secrecy of the Soviet Union, and its expressed belief that we wanted onsite inspections for espionage purposes. This is a very firm, built-in position which they have always had and they have said that they are perfectly willing to go to complete and general disarmament, and then give us every opportunity to inspect, but not during the process. We have said we are unwilling to do otherwise than have the amount of inspection parallel with and proportionate to the amount of disarma-



ment, and that would be true of a comprehensive test ban treaty, where we believe that it would be necessary for us to have the right to go look at a certain number of underground events in which it is impossible to distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. This is a traditional Russian approach. I faced it in my negotiations with the Russians over many, many years, and it is built in. We have attempted to prove to them that this is in their interest as well as ours because it would give confidence to both sides, that agreements undertaken were not being violated, but they do object to "verification"—we prefer to use that word—unless it is accompanied by disarmament. We say we will accept that principle as long as they are simultaneous.

Mr. WHALLEY. Does the cost of these three items come out of your funds?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. We have been the beneficiaries of the establishment of this system before this Agency was put into operation. We have added a good deal to some of the parts of that system by the advice and counsel of our scientists and we are very closely in touch with the operation of these systems.

Mr. WHALLEY. What part will you play from now on then in keeping it up to date?

Mr. FOSTER. We will continue to be closely in touch with them. There was at one point a suggestion that some of these, under our statute, perhaps should be transferred to us to operate. The statute you will recall, states that the force of our functions is to prepare for and to plan, and if necessary, to operate the verification system. It is a very small agency and these take some fairly substantial numbers of operating personnel. We have not had, in the past, the financial nor the personnel means to do other than to sit as advisers and counselors and policy suggesters on these systems. We have made, in the 2 years of our life, many, many contributions to this, and much of what the new plans are have actually evolved from our own Agency.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, it is good to have you here explaining the work of the Agency.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.

Mrs. KELLY. I am sure we all hope it is most successful.

Mr. Chairman, have we any hearings of the Senate on this bill, so that we will not have to duplicate, if possible, the questions?

Chairman MORGAN. Yes. Copies are on the table before you.

Mrs. KELLY. May I assume, Mr. Foster, that the administration and operating cost of this program is in the vicinity of \$2 million?

Mr. FOSTER. It is running presently at the rate of about \$3.7 million.

Mrs. KELLY. On page 35 it shows an anticipated increase in the contract research in practically every item. Personnel, almost doubled for 1964. Is that correct, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct. You will recall during the year 1963 we started with about 100 in personnel, and during the year we built it up so that we presently have 205 on board, and therefore, the sliding increase, or the buildup, is what makes it look like a very substantial increase, but it is not an increase of great size over our present level.

22 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

Mrs. KELLY. Do you feel you cannot obtain the material that you have on contract work in other agencies of research in our Government without your undertaking another special and separate research program?

Mr. FOSTER. We are absolutely certain of it, Mrs. Kelly. The objectives of the other agency are 180 degrees opposite to the objectives of ours. They are concerned in terms of this sort of research. We all have the same concern in terms of national security, but when they attempt to undertake research, it is to actually increase weapons to promote security. We believe it is possible to decrease weapons and promote security. We believe the continued massive addition of arms is not necessarily the way to promote national security, so our objectives and our responsibilities are quite different from those of the Defense Department, for instance, and their budgets, they claim—and I know, because I happened to run those budgets in the old days—are directed in other directions. So we cannot, unless their own legislation changed to instruct them to do that same sort of thing, we cannot achieve the kind of research objectives that we are setting forth in our programs under the funds to other agencies.

Mrs. KELLY. Wouldn't it be better for your Agency, Mr. Foster, to have the report of these agencies through their own personnel to deduct, instead of going through an outside agency, in schools and colleges, to come up with a survey with which they are completely unfamiliar; I assume that they do not have the background of operation of that which is in Government? You would have to get clearance and so forth with those contract people in colleges before you could even permit them to do a lot of research.

Mr. FOSTER. In certain of these activities, yes, but if this were available in other agencies, we do have it available. We are in daily touch with the Department of Defense at all levels. We are in daily touch with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. We have complete coordination in working arrangements so what they have available is available to us.

These are additive to what is available in those other agencies. As far as their people go, some of them are assigned to us. We have a number of military officers who are assigned to our Agency, on a reimbursable basis. We have numbers of people from the State Department assigned to us on a reimbursable basis. We have one or two from other agencies assigned to us on the same basis, so that in the daily working out, our job is one of coordinating what is available in the U.S. Government.

Mrs. KELLY. If you need any checks with CIA or FBI do they assume the cost of that research? Is it reflected in this program? Is it on page 35 where it says: "Administrative support functions performed by State and other agencies"—is that a reflection—

Mr. FOSTER. That is a reflection—the reimbursement of personnel is not in that amount. The \$749,000 which is requested for 1964 is largely a reimbursement to State for housekeeping, for bookkeeping, for the furniture, for the rooms, for the telephones, and for all the housekeeping things. The reimbursement of personnel, both from State and Defense, is in the \$3,074,000.

Mrs. KELLY. Some of these things will have to be answered in executive session.

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 23

I have many questions which I fear at this point are for executive session.

Chairman MORGAN. If the committee wishes, Mrs. Kelly, we will be glad to have the Director back up for an executive session.

Mrs. KELLY. I think it will be most necessary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. I have been interested in knowing what Pugwash Conference means?

Mr. FOSTER. That is a small town in, I think Nova Scotia, Mr. Gross. The conferences between Soviet and American scientists were commenced by Mr. Cyrus Eaton, one of Mrs. Bolton's constituents.

Mr. GROSS. This Cyrus Eaton is a notorious pro-Communist—you don't have to answer that. Let me state that as my opinion.

Have you attended any of these meetings?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; I have not. They have changed in character, may I say, Mr. Gross. Mr. Eaton is no longer connected with them. They are exchanges of American and Soviet scientists and British scientists and some others.

The principle of exchange of scientific ideas, I think is a useful one, and some of our very competent and able scientists have picked up what started at Pugwash and these meetings are continuing, I think, at a rate of twice a year.

Mr. GROSS. At Pugwash?

Mr. FOSTER. No, these are held at different locations.

Mr. GROSS. Let me ask you this question—my time is limited, and I would appreciate it if you would be as brief as possible in your answers, because I have several questions to ask—Do you advocate world government?

Mr. FOSTER. I do not.

Mr. GROSS. One world, or world government, either expression. Do you not advocate one world government?

Mr. FOSTER. We advocate, as the act instructs us, Mr. Gross, to move toward an ultimate goal of stable peace and general disarmament.

Mr. GROSS. Don't you get fairly close to it with this sort of propaganda—and you are the author, are you not, of the three-stage disarmament plan?

Mr. FOSTER. We are.

Mr. GROSS. You are, is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. I take responsibility for it, yes.

Mr. GROSS. You get dangerously close to it, don't you, when you set up the United Nations as the ultimate place to invest military power—what remaining power there would be after disarmament—don't you get close to it?

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Gross, yes. In those terms. If the world changes to the extent that all political tensions are removed, and if it is possible, through a balanced, safeguarded, staged movement toward the reduction of arms and the building up of international institutions, so that conflicts can be resolved under international law, then it is possible to give to the United Nations a greater responsibility for the settlement of conflicts between nations. This would be a union of independent, sovereign states, and it is not, in that sense, world government.

Mr. GROSS. This document is a House document, is it not, a House of Representatives document?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. Did you pay for it out of your funds, or did the House pay for this propaganda?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it is not propaganda. I think it is an outline of what has been done under the instructions and under the law.

Mr. GROSS. But the House paid for it? Is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't know. I doubt it.

This is our second annual report to the House and Congress, as called for by the law: "The Director shall submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress not later than January, a report concerning the activities of the Committee." It was paid for under the act.

Mr. GROSS. Well, paid for under the act. By that you mean what?

Mr. FOSTER. We paid for it.

Mr. GROSS. You paid for it, and not the House of Representatives, is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. We paid for 5,000. If you want more, you will pay for the additional.

Mr. GROSS. Now, let me ask you about your payroll. I have looked through this green book and I can't find where your payroll is broken down. Where is the payroll for this organization? I want it as to individuals and salaries paid.

Mr. FOSTER. That was submitted to your subcommittee, but we will be glad to submit it—

Mr. GROSS. It is not included in the green book?

Mr. FOSTER. It is not in the green book.

Mr. GROSS. But it has been submitted to the committee?

Mr. FOSTER. It has been submitted to the Appropriations Subcommittee.

Mr. GROSS. Why isn't it here?

Mr. FOSTER. It can be here.

Mr. GROSS. We are interested in what you pay these people. I personally am interested in your salary. I could start with you.

Mr. FOSTER. My salary is \$22,500.

Mr. GROSS. I would like to have all the rest of them.

Mr. FOSTER. We will get them. We will send you a report.

Mr. GROSS. At that point let me ask you: Did you hire one man for 12 days and pay him \$1,200?

Mr. FOSTER. We have certain consultants who get \$100 a day. It is possible.

Mr. GROSS. I say, one man, 12 days, and \$1,200. Not a hundred dollars a day, but a thousand a day. Did you hire an individual on this basis and pay him?

Mr. FOSTER. I think your mathematics are a little off.

Mr. GROSS. Twelve days, \$1,200. That would be \$100 a day. I stand corrected.

You paid a man \$1,200 for 12 days. Is this the sum total you paid him?

Mr. FOSTER. If you will give me the man's name, I can tell you.

Mr. GROSS. Why don't you give me his name?

Mr. FOSTER. We have a number of consultants getting \$100 a day. I am sure some of them are hired for 12 days during the course of a

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 25

year, so I think the answer to you is "Yes," and I can't give you specifics until you tell me who he is.

Mr. Gross. You are blossoming out all over the landscape. Apparently this will be up to \$50 million, and maybe \$100 million in a few years. I, for one on this committee—and I hope the chairman will go along with this—I want a complete breakdown of your payroll over there as to consultants and everyone else.

I notice in this green book that you do not list all the beneficiaries of these contracts by name that you are handing out with the greatest of abandonment.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, I think we do, sir. I would be very happy to submit both of those reports to you.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

*Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963*

Unclassified positions:

Foster, William C., Director.....	\$22,500
Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director.....	21,500
Alexander, Archibald, Assistant Director.....	20,000
Bunn, George, General Counsel.....	20,000
Nordness, Neville E., Public Affairs Adviser.....	20,000
GS-18:	
Berman, William H., Deputy General Counsel.....	20,000
Matteson, Robert E., Disarmament Adviser.....	20,000
Rathjens, George W., Deputy Assistant Director.....	20,000
Pugh, George R., Deputy Assistant Director.....	20,000
Finley, Robert L., Deputy Assistant Director.....	20,000
GS-17:	
Conger, Clement E., special assistant.....	18,000
GS-16:	
Gathright, Wreatham, foreign affairs officer.....	16,500
Van Doren, Charles N., assistant general counsel.....	16,000
GS-15:	
Neidle, Alan F., attorney adviser.....	14,565
Gehron, William S., information officer.....	15,045
Adams, Emery J., security specialist.....	16,005
Ertel, Walter C., budget officer.....	15,045
Holt, Phillip C., assistant disarmament adviser.....	17,445
Gellner, Charles R., foreign affairs officer.....	16,005
Baker, Vincent, foreign affairs officer.....	15,045
Moulton, Harland, foreign affairs officer.....	15,045
Benjamin, Donald, foreign affairs officer.....	15,045
Rich, Nathan, foreign affairs officer.....	15,525
Sage, Evan T., foreign affairs officer.....	16,005
Holmes, Larry, foreign affairs officer.....	14,565
Coleman, Charles, physical science officer.....	15,525
Ellis, Robert H., physical science officer.....	14,565
Risley, Edward M., foreign affairs officer.....	16,005
GS-14:	
Davis, Hampton, administrative officer.....	13,270
Christopher, Albert, attorney adviser.....	13,270
Reinecker, H. Keith, security specialist.....	13,270
Brockdorff, M. L., personnel officer.....	13,270
Zimmerman, M. O., contract specialist.....	14,120
Lough, Thomas S., project officer.....	13,270
Blanchet, Jeremy, foreign affairs officer.....	13,270
Wyner, Henry D., economist.....	13,695
Sivard, Ruth L., economist.....	13,270
Rodberg, Leonard S., physical science officer.....	13,270
Hall, John R., foreign affairs officer.....	14,970

*Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963—Continued*

GS-13:	
Wilrich, Mason, attorney adviser.....	\$11, 150
Griffiths, Douglas, contract specialist.....	11, 880
Lambert, Robert, foreign affairs officer.....	11, 880
Syphax, John W., foreign affairs officer.....	11, 880
Myers, Henry R., physical science officer.....	11, 515
Kreith, Kurt, physical science officer.....	11, 150
GS-12:	
Russell, Mary G., secretary.....	9, 475
Puckett, Beatrice, staff assistant.....	10, 105
Burmester, Lenor, foreign affairs officer.....	10, 105
Bodnar, James S., foreign affairs officer.....	9, 790
Nary, Ralph W., foreign affairs officer.....	9, 475
Mayer, Jean E., foreign affairs officer.....	9, 475
Stoll, Richard D., physical science officer.....	10, 420
Brandwein, Robert, international economist.....	9, 475
GS-11:	
Harbinson, David K., attorney adviser.....	8, 045
Timko, Leona, secretary.....	8, 045
Walker, Eunice A., information specialist.....	8, 310
Mills, Bernice M., management technician.....	8, 575
GS-10:	
Chatterton, Adeline, secretary.....	7, 535
Whittier, Alice O., secretary.....	7, 780
Doherty, Olive J., secretary.....	8, 315
GS-9:	
Fitzpatrick, Mary M., secretary.....	8, 025
Eller, June C., staff aid.....	6, 900
Gulasi, Anne, secretary.....	7, 125
Shaffer, Mary J., mail and file supervisor.....	8, 025
Davis, Adalyn, foreign affairs officer.....	8, 025
Ihara, Ruth O., foreign affairs officer.....	6, 675
Slany, Elizabeth A., documents officer.....	7, 125
Johnson, Margaret, secretary.....	7, 125
Kennedy, Sadie S., secretary.....	7, 575
Barry, Julia E., secretary.....	6, 675
Krenzel, Julia B., secretary.....	8, 025
Graves, John H., documents officer.....	6, 675
GS-8:	
Glazer, Katherine, secretary.....	6, 500
Lersch, Margaret A., secretary.....	6, 295
McFarland, Esther P., secretary.....	6, 910
Burchell, Kaye M., secretary.....	7, 935
GS-7:	
Williams, Patricia M., secretary.....	5, 910
Kascak, Patricia, secretary.....	6, 095
Weimer, Marian E., secretary.....	6, 095
Trapp, Pauline S., secretary.....	6, 280
Ridder, Regina M., secretary.....	5, 725
Enuton, Barbara, secretary.....	5, 725
Holm, Medora, staff aid.....	6, 835
Szpakowski, Helen, secretary.....	6, 650
Venable, Sammie, secretary.....	6, 465
Barrett, Margaret, secretary.....	6, 835
Price, Shirley, secretary.....	6, 280
Edwin, Susan, foreign affairs officer.....	5, 540
McCottry, Lorraine, secretary.....	6, 095
Hilton, Rose M., secretary.....	6, 280
Geigerich, Marjorie, secretary.....	6, 465
McDougall, Elizabeth, secretary.....	5, 725
Cunningham, Jean, secretary.....	5, 910
Givens, Barbara J., secretary.....	6, 835
Woodsley, Dorothy, secretary.....	5, 910

*Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963—Continued*

## GS-7—Continued

Rohrer, Gertrude, secretary-----	\$6, 465
Johnson, Christine, secretary-----	6, 835
Tewey, Barbara C., secretary-----	5, 910
Flaherty, Thomas P., clerk-----	5, 540
Sando, Jack C., foreign affairs officer-----	5, 540
GS-6:	
Gibbons, Victoria, secretary-----	5, 205
Allen, Mary F., clerk-----	5, 375
Yuzzolin, Linda C., secretary-----	6, 055
Knerr, Grace B., secretary-----	5, 205
Hennessey, Patricia, secretary-----	5, 035
Simms, Regina H., secretary-----	6, 565
Fliss, Henrietta, secretary-----	5, 205
GS-5:	
Krause, Gene M., secretary-----	4, 565
Dexter, Evalyn W., secretary-----	4, 565
Ishimoto, Paul I., mail and file clerk-----	5, 525
Vosseler, Oliver J., mail and file clerk-----	5, 045
Johnson, Francis, mail and file clerk-----	4, 885
Rowe, JoAnn M., secretary-----	4, 725
McFarland, Peggy J., documents clerk-----	5, 045
Weedon, Margaret C., secretary-----	5, 365
Shepherd, Joan, secretary-----	4, 885
Skeen, Cecelia, secretary-----	4, 565
Barrett, Bonnie, secretary-----	4, 565
Grear, Mary R., secretary-----	4, 725
Kostelnick, Lorraine, secretary-----	5, 205
Glenn, Marguerite, secretary-----	5, 205
Gordon, Robert W., foreign affairs assistant-----	4, 565
GS-4:	
Townsend, Susie, M., clerk-stenographer-----	4, 110
Leik, Trudy I., clerk-stenographer-----	4, 110
Pollard, Stephen, physical science assistant-----	4, 110
George, Roxanne, documents clerk-----	4, 110
Jones, Edna M., clerk-stenographer-----	4, 110
Greene, James E., mail and file clerk-----	4, 250
Moreau, Bonnie J., clerk-stenographer-----	4, 250
Mitchell, Odessa, clerk-typist-----	4, 950
Pigza, Patricia, clerk-stenographer-----	4, 250
Harley, Lillian, clerk-typist-----	5, 090
Hollingworth, Nancy, clerk-typist-----	4, 530
Gensh, Carole, clerk-stenographer-----	4, 110
GS-3:	
Hall, Eileen M., clerk-typist-----	4, 030
Cooksey, Gretchen C., clerk-stenographer-----	3, 820
Bolinger, Nancy, clerk-typist-----	3, 820
O'Brien, Elizabeth, clerk-typist-----	3, 820
Lieber, Anita L., clerk-typist-----	3, 925
Culbert, David, clerk-typist-----	3, 925
Hall, Patricia, clerk-typist-----	3, 925
Getz, Phyllis, clerk-typist-----	3, 925
Crane, John, clerk-typist-----	3, 820
Di Fura, Patricia, clerk-typist-----	3, 820
Pluchino, Josephine, clerk-typist-----	4, 030
GS-2:	
Hall, Melvin G., messenger/clerk-----	3, 980
GS-1:	
Pollard, Nathaniel, messenger-----	3, 455
Public Law 313 positions:	
Basore, Bennett L., physical science officer-----	20, 000
Wadman, Alton J., physical science officer-----	18, 500
Saaty, Thomas L., physical science officer-----	18, 500

*Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963—Continued*

## Public Law 313 positions—Continued

Kahn, Lessing, project manager.....	\$18,500
Kopp, Robert, electronic engineer.....	17,500
Davis, Harold, military systems analyst.....	17,000
Rochlin, Robert S., physical science officer.....	16,000

## Foreign Service officer, Reserve, and Staff personnel detailed from Department of State—Reimbursable:

Beam, Jacob D., Assistant Director.....	CM
Timberlake, C. H., Disarmament adviser.....	CM
Freund, Richard B., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-1
Rimestad, Idar, Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-2
De Palma, Samuel, Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-2
Kiefer, Alexander, Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-2
McIntyre, Stuart H., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-4
Haynes, William, Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-4
O'Boyle, Anthony, Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-5
Kinsey, William C., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-5
Pickering, Thomas R., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-6
Gross, Curt F., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-7
Prickett, Russell O., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-7
Parrent, Alan M., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-7
Thompson, Richard S., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-7
deGunzberg, Marie, Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-7
Martin, Robert A., Foreign Service officer.....	FSO-7
Maddox, William, Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-1
Spingarn, Jerome H., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-2
Boggs, Marion W., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-2
Weiler, Lawrence D., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-3
Halla, Philip J., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-3
Akalovsky, Alexander, Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-3
Irvin, Thomas C., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-4
Marks, Anne W., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-5
Kellogg, James C., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-6
Greene, Robert F., Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	FSR-7
Calkins, Howard W., Foreign Service Career Reserve officer.....	FSCR-3
Peyton, Betty A., Foreign Service Staff.....	FSS-5
Mistach, Edward C., Foreign Service Staff.....	FSS-6
Droit, Elizabeth G., Foreign Service Staff.....	FSS-6
Mullins, Francis J., Foreign Service Staff.....	FSS-7
Voegele, Rush, Foreign Service Staff.....	FSS-8
Finnell, Thomas, Foreign Service Staff.....	FSS-9

## Military personnel detailed from Department of Defense—Reimbursable:

Parker, Edward N., vice admiral, Assistant Director.  
 Daley, David S., colonel, U.S. Army.  
 Greenlee, Pleas E., captain, U.S. Navy.  
 Long, Paul J., colonel, U.S. Air Force.  
 McCoy, Charles W., colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.  
 Parrott, Kent, colonel, U.S. Air Force.  
 Porter, Stuart, colonel, U.S. Air Force.  
 Richards, Ira B., colonel, U.S. Army.  
 Samusson, J. Ernest, colonel, U.S. Army.  
 Creecy, R. B., captain, U.S. Navy.  
 Struby, Joseph R., lieutenant colonel, U.S. Air Force.  
 Sweeney, Arthur H., lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army.  
 Tisdale, Charles H., commander, U.S. Navy.  
 Woodstock, Raymond E., lieutenant colonel, U.S. Air Force.  
 Kline, Edward C., commander, U.S. Navy.



TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 29

*U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency listing of consultants who worked  
 Jan. 1 through Aug. 30, 1963*

<i>Name and title</i>	<i>Number of days worked</i>
Amado, Ralph D. (Dr.), physical science officer	20
Andrews, Thomas G. (Dr.), physical science officer	9½
Barnet, Richard J., foreign affairs officer	31
Bethe, Hans A. (Dr.), foreign affairs officer	1
Bornstein, Morris, international economist	3
Birge, Robert E., physical science officer	22
Daniels, Paul C., foreign affairs officer	36½
Doty, Paul M., Jr. (Dr.), physical science administrative officer	1
Dudley, Paul L. (Adm.), foreign affairs officer	5
Dyson, Freeman J. (Dr.), physical science officer	35
Emerson, Zola A., management analyst	51
Henkin, Louis (Dr.), attorney-adviser	4
Herrin, Eugene T. (Dr.), physical science officer	2
Johnson, Ralph P. (Dr.), physical science officer	15
Kissinger, Henry A. (Dr.), foreign affairs officer	2
Linde, Hans, attorney-adviser	24
Meselson, Matthew S., physical science officer	43
Mullen, Robert R., public affairs specialist	7
Muller, Steven, foreign affairs officer	18
Oliver, John E. (Dr.), physical science officer	3
Press, Frank (Dr.), foreign affairs officer	8
Sands, Matthew L. (Dr.), physical science officer	2
Schaub, William F., financial economist	10
Schelling, Thomas C. (Dr.), international economist	5
Sohn, Louis B. (Dr.), attorney-adviser	29
Wester, John W., Jr., physical science officer	5

*U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency General Advisory Committee, days  
 worked Jan. 1 through Aug. 30, 1963*

Name	Days worked	Home	Title
Roger M. Blough	4	Hawley, Pa.	Chairman of the board of directors, United States Steel Co.
Rev. Edward A. Conway	26	Omaha, Nebr.	Professor of political science, Creighton University.
John Cowles	2	Minneapolis, Minn.	President of the Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
Trevor Gardner	2	Pasadena, Calif.	Chairman and president of Hycon Manufacturing Co.
George B. Kistiakowsky	4	Cambridge, Mass.	Professor of chemistry, Harvard University.
Robert A. Lovett	2	Long Island, N.Y.	Partner of Brown Bros., Harriman & Co.
John Jay McCloy	7	New York, N.Y.	Consultant to law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley.
Dean Anderson McGee	4	Oklahoma City, Okla.	President of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries.
Ralph E. McGill	2	Atlanta, Ga.	Editor of the Atlanta Constitution.
George Meany	0	Bethesda, Md.	President of the AFL-CIO.
James A. Perkins	4	Ithaca, N.Y.	President, Cornell University.
Herman Phleger	4	Redwood City, Calif.	Partner of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison.
Isidor Issac Rabi	6	New York, N.Y.	Professor of physics, Columbia University.
Thomas Dresser White	4	Washington, D.C.	Air Force Chief of Staff (retired).
Herbert Frank York	2	La Jolla, Calif.	Chancellor of the University of California.

NOTE.—All members of the General Advisory Committee are paid at the rate of \$100 per diem, when actually employed, except Messrs. Blough, Gardner, and Lovett who do not accept pay.

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*Contracts and grants, fiscal years 1962 and 1963*

Contract or grant	Company or individual	Title of study	Amount
ACDA-1, contract.	Bendix Systems Division, Bendix Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich.	"Techniques for Monitoring Production of Strategic Delivery Vehicles."	\$150,000
ACDA-1, amendment contract.	do.....	"To Describe U.S. Strategic Missile Technology."	19,000
ACDA/WEC-2, contract.	Raytheon Corp., Missile and Space Division, Bedford, Mass.	"Progressive Zonal Disarmament"...	121,211
ACDA/WEC-2, amendment contract.	do.....	"Develop Planning Principles for Field Tests of Inspection Techniques."	78,120
ACDA/ST-3, contract.	Mathematica, 20 Nassau St., Princeton, N.J.	"Statistical Methodology in the Analysis of Inspection and Control Procedures for Arms Control and Disarmament."	47,461
ACDA/GC-4, contract.	Dr. Kazimierz Grzybowski, Yale University Law School, New Haven, Conn.	"Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes between Bloc Nations."	3,000
ACDA/ST-5, contract.	Institute for Defense Analyses, 1710 H St. NW., Washington 6, D.C.	"Inspection and Control in Disarmament Agreements."	120,000
ACDA/ST-6, contract.	Bendix Systems Division, Bendix Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich.	"Verification Requirements for Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements."	95,000
ACDA/IR-7, grant.	American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 280 Newton St., Brookline Station, Boston 46, Mass.	"Alternatives in the Conduct of Conflict: Behavioral Science Research Toward Peace."	15,000
ACDA/IR-8, grant.	Peace Research Institute, 1329 18th St. NW., Washington 6, D.C.	"Factors Pertinent to the Political Control of an International Police Force."	20,000
ACDA/WEC-9, grant.	Institute for Defense Analyses, 1710 H St. NW., Washington 6, D.C.	"Focus on Arms Information and Reassurance."	10,000
ACDA/IR-10, contract.	Hudson Institute, Quaker Ridge Rd., Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.	"Political and Strategic Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament of Civil Defense Programs."	146,265
ACDA/GC-11, contract.	Richard A. Falk, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.	"Problems of Subversion and Peaceful Change."	4,500
ACDA/ST-12, contract.	Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., Sylvania Electronic Systems, Western Operation, Post Office Box 459, Mountain View, Calif.	"Design and Evaluation of Inspection Systems for a Ban on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Space and for Restrictions on Missile Flight Tests."	354,000
ACDA/ST-12, amendment contract.	do.....	Special report on "Techniques of Verification for a Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone."	5,726
Do.....	do.....	Special report on "Arms Reduction and the Use of Potsdam-Type Military Liaison Missions."	2,632
ACDA/ST-13, contract.	Aerospace Corp., 2400 El Segundo Blvd., El Segundo, Calif.	"Implications and Inspection of Restrictions on Missile and Military Space Systems Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Activity."	217,700
ACDA/ST-13, amendment contract.	do.....	"Analyze the Technical Problems Involved in Converting Sounding Rockets to Surface-to-surface missiles."	4,418
ACDA/WEC-14, grant.	Institute for Strategic Studies, the Honorable Alastair Buchan, director, 18 Adam St., London, W.C.2, England.	"The Effect of Disarmament on European Security."	21,064
ACDA/IR-15, contract.	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Division of Sponsored Research, Cambridge 39, Mass.	"Studies on Arms Control and International Communism."	65,000
ACDA/ST-16, contract.	Bendix Systems Division, Bendix Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich.	"Evaluation of Combined Techniques for Monitoring Levels and Production of Strategic Vehicles."	218,500

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Contracts and grants, fiscal years 1962 and 1963—Continued

Contract or grant	Company or individual	Title of study	Amount
ACDA/GC-17, contract.	Historical Evaluation & Research Organization, 1075 Wisconsin Ave. N.W., Washington 7, D.C.	"Responses to Violations of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements."	\$162,000
ACDA/WEC-18, contract.	Bendix Systems Division, Bendix Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich.	"Design of Field Test of Inspection in Production of Strategic Delivery Vehicles."	158,500
ACDA/GC-19, contract.	The Johns Hopkins University, (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), Institute for Cooperative Research, Whitehead Hall, Baltimore 18, Md.	"Peace-Keeping Panel"-----	87,308
ACDA/IR-20, grant.	Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Wood Lawn, Neilson Campus, New Brunswick, N.J.	"Arms and Democracy: The Reciprocal Influence of Weapons and Political Systems."	40,000
ACDA/WEC-21, contract.	Research Analysis Corp., 6935 Arlington Rd., Bethesda 14, Md.	"Interaction of Arms Control and Disarmament Measures With Capabilities of Ground Forces."	177,300
ACDA/WEC-22, contract.	Sylvania Electric Products, Sylvania Electronic Systems, Inc., Western Operation, Post Office Box 459, Mountain View, Calif.	"Verification for Retained Levels of Ground Forces, Armament and Tactical Nuclear Delivery Vehicles."	202,000
ACDA/WEC-23, contract.	Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif.	"Arms Control and Disarmament Concepts and the Military Environment in the European Area."	267,688
ACDA/IR-24, contract.	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Division of Sponsored Research, Cambridge 39, Mass.	"Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas."	145,000
ACDA/DAS-25, contract.	Columbia University in the City of New York, Box 20, Low Memorial Library, New York 27, N.Y.	"Factors Affecting Soviet Attitudes on Disarmament."	91,000
ACDA/IR-26, grant.	Dr. Richard H. Pfaff, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.	"The Nonmilitary Aspects of CENTO."	1,500
ACDA/E-28, grant.	Institute for the Study of National Behavior, Inc., Dr. Bryant Wedge, director, 240 Nassau St., Princeton, N.J.	"Psychological Factors in Soviet Disarmament Positions."	10,704
ACDA/WEC-29, contract.	Burroughs Corp., Burroughs Laboratories, Post Office Box 305, Paoli, Pa.	"Analysis of Requirements for Automation of Data Processing for Inspection Field Tests."	203,999
ACDA/WEC-30, contract.	North American Aviation, Space & Information Systems Division, 12214 Lakewood Blvd., Downey, Calif.	"Survey of Sensors and Techniques Applicable to Arms Control Inspection and Verification."	136,600
ACDA/ST-31, contract.	Arthur D. Little, Inc., 30 Memorial Dr., Cambridge 42, Mass.	"Ground-Inspectable Features of Soviet Armaments Production Technology."	159,000
ACDA/IR-32, contract.	Yale University, 451 College St., New Haven, Conn.	"Arms Control and Disarmament Concepts and the European Political Environment."	90,000
ACDA/GC-33, grant.	President and Fellows of Harvard College, Harvard University, 10 Divinity Ave., Cambridge 38, Mass.	"Enforcement of Arms Control and Disarmament Measures by the Imposition of Sanctions on Individual Officials."	6,000
ACDA/IR-34, contract.	The Johns Hopkins University (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), Charles and 34th Sts., Baltimore 18, Md.	"Future Character and Role of Peace Observation Arrangements Under the United Nations."	139,000

Information on contracts and grants awarded during fiscal years 1962 and 1963

Contractor	Contract No.	Grant No. <sup>1</sup>	Unsolicited proposals <sup>2</sup>	Procurement by informal competition <sup>3</sup>	Procurement by formal competition <sup>4</sup>				Sole source <sup>5</sup> or follow-on <sup>6</sup>	Original dollar amount
					Invitees	Additional requests for the request for proposal	Number of proposals received	Award other than original invitees		
Bendix Systems Division.....	ACDA-1.....				15	1	11	No.....		\$150,000
Raytheon Co.....	ACDA/ WEC-2.....				9	0	5			125,000
Mathematics.....	ACDA/ST-3.....				9	0	1			47,461
K. Grzybowski.....	ACDA/GC-4.....			(7)						3,000
Institute for Defense Analyses.....	ACDA/ST-5.....			(8)						120,000
Bendix Systems Division.....	ACDA/ST-6.....				10	5	13	No.....		95,000
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.....	ACDA/IR-7.....									15,000
Peace Research Institute.....	ACDA/IR-8.....									20,000
Institute for Defense Analyses.....	ACDA/ WEC-9.....									10,000
Hudson Institute.....	ACDA/IR-10.....				6	16	7	No.....		147,000
Richard A. Falk.....	ACDA/ GC-11.....				3	0	3			3,500
Sylvania Electric Products Co.....	ACDA/ST-12.....				11	38	13	No.....		354,000
Aerospace Corp.....	ACDA/ST-13.....							Sole source		217,700
Institute for Strategic Studies.....	ACDA/ WEC-14.....									21,064
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.....	ACDA/IR-15.....		X							65,000
Bendix Systems Division.....	ACDA/ST-16.....							Follow-on <sup>9</sup>		218,500
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization.....	ACDA/GC-17.....				8	65	7	Yes.....		162,000
Bendix Systems Division.....	ACDA/ WEC-18.....							Follow-on <sup>10</sup>		158,500
Johns Hopkins University.....	ACDA/GC-19.....				12	31	3	No.....		87,308
Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics.....	ACDA/IR-20.....									40,000
Research Analysis Corp.....	ACDA/ WEC-21.....							Sole source		177,300
Sylvania Electronic Systems.....	ACDA/ WEC-22.....				14	25	12	No.....		202,000
Stanford Research Institute.....	ACDA/ WEC-23.....				15	44	11	No.....		267,688
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.....	ACDA/IR-24.....				9	30	4	No.....		145,000
Columbia University.....	ACDA/DAS-25.....			(11)						91,000
Dr. Richard H. Pfaff.....	ACDA/IR-26.....									\$1,500
(Negotiations terminated without agreement).....	ACDA/ WEC-27.....									

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Institute for the Study of National Behavior, Inc. Burroughs Corp.	ACDA/ WEC-29.	ACDA/E-28.		14	72	22	No.		10,704 203,999
North American Aviation	ACDA/ WEC-30.			9	86	20	No.		136,600
Arthur D. Little	ACDA/ ST-31							Sole source.	159,000
Yale University	ACDA/IR-32			22	29	11	No.		90,000
President and fellows of Harvard College (Roger Fisher)		ACDA/GC-33							6,000
The Johns Hopkins University	ACDA/IR-34.			20	7	5	No.		139,000

<sup>1</sup> The Agency has made a general solicitation of grants for research by individuals and nonprofit institutions in the field of arms control and disarmament. Thus, all grant proposers compete against each other for the funds available; the Agency does not seek competition among prospective grantees on specific research projects.

<sup>2</sup> These are proposals where the initiative for the research project was not taken by the Agency, but where the initiative was entirely that of the proposer and, either by reason of the profitmaking character of the proposer, or by reason of the nature of the work, the Agency believes that the appropriate vehicle for agreement is a contract rather than a grant. Such proposals must be consistent with the Agency's research program, be well developed, represent a considerable investment of time and effort by the proposer, and not be readily available from other sources in order to qualify for a noncompetitive contract award.

<sup>3</sup> Normally the Agency seeks competition by issuing formal Requests for Proposals (RFP's). In isolated instances, where the interests of the Government would be better served by significant savings of time and/or money, competition may be sought informally by telephonic or personal visit inquiries concerning interest and capability of prospective contractors. See footnotes 7 and 8, infra.

<sup>4</sup> Procurement by formal competition means selection of a contractor after consideration of competitive proposals received as the result of direct invitations to submit proposals and of the publication of the invitation in the Department of Commerce Synopsis. After selection of the contractor, the contract is negotiated.

<sup>5</sup> Contracts may be awarded without seeking competition in instances in which the project officer has made a thorough review of existing capabilities and has determined that there is only one source for the work. Before a contract award is made on this basis, the project officer's evaluation is reviewed by the Research Council and specifically approved or disapproved by the Director or his Deputy.

<sup>6</sup> Follow-on contract awards are similar in nature to sole-source awards, but are made on the ground that the contractor concerned has already performed such work for the Agency that it would be contrary to the best interests of the Government to award the contract to a different organization. See footnotes 9 and 10, infra, for specific examples.

<sup>7</sup> Individual. This was an instance where the work desired involved a very unusual combination of talents and circumstances for a very small contract project; research and writing experience, knowledge of comparative and Soviet bloc law and facility with a number of Eastern European languages were the talents required and promptly available time, as well as ready access to a major library, were the necessary circumstances. The project officer made informal inquiry of who might fulfill these unusual requirements and obtained the names of 5 possible persons to perform the work, 1 each from Harvard, Columbia, Michigan, and Cornell, and Mr. Grzybowski from Washington, D.C. 2 of these men were planning to be out of the country and 2 others contacted indicated they would

not have time, within the reasonable foreseeable future, to perform the work. Mr. Grzybowski, who upon extensive inquiry was generally said to be eminently qualified, was ready to proceed promptly at a reasonable price. The Agency did not feel that any purpose would be served by seeking competition on a more formal basis. It was believed that early completion of the study might prove helpful in connection with the negotiations in Geneva on peacekeeping under a possible arms control and disarmament agreement.

<sup>8</sup> Summer study. In this instance, the Agency contacted the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute for Defense Analyses for the performance of the work. The Academy decided it did not wish to run a study which was heavily concerned with social, as well as physical sciences, time would not have permitted seeking additional competition. The Agency then turned to the Institute, a nonprofit research organization. To have done otherwise would, because of 60- to 90-day clearance requirements for participants, have meant delaying the study for a year. Most of the desired participants were from academic institutions and were only free during the summer months. The study itself was vitally important to the further progress of Agency research during fiscal year 1963 on both verification and responses to violations.

<sup>9</sup> This contract concerns means of detecting violations of treaty limitations on strategic delivery vehicles through indicators related to the deployment, storage, and support of such vehicles. The study parallels ACDA-I, and because of the experience and performance of Bendix on the earlier study and the close interrelationship of the 2 undertakings, it was both logical and believed to be in the best interests of the Government to award this contract to Bendix.

<sup>10</sup> This contract is for the design of a field test for verifying treaty limitations on the production, testing, storage, maintenance, and deployment of strategic delivery vehicles. Because Bendix was the contractor for the 2 earlier studies dealing with means for detecting violations of such treaty limitations, it was only logical that it should be selected to develop the plans for giving practical application to its theoretical findings in the earlier efforts. This was felt to be in the best interests of the Government because of the special knowledge that Bendix Systems Division personnel had acquired in this area.

<sup>11</sup> When the Agency decided to sponsor this study, it concluded that a major research organization, with a group that specializes in Soviet problems, headed by an individual with the stature and maturity to direct a study symposium on Soviet attitudes, would be best equipped to draw together the experts desired, to guide and chair the symposium, and to prepare the final report. We sought competition for the contract informally by approaching 4 such organizations; the Russian Research Institute of Columbia was the only one that was both interested in performing the contract and whose director was willing and able to play the leading role in the project.

Mr. GROSS. There are some in this presentation not designated as to the beneficiaries of the contracts.

How do you handle contracts other than those with individual consultants and management firms—I am speaking now mainly of construction contracts. Are they competitive contracts, or what are they?

Mr. FOSTER. We have no construction contracts. We have done no construction.

We have a series of different kinds of contracts, Mr. Gross. We have a table which we would be very glad to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, showing all the contractors and how the contract is made.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. GROSS. You do not have that here, today?

Mr. FOSTER. I have it here today.

Mr. GROSS. Not for the information of the committee—you have one copy, is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

You might get what you are looking for at page 1 of the appendix in the green book.

Mr. GROSS. You farmed out a contract to the State Department for "Legal and Political Aspects of Inspection, Violation and Response." Yet you have a legal counsel, don't you, in your organization?

Mr. FOSTER. We do, sir.

Mr. GROSS. This contract, incidentally, is for what—400 and some odd thousand dollars—\$450,000?

Why didn't your own Legal Department provide you with this information?

Mr. FOSTER. For one thing, I will have to get that amount. What page is this on?

Mr. GROSS. Page 7 of the appendix.

Mr. FOSTER. "Fiscal Year 1964—Contract Proposed"—it has not been placed and it is not only one contract, but it is a number of contracts, and I doubt that the State Department is doing more than a small part of it.

Mr. GROSS. You have a contract listed here somewhere with the State Department for some legal advice. "Digest of International Laws" or something of that nature.

Mr. FOSTER. That is a \$14,500 contract to which we contributed a part of the expense so that the State Department, which has this international responsibility, could be partially reimbursed for additional work that they did in completing that digest. It is just useful to both of us.

Mr. GROSS. Yet you say in this "Annual Report to Congress" that "The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for all legal matters arising in or referred to the Agency; problems of international law and organization," and so on and so forth. Yet apparently you are farming out the legal work of your Agency.

Mr. FOSTER. We certainly are, and we are farming out a good deal of other work. We have a very small staff, Mr. Gross, which is very busy and there are things it does not have the ability to do, itself.

Mr. GROSS. Could it be possible that those in the Office of Legal Counsel are spending more of their time in liaison with Congress and lobbying Congress than in doing their legal work?

Mr. FOSTER. They spend a good deal of time in liaison with Congress, which I believe is a service to Congress, and is requested by Congress, and is, I think, a very wise expenditure in order for us to be helpful to you in the broad responsibilities that you have.

Mr. GROSS. Now, your first bite from the Treasury in fiscal 1962 was \$1.8 million, is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. Our first year's—

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. We had a total of \$2 million for our first year's operation.

Mr. GROSS. A little better than I thought.

Then you went to \$6.5 million in fiscal 1963, is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. GROSS. And now you want to go to what?

Mr. FOSTER. \$15 million.

Mr. GROSS. That is a pretty good increase. You are really blossoming out.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Gross, this is a highly important activity to the United States, which has never been done in this way before.

Mr. GROSS. I am sure it hasn't.

Mr. FOSTER. I think it is one of the best investments the United States has ever made, and I think actually it should be considerably larger than it is, and it would be under a great many other forms of management.

If the United States, by investment of \$15 or \$150 million can save 1 or 2 percent of its arms and have better security, believe me, that is a good investment.

Mr. GROSS. That is all for now Mr. Chairman. I have exceeded my time.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara—

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, I can judge what you have done for our country and the cause of peace only by the results. Your Agency has had less than \$10 million to work with, as I recall.

Mr. FOSTER. We had \$6.5 million for 1963, Mr. O'Hara. The Senate has given us \$10 million each for 2 years, in their authorization bill.

Mr. O'HARA. Now, am I right in saying for that investment of less than \$7 million you have brought to us the hot line?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. Which eliminates something that concerned the American people. There were fears that there might be a war through accident or miscalculation. The hot line has ended that danger; hasn't it?

Mr. FOSTER. It has reduced that danger, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. To a minimum.

Mr. FOSTER. We hope so.

Mr. O'HARA. Then your Agency, with only \$6.5 million to work with, is responsible for the test ban; is it not?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. So that for the small investment in your Agency the American people have purchased freedom from fear of war by accident and freedom from fear of deadly poisoned atmosphere. Is that

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a fair sizing up of the positive accomplishments of the Agency during the brief period of its existence?

Mr. FOSTER. We do not claim all credit for the test ban, but we claim the basic credit for staffing, initiating, and negotiating it.

Mr. O'HARA. May I say to you, Mr. Foster, that in my district—and this includes all my constituents, Republicans and Democrats and independents—all are concerned with peace. Peace with security, of course. They think that you have given us the best return for any money the Congress has ever spent. We spend \$50 billion a year preparing for war, if it should come, and with the few million dollars given your Agency the danger of war has been greatly reduced by the test ban treaty and the hot line.

How many persons are employed by the Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. 205, as of today.

Mr. O'HARA. I am a Member of Congress. There are 435 of us in the House. Each has a staff of nine people. That means that for every person working for your very important Agency, 19 are working for Members of the House of Representatives.

Well, Mr. Foster, you may get a little criticism from my good friend, Mr. Gross—and I appreciate his sincerity. You may get a little criticism from him, but you have been getting the thanks and prayers of the American people for the great work you have done in the advancement of peace—peace on earth and peace with security. I hope that you get the full amount that you want and need.

No one hesitates to appropriate over \$50 billion a year for arms. How anyone can hesitate to give \$15 million for the quest for peace is beyond my power of understanding.

Well, I haven't any questions, but I want to say, God bless you, Mr. Foster, and your Agency.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. O'Hara.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now that Mr. Foster has been properly eulogized, I will return to the questions.

First, Mr. Foster, I think it is fair to point out that we have, for some years, had a department called the Department of State. We have a sizable number of personnel involved there, and I am sure that they could have produced a hot line, and could have produced a test ban treaty. You are not trying to take complete credit for these items, are you?

Mr. FOSTER. I made very clear that there are many others who shared.

Mr. DERWINSKI. It is conceivable that without your Agency the hot line and the test ban treaty could not have developed?

Mr. FOSTER. Of that I am not sure.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Is there some genius and skill you have surprisingly and suddenly developed in this Agency that the Department of State could never have produced?

Mr. FOSTER. For the first time we devoted a group of experts to this single end, and this has been recommended and has been under consideration, to my certain knowledge, over the last 6 or 7 years. I think putting it together and having the competence my associates have, has made a great contribution to this, and has brought this about, at least considerably sooner than it would have otherwise come.



Mr. DERWINSKI. I wish to associate myself with remarks made earlier by Mrs. Kelly and Mr. Burleson, that we have the Director back in executive session.

On page 11 you have the description of the three-stage disarmament plan to which Mr. Gross referred.

My question is, Theoretically, do you propose the elimination of offensive military strength and substitution by a U.N. peacekeeping force? Is that a proper, theoretical interpretation of your views?

Mr. FOSTER. At the end of a long process, which I have no ability to judge as to time, we would depend on the international legal settlement of conflicts and a common international peace force for external resolution of such conflicts.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Individual nations would be limited to internal security forces?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. BURLESON. Will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. BURLESON. Of course, that would require, as a first step, the elimination of the so-called Connally amendment, would it not?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mr. BURLESON. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. BURLESON. This would mean yielding to the full authority of the World Court.

Mrs. BOLTON. It seems to me it involves the reorganization and the growth in spiritual capacity of mankind, so that I don't anticipate it is going to be in any of our lifetimes.

Mr. FOSTER. It is a complete revolution in international and political arrangements.

Mrs. BOLTON. A complete revolution in the whole aspect that man has of his responsibility to the universe.

Mr. FASCELL. It would take a revolution around this table, because most people would rather fight than not.

Mrs. BOLTON. All you men would. We don't feel that way about it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Foster, after the test ban treaty was negotiated, there were natural explanations made, or interpretations given to the motivation, at least on the part of the Soviet Union, for this agreement. We have been repeatedly told that one of the major factors is the growth of nationalism in the Soviet European satellites. The pressure that this growing nationalism brings to bear on the Soviet Union, it is being claimed, calls for more practical development of their diplomacy.

Therefore, growing nationalism has been explained as a positive factor in the positive production of the test ban treaty. As I understood your answer to one of Mr. Gross' questions, you would deliberately depreciate the effectiveness of nationalism in reaching the stated goal of world government, or world peace.

If I may rephrase the question: Do you consider the growing or the maintenance of nationalism an obstacle to world peace?

Mr. FOSTER. No, I don't. I carefully said that the end objective would still be based on an association of sovereign states, of which we would certainly be one.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You felt, however, that any unusual nationalistic motivation within a state must be committed to this world peacekeeping concept?

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Mr. FOSTER. No, I don't say that, either. I say that the States would certainly be free to press for the good of their own people. The thing that would change would be political international relationships and the settlement of conflicts as between them by law, rather than by force of arms.

Mr. DERWINSKI. One last question, Mr. Foster. I believe that we should have some means of obtaining arms control and reaching a practical and legitimate state of disarmament. Theoretically no one will argue with this concept.

The concern I have is that we are creating in your Agency an operation that is literally a bull in a china shop, rushing pellmell into some future agreement, when really the affected departments that should truly exercise the leadership and responsibility are the Defense Department and the State Department.

At what point do you start to usurp the responsibility and prerogatives of those two departments?

Mr. FOSTER. We never have, and we never will. We operate on a very well known basic basis of cooperation and coordination. We are charged with initiating and developing national policy in this field. It next goes in staff discussions to each of those agencies to which you refer. We have a Committee of Principals which consists of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the President's special assistants on international affairs and science, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and myself. Every proposal that is made for approval by the President is first coordinated through that group. This is not anything I am usurping. I am simply carrying out my responsibilities under the law. Coordination is direct and all of those agencies participate in what goes to the President and he makes the final decision.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Let me rephrase the previous question: In this area of coordination with other agencies and departments, would you consider it necessary that you subordinate the policies and operations of your Agency to the Defense and State Departments, or should they be subordinate to you in your sphere?

Mr. FOSTER. The law has me under the direction of the Secretary of State, and I report to the President and the Secretary of State. Anything I do is within that framework.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Hays.

Mr. Hays, I want to apologize. I didn't see you come in before I called on Mr. O'Hara. Do you want to use your time now?

Mr. HAYS. I'm sorry I was late, Mr. Chairman. I had an appointment out at Walter Reed of long standing, and I had to keep it.

I am sorry to have to ask this, but what is the total amount you are asking for, Mr. Foster?

Mr. FOSTER. \$15 million was our budget request, Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS. I notice frequent speeches saying the Pentagon wastes \$3 or \$4 billion a year. I don't know whether they do or not, but they have been charged with it. And I suspect in a \$50 billion operation, with people using jeeps and trucks and so on for which they don't pay anything, I suspect it is a fair appraisal that they would waste that much. If they do, they waste in 1 day approximately what you are asking for for the entire year.

