

I should like to address myself first to the formula by which we select quota immigrants. When Congress in 1924 devised this method, usually referred to as the national origins system, its primary objective was to maintain the ethnic balance among the American population as it existed in 1920.

This system preserves preferences based on race and place of birth in the admission of quota immigrants to the United States. This results in discrimination in our hospitality to different nationalities in a world situation which is quite different from that which existed at the time the national origins system was originally adopted.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been placed in a critical role of leadership in a troubled and changing world. We are concerned to see that our immigration laws reflect our real character and objectives.

What other peoples think about us plays an important role in the achievement of our foreign policies. We in the United States have learned to judge our fellow Americans on the basis of their ability, industry, intelligence, integrity, and all the other factors which truly determine a man's value to society. We do not reflect this judgment of our fellow citizens when we hold to immigration laws which classify men according to national and geographical origin. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand the reaction to this policy of a man from a geographical area, or of a national origin, which is not favored by our present quota laws. Irrespective of whether the man desires to come to the United States or not, he gets the impression that our standards of judgment are not based on the merits of the individual—as we proclaim—but rather on an assumption which can be interpreted as bias and prejudice.

This basic rule embodying the national origins systems was not intended to be the exclusive principle governing American immigration policy. From the very beginning Congress gave equal weight to our good neighbor policy when it exempted from quota restrictions natives of our sister republics in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, the Congress recognized the importance of uniting separated families by permitting wives and children of U.S. citizens to join their husbands and fathers outside of any quota restrictions. As the years progressed, the Congress has permitted more and more classes of immigrants to come to the United States irrespective of their national origin. In passing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Relief Act in 1953, and the Fair Share Refugee-Escapee Act in 1960, the Congress has made major contributions to the solution of the refugee problem. The main objective of these acts was to permit refugees to come to the United States expeditiously without subjecting them to delays as a result of quota restrictions. During the last 7 years the Congress, in five bills, has taken additional steps to ease existing quota restrictions by admitting as nonquota immigrants those quota immigrants who had been waiting for visas for a considerable period of time. As a result of this liberalizing policy of the Congress, only 34 percent of the 2,599,349 immigrants who came to the United States from 1953 through 1962 were quota immigrants.

The action we urge upon you, Mr. Chairman, is, therefore, not to make a drastic departure from a long established immigration policy but rather to reconcile our immigration policy as it has developed in recent years with the letter of the general law. The image held by many here and abroad of our immigration policy is one of discrimination which selects prospective immigrants based strictly on their national origin. This is totally understandable, since 70 percent of the total authorized annual immigration of approxi-

mately 156,000 is allocated to three countries, Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany; and only 30 percent is available for over 100 other countries and areas. A careful examination of our actual immigration policy over the last 10 years reveals that this is not an accurate picture.

The fact that we are a country of many races and national origins, that those who built this country and developed it made decisions about opening our doors to the rest of the world, that anything which makes it appear that we, ourselves, are discriminating in principle against particular national origins, suggests that we think less well of our citizens of those national origins, than of other citizens, and that we are somehow fearful or timid about receiving other such citizens from certain parts of the world.

The national origins principle, rather than the facts of our actual immigration, is picked up by people unfriendly to the United States and made an issue in their countries. This causes political disturbances in the good relations which we would hope to establish.

I therefore urge the committee to reflect in the letter of the law the policy adopted by the Congress during the last decade and to eliminate, with the safeguards proposed by the administration bill, the national origins system which has created an unwholesome atmosphere in our foreign relations.

The administration's proposal eliminates the national origins system on a gradual basis by reducing all quotas by 20 percent each year for 5 years. The present total authorized annual quota admissions of approximately 156,000 would be maintained, except initially all minimum quotas and subquotas would be increased from 100 to 200. These minimum quotas would have the 20-percent reduction each year applied to them.

A quota reserve pool is established by section 2 of the bill before the committee under which all numbers would be allocated by the fifth year. In each of the 5 years constituting the period of transition, the pool would consist of (1) the numbers released from national origin quotas each year, under the 20 percent progressive reduction plan and (2) numbers assigned to the old quotas but unused the previous year because insufficient demand for them existed in the assigned quota area.

Experience has shown that we have approximately 50,000 visa numbers annually which are unused and are not available for reallocation to other quota areas. These unused numbers are chiefly from the United Kingdom and Irish quotas.

In the fifth year all quota allocations would be made from the quota reserve pool which would then become a world-wide quota. So that no one country could enjoy a disproportionate amount of numbers from the pool based on registrations of relatively long-standing, the bill provides that no one of the highly oversubscribed quota areas would receive more than 10 percent of the total authorized quota numbers.

