

ers who for most children are perfect symbols of authority. So the pressure upon the student to remain and to participate becomes more than a young person should have to bear. The State has no right to impose this burden upon him. I believe it is especially offensive when it is done in the name of the Christian religion.

It has been maintained by proponents of school prayers and meditative Bible reading that these are not devotional programs at all but merely opening exercises. But to the extent this is true or to the extent that the public school gives the impression that it is true then the state and the church have joined to debase both prayer and Holy Scripture. Neither is a gimmick for cranking up the academic machinery and we shall damage the religious traditions we seek to preserve if we use them as such.

It remains true, however, that religious believers on both sides of this issue want young people—indeed, want all people—to know and to appreciate the religious traditions which have helped to make this Nation what it is. No man is well educated who does not have a mature and adequate understanding of vital religion.

But this can be accomplished by an objective study of religion, including a thorough reading of the Holy Bible as well as other religious literature, which can be done in public schools as an academic pursuit. The Supreme Court has not ruled this out. In fact, it seems to suggest that it be done. In good conscience, therefore, we can encourage and develop such teaching for our children; but what we may not do in good conscience is to require them to participate in any form of corporate worship.

Admittedly, neither the churches nor the public schools have done much to set up appropriate plans of objective study like this. The problems that face us as soon as we think of it are so numerous that it has been easier to settle for "opening devotions." But these problems, although thorny, are not forbidding. It will take a lot of doing, but I believe good religious education can be developed by Protestants, Orthodox, Jews, Roman Catholics, and others working together; and if we are genuinely concerned about wanting our young people to have an understanding of their religious and cultural heritage, we will make honest attempts to do so.

The questions raised by such a proposal are the ones for us to answer, it seems to me. It is no answer to our problem to say to Jews, to Roman Catholics, to 57 varieties of Protestants, to Orthodox, to atheists, and to all the varied and sundry types of believers, non-believers, and half-believers in our communities, "Please bow your heads and pray—or leave the room."

### Foreign Aid Victory for President Johnson

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. DONALD M. FRASER**  
OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Thursday, June 25, 1964

Mr. FRASER, Mr. Speaker, the recent passage of the foreign aid authorization bill was a historic occasion of which President Johnson can be justly proud. Never in the entire history of American foreign aid has a President been successful in obtaining the total amount of money requested for foreign assistance. I think this is a significant milestone

in the history of foreign policy and indicates the true support for this vital program.

The following editorial which appeared recently in the Washington Star commends President Johnson on his judicious leadership in the field of foreign aid. I join with the Washington Star in commending President Johnson for his skillful leadership and want to bring the editorial to the attention of my colleagues in the House.

The editorial follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, June 15, 1964]

#### A GIFT

President Johnson has good reason to feel a glow of gratification over the way the House has dealt with his request for foreign aid. By a rollcall vote of 230 to 175, it has authorized—almost exactly down to the last penny—the \$3.5 billion he has asked for.

This has never before happened in the 17-year history of foreign aid. Always in the past, the House has slashed away at the annual Presidential recommendations. But now, setting a precedent of sorts, it has accepted at face value Mr. Johnson's argument that \$3.5 billion must be regarded as a pre-shrunk, barebones, rockbottom sum vitally needed to serve the Nation's best interests abroad. We hope the Senate follows suit.

Still to come, of course, is the vote needed to appropriate the authorized funds. But what the House has already done is a promising augury. It is a measure of Mr. Johnson's unique skill and persuasiveness in dealing with the Congress. It suggests that honesty may be a better policy than the traditional practice of padding appropriations requests in anticipation of their being cut.

Given such a gift, any occupant of the White House must cherish it as something good not only for himself, but for all the Nation.

### Cuba Today—Third of a Series

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. PAUL G. ROGERS**

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 25, 1964

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, as I stated on June 24, the articles on conditions in Cuba written by Bruce Taylor and published by the Washington Star should be given the widest circulation, and accordingly I am inserting the third installment in the RECORD today:  
CUBA TODAY: CASTRO HAS TALENT—FOR RUINING THE ECONOMY  
(By Bruce Taylor)

It is not despite Fidel Castro's best efforts that Cuba is grievously ill. It is because of them. There is no realism in his programs to make the country self-sufficient.

He establishes himself as the ultimate authority in a project, becomes entirely engrossed in it, sets unattainable goals for it, makes mistakes, loses interest, leaves all of it to be puzzled out by subordinates who know less about it than he does, and moves on to something else.

The results are disastrous.

Cuba's economic welfare is determined almost wholly by its ability to produce sugar. It is Cuba's only real currency. Last year's production was 3.8 million tons, the lowest in the nation's recent history.

Premier Castro is talking about 10 million tons by 1970, but this year's production will be even lower than last year's.