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I suspect—I think peace and disarmament is a little difficult to be against, but I really believe that some of my colleagues will have enough mental agility to perform this gymnastic feat. I have a lot of confidence in them. Personally, I am willing to gamble that much money, as against \$50 billion that we spend for so-called defense, which really means weapons which, if we ultimately have to use them—and I don't think there is anybody in the Congress or the country who hopes we do have to use them, but if we do, they are ultimately for the destruction of human life.

I am not even as pessimistic as my colleague from Ohio—not because I think mankind is going to reform itself, but I really believe that the leaders of the great nations have now come face to face with the alternative of either “Let's try to find a way to peace,” or “Let's commit national suicide,” and I don't think that they have had a change of heart necessarily or that they are any more peaceful than they have ever been, but they are facing something that they just can't control and so the alternative is such that it might turn them in this direction. As far as I am concerned, I don't know what percentage—I am not competent to figure this out with a calculating machine—what percentage \$15 million is of \$50 billion, but I suspect it is one one-hundredth of 1 percent or thereabout, and I am willing to risk that much to try to grope toward peace and grope toward disarmament. I am not going to quibble about the figures.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.

Mr. BATTIN. I hope I will have an opportunity to visit with Mr. Foster in executive session.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Foster, I notice your increase in personnel is 57 in this requested authorization?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And the balance of the increase would be for the contract work?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. I believe you said in certain limited areas under the act you are an operations organization; is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We would, in this field test, do a certain amount of operating, and of course we have participated in the supervision of operations to an extent in the protection systems now established. This is as members of a steering committee, and not as director of the responsible agency.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you have any additional obligations if the test ban agreement is ratified by the United States?

Mr. FOSTER. The act is quite clear that we should make preparations for, do the planning for, and supervise the operation of verification systems. Now, how that would be done has not yet been decided, Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there included in this increased authorization the cost of this?

Mr. FOSTER. No.

Mr. FASCELL. That would come probably in the next budget, am I correct, or by way of a supplemental?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, these systems are presently operating at a certain level. Now, there have been some additional amounts requested on

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the assumption that an expansion was needed. This, however, was requested by the Department of Defense and not by ourselves.

Mr. FASCELL. It is in the present DOD budget and not in yours?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. That is what I was trying to get at.

I notice you have several contract studies which are very interesting to me, and I hope to others. I just picked out some at random.

On page 2 of the appendix, No. 6, for example, that is being worked on right now; is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. It is not completed.

Mr. FOSTER. That is complete. We can send you a copy, if you like.

Mr. FASCELL. There are going to be others I want to talk about briefly, but I first wanted to get a question of policy in my mind here. Are these type contracts—concept studies and other contracts of that kind—going to be classified in any way, or shall these be considered in the nature of basic research?

Mr. FOSTER. The basic research, the grants are normally unclassified, and I think this one was unclassified.

Mr. FASCELL. For example, when you get into Soviet attitudes, will that be classified or unclassified?

Mr. FOSTER. The one we spoke of earlier is unclassified.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not trying to get into the question of the specifics of a particular contract as to whether or not a particular contract is classified or unclassified. I am trying to get into the policy question. For example, let's say you do a behavioral study on psychological attitudes on disarmament. Is this going to be basic research or is this going to be classified material, and, if so, for whom? For the Agency? For all agencies? Will it affect the Department of Defense, or will it be available? Will it be available—of course, it will be to State, as I understand you are under their jurisdiction—USIA, for example, will they have the benefit of this? USIA doesn't have this same kind of contractual ability. I would like to give it to them. I would like to give them the money. They don't have it, and they don't have the operating responsibility, either. This is the reason why I asked the policy question.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, it is hard to state whether a particular subject is classified or not, but the judgment is made on each. Mr. Morrow is also a member of this Committee of Principals, and he has available to him all of these things we do develop, so he would have in USIA this study available to him, and all studies are circulated to all the interested agencies, even though classified.

Mr. FASCELL. As a matter of curiosity, let's take the contract on relationship between national and political environments in arms control. Does that include U.S. citizens? It might very well include Members of Congress, from what I have heard around this table this morning.

Mr. FOSTER. What page are you on now, sir?

Mr. FASCELL. I am on page 7 of the appendix.

If your researcher wanted to examine my attitude in depth, I would be delighted to cooperate with him.

Mr. FOSTER. That is one of our prospective studies in the fiscal year 1964 budget request. The details of that justification are outlined in more detail at page 25.

Mr. FASCELL. This does not include American attitudes? That is the big question.

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; it does not. This is within the Soviet Union.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not sure anyone in the Congress might stand still for your examining American attitudes on this subject, and that is the only question. I wanted to clarify that for the record.

What you are really trying to do is to research Soviet attitudes on the problem?

Mr. FOSTER. That is right. The title was not—

Mr. FASCELL. I was not sure what you had in mind and I wanted to clarify that for the record.

I am delighted to see the use of science with respect to attitudes and other psychological matters. I have been very interested in this because of the work of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. The subcommittee is studying all of the ideological aspects of what I consider to be the real struggle for survival. I believe we have to make greater use of what science we have available, both basic and applied, in the field of ideas. This leads me to this question: What relationship, if any, do you have on these studies with the Department of Defense who are spending millions of dollars for other studies with behavioral scientists, social anthropologists and others?

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Alexander's bureau which has cognizance over this, is in close touch with Mr. Barber's shop which is the Disarmament Group in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There is close working relationship in that, in addition to which we do have continuing inventory of studies being made which are available to us and which are included in our report to the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Foster, am I correct in thinking this: What we are doing is basic research involving the minds of people and their attitudes and reactions toward international problems, but we are doing it piecemeal? In other words, the Department of Defense is doing some here and you are doing some with respect to disarmament and somebody else is doing some someplace else, and the relationship you might have to the total U.S. effort, carrying it all in the same direction, might be purely coincidental?

Mr. FOSTER. I think we have some responsibility to act as two things; one, to coordinate and, two, a catalyst so we would stimulate some additional studies in other hands that have more money perhaps.

It is not completely uncoordinated.

I would confess to you that we do not, in this field have quite the opportunity of coordination that you do in some more specific or rather narrowly defined fields.

Mr. FASCELL. You could envision for the role of this Agency, particularly on the responsibility of peace, a greater effort toward coordination and the direction of the kinds of scientific studies we are talking about?

Mr. FOSTER. I could and we are attempting to undertake that. We are hoping to establish a Social Science Advisory Board which will deal with just this kind of problem.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson?

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOSTER, did you tell us that the hot line to Russia is simply a teletype wire that runs into the Kremlin and transmits simultaneously Russian and English?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. THOMSON. Do not the U.S. news services in Moscow have teletype wires that come to this country?

Mr. FOSTER. These hot line messages are coded. Those are uncoded messages.

Mr. THOMSON. Naturally; but there are other teletype wires.

Mr. FOSTER. We are using commercial lines between certain of the points, Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. The only difference is that you send coded messages when the President talks to Nikita?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct. They come to the National Command Center at the Pentagon and it is constantly live and in operation to make sure that it is effective at all times.

Mr. THOMSON. There is nothing revolutionary about the so-called hot line to Russia?

Mr. FOSTER. Except that it is encoded, except that it is a direct line with no intervening in the line.

Mr. THOMSON. Do we have a hot line to Paris?

Mr. FOSTER. Not this type; no, not Paris.

Mr. THOMSON. Would it not be just about as well to have a hot line to De Gaulle—

Mr. FOSTER. It might have some value, sir.

Mr. THOMSON. I am disturbed about your testimony on the use of other agencies. I have not been convinced there is not overlapping and duplication and unnecessary expense on the contract work which you do with other agencies. Your example was to use a military aircraft to fly over a selected target to look for certain objectives on the ground. Is that not exactly what the Air Force does when they fly over targets and does not their intelligence provide them advance information on where to look and what to expect?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; but the Air Force does not have in a single airplane for instance, all of the different sensors which would pick up all of the different evidences of both the obvious and the concealed activities. They are working with us on this. This is something which they have an interest in because they have not done it just this way and they think it will be valuable to them as well.

Mr. THOMSON. Then your expense is incurred by conversion of that hardware to the purposes for which you are seeking?

Mr. FOSTER. Plus the planning and the laying out of the objectives of the look, the developing of the data processing that should go with it to make it timely and valuable, and the kind of thing that we are interested in.

We are undertaking the planning, the policy direction, and the layout of this sort of thing plus the conversion of the hardware that will be operated by the military.

Mr. THOMSON. Wasn't CIA doing something very similar in the U-2 overflights?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, that is a form of reconnaissance, sir. The CIA is in this planning activity with us.

Mr. THOMSON. Is that not a similar type of inspection to what you propose to make?

Mr. FOSTER. Not exactly. The U-2 is a purely photographic activity, as you know. There are many other sensors.

I am sorry. I will save some of this for a little later, if I may.

Mr. THOMSON. In that same connection, Mr. Chairman, will it be possible for the committee to hear the Director of the CIA? I think on this question of testing and inspection—

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson, at your request we have talked to Mr. McCone and he will come up here as soon as time is available. He will be ready to discuss methods of detection while he is here.

Mr. THOMSON. He is coming?

Chairman MORGAN. Yes.

Mr. THOMSON. Before we complete our hearings on this bill?

Chairman MORGAN. Yes. He will be available after the recess, not only to discuss this bill but the other request you had made.

Mr. THOMSON. I thought it might be relevant on the question of detection, inspection, and so forth, to hear what the CIA is doing, which I think may be a duplication of the exact thing this Agency is proposing.

Mr. FOSTER. May I say again, sir, the end product we have is slightly different. We have got to design a system that we can negotiate with the other side. This will be a mutually acceptable verification system. We are in close and daily touch with the CIA and obviously they have much of great value in this. Other than that, we attempt to utilize, to avoid duplication, which is of concern to you and to us—

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOSTER, is yours not basically a "brains" Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, it is a catalytic agent. We have a science group. We have an experienced group of international Foreign Service officers. We have a weapons evaluation control group headed by an active vice admiral and with him are associated some 12 very fine officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel or colonel in all of the services.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Then it is basically that, is it not?

Mr. FOSTER. Our job is to think through and come up with plans; yes sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Do you not think your Agency would be more effective sticking to brainwork rather than operational duties?

Mr. FOSTER. That is essentially what we have done, Mr. Farbstein. The only operating would be this joint operation in the field tests, and if word becomes necessary it might be we would have to operate some part of the verification system on a test ban.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. These activities would be few and far between, would they not?

Mr. FOSTER. They would change the character of the present organization.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Obviously, for a "brains" organization, you do not need too great a budget? It is not necessary for you to go into the millions of dollars?

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Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Who determines what contracts are to be handed out, when they are not handled by your own organization?

Mr. FOSTER. You mean those placed in the Department of Defense?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. No.

Mr. FOSTER. We have a system in our own organization but you are asking about outside?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Yes; who determines what contracts are to be placed with outside organizations?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, we have a research council which passes on the ideas of all of the bureaus within our Agency. We have a contracting officer who handles each particular contract.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Pardon me for interrupting you, but time is fleeting.

When I get a sentence that is enough of an answer.

Who composes this research council?

Mr. FOSTER. The heads of each of the bureaus plus our executive officer.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. What bureaus?

Mr. FOSTER. Science and Technology, Weapons Evaluation and Control, International Relations, Economics, Disarmament Advisory Staff.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Therefore, at best it would seem to me yours would be in the nature of a supervisory organization rather than an activist organization, would it not?

Mr. FOSTER. Policy formulation and study; yes, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Your philosophy, as I learned this morning, is different from that of the Department of Defense?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. In view of that fact, how do you get along with the Department of Defense?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, I once helped run the Department of Defense. We both have the same broad basic objectives, the national security of the United States. You can approach that from differing viewpoints. There are differences between us and that is the purpose of the Committee of Principals, to attempt to resolve differences and bring about a unified approach.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. You expect that yours will prove to be a permanent agency?

Mr. FOSTER. I believe it would be useful to have it permanent, Mr. Farbstein, yes.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Nevertheless, all you need is a rather small budget?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Have you delineated the necessity for the \$15 million you requested in the budget for fiscal year 1964?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We have had a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee on it. We prepared the justification for it at that time.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. For the \$15 million?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Has the Appropriations Committee acted on it yet?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, they have acted and all they would report out was \$1.6 million, that being the present remaining authorization.



Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser?

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Foster, besides being Director of the Agency, do you have the title of Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. My sole title is Director of the Agency.

Mr. FRASER. I had the impression from somewhere that you had some relationship with the Secretary of State. Perhaps it is just the fact that you report to him?

Mr. FOSTER. I am under the direction of the Secretary of State and I am under the President. I have two reporting directions.

Mr. FRASER. Could you give us a little of your background?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, I came to Washington for 30 days in 1941, just before Pearl Harbor. I stayed in Washington through World War II and I was director of the Purchases Division of the War Department; special assistant to the Secretary of War for Aircraft Procurement during the war.

I went back to private business for 6 months in 1946 and then became Under Secretary of Commerce. I then became the Deputy U.S. Representative to Europe for the Marshall plan and then became the Deputy Administrator of the Marshall plan and then the Administrator.

I then became the Deputy Secretary of Defense during the Korean war. I returned to private business for 7 years, part time, because I was called back to Government on a number of occasions.

I was cochairman of the Gaither Committee and a negotiator on the Surprise Attack Conference in 1958 with the Soviet Union, and I was at that time executive vice president of the Olin Matheson Chemical Corp.

I had a different salary, Mr. Gross, at that time.

I then was asked by President Kennedy to come in as a consultant to Mr. McCloy when he was a special assistant to the President on disarmament. When this Agency was established, I was made Director of it.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you.

Do any other countries have a counterpart to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. Not exactly. Most of the countries which are active in this situation have a disarmament section of their foreign office. This is true of the Soviet Union.

All that they have set up is a special disarmament section in the Soviet Academy of Sciences which works closely with the Foreign Office group, although not directly a government agency, as we would consider it. We have recommended that this be done in those countries where there is a continuing activity, but so far as I know, no other country has done exactly this.

Mr. FRASER. Do we maintain any kind of a dialog with any other nations, other than the Soviet Union, on this general question of disarmament?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, we do. We are in constant touch with our NATO allies. We are in touch with the eight nonaligned nations which are at Geneva in a conference there, and we, of course, have discussions with other independent nations around the world as particular questions of disarmament or nuclear activity come up.

Our Agency has participated in this directly through our own representatives and also through instructions to our embassies in those countries. We are constantly visited by representatives of other countries at our Washington headquarters as well.

Mr. FRASER. Most of what you just described would be, I suppose, a discussion of policy alternatives which we may pursue and other countries may pursue in attempting to reach agreements. Is there any kind of dialog carried on at something less than the policy level? For example, at the technical level?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; members of our Science and Technology Bureau have had many meetings with other country representatives. We have had other types of meetings and international jurists have met representing other countries and our own. There are constant contacts by Washington embassies with our staff people in the different offices to which I have referred.

Mr. FRASER. With respect to the test ban treaty now under consideration in the Senate, supposing it is ratified and fully in effect and 6 months from now, hypothetically, we believe that through one of our detection systems we have noted a nuclear explosion in violation of the treaty? Does your Agency have any responsibility then for outlining the possible steps this Government might take in response to the situation with which we would be confronted at that point?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; I would think we would certainly initiate—

Mr. FRASER. I am not asking what steps might be taken. I am asking if this is a continuing responsibility of your Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. We do have; yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. For example, this is moving away from the treaty but supposing the Soviet Union, which has a number of ICBM's, should accidentally launch one and it should land on the United States and detonate. Would your Agency consider the problems that confront this country in that case, under those circumstances?

Mr. FOSTER. Well—

Mr. FRASER. This is one of those accidental situations we sometimes speculate about.

Mr. FOSTER. We have the responsibility of the principal advisers to the President and the Secretary of State on matters of disarmament and arms control policies, and for the formulation of such policies within the U.S. Government.

We would have a responsibility in this situation of recommending to our colleagues in the U.S. Government that, as a catalyst again, what might be the proper course of action under those circumstances.

Mr. FRASER. One of the things we are doing with respect to our rocketry and nuclear devices is to establish elaborate safeguards to prevent an accidental discharge of a missile. To what extent is your Agency concerned with the existence of similar precautions within the Soviet Union?

Mr. FOSTER. We are concerned with it. We have recommended similar activities be undertaken on their part.

This is also an activity carried on normally through the embassies. Therefore, we would make such recommendations to our embassies abroad or at formal or informal discussions at Geneva. For instance, informally, perhaps, at the United Nations.

Mr. FRASER. Do we have knowledge as to the kind of safeguards and precautions the Soviet Union is pursuing in this direction?

Mr. FOSTER. Limited; limited knowledge.

Mr. FRASER. Do they talk to us about it?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; but not very completely. We have made it perfectly clear to them on many occasions, and we do in our public prints, the safeguards we have established to protect us from such an accident by U.S. weapons. We do not get that same exchange, unfortunately, from them.

Mr. FRASER. Do we have any ideas as to whether their safeguards are nearly as elaborate as ours?

Mr. FOSTER. I have no good knowledge of that. I do not have any good knowledge of that.

Mr. FRASER. I think it was a few years ago—I do not recall the time, but we had a problem in Minnesota with respect to fallout in the feeding of dairy cattle. As a matter of fact, the feeding was changed for a period of time because of the situation that existed. Is this the kind of problem with which your Agency is familiar and do you study this problem of fallout levels in the United States?

Mr. FOSTER. No; we are, of course, thoroughly aware of it, but there is a Federal Radiation Council on which we are not represented. We do, of course, get the reports and the knowledge of what their activities are, on a continuing basis, but we are not members of that Council.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Foster, I take it that in the formulation of policy, at least to the extent your own views are involved, you do not subscribe to unilateral disarmament?

Mr. FOSTER. I certainly do not and the Agency does not.

Mr. FRASER. I also gather that you would not consider it feasible to contemplate substantial, total disarmament on a bilateral or multilateral basis without the creation of some kind of police force?

Mr. FOSTER. No. Our plan for general and complete disarmament was developed in response to a feeling that this should be an ultimate objective. In order to achieve that ultimate objective, one must go through a whole series of balanced safeguarded steps amongst which would be included the gradual reduction of national forces, and as they were reduced, have an international peace force.

That would not start until the second stage of our proposed plan. Our proposed plan, as you will recall, is fairly precise in the first stage. We would not move to the second stage unless and until all the requirements of the first stage had been carried out.

In turn, the second stage would be under the same philosophy. In each of the first two stages, we have set numbers and times for that, and we have not had the wisdom to look into the future to see how long the third stage might take to achieve many of these revolutions in thought and relationships. We think it is wise to have at least a framework under which that might proceed, but whether that would be 10, 25, or 50 years, I have no judgment on.

Mr. FRASER. The reason I asked that question is that a lot of people in this country feel that the way to achieve peace is through disarmament. I have reflected on this problem and it seems to me that disarmament standing alone without the substitution of an interna-

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tional police force of some kind lends no assurance we would have peace. We may find one country has disabled itself from responding to aggression whereas another country may in some way reconstitute its forces, or there may be shifts in alliances, which we have seen so often in the history of the world. I cannot forget the fact that in World War II we fought against Germany, against Japan, and with the Soviet Union as our ally, but now suddenly we have West Germany on our side and Japan on our side and our main problem is the Soviet Union.

I do not know what the alinement of forces will be 50 years from now, but I venture they will not be as they are today.

My impression is that armaments make up only a part of the so-called balance of power. If you attempt to limit this without dealing with the larger problem of the balance of power as we have traditionally considered it, this is not realistic.

Mr. FOSTER. We completely agree.

Mr. FRASER. So, disarmament, to be meaningful, has to be considered in a broader context—that is, in the broader terms you have been talking about?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will reserve most of my questions for the executive session we will have with Mr. Foster, but I would like to make a personal observation at this point.

I am sure that all of my colleagues here, to one degree or another, have deep personal regard for you, Mr. Foster, because of your past contributions to our Nation's preparedness and security.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Some of our people who write to us in an effort, I suppose, to be helpful to ACDA, and even some of those who have testified on behalf of ACDA before this committee, or in the Senate, have aroused a certain amount of concern about the Agency, its activities and its direction.

Some of those individuals have on occasion demonstrated a rather prominent tendency toward fuzziness in thinking, and softness in attitude toward our Nation's adversary. I am not at this time going to identify any individuals or organizations in this group. You know them well.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two questions.

Mr. Director, in answer to prior questions, you stated that the task of the ACDA is policy formulation and study—and that even in the event of an attack upon our country, you would continue to fulfill those responsibilities.

To what extent does ACDA make policy recommendations to the Department of Defense or the State Department at present? For example, has ACDA had any position on RS-70?

Mr. FOSTER. We have had no official position on the RS-70.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Did you have an unofficial position? Was there any recommendation made to the Department of Defense in that instance?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, this is a hard question to answer because we have a number of military people on our staff and some of them may have talked.

The Agency, as such, has made no written or personal recommendation to the Defense Department on this subject.

There may be other weapons systems, however, which we might have—

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Officially and formally, ACDA does not recommend policy or direction to the Department of Defense? Except through the President?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, it is entirely possible that in view of our responsibility for looking into the future, we can and should and do make comments on certain kinds of weapons systems plans. Maybe we will talk about this at a little later time in executive session.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Including the one that aroused such controversy about the award of the contract?

Mr. FOSTER. No, we didn't get into that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. With respect to the U.S. three-stage disarmament plan discussed on page 11, and the first stage of it, what liaison does ACDA maintain with the U.N. at the present time?

Mr. FOSTER. Of course we have no direct liaison. We do have on the General Assembly a group of our people. Ambassador Dean last year was one of the delegates and spent 2½ months there. Ambassador Steele will be an alternate delegate this year, so that through the U.S. delegation to the U.N. we have a number of competent officers who are constantly there during the General Assembly when disarmament and arms control activities are being discussed.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. To what extent do you expect your liaison with the U.N. to increase as you move into stage 2?

Mr. FOSTER. Certainly it would necessarily increase as you begin to build up those international institutions such as the international disarmament organization and the general discussion of such problems and the progress toward and the adherence to any agreements undertaken by the members of the United Nations.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. And if yours were a permanent agency, certainly such liaison would continue in the third stage?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it would.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two short questions?

Chairman MORGAN Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Is the United States ahead in the application of social science in the achievement of all its international objectives, including, but not limited to, arms control and disarmament?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't know that I am competent to answer.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you venture an estimate?

Mr. FOSTER. My estimate would be that we are.

Mr. FASCELL. What effect would an immediate chemical protection to radioactivity have on the operation of your Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. I think we would be very pleased that that might occur. I see no likelihood of it, in spite of some of these recent rumors, but we would still be faced with the necessity of developing arms con-

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trol and disarmament policies for other forms of attack and for the dangers from nuclear testing or nuclear activities.

Mr. FASCELL. In policy planning or formulation do you take this kind of contingency into account?

Mr. FOSTER. We haven't taken that into account.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it a factor which you ought to take into account?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it ought to be a little nearer to realization before we do, but I think we should be alert to such development.

Mr. FASCELL. Isn't it a safe assumption that the Russians would immediately and very diligently—shouldn't it be the assumption that the Russians are very diligent in seeking some immediate and complete protection of humans to radioactivity, and this would have immediate impact on national planning, both defensive and offensive?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it would. I still think there are more immediate things, with our limited resources, we should be attacking.

Mr. FASCELL. I wasn't thinking of attacking the problem of defense against radioactivity for the human being. I am thinking strictly about the place this possibility should have in policy planning and formulation, both from the standpoint of arms control and disarmament and from the standpoint of offensive operations, militarily, and from the standpoint of international objectives by the United States.

Chairman MORGAN. Are there further questions?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. I want to join with my colleague from Wisconsin, Mr. Thomson, in his question as to whether there isn't tremendous duplication and overlapping in this program, and I think the committee ought to hear witnesses, not at the same time Mr. Foster continues his testimony but at another time, from the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Department, and other agencies now providing services for which they are being paid by the Disarmament Agency. I think we need to go into this very thoroughly.

I hope the chairman will agree to our having witnesses from the other agencies on this subject.

Chairman MORGAN. We will be glad to consider all requests for witnesses to appear, but we have to set a deadline for closing our schedule. We have requests from 20 private witnesses to be heard.

Mr. GROSS. Is it not true in 1958 we had a moratorium on high level testing?

Mr. FOSTER. There was a tacit agreement by both sides that there would be no nuclear testing for a given period. It was not a joint moratorium at all.

Mr. GROSS. There was an agreement and there was a suspension of high-level testing?

Mr. FOSTER. There was a statement by each side that it did not plan to undertake nuclear tests.

Mr. GROSS. There was actually a suspension, was there not?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; there was a suspension for about 3 years.

Mr. GROSS. We were then spending on disarmament approximately \$1 million a year.

Mr. FOSTER. I don't know that I have any figures as to what we were spending on disarmament. If you include nuclear test ban discussions in Geneva, it may have been roughly that.

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Mr. GROSS. I think we were appropriating somewhere in the neighborhood of \$1 million a year through those particular years for an office of—what was it called—Disarmament or Secretary for Peace. We were not spending it at the rate of \$15 million, that is certain. Yet we had a moratorium. And this one may be no more or no less effective than the other. After the Russians evaluate the tests of their high level, high megaton devices, they may be back at it again in another 2 or 3 years, and it may be less time than that.

Mr. FOSTER. I think I should point out that this is a formal treaty, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GROSS. I understand, but they have had no hesitancy in breaking agreements and treaties in the past. Do you agree with that, Mr. Foster?

Mr. FOSTER. If it is in their national interests, it is entirely possible they may maintain it.

Mr. GROSS. If they deem it is not in their national interest, they would break it?

Mr. FOSTER. As would we, if it were not in our national interests.

Mr. GROSS. That is the record.

Well, I doubt if we will break it. We haven't broken many agreements with very many countries in the past.

Mr. FOSTER. We have the right, under the terms of treaty to withdraw if it is against our national interest.

Mr. GROSS. Are you a member of the Council on Foreign Relations?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. You have been and are now a member of the Council?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. Are there any others in your Agency who are also members?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; I think Mr. Alexander is.

Mr. GROSS. Has there been or is there now any disposition on the part of the Disarmament Agency to recommend that SAC be placed under NATO command?

Mr. FOSTER. No; we haven't participated in any such recommendation or study.

Mr. GROSS. Was there ever a recommendation to your knowledge in the Disarmament Agency which you how head that SAC be placed under NATO command?

Mr. FOSTER. Never under my administration, and I have been the only Administrator.

Mr. GROSS. You were previously connected with the Defense Department?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. And with agencies that were related to the old disarmament setup.

To your knowledge, sir, was it ever proposed by any of those engaged in heading up a disarmament agency that the Strategic Air Command be placed under NATO command?

Mr. FOSTER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. GROSS. You say you are the chief adviser to the President. Mr. McCloy is no longer chief adviser to the President in disarmament matters; is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. GROSS. You are?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Mr. GROSS. In reading Mr. McCloy's statement which accompanied the drafting of the legislation under which you presently operate, I get the definite impression that he thought one of the fundamental purposes of the Disarmament Agency was to put this Government under world government. Do you agree, or do you recall his statement that he made in connection with the transmittal of the bill which created this Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't recall that he stated it in those terms, sir. I think he hoped that there would be, as I have said earlier, a revolution in world relationships which could lead to the settlement of international disputes under world law, and for that purpose that the United Nations would have to be a different body and the world would have to be a different world.

Mr. GROSS. I will try to get some further information and try to corroborate this. Now, you do have the authority to construct laboratories do you not, under the law?

Mr. FOSTER. We do, sir.

Mr. GROSS. But you have not embarked upon any program of laboratory construction?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Mr. GROSS. May I ask you this question: In your statement today and in all the publicity attendant upon the Disarmament Agency we hear only one thing: fissionable material.

Are you convinced that there is not even the remotest possibility that the next war will be using the weapons of bacteria and gas or chemicals?

Mr. FOSTER. We are not convinced that that is impossible and we have studies in that connection, as well.

Mr. GROSS. You have studies presently being conducted?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. I should like to ask you further questions about it when you appear, as to your estimate of the possibility of this kind of warfare, rather than warfare based upon fissionable material.

In answer to Mr. Farbstein you spoke of a small budget and agreed that your Agency should be operated on a small budget. Would you please tell the committee what you mean by a small budget?

Mr. FOSTER. I consider, as I said to you earlier, sir, that the amounts we have requested consistent with the job with which we are seized, are small amounts. I think the Agency should continue to be small proportionately, since I think our job is a catalytic job. I think it is a policy formulation job. As contrasted with the tremendous operating budgets of the operating agencies, I consider it small, but highly useful, and I consider \$15 million toward that end, or even more, perhaps, next year, to be small in comparison with what can be achieved and which has shown some evidence of at least a start to achieving it.



Mr. GROSS. Could you give us any indication or estimate of a ceiling that you would go to?

Mr. FOSTER. I would say that should be considered in relationship to what the problems at that time would be. At the moment, \$15 million has been considered an appropriate and adequate amount, by not only your Agency, but by the President and the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. GROSS. Of course the 270 employees that you have represents only a part of your expenditure for personnel services. That is correct, too, is it not?

Mr. FOSTER. We have 205 employees at the moment. The additional administrative expenses are shown in the \$749,000 which is largely housekeeping, bookkeeping, telephone and communications expenses for which we reimburse the State Department.

Mr. GROSS. One last question with respect to the so-called hot line. You would not expect—if Khrushchev were to launch war upon this country, you would not expect him to pick up the phone or whatever it is, or have his operator send word via a teletype machine, that he was launching an attack?

Mr. FOSTER. Certainly not. This is intended to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation or accident, which, as I indicated earlier, could have been a very near thing last year when communications were not adequate.

Mr. GROSS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee proceeded to further business.)

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a.m., in room H-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning in open session to continue hearings on legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Our first witness this morning is Prof. Alexander Rich, professor of biophysics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Rich is representing the Federation of American Scientists and the Council for a Livable World.

Professor, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed.

### STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER RICH, PROFESSOR OF BIOPHYSICS AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, REPRESENT- ING THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND THE COUN- CIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Mr. RICH. I would like to file the statement in the record and make some remarks related to the statement.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Rich is as follows:)

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Alexander Rich. I am a professor of biophysics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I am appearing before you today in behalf of the Council for a Livable World, the Federation of American Scientists, and in my own behalf in support of H.R. 3299, to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Both you and I are here today because of our interest in the long-term security of the United States. Several agencies of the Government have been working strenuously for many years to enhance our security. However, despite our vast expenditure of funds, today we are less secure than we have been at almost any time in our history.

This lack of security does not stem from a failure of effort on the part of our armed services or a failure on the part of our scientific or industrial community, but rather stems directly, of course, from the technological changes which have taken place in the way in which nations are able to wage war against each other. Coupling the enormous destructive power of a multimegaton nuclear weapon with the very high speed and accuracy of a ballistic missile has brought about this profound change in our outlook. Today a nation with a relatively small number of these weapons can pose a substantial threat to this country even though we may have the same weapons in great preponderance.

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Lack of national security has a very graphic meaning for us today. Right at this moment, for example, there are undoubtedly several nuclear missiles which are already preprogramed and set to land upon this very site. They carry destructive power more than sufficient to eradicate all life in this area. Thus it is that you and your families, in a very literal sense, live 20 minutes from oblivion. This is the practical meaning of the term "insecurity."

We are, of course, trying to take many measures to make our situation more secure. For example great effort is directed toward the development of the antimissile missile. However, the problems behind it are enormous.

Today we are trying to develop antimissile missiles which will protect us against first generation ballistic missiles. However, it is quite clear that continued developments in technology will produce second generation vehicles with considerably greater sophistication than those which are seen today. The problem of multiple decoys is not one which is easily solved. In short, we cannot see a likely increase in our security through developments in this area.

This situation has brought about a substantial reorientation in our thinking, since we are forced to consider other methods for maintaining and increasing our security. Many people in this country and in other countries believe that a disarmament plan under an adequate system of control is the best method to achieve security.

Most scientists, I believe, share this opinion, and it is my impression and hope that it is also shared by most legislators as well. The urgency of the situation has been expressed by President Kennedy, who said, "The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us."

One of our responses to this situation has been the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to seriously look into the methods which can be developed to carry out a disarmament agreement to enhance our security. This Agency has the task of providing the Government with the background of information and new ideas so that we can enter into international disarmament negotiations from a position of strength.

To operate effectively, our negotiators must know that they have studied a particular problem thoroughly and are familiar with it in all aspects. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has already made a substantial start in this direction, and the question we are considering today is whether the activities of this Agency can be improved by modifying the terms under which it operates.

In particular, I believe that the Agency will be able to perform much more effectively if the authorization ceiling is removed so that the Agency can work with "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate." This amendment would place the Agency's funding on the same permanent basis as most other Government agencies.

My reasons for supporting this change are as follows: First of all, the Agency needs to undertake long-term research projects. There is no short cut to developing a disarmament program. The problems are a complex mixture of technical, political, and economic factors.

Secondly, an open-end appropriation and authorization means that the Agency has the flexibility which it needs in special cases.

Finally, the success of this program depends ultimately on the caliber of people carrying it out. But putting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the same permanent basis as most other governmental organizations, it will be possible to attract and hold the best people available for this job.

Let me be a little more specific in describing some of these points. It is apparent that any disarmament agreement is a very complicated enterprise. For example, the recent nuclear test ban treaty does not directly bring about any disarmament, but during the past 2 months we have seen the considerable entanglement of political problems which it has provoked.

If the treaty had included underground tests as well, then considerably more technological complications would have been involved. This serves to underline the fact that continued long-term study and analysis must precede any disarmament step.

When the nuclear test ban treaty is fully ratified, the Agency will have a new and continuing responsibility in monitoring the treaty. It will be a central point for collecting and analyzing data and this may come to occupy a fair amount of its daily effort. However, the Agency also has the responsibility of formulating additional disarmament steps to enhance our security. This is a long-term effort.

The crux of a disarmament measure often centers about the inspection procedures which are evolved for the particular problem. People in the Agency are

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now analyzing potential inspection techniques which might be used if we decided to create nuclear free zones, or if we decided to negotiate an arrangement to cut off the production of fissionable materials, or if we negotiated an agreement on the nontransfer of nuclear weapons.

Any one of these might become the next measure to follow the test ban agreement. They are all quite different, and they require intensive analysis. For example, what level of inspection is necessary to insure compliance with a treaty in an atom-free zone? Is it possible to monitor the isotope output of a nuclear weapons production plant by simply measuring its power consumption?

These are not simple questions, and it is the responsibility of the personnel in the Agency to be certain that we have the correct answers. These long-term studies would all be facilitated if the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were established on the same permanent basis as most other governmental organizations rather than living a more or less temporary existence.

An open-ended authorization also has other advantages. This does not mean that the Agency will spend vastly larger amounts of money or necessarily more money than that which has already been appropriated. However, it does allow the Agency to spend funds which may be necessary in certain special contingencies.

Let me give you a specific example of this. A special problem was created recently with the Russian suggestion that we install a system of control posts which are located so as to prevent a surprise attack. Such a step might provide an atmosphere of increased confidence in Europe, and it is necessary that this proposal be studied fully.

What is involved in a control post? How many people should be there and with what skills and equipment? Where should these posts be placed, and could we rely on them? Should we develop new instruments for such posts?

It is clear that the Agency must move rapidly on this issue and possibly spend more funds. When faced with a contingency of this type under the present authorization, the Arms Control Agency might have difficulty in obtaining this vital information. This does not seem to me to be the most effective way for the Agency to function.

I have described two types of problems, one arising from the necessity for long-range research and the other stemming from a sudden issue which requires great attention by the Agency. Both of these situations, together with the continual problem of obtaining the best personnel for staffing the Agency, make it extremely desirable to change the authorization of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency so that it can carry out more effectively its search for increased national security.

A temporary Government organization is quite appropriate when the problem which it is facing has a short lifetime. However, it is unlikely that the problems of arms control and disarmament will disappear thus readily and, in a sense, this is one of the main arguments for approving this amendment.

Finally, I must add that people in other countries watch with great interest our moves in the field of disarmament. A change of this type will be regarded as a significant indication of the seriousness of our intentions.

Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. RICH. We are here today because we are interested in the security of the United States. I think the terms "security" and "insecurity" have quite a different meaning today than they have had in the past. In a very real sense it is fair to assume there are several missiles right now which are programmed to land in this area, and likewise, prepared to land in my home town of Cambridge. We are 20 minutes from the edge of destruction.

This is a type of insecurity that we have never experienced in the past. I think this provides an overtone of concern and urgency to the kind of legislation which you are considering today. This type of concern is one that fortunately is felt in other parts of the world as well.

I have attended several conferences of scientists dealing with science and world affairs, the so-called Pugwash conferences, and I have spoken to Soviet scientists. I remember clearly a discussion with one

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very eminent mathematical physicist. I asked him why was he at the conference. It wasn't a conference dealing with his specialty in physics, but one dealing with problems of security and peace.

His answer was quite simple. He said:

I am a professor at Moscow State University. I realize that if there is a nuclear war I will be destroyed and my university also, and this is why I am here at this meeting.

This mirrored in effect the reasons that I and several of my colleagues had for being there.

The issue at hand is the question of the authorization for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This Agency was established by the Congress essentially to formulate disarmament agreements, to explore, develop, recommend, and, with the approval of the President, to negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance national security. The question that we are considering today is what is the most effective way in which this Agency is to operate, and in particular what kind of appropriations it should have.

My view of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is that it represents what might be called a prudent investment on the part of the Government. We don't really know what the long-term prospects are for disarmament and the extent to which disarmament would enhance the security of this country. On the other hand, we do realize the urgency of the problem and it makes good sense to invest a certain amount of money and a certain amount of research effort so that we can explore this field fully and find out to what extent we can enhance our security by carrying out disarmament measures.

One thing becomes clear as we observe the evolution of political events in the past few years: we have to make ourselves ready to take advantage of opportunities that may develop. For example, today we may have opportunities for negotiating disarmament agreements partially due to the split between the Soviets and the Chinese, to the high cost of Soviet armaments, or perhaps to the realization on the part of the Soviets, stimulated by the Cuban crisis, of the enormous threat to their own society the arms race poses. We don't really know what all the relevant variables are, but opportunities present themselves and the essence of the Agency's responsibility is that we be prepared to take advantage of these opportunities.

Right now we are in the process of ratifying a nuclear test ban treaty. This treaty is in part a product of the activities of the Agency, and this treaty in turn will modify the activities of the daily program of the Agency, especially if, as seems likely, the Agency has a continuing and great responsibility for monitoring the treaty.

In addition, the Agency has the long-term responsibility of doing research into the kind of disarmament steps that should follow the treaty. We are not clear what the next step should be, but I would like to enumerate some of the possibilities which the Agency has the responsibility of evaluating.

One of the most interesting general areas is the development and evolution of inspection techniques. We can only have a disarmament agreement that we believe in if it has all those aspects of a secure inspection system which assures us that the agreement is being honored by both sides.

One of the specific possibilities, which this country has talked about, is that we might enter into an agreement to create nuclear-free zones.

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This poses a great many problems. What kind of inspection techniques are appropriate for nuclear-free zones? How thorough do they need to be? Are there new hardware devices that we should develop in order to carry out such an agreement?

We might decide to negotiate a decrease or cutoff in the production of nuclear isotopes, of isotopes needed for nuclear weapons. What kind of monitoring would be necessary for such a treaty? For example, is it possible to monitor the production of weapons material just by measuring the power consumption of a plant without actually entering it?

We might decide to negotiate an agreement on the nontransfer of nuclear weapons. How could this treaty be implemented?

Recently there has been a great deal of interest in the idea of control posts which could be established in various countries to minimize the possibility of a surprise attack. This was, of course, mentioned recently by Khrushchev. It is the Agency's responsibility to determine the nature of such a control post, how it could be staffed, what kind of people should be there, what kind of skills they should have, what kind of equipment they should have, whether new equipment should be developed, to what extent we could rely on the information thus obtained.

All of these represent areas which require continuing study and investigation on a long-term basis. This is the problem that the Agency has to face. The bill which is now before this committee is one which recommends that the authorization of the Agency be changed so that it can have those funds with which to operate which are necessary and appropriate.

The current request by the Agency is for \$15 million. Of this \$4 million is for administration and \$11 million is for research. This is an investment made by this country. The fact that the figures are so heavily weighted in terms of research efforts I think simply reflects the fact that there is a large area of endeavor which the Agency has to initiate and supplement relating to the background material for any disarmament agreement. Even though we are not at all clear at the present time of the particular direction which any disarmament agreement will take, the responsibility of the Agency is to assure the negotiators that enter into any agreement that they have all the facts at hand.

In the past, before the development of this Agency, we were sometimes pushed to produce proposals and adopt positions without full thought and research. This is unfortunate. I think since the development of the Agency this has changed rather dramatically. We can see that in the manner in which the group went to Moscow to negotiate the nuclear test ban treaty. A great deal of research activity had gone on before the negotiations, so that when it was actually under discussion, we had done our homework, so to speak.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, of course, carried out other studies as well. It has a continuing study on the nature of the inspection process. It has studies on the way in which a country should respond to violations of disarmament agreements. It has studies on the ways in which we could control an international police force. It has studies on the ways in which one could develop a working form for a disarmament agreement, and the hardware which is necessary for the monitoring and operating of any disarmament

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agreement. These are a few isolated areas in the general field of disarmament that represent part of the broad program which the Agency is developing.

I think the fact that the Agency is now asking for a larger sum of money than it had in previous years reflects the gathering momentum of disarmament studies. I think the importance of this is pointed out by the fact that today a very great number of people are concerned with the debate at the present time going on in the Senate over the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. Judging from what polls have been made, there seems to be rather broad support among the people for this treaty. I believe that there is also rather broad support among the population as a whole for the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

It is in that light that I support the request.

Thank you very much. I would be happy to answer any questions. Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Rich.

Professor Rich, of course you realize this bill has already passed the other body.

Mr. RICH. Yes.

Chairman MORGAN. As it passed the Senate it provided for a \$10 million authorization for a 2-year period. In your statement you indicate that there should be an open-end authorization with no fixed figure?

Mr. RICH. Yes. This is in accordance with the way which many agencies operate. This does not necessarily mean that the Agency will spend more money. It does however provide a degree of flexibility to the operation of the Agency which it does not have at the present time.

The reason behind this essentially is that there are special cases in which the Agency might need to spend more money. Let me give you an example.

In the fall of 1962 it became apparent that the Soviet Union was introducing an entirely new element into the test ban negotiations; namely, the use of automatic, unattended seismographs for the detection of underground explosions. This was an area in which we had not up to that time done a great deal of work.

As soon as it became evident to us that the Soviets were introducing essentially a new element, it became very important for us to look rather intensively into the use of these stations. This involved a considerable expenditure of funds. In this case in particular it was carried out in the Vela program which is operated under the Department of Defense.

However, in a context in which the Disarmament Agency were responsible for carrying out a study of this type it would necessitate a short-term expenditure of funds which might be in excess of its current appropriations. The essential reason for supporting an open-end authorization is that it gives the Agency a kind of flexibility which it doesn't have at the present time.

Chairman MORGAN. Professor Rich, I see you also recommend that this be a permanent agency?

Mr. RICH. Yes. Nothing would please me more than to have the Agency disbanded by virtue of the fact that the problem had been solved. But I think it is unrealistic to believe this will come about in any short-term period. I think we will be facing the problems

stemming from the possession of nuclear missiles for quite a while. I think we have to learn to live with them rationally and control them. I think the vehicle for doing this is through the gradual evolution and development of a rational arms control and disarmament program.

I think one would be extremely optimistic to think these problems will disappear. I think they will intensify, become much more important to our activities, and that we will be faced in future years with the necessity for doing the work now performed by the Agency in a considerably expanded form.

Chairman MORGAN. Professor Rich, being a member of the scientific fraternity, are you familiar with any of the contracts that have already been let by the Disarmament Agency?

Mr. RICH. I have seen some of them. The one in particular that I am most familiar with is the result of a study carried out by the Institute of Defense Analysis on verification and response in disarmament agreements. This was essentially a research investigation carried out last summer by about 20 scientists at Woods Hole. It represents, I think, quite a substantial contribution to the entire problem. The problems of disarmament are incredibly complex and often not apparent. One has to really apply very good minds to this problem on a continuing basis.

If this study is an example of the kind of work that the Agency will do in the future, I think it augurs well.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Rich.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Professor Rich, I find little that I can argue with you about, but I would like to ask you a few questions. I would like to find out a little bit more of your thinking on the continuing authorization. I feel one of the things that is lacking on many of our foreign policy matters is that we don't have enough congressional review.

I think it is more than just merely dollars and cents connected with this Agency. I think it is where they are going. You have mentioned that you have some knowledge of some of the contracts that have been entered into. I could say you have more information on that than I do as a member of this committee.

Mr. RICH. I think that congressional liaison is extremely important. I believe this is one of the responsibilities which the Agency has and on which it probably should expand its efforts. The question is whether the best way to bring this about is through a constraint on the authorization.

I think, for example, it would be possible to set up a mechanism for a periodic review. I think this is very desirable, both in terms of educating the Congress in terms of some of the problems faced by the Agency, and also in terms of educating the Agency in the thinking of the Congress.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I think that latter part is even more important.

Mr. RICH. Yes, I think it is important. But I question whether a constraint on the authorization is the most effective way of bringing this about.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I sometimes think that as long as you are reasonable in your appropriation that it is important that this committee as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee keep abreast of the



work that they are doing. Will you for the record give us some information about the group you are representing?

Mr. RICH. Yes. There are two groups. One of these is the Council for a Livable World. This is a group of people who have felt very strongly that the lack of security engendered by the recent developments in science and technology has posed such a threat to our society that we really must do something in terms of educating both ourselves and the Congress to this problem. For this reason this group sponsors testimony by individuals like myself, as well as other activities, and supports congressional candidates.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. How large a group is it?

Mr. RICH. It is a group that has about 5,000 people in total. The other group, the Federation of American Scientists, is a group that was established in 1946. It has in the order of 5,000 or 6,000 members. These people are scientists who feel that, as scientists, they bear a special responsibility for the interaction between society and science.

The Federation of American Scientists was started by scientists, both in Chicago and Los Alamos, who were involved in the original work behind the atomic bomb. This group worked very hard; has worked continuously with the Congress since the original McMahon Act was passed. They sponsor, in addition to testimony like my own, study programs by scientists at various academic centers dealing with problems of science and society. Disarmament has been one of the issues they have been working on for many years.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Are you opposed, then, to the bill that was passed by the Senate?

Mr. RICH. I would rather have an authorization which was larger. I would support an authorization of \$15 million a year, rather than 10. I think what we are doing by decreasing the authorization is limiting the amount of research that we will be able to do in this area.

I feel this research is very important. And a limitation like this I think is against our best interest. So I would favor a bill which has a larger authorization to it than the one which the Senate passed.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. You are not so opposed to the 2-year limitation?

Mr. RICH. I would be realistic about it. I would say best of all would be to make an authorization which places this Agency on the same basis as other agencies. But if that is not possible, then I would favor an authorization which would allow the Agency to function at optimal effectiveness.

I think this problem will, of course, come up again in 2 years' time and the Congress may decide to change its mind then. But I think it is important that the Agency be allowed to operate effectively in that interim. I think the \$10 million appropriation is not in our best interest because we essentially decrease the amount of information which we would be able to develop in this area.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor, do you know of any research work that has been done relative to the economy of the United States in the event that there is an agreement on disarmament?

Mr. RICH. There has been a study carried out, I think first under the auspices of the United Nations, under the direction of Professor Benoit, of Columbia University, dealing with the problem. A group of economists essentially made a study of the economy of the United States and the way in which it would be modified under the impact of a substantial disarmament agreement.

This was a rather thorough study. The results were interesting, and were publicized fairly widely. The study came to the conclusion that we would not go into a recession or have a substantial difficulty in making this adjustment. The conclusion was based, I think, on a fairly comprehensive survey of the defense industries in this country and on some reasonable assumptions concerning the way in which the activities of these defense industries would be modified under a disarmament program.

For example, it is apparent that certain industries which are now active in the defense field could evolve into industries which are active, say, in our space program. This would be a very obvious transformation in which the industry would keep going, but its product would be changed slightly.

Mr. MURPHY. It would be a difficult transition though?

Mr. RICH. It would be difficult in some areas, but I think if it were carried out gradually it would not be as difficult as it appears. In other words, I think if one talks in terms of an abrupt transition then a large number of difficulties appear. But if one talks in terms of an evolution, then I think the strains are relaxed considerably.

The conclusions show there would be a gradual transformation of some industries and some areas in particular would experience more difficulties than others. But on the whole the conclusion was that our economy could make this adjustment. After all, we made the converse adjustment. That is to say, we went through a period in which our industries transformed rather radically after World War II, and although there were some strains, we were still able to manage without any undue hardship.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor, can you tell me what agencies now monitor any tests that might be made in other countries?

Mr. RICH. Yes. A program was set up in the Department of Defense called the Vela program which has the responsibility for conducting research in all kinds of environments for nuclear explosions. This program is subdivided into explosions underground, in the water, in the atmosphere, and in outer space. This is a very large activity under ARPA, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department. This was established prior to the existence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In many ways it would seem logical to have this activity under the Agency, but historically the Agency wasn't established at that time and so this was not done.

The Vela program is a very comprehensive one. I think it shows very well the virtue of investing money in research in this area. This is shown best by the change in our attitude concerning the number

of earthquakes, for example, in the Soviet Union, which might be confused with underground tests.

When this program was first initiated in 1958 we concluded—although I don't have the exact figure—that there would be a relatively large number of earthquakes which would be confused with underground explosions in the area covered by the Soviet Union. After 4 years of research, this number was decreased enormously, until it came down to the number of about 75 or so that was given to the Congress during the testimony this spring.

This more precise knowledge of the number of anticipated earthquakes that would mask tests springs directly from the application of our research efforts to this field. It illustrates, I think very well, the rewards that one can gain by a coordinated and comprehensive research program. In a way it is rather comparable to the research programs carried out by the Arms Control Agency. But in this case the program is administered by the Department of Defense.