A strict first-come, first-served basis of allocating visa quotas would create some problems in certain countries of Northern and Western Europe, which under the national origins system enjoyed a situation where quota numbers were readily available to visa applicants.

To apply the new principle rigidly would result, after a few years, in eliminating immigration from these countries almost entirely. Such a result would be undesirable, not only because it frustrates the aim of the bill that immigration from all countries should continue, but also because many of the countries so affected are among our closest allies. At a time when our national security rests in large part on a continual strengthening of our ties with these countries, it would be anomalous indeed to re-

strict opportunities for their nationals here. Therefore, the bill allows the President to reserve a portion of the pool for allocation to qualified immigrants, who could obtain visas under the present system, but not under the terms of the bill before the committee, and whose admission would further the national security interests in maintaining close ties with their countries. The bill before you proposes that 50 percent of the pool be available for this purpose. However, since the introduction of the bill we have determined, in consultation with the Attorney General, that 30 percent of the pool would suffice to meet our objective. This is indicated in a projection of estimated admissions for the first 5 years under the bill and in the computation of the estimated percentage of the reserve which will be utilized annually during the first 5 years. I am pleased to offer these charts for the record.

The second issue to which I should like to address myself is our immigration policy toward Asian persons. We urge the Congress to bring to a final conclusion a development which began more than 20 years ago; we do not ask for a drastic departure from existing policy. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the Congress eliminated the Chinese exclusion laws in 1943 at the request of President Roosevelt. At that time it established a quota which permitted Chinese persons to immigrate to this country. Progressively liberal amendments have followed this well-considered beginning of a revision of our exclusion policy as far as Asian persons are concerned. Race as a bar to naturalization and thereby to immigration was eliminated with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952. That act placed Asian spouses and children of American citizens on equal footing with all other immigrants of non-Asian ancestry by giving them the privilege of nonquota status. The establishment of an upper limit of 2,000 for the so-called minimum quotas in the Asian area, and the rule that the quota of an Asian person born outside Asia be governed by ancestry, remained the only discriminatory provisions in the 1952 act as far as Asian persons are concerned. The 2,000 limit on the number of Asian immigrants from any non-quota area was removed by Congress in 1961. Therefore, only one discriminatory provision remains in the law as far as Asian persons are concerned. This provision requires that an Asian person be charged to an Asian quota even if he was born outside Asia, whether in a quota or nonquota area.

For all practical purposes, Congress has already significantly tempered this provision during the last 10 years by passing the special legislation to which I referred earlier. This observation is best documented by the volume and composition of immigration from the major countries in the Far East—119,677 immigrants came to the United States from China, Japan, and the Philippines from 1953 to 1963. More than 90 percent of these immigrants, 109,654, were nonquota immigrants. Those who read our immigration laws and see that China has access to 205 quota numbers annually while Japan has a quota of 185, and the Philippines a quota of 100, are unaware of the actual number of immigrants from these countries. Against the background of the volume of Asian immigration into the United States between 1953 and 1963, any increase in the volume of immigration resulting from the proposed amendments would be limited. We deprive ourselves of a powerful weapon in our fight against misinformation if we do not reconcile here to the letter of the law with the facts of immigration and thus erase the unfavorable impression which unjustifiably has become attached to our immigration policy toward Asian persons.

It is of great importance to us from a foreign policy point of view that this last vestige of discrimination against Asian persons

be eliminated from our immigration laws. This action would bring to a logical conclusion the progressive policy the Congress has followed since 1943.

Two aspects of our present immigration laws are a source of misunderstanding and friction in the hemisphere.

A major problem arises from the fact that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 exempts from quota limitations only those persons born in Western Hemisphere countries that were independent at the time the law was enacted. This means that Jamaica and Trinidad—which achieved their independence after the date of the act—are each subjected to restrictions of 100 quota visas annually while their hemisphere neighbors are not. An additional irritant for these two countries is the fact that the language of the present law would grant nonquota status automatically to dependencies on the mainland if they become independent.

The Governments and people of Jamaica and Trinidad have made strong representations asking to be placed on an equal footing with the other American states.

It has long been the policy of the Congress to recognize the unique status of our independent hemisphere neighbors by according them nonquota immigration status. Jamaica and Trinidad are among the friendliest of these neighbors. I urge the committee to remove the accidental discrimination against them by granting nonquota status. The administration's proposal would also accord nonquota status to any dependencies that achieve independence in the future, making it clear to all concerned that there are no second-class countries in the hemisphere family.