#### FORCED TO BUY SUGAR

He is committed for 3.84 million tons, and has admitted in speeches he has been forced to buy sugar on the open market to meet that commitment.

Mr. Castro is unable to plan ahead.

Last year's low production was caused by the shortage of experienced cane cutters he created by bringing them into the cities after the previous season to work in industry. He was unable to free them to return to the fields at harvest time.

Wielding a machete is backbreaking work, and it is definitely an art. Amateurs not only can ruin the current crop, but the succeeding one.

#### IMPORTS CANE CUTTERS

This year, Mr. Castro thought he had the problem beaten by importing new, specially designed Russian mechanical cane cutters. They did not prove effective. So he ordered practically all of his army into the fields. This improved the situation to some extent—although we saw thousands upon thousands of acres of cane that could never be cut in time—but this year there was a new problem: transportation.

Where it was relatively good last year, it broke down this year. The old American trucks he has been using were another year older. There are not nearly enough Soviet vehicles in Cuba to replace them. He used oxen.

Next year, he doubtlessly will be plagued by the increasing malfunction of the machinery in the American-built sugar mills. All of it is at least 5 years old, and no replacement parts for it are available to him.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT

This second successive sugar crop failure has had a tremendous psychological effect on the Cubans. It has heightened anti-Castro emotion everywhere on the island, but most particularly in the agricultural areas where his main strength originally lay.

It is not generally known that Mr. Castro last year carried out a second agrarian reform. It nationalized the farms of the very people who had given him his most solid support.

His first agrarian reform law was enacted in 1960, a year after he became dictator, and was the one which he had promised. It took over for the state all farms of more than 30 "cavallerias." There are 33 acres to a cavalleria.

Most of these farms and plantations belonged to absentee United States and Cuban landlords, and there was little general sympathy for them. The land was not turned over to individuals, however; the individuals were turned onto it, to work it for the state.

#### REPORTS START TO FLY

Last year, reports began to fly that Mr. Castro was contemplating further agrarian measures.

ANAP, an association of owners of small private farms, was worried. It called a convention last summer to ask Mr. Castro what, if any, plans he had. Mr. Castro assured the association he was satisfied to take no more than 70 percent of all land under cultivation and to leave the balance to the ANAP.

Less than 2 months later he quietly enacted his second agrarian reform law. It nationalized all farms of more than five cavallerias.

ANAP was destroyed, but if that wasn't bad enough, Mr. Castro had more bad news.

#### TOOK ALL OF LAND

The state took every last acre of every farm of more than five cavallerias. It also took all buildings on the farms, and turned out their owners with nothing more than clothes on their backs.

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Compensation varied, from a minimum of 100 pesos a month to a maximum of 250 pesos a month for 10 years, according to the size of the farm.

A farmer with even one or two children could not survive. To maintain a stable diet he would have to buy food on the black market, and he would now have to pay rent—if he was lucky enough to find a place to live.

Premier Castro's typical lack of foresight compounded their troubles even further. He had neglected the mechanics of a system by which the compensation payments could be made. A great number of the evicted farmers received no money at all for several months.

**CONSCRIPTION RESENTED**

The reasons for their mounting antagonism toward Mr. Castro do not end even there. He has begun compulsory military service for all able-bodied men between 17 and 45. His method of conscription is to go into small towns, seemingly at random, and strip them of all men who fit the bill.

Mr. Castro began his reign with a great rash of construction. He had reasonable success putting up homes for laborers and farmers in the interior, but his project in East Havana—across the bay from the city proper—was a flop.

**MEANT AS SHOWPLACE**

It was to have been a showplace. He put up beautiful seven- and eight-story apartment buildings. They are impressive, and Government officials delight in pointing them out to you.

But when you get away from the officials and talk to the people who live there, you find the buildings are anything but practical.

You learn that Mr. Castro couldn't get elevators for them, so no one on the upper floors is happy. And transportation to the city is so unpredictable the people can't comfortably get to and from their jobs. Most of them would move—if there was somewhere else to go.

**BUILDS POWERPLANTS**

Cuba is in the process of constructing two thermoelectric powerplants, one at each end of the island. These, however, are being built by Russians, and are progressing well.

To the very bare credit side of Mr. Castro's construction ledger must be inscribed his fishermen's cooperative at Manzanillo, on the Caribbean coast of Oriente Province. Almost 600 fishermen and their families live in small but very attractive prefabricated concrete homes. They pay no rent.

The development has a barbershop, a hospital, a pharmacy, and other such services. All are free.

**RUSH GIVES OUT**

The fishermen earn up to 400 pesos a month, three to four times the national average.

Mr. Castro's early gush of construction has petered out now. There is a sign in Havana that tells people who can't get past the city to see for themselves that 70 percent of the population lived in "bohios"—huts made of palm leaves thatched over wood frames—when Castro came to power, and implies this condition no longer exists.