Mr. THOMSON. Do you see any duplication in the efforts in this area by the Arms Control Agency and the Vela program?

Mr. RICH. Not at all. The Vela project is directly addressed to the problem of nuclear explosions in various environments. The Arms Control Agency has a much broader responsibility: It must use this information. There is a great deal of coordination between the activities of the Arms Control Agency and the Department of Defense in this area. There must be. Just as there is, I might add, a great deal of coordination between the Arms Control Agency and other agencies of Government, for example, the State Department, or the CIA.

But the aim of the Agency is really quite different from the aims of the Vela program. The aim of the Agency is to develop in a comprehensive way information in the whole field of disarmament. The Vela program is directed toward obtaining information about nuclear explosions, which represents one area, to be sure an important one, in disarmament—but not the only one.

Mr. THOMSON. Would you name those other areas that the Arms Control Agency has that differ from the ones in the Vela—

Mr. RICH. Some of those I listed before; the evolution and development, for example, of inspection techniques on other kinds of agreements, or the control posts which are now being discussed.

For example, in a—

Mr. THOMSON. Doesn't the Defense Department have a similar interest in control posts?

Mr. RICH. Indeed they do. I think there would be a fair amount of coordination in this. In a way the vantage points of these two groups are different. They are looking toward the same thing, but they are looking from different points of view.

I think they are both important.

Mr. THOMSON. Couldn't the Defense Department provide the information to the Agency and then the Agency could place it in the proper perspective without duplicating the efforts at detection?

Mr. RICH. It does that in this program. There are some fields in which the overlap is not so complete. As an example of this, we are considering the possibility of developing nuclear-free zones, or the possibility of having a cutoff in the production of fissionable material.

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For a cutoff in the production of fissionable material, there would have to be a great deal of coordination between the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Agency. The Defense Department certainly is interested, but the Atomic Energy Commission is rather more centrally concerned, since it has developed the information needed to carry out this.

But the point is that in any of these areas, it is the Agency that has the responsibility of developing a coordinated program. I don't think it would be effective to parcel out these different areas of responsibility to the existing agencies and simply hope to get a coordinated program. What we want to have is the efforts of all of these agencies, but in such a way as to make the whole package effective. For example, avoiding duplication is an important responsibility of the Agency. If the Agency is aware of what is going on in the Defense Department, it can point out, say, to the Atomic Energy Commission that it need not carry out certain programs because they are being carried out elsewhere.

In other words, the Agency's activity is that of a coordinator as well as of an initiator of new programs. In fact, I think the main responsibility of the Agency is in this area. I would not regard the Agency as developing any conflicts at all with other agencies, but rather as assuring their coordination. This is not unknown in other agencies. For example, the State Department and the Defense Department often work on similar topics and they do it by coordination.

Mr. THOMSON. Does MIT have any contracts with the Arms Control Agency?

Mr. RICH. I don't think so. May I correct that statement: It has been called to my attention that two groups at MIT do have contracts with the Agency.

Mr. THOMSON. That is all. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Rich.

Our next witness is Chester C. Shore, legislative director, American Veterans Committee.

Mr. Shore, you have a prepared statement, and you may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF CHESTER C. SHORE, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR,  
AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE**

Mr. SHORE. I would appreciate it if the prepared statement would be submitted for the record, and I will make a few remarks.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Shore follows:)

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Chester C. Shore and I appear today as a representative of the American Veterans Committee, an organization of veterans of both World Wars and the Korean conflict. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee.

As representative of this veterans organization, I speak on behalf of those who are intimately acquainted with the horrors of war and thus have a vital interest in the objective of obtaining a disarmament plan that would ease world tensions that could lead to war and at the same time provide the necessary security for our Nation. This desire is set forth in our 1963 platform which provides as follows:

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"II. NUCLEAR TESTING AND DISARMAMENT

"Nuclear testing and disarmament are the two pressing questions that have imperatively forced themselves as first items on the world agenda. The arms race and renewed nuclear testing continue to pose a mortal danger to mankind. The world is further threatened by the possible growing spread of nuclear weapons. This possibility would make control more complex and difficult and the threat of war would be heightened. Despite the difficulties and the slow pace of disarmament negotiations, the United States should continue forcefully and imaginatively to negotiate for both general and complete disarmament with proper safeguards and control and for an effective nuclear test ban treaty. The American Veterans Committee continues to support staged disarmament proposals such as that set forth by the U.S. Government at Geneva.

"The American Veterans Committee states its firm belief that American leadership can help rescue us from the threat of war and lead all nations to a peaceful world protected by institutions of law and justice. We see the challenge to the United States to lie ultimately in the search of men everywhere for reliable systems of international security which make armed aggression impossible, for methods of organization and international cooperation to bring freedom from hunger and rising living standards to all continents and all people, and for political systems of government which protect the rights of each man and give to each a voice in his own government and his own destiny.

"Achievement of disarmament will bring peace to the world and enable us to get on with the real business of our century—freedom, security, and human betterment for all the world."

The American Veterans Committee is a member of the World Veterans Federation which represent more than 20 million veterans in 51 countries throughout the free world. At its 10th general assembly the World Veterans Federation again appealed to all nations to come to an agreement on a treaty for general and complete disarmament under an effective system of supervision and control.

Work toward this end is admittedly complex and demanding. It requires analysis, research, testing, and great thought. It cannot be done on a volunteer basis nor on a crash basis. It requires an established continuing governmental unit for its achievement. Such is the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And we, therefore, strongly support legislation which would continue in operation the work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

But we are greatly dismayed with the action the Senate took in regard to S. 777. This bill as originally introduced, as well as many of the House bills before this committee, would set up the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on a permanent basis by giving that organization a standing authorization or "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate" for its operation. The bill as it passed the Senate, however, struck out this standing authorization, and provided for only a 2-year authorization of \$20 million.

This committee has heard from Professor Rich in this regard and the American Veterans Committee takes the same position.

We urge this committee to report out legislation that would provide for standing authorization. This is imperative in order to give the Agency full status and to show the world we are serious about disarmament. Further, such standing authorization would better enable the Agency to attract the highest caliber personnel which is so necessary in this complex field. A temporary organization is a great handicap to personnel procurement.

Our country should recognize that the work of this Agency will continue as part of its security and defense system and thus the Agency should be given permanence. To require the Agency to come back to Congress year after year for authority to continue would deny the Agency the necessary flexibility in the event of significant changes in its operation. At the same time, since budget appropriations must always be justified, Congress will always be able to maintain the necessary supervision.

In the event that, however, this committee determines that an authorization limitation is appropriate, our organization believes that the \$20 million 2-year authorization is too low. In its budget request the administration requested \$15 million for fiscal 1964 which at that same rate would mean \$30 million for a 2-year period.

Mr. STORE. I understand from my reading of the Senate hearings that Mr. Foster of the Agency pointed up the necessity for standing authorization in order to give the Agency this necessary flexibility.

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However, if the committee does feel that a standing authorization is not appropriate, we could go on record as believing that a \$20 million 2-year authorization is too low. We understand the administration in its budget request requested \$15 million for fiscal year 1964 which at that rate would mean \$30 million for a 2-year period. The work of this Agency we believe is too important and the potential benefits too great for Congress to impose what we believe to be a niggardly authorization. To do so would be penny wise and pound foolish.

We therefore believe the minimum authorization should be \$30 million for a 2-year period. I am not an expert on this, I am a layman, but I wish to reemphasize the vital concern the Veterans Committee has as a lay organization and as an organization of veterans, for the work of this Agency in the field of disarmament, and we hope and pray that this committee and Congress will do everything that is possible to assure that this Agency can work effectively toward this most vital work of complete disarmament.

I would again like to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.

Mr. Shore, was the American Veterans Committee represented during the Senate hearings?

Mr. SHORE. Yes, sir. Not on disarmament; no, sir, I am sorry. We did testify on the nuclear test ban, but not disarmament.

Chairman MORGAN. In this quotation you read from your platform, When was this adopted? Was it during your convention?

Mr. SHORE. It was reaffirmed during our last convention in Washington in May 1963.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Shore, you feel then that the bill that passed the Senate with a \$20 million authorization for a 2-year period imposes too severe a limitation on the Agency?

Mr. SHORE. Yes, sir. We believe it should either be a standing authorization or else a higher authorization.

Chairman MORGAN. As you have testified, the administration only asked for \$15 million for fiscal 1964.

Mr. SHORE. I understand that. And projected over a 2-year term it would be \$30 million for 2 years, and I understand the present authorization is \$20 million which would be only—

Chairman MORGAN. This is an authorization not an appropriation.

Mr. SHORE. It is \$20 million for a 2-year period.

Chairman MORGAN. The Agency has been operating for 2 years on a \$10 million authorization, and they have only used \$8,500,000 over the 2-year period.

Mr. SHORE. I understand that, sir, I would suggest that, as Professor Rich has testified, this work is accelerating. There is a larger need for the work of the Agency, as problems become more complex. We are coming a little closer toward a solution.

In view of the fact that in the budget hearings the administration asked for \$15 million for 1 year. I would suggest, sir, a higher authorization than the \$20 million authorization is appropriate for 2 years.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Have you been following the newspapers recently, Mr. Shore, on foreign aid, and the testimony on the floor of the House?

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Mr. SHORE. I have, sir.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. You can see what the people through their elected representatives did after our committee worked 4 months on what I consider to be the finest foreign aid bill ever reported out of this committee—at least under our able chairman, Dr. Morgan—and they cut almost an additional \$600 million.

Mr. SHORE. I think that is unfortunate.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I think you have to put this in perspective. We still have to pass this bill through Congress. I think you will be lucky to get what the Senate passed.

This is \$10 million a year on a 2-year basis. I have supported both administrations, whether it was the Eisenhower or Kennedy administration, in this area. What we need more than anything else is more review. I think it is dangerous when you start putting these things on a permanent authorization basis without proper review by this committee, particularly when you are dealing in foreign policy.

Mr. SHORE. I understand your position, sir. It is still our considered opinion that we must recognize that this Agency is going to be with us for a long time. I don't believe that the proper method for review is by restricting the authorization. I believe committees can always hold hearings and ask the representatives of the Disarmament Agency to come up and explain their work.

I think it should be put on a standing basis for the reason of prestige, in order to obtain the best personnel, for the necessary flexibility, and for other reasons that have been brought before this committee and the other committee.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I want to point out to you, as Dr. Morgan has said, what has been authorized in the past has been more than the amount appropriated. The only thing they can spend is what is appropriated. I think if we are reasonable in our authorization, it is going to provide the flexibility, but still retain the congressional review in this committee, which I think is of the utmost importance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have only one question.

Mr. Shore, do you have any specific information or knowledge that you can give us upon which to base an increase in the authorization aside from the statement you just repeated of Professor Rich, that work is going to accelerate and will increase?

Mr. SHORE. I also based it on the fact that for 1 year the budget request of the administration was \$15 million. I base it on both those factors. I have nothing further to add as to the necessity of it.

I am sure Mr. Foster, when he testifies before this committee, can go into this in more detail. The only point I wish to make is this: I don't believe on something that is so vital to this country—I think disarmament is as vital as any possible subject that can come before this committee—my only point is this, on something that is so vital, I only ask Congress and this committee not to be niggardly. I think it would be more harmful to give too little than to err on the other side and perhaps give too much.

This is too vital. When you contrast the small amount involved here with the tremendous amount that is involved in the Department

of Defense in the arms race, when you contrast the two figures, it seems that an extra \$10 million is a very minor amount, and the potential benefits are so great and the potential economy to our country, if we can achieve some disarmament plan that would stop the arms race, or slow it down, the possible economic benefits, let alone the other benefits, even the possible economic benefits that would arise from the point of view of the tremendous sums of money we are spending on armaments, those possible benefits are sufficient, I think, to warrant this investment of an additional \$10 million.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. The word "niggardly" is a relative term, is it not?

Mr. SHORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is all.

Mr. SHORE. May I just—

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shore, what is your personal belief? Do you believe there can be an agreement on disarmament without Red China being a party thereto?

Mr. SHORE. To be quite honest, sir, I haven't really considered that question in proper detail. My personal belief, would be, and of course I am not speaking for the American Veterans' Committee, that there can be. Certainly from the point of view of future world peace, it certainly would be best if we can get as many nations as possible into an agreement on disarmament.

From a practical point of view, I don't see how we can look forward to it in the near future. But I see no reason why the other countries can't have an agreement on disarmament in the absence of Red China.

Mr. MURPHY. May I call your attention to the Washington Naval Conference held in Washington, D.C., in 1922, relative to disarmament by the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan? A proposal was made for a 5-5-3 ratio in armaments in the Pacific with the United Kingdom and the United States being assigned 5 as to 3 for Japan. It is my understanding that Japan withdrew from the Conference, not subscribing to the ratio. You will recall that with the advent of World War II Japanese naval vessels were more powerful than under the 5-5-3 allotment, and that they had fortified the mandated islands in the Pacific.

Mr. SHORE. I understand that, sir. I don't think the situation is comparable. I don't think Red China today from a military point of view poses the same sort of military threat that Japan did at that time. There can always be sufficient flexibility, I believe, in any disarmament plan that we could provide for any future contingency if China should become a serious military threat.

Mr. MURPHY. In reference to the test ban treaty, there are many groups that are rather fearful of our security under the provisions of this treaty at the present time, are there not?

Mr. SHORE. There certainly are.

Mr. MURPHY. The treaty would apply in a case like this?

Mr. SHORE. My only thought—I would point out again I am not an expert on this subject. I am merely conveying to this committee our deep concern for the arms race. I am sure the Disarmament



Agency has taken all these factors into consideration. I am sure any plan the Disarmament Agency might come up with would take these matters into consideration.

The only reason for me being here now is that I wish to wholeheartedly support this Agency because I believe this Agency is doing very vital work.

Mr. MURPHY. I also believe the Agency is doing good work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.

Mr. SHORE. May I make one other comment? I would point out to Mr. Broomfield that our organization did testify in support of the administration's foreign aid program. I know you pointed out the fact that there had been severe cuts in the work that this committee and the Senate committee came up with on foreign aid. We have, and we have always supported foreign aid very strongly.

Our members believe in it, are willing to pay the necessary taxes for it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Shore, I also support it.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.

Our next witness is the Reverend H. Lamar Gible, pastor of Good Shepherd Church of the Brethren, in Maryland.

Reverend Gible represents the general brotherhood board. You have a prepared statement, and you may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF REV. H. LAMAR GIBBLE, PASTOR OF GOOD SHEPHERD CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN, KENSINGTON, MD., REPRESENTING GENERAL BROTHERHOOD BOARD, CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN**

Reverend GIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the prepared statement and then respond to any questions you may have.

Chairman MORGAN. Please go right ahead.

Reverend GIBBLE. As the chairman has indicated, my name is H. Lamar Gible. I live in Kensington, Md., and serve as pastor of the Good Shepherd Church of the Brethren in this suburban community.

The general brotherhood board of my denomination has requested that I offer before this committee testimony favorable to the proposed bill (H.R. 3558) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

In August 1961, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, our organization strongly supported the proposal to establish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This testimony was presented because we were confident the proposed Agency could initiate significant steps toward the achievement of "general and complete disarmament," world peace, and real security.

Our confidence has not been dimmed as the Agency has emerged since September 26, 1961, from its status as Public Law 87-297. It is our judgment that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has performed significantly and well in its infancy even with its small initial budget and staff.

Therefore, we support the provisions of the bill before you and would elaborate on some of the areas with which we are concerned.

1. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency needs to be on a permanent footing.

With military hardware being produced at ever-increasing rates and being stockpiled at strategic positions, an effort toward the reduction of arms seems to be one of the greatest imperatives of our time. It, therefore, seems clear to us that we cannot deal with arms control and disarmament in a temporary and halfhearted manner. We do not deal with the national defense or the problems of agriculture in this manner. Let us not attempt to deal with arms control and disarmament through a temporary agency.

A realistic appraisal of the huge military arsenals in the world today seems to indicate that a disarmed world cannot be achieved in a year and maybe not even in a decade. Let us give permanent status to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, thus indicating our commitment to the long hard task of disarmament.

2. The "personal security procedures for contractor employees" of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act need to be modified.

ACDA Director William C. Foster has said :

We presently have perhaps the most restrictive security regulations in the Government, and this applies not only to our own employees, and I hope will continue to apply to our own employees and consultants, but now as interpreted also applies to any contractor personnel \* \* \*. When we let a contract, it sometimes takes as much as 6 months before we are able to utilize the personnel that we would like to utilize on it, even though they presently have the highest Defense Department clearances (FCNL Washington Newsletter, No. 231, December 1962, p. 4).

One of the most significant functions assigned to the ACDA is its research function. By Mr. Foster's own statement we gather that the research activity of the Agency has been impeded. It seems unfair to impose more stringent security clearances on this Agency's activities than we do on other sections of the State Department or the Defense Department.

We would feel that in this critical and controversial area of arms control and disarmament the Agency would want to profit by the work and opinions of the most creative, intelligent, and even controversial individuals and groups. The present law seems to hinder this freedom on the part of the Agency. Therefore, we favor the proposed modification of the personnel security procedures in the bill that is before you.

3. The \$10 million appropriations limit written into Public Law 87-297 should be removed in favor of the proposed amendment.

Financially we have been preparing for war like giants and for peace like pygmies. The national expenditures for our giant military arsenal staggers the imagination of the average person.

The following excerpt from President Kennedy's address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961, vividly describes the situation :

Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

If, indeed, we are to abolish the weapons of war before they abolish us, we need to be willing to invest as much money and creative energy in efforts toward arms control and disarmament.

Fifteen million dollars is proposed for the 1964 work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In the same year more than \$7

billion, I believe, is budgeted for military research and development alone. By comparison it would appear that the modest \$15 million request is so small as to almost seem ridiculous. Yet we hope even this modest request will be approved.

My denomination, the Church of the Brethren, was born in Germany over two and a half centuries ago while the wars of Frederick the Great and the French wars made the Rhine country a continual field of battle from 1618 to 1744. Its understanding of the Christian faith and its experience of the horrors of war prevented it since its origins from becoming a part of the crime and sin of war.

My denomination throughout its history has continued to maintain this position, attempting as best it can to promote peace, understanding, brotherhood, and good will. We believe that war is sin. We believe that the power given to man by God is misused when it is used to destroy—even an enemy.

Therefore, we believe that disarmament is consistent with God's divine will for the nations of earth, and we wish to support the efforts being made by the ACDA and any individual in Government or agency of Government that conscientiously works for disarmament and the elimination of the causes of war.

Secretary of State Rusk said concerning disarmament:

The obstacles to agreement are great. But all great achievements, in all ages, have been great precisely because they had seemed beyond our reach.

The question is not whether we can end the arms race. We must end it. Our very survival may depend on it (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 11, p. 38).

We believe the ACDA can be a vital part of our Nation's search for peace and international understanding. We believe that its program needs to be expanded until it is obvious to the world that we are sincere about our desire for peace and the vital role disarmament has to play in achieving that peace.

Therefore, sirs, we urge that you act favorably on this legislation before you to amend Public Law 87-297.

We thank you for the opportunity to present this statement to you. Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Reverend Gible.

Reverend, does your church have membership all over the United States?

Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir; it does. We have a membership of slightly over 200,000 in the United States.

Chairman MORGAN. Do you have a conference where you make an agreement on the positions you take on various issues?

Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir; we do. We would have almost an endless number of statements concerning peace and disarmament that we could submit to the committee if they wish.

Chairman MORGAN. This is a general agreement of your church at the national level?

Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir. Sir, we did present testimony similar to this before the Senate committee.

Chairman MORGAN. Reverend, you feel then the full \$15 million requested by the Executive is a modest amount to meet the requirements of the Agency?

Reverend GIBBLE. I was very much interested in the previous questions to those who offered testimony before me, and from our point

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of view we feel that the contrast in dollars spent in this area, or, add to it the Peace Corps, add to it our appropriations in the area of foreign aid, which I think are all efforts toward peace, this in contrast to our vast military effort seems to be pretty small. We feel that more appropriations could be used.

I was interested in the observation that the \$10 million budget for ACDA was not used this past year. We face this difficulty in church budgets as well. If a committee uses more than is appropriated, we have a penalty for them, and if they use less, we have a penalty too, because we cut their appropriations. I think often wrongly so.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gible, we realize that this is a new Agency and after the limitation of \$10 million was written into the bill as it passed in 1961, the Agency was slow in getting underway. It has now gotten into operation and may be expected to produce results.

We have to recognize that only \$8½ million out of that original \$10 million authorization has been used. Mr. Foster appeared before this committee 2 weeks ago and testified that out of the original \$10 million authorization they had used approximately \$8½ million and that they had only a million and a half of the pending authorization to carry it forward.

With a million and a half dollars the operations of the Agency will be curtailed if this present bill doesn't pass. Now that the other body has acted and put a limitation on the authorization for \$20 million over a 2-year period, it is going to be very difficult to get the approval of this committee and the House of Representatives for the full \$15 million authorization.

Under legislative procedure this bill would have to go to conference. As you know, anything that comes out of a conference is a compromise. I never knew the House conferees to sit down with the Senate conferees and agree to the full amount that passed either of the two bodies.

Looking at it realistically we have to recognize that even though this bill passed the House with the full amount of \$15 million, we would have to expect an approximate reduction to around \$12½ million. We have to look forward also to the fact that the Arms Control Agency, which I support strongly, will have some dollar limitation placed on its authorization whether it is for a 1- or a 2-year period.

Personally I feel that if the Agency can show need for an increased authorization after a 1-year period the act can be amended and the limit on the authorization can be increased.

I am inclined to agree with Mr. Broomfield that we are going to be very fortunate if we can get through this House a bill similar to that which passed the other body.

Reverend GIBBLE. I think we recognize these practical considerations, and would certainly support your committee if you would work for at least the \$12½ million. This would be an increase.

One major thing we are concerned about is that this Agency doesn't continue for a long period of time on this same budget. If we look over the report that Mr. Foster made fairly recently, we find that there are many areas that can be pursued and we feel should be pursued which will demand expenditures. We feel there is a very small

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amount being used in terms of education for disarmament, so that the public may know more about disarmament.

I think we have a lot of education in the area of military and very little in the area of what disarmament and arms control would mean. We need to face the issues of the economic involvements so that the general public does not panic if we move in the direction of arms control and disarmament.

These are all areas that have not really had major studies. I think the Agency has mainly spent its time on detection systems. This was necessary. Maybe in the year to come ACDA can move on in some of these other areas, and certainly money would be needed for studies in these areas.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I merely want to compliment Reverend Gibble for his testimony and his observations.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Reverend, I think on page 3 at the bottom there is a sentence: "Its understanding of the Christian faith and its experience of the horrors of war prevented it since its origins from becoming a part of the crime and sin of war."

Just exactly what does that mean? Wherein is that any different than any other church, the feeling, or the—

Reverend GIBBLE. I referred to this in connection with the history of our church. Our denomination was born in 1708 and grew out of the Pietist-Anabaptist movement in Germany. Ours was a sect group that was ostracized and denied religious freedom in some of the provinces of that time. Our forefathers suffered persecution for their pacifist views and suffered under the religious wars of that time.

Since our origins we have had experience with war and with the persecution that comes from the position that we take of attempting to remove ourselves from the causes of war or involvement in it.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Are you trying to tell me that yours is a pacifist organization?

Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir; the Church of the Brethren is considered one of the three historic peace churches, along with the Mennonites and the Friends.

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. McDowell.

Mr. McDOWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment Reverend Gibble for his testimony here before the committee this morning in support of this legislation. I think all of us know of the background and the work of the Church of the Brethren, and respect their position, not only as they might testify on this type of legislation but their devotion to their religious belief and their principles to face up to the problem of how to achieve peace in this world today.

I also want to tell you that I thoroughly agree with your evaluation that you make in your testimony on page 3 in your comparison of the amounts of the funds that are requested for this Agency as compared

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with national defense appropriations. I think it might be interesting to also say the Congress usually appropriates more money for national defense than the Defense Department requests. Last year we forced upon them some \$700 million that they did not want and did not use.

Yet we are here debating whether or not it is possible for us to appropriate \$15 million for this Agency, as the chairman suggested, knowing that we cannot achieve it with both bodies voting on the matter.

It is a commentary of how sincere we are sometimes in our desire to really get down to the business of how we achieve peace as compared to how willing we are to defend ourselves. I am wondering in your experience whether you would care to comment whether in your opinion you think that this demonstrates that perhaps in this country over the years since World War II that there may just today perhaps be those influences which, combined with a strong desire for self-preservation, support large national defense budgets which have had a tendency to build up an arms and armament lobby in the country.

Reverend GIBBLE. Sir, I think we would concur in what you have inferred. We thought of presenting this in our testimony, attempting to compare the eagerness of the Congress to increase military expenditures while being reluctant to increase expenditures in other important areas. I would think in response to your question, if I have followed you correctly, we have great concern about the industrial-military complex, and the vested interests that may drive our Nation in the direction that we are being driven. We have some very real fears in this area.

This is one of the reasons we made this comparison here in our testimony—what we are anxious to do in terms of the military budget and what we are reluctant to do in terms of ACDA, or foreign aid appropriations, for the Peace Corps, or some other areas in which we have very much interest because of our desire for peace and international good will.

Mr. McDOWELL. I was also glad to hear you associate the foreign aid bill with the efforts in the peacekeeping field of this legislation and the Peace Corps and others. I agree with you.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Reverend.

Reverend GIBBLE. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, September 11, 1963.)

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a.m., in room H-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning, in open session, on legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Our first witness is Prof. Elton Atwater, professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University.

Professor Atwater is representing the Friends Committee on National Legislation. It is nice to see you again, sir.

You have a prepared statement. You may proceed, sir.

### STATEMENT OF ELTON ATWATER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, REPRESENTING THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. ATWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Elton Atwater. I am professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University. I am here today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Although this committee is widely representative of the views of many Friends, or Quakers, no organization is authorized to speak for all members of the Religious Society of Friends.

In supporting the authorization for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I wish, at the outset, to express strong approval for the recent nuclear test ban treaty and to state my hope that it will be quickly ratified by our Government. It represents a start in the direction of a broader, internationally supervised disarmament program which is one of the essential ingredients of a genuine peace. While such a peace will, of course, depend on more than a disarmament agreement, disarmament is nevertheless one of the indispensable elements in an effective system of international security.

I would like to add here, too, that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency played a very important role in the preparation of this treaty and in the research and background which went into it. I believe this is one of the concrete evidences of the kind of work for which the Agency is to be very highly commended.

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With the conclusion of this treaty, it is even more important that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) be placed on a permanent statutory basis, and that it be assured sufficient funds to do a thorough job. We may well be at a significant turning point in Soviet-Western relations, and the United States must be prepared to move quickly and imaginatively into other areas of negotiation, probing constantly for new realms of consensus and agreement.

We should press for arrangements under which the use of nuclear arms will be prohibited under strict international inspection and supervision. Other ideas, such as the establishment of denuclearized zones under international observation, need to be reexamined in the light of the seemingly greater Soviet disposition to negotiate on a meaningful basis with the West. Time is very important, and, unless we can move ahead quickly, we may fail to make the most of our opportunities.

In the light of such consideration, I strongly urge this committee to approve a permanent authorization for the ACDA, comparable to that which exists for other regular Government agencies. It would be most unfortunate to give any impression that we are temporizing with the disarmament program, or hesitating to make a long-range commitment to it.

The Friends Committee on National Legislation was deeply disappointed by the Senate action in June, limiting the ACDA authorization to 2 years, with only \$10 million authorized for each year. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee carefully explained that its action did not provide that the ACDA should cease to exist on any certain date, it seems to me that the necessity of obtaining a renewed authorization every 2 years always raises the specter of uncertainty and temporary life.

This is not the way to treat either our interest or our responsibilities regarding anything so important as disarmament. The achievement of international disarmament will require many years of patient, persistent effort, and there should be no uncertainty about our willingness to stick with it. Ambassador John J. McCloy testified in the 1961 hearings on the establishment of the ACDA that competent professional personnel could be obtained only if there were a permanent organization which had been given express authority to perform the necessary research and staff services.

It is essential to develop a staff which is highly dedicated to the achievement of disarmament, and which is prepared to be imaginative and flexible in its thinking. These qualities will be very much more difficult to develop if there are uncertainties over the length of the Agency's authorization.

I can understand the importance of having the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee periodically review the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but I believe this can be accomplished in other ways without giving up the principle of permanent authorization. I see no reason, for example, why the Director of the Agency should not periodically come before these two committees to discuss the work of the Agency and the status of the international negotiations on disarmament, and to receive guidance from the committees on future lines of activity.



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Here again let me add that I know you gentlemen can make a great contribution to this field of the development of the disarmament policy. I in no way am trying to curtail the role you play. It just seems to me having a temporary or a limited authorization, or even what is called a continuing authorization, seems to imply something less than I would like to see the Congress committed to. That is my reason for urging permanency of the authorization.

I make these remarks simply to illustrate my point that in the crucial field of disarmament negotiations we must have an adequately prepared, imaginative staff to develop a variety of bargaining positions. In some respects, the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency resembles the extensive preparations which our State Department made for the drafting of the United Nations Charter between 1939 and 1945.

I am sure one of the main reasons why the United States was able to play such a constructive role in the creation of the U.N. was because of the thorough preparation by the various State Department officials and committees appointed by Cordell Hull. Likewise, the creation of the reciprocal trade agreements section in the State Department in the mid-1930's enabled our Government to play a leading role in the years to follow in the gradual lowering of international trade barriers. Tremendous research was needed in this highly complicated field.

I would like to add another note at this point. This would be to support the principle of research by outside organizations as well as research by the Agency itself or by Government organs. It seems to me that frequently people not immediately concerned with Government policy have a somewhat different point of view or may be a little more flexible in some of their ideas or concepts than those immediately responsible for the policy concerned. I think it is a source of greater variety of ideas to draw on the best brains you can on the outside. Therefore I would support this practice which the Agency uses of combining contracts to outside agencies with work done by its own staff.

The achievement of internationally supervised disarmament requires the same kind of thorough preparation that went into the United Nations Charter or the reciprocal trade agreements program. In evaluating the research needs of the ACDA, I urge you to follow the lines originally set forth in the President's request for an authorization of \$15 million for fiscal 1964, rather than the reduced figure of \$10 million recommended by the Senate.

One of the major research projects contemplated here is an elaborate field test program (Project Cloudgap) to discover whether a group of skilled inspectors can detect simulated clandestine violations of various arms control measures. This is an extremely important practical project in the development of effective inspection procedures. This is one of the programs that would probably be cut back if the research funds for the Agency were reduced.

I might say that I was very much impressed to see the character of that inspection test program because it seemed to me to be a very realistic effort to develop skilled technicians who could do the job of inspecting and to find out whether skilled evaders could escape detec-

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tion. This would be very useful in preparing the machinery for any kind of broader disarmament or nuclear test limitation.

Also, I would like to raise objection specifically to one of the amendments in the Senate bill which barred research by organizations outside the United States. There was one such contract I believe which was given to the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. I believe this was the object of that amendment. I don't know whether the members of the Senate were familiar with this project when they introduced this amendment or not. I know a little bit about the agency to which the contract was given, the Institute for Strategic Studies.

It is made up of very competent professional, educational, and former governmental personnel in London, devoted to the making of studies making British international security and foreign policy. In this particular case they were asked by the Arms Control Agency to make a study of the European reaction to a possible arms control agreement.

It seemed to me this agency was in a very good position to make such a study, perhaps better than one of our own agencies might be. It seemed to me particularly unfortunate that this kind of thing would be barred by this particular amendment. I would hope this committee might see fit to delete that amendment from the bill and perhaps then in conference it could be eliminated altogether.

While many of the research projects of ACDA relate to the technical and scientific aspects of developing effective inspection and verification methods, I am glad to see from the recent list of research plans that studies are also scheduled in the equally important political, economic, and historical aspects of disarmament negotiations.

A great deal more study is needed on the economic implications of disarmament, and the possible areas of conversion or diversification of industries now engaged in arms production. The history of previous disarmament negotiations also needs to be reexamined to see what lessons may be pertinent to today's problems. One of the reasons, I believe, why disarmament made little headway in Europe in the mid-1920's was because of the French insistence on a 100-percent "fool-proof" system of guarantees before they would begin any steps toward disarmament.

At times, we have in recent years made this same mistake, and the prospects of disarmament have become stalemated by the efforts of both sides to secure 100 percent of their objectives. In most international negotiations leading to a mutually satisfactory agreement, neither side gets 100 percent of what it wants. Yet the mutually satisfactory character of the agreement is what makes it enforceable and practical.

In our search for ways of inducing the Soviet Union to accept meaningful inspection, we might well keep this point in mind. I will cite here an illustration of what I mean with regard to the effort to get the Soviet Union to accept the principle of inspection. We have not made headway yet in reaching agreement on this point. In the sentences that follow I will try to explain why I think that may be the case.

The Soviet Union with its closed society stands to give up more under a system of effective inspection than we do with our open society.

When the New York Times, for example, publishes maps of the location of various American missile sites we know perfectly well that information is much more available to ordinary officials of the Soviet Union than to the readers of Pravda. This is one of the difficulties between the closed and open society. If we therefore want them to open up areas in the Soviet Union to inspection, we shall have to offer them more than comparable inspection privileges in our own territory. Otherwise it would be an uneven agreement. Here is my suggestion.

To do this, we might, for example, offer to evacuate one military base on the periphery of the Soviet territory for every two or three annual international inspection visits they would be willing to accept. If they would accept 12 to 15 such visits, we might evacuate 5 or 6 bases around their borders. This is something they really would like. I feel that the obtaining of 12 to 15 annual inspection visits in the Soviet Union by an impartial international body would be in the long run far more useful to us than the military bases there, because it would open up the doorway to agreement in this area of arms regulation and inspection.

The possible linking of an inspection agreement with the evacuation of certain bases in the above manner might offer some basis for making headway toward an agreement to ban all underground tests. It is the kind of idea which the ACDA might well study in its future research program.

Similarly, the possibility of linking an inspection agreement with an agreement on the denuclearization of central Europe, or on an exchange of nonaggressive pledges between the Eastern and Western blocs needs to be carefully analyzed. I think Mr. Khrushchev, in suggesting initially the linking of a test ban treaty with some kind of a nonaggression pact, was saying "Let's see if there are other areas on which progress can be made in connection with arms control."

The ACDA should be encouraged to study these possibilities, or to arrange to have the study made by qualified researchers on the outside. An \$11 million research program on all aspects of arms control and disarmament is little enough when the vastness of the subject matter is appreciated. It is an investment in peace planning which I sincerely hope the Congress will approve.

Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Atwater.

Professor Atwater, then you fully endorse the \$15 million requested by the Executive?

Mr. ATWATER. Yes, I do.

Chairman MORGAN. Professor Atwater, I was interested in your suggestion of the deletion of a Senate amendment. Do you have a copy of the Senate bill?

Mr. ATWATER. Yes.

Chairman MORGAN. You are speaking of page 4, section 5?

Mr. ATWATER. Yes.

Chairman MORGAN. Where the Senate inserted "the United States" before the word "private" making a limitation on it that it must be U.S. private institutions or persons?

Mr. ATWATER. That is right.

Chairman MORGAN. You feel the words "United States" should be eliminated?

Mr. ATWATER. I would revert to the wording of the original legislation which said "private organizations." It made no reference to the nationality.

Chairman MORGAN. I was interested in your suggestion on page 3 of your statement about opening up bases near the Soviet border for inspection. Is this your own suggestion, or has it ever been suggested in any of the disarmament talks at Geneva?

Mr. ATWATER. It has been an idea of my own for some time. I have written on it briefly at various places. I sent a letter to the New York Times a couple of years ago about it. I never saw it in any official disarmament talks until the Cuba crisis of a year ago when there was some discussion that the United States might evacuate certain bases in Turkey in exchange for the evacuation of Soviet bases in Cuba. This wasn't quite the same thing. It was the only time I have seen this idea brought into more general negotiations of this sort.

Chairman MORGAN. My memory might be faulty, Professor, but I think our Ambassador to the United Nations was accused of making such a suggestion, and then denied it; isn't that correct?

Mr. ATWATER. Again my memory is a little hazy. I believe Mr. Stevenson did—

Chairman MORGAN. Deny suggesting the removal of bases?

Mr. ATWATER. I am not sure exactly what he said. I think we ought to look up the record and see.

Chairman MORGAN. It is my memory that he did deny that he had made any such suggestion. Would you care to give us some of the reaction you have received from this proposal?

Mr. ATWATER. I have suggested it to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an idea that might be looked into. I got from them the reaction that it would be an interesting idea to look into.

Chairman MORGAN. You got no sign of any positive thinking along this line?

Mr. ATWATER. No; I have not seen any evidence that they had incorporated it yet in any of their official recommendations or policy. By making it in various places such as today, and also to them, I am trying to see if there might not be interest in it. It makes a great deal of sense to me because it represents a meaningful kind of exchange of concessions. That is what it seems to me we are looking for.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Atwater.

Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Atwater, Penn State University, of course, is a great university. It is located close to my congressional district. I know it does wonderful work. I think you should be thanked for coming here today to give us the benefit of your opinions.

I notice on page 3 where you say as Dr. Morgan has suggested we might evacuate different bases. It is my understanding that we have given up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy. I am not sure what we received in return.

I was of the impression that something was going to be done by the Russians in evacuating Cuba. Perhaps you know something more about that.

Mr. ATWATER. When I initially thought of this idea it was before the technological development of these bases reached the stage that some of them seemed to serve less usefulness than they formerly served. That today may be a little less meaningful to the Soviet Union because of our conversion of some of these bases and our evacuation of some of the equipment from them.

However, the bases are still there. We have forces there and they still represent I think a bargainable point although less of a bargainable point than 2 years ago.

Chairman MORGAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALLEY. Yes.

Chairman MORGAN. I think we ought to straighten the record out. The Jupiter missile was removed from Turkey and from Italy because it was an antique missile. It was an old liquid fuel missile that was no longer valuable to our defense system.

It wasn't taken out with any deal or anything. The Polaris missile has now replaced it. For the first time we have Polaris submarines in service in the Mediterranean to replace the Jupiter. I don't think there was any deal with the Soviets about Cuba for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey or from Italy.

Mr. WHALLEY. There are some experts, of course, that claim while the missiles were perhaps obsolete in Turkey or Italy they could have been replaced with the most modern missiles we have and we would be in better shape if we had land-based missiles rather than depending on the Polaris.

If I used the word "deal," perhaps I shouldn't have. I thought there was some negotiation when we removed the bases from Turkey and Italy at the same time we were talking about Cuba. It is nice to have your opinion, Mr. Atwater.

Mr. ATWATER. I didn't want to mix this up with the Cuban affair, which is another issue. I wanted to link it with the inspection issue. This is what we need to work hardest on to get Soviet acceptance. I have been looking for meaningful concessions that we might propose to get their acceptance of a wider inspection procedure. This seemed to be a possibility.

I think it still has utility, though I hope we won't wait until the bases lose their utility, if they are further altered by technological developments.

Mr. WHALLEY. I think we are all for peace. We are hoping that a good arrangement can be made. This morning we had breakfast with Gen. Curtis LeMay and had his opinions. By your coming here, we have yours also.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Professor Atwater, I had a question to follow up on the interrogation by the chairman. I can't understand, unfortunately, the logic of your statement on page 3, that inasmuch as the Soviet Union is a closed society and we are an open one, therefore if we want them to come our way a little bit, we have to open up even more and give them more than comparable inspection privileges.

You in fact admit that we are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Russians as far as information, intelligence, and so forth, are concerned. In order for them to be cooperative, we are to give them more. I can't quite understand that.

Mr. ATWATER. I think that for the Russians to be cooperative they have to pay a price. They don't need to offer inspection to us to get a lot of information they already have about the United States. Why should they give us the right to inspect or give an international organization the right to move inspectors around their territory when they perhaps feel that without this machinery they already have enough information about what is going on in our territory?

It is an unequal agreement as far as they are concerned, because they know more about us than we know about them. We want to know more about them. That would be, I think, a confidence-building mechanism, if we could get some kind of international inspection machinery.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is it that we want to know more about them, or that we simply want an assurance that they are going to be truthful and will carry out the disarmament procedures? It is not that we want to know more about them. We want to know if they are going to carry out their part of the bargain.

Mr. ATWATER. That involves knowing more about them. It is the same thing.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Inspection, you have to agree, is necessary if we are going to make any steps in the direction of disarmament. We are concerned that the Soviets follow through. You stated that this is what they would like to do. Have you any indication from the Soviets formally—

Mr. ATWATER. They have many times suggested we ought to evacuate the bases around the Mediterranean. This is a matter they have reiterated in various statements. I can say their reaction is a natural reaction. It corresponds to our reaction to the base in Cuba.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You suggested this proposal, but have you ever received a reply directly from them?

Mr. ATWATER. No.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.

Mr. BATTIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; thank you.

Mr. Atwater, the U.N. Charter, I believe, recognizes the legality of regional defense pacts such as NATO. You are not making a comparison of our presence in Europe under the NATO alliance to Russia's presence in this hemisphere in Cuba; are you?

Mr. ATWATER. A Soviet base in this hemisphere is a threat to our security because we feel it is near and might jeopardize our interest. I am merely trying to think now how a Soviet official might view an American base in Turkey or on any of the Soviet borders.

It seems to me they would regard an American base, whether it was in pursuit of NATO or not, as a threat. They don't regard NATO, of course, as within the charter. They regard NATO as illegal under the U.N. Charter.

Mr. BATTIN. How do they regard the Warsaw Pact nations?

Mr. ATWATER. The Warsaw Pact is almost identically worded to the NATO Treaty and they have I believe offered to scrap both. If we would scrap NATO, they would scrap the Warsaw Pact.

I suppose they have justified the Warsaw Pact on the basis of the NATO Pact. The NATO Pact, I might say, provides, you see, for enforcement action without sanction of the Security Council. In the use of regional organizations to enforce peace, articles 52, 53 of

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the U.N. Charter say that no enforcement action shall be taken except with the authorization of the Security Council.

In this sense NATO might be argued to be not compatible with the charter.

Mr. BATTIN. Except that I would hasten to add so far all the plans and work that have gone into the NATO countries has been of a defensive nature more than offensive. Though I didn't hear all of your statement, I have read the major portion of it. If we can't make any further progress in the field of disarming through agreements with the Soviet Union, do you personally favor unilateral disarmament?

Mr. ATWATER. I certainly favor the exploration of steps which might be taken by our Government unilaterally on the assumption that this might then induce responses by other countries. I think this deserves very careful exploration.

Mr. BATTIN. Aren't we in fact doing that now?

Mr. ATWATER. I think so. I would prefer to see an international agreement, of course, which is what should be our constant objective. But I think there may be unilateral steps which may be quite compatible with our own security which at the same time might serve in some areas to reduce tension and facilitate international agreements.

Mr. BATTIN. One last question, Mr. Chairman.

Assuming that the test ban treaty presently being debated in the Senate is ratified, and that Russia and the United States live up to the terms of that treaty, and that Red China explodes a nuclear device at some later date—and that is their publicly stated purpose—would you then consider the overall question between just the United States and Russia as imperiling the world as far as this is concerned, or would you be for the control of Red China—

Mr. ATWATER. The conduct of nuclear tests and weapons by countries that are not parties to the treaty, like China or France, is a very serious problem. It needs to be brought within the framework of the treaty if it is at all possible to do so.

I think we have to face these developments if and when they arise. I think it has been stated by those who have been responsible for the treaty that the Chinese, even if they should explode nuclear devices in the next year or two, would still be so far behind the Russians and the Americans that it wouldn't at the moment at least constitute a basis for letting the whole treaty go out the window.

But it would be a serious, and it is a serious development. I think there is more chance of eventually bringing the Chinese and the French into some agreement by having this treaty as a starting point than by leaving it entirely up to an uncontrolled competitive system of testing.

Mr. BATTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Nix.

Mr. NIX. Professor Atwater, I want to apologize for not having been here to hear all the statement. I was interested in one thing which you did say in answer to one of Mr. Zablocki's questions. You said that the Soviets knew more about us than we knew about them. I take it you are referring to our nuclear capacity?

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Mr. ATWATER. About our whole system, because we have newspapers which disclose a great deal of information. A person who sits and reads all the technical journals that are put out by science and industry would get a great deal of information about our system and our society, both military and scientific. That is what I mean.

Mr. NIX. I am concerned about this thing that we are talking about here. That would be included in the statement you made?

Mr. ATWATER. Yes.

Mr. NIX. I wanted that clarified because I have been on this committee almost 4 years. I have never yet been able to find out what we know about them. I would like to have your source of information.

Mr. ATWATER. I am basing it upon the knowledge of the kind of things which appear in the Soviet press and Soviet publications as compared to the kind of information which appears in the American press and American publications. There has been an increasing amount of Soviet scientific literature available in the last few years. This has added to our understanding of their system.

But there still are no journals comparable to, say the New York Times, which are not Government-controlled, and which publish information as the very best reporters can find out. Russia has a Government-controlled press, not a private free press.

Obviously those two will give you different kinds of information. This is why I simply say that their political system inhibits the United States and its officials in getting information about their nuclear tests or armament capacity far more than our system inhibits their getting information. That is why I think it is an uneven situation.

Mr. NIX. I still think it is an assumption, I think it is unwarranted. I think it should not be the basis for concession.

Mr. ATWATER. This is a matter of opinion. As I said, I think it is very important to look for meaningful areas of negotiation which will lead to future agreements. I thought this was one.

Mr. NIX. I thoroughly agree with that. But I think they should be based in substance and in fact. I don't think they should be visionary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Atwater.

Mr. ATWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is the Honorable George Allen, member of the national advisory board, United World Federalists, Inc. Mr. Allen is a witness that has appeared before this committee many times. Let me say to the newer members of the committee that for the last 20 years he has been sitting next to me here at the table on many occasions.

Mr. Allen, you have a prepared statement. You may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. ALLEN, MEMBER, NATIONAL  
ADVISORY BOARD, UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS, INC.**

Mr. ALLEN. I believe members of the committee have copies. I might read it hurriedly.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am George Venable Allen of Washington, D.C. I am here today on behalf of United World Federalists as a member of our national advisory board. It is



a pleasure for me to appear once again before your distinguished committee, as I have in the past for other purposes.

I have spent most of my adult life in the foreign affairs field and have long maintained a keen interest in the development of international machinery which could better serve the interests of U.S. national security and the cause of peace throughout the world. I have had the honor to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India and Nepal, and Greece. In 1955-56, I served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. From 1957 to 1960, I served under President Eisenhower as Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

I am here to register the support of United World Federalists for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and for the fullest funding of its work consistent with the wise and effective use of the American taxpayer's dollar. As a representative of United World Federalists, I shall speak in support of the first section of the bill, for the organization does not feel qualified to speak to the merits of section 2. That relates primarily to the question of contracts and security, and similar matters. If it is desired later, I shall be happy to give the committee my personal evaluation of section 2, based on long years of experience in dealing with security clearances.

In testifying on S. 777 before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Brig. Gen. J. H. Rothschild, USA, retired, expressed our support for the authorization without dollar limitation set forth in the bill, as it is in H.R. 3299. General Rothschild gave three reasons why we felt that it was important to put the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the same permanent basis as many other Government agencies:

1. It will permit the Agency to attract the high caliber personnel which are so necessary in this largely uncharted, complex field. People capable of providing the study, research, and imagination so necessary, will be difficult to find, to enlist, and to keep. A temporary organization is a great handicap to personnel procurement and to the establishment of a proper esprit de corps.
2. The stature gained by being placed on a permanent basis will permit the Agency to deal more effectively with other governmental organizations.
3. Granting the Agency a permanent status will be an indication to our people, and to the world at large, that we are striving for a disarmed world in which the rule of force has been subordinated to the rule of law.

We, the United World Federalists, understand the reasons why the Committee on Foreign Relations did not recommend an authorization without dollar limitation and we appreciate the desirability of periodic congressional review. Our concern was, and is, to make certain that this Agency shall continue its important work as an integral part of the executive branch of the U.S. Government and shall receive whatever funds may be necessary to the effective and expeditious discharge of its responsibilities under Public Law 87-297 enacted by the 87th Congress.

If this purpose can best be served, in the judgment of this committee, by periodic authorizations, we will not pursue our original strong support for an authorization without dollar limitation.

Let me now speak to the Senate bill 777 as amended, which is before you, along with H.R. 3299. We were pleased that the other body approved a 2-year authorization, although we would favor a longer

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authorization period as affording greater assurance of job continuity to prospective employees of the Agency.

We are seriously concerned, however, with the \$20 million figure adopted by the Senate. If this figure is allowed to stand—\$20 million for 2 years—it will mean a one-third curtailment in the projected work of this relatively new Agency. The legislative history shows clearly that the Congress intended the Agency to develop from the very limited operation of the U.S. Disarmament Administration into an agency which could effectively discharge the highly difficult and uniquely new tasks assigned it by the Congress.

The American eagle holds both arrows and an olive branch. We deem it of the utmost importance and totally consistent with America's purpose that our country should give equal attention both to the preparedness of its arrows and the preparedness of its olive branch. While recognizing the need for disproportionately large sums for defense through arms, we cannot reconcile the willingness to commit approximately \$56 billion to national security through arms with a willingness to slash by \$5 million the already modest sum of \$15 million being requested for national security through an increasingly intelligent search for arms control and safe, worldwide disarmament.

That means to say \$15 million per year or \$30 million for the 2-year period.

This is false economy. This is pennywise and pound foolish. Such a course would be foreign to the vision, faith, and courage of the American pioneers and to the boldness and willingness to invest heavily in the search for a better and fuller life which they exemplified.

We call upon this committee to authorize a sum of \$30 million for fiscal years 1964 and 1965. This amount would establish an authorization consistent with the 1964 appropriation request submitted by Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and formerly Deputy Secretary of Defense.