The differential treatment accorded Jamaica and Trinidad in the matter of non-quota status is compounded by the so-called Asia-Pacific triangle provisions of existing law which require that persons of Asian ancestry be charged to the quota of their ethnic origin rather than their place of birth. This provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act affects most countries in the hemisphere since in many of them some segment of the population is of Asian ethnic origin.

The question has special importance for Jamaica and Trinidad (roughly 40 percent of the Trinidad population is of Asian ancestry) since the law not only discriminates against these two countries on the basis of nationality by withholding nonquota status, but, in addition, establishes differential treatment for large segments of their populations on the basis of Asian ancestry—even though the persons affected are often generations removed from Asia. Nonquota status for Jamaica and Trinidad would have no significance for these persons unless the Asia-Pacific triangle provisions of the law are repealed. I respectfully urge that such action be taken to remove this last vestige of discrimination—the final step required to place all immigrants from our sister American states on an equal footing.

I realize, you may be concerned about the effect of granting nonquota status to these countries on the flow of immigration to the United States. No doubt this flow will increase slightly as a result of this action, since the United States has always had an attraction for those seeking economic opportunity and political freedom. I do not believe, however, that this increase will be dramatic or injurious to our national interest. We do not ask that the qualitative requirements be lifted or modified for these immigrants. They, as all others, will have to satisfy the public charge provisions of the law. They will have to pass the health, educational, and security tests prescribed by existing law. Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor always has the authority to close the door to immigrants whose admission would

adversely affect the working conditions of American labor, or who would take positions for which American labor is available.

Without going into details of the economic aspects of the administration's proposal, on which Secretary Wirtz will expand when he testifies before this committee, I would like to make a few general observations.

When Congress developed the national origins system in 1924, it appears that it may have been fearful that our country would be swamped with vast numbers of untrained and impoverished people. Present-day immigration is very different in volume and makeup from the older migration on which most of our thinking is still based; and its significance for this country is considerably different. Immigration now comes in limited volume and includes a relatively high proportion of older people, females, and persons of high skill and training.

The significance of immigration for the United States now depends less on the number than on the quality of the immigrants.

The explanation for the high professional and technical quality of present immigration lies in part in the nonquota and preference provisions of our immigration laws that favor the admission of highly qualified migrants. But still more it depends on world conditions of postwar economic and social dislocations, discriminations, and insecurities in various parts of the world that have disturbed social and occupational strata not normally disposed to emigrate and has attracted them to the greater political freedom and economic opportunity offered in the United States. Under present circumstances the United States has a rare opportunity to draw migrants of high intelligence and ability from abroad; and immigration, if well administered, can be one of our greatest national resources, a source of manpower and brain power in a divided world.

Mr. Chairman, I urge you and members of this committee to give most careful consideration to the President's proposals embodied in S. 1932. The adoption of these proposals would substantially assist in the conduct of our foreign relations because their impact is much wider than just on our immigration situation. History has made of this country a people drawn from many races, religions, and national origins.

The central issue of our time is between freedom and coercion—between free societies and a world of free nations, on the one hand, and a world in which the human race is regimented under Communist rule. As the great leader of the cause of freedom, we are expected to exemplify all that freedom means. We have proclaimed, again and again, from the Declaration of Independence until the present day, that freedom is the right of all men. The rest of the world watches us closely to see whether or not we live up to the great principles we have proclaimed and promoted. Our blemishes delight our enemies and dismay our friends. In recent legislation, the Congress has reaffirmed our basic commitment to ourselves: that all our citizens are equally entitled to their rights as citizens and human beings.

I believe that the amendments to our immigration laws proposed by the administration would materially strengthen our position in the world struggle in which we are engaged. And if we remain alert and energetic and resolute, and true to the ideas and ideals which gave birth to our Nation and which have now seized the minds of men everywhere, including millions behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, I have no doubt as to how the contest between freedom and coercion will be resolved.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Mr. HART. Mr. President, Americans share with Cuban refugees an active desire for the liberation of their homeland; and we are pledged to help defend and strengthen the forces of freedom throughout this hemisphere.

The solemn words of Secretary of State Rusk before the Organization of American States—OAS—last week, put on the line, once again, America's attitude toward the Castro regime and the Communist subversion of this hemisphere. More important, Mr. President, the Secretary's statement and the affirmative steps taken by the OAS reflect our active determination to continue the two longstanding principal lines of strategy for dealing with the menace of Castro's communism. These lines of strategy are summarized well in a white paper issued by the State Department in May 1964:

First, we must take all possible measures to strengthen the Latin American nations so that they may, through individual and collective means, resist Communist subversion.