It is an outrageous lie. The bohios still are there. So are the mud-floor hovels that line every roadway through the interior.

Castro is attempting to inject some reality into his planning now, but without notable achievement.

**LECTURES ON LIVESTOCK**

Currently, he is an expert on livestock, and lectures at great length on the subject in speeches and in private conversation. He wants to export beef, and says he is experimenting with natural feeds that will enable him to raise cattle without having to import the fertilizers of which he is so desperately short.

At the moment there is not enough good beef in Cuba for his own people.

Cuba's climate is such that it should be a prolific producer of food. Properly tanded, its soil can be induced to give three crops of corn a year, for instance. But the island's agriculture is in a mess. The Russian and Red Chinese technicians brought there to straighten it out do not appear to be making much headway.

**CANADIANS' FARM SUCCESS**

They are being shown to great disadvantage by several Ontario tobacco farmers working on contract in Cuba. Their success has been spectacular. They have introduced Canadian seed and methods to Cuban tobacco farming in Pinar del Rio Province, and have increased production there in the past year by 300 percent.

Mr. Castro's own inadequacies are largely responsible for the failure of his programs and, accordingly, the condition in which Cuba finds itself today.

But he also is handicapped by the fact that the only people he can trust are the people who fought with him in his revolution, and they are the ones he has had to install in positions of wide authority. Most are totally unfit to hold them.

**AVOID DECISIONS**

It is seldom that the head of one department or ministry knows what his counterpart in another is doing; it is even more seldom that one of them will make a decision.

Cubans have always been famous for getting things done "manana"—tomorrow.

With the addition of inept Communist bureaucracy, you're extremely fortunate in Cuba today if you can get things done by "la semana proxima"—next week.

**ARA's OEDP Program Was a Farce**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF**

**HON. BURT L. TALCOTT**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 17, 1964

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, communities scrambling for ARA benefits lost no time in filing their overall economic development plans. By May 1, 1963, 81 percent of the designated areas—850 areas—had filed OEDP's. Most of them involved only limited thoughtful analysis of community resources and contained little that would provide a blueprint for future community economic development. Many were poorly conceived and failed to contain essential economic data. Most were choked with information having no bearing upon the purpose of the OEDP. Since many of the filing organizations were direct successors of the established local economic development groups—by 1961 there were more than 3,000 in existence according to SBA estimates—it was not surprising to find that the OEDP's followed the long-established tradition of such groups by basing the "plans" for future development on enticing new manufacturing plants from some far-off place. In short, most of the OEDP's were "pie in the sky" documents. Actually, manufacturing employment is declining. ARA could scarcely base sound economic planning for its customers upon expanding manufacturing plants.

The community OEDP's also emphasized the need for more public works and facilities. A good many of the "needed" public works projects had little relationship to the future economic development of the community. Few promoters paid any attention to the potential cost of the proposed projects even when they had relevance to economic development. Few bothered to compute a cost-benefit ratio to justify the proposed public works. The planning process was not taken seriously; it was just looked upon as a preliminary hurdle to obtaining Federal largess.

Local communities of State economic development agencies often ignored the congressional and ARA desire for "grass-roots" preparation. For one example, most, if not all, of the OEDP's for Kentucky were prepared by the State area program office in Frankfort. They were in such general terms that without basic changes they could have described almost any area.

Incredibly, the ARA went along with this cavalier attitude. It faced the choice of either approving inadequate plans or disqualifying areas for receiving ARA cash until better plans were produced. The ARA was no less anxious to help than the communities were to receive help. So it accepted the plans. The ARA had developed neither the expertise nor the staff to appraise the validity of the local programs and to offer sound suggestions for the development of more comprehensive plans.

ARA and its staff are inexperienced in the crucial business of economic development and planning. Their main objective is to stimulate and process applications for Federal cash. ARA does not let essentials interfere with spending.

ARA also dissipated funds on foolish engineering studies. For example, ARA financed one study of the feasibility and design of a multipurpose reservoir in the Willapa River Basin, Wash., the kind of job that Congress has the Corps of Engineers to do. It did the same thing in southern Illinois, where the Corps of Engineers has for several years been considering the building of a multimillion-dollar reservoir to supply industrial water and create a tourist attraction.

**Critical View of Student Grouping**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF**

**HON. ROLAND V. LIBONATI**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 26, 1964

Mr. LIBONATI. Mr. Speaker, my good friend, Dr. George S. Reuter, Jr., secretary of the Chicago chapter, Industrial Relations Research Association, has prepared a "Critical Review of Student Groupings," with a review of its early history and a compendium of the various plans that have been experimented with in the United States and abroad, for the purpose of giving deliberate and scholarly thought to the evaluation and recon-