We recognize that House approval of a 2-year authorization or \$30 million will necessitate a conference with the other body which may reduce that figure, but at least the House, as the body closer to the people, will have reflected the overwhelming sentiment of the American people in favor of pursuing every reasonable step to find a way out of the present arms race.

In substantiation of this statement as to the sentiments of Americans, Mr. Chairman, I have attached the results of several polls conducted by Members of Congress among their own constituents, which I would request be printed in the record of your hearings at the conclusion of my statement.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection, Mr. Allen, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We believe that a figure of \$30 million is conservative in terms of the responsibilities involved. In view of the fact that the Agency in April and May had developed its operation to the point where it was in a position to obligate funds constructively at the rate of about \$1 million a month, it is reasonable to assume that its rate of obligation will continue to rise slowly for at least another year or two. Since the \$1 million monthly rate means a need for at least \$12 million yearly,

it is not at all unreasonable to request a \$15 million yearly authorization for the next 2 fiscal years or a \$30 million total.

Of the other amendments to S. 777 made by the Senate, we would comment on only one, and this relates to one already mentioned by Professor Atwater. During the floor debate, section 31(2) of the act was amended by adding the words "United States" before the word "private." This amendment has the effect of denying the Agency the option of obtaining information from "private or public institutions" abroad through study contracts, even where the Agency may determine that such information is necessary to its work and cannot be obtained from domestic sources.

Since the matters dealt with by this Agency involve aspects which concern many other areas of the world, it would seem self-defeating to us to enjoin the Agency from utilizing sources of knowledge which will contribute to its objective just because they are not within our country. We therefore recommend that your committee, Mr. Chairman, either strike the words "United States" from section 31(2) or modify this section in such a way as to permit the Director of the Agency some leeway in letting modest contracts abroad when they are desirable in his judgment.

United World Federalists has no illusions that the achievement of our country's ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world will be quickly or easily reached. Neither do we believe in unilateral disarmament or in letting down our guard unless and until adequate international institutions have been established which can better assure our security and the peace of the world.

We believe firmly, however, that the search for better and more economical ways of protecting our Nation and of achieving freedom from war must be relentlessly pursued and that a full measure of the wealth with which our country is blessed must be devoted to this search. Until war is eliminated as an institution and the use of force in international affairs has been subjected to a world rule of law, the United States will know no real security, nor its citizens any substantial relief from the burdens inherent in attempting to maintain a balance of power which is constantly thrown out of balance by each new weapon.

The Congress has charged the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with responsibility for seeking solutions to this fundamental problem. We hold this search vital to our national security. It is for this reason that United World Federalists support a \$30 million, 2-year authorization for this Agency, and urge this distinguished committee to so recommend to the full House.

(The material furnished by Mr. Allen is as follows:)

YOUR CONGRESSMAN, WILLIAM B. WIDNALL, 7TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY,  
REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON

AUGUST 4, 1961.

MORE QUESTIONNAIRE STATISTICS

During the past session of Congress, I have received enough controversial mail on the United Nations and the scope of its present operations and authority to warrant securing the consensus of my constituents on the subject. Accordingly, I included 7 questions on the U.N. in the recent questionnaire mailed to 60,000 families in the district, 12,000 of whom replied.

Results of this portion of the poll were purposefully omitted from my first report on the opinions of the voters so that the entire block of inquiries relating to the United Nations could be dealt with separately and be in that form more meaningful and interesting.

Uniform heavy support was expressed for the United Nations as the best hope for peace in the world and for the past effectiveness of the world body. Similar favor was shown for strengthening the U.N. into a federal form of world government similar to the United States and for achieving general disarmament under effective international control governed by rules of law and enforced by an international armed force.

The following is the statistical breakdown of the percentages of voters favoring, disapproving, or expressing no opinion on the specific questions:

[Percent]

Question	Yes	No	No opinion
1. Do you regard the United Nations as the best hope for maintaining world peace?.....	83.95	13.55	2.50
2. Do you believe that the United Nations has been effective in maintaining a better understanding between nations in the past?.....	79.01	16.05	4.94
3a. Do you believe that one of the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy should be the achievement of worldwide general and complete disarmament under effective international control?.....	72.50	21.25	6.25
3b. As a means of assuring "effective international control" of any disarmament agreement would you favor the creation of rules of law backed by a world court and enforced by legally controlled international armed force?.....	77.50	8.75	13.75
4. Do you believe that the purpose of world peace could be achieved through strengthening the United Nations?.....	81.48	12.50	6.02
5. Do you believe that our Federal form of government, through which 50 sovereign States live together in peace, provides an example of a well-tested system which the peoples of the world might follow by delegating to a strengthened United Nations constitutionally limited powers for enforcement of worldwide disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes?.....	76.58	8.75	14.67
6. Do you believe that the United States should take the lead in proposing measures of this nature in the face of the present attitude of the Soviet Union?.....	72.84	12.49	14.67

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY SENATOR BENJAMIN A. SMITH II (DEMOCRAT, OF MASSACHUSETTS), TO 10,000 RESIDENTS OF MASSACHUSETTS IN SEPTEMBER 1962.

Recipients were selected from his regular mailing list. The results are based on a return of almost 37 percent. The Brockton Chamber of Commerce reproduced several hundred copies of the questionnaire on its own initiative and sent them to Brockton residents. This added about 100 returns to the totals.

Excerpt from Senator Smith's November 1, 1962, press release: "I believe all Americans would prefer to see our struggle for world peace fought in the U.N. rather than in Cuba or Berlin. This was brought out in a poll on the U.N. which I took in Massachusetts. Over 80 percent of those who replied said we should place major emphasis on the U.N. in our search for peace. A similar

number believed that worldwide disarmament, effectively controlled, should be a primary goal of our foreign policy."

Question	Yes	No	No opinion
1. Do you believe that the United States should or should not place major emphasis on the United Nations in its search for peace?	80.2	18.3	1.5
2. The United Nations has been having grave financial problems because some members have refused to pay their assessed share of its peace-keeping operations. Do you believe that the United Nations should or should not have some carefully limited but effective power to tax member nations?	92.4	5.7	1.9
3. Do you believe that one of the primary goals of U.S. foreign policy should or should not be the achievement of worldwide general and complete disarmament under effective international control?	80.5	16.5	3.0
4. As a means of assuring "effective international control" of any disarmament agreement, would you or would you not favor the creation of rules of law backed by a world court and enforced by legally controlled international armed force?	81.5	13.8	4.7
5. Our Federal system of government has made it possible for 50 different States of the United States to live together peacefully by delegating certain authority to the Federal Government in Washington, D.C. Would you or would you not support a federal system for the United Nations by which the member nations would give the U.N. constitutionally limited executive, legislative, judicial, and police authority in the area of disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes?	71.7	21.8	6.5
6. Do you or do you not favor the United States taking the lead in proposing measures to strengthen the United Nations in the face of a probable negative response by the Soviet Union?	87.4	10.1	2.5

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE UNITED NATIONS REPORTED BY THE HONORABLE JAMES ROOSEVELT (DEMOCRAT) OF THE 26TH DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Congressional Record, Jan. 23, 1962, page A405]

An attempt was made to hit all areas of my district, with no particular differentiation between men and women voters, or between Democrats, Republicans, and nonpartisans. Further, my office was more completely equipped with precinct rosters for what might be termed "conservative" areas of the district, than for the so-called "liberal" areas, so there is little doubt that, percentage-wise, "conservatives" actually got more questionnaires than "liberals."

Of the 60,000 copies mailed, approximately 11 percent, or 6,600 envelopes, were returned as undeliverable. This presumably left 53,400 questionnaires actually delivered into voters' hands. Of these, 7,521, or approximately 14.1 percent, were returned, which direct mail experts tell me is an extremely heavy return.

The questions asked and the percentage breakdowns of the replies are as follows:

Question	Yes	No
1. Do you think that the United Nations offers the best hope of keeping peace in the world?	84.8	15.2
2. Do you think the United States should continue its membership in the U.N.?	88.8	11.2
3. Do you think that further strengthening of the U.N. would be apt to advance the cause of world peace?	87.6	12.4
4. Do you think that the foreign policy of the United States should concern itself with attempting to achieve agreement on total disarmament under conditions of rigid international inspection?	85.6	15.0
5. If you do, do you feel that such inspection, and the rules therefor, should be administered by a world court, backed up by an international armed force adequate to enforce the court's rulings?	87.2	12.8
6. If you have answered these questions affirmatively, or largely affirmatively, do you think that the United States should propose such a program to the U.N., and to the world, regardless of the present intransigent position of the U.S.S.R.?	88.1	11.9

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RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR.  
(DEMOCRAT, OF MASSACHUSETTS), TO 10,000 REGISTERED VOTERS OF THE 11TH  
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Recipients were picked at random from voting lists and 1,790 replied making an 18-percent response. The poll was mailed out during February and March 1962 and the tabulations completed in May 1962.

Question	Number of affirmative answers	Percent
1. Do you believe that the United States should or should not be a member of the United Nations?.....	1,712	95.4
2. Do you believe that the United Nations has done a good or a poor job of maintaining peace?.....	1,419	79.0
3. In your opinion is there a better chance for maintaining world peace with or without the United Nations?.....	1,693	94.5
4. Do you believe that the United Nations should try to promote worldwide disarmament under effective international control?.....	1,621	90.5
5. To make sure that international control is effective, would you favor the creation of a world court whose rulings would be enforced against violators by an international armed force?.....	1,490	83.3
6. Do you believe that countries should delegate to the United Nations constitutionally limited powers for enforcement of international disputes?.....	1,458	81.4
7. Do you believe that the United States should or should not take the lead in proposing measures to strengthen the United Nations?.....	1,593	89.0

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY REPRESENTATIVE STANLEY R. TUPPER  
(REPUBLICAN, OF MAINE), TO ALL CONSTITUENTS ON HIS MAILING LIST FOR  
THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

The poll was mailed on May 29, 1963, and results were tabulated by June 26, 1963.

[Percent]

Question	Yes	No	Undecided
1. Do you regard the U.N. as the best hope for maintaining world peace?..	75.8	21.4	2.8
2. Do you believe the U.N. has been effective in maintaining a better understanding between nations during the past 18 years?.....	77.4	19.2	3.4
3. Do you believe that the purpose of world peace could be achieved through strengthening the U.N.?.....	65.9	26.3	7.8
4. Do you believe that one of the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy should be achievement of worldwide general and complete disarmament under effective international control?.....	69.1	26.0	4.9
5. Do you believe that all U.N. members should delegate to a strengthened U.N. constitutionally limited powers for enforcement of worldwide disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes?.....	71.0	23.2	5.8

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD P. BOLAND  
(DEMOCRAT, OF MASSACHUSETTS), TO 10,000 RESIDENTS OF THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Recipients were selected on a random sampling basis from telephone directories. The results are based on a 27-percent return between July and November 1962. Returns rose to 34 percent by January 1963, but the percentages remained

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almost constant. (The questionnaire included two domestic policy questions, also. Only those pertaining to foreign policy are reported here.)

Question	Affirmative	Percent
1. Do you believe that the United States should or should not be a member of the United Nations?.....	2,487	96.8
2. Do you believe that the United Nations has done a good or a poor job of maintaining peace?.....	2,161	83.7
3. In your opinion, is there a better chance for maintaining world peace with or without the United Nations?.....	2,462	96.4
4. Do you believe that the United Nations should try to promote worldwide disarmament under effective international control?.....	2,347	91.7
5. To make sure that international control is effective, would you favor the creation of a World Court whose rulings would be enforced?.....	2,332	88.6
6. Do you believe that countries should delegate to the United Nations constitutionally limited powers for enforcement of worldwide disarmament and settlement of international disputes?.....	2,133	85.1
7. Do you believe that the United States should or should not take the lead in proposing measures to strengthen the United Nations?.....	2,321	94.4
8. Do you favor support of an Alliance for Progress with Latin America, with financial assistance where necessary?.....	2,237	86.6

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. CLARK (DEMOCRAT, OF PENNSYLVANIA), TO 10,000 PERSONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, ON MARCH 10, 1962

These questionnaires were mailed to a random sampling of Pennsylvania residents taken from telephone books and spread throughout the State according to density of population. The questions are multiple choice and allow for all shades of opinion. Every effort was made to obtain results which would reflect accurately the thinking of the people of Pennsylvania.

Question	Number	Percent
1. Which policy do you think the United States should follow? (Check one):		
(1) Prepare to launch preventive war to defeat the Communists.....	73	4.55
(2) Continue to build up U.S. armed strength to maintain balance with or superiority over the Communists in order to deter or meet with force any Communist attack.....	384	23.96
(3) Maintain balance of forces with the Communists but try to negotiate arms control agreements with them to insure that the balance of forces is preserved and to reduce dangers of surprise attack.....	175	10.92
(4) Maintain balance of forces with the Communists but try to negotiate agreement with them to achieve general worldwide disarmament under adequate international controls (and a strengthened United Nations capable of keeping the peace).....	888	55.40
(5) Try to reverse the arms race by disarming in part now without trying to negotiate a disarmament agreement, and urge the Communists to do likewise.....	36	2.25
(6) Other (spell out).....	43	2.68
(7) Haven't made up my mind.....	4	0.25
Total.....	1,603	
2. Which policy toward the United Nations do you favor? (Check one):		
(1) The United States should withdraw from the U.N.....	52	3.26
(2) The United States should stay in the U.N. but place decreasing importance on membership, because the U.N. is too weak and divided to keep the peace.....	111	6.95
(3) The United States should continue to work through the U.N. as it does today and try to improve gradually the U.N.'s existing machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes.....	466	29.20
(4) The United States should attempt through amendment of the present U.N. Charter or otherwise to give the U.N. additional authority to prevent war by peaceful means, or by force if necessary.....	381	23.87
(5) The United States should work to change the U.N. into an International Governmental Organization of all countries with authority to keep the peace through a system of enforceable world law against aggression, binding on all nations and all people.....	538	33.71
(6) Other (spell out).....	41	2.57
(7) Haven't made up my mind.....	7	0.55
Total.....	1,596	

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Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Mr. Allen, you feel then that a \$30 million figure for 2 years will be a good investment when we consider the amount that is spent in research by the Department of Defense?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Allen, I have been interested in paragraph 3 of your statement, where you say that the organization you represent is not competent to make any comment on section 2. In the last sentence of that paragraph, you say "If it is desired later, I shall be happy to give the committee my personal evaluation of section 2 based on long years of experience in dealing with security clearances."

I know, during your many years of Government service, you dealt with this security problem many times. Would you care to give us your personal evaluation of section 2?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. I think all members of the committee will recall that the question of security in Government has been one which, for 15 years now, has occupied a great deal of time and attention. When the matter first arose, I was in the State Department. Later, in the independent agency, USIA, I had occasion to be concerned with this matter very frequently.

I certainly do not suggest that we relax in the care with which we concern ourselves with the security of our personnel. The recent experiences of the British Government in this respect show that one can be too lax concerning the security of government personnel. There have been some shameful experiences in other governments.

I am not certain, however, that even with the great emphasis we place on security, we can cast many stones, because we have had some most unfortunate instances ourselves. I suppose there is no absolute way of achieving 100-percent security, no matter how carefully we screen our personnel through historical background research, full-field investigations, and psychological tests.

Incidentally, we had some small measure of success in selecting new personnel in the U.S. Information Agency through screening by a panel of psychologists, although our decision to do so created a good deal of concern. I think we were making some headway, but the appropriation for this screening, was discontinued by the Appropriations Committee—I think mistakenly.

There was also some disagreement between USIA and the State Department on the subject.

There is no absolute security of personnel. When General Bedell Smith first took over the direction of CIA, a committee of Congress—perhaps this committee—asked him whether he thought that there might be any spies in the CIA. He said "I assume there are. I take it for granted that the Communists are trying to penetrate the CIA and I must go on the assumption that in any organization as large as this, they may have succeeded. I am going to try as best I possibly can, all the time I am here, to ferret out any that may be here."

In other words, there is no absolute security. The pendulum can swing too far. I had some ridiculous cases of people who were going to be librarians in Rio or Buenos Aires who were held up for 6 or 8 months for full security clearance. We lost applicants time after time who took other jobs rather than wait for our clearance procedures for positions which didn't require the strictest security concern.



I would argue for allowing Mr. Foster to satisfy himself and his organization, and this committee, that he has secure personnel, but I would not tie his hands with needless redtape which might prevent his being able to acquire the personnel he needs within a reasonable time.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Allen, you have had a very distinguished career with the U.S. Government. In my opinion, you deserve our commendation for appearing here today and presenting your opinions and statement.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to welcome you.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On page 3, referring to the amendment to Senate bill 777, section (31)(2), to add the words "United States" before "private," you state the reason why that section should be amended, and possibly the words "United States," taken out, is because information is necessary and cannot be obtained from domestic sources but can be obtained from private or public institutions abroad.

To what extent has ACDA utilized such information in the past?

Mr. ALLEN. I inquired into that same point, Mr. Zablocki, and was informed that the Disarmament Agency let a contract for some \$21,000 last year to a British firm for some kind of study analysis in the disarmament field. And it was that one contract, out of their \$10 million appropriation, which was subject to severe attack. I would expect that any reasonable director of an agency of this kind, and certainly Bill Foster is such a person, would be very limited in the number of foreign contracts he would let.

At the same time, we would of course be unduly nationalistic if we thought that we had all wisdom in the field of disarmament and national security. Every other nation, of course, is concerned with security. Every other nation is concerned that a relatively large part of its budget goes into disarmament. A lot of other people have been giving very serious attention and thought to this field.

It might well be that occasionally he could find experts or groups in some foreign countries who might be useful in his work. I think putting shackles on him by writing in a limitation that he can only make contracts with U.S. citizens is unduly restrictive.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It would appear that the reason for the Senate action may be some concern that the Disarmament Agency is becoming another CIA.

Mr. ALLEN. I was not aware of that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There is duplication of services in information gathering.

Mr. ALLEN. I see.

Chairman MORGAN. That one contract, Mr. Zablocki, that was let to an institute in England was for the study of the effect of disarmament on European security.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There was only one contract?

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Chairman MORGAN. One contract. A 6-month study. A figure of \$21,064.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, has the Agency produced evidence that that information could not be obtained except by giving the contract to that British firm?

Chairman MORGAN. I suppose that it is possible that the institution in England was more qualified to study the effect of disarmament on European security than any American institution.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Being advised of the contract that was awarded, I think I will privately look into it and see whether it was warranted.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.

Mr. BATTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I read the record of the debate in the Senate concerning the amendment that you have discussed in your testimony, that is, the insertion of the words "United States," it was accepted by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright, without debate. Perhaps Senator Fulbright had some information that is not available to you, sir, or to the committee at the present time.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. ALLEN. I appreciate your information. I was not aware that Senator Fulbright accepted that without debate or complaint. I simply do not know the circumstances under which that arose. I may point out that I am also active in a private voluntary group here in Washington, called the Washington Institute for Foreign Affairs, which is modeled somewhat on the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Our group here consists largely of former officials of the Government, both military and civilian, and prominent persons in the field of law and business and academic life here in Washington.

We are in close contact with similar organizations in other countries. One in Britain, for example, Chatham House, carries on a good deal of research and publication, and has a long and very good history of serious studies on international affairs of this kind. I can speak with some knowledge that there is a considerable body of highly intelligent information and analysis in certain foreign institutions.

The French have been engaged in studies on international affairs for a very long time. I don't know whether they might have anything of use in this connection or not.

I think we would make a mistake to shut our eyes to that possibility.

Mr. BATTIN. The contract that was awarded to the English concern was awarded to the Institute for Strategic Studies in England. The information I have is that the same type of institute was denied a charter in France and in Germany by the French and German Governments. Whether that had any bearing upon the insertion of the words "United States" I don't know.

Another question that I have, and again I would call for your opinion, don't you believe that some of the cost involved in the studies of the disarmament question should also be borne by some of the countries who will receive the fruits of any agreements or discoveries that are made in this field, such as England, France, Germany, and Europe, generally speaking?

Mr. ALLEN. I take it that similar studies are going on in certain other countries, particularly in Great Britain, and in private institutes—academic or otherwise—in France, Germany, Italy, and vari-

ous other countries. I know that one in Greece, for example, is quite active.

It might be well to have closer liaison and understanding between groups in the Western World active in this field. Joint projects might well be brought forward which would require joint contributions of funds. I doubt that the United States would be able to enter into such joint contracts if the limitation put in by the Senate were allowed to stand.

Mr. BATTIN. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson?

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Nix.

Mr. NIX. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is Mr. Everett Jones, representing the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church.

#### STATEMENT OF EVERETT JONES, GENERAL BOARD OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL CONCERNS OF THE METHODIST CHURCH

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. My name is Everett R. Jones. I am a mechanical contractor residing in Damascus, Md., and a member of the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church.

National security and world peace require the achievement of safeguarded disarmament. It is surely evident that an arms race which continues despite a test ban treaty threatens the possibility of an eventual explosion into war through accident, folly, or madness. The fantastic destruction that would come to our country, as well as to all Western civilization, lies beyond the imagination's grasp.

The only adequate defense that either side can now have against war is participation in mutual disarmament that removes the arms from both sides while safeguarding the national security of each. Arms, which have historically served as a source of security for nations, have now become a primary source of insecurity.

Whereas arms have traditionally been essential to a nation's defense, only effective world disarmament can any longer provide a really meaningful defense for the existence and welfare of our Nation. Whether the motive be high morality or the elemental matter of survival, all logic demands a massive effort for safeguarded world disarmament.

Congressional regard for national security in a world not yet disarmed would cause it to immediately reject any suggestion that the U.S. Department of Defense should be on a temporary basis. The increasing realization that arms at best can only buy time, and that national safety requires disarmament, surely calls for putting ACDA on a permanent footing.

Congress certainly should be reluctant to leave on a temporary basis any agency of Government whose existence and efforts are essential to

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the security of the Nation. Thus we hope that Congress will approve the bill giving permanency to the ACDA, in its basic original form.

One would hardly describe as vigorous a disarmament effort that receives only as much as 1 percent of the financial support given to the research and development of arms. Yet the \$15 million proposed for the 1964 work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency falls far short of that sum, being only about two-tenths of 1 percent of the more than \$7 billion budgeted for military research and development for the same year.

The carefully prepared disarmament plans being presented by the United States at Geneva reveal the valuable work that the ACDA has been able to perform on a budget that is minuscule in proportion to the gravity of its task. The broadened effort contemplated in the current budget request is heartening, but still falls far short of the massive effort that is needed.

Some important problems in disarmament will be touched only lightly under the proposed 1964 ACDA budget. For instance, substantial additional research should be done on the relationship of disarmament to the U.S. economy.

The economic benefits of disarmament should be documented, such as the reduced role of Government in business which would result in the restoration to free enterprise of the multitudes of businesses and millions of workers now dependent on defense expenditures from public funds. To give assurance that this can be done in a beneficial rather than a disastrous manner, models of conversion procedure from an arms economy to a disarmed economy should be constructed.

There should be an extensive exploration of the possibilities for strengthening health research, education, and other desirable programs through money made available to individuals and local communities by the reduction of Federal taxes which would result from disarmament.

Thorough research should be carried out as to the enforceable safeguards necessary if the disarmament system is to give each country assurance that, once it has joined others in laying down its arms, no other country can take advantage of its disarmed condition.

The public information of the ACDA needs to be stepped up considerably. The existing misinformation and lack of information among the American people is greater in the area of disarmament than in any other significant matter. Vigorous organized attacks upon the ACDA and upon the U.S. disarmament proposals are appearing with increasing frequency across the Nation. Gross misrepresentations and distortions are often accepted as truth by the public because accurate information is not easily available.

The ACDA budget should allow for factual briefings to be given for representatives from interested nongovernmental organizations. It should be possible for the ACDA to hold such briefing conferences on a regional basis, particularly in areas where misunderstanding and opposition is the greatest.

The public has not only a need but a right to be adequately informed on the developments in a subject so vital to their future.

To meet this responsibility of the Government for adequate information to the citizenry would require many times the sum requested

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for this purpose. Congress could take a significant step in that direction by increasing the amount presently asked.

As an illustration of a more specific need for information, the Methodist Church has recently embarked on an expanded program of disarmament education among its people. In the coming year it plans to hold many conferences and workshops, at local and national levels, on the problems and possibilities of disarmament. For this important work the church will lean heavily on the materials, and in some cases, the personnel which can be made available by the ACDA.

The Methodist Church, since its 1940 general conference, has steadfastly supported the cause of safeguarded world disarmament. In addition, the 1960 general conference stated:

We commend the President, the Congress and the State Department of the United States on their attention to disarmament, but we call for an expansion of efforts and staff to develop a comprehensive, safeguarded disarmament plan upon which to focus negotiations.

Members of Congress, acting in the interests of our national security and defense, which now require the achievement of lasting peace through an effective system of world disarmament, will surely want the ACDA to accelerate its work and will also want to provide funds adequate for that purpose.

We earnestly hope, therefore, that your committee will not only resist all efforts to decrease the requested appropriation for this Agency, but that in light of the importance of disarmament to our national security, will consider an increase in that appropriation.

Now that a test ban treaty has been signed, we need to prepare for every opportunity to make further progress in the area of safeguarded world disarmament, with full awareness that this objective will not only require adequate funds, but also demand many years of patient and determined effort to achieve success. To this end we urge affirmative action on the Disarmament Agency legislation.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Are there any questions?

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Jones, as a member of the Methodist Church I am not familiar with the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church. How often does this board meet?

Mr. JONES. This board meets annually. We have a 90-man board. I am a lay member. We are represented throughout the 10-million member church by approximately 45 laymen, 45 ministers, some of them bishops.

Chairman MORGAN. It meets annually?

Mr. JONES. Yes. We have still further committees which meet more often than that.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Jones, I notice on pages 3 and 4 of your statement you give a considerable amount of emphasis to pointing out that public information as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency needs to be stepped up considerably. I am sure you are familiar with the fact that the Senate put an amendment in the bill, and I want to read it:

None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda in support of any pending legislation concerning the work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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Mr. JONES. Not in support of the legislation, but in the program itself; that is, in the information concerning disarmament. I agree with the statement, that an agency ought not to support legislation to continue its existence. But the information which they have we need as a church; our people need it. I think this is not in support of the legislation as such, sir, as it would be in promoting a disarmament program.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.

Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jones, you say you think the \$15 million figure that is asked for should be increased. Do you have any idea what figure would be adequate?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. We are not technicians in this sense. We feel that a massive effort would require more than this recommended reduction that the Senate approved. We feel that this effort, if you are comparing a \$7 billion research program of arms production, that this is infinitesimal in comparison to that. It needs considerably more support.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have no questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin?

Mr. BATTIN. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Nix?

Mr. NIX. I will follow Mr. Zablocki's leadership. I have no questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Our final witness this morning is Prof. William Neumann, Goucher College, Towson, Md., representing the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Inc.

Professor, you have a prepared statement. You may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF PROF. WILLIAM NEUMANN, GOUCHER COLLEGE,  
TOWSON, MD., REPRESENTING THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR  
A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY, INC.**

Mr. NEUMANN. My name is William L. Neumann. I am a professor of history at Goucher College, Towson, Md., and I am appearing on behalf of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. My area of scholarly interest is international relations and I served for 2 years as foreign relations specialist for the Senate Republican policy committee.

Since the formation of nation-states there have been two contending theories over the best way to maintain peace. Both theories have had the support of great thinkers and both can cite many plausible historical examples in defense of their validity.

One theory holds that the way to preserve the peace is to prepare for war and thus intimidate all possible enemies by an imposing show of force. Sometimes this technique has been effective; at other times and occasions it has led only to a contest between states, each trying to outintimidate the other. The result of such contests is very frequently war.

The other theory claims that peace can best be maintained by easing the conflicts and tensions which create wars by diplomacy, mutual compromise and, if necessary, by some form of adjudication. Many wars have been prevented by these means; some have erupted despite diplomatic efforts at finding a nonviolent settlement.

Since neither theory has proven infallible, nations seek to follow both. Since 1945, however, and with due regard for the establishment of the United Nations, the major powers have devoted a major share of their national budgets and many of their best minds to only one theory, the idea of deterring enemies through accumulated force. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has devoted more than a small fraction of its military expenditures to the United Nations and to diplomatic efforts.

The creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was a unique step in the exploration of ways of maintaining peace without the use of military threats. The Agency's first year has not produced great results nor have its funds always been expended in the wisest way. But we would still call for a dramatic expansion of the work of the ACDA, an expansion which necessitates a larger staff and a more substantial budget.

I may say here that research is inevitably wasteful to some extent. I think you gentlemen who have had some experience with medical research know you may spend \$5 million and get no results, and then somebody comes along with a \$10,000 grant, and gets great results. You have to use the shotgun approach.

I am afraid this is the same way for research in the field of disarmament. You have to spend money because you don't know who is going to come up with the good ideas. Somebody will come up with some good ideas.

The lack of a permanent legislative status, budgetary uncertainties and efforts by some private groups to confuse the public about the Agency's goals have hindered its performance. The type of top-quality minds and capable administrators which the Military Establishment recruits for its important programs have been difficult to secure for an organization whose future is uncertain.

If this Agency was worth creating, it should be given the support it needs to achieve its ends. In a world in which the major powers spend more than \$14 million hourly in preparation for war, the United States ought to spend at least that amount yearly in support of alternate approaches.

Even in military circles it is beginning to be recognized that the deterrent theory in an age of nuclear weapons is reaching a point of decreasing utility. Secretary of Defense McNamara made this point in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

I cannot allege that the vast increase in our nuclear forces, accompanied as it was by large increases in Soviet nuclear stockpiles, has produced a comparable enhancement in our security \* \* \*. It is clear that the absolute growth of Soviet

capability to inflict damage on the United States has narrowed the range of contingencies in which our nuclear deterrent is credible.

The alternative is disarmament and expanded and enriched diplomatic efforts. But the wildest enthusiast for disarmament will not claim that its achievement is possible in a year or two. The technical problems are great, the psychological, economic, and political problems are greater. As in the Military Establishment, the solving of these problems calls for a great deal of research and thought by the best of minds.

As an historian I can speak of how little is still known about the disarmament efforts, successful and unsuccessful of the past. In 1818 the Senate ratified a treaty with this Nation's major enemy, Great Britain, 3 years after an unsatisfactory peace—the peace of the Treaty of Ghent—after a bitter war in which this Nation's Capital was occupied by the enemy. That treaty began an effort at disarming the Great Lakes border, but it only slowly became effective and expanded over the course of 50 years into a completely disarmed Canadian-American frontier.

There has been little recent historical study of this evolutionary case of disarmament directed at throwing light on the problems of the present. The same is true of the much misunderstood Washington Naval Limitations Agreement of 1922 which halted an expensive naval race between the United States and Britain. This same treaty gave our diplomats a period of eased tensions of almost a decade in which to work out the complex problems of conflicting interests with Japan in China.

The diplomats failed, but the treaty was a success in its limited objectives. It, too, deserves more thorough study, particularly since it operated without serious violations despite lack of any system of inspections or sanctions against violations.

These are only a few of the historical areas which deserve study as possible guides for future action. I need not enumerate for this committee, as previous witnesses have, the many economic problems which disarmament presents. Some of our most capable economists are confident that this economy can adjust to peace and even decrease our present level of unemployment. But this, too, requires careful study of the various areas of this country and of methods of reconversion to production which will meet the many unfulfilled needs of the world.

These are not answers which can be completely and finally worked out within the 2 years of extra life which the Senate bill has recommended for this Agency. These are answers which may take a lifetime to work out, but a lifetime of peace and lowering levels of nuclear threat.

The goal to which this Agency seeks to expedite progress is one on which all reasonable men agree. The existing obstacles are great. No further obstacles should be placed in the way of an authorization or budgetary nature which hamper this pioneering agency.

On behalf of my organization, I urge that you authorize permanent status and the possibility for major expansion of the work and influence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Neumann.

Professor Neumann, you don't mention the amount, but from reading between the lines of your statement, I think you recommend the full \$15 million requested by the Executive?



Mr. NEUMANN. Yes, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. You feel any reduction in the full \$15 million would be a handicap to the Agency?

Mr. NEUMANN. Yes, because as I said you have to waste some money to get results. There is no other way of doing it. Maybe you shouldn't even say "waste," in this respect, but you have to spend some money, as a military agency knows very well. You have to spend money in this area, too.

Chairman MORGAN. Professor Neumann, as a specialist for the Senate Republican policy committee you have had some experience here on Capitol Hill and you know the concern that Members of Congress have about enlarging agencies and that agencies grow too fast. You feel that the progress made so far by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and what is proposed that it do during the next 2 years is not the case of an agency that is growing too fast?

Mr. NEUMANN. I share with Congress the fear of expanding agencies. I think we are straining at a gnat over this little Agency. This is not one I am afraid that is going to become a gigantic agency. We have many expanding agencies that Congress could do something about. But I don't think this will be that important an agency.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Neumann.

Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You state in your opening paragraph that you worked 2 years for the Senate Republican policy committee.

Mr. NEUMANN. I served under Robert Taft and William Knowland; 1950 through early 1953.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. No further questions. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.

Mr. BATTIN. I was curious. On page 1 of your statement you say, "One theory holds that the way to preserve the peace is to prepare for war and thus intimidate all possible enemies by an imposing show of force."

Would you relate this to both the United States and Russia, or just to Russia?

Mr. NEUMANN. I think that is what the deterrent is supposed to do. It is supposed to deter Russia from taking any steps by an imposing show of force.

Mr. BATTIN. Assume then that Russia were to continue to build its force and we said "No, we don't want to." Then which one would gain the psychological and military objective?

Mr. NEUMANN. I think we have reached a very unique position in the history of the world where two nations are quite capable of deterring each other and are stalemated; that is, both can kill each other's population many times over, and therefore the concept of deterrent has reached declining utility. To know that the Russians can kill the Americans 5 times or to know that Americans can kill the Russians 10 times, to step that up to 15 times or 20 times I don't think makes anyone feel more deterred.

I feel deterred at this point. I know many people feel deterred. I don't know that increasing the amount of atomic power will deter us any more or the Russians any more.

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Mr. BATTIN. Continuing in the same paragraph of your statement, why you feel that history evidently would show that we have reached the point of intimidation, and the result in such cases is usually and "very frequently war."

Mr. NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. BATTIN. Would you say that the United States was prepared for war at the beginning of World War I?

Mr. NEUMANN. You are referring to 1914?

Mr. BATTIN. Yes.

Mr. NEUMANN. The United States was not prepared for war in 1914.

Mr. BATTIN. Would you say we were prepared for war in December 1941?

Mr. NEUMANN. I would say in certain areas fairly well prepared.

Mr. BATTIN. Would you care to specify?

Mr. NEUMANN. I would say in the case of the Naval Establishment quite well prepared; in fact if you look at the record the Naval Establishment received more money from Congress than they had asked. The Navy made some mistakes. They did not place great importance on aircraft carriers. That was not a fault of Congress. That was the fault of the naval men.

They did not use the money to the most satisfactory purposes at that point.

Mr. BATTIN. You are aware of the necessary appropriation procedure in Congress to build aircraft or ships. They must be authorized by Congress?

Mr. NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. BATTIN. The TFX of recent date is a good example. We just don't appropriate a sum of money and tell the services "You do with it what you want."

Mr. NEUMANN. No. To go back to the period that I know best, I am an historian. In the late 1930's actually the Navy said "We don't need any more money for aircraft carriers," and continued to build battleships, which as you know very well proved not to be of any great value. They had plenty of money. Their lack of preparation was due to misjudgment of the nature of World War II, rather than the lack of money from the Congress of the United States.

Mr. BATTIN. Wouldn't it be a fair statement, too, that it was the lack of the judgment of what Japan might do?

Mr. NEUMANN. I think it was a failure of intelligence, a clinging to certain traditional concepts which the military oftentimes do, and a failure to recognize that the world has changed. I think that is the same problem we have now.

Mr. BATTIN. Being an old Navy man, I recall they were building battleships right up to the end of World War II.

Mr. NEUMANN. If you look at the history of attempts to end the Cavalry Corps, you will see it more ridiculously, because throughout the twenties they said "We will need them during the next war. They will charge and rip up the tanks."

We have a long history of misjudgment in this area.

Mr. BATTIN. And it has led to catastrophe on the part of this country as far as its losses of men and money are concerned and not being the deterrent force that you say often leads to war?

Mr. NEUMANN. Yes. I don't think the United States has made such a catastrophic misjudgment as the Germans in World War II or the misjudgment that Stalin made on the eve of World War II.

We have made misjudgments, but they haven't been as great. It hasn't cost America the way it cost the Russians, as much as 7 million men.

Mr. BATTIN. Maybe we are better shots.

One final question. It is one I am sure you would care to clear up. As I read the record, you leave me with the general impression that anybody who disagrees with the position that you have taken and other witnesses have taken is unreasonable and uninformed?

Mr. NEUMANN. I don't think that is a conclusion. The goal which I refer to is a peaceful disarmed world. I think everyone wants a peaceful world. Mr. Teller has talked about the need for total disarmament, too. I don't think reasonable men disagree about the end.

We disagree about the means.

Mr. BATTIN. This is what we are talking about, living in a peaceful world. It is a question of how we arrive at that goal that seems to have some conflict in the country.

Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson?

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Neumann.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 12, 1963.)

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a.m., in room H-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning in open session for the continuation of the hearings on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency legislation. Our first witness this morning is the distinguished Member of Congress from the great State of Florida, a former member of this committee during his earlier tenure of Congress, the Honorable Robert L. F. Sikes.

### STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. F. SIKES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. SIKES. This meeting does bring back memories. In my first 2 years in Congress I served on this committee. It was a great privilege. I served with most of the men whose pictures adorn these walls. Sol Bloom was then chairman. Boyd Crawford was already the committee clerk, but of course a much younger man. It has been a long time, but I retain many pleasant memories.

The bill, S. 777, an act to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, contains new language which was inserted in the bill at the request of Senator Hickenlooper. It is found in paragraph (c), section 3, of the bill on page 3 and reads as follows:

Such section is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any policy or action by any Government agency which would interfere with, restrict, or prohibit the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms by an individual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education, or training."

This is similar to H.R. 6364 introduced by me as a separate bill amending section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

In the Senate at the time of the passage of the act, Mr. Humphrey had this to say about the language to which I have referred:

The amendment is self-explanatory. It is the committee's view that nothing in the original act would have authorized the Agency to deal with the question of individual ownership and possession of firearms. Since some concern seems to exist, nevertheless, in the minds of sportsmen and others, the committee

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recommends this amendment to the Senate to make the congressional intent entirely clear.

It appears on page 10240 of the Congressional Record of June 13, 1963.

It is my hope that this language will be retained in the bill if it is reported by your committee. This is language which has been urged by the National Rifle Association of the United States, by a number of sports magazines, such as Guns and Ammo, by powerful military, veterans' and patriotic organizations, and by many individuals. I have before me an editorial from the magazine, Guns and Ammo, which I submit for the record of the committee. The editorial is entitled "A Vital Bill Before Congress" and refers to my amendment.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection, Mr. Sikes, this editorial will be inserted in the record.

(The editorial referred to is as follows:)

EDITORIALLY SPEAKING!!—A VITAL BILL BEFORE CONGRESS

A year ago this month, Guns and Ammo initiated the right to keep and bear arms campaign with an editorial announcement in this column. One of the first articles to appear in the new department was a two-part series, authored by Fritz Samuels, analyzing Public Law 87-297, 87th Congress, H.R. 9118—an act which established the highly controversial U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Samuels interviewed the Honorable Judge Hilliard Comstock, a Superior Court Judge of California and past president of the National Rifle Association. He is currently the head of the NRA's legislative committee. Judge Comstock literally ripped into the Arms Control and Disarmament Act as a very real threat which could conceivably be used to virtually disarm the citizenry if the Federal Government ever chose to do so. The usually staid National Rifle Association recognized the potential danger to the private ownership of firearms and so stated in a resolution framed and adopted by the legislative committee. (Guns & Ammo, September 1962.)

G&A's two-part series really stirred the pot and resulted in a flood of mail to the House of Representatives and the Senate. How really effective Judge Comstock's critical analyses of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was became apparent when Guns & Ammo received a four-page letter from William C. Foster, the Director of the Agency and currently the U.S. representative on disarmament in Geneva. Mr. Foster took issue with us and with Judge Comstock. He had this to say:

"First, let me assure you readers that, in my capacity as Director of this Agency, I have neither the power nor the desire to confiscate or require registration of firearms owned by private citizens for sporting purposes. I am advised by my General Counsel that nothing in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act authorizes this Agency to take such action. As the article points out (G. & A.'s article—Ed.), the second amendment to the Constitution provides that 'the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.' No strained interpretation of the act—such as that of Judge Comstock—which violated this amendment would be countenanced by the executive branch of this Government or the U.S. courts. An amendment to the act such as you suggest, to preserve a citizen's right to bear arms, might cast doubts upon the efficacy of the second amendment and thereby tend to defeat the very purpose which you are attempting to serve."

The amendment to which Mr. Foster refers is one which G. & A. has felt should be included in the Disarmament Act and which would serve to specifically exclude private firearms owned by U.S. citizens for lawful purposes. It isn't that we feel that Mr. Foster and the Federal Government aren't sincere in their current avowal that the right of the citizens to keep and bear arms would never be infringed. There is no doubt that Mr. Foster and our present administration really mean what they say. However, what assurance do we have that a successor to Mr. Foster or succeeding administrations would feel as they do? What would prevent the future adoption of another amendment which would include the elimination or curtailment of privately owned firearms? Can

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Mr. Foster guarantee some 50 million gun owners in the United States if the issue came before the Supreme Court that, in the absence of a specific clause excluding privately owned firearms, the justices would not rule against the "right to keep and bear arms"?

The right we enjoy today is too precious to take any untoward chances with. The private ownership of firearms is the hallmark of a free people. We intend to keep it that way.

Now it seems that some Members of Congress feel as we do. So much so, in fact, that Congressman Robert L. F. Sikes, Florida Democrat, recently introduced a short but terribly important bill numbered H.R. 6364.

Mr. SIKES. Insofar as I can determine, Mr. Chairman, there is no opposition to the amendment. In a letter addressed to the chairman by Mr. William C. Foster, it is stated that:

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has no objection to such an amendment, but believes it unnecessary.

Now it may be unnecessary, Mr. Chairman, just as insurance on property may be unnecessary, but it sometimes is a very useful thing to have. You may have a building that you consider fireproof and then should a fuel oil truck overturn against the side of the building, or should there be a short circuit in the electric system, or should a firebug with incendiaries get loose in the neighborhood, you find that you no longer have a fireproof building. Then you wish you had insurance, but it is too late. Such an eventuality could happen in this case and I believe the language will be a very useful protection to have.

As the committee well knows, the content of the legislation and the executive policy on the subject of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have generated much publicity and reaction throughout the country. Many patriotic organizations and individuals have been highly critical of the purposes and scope of the Disarmament Act. The general grounds for criticism have been that the implementation of this law would place the United States in a dangerous political, economic, and military position vis-a-vis the Communist bloc.

There is a great deal of public apprehension over the prospect of leaving our defenses to the U.N.

The language, temper, and range of the act are idealistic and broad. Certain perhaps unintended consequences could conceivably flow from the carrying out of its existing provisions, and such consequences would negate one of our most cherished rights. This right is the possession and use of firearms by the law-abiding private citizen.

Thousands of Americans who own and enjoy firearms for defense and sport strongly feel that the continuation of this ownership and enjoyment is seriously threatened by the vague language and administrative interpretation of the disarmament statute. Assurances of the Director and other officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have not dispelled this fear.

I believe there is substance to the apprehension of our citizens. The all-encompassing nature of the law and Agency pronouncements thereon speak for themselves. In order to make absolutely clear that the Arms Control and Disarmament Act does not include the elimination of private firearms as part of the proposed disarmament program, I support the amendment adopted by the Senate and covered by my bill on this subject.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Sikes.

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Mr. Sikes, I want to assure you as the chairman of the committee that during the markup of the bill I will support this amendment. During the testimony of the Director of the Arms Control Agency he was asked about this amendment and indicated that he had no objection. It will have my support when we mark up the bill.

Mr. SIKES. That is very reassuring.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. GROSS.

Mr. GROSS. I commend the gentleman from Florida for his statement and for this support of this amendment. I certainly support it. I would say to him and to others of like mind that this will be a continuing fight if Mr. Foster and others of his persuasion get what they are seeking now, an international police force. They will try to disarm every citizen of this country, if the police force is to be operated through the United Nations or any other form of one-world government.

This is their aim. This is their desire, to create a one-world situation. I don't agree with it at all. As long as I am around here I will certainly—

Mr. SIKES. The public is genuinely disturbed about that prospect and I think overwhelmingly supports this measure of protection.

Mr. GROSS. I certainly do. I thank the gentleman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Sikes.

(The following article from Sports Afield, August 1963, has been submitted by Mr. Sikes for inclusion in the record at this point:)

BLUEPRINT FOR PEACE—A THREAT TO GUN OWNERSHIP?

(By Pete Brown)

Is the American Government about to sell the second amendment (right to bear arms) for a doubtful peace? Here are the grim, hidden facts:

Are the 30 million private American gun owners a threat to peace and security in this country—or the world?

Yes; under certain conditions this is entirely possible. There is little doubt that this possibility of a threat was fully intended by those States, of the original 13, which insisted on adoption of the first 10 amendments of the U.S. Constitution. We can be forever thankful that some of the original States were very suspicious of unbridled government power and demanded that these amendments, later to be known as our Bill of Rights, be passed as soon as possible after the establishment of the Government to be formed under the Constitution.

Of course our response to the words "peace" and "security" depends on our understanding of these two terms. Peace and security do not mean the same to all people. To the growing cult of mildness, peace means simply freedom from the threat of war. We can have this brand of peace any time we seek it. All we have to do is surrender our sovereignty and our capacity for self-defense, and thereby throw ourselves on the mercy of the powers that be. Security, to some people, means being taken care of from cradle to grave. These people generally reason that an all-powerful Federal Government is best qualified to take on this responsibility. We can get this kind of security at any time by merely surrendering our liberties. Those who seek the power to impose their will on the majority are only too happy to assume full responsibility for the peace and security of others. Naturally, those who relinquish their responsibility are expected to surrender their capacity to disturb the "peace." Not too long ago we had an offer to "bury us," and I'm quite sure it was intended that this service be rendered entirely free of charge.

Although a kind of peace and security is always easily and instantly obtainable, the conditions have always been repugnant to the vast majority of the American people. We are endowed with a heritage which inspires us to fight—if necessary—to preserve our national sovereignty and our individual liberties. Need I point out the fact that without forefathers, friends and relatives willing to die for this cause—as many have—we would not enjoy our liberties today?

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Yes, I think we can say quite definitely that 30 million gun owners are a threat to a peace and security which involves surrender of our liberties or a surrender of our Government of the people, by the people, for the people.

Most of our Founding Fathers who were responsible for our Constitution were learned men. They were aware of the poisoning influences which seeped into the Roman Empire and brought about its fall. They knew that a nation of people not ready and willing to fight its own battles is effete. They themselves were fresh from one of freedom's greatest struggles, and they were satisfied that the government of a free, self-governing people has no reason to fear its own citizens. They know that citizens experienced in the use of firearms add strength which only a nation of free people can muster.

DICTATOR STATES DON'T DARE ALLOW THEIR CITIZENRY TO BEAR OR EVEN TO KEEP ARMS

By the same token, our Founding Fathers were apparently fully aware of the fact that the government of an oppressed people does fear its subjects. That, in a nutshell, is a very good reason for there always being a right to keep and bear arms—our second amendment. Lose our second amendment, or pervert its meaning, and it will signal our downfall as a great nation—the bastion of freedom.

The legislative attempts at outlawing guns can be dealt with by an alert people, and wrong-way legislation can be corrected; but there is an entirely new threat looming big in the form of a disarmament treaty proposed by our Government. If accepted, it would leave us powerless to act. The decisions relative to whether or not we can have guns and the conditions under which we will be permitted to use them—if at all—will not even be made by our Government. These decisions will be made by representatives from various countries, including enemy powers. It also appears that we would have foreign inspectors in this country to see that the conditions imposed on us are enforced. Our only recourse as a nation will be through the World Court. The World Court consists of 15 judges, of which one may be an American. The other 14 will be from various countries, including enemy countries. Can we expect them to be sympathetic to our cause? Does this sound like a pretty package? It is not exaggeration. Unless you have studied the provisions of the proposed treaty, you don't know the half of it. It is far worse than I've been able to reveal in a few words.

REPLACING THE WORD "POLICE" WITH THE WORD "PEACE" REALLY DOESN'T  
CHANGE ANYTHING

The treaty outlines a three-phase disarmament plan. All parties to the treaty would agree to do away, for all practical purposes, with their entire military forces and all armaments within a period of something over 6 years. The only military force, as such, remaining would exist only to be placed at the disposal of a United Nations command. This would be called a peace force. As the treaty puts it, by the final stage of the plan: "Parties to the treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing." There are vague provisions for retaining armaments for forces which parties to the treaty would be permitted to retain to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of their citizens. Dictator states don't dare permit an armed citizenry. Is it likely that the administrators of the proposed treaty would permit U.S. citizens to have weapons?

The United States presented this treaty, referred to as an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, at the 17-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Reports coming out of Geneva would indicate that the negotiations are concerned with nuclear weapons only, but this by no means reflects the thinking behind the entire disarmament picture as revealed in the treaty proposed by our Government.

The provisions of the treaty are found in a seldom-mentioned Government publication "Blueprint for the Peace Race—Outline of the Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." It is U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 4, General Series 3, released in May 1962. It has been available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.—price, 30 cents.



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The basic provisions outlined in this treaty were presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations by President Kennedy on September 25, 1961. This was just 2 days after the Congress had approved the Disarmament Act establishing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, now headed by William C. Foster.