Second, we must employ all available instruments of power less than acts of war to limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban Government to advance the Communist cause in Latin America through propaganda, sabotage, and subversion.

To the greatest extent possible, we are pursuing both lines of strategy within the framework of the inter-American system.

Mr. President, these lines of strategy reflect the responsible leadership President Johnson is giving to our Nation's foreign relations. I deeply believe they also reflect an American consensus—supported, I may add, by an overwhelming majority of the Cuban exiles—on how to handle Castro.

As the white paper correctly points out—and I emphasize this point, Mr. President—even the most vigorous critics of our Cuban policy reject the taking of steps that involve acts of war.

On the other hand, there currently seems little sign of a possibility to negotiate seriously with the present regime. As President Johnson said recently, we need deeds, not words, from the Castro regime. In my book, this is a long list of deeds, including the release of thousands of political prisoners who Castro finally admits are in his dungeons.

The generally accepted limits of American policy toward Cuba, therefore, are well defined and narrow. It behooves the vigorous critics to bear this factor in mind, and not delude the American people into believing there are prudent alternatives to accomplish miracles overnight.

The disheveled state of Cuban society and the frantic pleas for help by the Castro brothers would indicate that our policy of collective action to isolate Cuba is bearing fruit. There is little doubt in my mind that the United States is in a position of great strength as it continues to cope with the Castro regime. The steps taken by the OAS reinforce our position.

Mr. President, it is hoped that a responsible political alternative to the Castro regime will emerge on the island of Cuba. In the meantime, I am con-

fidant that our Government will continue to use wisely our great strength as we pursue determined efforts to broaden the boundaries of freedom within this hemisphere.

The Cuban white paper, issued by the State Department in May, is a helpful document and a clear statement of the basis and content of U.S. policy toward Cuba. I commend it to Senators; and I ask unanimous consent it be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. President, as Senators know, several American newsmen and journalists are currently in Cuba. Their reports should be of interest to all Americans. As Mr. Derick Daniels, assistant managing editor of the Detroit Free Press, put it:

Our man will report what he sees and finds in what we consider to be a newsworthy spot.

Two reports by Mr. Lee Winfrey, of the Detroit Free Press, and one report by Mr. Al Burt, of the Miami Herald, were published in the July 25 and 26 issues of the Miami Herald. I ask unanimous consent these three articles also be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the pamphlet and the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT 1

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Foreign policies are rarely born full armed like Minerva. More often they evolve in response to events and circumstances.

In such cases there is a danger that the assumptions on which policies are founded may become obscured.

This has happened to some extent with regard to our policy toward the present government of Cuba. Some of the public discussion that has surrounded that policy has involved misapprehensions on a number of fronts—misapprehensions as to the nature of the danger posed by the present and potential activities of the Castro government, misapprehensions as to the range of policies available to counter that danger, and misapprehensions as to the objectives that we can expect to accomplish by the policies employed.

We shall try to answer some of the questions that have arisen with regard to our Cuba policy and shall try to clarify some of the confusion that has been apparent in the public debate.

A MODERN MENACE

First, what is the nature of the threat imposed by the existence of a Communist regime in Cuba?

It is not, in our judgment, a military threat to the United States. We shall never permit it to menace our own strategic power, as our actions in October 1962 demonstrated. We are taking constant and effective measures to insure that such a threat does not occur again—and we shall continue to take those measures.

Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct military threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed forces are large and equipped with modern weaponry. They are by all odds the most powerful military establishment in Latin America. But Cuba does not possess airlift and seallift sufficient to permit it to take offensive action against its neighbors, and, in any event, we maintain overwhelming military forces in the area to prevent Cuba from attacking other American Republics.

The menace of Castro communism to Latin America is of a different and perhaps a more

modern kind. It is the menace of subversion—the undermining of existing governments, the arming of organized Communist minorities, and the mounting of campaigns of sabotage and terror.

Some areas of Latin America are peculiarly vulnerable to such tactics. Vulnerability is greatest where social injustice is widely prevalent, where anachronistic societies remain dominated by small elites—tight little oligarchies that control the bulk of the productive wealth. In some places these oligarchies have only recently—and reluctantly—begun to make concessions to the insistent demands of the millions of economically submerged peoples for a measure of social justice and a decent standard of living.