## AN EFFICIENT REGISTRATION OF WEAPONS MAKES CONFISCATION AN EASY AND RAPID PROCEDURE

The fact that this treaty proposes that we do away with our entire Military Establishment and place ourselves militarily at the mercy of a world order means surrender of our national sovereignty. It would seem that such a drastic, historymaking proposal by our own Government would be top news. But it has had very little mention in the press or on the air. The long silence regarding the terms of this treaty is, I think, one of the most baffling mysteries of our time.

As late as April 5, 1962, about 6 months after the President presented the disarmament plan to the United Nations, even key Senators in the U.S. Senate stated that they had no knowledge of the plan. A colloquy on the floor of the Senate, as recorded in the Congressional Record for April 5, 1962, reveals this very clearly.

Some Members of Congress have since indicated that this treaty does not include sporting weapons. It doesn't mention sporting weapons specifically—nor does it exclude them. It would be exceedingly naive to expect specific mention of sporting weapons. However, if you read the treaty, you can see that these can easily be included after the treaty is put into force. But from that time on, an aroused American public won't mean much. The treaty does refer to *all* armaments, with certain exceptions for what is apparently a police force. "Subject to agreed requirements for nonnuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the parties to the treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of stage II." We'll be told that sporting weapons are not included in the treaty terms. Then try to get sporting weapons (carefully defined) excluded, and see how far you get.

As soon as the proposed treaty is agreed upon, ratified by the Congress and put into force, the International Disarmament Organization would be established to function within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with the terms and conditions of the treaty.

After a careful reading of the terms of the treaty, it becomes apparent that it makes little difference whether sporting weapons are mentioned or not. If the International Disarmament Organization decides to include them, they can do it. There are provisions for amending the treaty and/or adopting rules for implementing the broad terms of the treaty. As a Nation, we have only one vote in the matter. As a Nation, our only recourse is to the World Court, where, at present, we have only one vote—not as a Nation, but a vote cast by 1 United States-appointed judge out of 15 sitting on the World Court.

As individual citizens, we would have no recourse, because our elected representatives, once the treaty is signed, have no voice in disarmament matters, and it appears that our courts would have no jurisdiction. The disarmament treaty would spell the end of the Connally reservation. This reservation consists of six little words "as determined by the United States." When the United States accepted jurisdiction of the World Court in 1946, we excluded disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. By the Connally reservation, we also reserved the right to determine whether or not a dispute is within our domestic jurisdiction. We might point out that the Communist nations have not accepted the World Court, and there are other Western nations which have also placed restrictions on acceptance of the court's jurisdiction.

A careful reading of the disarmament treaty also reveals that we will be under the surveillance of a foreign "Peace Observation Corps" and policed by a foreign "Peace Force." The individual citizens of this country will have no control over these peace cadres. They will constitute an international gestapo. Let's face it; replacing the word "police" with the word "peace" in the names of these organizations doesn't really change a thing—another subterfuge.

There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution which allows for this sort of thing, but there is reason to fear that the Supreme Court, citing article VI, section 2

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of the Constitution, will decide that treaties supersede the Constitution. If we are not intent on upholding the Constitution, and wish to circumvent it, then I suppose the treaty route is the quick and easy way to do it. If this is our Government's decision, even if we offer no protest, let's at least go into it with our eyes wide open. Our Bill of Rights will no longer have any meaning—least of all the second amendment, guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms. Surrender our military forces, our armament, and our sovereignty, and we are heading up a one-way, dead end street. After all of the blood that has been shed to gain and protect our freedoms, why should we now offer them up on a silver platter as a sort of sacrifice to the United Nations? Do we have the right to subject future generations to possible untold misery and possible enslavement because we have surrendered their sovereignty and destroyed their means of protection?

Now, if we disband our military forces, and destroy all of our armament—except what we turn over to the command of the "Peace Force"—who will then be the guardians of our liberties? Perhaps this deserves looking into. The United Nations Security Council directs the U.N. military actions, and I presume that this will also be the case with the U.N. "Peace Force." I wonder how many people know that since the beginning of the United Nations, the Undersecretary for Political and Security Council Affairs has always been a Russian?

1946 to 1949, Arkady S. Sobelov, U.S.S.R.

1950 to 1953, Konstantine Zinchenko, U.S.S.R.

1953 to 1957, Ilya Tchernyshev, U.S.S.R.

1957 to 1960, Anatoly Dobrynin, U.S.S.R.

1960 to 1962, George O. Arkadev, U.S.S.R.

1962 to 1963, Eugeney D. Kiselev, U.S.S.R.

1963, Vladimir Suslov, U.S.S.R.

Instead of simply standing ready to go on the defensive, the American people should be demanding the repeal of some objectionable and useless legislation now on the books. At the Federal level, let's take a look at the National Firearms Act. This act is another subterfuge. It is a tax act, but its real purpose was to prevent criminals from obtaining gangster weapons. The so-called gangster weapons include fully automatic weapons, shotguns with barrels less than 18 inches, rifles with barrels less than 16 inches, altered shotguns or rifles with an overall length less than 26 inches, pistols with shoulder stocks and silencers. This act has caused legitimate gun users and gun collectors much inconvenience and many headaches. After I tried, unsuccessfully, to ascertain the number and the nature of convictions under the act, I have concluded that the act has done little or nothing in the way of curbing crime. I am informed by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Department that the only figures available show seizures and arrests. The figures they sent me do not reveal the number of convictions. Why not get rid of the tax act and deal directly with the criminal, as was indirectly intended?

We might ask the same question concerning the Federal Firearms Act. This is an act to regulate interstate traffic in firearms, but it was designed to deny the criminal lawful access to firearms. This act is of little, if any, concern to the criminal, but it does cause the sportsman and dealer inconvenience and some anxiety. Both acts are good cause for anxiety—for the reason that the Internal Revenue Department, administrator of the act, has the power to make regulations for administering it. In 1957 this bureaucratic power to make regulations was exercised, and regulations which would have worked a real hardship on sportsmen and dealers, even concerning the purchase of ammunition, pretty nearly got by the American public. An alert dealer happened to spot the advance notice of these regulations in the Federal Register. He sounded the alarm. Dealers and sportsmen throughout the country rallied to the cause, and another objectionable bit of legislation was given the heave-ho. The matter shouldn't have ended there. The power to make law by bureaucratic fiat has no place in our form of government. This power should be removed, and I don't know of a better way to do it than to shoot at getting the acts repealed entirely. If anyone can prove any real merit in these acts, perhaps it can be preserved in new legislation which is directed squarely at the real problem—the criminal, not the gun.

Sometimes even legislative action at the Federal level slips by. In 1961 a bill was written to strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, and this bill was passed.

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The significance of this bill was not recognized at first and even received some support from the sportsman's corner.

Among other things, the Federal Firearms Act before the 1961 change prohibited the shipment of firearms in interstate or foreign commerce to or by a felon (convicted of a crime of violence), a fugitive or a person under indictment for a crime of violence. A crime of violence is defined as murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, assault with intent to kill, commit rape or rob, assault with a dangerous weapon or assault to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year. This regulation, as it stood, was not readily abused, because it is not too easy to trump up a charge of a crime of violence.

However, the 1961 bill amended the act to eliminate the term "crime of violence" and inserted in lieu thereof the words "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year." It is doubtful that this change will do one particle of good in curbing crime. It does open up the possibility of abuse of the act. There are numerous things for which a person can be indicted and for which punishment involves imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year. Revenue agents may, for example, have a dealer indicted for selling a certain collector's item which the agents claim is illegal, or perhaps indicted for something in connection with his income tax. Let's assume that there is no idea of convicting the dealer, but while he is awaiting trial and a verdict, he is prevented from shipping or receiving firearms in interstate commerce. This could work such a hardship on this dealer that it could put him out of business without his ever having had a trial. This new amendment makes it possible to use the act as a threat of harassment and nothing more. It's another subterfuge and avoids coming to grips with the real problem—the criminal.

Has the second amendment outlived its purpose? Is it out of place in our modern society? Of course not; there has never been a greater need for the second amendment. Stand before a globe of the world, turn it slowly, and look at the countries which have fallen to tyranny since World War II. They comprise a vast area of the globe's surface, and their boundaries confine millions of people who have lost their liberties.

Why have so many nations fallen, and why have the suppressed people not been able to gain or regain their freedoms? The reasons may not be quite the same in every case, but these people in every case most certainly lacked either the power or the will to resist the takeover. We won't explore all the reasons, but it is axiomatic that compulsory registration of sporting and protection weapons preceded their downfall. Please note that I said registration preceded their downfall. Registration doesn't necessarily lead to downfall. However, an efficient registration of weapons makes confiscation a very neat, easy, and rapid procedure. And when this confiscation takes place, it is for one reason only. The citizens have lost or are about to lose their freedoms. The government—be it their own or a government imposed by outside influence—feels that it has good reason to fear the governed.

Of course people will argue that weapons must be registered or confiscated to curb crime.

In the first place, individual citizens in the past have been responsible for the taking of a large percentage of criminals. A study made in Chicago several years ago revealed that 45 percent of the criminals killed while committing a crime were killed by "unofficial self-defenders."

I'm not aware of any more recent comparative figures, but I suspect that the percentage of criminals taken by private citizens has been drastically reduced. The trend has been toward discouraging people from defending themselves. It seems that if a person is so rash and undisciplined as to attempt self-defense, he had better be in a position to prove that he was unsuccessful in an attempt to run from his assailant. (A knife in the back is generally accepted proof.) I've actually seen where authorities have advised people to submit to whatever abuse or indignity is demanded and then scream for the police.

The trend has also been toward making it more and more difficult for the private citizen to have a gun readily available for self-defense. The American citizen is thereby frequently denied the weapon which, under certain circumstances, would be the most effective means of protecting himself and his family. This denial, of course, tends to give the criminal a tremendous advantage. Legislating against the gun rather than the culprit can successfully remove guns from the hands of law-abiding people, but it is mighty difficult to prevent the criminal from getting a gun. This has been demonstrated in New York

State, where they have the disarming Sullivan law. Even young punks are able to fashion handmade guns. These guns don't look like much, but at close range they are just as deadly as the most expensive gun money can buy. If some nervous thug puts a gun in my ribs, I'd prefer it to be a regular factory-made gun. While I'm deciding my next move, I'd hate to contemplate the uncertain mechanism of a crude, handmade zip gun. I wouldn't gamble on its not working, but on the other hand it might be a trifle too sensitive in the hands of some hopped-up twerp with trigger-finger twitch.

There is only one way to stop crime with guns, and that is to make it very tough on those who use a gun in the commission of a crime. It is doubtful that this will prevent crime. Let's not forget that there are such things as knives and all sort of everyday instruments which are silent, practically impossible to trace and very deadly. I detest the idea of having someone hacking at me with a knife. I even protested having my tonsils removed.

Try to outlaw all weapons—impossible. Legislating against inanimate objects is no substitute for dealing directly with the individual. We have an obligation to teach our young people responsibility and self-discipline. Failing this, we have no choice but to be tough on those convicted of criminal activity. We can deal severely with the criminal and still make every attempt to get him back on the right track. With severe and fair treatment, we would certainly discourage new entries, and perhaps make possible the quicker rehabilitation of the habitual offenders.

How about the police? Do they recommend the registration and outlawing of guns? Sure, you can find some police authorities favoring the outlawing of guns. I don't know of any police who do, but I haven't really been looking for them. There are a lot of police I know who favor private ownership of firearms.

The National Police Officers Association of America and the National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., recently signed a joint resolution. I won't repeat every "whereas" and "be it further resolved," but here are enough to indicate the feeling of the National Police Officers Association of America :

"Whereas the beginning history of our Nation was written and our sovereignty assured by the heroic sacrifice of volunteer riflemen, adept in their use and armed by their own personal weapons ; and

"Whereas the professional military forces of our country have through the conflicts of the past relied upon trained citizen soldiers who were capable in the use of firearms ; and

"Whereas it is reasonable to believe that a capable and well-armed citizenry, as a potential backup to our regular forces, could well deter an aggressor from our shores and effectively assist in interdicting the enemy's progress, should he effect a bridgehead ; and

"Whereas restrictive antigun laws do not succeed in disarming the criminal, but do disarm the law-abiding citizen, thus denying the law-abiding citizen effective self-defense, as well as jeopardizing his opportunities for training in the use of firearms and discouraging his hunting and gun sports afield. We, the undersigned, make the following statements for and in behalf of the National Police Officers Association of America and National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., in the best interests of all law-abiding citizens of the United States of America :  
Be it further

*Resolved*, That we now commend the prosecutors of the Federal Government and the various States for the vigorous action taken on their part in the prosecution of criminals committing felonies while armed with a firearm. And, further strongly recommend to the courts a continuance of the policy of strict enforcement of the penalties prescribed wherein a crime is aggravated by the use of a firearm ; and be it further

*Resolved*, That we believe that an American citizen of voting age or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, of whatever age, should have the right to legally purchase, without restriction, a handgun, rifle, air rifle, shotgun, or a like item, excepting fully automatic firearms."

We are accustomed to resisting what we consider misdirected legislation on local, State, and National levels, but now we are faced with international control outside the sphere of our Government, and this calls for a new awakening. Within the framework of our Government, even when we lose a round, there is always the possibility of changing the law. In the final analysis, the will of the people prevails, and in this we believe. With our background of freedom and self-government, we have confidence in the will of an informed U.S. public. The fact that our people do not seem to be informed about the general disarmament

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treaty proposed by our Government at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva is cause for alarm.

We feel sure that the American people, fully aware of what is involved in our Government's "Blueprint for the Peace Race"—a treaty on general and complete disarmament—would flood the Congress with mail protesting this instrument for national suicide. Our best hope is to keep in touch with our Senators and Representatives regarding this treaty and to let them know what we think about it.

Chairman MORGAN. The next witness is Franklin L. Orth, executive vice president of the National Rifle Association of America.

You have a prepared statement. You may proceed; sir.

**STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN L. ORTH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,  
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA**

Mr. ORTH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a distinct honor and privilege to be allowed to appear before this august body. As executive vice president of the National Rifle Association, I speak for a shooter-sportsmen membership of more than 570,000 individuals and over 11,000 affiliated clubs and associations. You will note the statement says 570,000. At the time I printed this that was so. It is now over 600,000. This is one of the fastest growing organizations in the United States.

Since the original association charter was granted in 1871, the basic objectives of the National Rifle Association have been to promote social welfare and public safety, law and order; to increase the knowledge of small arms and promote efficiency in the use of such arms on the part of members of law enforcement agencies, of the Armed Forces, and of the citizens who would be subject to service in our Armed Forces in the event of war; and generally to encourage the lawful ownership and use of small arms by citizens of good repute.

The association constantly directs its efforts into a program of activities which advance firearms safety education as a public service, marksmanship training as a contribution to the national defense, and hunting and shooting as wholesome forms of recreation.

The association is highly respected by citizens of all walks of life for fairness, logic, and a wealth of information and experience with respect to the lawful use of firearms. Our educational programs direct firearms safety throughout the Nation. Both our marksmanship training and hunter safety training programs are recognized as an outstanding public service.

The competitive programs for rifle and pistol shooting, both nationally and internationally, are receiving wide public interest with ever-increasing participation by military personnel, law enforcement officers, and civilians.

The National Rifle Association wishes to go formally on record in support of H.R. 6364, introduced by Representative Robert Sikes, of Florida, and referred to your committee. This bill would amend section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence:

Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any policy or action by any Government agency which would interfere with, restrict, or prohibit the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms by an individual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education, or training.

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Senate bill 777, to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees, includes the addition by Senator Hickenlooper to section 3 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of the wording quoted above. This bill, as amended, has been approved in the Senate. I urge that this amendment be retained by the House.

During the several weeks of legislative activity preceding the enactment of Public Law 87-297, which established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Rifle Association advised both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate of its growing concern that the title and content of that public law might give rise to a feeling among the general public that the possession and use of firearms by the private citizen could possibly be placed in a position of jeopardy.

As a result of our urgings, and others, the title was amended in such a manner as to better convey the real functions of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. However, such feelings of doubt and mistrust as to the functions of that Agency have become reality. Perhaps this has been brought about by the wide distribution of certain Government publications on general and complete disarmament, or because of a public disbelief of the value of any dealings with foreign nations on this subject.

Whatever the case may be, H.R. 6364 and S. 777 should, to a great extent, allay the concern of the citizen-sportsman as to any infringement on his lawful possession and use of firearms by any Government agency.

The National Rifle Association has long championed the importance of the citizen skilled in the use of small arms as an integral role in the defense of his country during times of national emergency. Of equal importance to the advancement of our national preparedness is the continual familiarization and practice with firearms during peacetime that can only be gained by experience and instruction.

Some people feel that there is a decreasing need for marksmanship activities in this day and age of nuclear and electronic warfare. In some ways the encroachment of organized society has tended to de-emphasize the importance of such training to the extent that man has, in many instances, sought other avenues of pleasure and recreational activities. This unfortunate circumstance has been brought about, in part, by somewhat of a reliance on nuclear weapons and devices as a deterrent to war or as a prime countermeasure to an attack on our shores.

The importance of the rifleman in this present age of sophisticated weaponry was highlighted by President John F. Kennedy during a visit to the Marine Barracks in Washington on July 12, 1962. Speaking before the assembled companies of the men of the corps, he said:

All of us, I am sure, 10 years ago, thought that the need for the man with the rifle would be passing away from the scene in the 1960's. And it is true that there are a good many Americans tonight who are stationed underground in a hardened silo whose duty is to watch some tables and some dials and a button.

But the very size and magnitude of these new, great weapons have placed a new emphasis upon what we call rather strangely conventional war, and they have made it even more mandatory than ever that we keep the man with the rifle \* \* \*.

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Thus, thinking men know that the awful devastation caused by nuclear explosives is something to be avoided or resorted to only after all other efforts of defense have been exhausted. Military experts throughout the world realize that "limited" warfare is the only means of combat short of nuclear involvement.

Military strategy of today emphasizes the small, highly trained, and mobile units of special forces capable of guerrilla-type warfare and combat-ready units able to be transported into action on a moment's notice. The dependency in such operations on the foot soldier highly trained and skilled in the use of small arms is a matter of basic military tactics.

Such skill in the knowledge and use of basic weapons is the reward of proper training of its user. Effective instruction in marksmanship must be conducted by capable coaches with individual instruction for each man while he is on the firing line.

No shortcuts, no substitutes have been found which would otherwise produce the necessary results. A civilian populace trained at leisure in the use of firearms during peacetime, whether by competitive shooting or hunting in the field, can be, and has been, a bulwark of defense of this country in periods of national emergency when time for such training is of the essence.

To deprive the citizens of our country of the tools for firearms training, whether for the purpose of national defense or for recreational activities, by means of an international disarmament agreement, would be tantamount to national catastrophe and suicide.

While the National Rifle Association does not feel that such a phase of disarmament is presently contemplated by the precise terms of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, we certainly subscribe to the intent and content of section 33(b), as amended by these bills, as a definite assurance of the prevention of such an action by any future administration or agency in its negotiations with foreign nations.

We urge this committee to vote in favor of the passage of these measures. Such action on your part will make great strides in our national endeavor to seek world peace and tranquillity, and at the same time will insure the lawful use of firearms by our citizenry, a use that has played such an important role in our national heritage.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Orth.

Mr. Orth, we have always appreciated the advice we got from the National Rifle Association in the past. I know I have received many letters from sportsmen and rifle clubs in my district on this matter.

I think we should have given a little bit more time and research to this matter when we considered the original bill in 1961. I know Mr. Sikes was very active with the members of the committee and on the floor during the debate and we are grateful for his interest.

I want to assure you again, as I assured Mr. Sikes, that in the mark-up of the bill which should take place in the next week or 10 days I will be supporting this.

Mr. ORTH. Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. I want to commend you as I did Representative Sikes for your support of this provision and say to you, as I did to Representative Sikes, that you had better stay on the job with your organi-

zation to see it is retained because it will come out if some people have their way.

This is not in any way to reflect upon the statement just made to you by the chairman, and his support of this provision. I am sure he will do his best to keep it in any future legislation, but there are those who will try to take it out.

Mr. ORTH. Thank you, sir. As you know, this association has strongly supported the Constitution, the second amendment of which gives the ordinary citizen the right to keep and bear arms. But this in one way or another is being watered down by interpretations of our courts. So that I feel that your statement is absolutely accurate, that we must remain on the job and we will be on the job.

Mr. GROSS. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to welcome a Wisconsin man before this committee. As a member of his very fine association and as a father who has a boy who is also a member, I have great confidence that they will remain eternally vigilant for the rights of the individual. I, too, want to give him the assurance that the chairman already has, that I will be supporting this proposal which you have presented here today.

Mr. ORTH. Thank you, Congressman Thomson.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Orth, speaking of Wisconsin, last week I spent a night at Superior, Wis. The day before I was there a black bear had walked into the lobby of the main hotel. I didn't have a rifle with me, however.

Mr. ORTH. You might have wished you had, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Orth.

The next witness is Mrs. Aileen Hutchinson representing the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

#### **STATEMENT OF MRS. AILEEN HUTCHINSON, REPRESENTING THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM**

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. You have a prepared statement. You may proceed.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you.

I am Mrs. Aileen Hutchinson of 3316 McComas Avenue, Kensington, Md. I am speaking in behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, U.S. Section, of which I am a member. I serve on the national legislative committee of that body.

The league was founded in 1915 and Jane Addams, an outspoken advocate of the causes of peace and freedom, was its first president. We have continued in her footsteps, supporting and working for those conditions, political, economic, social, and psychological, which can bring peace and freedom to the world through nonviolent means.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom urges this committee to grant continuing authorization to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by approving H.R. 3299 rather than the amended Senate bill which would restrict the Agency's authoriza-



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tion to another 2-year period. In the 2 years of its existence, the Agency has proved its right to exist as a permanent branch of our Government.

Without such an Agency whose personnel are concerned only with disarmament questions, the United States may not have taken the positive role in negotiation which has led to many breakthroughs in areas of agreement with the Soviet Union. At this time, after many years of deadlock, we have concluded a test ban treaty which is presently being debated in the Senate for advice and consent to ratify. This is the first real move toward world peace, and a signal to the rest of the world of our sincerity in attempting to find peaceful solutions to conflict.

In addition to its role in negotiations, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has authorized and conducted research which has added to our knowledge of verification, inspection, and other arms-control problems. The results of this kind of research can speed up the negotiation process and lead to further breakthroughs in agreement with the Soviet Union.

The league is particularly pleased with the intention of the Agency to expand its operations in the field of economics. We hope that with the adequate staffing of the Economics Bureau, the study of the economics of disarmament will be given the attention it deserves.

We need greatly expanded research in this area so that we can plan and prepare in advance for the conversion of our economy to peaceful uses when further agreements for disarmament finally come, as they must if human beings are to survive on this planet.

The league would like to see the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency given the standing and prestige within Government circles and with the public that its work in the field of disarmament deserves. The original supporters of the Agency envisioned it as providing opposing ideas to the almost overwhelming opinions of the armaments proponents.

It should be this Agency's function to voice the disarmament position continuously and persuasively with other Government agencies and with the American public. Members of Congress should depend on the expert advice of the Agency's staff to increase their knowledge of disarmament questions. It should stand on an equal footing with other agencies of Government.

Unfortunately, there are certain aspects of the mandate which created this Agency which seem to impede its effectiveness. Unlike other sections of the Department of State, the most stringent security clearances are required of applicants for positions with the Agency. The unnecessarily long wait for clearance deters many qualified people from seeking employment.

More important, this Agency should be seeking and attracting creative, intelligent people who are not afraid to voice their opinions in controversial areas. We suspect the Agency's clearance procedures either deter or blacklist the very people who have the most to contribute to the important work of disarmament.

The league also believes that in the area of public relations, the Agency has not sufficiently striven to inform the American people about its purposes and activities. This Agency is the logical one to conduct the educational campaign so vitally necessary to win public

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support for the administration's efforts in arms control and disarmament. We urge Congress to encourage the Agency's efforts in this direction rather than to impede them by crippling amendments.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in a strengthened position can contribute more effectively to the ongoing research, negotiations, and education necessary to reach further international agreements bringing about world peace for which we in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom have so earnestly worked.

The league affirms its belief in a world of peace and freedom under the rule of law. We hope that the U.S. Government will continue to support the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an example of the effort that all men must make to attain that world. Until all men have shown that they are willing to work together for peace and freedom, the world will never be safe from the threat of nuclear destruction.

Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hutchinson.

Mrs. Hutchinson, what is the total membership of the International League for Peace and Freedom? Is it a large organization?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. You mean nationally, not internationally?

Chairman MORGAN. Nationally.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I would say about 10,000.

Chairman MORGAN. Mrs. Hutchinson, your organization fully approves the \$15 million requested by the executive branch?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes. As I understand the wording of the original S. 777, which is the same as your H.R. 3299, that is, without the amendments—

Chairman MORGAN. That is correct.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. That is the one we approve of because we felt it gave continuing authorization to the Agency rather than restricting it to another 2-year period.

Chairman MORGAN. You feel the \$10 million annual limitation authorized by the Senate bill is going to be a handicap to the Agency?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. My understanding from what I have heard from the Agency people and others is that it isn't the money involved but it is the prestige involved in giving this Agency a continuing authorization rather than having it come back year after year to again have hearings and to again be authorized to exist.

Isn't that correct, when you put a limitation on it such as the amendment to S. 777?

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster testified that, if he received the \$15 million requested, the Agency could proceed with its research program and function very well. Of course, he said the \$10 million authorization granted by the Senate would cause him to cut back his program.

The Senate gave him a 2-year authorization, a total of \$20 million to take care of both fiscal 1964 and fiscal 1965.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Our point was the 2-year limitation, that is what we are opposed to. We would like to see it not limited to a 2-year period but be given in effect continuing authorization.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hutchinson.

Mr. Broomfield.

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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask a question relative to your statement, Mrs. Hutchinson. On page 2, you state in the second paragraph:

Unlike other sections of the Department of State, the most stringent security clearances are required of applicants for positions with the Agency. The unnecessarily long wait for clearance deters many qualified people from seeking employment. More important, this Agency should be seeking and attracting creative, intelligent people who are not afraid to voice their opinions in controversial areas. We suspect the Agency's clearance procedures either deter or blacklist the very people who have the most to contribute to the important work of disarmament.

Do you stand on that statement?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes. From what I have understood and from reading the act—we may have misread the act—that the original Disarmament Agency as it was in the Department of State, the staff on the original Disarmament Agency had to go through additional very stringent security clearances when they were set up as a new Agency.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. You don't think it is necessary that we should have stringent clearance before these people are hired?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Why wasn't it necessary when they were a section of the Department of State? Even looking at the Senate amendment here, apparently it went down even into contractors and subcontractors to the point where work was delayed and appointments were delayed over and over again because these people even if they had original clearances had to have new ones by the FBI and so forth. Is that correct?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. It may be. I am merely saying this kind of statement is what is going to be required. I am sure the Congress will insist on continued congressional review for this very reason. If you ever took this off, I am not sure what would happen. What worries me most of all is whether you are trying to break down the barriers for screening people in this particular area.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I understand the screening is more severe.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. So don't you think it is necessary to be more severe in this particular area?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I don't see why it shouldn't be the same as it is in other important areas of the Department of State or Department of Defense and so forth. If these people are supposed to be working on disarmament, which is a positive step, why should they be so stringently limited in who they can hire? I also notice this takes a long time, that the clearances take an unusually long time and some people who are qualified and want to work for the Agency can't wait for financial reasons.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would rather have you come out with a statement that you feel it should be improved as far as the procedures go, rather than letting down the barriers.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I didn't say that. I mean that it should be improved as far as the stringent ones that are now in existence.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mrs. Hutchinson, following on Mr. Broomfield's questions, do you know the difference of time between clearance of State Department and Disarmament personnel?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I heard it was something—of course, what we have heard from different people may be wrong, but it took up to 18 months to 2 years.

Mr. WHALLEY. For Disarmament. How much time does it take to clear State Department personnel?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I assume a few months. This is what I heard from people who were applicants or who knew people who were applicants.

Mr. WHALLEY. The principal items then you are talking about are a continuing authorization and also the clearance?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes.

Mr. WHALLEY. The continuance of the Agency and shorter clearance time.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, because of the fact that I think it deters qualified people who would be sincerely interested.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I don't recall that Director Foster made any complaint when he was before the committee about the slowness of security clearance in the organization. Do you recall any?

Chairman MORGAN. I think he testified that he had no problem in clearing the top people, but when he got down to the contractors and subcontractors he thought there should be some relaxation.

Mr. GROSS. If an emergency developed, the Secretary of State would have authority to waive clearance, would he not?

Chairman MORGAN. I do not believe there is any authority to do so under the original act.

Mr. GROSS. He has already used that right to waive clearance in the State Department, to my certain knowledge. I don't understand that this poses any problem with respect to the functioning of this organization.

Mrs. Hutchinson, why is it wrong for Congress to scrutinize this program every year? What is wrong about Congress looking over the shoulder of the Disarmament Agency and asking those people to justify all that they are doing—policy, spending, and all of that sort of thing? Why?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. The Congress can still do that, can they not, as they do with every other agency, and continue to scrutinize everything they do. It is your right and duty to do so. I understand as far as prestige and standing is concerned, when it has this sort of temporary status—

Mr. GROSS. Why do you ask it to be put on a permanent basis?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Because other agencies of similar standing are on a permanent basis, and because the question of disarmament is so crucially important, requiring continuing and careful negotiation that should not be interrupted.

Mr. GROSS. There are some that are not, too.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. This would not deter you from continuing to scrutinize that Agency, would it?

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Mr. GROSS. We have, it seems to me, a much better opportunity to scrutinize what they are doing if they come in here dependent year after year for their authorization—come before this committee. You say that in the 2 years of its existence the Agency has proved its right to existence as a permanent branch of Government.

What has it done to prove this right?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. We have before us right now the test ban treaty. Other steps have been worked on, and new ones will be necessary to reach further agreements, according to administration spokesmen.

Mr. GROSS. Do you think this was accomplished—for whatever it is worth, and I don't think it is worth very much—do you think this was accomplished by the Disarmament Agency alone?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I understand that all the top negotiators and all the people who worked on this come from the Disarmament Agency, yes—with the exception of the final negotiations—and they are continuing work in this research, in many areas that we are not too well aware of. In Geneva, in some other areas of this arms control, they have been able to reach agreements—over a long period and maybe very small agreements, but they have been able to make some breakthrough, in addition to the hot line between Washington and Moscow.

Mr. GROSS. It seems to me Mr. Foster was very much in the background in Geneva in this last business over there, this limited nuclear test ban treaty. It seems to me one W. Averell Harriman was the top dog over there in the publicity, pictures, everything else.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Harriman was not in Geneva.

Mr. GROSS. He was in Moscow, which I think is even worse, from the standpoint of negotiation of the test ban treaty.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. Certainly.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Who in the Disarmament Agency was in Moscow at the time of the negotiations?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I don't know. Our feeling is that the work in Moscow was a culmination of all that had gone before. You wouldn't get a test ban treaty if good, long, hard negotiation had not gone before.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Do you know of anyone connected with the Disarmament Agency who sat in on the negotiations in Moscow?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I didn't check it, so I couldn't say.

Mr. GROSS. You say this is the first real move toward real peace, this limited test ban treaty?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. You don't really believe that?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I really do. That is what I have been working for for many years.

Mr. GROSS. We have dumped much money down the drain on disarmament and peace offices, if this is the first real move.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. This is the first real conclusion we have made.

Mr. GROSS. So you want to give this Agency now \$10 million a year for a period of 2 years, \$10 million each for 2 years? Is this the bill you support?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Foster wanted \$15 million, did he not?

Mr. GROSS. You support the \$15 million, is that right?

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Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, on a continuing basis.

Mr. GROSS. That would increase them from \$6½ to \$15 million. They started at \$1,800,000 in fiscal 1962. They went to \$6,500,000 in fiscal 1963 and now they want to go to \$15 million in 1964.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Which is a drop in the bucket, sir, compared to the billions spent every year. We have to make that realistic comparison always.

Mr. GROSS. I don't know whether you own property or not, but you could probably break down the tax on your property into a few cents per foot. This business of "it is small by comparison with something else," can be big in its cumulative effect.

How in the world do you think this Disarmament Agency spends six and a half million on 205 employees? That is the number they had, on what they are pleased to call "on board," when Mr. Foster appeared before this committee.

How do they spend six and a half million on 205 employees?

They haven't put a penny in brick and mortar.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. They are subcontracting out to other agencies.

Mr. GROSS. Have you read any of the material obtained through those subcontracting out jobs?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I read one of the reports from Woods Hole which I thought was revealing on the problem of arms control and inspection.

Mr. GROSS. There is more drivel contained in some of these reports than I have read from any other agency in a long time. I am sure our opinions would differ as to the value of these reports. We got into a test moratorium in 1958, didn't we? Do you know how much we were spending at that time on a disarmament agency in this Government?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. We didn't have one. We only had a section in the State Department.

Mr. GROSS. All right. A disarmament setup. Do you know what we were spending on that setup in 1958?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GROSS. Between \$700,000 and a million dollars, as I remember the figures.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. There was no negotiated treaty at that time. That just happened to be a moratorium—

Mr. GROSS. What is the difference, whether it is a treaty, understanding, or agreement. The Russians will break it when it is their desire to break it. What is the difference whether it is a treaty or what it is?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. When a treaty or contract in any society, even with our own society, is desirable to both parties, they both keep it. If it is not beneficial to both, neither keeps it.

Mr. GROSS. It is just that simple?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. You know that from your own business contracts.

Mr. GROSS. Do you think we would break this treaty that we are apparently headed into now? Would you suggest that we break it?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I think I misunderstood you. No, what I am trying to say is that this treaty is obviously to the benefit of both parties concerned, or it would never have been consummated in the first place, that it is to our mutual benefit, therefore we will keep it.

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Mr. GROSS. If it is ratified by the other body, I hope it will be to our mutual benefit, but I am afraid it won't be. I am afraid we start off with a treaty that is loaded against the United States. So you think that we ought to spend money for studies such as those in the field of economics?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, very much so.

Mr. GROSS. We have a Department of Commerce. We have people studying economics, domestic and international economics, all over the map in this Government.

Why should we spend money on a disarmament agency to go into the field of studies in economics?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Because apparently the other agencies are not studying the specific problem of the conversion of the economy, which will be a great problem if we get disarmament in this country. We need those studies to make advance planning.

Of course, people who work in the defense industry will be considerably concerned about the loss of their business and about the loss of jobs, if we begin to get, as we hope we will, gradual arms control and disarmament.

You need to make those advance plans.

Mr. GROSS. You are real liberal with the taxpayers' money. I will say that.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I am not. I would love to see a cut in the defense budget.

Mr. GROSS. I imagine you would. How do you feel about the amendment that was discussed earlier in this session?

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. The firearms one?

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I think it is fine. These people are apparently optimistic because when it comes to individuals holding firearms it means we have won the peace. If this is all they are concerned about, it means they are quite optimistic about disarmament coming about.

It is a right in our Bill of Rights. As I understand it, it is to protect the individual against a tyrannical government. It is important to keep that right.

Mr. GROSS. I could comment on that, but I don't believe I want to get that deeply into politics right now. That is all for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hutchinson.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you for hearing me.

Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is John W. Wood, general counsel for the Liberty Lobby.

Mr. Wood, you have a prepared statement.

You may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN W. WOOD, GENERAL COUNSEL, LIBERTY LOBBY**

Mr. Wood. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Liberty Lobby is opposed to any attempt by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to secure either unlimited spending authorizations and/or establishment of the Agency as a permanent independent

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agency of the Government. It is our hope that your committee will recommend the adoption of S. 777 as it came from the Senate, which limits expenditures of the Agency to \$10 million for each of the next 2 years and continues the Agency only as a temporary organization.

S. 777 also contains the Lausche amendment which eliminated objectional language from the Disarmament Act and specifically spells out that only the Senate can advise and consent to a treaty. This amendment, as adopted by the Senate, we should also point out, covers a similar idea as expressed in House Resolution 83, introduced by Congressman Omar Burleson, which is pending before your committee, on which, I might add, we also support.

Liberty Lobby believes that the entire fiscal philosophy behind the Agency's request for the "use of all necessary moneys" cannot be justified by the use of any standard of business experience. If agencies can have this power, then it is unnecessary to establish appropriation committees and committees on government operations. With such financial power, each agency administrator could create an ever-expanding bureaucracy. The ACDA under this proposal might well become the grandest and most expensive example of Parkinson's law yet seen on the Government bureaucratic scene.

I must point out also that this unrealistic approach to fiscal power was recognized early in the deliberations of the Senate committee and a specific figure was readily obtainable from the Arms Control Agency. This suggestion was even cut by action of the Senate on the final vote and the Senate's version reduced the amount to \$10 million each year for the next 2 years.

We believe even this amount is too much. After all, under the previous authorization the Agency took 18 months to spend \$10 million. Now, under the Senate action, they would receive \$10 million for each of the next 2 years. Surely even this speeds up the Agency's spending rate tremendously. A cut down to \$5 million for each of the 2 years seems more reasonable.

A previous witness for the proponents of increased funds, evidently well briefed, stated that the Agency needs \$4 million for administration and \$11 million for research contracts. We humbly suggest that a more reasonable suggestion would be to give the Agency \$1 million for administration and \$4 million for research, and turn over most of the present research projects to the Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government who are concerned with our military posture and the political relationships arising out of this military posture.

The establishment of huge civilian research firms manned, not by men trained in military techniques and security requirements, but by theorists and writers not qualified by experience to delve in the esoteric knowledge of national security problems, has been seen with alarm both by portions of the public and by some professional military authorities. To use a popular word, Liberty Lobby believes the Arms Control Agency is guilty of creating the proliferation of these so-called experts on disarmament.

Peace is a commendable goal and all Americans long for it, but there are those who do not want to achieve peace by jumping at the first carrot offered suddenly by Mr. Khrushchev. Unfortunately, we have come to the reluctant conclusion that the heads of the U.S. Arms



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Control and Disarmament Agency are naive or woefully blind to the dangers involved in seeking disarmament agreements with the Soviets since it was just last October that the Communists almost pulled another "Pearl Harbor" via the Red missiles in Cuba.

Have our disarmament leaders already forgotten this attempted treachery by Mr. K.? Liberty Lobby thus believes that this is not the time for disarmament but for better national security measures.

If this be true, then there is no justification for such research in the name of peace but rather more should be allocated to the means of maintaining our national vigilance. We are for world peace, but not at the price of giving up some of the sovereign rights of Americans and we earnestly believe that if the general disarmament proposals which we offered at Geneva and which were the result of the research and work of our Arms Control Agency were adopted, we would lose some of these rights.

It is of fashion today for many to label those who believe in national sovereignty as "rightists" but all through the history of the 18th and 19th century America this same view, so different than the new "one world" view in sovereignty, was called national patriotism. Believing as we do in national sovereignty, we reject the basic proposals of the Disarmament Agency which would require eventual surrender of some if not all of our national sovereignty.

However, apart from these basic differences of approach to peace and national strength, we must realistically accept the fact that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is in existence. It is our hope that during the probable short span of bureaucratic life Congress will maintain vigorous control of its functions and administration.

Therefore, although we would prefer a more drastic curtailment of the Agency, Liberty Lobby urges your committee to adopt the provisions of S. 777 and reject all efforts which would permit either open-end financing or a larger annual appropriation during the next 2 fiscal years.

Also, although we recognize that Liberty Lobby's views on this subject probably do not reflect the views held by many on your committee, we do urge your earnest consideration of the arguments presented in this short brief.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Mr. Wood, in your first paragraph, second sentence, you say, "It is our hope that your committee will recommend the adoption of S. 777, as it came from the Senate, which limits expenditures of the Agency to \$10 million for each of the next 2 years." Down at the bottom of the page, after you make this recommendation, I see you cut that \$10 to \$5 million.

Mr. Wood. We would prefer \$5 million. If we can't get 5, we will take 10.

Chairman MORGAN. You make a recommendation up here for \$10 million, and, when you get to the bottom of the page, you recommend only \$5 million.

Mr. Wood. I suppose we thought it over when we came down the page. As I say, we would probably abolish the Agency altogether. But that seems rather unlikely.

Chairman MORGAN. I see you raise serious objection because this Agency is staffed by civilians instead of military.

Mr. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Then we should have a general as Secretary of Defense, according to your idea, instead of a civilian?

Mr. WOOD. As Secretary of Defense?

Chairman MORGAN. Perhaps we should dismiss Mr. McNamara, and put in some retired general?

Mr. WOOD. I could think of several generals; yes, sir, that I would like to see as Secretary of Defense.

Chairman MORGAN. Have you gone over the hearings on the original bill creating this Agency in 1961, and noted the military men that testified in favor of the Agency?

Mr. WOOD. I wasn't in Washington at that time.

Chairman MORGAN. Would you consider General Eisenhower a pretty good soldier?

Mr. WOOD. I think he is a good man.

Chairman MORGAN. I want to read his statement in support of the Disarmament Agency. Here is what he said:

While any progress toward real disarmament can be achieved only where the opposing sides genuinely pursue the ideal of peace, yet it is futile to speculate as to whether progress toward peace or disarmament should take priority in such effort. It is clear that they must progress in step-by-step coordination, as otherwise nothing will be accomplished.

He sent a letter to this committee strongly endorsing this statement. General Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, and appeared before the committee in support of the Agency. Many others submitted statements.

This legislation was strongly supported by the former Secretary of Defense during the Eisenhower administration, Secretary Tom Gates, who appeared here and testified on behalf of this Agency.

Mr. WOOD. You mean no military people appeared before your committee in opposition?

Chairman MORGAN. Not a single one.

Mr. WOOD. I have read some statements by various generals, ranking officers, in opposition to it. I don't know whether they appeared. I wasn't here.

Chairman MORGAN. Do you remember who the generals were?

Mr. WOOD. I remember General MacArthur, which I think is in my office, in opposition to the Arms Control Agency. I consider him a good general.

Chairman MORGAN. I consider him a good general. I am not aware of his statement. I would appreciate your mailing a statement of his views on disarmament to me.

Mr. WOOD. I will.

Chairman MORGAN. I have never seen any published statement by General MacArthur opposing the Disarmament Agency.

The vice presidential candidate, and former Ambassador to the U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, also appeared here and testified for this Agency in 1961. So I think both military and civilian, from both administrations, supported this Agency. There wasn't a single witness, as far as I can remember, that appeared against this Agency during the original hearings in 1961.

Mr. WOOD. Since they didn't appear—

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Chairman MORGAN. These are the first hearings that we have had since the original legislation was considered. I do not remember any witnesses in opposition at that time.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley?

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wood, how many members does the Liberty Lobby have?

Mr. WOOD. We don't call them members. We call them subscribers. They subscribe to our monthly legislative report. We have approximately 30,000 over the entire country.

Mr. WHALLEY. How do you know what to put in this brief, and who does prepare it?

Mr. WOOD. We have a research director who prepares a great deal of our material. He worked on this. We had some help from Mr. Stanley Andrews, who is Executive Director of the Americans for National Security. Our organization is primarily concerned in this work and—of your Mr. Burluson's resolution.

Mr. WHALLEY. 30,000 members. Is there a membership fee?

Mr. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. What would be your complete budget?

Mr. WOOD. For this year, it will exceed \$100,000. I am not sure of the exact amount.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. I would estimate \$110,000.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Wood, I think you are probably right in your last statement with respect to the money, more nearly right, let me put it that way, in suggesting \$5 million annually for this Agency. If I had my way, it would be shaved considerably below \$5 million a year.

Mr. WOOD. I would be happy to amend our record.

Mr. GROSS. The chairman speaks of the generals who testified in behalf of this legislation. I suspect that the generals are interested in arms control more than they are in disarmament. I will say to the chairman that the Defense Department is interested, 365 days a year, in arms control, the control of enemy arms. That is their business over there.

Chairman MORGAN. They are also interested in disarmament, Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. They are interested especially in the control of enemy arms. That is their business. That is why some of them object as strongly as they can without being decapitated to this so-called limited test ban treaty.

Chairman MORGAN. I can't agree with that. I do not believe that any general who testified on this matter did not state his own views.

Mr. GROSS. I have always wished we might have had some generals at Potsdam and Yalta—generals who would speak their minds. No one spoke out against the establishment of West Berlin as an island, isolated and strategically impossible of defense. I am surprised we had no generals there who would speak out in protest. Of course, we had one in the person of General MacArthur who spoke his piece about

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Yalu, the pursuit of the Communists, the conduct of the Korean war, and they lopped off his head; a Democrat President lopped off his head. So it goes.

They can go to a certain point—generals and admirals—and they quickly find themselves stretched out on the guillotine.

Chairman MORGAN. We had a great general in Europe at that time and he was elected President.

Mr. GROSS. That is one of the reasons why I, as a Republican, was not one of his most enthusiastic supporters. I am perfectly willing to have that on the record. He was one of those who didn't speak out, along with President Truman, in the final settlement at Potsdam, when and where we were outfoxed by the Communists to the point that it cost us a billion dollars to operate the Berlin airlift, and it has cost us heavily ever since because of that blunder.

I don't care to pursue that any further.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Wood.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock Tuesday morning.

(Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, September 17, 1963.)

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room H-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning in continuation of the hearings on legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. Our first witness this morning is Mr. Stanley M. Andrews, executive director of Americans for National Security.

Mr. Andrews, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed, sir.

### STATEMENT OF STANLEY M. ANDREWS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICANS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Stanley Andrews. I am registered as a lobbyist for Americans for National Security. My personal background includes work in both religious and newspaper fields, also 10 years in State government work, including a year as executive secretary of the Governor's Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy, followed by four and a half years as research assistant for a U.S. Senator. Since then I have engaged in public relations work.

I represent today Americans for National Security, which was organized and incorporated early this year to provide a means by which patriotic groups of all persuasions interested in national defense problems and a strong national defense system could be alerted to current issues in the field. We do not seek memberships and have relied largely on the good will of friends.

Up to now, our most important function has been to interest citizens and the Congress in the need for passage of the Burleson-Curtis resolution. As a byproduct, we recently generated some interest in amendments to S. 777 which were subsequently adopted in part by the Senate. We issue no newsletter and have printed only two items dealing with the Burleson-Curtis resolution. We work largely with various patriotic groups through correspondence and by contacts here on the Hill.

No one can quarrel with the administration's objective of seeking peace. This has been the quest of the last 25 years. We all want it for our children, but some of us do not want it on a "peace at any

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price" basis. We do not want it at the price of weakening or losing our own national security and sovereignty. This is the general philosophy of AFNS.

Americans for National Security is opposed to the administration bill which provides some \$15 million for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for each of the next 2 years. It is our hope that your committee will adopt rather the provisions of S. 777 as finally passed by the Senate, and which limits the expenditures of the Agency to the sum of \$10 million for each of the next 2 fiscal years.

We commend the bill adopted by the Senate since it does not make ACDA a permanent agency. It is our belief that the research work and the negotiations needed for any general disarmament plan can best be accomplished by and under the direction of the Department of Defense.

We would, incidentally, urge your committee to review and examine the type and need for the present and proposed research contracts of the Agency.

AFNS believes that efforts to seek peace are essential in the thermo-nuclear age. Those engaged in such a serious pursuit, however, should not be spending their time in efforts to build up a new Federal bureaucracy whose objectives are not even foreseeable in the next two decades.

We believe that such necessary research rightfully belongs in the custody of the men at the Pentagon who know best the military and economic strategies of the enemy and are indoctrinated with a philosophy of "winning."

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency evidently proceeds on the basis that an arms race inevitably results in a war. Actually most modern students of history will admit it is difficult to point to a single war that was a direct outcome of an arms race.

The Agency in many statements has talked about "world opinion and the need to satisfy the uncommitted nations." It has well been said that "security policies cannot be determined by a world Gallup poll." Instead AFNS believes that the United States instead of always adjusting to world opinion needs to take strong positions without seeking a momentarily widespread popularity.

AFNS believes this Agency is committed to types of unilateral disarmament under the guise of "economy" and that its research reports tend to build cloud castles of world government contrary to American traditions.

AFNS is also opposed to the adoption of the new subsection 45(b) as proposed. We do not believe ACDA should be granted a waiver on the provisions that research contractors must have a full-field investigation by the FBI or the Civil Service Commission before being allowed access to classified materials. AFNS firmly believes any agency concerned with the problems of peace and war, defense and security, should maintain the strictest type of preemployment investigation.

Actually, we hold that the Agency should be abolished and its research functions placed more properly in the Defense Department. Being realists, however, we accept the practical position, which is the reducing of the powers and functions of this Agency and the curtailment of a policy of fiscal irresponsibility which the administration bill would continue.

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An examination of the annual report of the Agency gives some little indication of the use of the Agency's funds for domestic propaganda purposes; that is, to sell the Agency and its objectives to the American public. Congress has always frowned on Government agencies using appropriated tax funds to "hard sell" the citizenry of the United States.

For the size of the Agency, it has exercised unusual public relations activity both in the Halls of Congress and in the various communication channels of the Nation. S. 777 recognizes this danger and a proper safeguard was adopted. This amendment was commended by Senator Fulbright.

We recommend your consideration of the language of S. 777 for all of the above reasons and for the additional reason that the Lausche amendment, which eliminated some objectionable wordage on the subject of securing the advice and consent of the legislative branch for any proposed treaties, is essential to maintain the necessary checks-balance system of our Government. This amendment contains similar language to the Burleson-Curtis resolution which is also before your committee.

For all of these reasons we urge your committee to accept the Senate bill as it comes to you, without changes, except for the security provision which we pointed out earlier. The security provision should remain most stringent since security of the Nation depends on these employees in a large part.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I reiterate our basic position. AFNS does not believe in the necessity of an ACDA nor any financing of such an agency, but since we recognize its existence on the bureaucratic scene, we believe its services can be better utilized by absorption of the Agency into the Department of Defense. We hope that in the future some further study of this suggestion may be made by those interested in national security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. Andrews, you say your organization is a recent one. Was it incorporated last year?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; this year.

Chairman MORGAN. Are you the head of the new organization?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Chairman MORGAN. How many members does it have?

Mr. ANDREWS. We do not have members. The organization was conceived by a number of people interested in this field and after we determined our position, which eventually became what is now called the Burleson-Curtis resolution, then we contacted various retired military men around the country, had them endorse it, and we have been working since on that basis.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Andrews, of course the Lausche amendment is already incorporated in S. 777.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right; we commend that.

Chairman MORGAN. Am I to understand that you endorse the present bill, because of the Lausche amendment?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, no; not necessarily. We commend it because we feel that the original bill, as you are well acquainted with, provided for open-end financing. Then in the committee there was an

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agreement that it would be \$15 million per year for the next 2 years, and then on the floor of the Senate that was further reduced to \$10 million a year.

We feel that since that \$10 million for each of 2 years represents a 100-percent increase in your original appropriation that the \$10 million for each of the 2 years is a compromise in favor of the Agency.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Andrews, how did your organization arrive at an opinion that the Agency should be transferred to the Department of Defense? How would you arrive at an opinion on any issue? You say you have no members.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think as I first stated, Dr. Morgan, a group of us who are generally interested in military problems—we do not pretend to be experts in the field—reached an agreement that this was our position.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Andrews, are you familiar with the hearings in 1961 when this Agency was created?

Mr. ANDREWS. I was on the staff of Senator Lausche at that time.

Chairman MORGAN. You are aware, of course, that some very prominent military men testified on behalf of this Agency.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right, there is no question, but I think I could at the same time, Dr. Morgan, cite a number of military men who presently would not agree with it.

Chairman MORGAN. You agree that General Eisenhower was a great general; don't you?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is a matter of opinion. I happen to be a Democrat and I am not so willing to say that.

Chairman MORGAN. Well, I think he was a great general. He endorsed this Agency. General Lemnitzer, who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, testified before this committee on behalf of this Agency.

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Morgan, we just had an example—and I hope I am not presumptuous in citing this to you with your many years of experience here—but we certainly have had an example on the other side in the hearings on the treaty where high military men undoubtedly had their arms twisted to come to an agreement that the administration wants.

Chairman MORGAN. I can't believe that any man who accepts the responsibility of being Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the head of the Navy or head of the Marines—I would hate to think that all of our recognized military leaders that we are depending on for our security could have their arms twisted so that they would not do what they thought was in the best interest of our country.

Mr. ANDREWS. They are employees per se, and you do not argue with your boss up to a certain point. I can remember many occasions, if I could make a personal remark, when the Senator and staff would discuss some issue and then there was a point where he said, "But this is my viewpoint," and at that point we naturally were the loyal employees who followed the boss' thinking.

Certainly it is most reasonable to consider these men—when a man disagrees with any administration, a military man, he loses his job. Now certainly Admiral Anderson has lost his job for disagreeing with the administration.

Chairman MORGAN. I don't think he lost his job. I think he got a promotion.



Mr. ANDREWS. Oh, no; he even took a cut in salary, as I recall.

Chairman MORGAN. He may have gotten a raise in salary. A general doesn't make as much as our top ambassadors.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am not sure about that.

Chairman MORGAN. Well, being made Ambassador to an important country like Portugal is not a demotion.

Mr. ANDREWS. You wouldn't want to bet that he will be Ambassador 12 months from now.

Chairman MORGAN. I don't know. It depends upon what kind of job he does. He is in a very important country. He had a lot of experience in dealing with foreign governments. I think it was a good appointment.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think it was a fine appointment.

Chairman MORGAN. I don't think there was anything wrong in his differing with the Secretary of Defense. He didn't differ with the President.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Chairman MORGAN. I can't understand why this Agency should be put over in the Department of Defense.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can I explain why I think so?

Chairman MORGAN. Sure.

Mr. ANDREWS. Beyond what I have said here, I think this, Mr. Chairman: The problems that are involved in any disarmament scheme are technical problems involving military strategies, military requirements, military technology, and I think the only men who are—and this is a matter of opinion, naturally—but it is my personal opinion that it takes men who, from the time they were a plebe at West Point to the time that they are a member of the Joint Staff, to get the background, the experience, so that they can make value judgments.

Frankly, I read a few of the research reports that have come out of the Agency and I think a fair judgment is that some of them do not have the technical background. They do not have these years of experience in viewing these subjects from a military viewpoint, and you get into a situation of using the old derogatory term, we have "egg-heads" coming out with theories and they are not given then the proper review over at the Department of Defense.

That is an opinion. Certainly I would like to see peace, Dr. Morgan. I have five children; I have a real concern for peace. I have a boy in college who will be going into the armed services. I realize those problems. I am a clergyman. Certainly I am for peace. But I am not for peace at the risk of all of our security and I feel that civilians are not competent to judge these technical problems of security.

Chairman MORGAN. The President is a civilian and he is the Commander in Chief.

Mr. ANDREWS. The President has available to him all of the resources of technical information. I am not quarreling with the President. I am quarreling at this point only with the Agency.

Chairman MORGAN. I think that to put the Agency in the Department of Defense is in a sense going in the opposite direction. Its job is not to focus on disarmament. We need an agency to work on disarmament.

Mr. ANDREWS. But Dr. Morgan, you say that the Department of Defense has gone in the opposite direction. I disagree with you, because I believe that a strong defense setup of a country guarantees

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the peace of the country. If we have a strong defense, no one is going to attack us, not even the Soviets.

Chairman MORGAN. There are countries in Latin America where a strong military system has maintained military dictatorships.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would never want to see that.

Chairman MORGAN. You would never want to see it, but we have always recognized the importance of civilian control over the military in this country.

Mr. ANDREWS. You still have the civilian controls. You have a civilian Secretary, and then he is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, who is a civilian.

Chairman MORGAN. A civilian Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, testified in 1961 on behalf of this legislation. Former President Eisenhower issued a very strong letter.

Mr. ANDREWS. I read it.

Chairman MORGAN. Former Secretary of State Christian Herter—these people all supported the creation of the Agency—General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, two members of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. ANDREWS. Isn't it rather difficult, Dr. Morgan, to be against something that seems as simple as being against sin? It is like the Senators who are now saying we can't vote against the treaty because it looks like then we are voting for radioactive fallout for all of the children in the United States.

Chairman MORGAN. How does your organization stand on the treaty?

Mr. ANDREWS. I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in opposition.

Chairman MORGAN. You testified in opposition?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I regret that I was a bit late. I am reading the statement of Mr. Andrews. I have no questions at this time.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was otherwise tied up and couldn't get here earlier. Do I understand Mr. Andrews is testifying concerning the Burleson resolution?

Chairman MORGAN. No; he testified in support of the Senate bill that includes the Lausche amendment, which is similar to some of the provisions of the Burleson resolution.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. You mean a bill the Senate has passed?

Chairman MORGAN. A bill the Senate has passed includes the Lausche amendment. It deals with one of the purposes of the Burleson resolution.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Well, I haven't had a chance to analyze the amendment so I don't have any questions. I will say that when we passed this bill, the House adopted an amendment which I proposed. It was designed to do what I understand the Burleson amendment is now attempting to reemphasize and maybe what the Senate has done. I don't know. Personally I am not opposed to anything that will

strengthen this country or will make it necessary that proper constitutional consultation be had between the President and the Congress, but this amendment which I proposed—I don't have it here—prohibited unilateral action on disarmament except in compliance with the Constitution of the United States or by affirmative action of both Houses of the Congress. Here is the proviso which I offered and which was adopted.

Of course there were some other amendments :

Section 33. The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies as the President may determine, recommendations concerning U.S. arms control and disarmament policy : *Provided—*

and this proviso was inserted here because it seemed to be one of the best places to put it, and for no other reason—

*Provided, however,* that no action shall be taken under this—

and get this next language—

or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce, or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation of the Congress of the United States—

and in view of the authority, of course, of the President, as Commander in Chief, that was the strongest language I could think of at that particular time, and since then I haven't seen any which I think is any stronger, although if there is any way we can improve the arms control legislation to prevent what I had in mind in that amendment, I would support it, even if it is simply adding repetitious language to the legislation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to comment that we are aware of the Congressman's amendment. And that we found ourselves agreeing with most of it, except, Mr. Congressman, we felt that under the Constitution only the Senate should have the right and, therefore, the Lausche amendment provided for a change in the language.

The present language I believe reads that a treaty shall be by advice and consent of the Senate or by other affirmative action of the Congress, and it was our feeling that that "other affirmative action of Congress" was not constitutional, since the Constitution clearly says that only the Senate—frankly, I wish—

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Well, it depends upon what you are talking about. It depends upon whether or not the action of the President might be construed as not coming within the constitutional provision and maybe not requiring a ratification of the Senate. That is why I wanted to be sure if any such thing did happen that the President would have to come to the whole Congress for affirmative action if he didn't have to come to the Senate.

You have the protection of the requirement of confirmation by the Senate, but if it is something that does not come to the Senate there might be some debate as to whether or not it requires consent of the Senate, then the Executive would have to come and get affirmative action of the whole Congress. That was the purpose for the language including the House. If it's a treaty, naturally, it would go only to the Senate; but if any such action is taken which does not require

Senate confirmation, then I wanted affirmative action by the whole Congress.

Mr. ANDREWS. We are concerned that there will be further disarmament steps taken by Executive order which would not come under the purview of the treaty and I think the committee should consider that problem very closely. Certainly the treaty is merely a first step, whether you agree that it is good or bad. It is a step forward in the field of disarmament, and certainly other steps are going to come along.

Now, unless these other steps are written in the form of treaties, and there is nothing that says they will be, it is quite possible that further steps in disarmament will be taken through Executive order, Executive agreement.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. The gentleman mentioned earlier that he was a Democrat, and he also said—

Mr. ANDREWS. A Lausche Democrat.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Oh, I didn't know you had a division in the Democrats by different type. The thing that amazes me is your attitude of not trusting the President. Now I am a Republican. I don't care whether it is President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, I don't think either one of the gentlemen would do anything that would jeopardize the security of the United States. You are implying that through Executive order they might change this Disarmament Agency and enter into agreements through the executive branch rather than consulting Congress.

I don't agree with that. Even as a Republican, I don't think President Kennedy would do anything to change the security of the United States.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, that, of course, is your opinion, Congressman.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. And I didn't vote for him.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I did.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Broomfield, what we had in mind here—I don't think it was a question of trust or lack of trust of any particular man in the White House—it was simply to protect the country in the event mistakes, errors of judgment, and so forth, were made. Someone might be in the White House who would go too far on his own in disarmament. Under my amendment, if Senate action is not sought we might insist that the entire Congress must act. Obviously, constitutionally, the House has no say-so over treaties, although I think it would be a good idea.

I quite agree with you when we have a man who is elected President by the people of the United States, under the Constitution, he is the chief foreign officer of the United States. He has control of the foreign policy, and when we elect him, if he does something within his constitutional right which is detrimental to the United States, there is not too much we can do about it at the time except come up here and do a lot of talking and maybe passing of resolutions. This area of disarmament is so important to our country and national security that I felt there was something that could be done and should be done to give us a stronger feeling of greater security. Without my amendment, many of us would not have voted for the arms control bill.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Fountain, if you will yield just a moment, I agree with what you are saying as far as these provisions and safeguards are concerned. The question I take issue with is that of questioning the integrity of a President, regardless of whether he is a Republican or a Democrat. I am merely making the point that I trust President Kennedy to do what is right for our country.

Mr. ANDREWS. May I comment. I would like for the record to make it plain I was not casting any aspersions on the integrity of any President of the United States. Sometimes I think the majority opinion, even in a democracy, is wrong, but I respect the intent of people. I see no sinister connotation.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Andrews, I am not sure that anyone has asked how many members the Americans for National Security has?

Mr. ANDREWS. I think as I explained in earlier questioning we do not have a membership per se. Our function has been merely to act as an alerting agency to other patriotic groups.

For instance, we have discussions with the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, various groups, who are interested, who have passed resolutions at their national conventions, in this general area.

Then when we see what we think is the issue, we try to alert these organizations to take some active part.

Mr. WHALLEY. How many members do you think you would have?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would say we have an area of influence over some 100,000 or 300,000 people, through various organizations that cooperate with us.

Mr. WHALLEY. How would an organization like that get started?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, it is a very easy thing to explain. Last October several aids of several Senators—both Republican and Democratic, I might say—we had a discussion as to where the Government was going on this policy of disarmament and we felt that guidelines were necessary and that these guidelines should be provided by the Congress, and as a result of those discussions and some studies that I have made, we determined that we didn't need a new organization in the field to get memberships and to carry on organization activities, but we needed an organization that could alert other organizations already in the field.

Then as a result of that the Burleson-Curtis resolution was written. I might say for the record that—no, I will let that go.

There were other provisions in the original Burleson resolution, but the resolution, as you have it before your committee, we felt we could support and we have tried to get a great interest in it. In fact, I hope some of you Congressmen have had some letters concerning it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. WHALLEY. Certainly.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are you implying, sir, that AFNS wrote the original Burleson resolution?

Mr. ANDREWS. Oh, no, we were merely in on the discussions concerning it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There wasn't a resolution prior to the one now filed that I have seen. You mentioned the "original Burleson resolution."

Mr. ANDREWS. I meant the original draft.

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Chairman MORGAN. It was introduced this year?

Mr. ANDREWS. It was introduced this year.

Chairman MORGAN. I think Mr. Andrews said that he had discussions last October.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right, but it was not introduced until this year.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then the original draft you are speaking of—

Mr. ANDREWS. Was circulated among a number of people who were interested. Then when the final draft was decided on by Congressmen we, of course, had no part in that. I think I have had, I would say, three conversations with the Congressman—very casual ones at that.

Mr. WHALLEY. I agree with Mr. Fountain, and I also agree with Mr. Broomfield, the President has the biggest and busiest job in the world, there is always a chance of an error, and I think Congress should have something to say about the decisions.

Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Andrews, you use the word "we" repeatedly in your testimony. To whom are you referring?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I am using it in the sense of the organization.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have a board of directors?

Mr. ANDREWS. We have a board of endorsers, yes.

Mr. FRASER. Is that published any place that we can have it?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, on our letterhead. I will make one available for the record.

Mr. FRASER. I think it would be interesting for the committee to have it.

Mr. ANDREWS. I will be glad to put the names in the record at the present time, if you wish. The members of the board of endorsers are Brig. Gen. W. P. Campbell, U.S. Army, retired; Adm. Charles M. Cooke, U.S. Navy, retired; Adm. Charles S. Freeman, U.S. Navy, retired; Revillo P. Oliver, Ph. D.; Rear Adm. E. D. McEathron, U.S. Navy, retired; Adm. J. W. Reeves, U.S. Navy, retired; Col. F. W. Alstetter, U.S. Army, retired.

Mr. FRASER. These are persons who—

Mr. ANDREWS. Who have endorsed the purposes and who endorse the policies of the organization.

Mr. FRASER. How large a staff do you have?

Mr. ANDREWS. I am the organization.

Mr. FRASER. How is the organization financed?

Mr. ANDREWS. We made an appeal in May for funds.

Mr. FRASER. You refer in your testimony to the fact that the men at the Pentagon are indoctrinated with a philosophy of winning.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. I gather that you feel perhaps that some of the others in the executive branch are not. What do you mean by a "philosophy of winning"?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would define it as a philosophy that we are going to keep our Nation in a superior military position, so that in case of any conflict we would be capable of winning. The philosophy

which was given in several speeches by members of the Disarmament Agency at seminars in which they implied that we would be perhaps better off—it was a theory worth considering—of letting the Soviet build up their first strike capacity to ourselves so that then they wouldn't be afraid of us, I think is a philosophy of defeat, and I think that it is entirely contrary to the thinking of military men at the Pentagon.

Mr. FRASER. Do I understand then that what you mean by winning is that we would inflict more damage through a nuclear exchange—we would inflict more damage on the Soviet Union than they would inflict on us?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would say my philosophy of winning is that we would maintain, as President Theodore Roosevelt said many years ago, a big stick. I am still not advocating a nuclear holocaust, Congressman.

Mr. FRASER. I would judge that what you argue is that through your approach you are less likely to have one.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right. I do not believe that an arms race and the building up of arms necessarily means that that is going to create a war situation. A strong arms force has acted as a deterrent in the past, and I believe it could still serve as a deterrent.

I think it served as a deterrent in Cuba. Mr. Khrushchev knew what we had. He wasn't any more anxious for a real war than we are.

Mr. FRASER. Is your committee limited just to consideration of questions that may relate to disarmament or do you get into other policies?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; strictly disarmament.

Mr. FRASER. You don't, for example, have any position on our policy toward Cuba?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, I have not.

Mr. FRASER. Or toward the United Nations?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; I have not declared any, and I would certainly have to take that up if I did. It is strictly for disarmament and we felt that the treaty was part of the disarmament picture.

Mr. FRASER. You make the statement that you think the Disarmament Agency is committed to types of unilateral disarmament in the guise of economy.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. Do you get that from testimony or statements of Mr. Foster?

Mr. ANDREWS. I get that from observation when it is quite obvious that the Agency has recommended to the administration the cutting down of various technical forces which would be a defense for our Nation.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any specific report or document that you could refer to in this connection?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, I have not. Not available here.

Mr. FRASER. Well, could you supply us with some?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, I think I could as to the various types of military forces and weapons which in the last 2 years have been denigrated, and certainly I would assume—

Mr. FRASER. These are publications now that the Disarmament Agency has put out?

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Mr. ANDREWS. I didn't say the Disarmament Agency, I said the influence of the Agency. Certainly those who are counseling the administration are coming out of the Agency.

Mr. FRASER. Is it your statement, Mr. Andrews, that the Agency is determining our defense policies?

Mr. ANDREWS. I didn't say that. The President of the United States determines our policy. I certainly think with any administrator, and the President is the chief administrator of our Nation, he is influenced by those about him. I certainly know that is true.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Andrews, this is an important charge you have made here.

Mr. ANDREWS. There is no charge.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I asked Mr. Foster directly whether he believed in unilateral disarmament and he was emphatic that he did not. Now you make the statement as to the Agency is committed to unilateral disarmament under the guise of economy. Now you say there are written reports, but they are not from that Agency.

Now let me ask you, Mr. Andrews, Do you have anything in writing, published by that Agency that will substantiate this statement?

Mr. ANDREWS. No.

Mr. FRASER. Are you prepared to withdraw the statement?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; because I think if you take up a recent copy of U.S. News & World Report you will see a fine objective article there which shows the various types of weapons systems, of carriers for weapons, and so forth, of systems which have all been eliminated or dropped in the last 2 years.

Mr. FRASER. All right, sir, and does that article attribute that to the Disarmament Agency?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, certainly it is an inference.

Mr. FRASER. But it is your inference. Does the article say that in any way?

Mr. ANDREWS. I don't recall.

Mr. FRASER. Then why do you make this kind of charge, Mr. Andrews? This is a matter that is really important to the national security and you are charging this Agency with advocating unilateral disarmament.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am saying that—

Mr. FRASER. Don't you think that we are entitled to a responsible foundation for a statement of this kind?

Mr. ANDREWS. I think I have given one which is that certainly the administration is taking the advice of the Disarmament Agency. That is what they are paying them for. That is their job.

Mr. FRASER. Can you show me anywhere where the Disarmament Agency is charged with the responsibility of advising the President with respect to the structure of our defense forces?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would have to look it up.

Mr. FRASER. So you have no present knowledge that they have any such responsibility; is that right?

I have no further questions.

(Discussion off the record).

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, before we close—I realize all of us have limited time—I have reexamined the amendment which I



offered and the amendments put in by the Senate and I am not so sure that the Senate amendment doesn't weaken the amendment to which I referred, which we adopted in the House.

As a matter of fact, I first had in my amendment, language similar to that in the Senate bill before us—"in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States". However there seems to be such a divergence of opinion as to what "constitutional processes" are and as to what authority the President might use pursuant to some other law, that when I wrote my amendment, I used the language "no action shall be taken under this or any other law." I referred specifically to the treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution, so as to avoid the possibility of action by Executive order. We stated that it had to be done under the treatymaking power, but we added the other language, "or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States," to take care of any such action as might not require Senate consent or where the advice and consent of the Senate may not be sought. There may be differences of opinion as to what "constitutional processes" are or whether or not it is the kind of document or agreement which would come before the Senate under the treatymaking power of the President.

In other words, we got it "under this or any other law" and we have also bound the President to take such action as is taken, pursuant to his treatymaking power and not pursuant to his power to issue Executive orders, as Commander in Chief, and so forth. Consequently, I am not sure but what the Senate amendment weakens the amendment we already have in the bill.

Would you think about that?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to. I will take a look at that, Congressman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is Rabbi Richard G. Hirsch. Rabbi Hirsch is a representative of the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism.

Rabbi Hirsch, you have a prepared statement, and you may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF RABBI RICHARD G. HIRSCH, DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON SOCIAL ACTION OF REFORM JUDAISM**

Rabbi HIRSCH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Rabbi Richard G. Hirsch, director of the Religious Action Center, Union of American Hebrew Congregations. I appear in behalf of the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, a joint instrumentality of the Central Conference of American Rabbis and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. Other national agencies which are members of the Commission on Social Action are the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, the National Federation of Temple Brotherhoods, and the National Federation of Temple Youth.

At the most recent biennial convention of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, held in Washington in November 1961, a

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resolution on world peace was adopted, which contained the following statement:

We commend the United States for intensified efforts to achieve universal enforceable disarmament and urge that all such efforts be carried forward with the greatest of urgency and imagination. In this regard, we express gratification that the U.S. Congress has established an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to augment and accelerate studies and planning in this field.

In the 2 years since its establishment, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has justified its existence. Despite meager funds and limited staff, the Agency has fulfilled the major functions assigned to it by Public Law 87-297 (Arms Control and Disarmament Act). As the fountainhead for disarmament proposals, the Agency has been responsible for three negotiation instruments of great significance: An outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world; a draft treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments; and a draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

The latter provided the basis for the test ban treaty which, hopefully, will be overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate within the next few days. The Agency shared with the State Department major responsibility for the successful negotiation of the test ban treaty and was also responsible for the formulation of the so-called hot line agreement between the United States and Russia.

These "first steps," to use the cautious but sanguine language of President Kennedy, must now be bolstered by preparations for additional steps. In these preparations, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency plays an indispensable role.

In this thermonuclear age, men have perverted blessed discoveries capable of enriching life into cursed instruments capable of annihilating life—and have reversed the prophetic vision by turning plowshares into swords. Yet the massive military power which our own Nation has assembled has given us no real guarantee of peace and security. We have established a mighty system of defense based on deterrence, but this system is not infallible, because it is based on the following theoretical assumptions which may prove to be inaccurate and misleading:

(a) The assumption that there will be no irrationality—that the leader of an opposing nation will recognize that any attack on the United States will lead to retaliation resulting in the destruction of his own country. However, in the light of world history, especially during the last generation, totalitarian systems of government, which do not have the checks on leadership built into our democratic system, have not been renowned for their rational behavior.

(b) The assumption that there will be no miscalculation—that both we and potential enemies will always be fully cognizant of each other's intentions. The Cuban crisis was resolved because both Russia and the United States were to a certain extent informed of each other's policies and the ramifications thereof. However, in a future crisis, one of the two parties to an international dispute may not be firmly convinced that the other will use its total nuclear force. This might well lead to a full-scale war, even though neither nation originally intended to go that far.

(c) The assumption that there will be no accident—that no mechanical failure or human aberration will occur. It has been generally

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recognized that there are no foolproof "fail safe" measures which will guarantee against mechanical failure. And what assurance do we have that one day a pilot, either ours or a potential enemy's, motivated by mistaken patriotic impulses, will not take matters into his own hands, as did the French pilot who in 1957 bombed an Algerian village without any orders from his superiors?

An additional factor leading to world instability is the proliferation of nations possessing nuclear weapons. The more fingers grasp the nuclear trigger, the more does our security based on deterrence diminish. The signing of the test ban treaty and its pending ratification by the Senate express the conviction of our Government and of our people that the only secure system of defense lies in the direction of establishing a disarmed world governed by law. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a vital instrument for implementing that objective.

However, the ACDA can perform its necessary functions only if it is permanently established. To fail to give permanent authorization to the Agency is to hobble it with uncertainty and to limit its continuity of staff and program. A realistic evaluation of international relations requires a recognition that peace will not be attained quickly or effortlessly. The highly complex problems of disarmament and arms control are inextricably related to even more complex political, economic, social, and psychological problems.

The resolution of these problems requires the persistent efforts of experts dedicated to their tasks over a period of many years. Numerous other governmental agencies dealing with areas of less gravity have permanent status. Certainly the objective which the ACDA pursues merits the permanent status that will reflect our Nation's permanent commitment "to seek peace and pursue it."

Proper financing is likewise essential for the fulfillment of the ACDA's functions as a vital supplement to other governmental efforts. The nation which can afford to devote more than one-half of its national budget to military defense should be able to devote one-sixtieth of 1 percent of its budget to the ultimate defense—negotiated disarmament. The nation which can afford to spend more than \$6 million an hour, every day of the year, for its military preparedness should be able to afford more than 2 hours a year worth of those funds to prepare for peace.

I therefore urge this committee as a minimum to restore the original request for authorization of \$15 million for 1964, and to give serious consideration to the allocation of "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate."

Inadequate funds have prevented the ACDA from implementing sufficiently one of its assigned functions:

The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament.

At the present time, the plethora of misinformation almost suffocates the paucity of valid information. Civic and religious groups such as ours have been attempting to fill the void, but we require on both the national and regional levels the active assistance and guidance which can best be provided by the physical presence of ACDA personnel, and the dissemination of more extensive printed and audio-visual materials.

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Our Nation must begin the process of expending much more of our human and financial resources on efforts directed toward disarmament. We have been able to expand our military power, because we have devoted ever larger sums (\$7 billion for next year) to scientific research for the development of new and more powerful weapons. Does it not stand to reason that in order to regulate and control these arms, the same scope and degree of scientific research must be developed and applied?

In the last few years, striking new scientific discoveries have been made in the areas of detection and inspection. This type of research must be intensified. It has been especially encouraging to note that the ACDA envisages the expansion of its research endeavors in the areas of political, economic, and historical ramifications of disarmament.

We have lived with war, or the threat of war, for so long that our people, our economy, indeed our civilization, has become conditioned to it. We must begin now to formulate plans for the reconditioning of our Nation and our world to peace, in confidence that we can meet the radical changes which peace may bring in its wake. Science has taught the world how to wage war. Now science must teach the world how to wage peace.

Even as we endorse a permanent status and maximum budget for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we would direct the attention of this committee to necessary prerequisites for a lasting peace. Jewish tradition maintains that there is a basic distinction between the Latin word "pax" which is the root of our English word for peace—and "shalom," the Hebrew word. "Pax," which is also the root for "pact," literally means, according to the dictionary, "the absence of a state of war." "Shalom" means much more—"completeness," "wholeness," "perfection," not the absence of something negative, but the presence of something positive.

True peace requires more than a balance of power between nations, and more even than a state of disarmament. True peace requires international harmony predicated on the well-being of every nation, and the personal well-being of every individual. It is our fervent prayer that disarmament will enable us to devote more of our energies to the elimination of poverty, ignorance, disease, and exploitation—and to the eventual realization of "shalom."

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Rabbi Hirsch.

Rabbi Hirsch, the group you represent here fully supports the Executive request of the full amount of \$15 million?

Rabbi HIRSCH. We do, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. You feel then that the bill which passed the other body with a limitation of \$20 million over a 2-year period would impose too severe a limitation on the Arms Control Agency?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I believe so, and I believe the testimony of the previous witness indicated such.

Chairman MORGAN. Rabbi Hirsch, you feel confident then that the Arms Control Agency, which was created by the Congress in 1961, has been helpful? It has contributed to establishing the hot line and to working out the nuclear treaty that is now under consideration by the other body.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so, and we have been very gratified by the role played by this Agency. I think it is essential to recognize that

the Agency is still in a very formative stage and the fact that it could achieve what it has up to this point is a good harbinger for the future.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Rabbi Hirsch.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Rabbi Hirsch, it was a very eloquent statement you made. I have very brief questions.

At the end of your testimony you pointed out that our civilization has become accustomed to war and the threat of war, and that we must now begin to formulate plans for the reconditioning of our Nation and our world to peace.

Is it your feeling that the existence, or the absence of the Arms Control Agency would affect the reconditioning of our Nation to peace? Surely if that should be desirable, we could do it with or without the Agency.

Do you feel that the Agency is going to expedite a trend toward peace? Isn't the problem really a question of whether the other side—the Sino-Soviet bloc—is willing to come to some kind of agreement, not whether we have the mechanics with which to develop the plowshares again?

Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, Mr. Congressman, I think the U.S. foreign policy is in large measure a reaction to the foreign policy of Russia and of other nations, just as to a certain extent their policy is a reaction to ours. I think it is true that peace will be achieved if each nation feels that peace is in its interest.

On the other hand I think there is an element of peace for which we are responsible. Take the problem, for example, of economics. One of the problems which the Agency is presently studying—although I don't think the Agency has been able to give sufficient attention to it—is the question of the economics of disarmament.

I understand that one of the areas to which they would like to proceed is this very serious question of how you achieve disarmament without disrupting the entire economy of the Nation. It is this type of problem which it is essential for us to begin to study, and to be prepared for, should further steps of disarmament present themselves.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But do you think that the fact that this Agency has not yet made any intensive study of the economics of disarmament has deterred us from trying to seek some kind of arms control?

Rabbi HIRSCH. No; I don't think so. But I think that there is always that possibility. I think there are elements in the country who would utilize either overtly or covertly the fact that disarmament might disrupt the economy as a pretext for being opposed to disarmament.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't think there is any question that if we should have peace tomorrow it would disrupt our economy, and any intensive study would presumably come up with that conclusion.

I don't think that we could really argue that experts would say there will not be a disruption of our economy as it is presently constituted if we should stop spending at the rate of \$50 billion a year for essentially military purposes.

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Rabbi HIRSCH. But there have been studies already undertaken, and incidentally the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, I believe, issued several such studies on the economics of disarmament—and there have been other studies made by private groups as well—which do indicate how the transition can occur without deleterious consequences to the economy.

The important element is that we have to begin to prepare for these steps, just as we have expended so much energy in the past to prepare for possible war.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. One of the reasons there is some criticism of the Agency is the fact that it is felt by some that it will be used, and that the treaty which is about to be ratified itself may be used, as ways in which we will lower our own guard, even though our security is still threatened. Some feel that if we talk about how we would adjust to a peacetime economy, we may believe that conditions are such as to make this possible, whereas the other side is only waiting its opportunity to pounce on us and proceed with its scheme of world domination.

In other words, I think one of the reasons why the Agency is not wholly accepted is the feeling that it is leaning toward a softening of our very necessary defense posture. Not that we don't want and don't all share your peaceful objectives, but we may feel prematurely, if conditions and tensions are relaxed, that we can reduce our spending for military purposes, and do less research in some areas which may be of crucial importance to our own security.

Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, I think what you are saying is correct, Mr. Congressman.

I think many people oppose the nuclear test ban treaty not because of the lack of intrinsic value in the treaty itself, but because of what the treaty presupposes for the future, and I am sure that there are those—just as the previous witness manifested—who are opposed to anything which smacks of steps leading in the direction of peace because they feel this will lower our guard.

The United States has to take both postures and I think we have done that. That is why I am so convinced of the validity and the necessity for the perpetuation of this Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We must take the posture that we are ready for war and we have to prepare for war, but we cannot neglect the other posture which is in line with the ultimate objectives and principles upon which this country has been based; namely, that we want to have world peace.

My premise is that you would balance off the amounts of money that this Nation has spent, we have spent much more proportionately in the preparations for possible war than we have spent in the preparations for possible world peace. A reduction of the Agency's budget would just proceed in that same disproportionate direction to which too many people in our Nation may want us to go.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, from some points of view, Congress is not always logical. We spend a tenth on our foreign aid program of what we do on our military program, and yet the foreign aid program is in a lot more trouble than the military program.

The fact is that a comparatively small amount for an agency like this is going to be subject to more criticism than a large amount for a military agency.

Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On page four of your statement, Rabbi Hirsch, you indicate the conviction of your group and other civic and religious groups such as yours that it is necessary to fill the void in the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament. Can you give the committee specific examples of your commission's efforts in this regard?

Rabbi HIRSCH. From time to time we have held various seminars on peace. We represent several agencies, as I indicated in my introduction, one of which is the Central Conference of American Rabbis. We have plans for several conferences in the near future for rabbis and for our lay people as well on the subject of disarmament and peace.

We have had various training sessions to which we have brought some of the material disseminated by the ACDA, by the State Department, and by other agencies of Government.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism did not publish any of its own brochures in this regard?

Rabbi HIRSCH. We have one published; that is, one printed pamphlet on the subject of Judaism and international relations which tries to relate the basic ethical stance of Judaism to contemporary issues in international relations.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. But that question does not enter directly into arms control.

Rabbi HIRSCH. It does enter into the subject of disarmament, not in any great detail, but it does urge that we proceed in the direction of disarmament.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What is the publication date of that brochure?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think 1960. If the question you are asking is whether or not it referred specifically to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it was published prior to the establishment of the Agency, but it talks about disarmament in general.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I believe a sample copy of the brochure for the committee would be very helpful.

Rabbi HIRSCH. We would be very happy to submit it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hirsch, I am very much interested in your statement. Of course, everybody agrees that world peace is a desire of our country, but it is very difficult to achieve when you realize that Russia has supposedly broken 50 of the 52 agreements that it has entered into. There are so many other areas, as you know—Israel and the Arab countries on a smaller scale. Would you care to suggest how France and Red China could be brought into this nuclear ban?

Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, I would certainly have no statement to offer that would be authoritative, that is, representing the commission. If you ask my own personal view—

Mr. WHALLEY. Just personally.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think that it would be very difficult to bring China into this, to have China affix its signature as one of the signatories of the test ban treaty, for all kinds of reasons that I am sure you gentlemen are much more familiar with than I am.

As for France, I would hope that eventually, if not now, then perhaps in the foreseeable future, France would consider it to be in its best interest to affix its signature to the treaty.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Rabbi Hirsch, I want to say good morning to you, and thank you for a very fine statement. I am sorry I was unable to be here earlier, but I have gone through this statement of yours, and I want to, as I said, compliment you on it.

There isn't much I can question you on, except perhaps to repeat, in a different fashion, some of the questions that have been put to you.

Now the mere entering into a test ban agreement doesn't, of necessity, in and of itself, mean that there has to be a relaxation of defense, does it?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I don't think so at all. I don't think there should be.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. We can enter into a test ban treaty and still, as the President has said, in his letter of recent date, still keep our guard up; and, as has been suggested, the attitude being manifested is one of a desire for peaceful relations rather than standing with your fists raised constantly; isn't that so?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. You favor the continuation of this Agency, irrespective of the amount appropriated; isn't that so?

Rabbi HIRSCH. We have asked for permanent authorization as our primary concern.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. But there is nothing definite that you can add to the question of moneys as such. You take the position, I believe, that because they are asking for \$15 million, we ought to give it to them. And because we are satisfied that this organization won't waste any money, yet at the same time we don't want to be niggardly with them, but there is no basis upon which you can rest a statement that they should be given the \$15 million as such?

Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, our organization would not be qualified to comment on specific budgets.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is what I thought.

Rabbi HIRSCH. We feel that they ought to be given, as the proposed bill suggests, "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate." The only reason why we specifically supported the \$15 million was that that amount was the request which had been made by the administration.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I see.

Rabbi HIRSCH. But I don't think that any private agency outside Government is really qualified to comment on the specific amounts without having made the studies.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is exactly what I thought, but your main purpose in coming here is because of your feeling that this Disarmament Agency should be maintained, should be made permanent, because this is an added means whereby we may be able to arrive at a peaceful solution for the troubles of the world?

Rabbi HIRSCH. That is correct.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you very much, Rabbi.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.



Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Rabbi, do you believe there can be an agreement on disarmament without Red China being a party thereto?

Rabbi HIRSCH. Again, I want to speak personally and not on behalf of the organizations which I represent. I think there can be an agreement on modified disarmament without Red China being a party thereto, but if such an agreement were to occur, the parties thereto would have to be cognizant of the military strength of China and should not permit their strength to be so modified that it would not be capable of dealing with China.

Mr. MURPHY. Rabbi, I cannot understand how any one of the three powers, United Kingdom, Russia, or the United States, would enter into any agreement relative to disarmament when China is not a party to the agreement. The reason I asked this question was because of the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference that was held in this city in 1922. This conference set up a ratio of 5-5-3, as to the armaments allowed the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan in the Pacific. It is my understanding that Japan withdrew from the conference taking exception to the allotment of 5 to the United Kingdom and the United States, and 3 to Japan. We found that with the event of World War II, Japan, who had not disarmed according to the conference, had greater naval strength in the Pacific than the United Kingdom and the United States, who had disarmed. Japan also fortified the mandated islands in the Pacific. It was a great awakening as to Japan's naval power. I am supporting this legislation and believe that we should do everything possible to work toward a peaceful existence in the world and be prepared in the event of a disarmament agreement as to the transition from a war to a peace economy.

Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, I agree with you, Congressman, that that is a very important factor and should be borne in mind. I also agree with you that I think we can learn a great deal from the study of the past. One of the areas into which I would hope the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would go, either with its own staff or perhaps instituting special studies outside of its own staff, is the area of historical experience which I think has much bearing on our action for the future.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, Rabbi, along the lines of the last question, isn't this a somewhat relative matter, however? That is, the military significance of Red China has some importance, but it is not of the same scale of importance as that of, shall we say, the major powers of Russia and the United States in this whole disarmament matter at the present time?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I would agree. I thought I indicated, in answer to an earlier question, that I considered the relative strength to be significant and that the United States and Russia could enter into negotiated disarmament agreements without in any way impairing their capacity to deal with a possible future enemy in the form of China.

Mr. MONAGAN. It might be a step in the right direction. We have heard a lot about that in recent days. It might be moving in the right direction without having a completely watertight agreement that would include every nation in the world.

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Rabbi HIRSCH. That is right; I agree.

Mr. MONAGAN. In fact, France provides the same sort of problem that Red China does in this area, I think.

Rabbi HIRSCH. It is interesting to note, while we are talking about this subject, that the proverb upon which President Kennedy based his "first step" was a Chinese proverb.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Rabbi Hirsch, in 1938, what would have been the most effective steps that the United States could have made toward peace?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think the experience prior to the World War II period indicates that we have to be concerned about not disarming to the point where we are no longer capable of meeting our responsibilities in the world. In retrospect I am sure I would have wanted the United States to have had much greater arms strength in the 1930's than it did possess.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you yield?

Mr. FRASER. Surely.

Mr. MURPHY. Around the period of 1938 or 1939 the United States passed the Neutrality Act, is that correct? Would you say that was one of the reasons that European nations began to arm?

Rabbi HIRSCH. There are all kinds of reasons why I think the European nations began to arm.

Mr. MURPHY. I know, but it created an emergency. Russia entered immediately into a pact with Germany for self-protection because she was not prepared at the time.

Rabbi HIRSCH. My point is I do think we can learn a great deal from historical experience, and we have to remember the historical experience.

On the other hand, we also have to recognize that we are living in a new world which requires other arrangements and I think that there is one other factor which is especially significant and which was not present during the World War II period, which is of course the nuclear force, which puts war on a completely different basis from what it was in any experience known to man.

Mr. FRASER. So that as I understand the answer to my question, Rabbi Hirsch, you feel that the thing we might have done in 1938 to contribute to peace might have been to build up our armaments?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I didn't understand that to be your question, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. FRASER. My question was what policy should this country have pursued in 1938 to attempt to more adequately have pursued the peace?

Rabbi HIRSCH. If we are speaking in retrospect, I would not necessarily pick the year 1938. You have a rough year there. I would say that the United States in retrospect should have maintained sufficient armed strength to be able to exert and manifest the position of leadership which it expected to have in the world.

Mr. FRASER. Is it fair to conclude from what you are saying that our position of weakness created a condition conducive to the development of war?

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so.

Mr. FRASER. After World War II we disbanded much of our armed strength. In retrospect do you think that was a contribution toward peace?

Rabbi HIRSCH. The word "retrospect" is the keyword.

Mr. FRASER. I understand. We learn from history.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think in retrospect it was. At the time, and with relations between countries being what they were, I think it was the correct move, and I am not implying that if I had been in the position to say something about it at the time, that I would not have done the same thing we did.

Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't you say, Rabbi Hirsch, that many of the things that we do as a country tend to be influenced by a kind of popular attitude? There is a general belief today that disarmament is a desirable goal without regard to some of the other problems that may exist. You have already given us an example where a lack of national strength may have contributed to the likelihood of war.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I agree.

Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't you say, then, that rather than have the actions of Congress and the national administration be influenced as much by what I would in some respects call uninformed public opinion, that it would be desirable that there be an agency that devotes full time, attention, and study to this whole problem of disarmament and to the relationship between our actions in maintaining or failing to maintain our military strength and the likelihood of war?

Rabbi HIRSCH. The only thing I have question with, Congressman, is the either/or basis you propose.

Mr. FRASER. Well, let's assume that the Disarmament Agency has the goal of advising the President on ways in which peace can be secured. Isn't it desirable that in the pursuit of that objective there should be careful professional studies undertaken?

Rabbi HIRSCH. That is what I am advocating, and that is what I think is very important. The only question I had in connection with your question was the seeming implication that somehow or other public opinion being misinformed as it so often is, its effect or influence on these proposals might be deleterious. It is not a question of either/or, but of both/and both experts and an informed public. We have agencies with experts, but we also have to educate our people, because if the people do not support our objectives we can't achieve them.

Mr. FRASER. Well, if we are going to educate our people, we need to know as much about the subject as we can.

Rabbi HIRSCH. Right.

Mr. FRASER. An agency such as the one that is under discussion may contribute a better understanding of the relationship of armaments to the securing of peace than we have today.

Rabbi HIRSCH. What I am advocating is that this Agency be assigned a great deal more funds than it presently has for such study. It seems to me one of the problems has been that insufficient attention has been paid to the necessity of keeping the people well informed.

For example, in the Senate bill, section 3(c), referring to the fact that "nothing contained in this act shall be construed to authorize any policy or action by any Government agency which would interfere with, restrict, or prohibit the acquisition, possession or use of firearms by an individual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, rec-

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reation, education, or training"—that was inserted in the Senate bill because of a lack of education or a lack of knowledge on the part of the public as to what the Disarmament Agency was really dealing with.

Mr. FRASER. Let's go back now. Twice in recent history we have disarmed under circumstances which in retrospect made war more likely. We have talked about the two times. Both of these events took place without the existence of a Disarmament Agency.

What I am suggesting to you—and I want to see if you concur—is that if we had had a Disarmament Agency at that time, if we had had careful technical studies, careful historical review, in other words if insight into the relationship between armaments and war and peace had been better developed and this information had been made known to the Congress and to the people, in retrospect our actions might have been wiser than they now appear to have been.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so, and I believe it is an important point that you are making and I would wish that view would be more widely held.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. The mere fact that the committee has a title doesn't of necessity mean that it goes blindly along a certain alley even though it finds that that alley is a difficult one and an injurious one. In other words, as suggested by Mr. Fraser, if it determines that it is in the interest of our Nation, we presume that they would give us good advice insofar as armament as against disarmament.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It seems to me that the Disarmament Agency isn't likely to come up with a recommendation that we arm. Mr. Fraser's point seems to be, or as I understood Rabbi Hirsch's point, that if we had taken a look and evaluated properly in the 1930's we probably would have been building up our armaments.

I don't suppose, Mr. Fraser, you are suggesting that if the Agency were in existence that they would have been recommending that we build up. Surely their objective would be to lend support to those who felt we should be reducing our armaments. The whole purport of this kind of agency is to develop reasons why there should be a relaxation of tensions. One of the ways in which you can relax tensions is to reduce armaments, not increase them.

Mr. FRASER. If the gentleman will yield—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have the floor.

Mr. FRASER. Let me say that the contrast between the proposal which is on the table at Geneva and the other kind of disarmament agreements we have entered into in the past—Congressman Murphy already referred to one of them, the Naval Limitations Agreement—the difference between what we have on the table in Geneva and those earlier experiments is very important, in my judgment. In the draft treaty at Geneva, as I understand it, there is provision for a substitute force controlled by some international agency. I regard this, frankly, as almost a condition precedent to any meaningful disarmament. We didn't have any such provision in these earlier disarmament agreements, so when Ethiopia was invaded by Italy, we did nothing. Nobody did anything.

This is why I say that more insight into the relation of disarmaments and political relationships is needed in this country. Otherwise I am fearful we may go back and repeat the errors of history without having developed the insight.

That is my view. That is why I think the Agency would be helpful.

Chairman MORGAN. Any further questions?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Rabbi Hirsch would comment on section 4, paragraph (d), and I quote:

None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda in support of any pending legislation concerning the work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In view of the fact that you said that the activity of ACDA ought to be more fully understood and known to the public, would you care to comment on this particular amendment appended to the legislation in the Senate.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I am not clear, Mr. Congressman, as to what your question is.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, Rabbi Hirsch, you have stated earlier that the activity of the Agency ought to be better understood by the U.S. public. On the other hand, the proposal contains a restriction on the part of the Agency in disseminating information.

Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, the restriction, as I understand it, concerns legislation.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, I am not so sure that that is intended only for the purpose of lobbying in support of any pending legislation. The limitation could also be interpreted to mean that the Agency could not disseminate any information in the United States.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The word isn't "information," it is "propaganda." Does that have significance, Mr. Zablocki?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That would have some significance. I am not sure that the Senate report was clear on this point.

Rabbi HIRSCH. I think the key word is "legislation." For example, I know that ACDA put out a very fine pamphlet which we did use and which we did disseminate to our people and which other religious and civic groups used to explain the provisions of the nuclear test ban treaty.

It was an informative brochure which some of you may have seen which set forth questions and answers about the treaty. That type of information is essential for educating the public in order to understand what is happening in foreign affairs.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Now, the very fact that the Agency had made available to your committee brochures—would this be considered propaganda? Under the limitation proposed in section 4 on the use of funds, ACDA would be prohibited in the future to publish such a pamphlet.

Let me read from the Senate report:

This language reflects the committee's concern over the organized pressures brought to bear during consideration of S. 777. The committee is fully aware of the constitutional rights of citizens to petition their Government. It is concerned, however, that tax funds gathered from all the citizens not be used directly or indirectly to encourage expressions of particular groups of citizens simply because those groups support positions taken by the Government agency.

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Rabbi HIRSCH. We are dealing with a complex problem here. Referring to the specific issue of the nuclear test ban treaty and the dissemination of information concerning the treaty by the ACDA, that Agency performed for us and for the Nation an invaluable service. The absence of that information would have meant great confusion, I believe, in the thinking of the populace.

Now, whether or not that type of information relates specifically to the subject contained here, namely, of pending legislation, is something I am not qualified to answer. My own view would be that if the intent of section 4(d) is to prohibit the Agency from disseminating the type of information they did in connection with the nuclear test ban treaty, I would be adamantly opposed to section 4(d).

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to join you in your opposition. I believe that the American public should be informed. Therefore, I believe the Congress ought to give guidelines to the ACDA as to the extent that they may disseminate information.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara, any questions?

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret very much my unavoidable delay. I had anticipated listening to you, Rabbi. I have been reading your splendid statement and in the underlying thought I am in complete agreement.

I note that you suggest that we should restore the \$15 million figure, and you point out the large sums of money we are spending for arms, and certainly \$15 million is a small sum of money to spend for peace.

I read with interest and inspiration your statement. You have made an outstanding contribution to our hearing.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Rabbi Hirsch.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, September 18, 1963.)

## TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room H-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. Let's come to order.

The committee meets this morning in executive session on legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Our witness this morning is the Honorable William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. Foster, at your previous appearance the committee requested that you appear in executive session. You have a short prepared statement.

### STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I thought it would be helpful to hit a few of these points before the questioning. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you again.

I realize that the prime purpose of this hearing is to enable the committee members to ask questions. However, with your permission, I would like to read a statement that may clarify some points about which you are concerned.

When I appeared before you on August 29, I spoke in detail of the importance of adequate funding for our research program. Some of you expressed concern about overlapping or duplication of research. It was also suggested that some of our research projects should be conducted by other agencies.

Two years ago this committee held hearings on the arms control and disarmament bill. Many Government officials testified concerning the need for a coordinated research effort in this field. The creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency resulted. One of the four primary functions assigned the Agency was "the conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation."

Section 35 of the act authorized the President to establish procedures for coordinating the Government's total effort in the field of arms control and disarmament. The President established such procedures in Executive Order 11044.

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The Executive order was coordinated by the Bureau of the Budget with the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other interested agencies. One of the main objectives was to avoid overlap and duplication in research.

To assist in carrying out the responsibility for coordinating Government research in this field, an ACDA Research Council was established promptly after the Executive order was issued. This Council is composed of the principal bureau and office heads of the Agency. It advises me on three categories of arms control and disarmament research:

- (1) Studies undertaken by ACDA staff;
- (2) ACDA contract research studies; and
- (3) Staff and contract studies of all other agencies.

My directive to the Research Council stressed the importance of preventing overlapping or duplicating research within ACDA and between ACDA and other agencies.

The affected agencies designated in the Executive order include the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. These agencies submit to ACDA semiannual reports covering all current or contemplated research projects in the field of arms control and disarmament.

On the basis of the reports, the Research Council prepares an evaluation of all Government research in the field. I submit these reports to the Bureau of the Budget. This semiannual review focuses our attention regularly on the overall Government effort and puts us constantly on watch for duplication.

As a further means of preventing duplication in research, we require Agency officers responsible for individual research projects to coordinate the substantive scope of each planned contract or grant with other appropriate agencies. They do this before we request contract proposals for the study. Thus, there is assurance against duplication of effort as well as an opportunity to improve the subject matter of the study through consultation with others.

On the basis of the information we obtain through these coordinating mechanisms, we do research that has not been done and that we believe needs doing. Our effort to avoid duplication and unnecessary overlapping is, I might add, considerably more than was done prior to the creation of the Agency.