For Latin America, as has been frequently remarked, is in the throes of a great transformation from a continent of backward societies to a continent of new, modern nations. During this period of change and tension, it offers a tempting target for the Communists. They are at least as conscious as we of the importance and weakness of the area. They are at least as determined as we to see that the brew produced by the Latin American ferment is to their liking. They have, therefore, regarded the establishment of a Communist government in Cuba—a Communist Latin American state at the very doorstep of the United States—as a major asset for communism.

CASTRO'S BID FOR POWER

In their determination to establish a center of subversion for Latin America in Cuba, the Communists have found a natural lieutenant in Fidel Castro. Castro regards himself as the "liberator" of all Latin America. A born revolutionary, driven by a hunger for power and prestige, he looks upon the southern half of the American Continent as a proper field for the fulfillment of his ambitions. He seeks a revolutionary millennium in which the example of Cuba will have swept the continent, and his position of liberator and leader—not of the small island of Cuba, but of all Latin America—will have been assured.

This vision springs from his psychological and political needs. It is necessary to the man and equally to his followers, whose revolutionary enthusiasm must be constantly fed on the prospect of further advance beyond the confines of the island—an island which they look upon as the base from which the continentwide revolution will be propagated by word and deed.

That Castro intends to extend Communist power, and that he is actively seeking to do so, have been clearly shown. The most recent and dramatic evidence is the three tons of arms sent from Cuba to Venezuelan Castroist insurgents. An investigating committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) was appointed to study all aspects of this case. It found that the evidence clearly substantiated the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban intervention and aggression. The committee's report provides the basis for further collective OAS action against Cuba, and the members are consulting now among themselves to determine the collective measures which should be taken.

TWO LINES OF STRATEGY

The United States, as the strongest nation in the Western Hemisphere, is faced with a difficult but practical problem. With the existence of a Communist center in Latin America, how do we and our Latin American allies prevent that center from being used as an active center for Communist infection?

The most obvious and direct way to eliminate the Castro regime in Cuba would be by direct military action designed to replace the present government by a non-Communist government friendly to the West. Less di-

rect action might take the form of an enforced blockade—which would still be an act of war.

At the other end of the spectrum from military action is a policy of trying to negotiate with Castro. Taking account of the decisions reached within the American system, we have consistently maintained that two elements in the Cuban situation are not negotiable. First, Castro's political, economic, and military dependence upon the Soviets; and, second, the continuance of Castro's subversive activities in Latin America.

We see no present evidence that Castro is prepared to eliminate these two conditions—and, in fact, the evidence thus far is all the other way.

The limits within which the United States must erect a Cuban policy are, therefore, well defined and narrow. If, on the one hand, we do not wish to adopt policies that involve an act of war—and even the most vigorous critics of our Cuban policy have rejected this course of action—and, on the other, there seems little sign of a possibility of serious negotiation with the present regime, we are left with two principal lines of strategy for dealing with the menace of Castro's Cuba to Latin America:

First, we must take all possible measures to strengthen the Latin American nations so that they may, through individual and collective means, resist Communist subversion.

Second, we must employ all available instruments of power less than acts of war to limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban Government to advance the Communist cause in Latin America through propaganda, sabotage, and subversion.

To the greatest extent possible, we are pursuing both these lines of strategy within the framework of the inter-American system. We have sought to make clear to our Latin American friends that the problem of protecting the continent against the menace of Castro communism must be tackled by the American states as a collective undertaking. The Organization of American States is the principal instrumentality for this purpose, but we are also employing other multilateral groupings within the inter-American family.

In January 1962, the Foreign Ministers of the OAS formally found the Castro regime to be incompatible with the inter-American system and excluded it from further participation in that system. The Foreign Ministers also approved the immediate suspension of trade with Cuba in arms and war material.

In early October 1962, the Foreign Ministers of the OAS informally met to consider the problems arising from growing Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba, particularly the attempt to convert the island into an armed base for Communist subversive penetration of the hemisphere. In their conclusions, the Foreign Ministers pointed out:

1. The need for the American Republics and all other independent countries to review their policies on trade with Cuba, including the use of their ships in the Cuban trade;

2. The importance of intensifying measures against Communist subversion;

3. The desirability of keeping a careful check on the delivery of arms to Cuba; and

4. The need for special studies of the transfer of funds for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques.

The Council of the OAS subsequently directed the preparation of a special study on measures for controlling funds, propaganda, and training for subversive purposes. The Council sent the report, incorporating specific and general recommendations in these three fields, to member governments in July 1963 urging that the recommended measures be carried out promptly.