Despite the fact that the Agency uses the research capabilities and facilities of other Government agencies to the fullest extent possible, there are large areas of study where work sponsored by ACDA is necessary and appropriate.

As Commisisoner Haworth of the AEC told you in 1961:

The bill before you endows the proposed Agency with extensive authority to sponsor research in its own and other facilities under a variety of conditions. This authority is necessary. As you know, Mr. Chairman, existing Government agencies have carried out programs of research in the field of disarmament \* \* \*. At the same time we feel that not enough has been done \* \* \*.

\* \* \* \* \*

The new Agency, as the organization primarily responsible for disarmament, should have authority to carry on research quite independently of other agencies. This will preserve its independence in cases where a completely separate evaluation should be made, and will make it possible to proceed where available



assistance from other agencies may not be adequate. Even more importantly, the Agency's own research will provide the core around which the program can be integrated.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric also asserted the importance of the new Agency doing independent research :

There should be an arm of Government to exhaust the possibilities of such measures and to explore their implications with respect to our military capabilities, our economy, and our collective defense alliances. Hence, the need for a separate agency to focus solely on disarmament and arms control, an agency which will have no other responsibilities to divert it from these vital concerns.

\* \* \* \* \*

The establishment and operation of such an agency, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State \* \* \* should in no way impair the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.

If the Government's program in this field is to constitute a cohesive whole, the research work of other Government agencies must be supplemented. And, in a context of dollar amounts, the \$11 million which we have requested for fiscal year 1964 research is certainly supplemental in nature. By comparison, the Department of Defense has spent over \$168 million on Project Vela alone.

Mr. BARRY. What is Vela?

Mr. FOSTER. Vela is the activity for research on the detection means for atomic tests. It is applied to the three environments, underground, the atmosphere, and space, and the total authorizations are almost a quarter of a billion dollars now, of which this \$168 million has already been spent.

A little reflection on the character of the arms control problem will illustrate why independent research by ACDA is required to fill out our knowledge.

It was suggested during the hearings several weeks ago that there is a great similarity between the problem of intelligence gathering, or military reconnaissance, and the problem of arms control inspection. While this is true in part, it is also true that there are many significant differences.

Intelligence gathering is accomplished primarily by covert means. Arms control inspection, conducted pursuant to negotiated agreements, would not be similarly inhibited.

This means that there are important differences in the types of sensing equipment utilized and in the potential of aerial and other reconnaissance systems.

Thus, under mutually agreed inspection procedures, there is the possibility of having overt observers on the ground in the territory to be inspected. Such observers could be equipped with sensing and recording devices impossible to use in clandestine intelligence operations.

Arms control agreements may even provide for locating inspectors within military production facilities. This type of observation has no counterpart in intelligence operations.

Studies of these types of inspection are not ordinarily pursued under other Government research programs. Such studies encompass a large range of research necessary to fill gaps in our overall knowledge.

We have similar requirements for research in areas other than inspection. For example, we must understand fully possible changes in the military environment which would result from formally nego-

tiated arms control agreements, and we must explore thoroughly the economic implications of arms control and disarmament measures.

I want to emphasize this need for understanding the problem of economic adjustment to steps toward arms control. The problem sometimes is posed as one without solution. This overlooks the fact that the United States grew to affluence with a very limited defense budget.

We have successfully mobilized for war and converted back to peace several times in the past several decades. We are neither dependent upon defense spending for our prosperity nor incapable of reorienting our production base while continuing our economic growth.

This is not to suggest that a reduction in defense spending will not create problems. But research and planning can prepare the way and can help to solve these problems.

Studies in this area are an important part of our projected program. Again, we plan to conduct this program in cooperation, and after coordination, with other relevant agencies, including, in this area, State and local governmental entities.

Certainly we plan to look to State and local authorities, as well as to industry and labor, to obtain accurate information on the probable economic implications of arms control.

I see no useful purpose in delaying investigation and preparation for economic impact until disarmament prospects appear more immediately promising. The sooner we do our homework in this area, the better prepared we will be to cope with such readjustments as may be necessary.

In addition to our extensive effort to coordinate research work by all Government agencies in the field of arms control, we make every possible attempt to utilize existing capabilities. Where studies, capabilities, or facilities of relevance are available, we use them.

If a small addition to an existing DOD contract will provide us with necessary information, the Agency endeavors to use DOD as the contracting agent. For example, ACDA has made arrangements with the DOD to use the computation facility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in the Pentagon. This arrangement allows ACDA to benefit from the extensive DOD investment in a facility designed to analyze different military force postures.

There are also many cases where a project is of mutual interest and where joint sponsorship is desirable. In such instances, we may use the other agency as the contracting agent.

Probably the most important example of such an arrangement is our inspection field test program, Project Cloud Gap. This is a joint ACDA-DOD effort concerned primarily with the test and evaluation of inspection procedures. It involves some considerations that are not encountered in ordinary military intelligence operations.

To assure that the Cloud Gap project makes full use of all existing knowledge, however, a Steering Committee, composed of senior representatives of ACDA, DOD, CIA, and AEC, has been established. This Committee reviews the Cloud Gap program and makes its recommendations before any major element of the program receives final approval by ACDA and DOD.

Most of the Cloud Gap inspection equipment and personnel, as well as the equipment to be inspected and monitored, will be supplied

by the DOD. The planning of the program, however, is a joint effort and ACDA has primarily responsibility for analysis and evaluation.

The detailed planning and support contracting for the program will be handled by DOD, using both DOD funds and funds supplied by ACDA. Our projected share for fiscal year 1964 is a little less than half and amounts to approximately \$2.4 million.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Congress has given ACDA overall responsibility for research in this field. If necessary research projects have not been programed by other agencies, it is our responsibility to pursue them. This is our job, and, to the best of our abilities, we perform it without duplication and without infringing upon the functions of other agencies.

As former President Eisenhower said in a letter which Mr. McCloy inserted in the record of your hearings in 1961 :

As we know, negotiation for disarmament is one of the functions of diplomacy, the traditional responsibility of the State Department under the President. But we also know that in today's world, the many included problems in the general one of disarmament are so technical and complex that there is required a special group of statesmen, scientists, international lawyers, and the like, in order to serve effectively the Secretary of State, the President and the country in this important field.

With the help of Congress, this is what we are trying to do.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Mr. Foster, just how deep do you go into inspection systems? I notice you mention one here, Cloud Gap. Does your Agency do research on inspection systems?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, this is a major part of our activity. The Cloud Gap proposal will deal with field tests in many areas. I think one of the most interesting of those has to do with something of concern to the Congress at this moment in time; namely, the detection of atomic tests by the other side. While this program, as I indicated, as far as research goes, has been under the administration of the Department of Defense, this I think was because we were not at that time in business. Actually we are the largest clients of that research program.

We are also very much engaged in the establishment of procedures under which they will make their research, and I think have worked very closely in the laying out of fields which they should devote themselves to. This is an executive session——

Chairman MORGAN. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. [Security deletion.] We are thoroughly familiar with the actual detection system in our country and it is because of our knowledge of, our contribution to, and the close working relationships that we have with this, that we have felt confident when we undertook negotiations on such things as the present three-environment test ban treaty, depending in this case on our national systems and without onsite inspection.

The reason we are able to do this is that this system has been operating. We know the results. We have watched these results every day in finding events that happened around the world and we are conscious of the solid scientific basis for their findings.

The system, of course, because of the emphasis of the proposed treaty, is being expanded, as Secretary McNamara has said in his

testimony, and this will require additional expenditures to make sure that in certain environments the presently perhaps somewhat less than elaborate systems will be expanded to take care of any eventualities. I refer to such things as the ability to detect in outer space.

This, up to now, has not been a matter of concern because nobody has wanted to face the expense of testing in outer space, but if we are concerned with the possible violation of the treaty, it is necessary for us to actually put into operation those elements of the system which we have tested thoroughly but which have not been yet mounted because this was not a condition which required the investment in actual field equipment.

So in this way, Mr. Chairman, we are very definitely concerned with research on the detection systems and have made many suggestions as to improvements to meet the kind of conditions with which we have been dealing in our negotiations.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What role did your Agency have in the agreements in Moscow, Was your personnel present for the signing of the treaty?

Mr. FOSTER. Do you mean the initialing, the negotiating?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes. As a matter of fact the basis for the negotiations was the treaty form which we had worked out a year ago in 1962, which was worked out and initiated by our Agency and then went through the usual process of coordination with the Committee of Principals and then during many months from August 1962 when we had tabled two different forms of treaty, one a comprehensive treaty and one a treaty covering the three environments. We had continued negotiations at Geneva on the subject and also, as a representative of the President, in January I conducted negotiations with Mr. Fedorenko and Mr. Tsarapkin in New York and Washington and then I continued them in Geneva starting in the spring.

When the apparent change in state of mind was exhibited by Mr. Khrushchev in his July 2 speech which indicated the possibility of a negotiation of this present treaty, we immediately again called a meeting of the Committee of Principals. It was decided that Mr. Harriman would be sent to Moscow as the representative of the President in view of his many contacts with Mr. Khrushchev, but the drawing up of the instructions, that part of the activity was at our initiation and done by us, of course with cooperation again of the Committee of Principals and finally with the President, and when the mission was selected, my deputy, Mr. Fisher, was Mr. Harriman's deputy. The scientists who went were our scientists. The interpreter was our interpreter, the secretaries were our secretaries, so that we made up some 40 or 50 percent of the delegation and in the drafting committee, Mr. Fisher was the actual member of the drafting committee that worked with the representative of the Soviet Union in the final drafting of the treaty.

The signing, of course, that was kind of ceremonial. I went along as a member of the delegation for the signing, but we have participated in every step of this negotiation all of the way through.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I appreciate that very much.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Foster, in your discussion of the coordination of these programs may I inquire whether or not in the many other departments, particularly the Defense Department, but State and others, you find a lack of cooperation in coordinating these efforts which you have described?

Mr. FOSTER. No, Mr. Burleson, quite frankly we don't. We have had the finest cooperation from the members of the Committee of Principals, which includes the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the AEC, Director of Central Intelligence, and various other members, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now I don't mean to say by that that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were always enthusiastic about every proposal we made to look at the possibility of reducing, for instance, the level of forces in connection with a general and complete disarmament program, but as far as willingness to give us technical information on it, it is of the finest.

We have, as I have said previously, 13 field grade officers on reimbursable detail to the Agency, very good people, colonels, captains in the Navy, and a vice admiral,—an active vice admiral—heads our Weapons Control Bureau.

Our scientists have the closest relationship with these men that I have been talking about.

Speaking of this, Harold Brown and his colleagues in Defense Research and Engineering Group, and my own personal relationships with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Barber, are of the finest as they are with these other gentlemen to whom I have referred, so that we do have excellent cooperation.

The President's own interest in this field was evidenced on many occasions when the Committee of Principals met with him in order to give him the final recommendations or the points of view which are in the minds of the various members of the Committee. The Executive order, which was issued, following the passage of the act, makes it clear that as Director I have access to the President at any time on questions of differences between us and the Department of Defense, always after I have made my position clear to the other side and he in turn has made his position clear to me.

So this works very well. As I say, there are differences, obviously. This is a very important, complicated field, and there are differing approaches to many of these considerations, but it has been a harmonious and a coordinated activity and I think there is some evidence of this in the testimony which is being given on the test ban treaty.

It has been thoroughly coordinated through this procedure.

Mr. BURLESON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, I have only one question, following up what you said about the nature of your relationship with the other agencies. You have said quite frankly that there have been differences between your agency and the Department of Defense. I notice also that you quote President Eisenhower in your statement.

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I would like to refer to section 22 of the act which says:

In carrying out his duties under this act, the Director shall under the direction of the Secretary of State, have prime responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this act.

The quote from President Eisenhower says that negotiation for disarmament is one of the functions of diplomacy, the traditional responsibility of the State Department under the President. Then he goes on to say that the problems are so technical and complex that there is required a special group of statesmen, scientists, international lawyers, and the like, in order to serve effectively the Secretary of State, the President, and the country.

My question is this: How has the relationship between your Agency and the Department of State developed? Is there a clear subordination of your efforts to the Department of State? You mentioned that the Department of Defense and yourselves have differing views. Do you have different views with the Department of State, or is the Secretary of State clearly your boss?

This language was inserted, if my recollection is correct, so that there would be a clear chain of command through the Secretary of State. Is that not so?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, that is so. I operate under the direction of the Secretary of State, except in the coordination of research functions within the U.S. Government. In that capacity I report directly to the President of the United States or in matters of different views I report to the President of the United States.

Now as to the actual way this works out, we, of course, are housed in the Department of State. We have maintained the independence of the Agency as such, and we have different offices than they do, but coordinating every day. For instance, in our dealings with the European scene we coordinate with the Soviet desk and the European Bureau. The Secretary of State I see and talk to every day.

He has said publicly that he spends 50 percent of his time in this field. The papers which he has, the position papers on this field, are prepared by us. They are, of course, commented on by his Bureaus, but my line to him is direct, and in the meeting of the Committee of Principals, he is the Chairman of that Committee, and I am a member.

Of course, when we go to the President, he is the man who sets forth the issue and the general results of the discussion and usually calls on me to outline the details of such issue before the President. On the organization chart of the State Department there is a dotted line from the Secretary of State to me, and under me there is this Agency, and we are shown separately on the organization chart.

So while this is a direct chain of command in the negotiating field and in the fields in which the State Department has this responsibility traditionally and constitutionally, there is no doubt that I report to the Secretary of State, but the orders to my organization come through me and not through State Department officials at other levels.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I gather from what you say that the relationship is harmonious.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But there is definitely a subordination on your part to the Secretary? I am not sure what the direction on his part consists of. Does he determine whether you should, or should

not, involve yourself in some matter or whether it belongs to the State Department?

Mr. FOSTER. It usually works the other way. We initiate, Mr. Frelinghuysen—arms control and disarmament is a fairly readily defined phase of international negotiations and in this field it is customary that we will prepare a position or an idea or create the basis for a negotiation which then I will usually discuss with the Secretary in general terms. Then I come back and we put it in further detail, at which point it would be discussed at an appropriate level with the Bureau in the State Department, an opposite member of one of my Bureaus.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You say your office initiates. Does that mean you don't have to clear with anybody, presumably the Secretary, before you initiate a project? He surely has the power to veto and say, "I think it would be better for you to utilize available personnel on some other project."

Mr. FOSTER. When I say "initiate," what we do is we are charged with the formulation of policy in the fields of arms control and disarmament. For example, we may in our discussions and staff meetings conceive that in the upcoming General Assembly it would be desirable to have this sort of approach to a particular item which might be of interest to the Soviet Union.

We would normally discuss this detail in our own shop. As a matter of good business we would probably also then discuss it with the International Organization Bureau in the State Department, but we would not allow a veto from that office to prevent my going to the Secretary with it, if we continued to think it was a good idea.

We would use, however, whatever knowledge was in that other office to make our idea a better one.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But there is no question about the Secretary's capability to veto a suggestion which you think is good if he thinks it is inadvisable?

Mr. FOSTER. Except that I could also take it to the President if I felt strongly enough about it, but I should state that the Secretary of State and I have for 2 years had the finest of relationships and I recall no instance where that has occurred.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Foster.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, I take it if there were any matters in dispute with regard to policy, the decision probably would be made by President Kennedy, wouldn't it?

Mr. FOSTER. If it is a basic decision, and I feel strongly about it, I am sure the Secretary of State would want me to take it to the President.

Mr. O'HARA. And all of us know that the President would make the decision if it were a matter of vital concern.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; he certainly would.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Foster, I was interested in the emphasis that you place on the readjustment of the economy from a wartime basis to a peacetime basis, on page 7 of your statement.

Is there any other agency working in the vitally important field of readjustment of the economy?

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Mr. FOSTER. We have, Mr. O'Hara, attempted to generate perhaps more active interest in this. We have initiated and stimulated an interagency committee chaired by the Council of Economic Advisers, with a membership consisting of the DOD, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and ourselves, to have each of the member agencies of that committee look at the parts of concern to them in this field.

We have also worked closely with an industry advisory group which the Secretary of Defense set up, consisting of representatives of the large contractors and our Mr. Alexander, Assistant Director for Economics, is a member of that committee. That committee is starting on field trips to various States in league with the State governments and the community governments, starting next month, I think, with California—obviously because of its large defense interest—but will go to other States, Illinois, Colorado, Michigan, going down the line to attempt to stimulate at the local level, a study of this.

We have not been satisfied that this has been actively enough pursued. We doubt that it can be done best by us, but we think again that we can be a catalyst in this to stimulate this approach at levels where the primary interest resides; namely, in the fields of industry and in the fields of the local and State governments, and we are hopeful that by working with the other interested Federal agencies, that this can be gotten well along.

The interagency committee, to which I referred, meets quite regularly now, and as I say, they have started an active campaign of starting the word to the other levels of government and of industry.

Mr. O'HARA. I noted, Mr. Foster, your statement that the problem sometimes is posed as one without solution. Now you do not reach that same conclusion?

Mr. FOSTER. I certainly do not. I think that while the evidence after World War II—while the conditions after World War II were quite different than would occur following an arms control or disarmament program, nonetheless there were many similarities. We were quite able in World War II by prior planning to meet these conditions of very abrupt demobilization and disarmament successfully.

You recall we started to plan for the contract termination process the week after Pearl Harbor, in the Department of Defense, and all during that period plans were made, the office was established, procedures were all worked out with industry and within the Government to take care of the situation which would arise when the war terminated.

Also we stimulated and worked with committees such as the Committee for Economic Development, which encouraged planning at the community level for that turnover. It happened that I was Director of Purchases for the War Department at the end of the war, and I am aware of the fact that we canceled almost a hundred billion dollars worth of contracts in practically 24 hours.

You will recall the demobilization of personnel was in the neighborhood of 11 million in the course of 18 months. We were able to meet that condition.

True, it was a situation where consumer demand had been built up greatly, but this was a very rapid process. It was not comparable to any disarmament problems I can now envisage, but nonetheless we should begin to plan now for conditions that would occur.



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Mr. O'HARA. How much money do you devote to reseach in the economic field?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, it has not been great in the past year, Mr. O'Hara. We have an expanded program for the coming year, which, if we were to get the \$11 million we are asking for for research—I think it runs in the vicinity of a million—I will get you that figure.

Mr. O'HARA. Could that program wisely be expanded?

Mr. FOSTER. I doubt that it requires an expansion in the present period. I think that the major thing to be done now is to establish some of these mechanisms, to have some research into the distribution of contracts, the possible diversion of certain of these to other figures—I am corrected, it is \$500,000 for the 1964 fiscal proposal, but the major part of it is in the planning field, with some research into economic impacts on particular regions and we can supply for the record the title of those particular research projects.

(The information is as follows:)

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

LIST OF FISCAL YEAR 1964 STUDIES CONCERNED WITH THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. "Economic Impact of Specific Arms Control and Disarmament Measures in the U.S.S.R." (Described on app. 10 of presentation book.)
2. "Effect of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Electromagnetic Industry (United States)." (Described on app. 29-30 of the presentation book.)
3. "Methods for Analyzing Defense Employment (a Feasible Study)." (Described on app. 30 of presentation book.)
4. "Regional Case Study (Economic Impact)." (Described on app. 31 of the presentation book.)

Mr. FOSTER. We have selected as particularly affected by such cuts the electronics industry so we would make a survey of the electronics industry during the year and then these regional studies which I had referred to would also be part of the research activity.

We have in the past, as you probably know, published two studies of the economic and social consequences of disarmament. One was published in 1962 and the other was our contribution to the United Nations study in the fall of 1961.

Mr. O'HARA. Is all the research in that field without duplication?

Mr. FOSTER. I know of no organized approach to this except that which we have now begun to study. We had established an advisory panel on this in 1961 and some of the members of that panel have gone on and written individual studies following that experience, and, of course, the United Nations has now published two studies—one a country-by-country study and one a general study produced by a panel which they selected and they used much of our material, incidentally, in both of their studies.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Foster. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for going over my 5 minutes.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Barry.

Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster and Mr. Fisher, it is my understanding that you are before us now wanting a \$20 million authorization for use during the next 2 years; is that correct?

Mr. FOSTER. We wanted—our request, Mr. Barry, was for an open authorization, and our budget request was \$15 million for fiscal 1964.

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The Senate passed a bill in which they gave us—they authorized \$20 million for 2 years which was less than we had requested, and would entail a very substantial cut in our research program.

Mr. BARRY. What did you spend for fiscal year 1963, just ended?

Mr. FOSTER. \$6,100,000, roughly, and on research, \$3,560,000.

Mr. BARRY. So roughly \$10 million was expended during fiscal 1963?

Mr. FOSTER. No; of the \$6.1 million, \$3.5 million roughly was for research.

Mr. BARRY. So, \$10 million each year, 1964 and 1965, which the Senate has put in, does represent about a 50-percent increase over the amount expended in the last fiscal year?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. Not—on personnel it would not represent that much; it would represent about 10 or 15 percent on personnel and would represent on research about a 50-percent increase.

Mr. BARRY. You believe that the Senate bill should be amended to increase it?

Mr. FOSTER. I feel very strongly that the reduction from \$11 million to about \$6 million for research will have a real impact on a research program which is actually just getting underway and is becoming more and more useful. The first year or year and a half we had to build our organization. We had to get contractors who understood this procedure. We had to develop a set of sources and we are in a position now to take advantage of what has been built and a reduction to the \$10 million has its impact primarily on the research program and I think quite frankly, as I have expressed before, I feel very strongly that this kind of investment in this kind of research has the possibility of tremendous payoffs and I therefore am deeply of the opinion that the interests of the United States would be better served by a research program which we had very carefully prepared and which incidentally would be fully useful in this field.

Mr. BARRY. You are holding up on the letting of those contracts until an authorization and appropriation is made; is that correct? Are they in that stage of development?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We have no funds to allocate for research at all because the only authorization that we have is \$1,669,000 which is the remnant of the original 10. Therefore we are just barely able to keep our personnel together and we have not felt it wise to request proposals for any contracts except one very small one, which I felt was so urgent it should be placed in any event, so that this means that for a number of months that we have been unable—as we were last year unable—to place any research contracts because of the lack of adequate authorizations.

Mr. BARRY. Would you say that your efforts are being rather seriously crippled by this lag of time and also the indefiniteness with respect to how much money you are going to have?

Mr. FOSTER. I think delayed, I would not say seriously crippled. My instructions to the organization are that they are to go through all of the negotiating process with the contractors to the extent that they can on the clear understanding that we do not have the money, but we are hopeful of getting it.

However, in view of the uncertainty of course we are not able to move ahead, for instance, with such important contracts at a rate that

I would like to, such important contracts as the Cloud Gap situation which is a field test of verification machinery and which had in our program been allocated \$2,400,000.

If we are to be limited to the Senate level, I would feel it unwise to devote that high proportion of our available funds to that contract.

Mr. BARRY. Defense does participate?

Mr. FOSTER. Defense participates extensively and they finance that particular contract a little more than 50 percent because of their belief that it would be a valuable thing to undertake.

Mr. BARRY. What concerns me, Mr. Foster, is all these reports are made and then you say on page 3 that they are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget. Just what does the Bureau of the Budget do about them?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, the Bureau of the Budget submission is an internal audit process to examine, to see whether duplication has been eliminated.

Mr. BARRY. But you have already done that.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, they just want to check to make sure that we have. They do not make any substantive use of these reports. Those are used by us and by other agencies.

Mr. BARRY. Are they being used?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mr. BARRY. And are they acting on your studies and the research that has been developed thus far?

Mr. FOSTER. Very definitely. In our negotiating we have used a good deal of this background.

Mr. BARRY. Has there been a considerable saving to our defense posture or defense budget, shall we say, arising out of this?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir: I cannot say that it has as yet. We have two agreements which we have negotiated. One is the so-called hot line which is in operation, and I attended one of the test runs in the Department of Defense the other day on this. It is tested every hour on the hour to make sure that the lines are open, and this agreement was a development of some of our studies, of means by which we might reduce the risk of war.

The second agreement, of course, is the nuclear test ban treaty, in the three environments and the ability to accept this with, in our belief, full confidence in our ability to detect, is partially due to some of the research that we did on detection systems and seismology, so there is no real saving as yet, Mr. Barry, but this is contemplated for the future.

Mr. BARRY. It is contemplated and hoped for?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes.

Mr. BARRY. You say on page 6:

We require Agency officers responsible for individual projects to coordinate the substance and scope of each planned contract with other appropriate agencies.

Does that mean you have the authority to say to an agency of Government, "Look, this thing is being done elsewhere and you can't do it," or does it just mean that you point it out to them and then it is up to them to use their good business discretion in seeing that it not be done?

Mr. FOSTER. The word "coordinate" is a magic word in Government, as you know. The process would normally be that we would point

out to the Department of Defense that this is something that we had done, or we thought could be done better in another way, if we had that feeling.

In the normal course of events there would be a discussion between our two staffs. It might come up to the Secretary of Defense and me to decide which of us should do it, or whether it should be done at all; but the normal process is that if it is pointed out at the staff level, there is a discussion and one side or the other agrees that they will adopt it, we will take it up.

Mr. BARRY. Well, has it actually——

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, this has occurred.

Mr. BARRY. Has it worked so that it does eliminate and prevent the overlapping?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Barry, it has reduced that overlap, I am quite confident.

Mr. BARRY. You say on page 7 that you must explore thoroughly the economic implications of arms control and disarmament measures and in answer to Mr. O'Hara, I think you indicated that some half million dollars had gone into this.

Mr. FOSTER. Was proposed to go into it.

Mr. BARRY. Well, then at the bottom of the page you say :

We are neither dependent upon defense spending for our prosperity nor incapable of reorienting our production base while contemplating our economic growth.

That seemed a little inconsistent to me. Indeed, if we are not dependent upon defense spending, why spend the money to look into the economic aspects of disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid that is a little bit of shorthand on my part. I meant that our economy is one that depends in the main on other than defense spending, and while defense spending is an important element, it is not necessarily the best way to use our economic resources, and we have in the past, with very low defense budgets, still had a tremendous economic growth and in that sense we don't depend entirely on having defense expenditures to keep our economy healthy.

Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say for the short time you have been in existence, I think you have made remarkable progress.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Beckworth.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, as I interpret what you said, the Agency of which you are the head works very closely with the Defense Department at all times.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it does.

Mr. BECKWORTH. When a major judgment that you make in behalf of your Agency is made, do you think the American people generally know that that judgment at least has the sanction of the Defense Department?

Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid that it has failed to have that knowledge in many instances, and I can assure you I am concerned by that. We make every attempt to make it clear in every congressional appearance that we make that these are concerted judgments. They are always

concerted with the Department of Defense. Our law says that anything we do must be consistent with the national security and I can assure you personally that that has been my guiding light for 25 years, so that anything that we undertake is thoroughly discussed and gone over with these agencies which also have a major interest in national security, sometimes from another viewpoint.

We have a responsibility for the dissemination of information concerning our workings, but we have very modest means by which to carry those out, and I am afraid we haven't done it as well as we should.

Mr. BECKWORTH. That certainly is my feeling, that there are many people in this Nation who honestly do not know that major judgments that you have made in behalf of your Agency are concurred in by the Defense Department. I believe one of the best things that could be done would be to try to acquaint them with that fact.

May I ask this: Has there been any primary decision or judgment made so far by your Agency that has not been concurred in by the Defense Department?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, I can think of none.

Mr. BECKWORTH. That is very comforting and I say again the American people ought to know that and this administration or the next administration, whichever party is represented, as I see it, ought to try to see that there is a greater effort made to see that Americans throughout the Nation do know that the Defense Department is in on these decisions.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, sir. We shall certainly attempt to do it.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. GROSS.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Foster, you have been asked this question in various ways. I want to ask it in another:

Do you accept the Defense Department's opinions as to what is good for our national security or do you appeal such opinions to the President or to the Secretary of State?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't always accept the military judgment as necessarily being the final answer as to the things that are good for the security of the United States. When I say the "military judgment" I mean primarily the strictly military judgment of the military officers.

We have made no judgments which have been accepted by the Committee of Principals and the other agencies which are members of the Committee of Principals which have not been concurred in on a broad basis by those agencies.

The military judgments on some points at the beginning of discussion have seemed to be opposed to the position which we were recommended but when all of the factors have been taken into account, the final judgment as to the national security has been accepted by those other agencies.

Mr. GROSS. Well, you scarcely answered my question. In the event of a disagreement, would you go to the Secretary of State or to the President?

Mr. FOSTER. I would go to the Secretary of State—well, this method is that such questions are discussed by the Committee of Principals, at which are present the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and these other officials. If at the Committee of Principals there is

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a consensus then it is easy. If there is a disagreement, I would certainly reserve the right to go to the President on it if I felt strongly about it.

Mr. GROSS. All right, now is the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented in the Committee of Principals?

Mr. FOSTER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is a member of that committee.

Mr. GROSS. Was the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented in the planning for the Harriman mission to Moscow?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. GROSS. By whom?

Mr. FOSTER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. GROSS. Was there a military man on the Moscow mission?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Mr. GROSS. Why not?

Mr. FOSTER. The instructions were developed by the President's representative and approved by the President, and the mission operated under the instructions which were developed on this side of the water. There was no need of a military man there to carry out the negotiating functions.

Mr. GROSS. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve of the limited test ban treaty which was tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962, and upon which the present treaty is based?

Mr. FOSTER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was present at the meetings at which it was discussed by the President and his advisers and their advice was considered in the decision to proceed with it.

Mr. GROSS. Did they approve?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't think they have to approve in a corporate sense. The President met with his advisers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made some suggestions, some of which were included in the treaty as presented, and the President made a decision that that was the position of the United States and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs accepted that decision as that of the President of the United States.

Mr. GROSS. But you don't care to answer whether they approved or did not approve, is that your answer?

Mr. FOSTER. I don't know that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to take a corporate vote to approve a treaty. They have appeared at the meeting of the Security Council the President had with his advisers and the President must make a decision taking into account all of the advice which is available to him.

Mr. GROSS. Do you personally study the Joint Chiefs of Staff's positions on disarmament issues?

Mr. FOSTER. I certainly do.

Mr. GROSS. Did Mr. Harriman to your knowledge?

Mr. FOSTER. I can't answer that question.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Foster, in the book "Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security," edited by Donald G. Brennan, a statement is made in the foreword by Jerome Weisner, scientific adviser to the President, and I quote:

If the arms race is allowed to continue its accelerating pace, our country will have less security, not more, with each passing year.

Do you believe this?

Mr. FOSTER. I do.

Mr. GROSS. Well, if security is reduced by our building weapons in the so-called arms race, wouldn't it follow that our security would be enhanced by not building weapons?

Mr. FOSTER. It isn't that simple, Mr. Gross. There are a great many interrelated factors in such a situation and the sheer building of arms is not necessarily the way to build security.

Mr. GROSS. In the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament referred to as GCD, which the United States tabled at Geneva on the 18th of April 1962, it is stated under Principles, paragraph (b) (4) of that—

As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to insure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences.

I presume you concur in this since I refer to a document which was produced in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Is this presumption correct?

Mr. FOSTER. That presumption is correct.

Mr. GROSS. Now as the United States and the U.S.S.R. disarm, the U.N. builds a military establishment in order to solve international differences, I assume you would say that is correct?

Mr. FOSTER. Again this is an oversimplification. The principle of this proposal is that as armaments are reduced, other means of verifying, of resolving differences are developed in parallel. As I have said on many occasions, before a process such as this may progress far, many revolutionary changes must take place between nations and in the international institutions which presently are inadequate to supplant such national forces.

Mr. GROSS. Who, Mr. Foster, will control this supreme United Nations military establishment?

Mr. FOSTER. The United Nations, in the third stage of a proposal such as this, which third stage would be 10 years, 15 years, 25 years, a hundred years off, I do not know. It will follow the revolutionary developments to which I have referred.

The United Nations would control the international peace force. It would control it under the type of participation in which sovereign nations have their say in that control. It would be also associated with an improvement in the functions of international law. There would be international disarmament organizations which would undertake verification procedures to guarantee that people were not violating treaties undertaken, so what we are talking about is a massive change in political and personal and human and military relationships.

I do not think this is impossible. Certainly it is a long way off, but the objectives of our country and the objectives of my Agency are set forward very clearly in the law to ultimately work toward a world of stability and peace. I do not think this is a bad objective. To do that you have got to achieve all of these other revolutionary changes. These are what are contemplated in such a plan.

Mr. GROSS. If the ultimate world power rests in the U.N., doesn't that constitute world government?

Mr. FOSTER. The ultimate power rests in the U.N. which is an organization of independent states.

Mr. GROSS. An organization of independent states?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

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Mr. GROSS. I wonder how the majority—does the majority of the 112 members of the U.N. have a tradition calling for civil control of the military?

Mr. FOSTER. We still have a Security Council.

Mr. GROSS. Well, that is scarcely an answer to my question. Does a majority of the 112 members of the U.N. have a tradition calling for civil control of the military?

Mr. FOSTER. I can't answer that. I would suspect they do. I don't know how big the majority is.

Mr. GROSS. That is a rather civilized concept, is it not, civil control of the military?

Mr. FOSTER. It is our concept.

Mr. GROSS. Wouldn't you like to see that as the concept of any international military power?

Mr. FOSTER. I happen to agree that it is a good concept. I do not believe that it is absolutely certain that our concepts of government will always be accepted by all of the other nations of the world.

Mr. GROSS. Well, that is the danger of this thing, one of the real dangers of this setup which you have proposed and with which I don't agree for one minute. Certainly all of us would like to see disarmament, but not on the basis of vesting the military power and the sovereignty of the United States in the United Nations or any agency of the United Nations.

Mr. FOSTER. I don't think we do that, Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Well, that is what you propose.

Mr. FOSTER. I don't think so.

Mr. GROSS. I suspect I have used my 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to come back. I have additional questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, on page 9 of your statement you mentioned that a special steering committee was established, made up of your Agency, the Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to assure that the Cloud Gap project makes full use of existing knowledge. My question is, Does your Agency or the special steering committee have any knowledge of a test being made recently in the Antarctic?

Mr. FOSTER. Nuclear test?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, or any nuclear explosion.

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, we do not.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, I was looking at your proposal in this green book in the appendix on page 3, you refer to a peacekeeping panel study at Johns Hopkins University, at a cost of \$87,000. Could you tell me who the panelists were in that study, or could you supply the names?

Mr. FOSTER. I will supply the names. I will have to supply the list. (The information is as follows:)

MEMBERS OF THE PEACEKEEPING PANEL, CONTRACT NO. ACDA/GC-19, WITH  
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Arnold Wolfers (chairman of the panel), director, the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, affiliated with the School of Advanced International



Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, 1957 to present date; consultant, Department of State, 1960 to present date; consultant, Department of the Army, 1960 to present date; professor, international relations, Yale University, 1944-57.

Dr. Wolfer's publications in the field of international relations include: "Britain and France Between Two Wars"; "Alliance Policy in the Cold War"; "Discord and Collaboration"; and numerous articles concerning international affairs.

Livingston T. Merchant, research associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research; formerly, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1959-61; U.S. Ambassador to Canada, 1956-58 and 1961-62; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1953-56 and 1958-59.

Charles Burton Marshall, research associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1959 to present date; formerly, member, policy planning staff, U.S. Department of State, 1950-53; political adviser to Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1955-57; visiting research scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1958-59.

Mr. Marshall's publications include: "The Limits of Foreign Policy," and numerous articles concerning international relations.

Robert E. Osgood, professor, American foreign policy, the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University; research associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research; formerly, professor of political science, University of Chicago.

Mr. Osgood's publications include: "Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations"; "Limited War—The Challenge to American Strategy"; "NATO—The Entangling Alliance"; and numerous articles on international relations.

Robert W. Tucker, professor, political science, Johns Hopkins University, 1961 to present date; from 1954 to 1961, assistant and associate professor, political science, Johns Hopkins University; research associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research 1961 to present date.

Mr. Tucker's publications include: "The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea"; "The Just War"; and numerous articles on international relations.

Paul Y. Hammond, research associate, the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research; assistant professor of political science, Yale University.

Mr. Hammond's publications include: "Organizing for Defense"; "Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets"; and numerous articles concerning international relations.

Laurence W. Martin, associate professor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1961 to present date; formerly, instructor in political science, Yale University, and assistant professor, MIT.

Mr. Martin's publications include: "The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs"; "Neutrality and Non-Alignment"; and numerous articles on international relations.

Mr. THOMSON. What did they do, read papers at that panel?

Mr. FOSTER. No; they had seminars, meetings, read papers, prepared papers, discussed papers. Papers are prepared by members of the panel and they are discussed by members of the panel in panel meetings.

The contract extends for a year and we have real confidence due to the level of the experience of the members of the panel that this will be a very useful exercise.

Mr. THOMSON. Well, could you tell us what specific accomplishments of importance to your Agency came out of this panel study?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, we don't have much to go on this. We have only had 3 months of this particular contract. Our officers do participate in these panel discussions and therefore the officers have gained by exposure to the thinking of these panel members, but the study is not complete. It will not be complete until the middle of next year but we have confidence that we will gain from this.

Mr. THOMSON. Now, on page 6 of the appendix, I notice you contributed \$14,500 to the State Department.

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Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMSON. To provide an installment of printing costs on a State Department digest which was then already well underway and I wonder why you would contribute to such a cost.

**STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY**

Mr. FISHER. If I could respond to that, Mr. Thomson. This is the Whiteman edition of Hackworth's Digest. Those of you familiar with international law know the great role that has had. The question was, Should we have international materials dealing with disarmament appear in that digest, in which case the cost might properly be picked up by us or whether we should have a separate section? It appeared to us quite appropriate that we felt we were in good company if we had the materials dealing with the structure of disarmament in the total digest. It is a very small part of the total cost. This is a current bringing up to date of the old Hackworth Digest, last printed, I think, in 1941. It is being brought up to date by Marjory Whiteman, an Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department, an extremely brilliant lawyer, to bring it up to date, 1962 as it is put out. We wanted to be included as a part of the overall publication. We felt that was better for us than to have one of our own dealing with the international legal materials, insofar as they bore on disarmament.

Mr. THOMSON. Now, I notice on page 27 of the appendix—item 8, page 27, under A.4, you are making a study of disputes of the status of individuals; that is, the status of indigenous natives in South Africa. Do we need to disarm those natives in South Africa or control the armaments there, or what is the purpose of such a study?

Mr. FOSTER. I am informed that some international disputes arise out of disputes between individuals, particularly in some of these newer nations, and these four points are a listing of the kinds of matters which lead to international disputes and A.4 is one such and is being studied with that end in view. If one can find what the basis of a dispute is, it is possible that one might find a better way to solve the situation.

Mr. THOMSON. Did you have an observer in the caucus room last week when there were some individual disputes?

Mr. FOSTER. I am not sure that led to international disputes, Governor Thomson, but maybe it did. Maybe we should have observed it.

Mr. THOMSON. Mr. Foster, in your request for financing, don't you find it rather amazing that the other body passed out a bill for less money than was asked for? The other body is always the body that is looked to to increase the authorizations and isn't this an amazing situation in which you find yourself before this committee?

Mr. FOSTER. I have learned after a great many years not to comment on the relationship between the two bodies. I would rather reserve comment.

Mr. THOMSON. Mr. Foster, do you anticipate that we will receive some specifications on the question of inspection and detection from the CIA—will they testify tomorrow?

Chairman MORGAN. No, Mr. McCone is unable to be here.

Mr. THOMSON. Well, I have had the opinion expressed to me many times that this country was retreating from a strong position taken by the President just a very few short months ago that inspection was essential and would be demanded. Now, when this test ban treaty is proposed, with great fanfare as you say, champagne glasses and peace around the corner, there is no requirement for inspection of any kind. Now, is that because we are retreating from a strong position or is it because of the rapid development of detection devices that were unknown at the time the President made his statement?

Mr. FOSTER. It is no retreat, Governor Thompson. There have been some very substantial advancements in detection capabilities since the President's speech, I think you refer to one early in the year 1962, after the Soviet Union had completed a group of tests. The concern that had been expressed by the President referred primarily to those areas where we did not have the capacity to detect and identify; namely, underground. We have had a long time a considerable capacity to detect in the atmosphere and underwater and a capability for detection in the same way in space. We have a very substantial capability to detect underground. Our concern and our reason for insistence on inspection—onsite inspection—concerned underground tests where we cannot distinguish always the manmade from the natural events. We still do not have complete capacity for underground detection.

The capacity to detect in the atmosphere has been developed over many years. It has constantly improved, partially by virtue of the expenditure of funds under the Vela program, and we doubt that there are any other than the very smallest of explosions which would go undetected, and the smallest explosions, in fact fairly substantial explosions, under the proposed treaty can be done legally underground and therefore it would be unlikely that the Soviet Union attempt to do in the atmosphere an explosion which they could do legally underground with practically the same results. So to answer your question, the capacity of our system is in our being quite capable of detecting and distinguishing events in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space, based purely on U.S. control activities. Therefore, we do not need onsite inspection to support our national security and our ability to determine whether this treaty is being violated or not. We still require—and this has been the basic difference between the Soviet Union and ourselves—we still require onsite inspection in order to distinguish between some manmade explosion underground and certain natural earthquakes. Our capacity so to distinguish others is very good indeed and, as I say, the ability to undertake such tests underground legally is easy. Therefore we feel that onsite inspection or any inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union is unnecessary to protect our rights under this three-environment treaty.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, when your pamphlet, "The Economic Impacts of Disarmament," was first published, I read it at that time and I thought it was very interesting. As I recall now the conclusions seemed to be quite optimistic and also I thought that the basis on which the

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conclusions were founded was not too clear. I just am wondering if you have any feeling of that sort, and secondly is this study being continued, with the objective of having more specification in these findings?

Mr. FOSTER. I think you are right, Mr. Monagan. I think this was a first cut. It was done by a part-time panel, a very distinguished panel, representing a great many sectors, and I think in the circumstances was a good job. We do feel it must be studied more thoroughly. It is being studied more thoroughly. As a matter of fact, the country study which was done for the United Nations was a good deal more complete and was done pretty much by our staff working with an interagency committee consisting of Federal Reserve, Budget Bureau, Commerce, Labor, DOD and State. However, this is a continuing problem and while I share some of the optimistic conclusions of that first study in that the impact would be such that with proper planning it could be made acceptable, we realize that there are certain regions where this is not quite that easy, and, of course, that was a pretty general study and what we are trying to do now is be more specific, get down to industries, regions, that type of approach, to see what can be done, looking at it in advance, to make this transition more acceptable.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, I would hope that the conclusions were correct. As you say, they have been correct in past postwar experience, but that, of course, is no criterion for the present. But I am glad to hear that more study is being given to it, and I am happy, too, that you have clarified your statement on the point of the dependence of the economy on defense spending, because just as an example, Connecticut, which I represent, is a State where a billion dollars of defense money are spent every year. United Aircraft employs 50,000 people, the largest employer by far in the State. Eighty percent of their production is defense production. So obviously the impact there could be very substantial and might be very abrupt.

Mr. FOSTER. I am glad to state that they are one of the companies which has established a disarmament division, as you probably know, which is studying this on their own and also attempting to find ways in which, if it comes, it will be possible to convert. We have had many conversations with them in that direction.

Mr. MONAGAN. But even though meanwhile we study the impact, of course, we get back to the essential question that this whole matter of disarmament is an iffy proposition unless you have a disposition on the part of the Soviets, for example, to enter into meaningful discussions or to have a frame of mind that will make disarmament something practical to talk about, do you not?

Mr. FOSTER. We do. This is very definitely a two-sided game and if we are unable to get appropriate responses from them, it cannot go forward.

Mr. MONAGAN. Now, this is the Arms Control Agency and you do discuss in your statement certain things that perhaps have been substantially contributed to through the activities of this Agency; the hot line, and the test ban treaty, but these are not actually the control or reduction of armaments, are they?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, they are not. They are simply steps in the direction of possible further agreements which might lead to arms con-

trol and arms reduction. The test ban treaty itself does impose control on certain aspects of new weapons development, mainly the large nuclear weapons which can only be tested in the atmosphere and which are prohibited from testing by this treaty and which therefore does impose a certain amount of restriction on further development.

Mr. MONAGAN. Do you feel that the atmosphere exists, or the frame of mind exists insofar as the Russians are concerned, where it is possible now to talk about meaningful reduction or control of armaments?

Mr. FOSTER. Let me say that there has been an obvious change in the state of mind on the part of the Russian negotiators. We are hopeful that this is a permanent change in the state of mind which may lead to other things. It seems quite clear to us from our various contacts, Geneva, Moscow, New York, that there is no intent on their part presently to move toward major arms reduction and disarmament processes. They look at this as a sort of start, perhaps, to some more meaningful things but I think at this moment in time they are thinking of it in terms of other small steps which, when integrated, will gradually build this kind of base. I think this from our viewpoint is completely acceptable and is perhaps a sounder way to proceed. [Security deletion.]

So there appears to be a change in the state of mind here and it is one that can lead, if this is permanent and if this split with the Chinese is what it looks to be, it can lead to more substantial and more meaningful arms control and arms reduction measures.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield briefly?

Mr. MONAGAN. Yes, I would be glad to.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How do you account for the change of mind, Mr. Foster?

Mr. FOSTER. I presently am one who believes that it is largely motivated by the fight between the respective leaders of the Communist world, namely the Chinese-Soviet split. I also think it is occasioned to a degree by the real economic pressures which they are exposed to at this moment in time. They have had a bad agricultural year. It looks as if it may have been a very serious agricultural year. This is an expensive club, and with the diversion that they have had to make from their less plentiful economic resources than ours, I think that they would like very much to have a breathing space in this regard. I think this is another factor. So I think that economic pressures, the fight with the other Communist great nation, I think these two things together have made it politically acceptable to the Kremlin to move somewhat in this direction.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you.

Mr. MONAGAN. Of course, it could all change tomorrow.

Mr. FOSTER. It could, and if Mr. Khrushchev were to die and Mr. Mao were to die and new leaders came in, perhaps they would get together. At the moment I am convinced that this is a serious split.

Mr. MONAGAN. Now, you have spoken about testing the hot line every hour on the hour. How is that done? I am curious to know.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, you know the principle. They supplied us with certain Russian equipment which encodes the messages in Russian and we supplied them with certain American equipment which encodes the stuff in English.

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There are two systems, parallel systems. One is a direct line for the telecommunications activity which is on an encoded typewriter. It is a tape that is run through a typewriter which goes right on the line, direct to Moscow, through London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki to Moscow. The parallel line is a radio line which goes to Tangiers and then direct to Moscow. The land line, of course, is the more dependable and this is the primary line but should that fail on one of these tests then it is presumed that the radio link could be activated in the same way so both links are tested every hour. The English message is initiated on the even hours from the United States and acknowledged in Moscow and on the odd hours it is initiated at Moscow and acknowledged on this end and there is a telecommunications room set up in the Pentagon, in the National Command Center, manned 24 hours a day with Russian interpreters, Russian-speaking officers so that this can be done at any time. Of course, it is switched to the White House by a direct switch in those instances where the President or Khrushchev wants to take command of the channel and then is a direct channel without any dropouts on the line. It has been in operation now since the first of September and the normal test message is the usual "brown dog jumps over the"—whatever it is—except the first message from Russia described in lyrical language the beauties of a Moscow sunset. We have never been able to equal that message. I happen to have a copy of that message, Mr. Chairman, I will give it to you. This is the way it came over the line.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would think we would be ingenious enough to say something original, or maybe poetic each time we test.

Mr. BURLISON. Yes, something about Texas should be appropriate.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Foster, I have heard the claim made that you were given a lot of "retreads" for personnel. Are you happy with the personnel in your Agency?

Mr. FOSTER. I think I personally recruited 90 percent of the top 40 percent of the staff. I acquired and am very grateful for the acquisition of a number of State Department people who have worked in this field, and particularly in my International Relations Bureau, while in my Science and Technology Bureau, in my Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, in the Economics Bureau, I think that there are no people who might be classified technically as retreads and I happen to think I have one of the finest agencies in town, all of the way through. They are a very fine group of people.

Mr. MONAGAN. I didn't mean technically I meant substantially, and I thought because of the importance of this claim that has been made, if correct, I would like to ask you about it and have it put on the record.

Mr. FOSTER. Let me just say—

Mr. FISHER. I am sorry, did you want this on the record?

Mr. MONAGAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, I wanted to say when the Agency was set up there were 50 people in the Disarmament Administration of the State Department and I took all 50 of those people. I suspect I still have 20 or 25 of them but I have 205 people aboard now so that at least 175 people that we have recruited since the Agency actually started in business in September 1961.

Mr. MONAGAN. Are most of those new employees rather than transfers from other departments?

Mr. FOSTER. I would say in science and technology most of them are from outside Government. In the Economics Bureau, it is probably 75 percent from Government. In the weapons evaluation and control group, the military obviously are from the Department of Defense but there are another 25 people and of those 25, 20 of them probably came from outside.

Mr. MÓNAGAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Foster, does your Agency advise the President with respect to the structure of our Armed Forces or with respect to which type of offensive or defensive weapons systems should be kept in operational status?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, we don't. The Secretary of Defense under the Executive order is instructed to keep us advised as to major changes in forces or armaments. We in turn are instructed to keep the Secretary of Defense informed as to proposed arms control and disarmament plans. If there is a major new weapons system projected or major changes in weapons systems are contemplated, if it appears to have an arms control implication, we are normally aware of it and we are privileged to make comments on such plans. but we do not initiate such plans, but, for instance, in the large yield nuclear weapons we felt this had an arms control implication and we made known our comments from an arms control viewpoint as to the possible political and psychological and other effects of such a development. So I think that my answer to your question is we do not advise on new proposals but we comment on those which appear to have arms control and disarmament implications.

Mr. FRASER. Under the claim or guise of economy would you be advising the President as to what weapons systems to employ as against—

Mr. FOSTER. In order to reduce the budget, this sort of thing, do you mean?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. This country has been a party to one or more disarmament agreements in past years. Can you tell me anything about those?

Mr. FOSTER. There have been several, as you have indicated. Of course, there was the naval reduction in the 1920's. The earliest one was the one between us and Canada in 1840, something which was fairly successful but the naval one was not very successful in the 1920's. There have been nonaggression pacts in the past which might be included in your question. These have not been particularly successful.

Mr. FRASER. I take it that in the studies that you have made you take a look at the history of disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Not only as to those in which our Nation has been a participant but as to disarmament enterprises throughout the world.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, we have had some past studies and some current studies on this sort of thing, to see what can be learned from the form of and the results of such agreements.

Mr. FRASER. Is it your impression, Mr. Foster, that sometimes the policies of this country are dictated in large part in the disarmament

field or toward the lessening of armaments by the force of public opinion. I am thinking of what happened after World War II when there was a general consensus apparently that we could demobilize our Armed Forces.

Mr. FOSTER. I am sure that public opinion has an influence on such. It certainly did after World War II, a very strong influence, and I would suspect that it can and will have an influence in the future.

Mr. FRASER. So, Mr. Foster, whether your Agency existed or not this country might well be exploring either unilateral or multilateral disarmament programs, based on our historical experience—on the history of this country?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it is entirely possible that there would be some movement—I am sure that there would be some movement toward such. I happen to think it would not be as wise in the ability to achieve such as it does, having an agency which devotes its time and thought in conjunction with other agencies to the subject.

Mr. FRASER. There is, for example, across the country today a general feeling that nuclear war should be avoided at almost any cost and with this feeling among the public there may be efforts made to do something about the situation. Now, would I be correct in saying that to the extent that your Agency is able to provide refined and careful analysis of the different kinds of disarmament arrangements that might be entered into, that you might help advise the President so as to avoid an imprudent or unwise kind of disarmament program?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Fraser, I would think that this would certainly be a real objective of the work of our Agency and one that I think there is real hope we might contribute to.

Mr. FRASER. In fact, it might be as important to avoid an unwise disarmament agreement as not to have any disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER. I agree with the statement. I think when the chips are down the American public will probably come out with a wise decision but I think we could be helpful in achieving that wise decision.

Mr. FRASER. Now, when we talk about the hot line, you say that it isn't a form of arms control but in a way it is, to the extent that you are attempting to reduce some of the consequences of the political or psychological difficulties that may arise from, for example, a confrontation with the Soviets. At least by the technical device of a hot line you are lessening the chance of an imprudent or accidental war?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; I think we definitely do. I think this contributes substantially to a reduction in the risk of war and in that sense it is an arms control activity. I think had we had this last fall when we were very close to a tragedy I think at times, partially due to the lack of dependable and rapid communications, this would have been a real asset, and I think it can have that potential effect in the future.

Mr. FRASER. I think I asked you these questions before, but just to try to finish my thoughts here, the program that is outlined in the general disarmament agreement that was put on the table at Geneva, does take into account the problems that we would face in the political sphere if we were to disarm or there were to be disarmament. You have already referred to the idea of building up a United Nations police force.



Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; it does, and it outlines in general terms the basis on which the United States would want to proceed in the buildup of such institutions and, of course, it is a progressive plan which only moves forward as the current steps are completed. The plan is designed to have the opportunity to review whether these things have been achieved as the plan progresses and it leaves within the decision of the United States the question of whether to move to the next step, being satisfied that those steps called for have been carried out to the extent that they do protect the security of the United States.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. BURLERSON. Mr. Chairman, if all the members of the committee have completed their initial question may I be permitted a further inquiry?

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. BurlerSON.

Mr. BURLERSON. Mr. Foster, perhaps I should direct my question to Mr. Fisher since it involves legalities.

You may recall we mentioned the amendment by the other body to section 33 of the bill. It comes in subsection 3 of the Senate measure having to do with a change in the wording of that section, striking out "this or any other law" at the bottom of page 2 and at the top of page 3. Further in the proviso, the amendment strikes out the balance of the sentence after the word "except" and inserts "in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States." Now, I take it that there are two purposes involved in this amendment. No. 1, it is intended to assure that agreements which may be consummated under this legislation, be ratified by constitutional procedures. No. 2, it removed that part which says, "Or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States."

It has been interpreted by some that this deleted portion authorizes the House of Representatives, by a majority vote and a majority of the Senate, to pass on matters reserved to the Senate under the Constitution. Now, I assume the repeal of this language removes this possibility. There is always this borderline question as to what should be done by executive agreements and what should be done by treaty. Now, as I understand the constitutional processes, once a provision of law is in effect, its implementation is by executive agreements. To amend a treaty, such as is now before the Senate, may, and in my opinion does, require further action of ratification. I take it this amendment attempts to insure that further agreements under this or any other act—or under any other provisions of law—require ratification by the Senate of the United States, and it would remove the House of Representatives from any authority in determining the issue. Do you agree with this amendment?

Mr. FISHER. Well, this again involves the probabilistic actions of the other body. The term "executive agreement" has been confused, to mean two different things: One, that the President enters into it on his own; or two, that he enters into it by authorization subsequently given or previously given by both Houses of the Congress. Those are two quite separate factors.

If I may violate my statement—I will probably regret it—but when I was asked my opinion of this by the other body, they initially proposed merely to eliminate the—to just leave the words "treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution"—and with the deference of an executive witness I said I thought it inadvisable to do that

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because in my judgment the Constitution did make provision for agreements entered into by the approval of both Houses of Congress. The reciprocal trade programs are an illustration of that. People may argue whether it is wise or not, but the fact that under the Constitution there are some types of agreements that might be authorized by the Congress as opposed to done by treaty, I didn't want to make a—to say well, we can't ever have under any circumstances agreement approved by both Houses of Congress, because that would seem to me to be reflecting on the possible authority of this body in some circumstances where it might exist. As a result the bill that was reported out did not make this change. The change was made on the floor. The change was made on the floor—its sponsor talked like he was merely making the—like he was trying to eliminate any reference to the House. That is the observations that were made when the amendment was proposed.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Which amendment are we talking about now?

Mr. FISHER. We are talking about the amendment made on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The change in the proviso section, or the change with reference to this or any other law?

Mr. BURLESON. It is under the heading "policy formulations," subsection 3 of section 33.

Mr. FISHER. It is in the provisos.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just the proviso?

Mr. FISHER. Yes.

Mr. BURLESON. Originally, as I understood it, a proposal was made to place a period after "Constitution" and the remainder of that sentence was to be deleted. That was the original proposal, as I understand it.

Mr. FISHER. The committee did not act on that.

Mr. BURLESON. That is correct, but then when it came to the floor, the language to which I have just referred was added and the other deleted, which is this last sentence on policy formulation.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir, but it doesn't refer solely to the treaty-making power under the Constitution, as I understand the way it has been passed by the other body.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What in your opinion is the significance of the change, if the gentleman would yield? I don't want to interrupt but does Mr. Fisher feel there is any difference in the significance of the language which is in the law, and the change approved by the Senate?

Mr. FISHER. Well, in my judgment there is no difference; however, reading the legislative history of the sponsor who offered this amendment on the floor, it leads me to think that there is. If I were asked as an opinion for a lawyer, if I may step back into that role, I would say that the constitutional processes of the United States include things like the reciprocal trade program. I don't consider that unconstitutional. So I don't think it changes it. I think, however, the sponsor of the amendment on the floor may think that it does and it would seem to me that this would be an appropriate matter for this group to discuss with your colleagues when, as this bill inevitably does, it goes to conference, just to be sure there is no misunderstanding on this subject.

Mr. BURLERSON. Well, would you agree that supposedly the intent was the two things I mentioned: No. 1, to prevent substantive changes in the form of amendments by executive agreements. That is No. 1, and the other is that it clearly would eliminate the House of Representatives insofar as passing on the implementations or amendments to existing agreements or treaties?

Mr. FISHER. Well, I think of the two objectives, the elimination of the executive agreement obligating us to disarm merely on the basis of the authority of this act, we agree with that. We agreed with the Fountain amendment and in fact I helped Congressman Fountain draft it in this room 2 years ago. So we are perfectly acceptable to the continuation of the language in the act is it now is. In fact, I believe the effect of the Senate language is to continue one portion of the Fountain amendment, that is to state the view of the Senate that this act does not authorize an executive agreement. It requires either subsequent treaty or subsequent act of Congress. Here is where I think what he offered and what he said may have a slight difference. I think it is his view that the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Ohio in fact said it always has to be a treaty and therefore the House of Representatives is precluded from a role. I don't consider that the effect of the language. If it had said as was originally proposed, "only in accordance with the treaty-making power," that would clearly be the language, but where instead it says "except in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States," I would not so interpret it. However, if the sponsor of the language does, it occurs to me that that is an appropriate matter for this group to take up and get cleared up.

Mr. O'HARA. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURLERSON. Certainly.

Mr. O'HARA. Who was the author?

Mr. FISHER. Senator Lausche.

Mr. BURLERSON. From what you have just said, as a constitutional lawyer, I assume you feel that the language proposed in the committee was actually stronger than the language adopted on the floor of the Senate?

Chairman MORGAN. That was Mr. Fountain's opinion.

Mr. FISHER. I think I would agree with that, sir. I think the language that the committee reported out materially settled one of the problems. It did not purport to make a constitutional division between treaties of two-thirds of the Senate and executive agreements approved by the Congress. It let the Constitution be where it is on that subject.

Mr. BURLERSON. Well, what would be wrong in spelling out in some detail, to require that any amendments to this act in connection with disarmament and arms control must be in the form of a treaty, ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate? The language in the latter part would take care of itself. If I am correct, not only would it not be necessary to have the remainder of the sentence, but it also would not be necessary to say that the House of Representatives shall have nothing to do with it. It is automatic. Do you agree with that?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir, not entirely, because it seems to me that there might be some circumstances under which this body would consider it proper to have an agreement approved by a subsequent—mind you, I say a subsequent act of Congress. You might have a somewhat more

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limited type of agreement, the authorization for which—I don't think a general disarmament treaty would be a treaty, obviously, it would go under article II, clause 2 of the Constitution, but there might be some other things that we might want to do and the Congress empowered to regulate the Armed Forces. Now, I am not suggesting that we think we have any authority in this law to do it, the Fountain amendment with which we agree makes that quite clear. But I would not want now to say that never under any circumstances could agreement be—agreement which came for approval of the two bodies of Congress rather than merely the Senate and make that decision now which is what I urged the Senate not to do and I would think that in a sense this body would want to recognize that there are some types of agreement on which it has a coequal role with the Senate—not the ones of greater political significance, but limited agreements—there are some types of agreements on which the approval by both Houses of Congress is a recognized constitutional form of action. I would not want to say that there is nothing in the disarmament field as such that that type of agreement—that would require that type of approval.

Mr. BURLERSON. I don't want to belabor the point but following your thesis, the theory that the House of Representatives may pass on matters not submitted as a treaty, are we to assume that an executive agreement might or could be submitted for approval of both Houses of Congress? Further, if proposed changes come under the category of executive agreements then why would it be necessary or desirable for action of either body of Congress? That is the logical conclusion to what you said, is it not?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir, if I may respectfully disagree, I think there are types of things we could agree to if we had the approval of Congress, given under Congress delegated power, for example, to deal with the Armed Forces, which we would not have the authority to commit the Government on other bases of security power. I think that there is a great area of international authority, the Executive plus two Houses of Congress, then there is the Executive alone, and that it seemed to me was the spirit of the original Fountain amendment. I don't want to speak for Congressman Fountain in his absence.

Mr. BURLERSON. I think you stated it well.

Mr. FISHER. That was the way I understood the spirit of the original Fountain amendment and he wanted to say you might act in two ways to obligate the United States, whichever is proper—treaty or approval by subsequent act of Congress. "We are saying to you now, Don't say that you can do it without or that we have given you that authority in passing this law." That was as I understood the spirit of Congressman Fountain's amendment, and we indicated that the executive branch had no objection to it, we did it with no reservation, we didn't have any objection to it. To the extent that a proposed amendment would eliminate not one of those ruts which we agree should be eliminated but two of those ruts, and say there is only a third, then it would seem to me that that in a sense is maybe a reflection on the role of this body which I don't believe is required by the Constitution, since there might be agreements which we could enter into in this field which we got subsequent statutory authorization for.

Mr. BURLERSON. Well, I am not arguing. I am trying to clarify. After all each tub sits on its own bottom insofar as the implementa-

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tion or amendments to this or any other agreements and finally it comes to rest upon the President of the United States as to what he considers really are executive agreements versus treaties. If he decides it is a substitute agreement there is just not anything the Congress can do about it in any way, is there?

Mr. FISHER. Well, sir, there is, because we deal in a constant continuing relationship with the Congress.

Mr. BURLERSON. Well we can't sue one another. We can pass a bill or we can take any action we please, but the fact is the President can enter into agreements in those matters not considered by him to be a treaty.

Mr. FISHER. Well, sir, I remember once in the Army I was asked by the sergeant, "Lieutenant, here is where you sign your consent." I said, "Sergeant, they can't make me consent." And he said, "No, sonny, they can just make you wish they had." In terms of continuing relationships, if the Congress enacts its view on that, and we act in a way you think is improper, maybe you can't stop us, but you can make us wish we had done it your way, so I am perfectly willing to think that the Fountain amendment as drafted is satisfactory. This is equally satisfactory as I interpreted it. It occurred to me as long as the House and Senate are satisfied on their respective roles then I perhaps should have indicated what I said at the very beginning that a member of the executive branch shouldn't get involved in it. I believe I have discussed this with the Director. That is the reason I am talking about it, and I believe we would be satisfied with the Fountain amendment as originally drafted and we would be satisfied with this as we interpret it that this group and the Senate are satisfied with it. Anything you come up with is all right with us.

Mr. BURLERSON. Would you be agreeable with placing the period as it was originally considered in the Foreign Relations Committee, after the word "Constitution" and leaving the remainder.

Mr. FISHER. Yes; I think I would, provided this body and the Senate were satisfied with this. This is the most important thing. We can't do anything subsequently obligating the United States on the basis of our own authority. That is the reason we agreed with the Fountain amendment in the first place and we would agree to any change of it that this group and the Senate would find satisfactory.

Mr. BURLERSON. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Barry.

Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is changing the subject to a much less deep subject, but one very important to me. You indicated, Mr. Foster [security deletion] that you believe this is a serious break with China. Then you also mentioned something about the Soviets wanting this test ban because it was a breathing space for them. Well, in the light of all that, how are we being affected, if this is all true? Are we relaxing our testing? Is this breathing space merely to accommodate or is there some advantage to us?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, there is a definite advantage to us in that we certainly contribute to the reduction of proliferation of these arms in the rest of the world. We now have 95 signatures on this test ban treaty and I should think that we will have 105 within the next 2 or 3 weeks. [Security deletion.]

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As far as what happens with us, we are actually accelerating our underground test program. We are improving our ability to test in the atmosphere quickly by restoration of facilities on Johnson Island and in the equipment needed to resume atmospheric tests in a hurry. We are beefing up our detection system as I indicated and we are supporting the laboratories with a vigorous development program.

Mr. BARRY. In other words, the net effect of the test ban so far as we are concerned is to accelerate our own experimentation.

Mr. FOSTER. In the underground field. Of course, it does put limits on our test activities in the atmosphere and, therefore, it is a measure of control on the development of larger weapons. I think the major advantage of this, of course, is that it forms a test opportunity as to whether the Soviet Union really is in the process of a fundamental change and whether as time goes on we can build on this first agreement or substantive agreements in the direction of arms control. [Security deletion.]

Mr. BARRY. Last week I was in the Soviet Union and was talking to the Acting Foreign Minister there and he indicated that—

Mr. MONAGAN. Is this off the record now?

Mr. BARRY. No—that there were certain things that there was no possibility of getting together on, where there couldn't be any agreement, and to stay off those subjects, but that we should probe areas where there was some possibility of getting together in the general field of disarmament and the first thing he asked me was what about these things, captive nations you talk about over here. I said, "Well, get your troops out of Hungary and East Germany and Poland and we may not have so much to talk about." He said, "Well, if you get your troops out of Germany we will get our troops out of those other countries." So I just pass that on as a possibility. The question may be rather puerile, but I would like to get some technical answer to the ability of the Soviet Union to so-called incinerate us.

Mr. FOSTER. I think McNamara has put into the public domain the numbers of strategic delivery vehicles which are in the inventories of each side or prospectively will be in the inventories in the course of the next 3 or 4 years. What they have in the way of delivery vehicles and what they have in the way of warheads to our knowledge is such that if they were to mount a surprise attack by airplanes, by missiles, and by submarine-launched missiles it would be possible for them to put on the United States a significant number of megatons of nuclear warheads. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is this public information, Mr. Foster?

Mr. FOSTER. This I am quite sure is public information. Why don't we supply this for the record? There is no doubt but what they can destroy many of our largest cities and probably would run casualties of the order of a hundred million in a surprise attack, with what we know to be in their inventory.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

STATEMENT REGARDING DAMAGE THE SOVIET UNION IS CAPABLE OF INFLICTING ON  
THE UNITED STATES IN A NUCLEAR ATTACK

Secretary McNamara, in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 13, 1963, on the nuclear test ban treaty, gave the following comparison of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces:

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"The U.S. force today now contains more than 500 missiles—Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris—and is planned to increase to over 1,700 by 1966. In addition, the United States has SAC bombers on air alert and over 500 SAC bombers on quick reaction alert.

"By comparison, the consensus is that today the Soviets could place less than half as many bombers over North America on a first strike mission; the Soviets are estimated to have today only a fraction as many ICBM missiles, and their sub-launched ballistic missiles are short range, require surface launch, and generally are not comparable to our Polaris force. Between now and 1966, it is estimated that our ballistic missile numerical superiority will increase both absolutely and relatively."

\* \* \* \* \*  
"That is the very general picture. It is the picture of existing and continuing U.S. nuclear superiority."

From this comparison of nuclear forces, it would appear evident that in spite of Soviet numerical inferiority in its strategic nuclear force, the numbers of Soviet bombers and missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons against targets in the United States are and will continue to be sufficient to inflict very grave damage. This conclusion is emphasized when one considers the comparatively high degree of urbanization in the United States and the fact that the majority of our major urban-industrial complexes which would be likely targets for Soviet attack are located within a few hundred miles of a coastline.

A rough estimate of the damage levels on both sides which could result from a nuclear war was given by President Kennedy in his address to the people on July 26, 1963. The President stated:

"A full-scale nuclear exchange lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians."

Mr. BARRY. If we knew they were going to attack us, if our intelligence showed that, what if anything could we do?

Mr. FOSTER. Our basic policy has been that we would not mount a preemptive attack, that we have placed our missiles in hardened bases or in invulnerable Polaris submarines and others, so that even after they had mounted such an attack, we would have the ability to destroy Russia in a second strike. This is the philosophy of our military posture. How anyone can know in advance what they are sure to do, I don't know. This is the problem of instability, but both sides without any question, Mr. Barry, have this ability to destroy lives up to the hundreds of millions and certainly to completely destroy civilization as we know it, not only in our two countries but probably in the Northern Hemisphere.

Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Foster, I want to turn to your grants and contracts. In fiscal year 1963 ACDA assigned contracts to Bendix, Sylvania, Aerospace, Raytheon, North American Aviation—perhaps others. These are to be found in the appendix—I won't take the time to give the identifying numbers unless someone is interested in them.

These firms manufacture highly specialized equipment and have contracts with the Department of Defense. My question is, Do you find any conflict between the development and sale of equipment for military use on the one hand, and equipment for the ACDA program which, if successful, may result in decrease in sales by these companies to the Department of Defense?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. Our contracts are not hardware contracts. We are not ordering equipment from these companies, we are taking advantage of their engineering and their experience in these activities and in each instance these companies have set up different separate

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departments to—as I indicated in the case of United Aircraft—to study the problems connected with arms control and disarmament, and also to make proposals on research in this field.

The companies which you have mentioned all have defense contracts.

Mr. GROSS. Many millions of dollars of defense contracts?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes; many millions of dollars, and the experience which they have obtained in that regard is available to them in the studies which they make for us, and in many cases the reports that they have made or the studies they have made to the Department of Defense are turned over to us, and in many cases to the contractor for use in meeting these different specifications which we give them in our own contracts.

Mr. GROSS. You find no conflict at all in hiring these firms for the purpose of providing you with information, while they are supplying many millions of dollars worth of materials and services under contract?

Mr. FOSTER. On the contrary, Mr. Gross, we find that this enables them better to meet the specifications and the objectives which the contracts from us ask for. This is done in cooperation with the departments who are their prime contractors in the other field.

Mr. GROSS. Well, do the reports of these contractors suggest directly or indirectly the use of equipment which they alone manufacture or are alone capable of manufacturing?

Mr. FOSTER. I know of no instance of that, sir.

Mr. GROSS. On what basis was each of these firms selected?

Mr. FOSTER. Well, we have a table which I would be very glad to provide for the record, which shows the process by which each of these was placed.

For instance, the Bendix contract with ACDA, No. 1, we invited 15 companies to submit a proposal on this assignment and we received 11 proposals from the 15, and the contract was given to 1 of those invited to bid; namely, Bendix.

Raytheon, we invited nine people to submit proposals, five submitted proposals; Bendix Contract No. 6, we invited 16 to make a proposal, we had 5 additional requests; and incidentally, as we send out a request for proposal we now are apt to get a great many additional proposals, knowing that we are placing contracts which was not true when we started.

Mr. GROSS. Let me ask you this question: Are these all on the basis of invitation?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, not all of them. There are some grants which are made on the basis of an unsolicited proposal which we feel is useful to finance. There are some—

Mr. GROSS. What do you mean by that, Mr. Foster, an “unsolicited proposal.” Do you mean they volunteer to provide you with information and you pay for it?

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct. They come in and say that they believe they have resources to make a useful study on such and such a subject. I will read. These are the instances where the initiative was entirely that of the proposer and, either by reason of the profit-making character of the proposer, or by reason of the nature of the work, the Agency believes that the appropriate vehicle for agreement is a contract rather than a grant. Such proposals must be consistent



with the Agency's research program, be well developed, represent a considerable investment of time and effort by the proposer, and not be readily available from other sources in order to qualify for a non-competitive contract award.

It submits a list of the people that it has that might work on such a proposal, and it submits an outline of what it thinks it might find and the way in which it might approach that. There have been a few such unsolicited proposals that we have accepted, and given a contract to. There was one which was given to MIT in the amount of \$65,000—contract No. ACDA No. 15—they have an institute—well, this is one—I think that is the only one of such.

Mr. GROSS. Does the committee have a complete list of those contracts?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, you do.

Mr. GROSS. And whether by invitation or unsolicited?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, we have submitted this.

Mr. GROSS. Or by negotiation?

Mr. FOSTER. That is right.

Mr. GROSS. This committee has all that—has that list?

Mr. FOSTER. You do.

Mr. GROSS. All right.

Now let me ask about this one title, "European View of European Security and the Present General and Complete Disarmament Proposals."

That study is by a British group, the Institute for Strategic Studies. I am not going to pass judgment on the competence of the institute, but the question is whether its findings may not reflect British interpretation of European events, and even more basic is whether it is appropriate for part of the State Department to employ a foreign agency to make a study which will be "ground in," or put into foreign policy views of the United States.

Mr. FOSTER. The Institute for Strategic Studies is a nonprofit institution in Great Britain which has on its board many other nationalities represented. It has made studies for the British Government, and it has also made studies for NATO. It has access to a great deal of information concerning the European problems. It has an objective approach to that—that is, perhaps in some ways more objective than a U.S. institution would—and we felt it would be valuable to have the benefit of their competence, their access to European information, which it is possible we could get, but not as readily—and I might say that they have produced a very interesting document which we have found of great value.

Now the Senate has introduced an amendment to the bill which would prevent our doing this in the future. We regret this, although this will not work any serious handicaps on our work, but the Institute of Strategic Studies is a highly respected European organization. It is partially financed by American sources, and I would very gladly place additional contracts with them for things in which they have greater competence than some of our own people do.

Mr. GROSS. I am personally pleased that the Senate put that provision in their bill.

Now, I have before me this volume 2, appendixes, collaborative studies by certain people. I won't read the names of the authors. I

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don't know what this—apparently these are two French words, I don't know how to pronounce them—but apparently this fat volume deals with the subject of "Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World." It carries this stamp on the cover: "Peace Research Institute."

I don't find this listed in your appendix anywhere as to cost. Can you tell me about this deal, where this blossomed?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it is listed, I think. It is ACDA IR-8. It is in the sum of \$20,000, and again it took advantage of the particular expertise of some individuals in this field, the Peace Research Institute I think is a Washington organization. This was a 1962 contract, and it was a grant.

Mr. GROSS. When you say, Mr. Foster, that this is the work of expertise—do you mean that it is done by experts; is that it? I would ask you to evaluate this sort of thing. Do you have any reports? Who in your organization reads these so-called studies and evaluates them?

Mr. FOSTER. I have indicated in the statement we have established a Research Council which consists of each of the heads of the Bureaus in the Agency. It is chaired by the Director of Research and Technology.

This group meets regularly and passes on the research projects of each Bureau, decides which of the suggested research activities will be financed, passes on the form of the project, and recommends to the Director the contractor which shall be selected. The Bureau responsible receives reports when made, and, with a review committee under the cognizance of the Research Council recommends the utilization of the reports.

Mr. GROSS. Well, Mr. Foster, I call your attention to page A-14, since you seem to think this is a valuable document, and I read this sentence:

Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over 200 million-odd Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states.

Do you agree with that? Would you like to have it read again?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, I would.

Mr. GROSS (reading):

Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over the 200 million-odd Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states.

Mr. O'HARA. What page is that on?

Mr. GROSS. Page A-14.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, do we have that book Mr. Gross is quoting from?

Mr. GROSS. It is available to you.

Mr. FOSTER. You are reading from the report itself?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, a statement by one of the men that you describe as an expert.

Mr. O'HARA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to know what he is quoting from.

Mr. GROSS. I am quoting from a study made by six individuals who were paid by the Disarmament Control Agency—

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman, can we get a copy of that book?

Chairman MORGAN. Is it available to the committee?

Mr. GROSS. Of course it is available.

(The document referred to has been furnished and is contained in the files of the committee.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, can we inquire what the study is about? I can't judge the statement myself unless I know the context.

Mr. GROSS. The study is "Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World."

Mr. FRASER. Does this presuppose it is a disarmed world?

Mr. GROSS. I am trying to find out what it is myself.

Mr. O'HARA. I don't like questions in the dark. I know nothing about the subject matter of the question.

Mr. GROSS. Well, I didn't yield to the gentleman and if I have the floor—

Mr. O'HARA. Then, Mr. Chairman, if this persists I shall raise a question of decorum. This has gone on for 10 or 15 minutes now. I don't like questions raised in the dark. Nobody knows the basis of the questions or what relation they have to the Disarmament Agency.

Chairman MORGAN. I think Mr. Gross has been a little more energetic than some other members of the committee and has taken the trouble to study one of the reports. He is asking questions about the report. I hate to see you raise a point of order. I would like to proceed with the hearing.

Mr. FOSTER. We would be very glad, Mr. Chairman, to submit an evaluation of the entire report. I can't really comment on one sentence from an outside report, and I don't necessarily agree with every sentence made by independent students of this.

I just don't know how that happens to fit into the context. I think what is referred to here is is it possible in a peaceful world to depend on the national police to keep nations from streaming over the borders, and this might have some value in such a situation, but I think it would be of more value if we give a broad evaluation of the whole report, rather than for me to comment on a single sentence.

(The following information has been submitted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for inclusion in the record at this point:)

STATEMENT OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ON PEACE INSTITUTE STUDY ENTITLED "QUIS CUSTODIET? CONTROLLING THE POLICE IN A DISARMED WORLD"<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of this study was to make a preliminary examination of the political control of an international police force. The fundamental problem is to develop a system of political control that will permit effective use of such a force and, at the same time, inhibit actions by the force that would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and other countries. This preliminary study was also intended to identify areas requiring more detailed research.

The Agency recognizes that major reductions of national armaments will not prevent international disputes from arising. Some such disputes may lead to open conflict. Consequently, various arrangements for keeping the peace will have to accompany agreements for reducing national arms. An international police force, properly controlled, is being considered as one possible means of assuring the security of this and other states.

The approach adopted by the Peace Research Institute was to examine such

<sup>1</sup> The study was conducted under a \$20,000 grant awarded by the Agency and accepted by Mr. James J. Wadsworth on behalf of the Peace Research Institute in June 1962. The final report was published in April 1963, and \$4,759.38 not required in connection with the study was returned to the Government.

a force from a number of different points of view. In addition to a paper on the overall problem of controlling an international police force, papers were devoted to the international political control of such a force in local, regional, and worldwide operations; to the internal organization and operation of such a force; and to operational guidelines and restrictions on the use of such a force. Scholars engaged in the study were from two private research institutes as well as Yale University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern University and the Universities of Chicago and Michigan.

The views expressed by the individual writers of these papers do not necessarily reflect those of the Agency. This is specifically stated in a footnote on page 1, volume I of the report. The Agency does, in fact, disagree with certain of these views. Indeed, the study reflects a substantial divergence of opinion among the writers on a number of points. Since there was no requirement that the participants arrive at consensus of opinion, such a divergence of views was to be expected and is one of the values of a study of this character. It is the task of ACDA to synthesize, evaluate and extract from such studies what might be useful.

Keeping in mind that the study was exploratory, rather than definitive in character, and evaluating it on the overall basis, we believe that the study illuminates the basic differences between reaching agreement on, and exercising effective political control over, an international force with relatively limited functions on the one hand, and the capabilities and problems involved in parallel arrangements of a more extensive character on the other. It will be necessary to examine conclusions and implications of this study in greater depth, as well as to determine the suitability of more specific approaches in light of the problems identified. The study will assist us in directing our further efforts in this area.

#### SUMMARY OF "QUIS CUSTODIET? CONTROLLING THE POLICE IN A DISARMED WORLD"

A REPORT PREPARED BY THE PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
APRIL 1963<sup>1</sup>

NOTE.—The report consists of seven papers, the major theses of which are summarized below.

##### 1. Quis Custodiet? Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World (vol. I), Arthur I. Waskow.

Waskow rejects the idea of an international force in the form of a "world army" having such power that "no state could challenge it." He argues specifically against a force equipped with nuclear weapons, expressing the view that basically governments would fear such an army might prove uncontrollable. In contrast, he contemplates an international force constructed "on the model of true police functions."

The force Waskow describes is small; uses police rather than military methods; meets violations early and aims at the specific violations rather than at the violating nation; is prepared to increase the amount of coercion in a given situation if authorized to do so by a wider international consensus; and is unwilling to control international conflict of a political and economic nature.

Three "police missions" are envisaged for the International Police Force (IPF); preventing the possession or manufacture of prohibited weapons; restoring order where domestic conflict threatens international peace; and protecting international boundaries from incursions by lightly armed or unarmed forces.

Waskow recommends that ACDA undertake or encourage studies in the following areas: (1) Historical examination of transition periods in the transfer of military power and of periods when political power has been exercised by nonlethal equivalents of war; (2) operations analyses of the problems of financing, transporting, training, equipping, and arming an international police force; (3) simulations of international crises in a disarmed world; (4) examinations of the question of whether an international police force as described above can enforce an agreement on GCD in a manner acceptable to the United States; (5) examination of the question of how proposals for an IPF would be received by other governments.

<sup>1</sup> The report was prepared under a grant by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency or any other department or agency of the U.S. Government.

This summary was prepared by the staff of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Waskow notes that Hans Morgenthau in direct contrast, argues that in an international crisis, the distinctions between a police response and a military response may dissolve. The international order being defended in a crisis will take on the qualities of a government. If, as Waskow suggests, an IPF enforced rules on individuals rather than on states, this would constitute an utter negation of national sovereignty," says Morgenthau. The enforcement would be a governmental act.

Walter Millis agrees on a police-type force, but argues that in controlling international violence, main reliance must be placed on existing national police. The role of an IPF must be severely limited.

2. The Political Control of an International Police Force (vol. II, pp. a1-61), Walter Millis.

In discussing the factors pertinent to the potential control of an international police force, Millis contends the primary factor is the constitutional role to be played by the force in a demilitarized world order. Millis sees such a world order as one in which today's existing global constitution will have undergone a dramatic revision; i.e., a transformation from the existing "police-cum-military organization of legal coercion."

Main reliance for keeping order will be placed on the national police forces, according to Millis. However, they will not be adequate for all situations; and "when they break down \* \* \* we will have to have a supranational police force." The constitutional role of such a force will be limited to securing observance of "that minimum of basic rules \* \* \* accepted as necessary to the survival of the demilitarized world system."

These basic rules are: (a) all states must divest themselves of all instrumentalities of military power or threat and must not rebuild them; (b) all states are bound to resolve any national differences arising among them by nonmilitary and nonviolent means.

How would such a force be organized? Millis suggests that it be unitary in character (i.e., directed by a unitary executive head appointed by and solely responsible to a supranational political authority) and beyond veto by any of the member states.

He then raises two serious questions about the role of the force: (1) How to prevent it from becoming an independent superpower? and (2) even if there is no such development, can an individual state be protected against the misuse of the powers granted to an international force?

Millis answers the first of these questions by proposing that while the international police power must be final, the physical force at its command must be minimal. For example, he wants no weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an IPF.

The second problem of control could be solved, in Millis' view, by a supranational authority to which the police executive and its organization would be responsible and which would be the final source of political control over the police. The authority would consist of representatives nominated by the member states of the world community, directly appointed by the great-power governments, and chosen in some form of regional convention for the seats allotted to regional groupings. Millis imagines a small group of highly able men charged with providing political control and direction of the police force—and nothing else. Such a body, he emphasizes, "would be competent to keep a tolerable minimum of world order."

Millis is doubtful about the concept (advanced by Roger Fisher and Arthur Waskow) of having international authority reach beyond national governments to the individual citizens. "If," he says, "an international police has a function of this kind \* \* \* it will have to be very narrowly and specifically delimited \* \* \* and one that can be carried out with very modest amounts of armed power."

3. "The Impartiality of the International Police" (vol. II, pp. B-1-23), Hans J. Morgenthau.

Morgenthau's paper is comprised of an analysis of the traditional police functions within the state and an application of this analysis to the function of the international police force in a disarmed world.

In the nontotalitarian state, the police's law enforcement function is "specialized or marginal." Peace and order really depend on the psychological predilection of the citizens to support the status quo. Within such a state the impartiality of the police has two different meanings. The police are not impartial when it comes to supporting the existing legal order and the political, social, and economic status quo. It is their purpose to defend it. On the other

hand, impartiality in its meaning of equality before the law can be achieved by the police.

In discussing an international police force, Morgenthau makes two assumptions: (1) the world could be disarmed only in the sense that no nation will be able to wage a major war after the model of the two World Wars; (2) the day-to-day enforcement of legal rules in international relations will not be appreciably affected by general and complete disarmament.

In this type world Morgenthau sees only one law enforcement function in the strict sense left: the enforcement of disarmament itself. Here the issue of impartiality of the international police poses itself in terms similar to those within the nation. The police, while committed to preserving the established international order, must guard against the charge of unfairness in operation. To avoid unfairness, Morgenthau urges such measures as a judicious national composition of the force, strict legal standards reducing the discretion of the international police, and judicial review of the actions of the police.

4. "Sequential Controls for International Police," (vol. II, pp. C-1-51), Roger Fisher.

Fisher's study is concerned with the question of how international police can control the conduct of governments and vice versa.

Basic to the author's concept is a process of control consisting of a sequence of steps that the IPF could carry out. Once a primary rule of conduct is broken, says Fisher, a single response is not adequate. Rather he suggests a sequence of responses designed to "turn first-order violations into second-order compliance." Fisher defines first order rules as primary rules of international conduct—such as those established by a disarmament treaty. He expects a "fair amount of noncompliance" with these rules. What Fisher's scheme aims to avoid are those crises arising from "second-order violations," violations arising from defiance by an official of an explicit order issued by a court or law enforcement official.

Fisher believes that the IPF should operate on the assumption it is enforcing the conduct of individuals rather than of governments. Analogies are drawn from domestic legal systems.

A number of ways of obtaining compliance are suggested. The overall aim should be to "alter the anticipated consequences of noncompliance, i.e., reducing the costs by narrowing the impact that rule enforcement will have on government; and by providing rewards for compliance." Finally for deterrent effect, there should be much stiffer penalties for second order noncompliance than for first order.

Fisher's second major point calls for the control of the IPF by a system of checks and balances. These include such measures as (1) dividing the IPF into units, each having standing authority to do limited things; (2) strengthening those factors tending to cause respect for the limits on the authority; and (3) finally, determining those bodies which would augment (or restrict) the authorized actions of the various units.

A crucial point in Fisher's plan is that there should be an increasing consensus as a condition of increasing the capability of the international police contingent. The force available to it should not, in Fisher's view, extend to nuclear weapons.

5. "The Internal Operations and Organization of an International Police Force" (vol. II, pp. D-1-69), J. David Singer.

Singer's study offers what he calls "essentially a prescientific checklist," whose "value is more for its cataloging of the issues and the range of alternative approaches than for the arrangements proposed."

Singer proposes to reduce armaments and develop a U.N. force simultaneously. He suggests the notion of arms transfer whereby a fixed but increasing percentage of each class of each disarmament treaty signatory's conventional weapons be delivered to designated U.N. force depots. A large portion of these would be retained by the force. Next, nuclear weapons and strategic-delivery vehicles would be disposed of through "sequestration," i.e., the weapons and vehicles would be taken to warehouse-type depots by small technical maintenance forces where the U.N. force would have custodial rather than operational control over them. The depots would not be so well defended that the original owners of the weapons could not repossess them. Repossession of course would mean open abrogation of the treaty.

Singer next outlines the sort of political organ under which the U.N. force might operate. Basically he envisages a modified Security Council called the

Security Advisory Council, consisting of two divisions. The Arms Control Division would receive, store and maintain the quantities of conventional and nuclear weapons in addition to performing such functions as gathering and transmitting information weapons levels and deployment in the signatory nations. The Police Force Division would be responsible for manning, deploying and perhaps using a small but significant portion of the conventional weapons. Singer does not feel this Division should be equipped with nuclear weapons.

In general, Singer's IPF would be considerably stronger and of a more permanent nature than that contemplated by Fisher, Waskow, or Millis.

When discussing the organization of personnel within the IPF Singer suggests the advantages and disadvantages of the integrated multinational unit. He tends to favor this type unit. In a detailed analysis of the question of loyalty to an international force and how to develop it, Singer rejects the idea that the Force seek "thoroughly denationalized individuals." The important thing is to find men who have the capacities for several loyalties, i.e., a loyalty toward their nation as well as toward the world community.

In his section on "finances," Singer suggests that nations transfer arms to the U.N. for cash. He feels that this would obviate much of the sheer economic and resource waste inherent in most disarmament plans and since the U.N. would be purchasing secondhand weapons instead of new ones, the cost of hardware procurement for the IPF would be lowered.

In speculative fashion Singer examines the possibility of financing U.N. security activities with an independent source of income. Such income might be derived from "the natural resources of the seas of Antarctica; a monopoly of global communications and transport, or an automatic levy on same; the sale of passports; a monopoly on atomic energy \* \* \* and perhaps, most intriguing of all, direct personal and corporation taxation."

6. "Political Control of International Forces in Dealing with Problems of Local Instability, and Notes on the Early Experience of the United Nations Force in the Congo" (vol. II, pp. E-1-59), Lincoln P. Bloomfield.

Bloomfield concludes in his first paper that (1) in a disarming or even disarmed world, the majority of peacekeeping problems may well be characterized by internal disorder, subversion and indirect aggression, civil war and insurgency movements of all varieties; (2) problems of local instability will not be any easier to deal with than they are today; and (3) the problem of political control (of IPF) at the top will labor under many of the fundamental disabilities we have become aware of in U.N. operations thus far. He believes although political control below the top is a less vexing matter, solutions addressed to lower levels will not go to the heart of the matter.

Based on his contact with the U.N. Congo operation personnel, Bloomfield records a number of concrete recommendations aimed at improving the quality of the response to future international crises. Some of these are: The need for riot police in certain cases rather than infantry; the urgent necessity for some sort of standardization of U.N. equipment; a troop rotation policy with a minimum tour of at least 1 year; clearer directives for military and civilian personnel covering the aims of the operation and channels of command.

In questioning whether GCD might have destabilizing influence on the strategies of the superpowers, Bloomfield, in marked contrast with Millis and Waskow, raises the possibility of sudden and secret rearmament in a stage III environment. Millis in particular, discounts the likelihood of "nuclear blackmail in a disarmed world" as "wholly unreal."

7. "Some Thoughts on Problems of Thinking Into the Future With Particular References to Political Control of an International Police Force" (vol. II, pp. F-1-39), Richard C. Snyder.

Snyder's paper is concerned with the improvement of planning for future arms control environments. He recommends the coordinated use of four basic research techniques in the formulation of what he calls a multiple strategy for planning: (1) Trend analyses-continuing recordings of events and conditions relevant to the arms control problem which can be coded and stored for quick retrieval, (2) trend projection, (3) the development of historical analogs such as those brought out in the PRI papers (the confrontation of Federal and State forces in Mississippi cited by Fisher, the U.N. Congo experiences described by Bloomfield), (4) situational analysis, and (5) the use of simulation and gaming.

Mr. Gross. This man goes on to say the breakup of the Russian Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom,

but would be a good deal more catastrophic for world order than was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918.

Mr. FOSTER. I can conceive of that being so.

Mr. GROSS. I don't know that the world came to an end because of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918, nor was there any great catastrophe flowing from it.

Mr. FOSTER. We could well have had the breakup of the world if we had had nuclear weapons at that time.

Mr. GROSS. Of course we didn't have nuclear weapons at that time and there isn't any point in trying to associate nuclear weapons with the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918.

Mr. FOSTER. I was talking about your question, which is talking about a time when there are nuclear weapons, and this report is directed to that.

Mr. GROSS. Well, I would like to have you give to the committee your evaluation of this particular information contained on page 14, and you can relate it backward and forward to the rest of the drivel which is contained in this volume.

I have read it, and I have never found more drivel. I haven't forgotten the day, Mr. Foster, that you came to former Representative Davis and myself, the chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee, asking for additional supergrades for your Disarmament Agency, and I will never forget the fact that at that time we tried to tell you that there was information available, and good information available in the various departments and agencies of this Government, that you didn't have to blossom out and spend millions of dollars on contracts and grants for studies of this kind and other descriptions, and I will never forget your answer to this, that your Agency was not going to do any "intellectual hitchhiking."

Remember?

Mr. FOSTER. May I make one correction to that, Mr. Gross?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, in just a minute. Here is an excellent example.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. I object to the lecturing of any witness before this committee. The gentleman from Iowa has had the floor for a long time, much in excess of the 5 minutes. He has finally come to the matter of hitting his fist on the desk, talking about a man no longer in the Congress, what he did. It has nothing to do with what we are discussing.

Mr. GROSS. I didn't yield for this purpose, Mr. Chairman. I don't yield to the gentleman.

Mr. O'HARA. Well, I am objecting.

Mr. GROSS. I don't yield to the gentleman. I ask that we proceed in the regular order.

Chairman MORGAN. After every member has had an opportunity to ask questions under the 5-minute rule, it has been customary to be rather lenient in allowing members to proceed for more than 5 minutes. I am not going to speak for either Mr. Davis, who I know very well, or Mr. Gross, but I participated in working out an arrangement with the Manpower Subcommittee, which was adopted by the House, which established the number of supergrade jobs.



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I think Mr. Gross agreed with me. I don't know why he is objecting now.

Mr. GROSS. I certainly agreed with it, but what I am trying to say is, Mr. Chairman, they are going out into the contract field.

Mr. THOMSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. O'HARA. Certainly.

Mr. THOMSON. I would like Mr. Foster to make the reply he indicated.

Chairman MORGAN. I think he wants to. With Mr. O'Hara's permission he would like to reply.

Mr. FOSTER. I will make a very brief comment.

Mr. GROSS, that was not I you were talking about.

Mr. GROSS. I beg your pardon.

Mr. FOSTER. I say you didn't talk to me on that subject at all. That happened to be Mr. Fisher.

Mr. GROSS. You were there.

Mr. FOSTER. I was not there. When was this?

Mr. GROSS. I can't give you the specific date.

Mr. FOSTER. September 1961?

Chairman MORGAN. September 1961.

Mr. GROSS. I can't give you the specific date. I will get it for you.

Mr. FOSTER. I was not present. I did not have that conversation.

Mr. O'HARA. Now, Mr. Chairman, do I still have the floor?

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Might I ask the chairman how much longer we are going to remain here?

Chairman MORGAN. As long as you have any questions.

Do you have any questions, Mr. O'Hara?

Mr. O'HARA. If I stop, do we adjourn?

Chairman MORGAN. I don't know whether Governor Thomson or Mr. Fraser have any questions.

Mr. THOMSON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Do you have any questions, Mr. Fraser?

Mr. O'HARA. I will yield to Mr. Fraser. May I first remark that in my opinion Mr. Foster has been one of the most convincing and intelligently articulate witnesses I have ever heard at a congressional hearing. I think the gentleman from Iowa erred in judgment in continuing his interrogation.

Mr. GROSS. What is this?

Mr. O'HARA. He more than answered every question that you asked him. Every time you asked him a question you got a complete, conclusive answer.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Fisher holds what position in your organization?

Mr. FOSTER. Deputy Director.

Mr. GROSS. You are Deputy Director?

Mr. FISHER. I was not at the time of the discussion.

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Chairman, I move we adjourn.

Mr. O'HARA. Second the motion.

Chairman MORGAN. If there are no further questions, the committee stands adjourned.

Thank you, Mr. Foster.

(Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

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(The following statement was submitted for inclusion in the record :)

STATEMENT OF THE STUDENT PEACE UNION

The Student Peace Union, an organization of young people with close to 5,000 members on college and high school campuses across the Nation, would like to go on record as advocating the fullest possible support of an adequate appropriation for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

According to its statement of purpose, the Student Peace Union "believes that war can no longer be used successfully to settle international disputes," and further asserts that we "must seek new and creative means of achieving a free and peaceful society." As a step toward seeking those new and creative means of ending the arms race, we welcomed the passage in the last session of Congress of the bill establishing the ACDA.

The passage of the ACDA bill by bipartisan majorities of 73 to 14 in the Senate and 290 to 54 in the House was an encouraging sign that at long last this country was determined to bring to bear on the complex problems of disarmament the best minds in the country.

Public Law 87-297, which established the ACDA, described the Agency's purpose in these words: "\* \* \* An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully."

It seems obvious to us that the 18 years since the beginning of the nuclear age have been marked by neglect of the warning spoken by Albert Einstein, who said that "the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." We must change our "modes of thinking" about the nature of the arms race, for the nature of modern warfare is such that any recourse to it will mean the end of civilization as we know it and the destruction of our ideals of democracy.

When the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established, it was given authorization to spend up to \$10 million. That money is now exhausted. It has become apparent that if the Agency is to discharge the mission given it, its authorization must be greatly increased. When the Senate this year passed S. 777, authorizing new funds for the Agency, it only provided for expenditures of \$20 million for the next 2 fiscal years, or \$10 million per year. The House bill, H.R. 3299, has an open-ended authorization, and the Appropriations Committee will probably grant the Agency close to the amount already approved by the Senate.

In our view, neither the Senate appropriation nor the proposal in the House to grant the Agency \$15 million per year is realistic. The complex problems of disarmament cannot be thoroughly researched on such a picayune monetary foundation. The Senate Armed Services Committee recently reported a military appropriations bill calling for the expenditure of more than \$47 billion for the Defense Department for the current fiscal year. This represents more than \$5 million each hour for the Military Establishment. The magnitude of these figures brings to mind the cogent warning of the Secretary of Defense, who stated in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that "as the arms race continues and the weapons multiply and become more swift and deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either by miscalculation or design, becomes more real." In concluding his statement, Secretary McNamara stated that "more armaments, whether offensive or defensive, cannot solve this dilemma."

In our pinchpenny attitude toward appropriations for the ACDA, we seem to have ignored the import of these words. One cannot formulate a coherent policy on disarmament on a budget less than that spent by the Defense Department in 2 hours. The Student Peace Union favors an appropriation at least double that approved in S. 777. This seems to us a bare minimum.

We would also like to make certain comments on the operation of the Agency itself. In several respects, we are critical of the efforts of the Agency, although we realize that many of its deficiencies are due to the restricted budget on which it has been forced to operate. The Agency has carried out some valuable functions. The preparation of the "Outlines of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" has served as a fruitful basis for the 17-nation disarmament negotiations in Geneva, and hopefully the United States will go back to Geneva, after the ratification of the limited test ban treaty, determined to negotiate a comprehensive disarmament treaty.

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Another solid achievement of the Agency has been the studies commissioned by it to investigate the steps needed to provide the economic adjustments necessary for disarmament, so vital to our economic well-being. The report of the panel of economists headed by Dr. Emile Benoit, of Columbia University, was an effective presentation of the feasibility of a rationally planned program for economic adjustment.

Unfortunately, in our view, these studies represent only a minimal commitment on the part of the administration and the Agency to the development of a comprehensive attack on this problem. We fully support the proposal of Senator George McGovern, on August 2, that an Economic Conversion Commission be established to carry out programs in this area.

Another area in which we feel that the Agency has not fulfilled its promise is its unwillingness to study in depth the political problems underlying the cold war, and their relation to disarmament. The study of the possible military disengagement of Central Europe is vital, but it has been virtually ignored. We believe that the Agency should be encouraged to commission research on these political problems by scholars representing a wide range of opinion, so that the administration can get the benefit of widely divergent views. The Agency has seemed to us too cautious in this area.

It is a matter of common knowledge that many of the most promising staff members of the Agency have left it because of: (1) dissatisfaction with the scope of studies undertaken, and (2) the reluctance of Congress to provide adequate funding for studies needed in various fields.

It is the opinion of the Student Peace Union that the functions of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency cannot be fulfilled unless the Congress is willing to appropriate a much greater amount of money for its operation.