Meanwhile, in April 1963, the five Central American Republics, together with Panama and the United States, undertook a cooperative effort to safeguard the Caribbean area against Cuban subversive activities. At that meeting, and at a subsequent second meeting in January 1964, the cooperating countries agreed on a series of measures to increase the security of the countries of the area. The program includes the control of subversive travel, funds, and propaganda, the strengthening of security organizations, and the improvement of communications between national security agencies.

Following its own investigation of the recently discovered Venezuelan arms cache, the OAS is now studying additional measures for dealing with Cuba as a base of subversion and for policing Cuban-supported activities in Latin America.

These cooperative actions by the American states have shown considerable success. In order to control movement to and from Cuba for subversive purposes, many Latin American governments have instituted procedures for restricting travel by their nationals to Cuba. As a result of these measures, only 50 percent as many Latin Americans were able to travel to Cuba during 1963 as during the preceding year.

We continue to work with individual governments to help them improve the ability of their police and armed forces to deal with terrorism and insurgency. The United States and Latin American governments are also cooperating with increasing effectiveness in exchanging intelligence on Castroist subversion activities and in improving communications between their security services.

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

In the long run, however, Latin America will be rendered immune to Communist infection only by an amelioration of the conditions—political, economic, and social—in which subversion flourishes. The United States and the free nations of Latin America have, therefore, through the Alliance for Progress, undertaken a major collective effort. It is directed at the ambitious target of transforming the structure and productive capacity of the Latin American nations so as to bring about not merely an increase but a more equitable distribution of resources.

Given the magnitude of this undertaking, it will be years before major results can be achieved. But until such a transformation is accomplished, Latin America will remain a fertile seedbed for Communist subversion.

PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC DENIAL

By strengthening the Latin American nations through collective political, economic, and military measures we are increasing their ability to resist subversion. But at the same time we must actively pursue measures against Cuba to limit its ability to subvert.

In this effort we are exploiting the propaganda potential to the fullest. But an information program must be regarded primarily as a supplement to substantive policies. Given the present limits of action, we must rely, as our major instrument, on a systematic program of economic denial.

This is the only policy—short of the use of force—that gives promise of having a significant impact on Cuba and its continuance as a Communist base in the Western Hemisphere.

Such a program, in our judgment, can and does work effectively to achieve objectives that are in the manifest interest not only of the United States and Latin America but of other free-world nations.

In discussing the effectiveness of this program, let us make one point quite clear. We have never contended that a program of economic denial—short of an act of war such as a military blockade that would cut off bloc as well as free-world trade—is likely

by itself to bring down the present Cuban regime.

The objectives which this program can accomplish are more limited. They are four in number:

First—and most important—to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere;

Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba and to elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot serve their interests;

Third, to reduce the will and ability of the present Cuban regime to export subversion and violence to the other American states;

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.

Those are the objectives which we seek to achieve by a program of economic denial against Cuba. That program reflects the purpose of the Organization of American States. In our opinion, it is realistically designed to accomplish the limited but nonetheless important objectives toward which it is directed.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DENIAL PROGRAM

Economic denial is a weapon that must be used with great selectivity. It can never be more effective than the economic circumstances of the target country. A program of general economic denial against the Soviet Union, for example, would in the long run make little sense, since the Soviet Union imports from the free world only about one-half of 1 percent of its gross national product.

But Cuba presents a wholly different situation. It is a small island with meager natural resources and a low level of industrial development. Prior to the Castro regime, its imports from the free world—principally the United States—represented more than 30 percent of its gross national product.

Those imports were the vital elements of its economic prosperity. They consisted principally of industrial goods and equipment, fuel, raw materials, and foodstuffs.

Cuba's industrial installations, its powerplants, its sugar mills, its transportation equipment, are all of western origin. After 5 years Cuba's industrial plant is obsolete and rapidly deteriorating. With no continuing supply of spare parts, it has resorted to cannibalizing its existing equipment.

In addition, Cuba has become far more exposed and vulnerable to economic pressure because Castro's internal policies have driven into exile several hundred thousand Cubans—the managerial and professional elite. There is now a great shortage of skills, and much of the equipment in the industrial plant is mishandled. This situation has been further aggravated by management decisions taken on ideological, rather than economic, grounds.

Cuba is, therefore, vulnerable to a policy of economic denial. Its vulnerability is well illustrated by what has happened to the Cuban economy since trade with the West was first restricted. Today the Cuban standard of living is some 20 percent below pre-Castro levels. Many essential items are rationed and many imported items, such as fresh fruits and canned goods, have almost disappeared. The Cuban people are allowed two bars of soap per person per month, 3 pounds of meat per person per month, and 6 ounces of coffee per person per month—when they can get them.

Industrial output, which accounts for less than 25 percent of the gross national product, has remained stagnant. Quality has frequently been sacrificed to maintain the volume of production. In many industries output is shoddy, centralized operations inefficient, and labor productivity extremely

low, in large part because of lack of morale and incentive. Plants and machinery are often idle because of a lack of spare parts or raw materials, and breakdowns in water, power, and transport exacerbate the general disorganization.

Cuban sugar production—the basis of the entire economy—has fallen drastically. Last year's production of 3.8 million tons was the lowest since the early 1940's, and the crop for this year will probably be near the same figure.

With the curtailment of free-world trade, exports have fallen drastically—from more than \$800 million in 1958 to less than \$500 million in 1963. The lines of trade have been completely redrawn. In 1958 substantially all imports came from free-world sources; last year 85 percent came from the Communist bloc.

It is perhaps pertinent to point out that Cuban exports to Latin America fell from \$24 million in 1953 to an estimated \$8 million in 1962, while Latin American exports to Cuba fell from \$78 million in 1958 to an estimated \$6.7 million in 1962.

ALLIED COOPERATION

In order to exploit Cuba's economic vulnerability we have developed programs of common action on two levels: First, to restrict the availability of free-world shipping to Cuba; second, to limit the categories of goods that may be available to Cuba.

In order to make these policies effective, we have sought the cooperation of the other major industrialized countries of the free world, and particularly our NATO allies. We have obtained considerable, although not complete, cooperation.

For example, the number of calls by free-world vessels at Cuban ports dropped 60 percent in 1963 as compared to 1962, and there are reasonable prospects that, over 1964 as a whole, there will be a further drop.

Realistically, we must recognize that the restriction of free-world shipping, while useful, is of only limited utility. Shipping under the control of the bloc could transport the goods that Cuba requires, although at the cost of a considerable reorganization and disruption of schedules and charters.

Much more important is the denial of those categories of goods that are most vital to the operation of the Cuban economy. This includes industrial goods, transport equipment, and critical materials. Not only is Cuba wholly dependent on a large and continuing import of consumer goods if it is to maintain more than a subsistence economy, but its limited industrial plant, including the sugar industry, is based on Western equipment that is rapidly becoming worn out and obsolete and on Western transport equipment that is rapidly falling apart. It is important, therefore, that the West should not bolster the economy by providing spare parts and replacements.

This was the reason, for example, that the United States took such a strong position against the recent sale of 450 buses to the Castro government—400 of which are to be used in Havana. Those 400 additional buses will almost double available public transport in the city that dominates Cuba's economic life. Without those buses the efficiency of the Cuban economy and the level of Cuban morale would be further impaired.

The sale of Western locomotives to Cuba could have an even greater impact. Movement of sugar to Cuban ports is almost entirely by rail, and the motive power of the Cuban railroad system is presently in a critical state of disrepair. In a late-1963 description of the "desperate state" of the railroad system, a Cuban official organ estimated that only one-quarter as many locomotives were then in operating condition as in 1959. To replace even a part of this equipment would be a very big boon to the Cuban economy.

A MISLEADING COMPARISON

The position of our Government in seeking to prevent the sale of such heavy equipment to the Cuban regime has, unfortunately, not always been fully understood either in the United States or by some of our friends abroad. The question has frequently been confused by the curious contention that the sale of U.S. wheat to the Soviet Union somehow justifies the sale of critical supplies to Cuba. Such an argument betrays a misunderstanding of the nature and objectives of the program of economic denial.

As mentioned above, the continentwide economy of the Soviet Union, which in many ways approaches self-sufficiency, is far less vulnerable to economic denial than that of Cuba. There would be no point in trying to influence Soviet strength or Soviet policy by a general effort to deny exports to that country. All that has ever been attempted is a selective program of denying access primarily to strategic goods.

The United States has long had a modest trade in agricultural products with the Soviet Union. The special aspect of the wheat sale was its unusual size and character. The Soviet Union has been traditionally an exporter of wheat, and before approaching the United States it had already contracted the bulk of its wheat import requirements from Canada and Australia. Purchases from the United States were, from the Soviet point of view, marginal. Even the 2½ million tons originally discussed would have totaled only about 3½ percent of normal Soviet bread grain production.

Under these circumstances it is quite clear that the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union involved considerations quite unrelated to those involved in the denial of economic goods and other capital equipment to Cuba. Thus any sale of wheat to the Soviet Union was not of great importance to the Soviet economy and was of slight importance to the food stocks of the Soviet people. But our denial of industrial and transport equipment and spare parts to Cuba can mean a serious impairment in the state of the Cuban economy.

Oddly, enough, these two quite distinct questions have been confused, sometimes deliberately, by people holding quite disparate views: by those in Europe who would like to find an excuse to sell heavy equipment to Cuba, and by those in America who would like to find a basis for attacking the wheat sale. An objective comparison of these two situations reveals the emptiness of the argument.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA

These in brief are the bases for our policy toward Cuba and the reasons why we are seeking—and shall continue to seek—to limit the supply of critical goods to the Cuban economy.

This program is directed at the present Cuban Government. It will be continued so long as that government persists in its efforts to subvert and undermine the free societies of Latin America.

Within recent weeks it has become more than ever apparent that our program is succeeding. Cuba under communism is providing a spectacle of economic failure for all to see. Far from offering a better life for the Cuban people, communism is bringing only depression and want.

Today the Cuban economy is in a mess—a mess produced by incompetent management, ideological interference, and the refusal of the United States and many other Western societies to deal with a government that is seeking to undermine its neighbors.

The magnitude of the Cuban economic failure is clearly apparent in the constant complaints of the present Cuban leaders.

But if our program of economic denial is helping to accentuate the failures of the

Cuban economy, let it be clearly understood that it is not aimed at the Cuban people. The United States has no quarrel with the people of Cuba. It feels no animosity, only sympathy and sorrow. We have shown our good will by exempting food and medicines from the restrictions imposed on our trade with Cuba. We have never sought in any way to starve the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of Cuba will not always be compelled to suffer under Communist tyranny. Yet only when they achieve freedom and democracy, will they be able to develop the high potential of their country for economic and social progress.

And so we oppose the present Cuban regime not just because its ambitions menace our hemispheric neighbors. We oppose it, above all, because its standards of conduct and its tyrannical practices condemn the Cuban people to misery and fear.

The Cuban people deserve better than that.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, July 25, 1964]

UNIFORMS, CARNIVAL, AN ODD CONTRAST: SANTIAGO REFLECTS CUBAN REVOLUTION

(By Lee Winfrey)

SANTIAGO, CUBA.—Mixing the old Cuban culture with the new, Santiago Friday continued to prepare for the 26th of July revolutionary rally here Sunday.

At night, along La Trocha Street, Santiago's annual July carnival makes the neighborhood a bedlam.

Between blocks and blocks of open air beer joints and pushwagon pig meat stands, the people dance shoulder to shoulder in the streets to the sound of jukeboxes turned up to ear-hammering volume.

In the daytime around Cespedes Squares, the militiamen walk in ones and twos, each in green fatigues, each with a heavy .45-caliber pistol swinging from a cartridge belt around his waist.

The carnival is old and goes back many years. It is Santiago's version of the Mardi gras and dawn lights the way home for many of the revelers who flock there.

The militiamen are relatively new. Along with the numberless billboards which blare "Padra o Muerte" (Fatherland or Death) their world dates from July 26, 1953, when Fidel Castro Ruz, a Havana lawyer, attacked an army barracks here.

Moncada Barracks, where Castro began his revolution, is now a grammar school with 285 students. The old parade grounds is now a baseball diamond and the old concrete walls have been torn down and replaced with a chain link fence.

With 157 men and 2 women, Castro attacked the barracks at 5 a.m. on a Sunday when many Santiagueros were making their weary way home from a carnival. He picked a perfect time, for now his annual anniversary speech comes at the end of the city's most enjoyable week.

Santiago normally is a rather dull, drab-looking city of about a quarter million.

The brightest things in town are the billboards. They all say things like "Viva la 26 de Julio" and they are painted in the most vivid tones of red and black.

There is a new name in this year's 26th of July rally.

It is that of Ramon Lopez Pena, who seems to be well on his way to becoming the revolution's newest folk hero.

Lopez Pena was a Cuban soldier who died of a gunshot wound outside Guantanamo Naval Base this week. The Cubans insist that an American sentry shot him, a charge which the United States has denied.

There are more pictures of Lopez Pena around town than of anyone except Premier Castro. The posters are all the same—they show the face of the young soldier, eyes closed in death, and over his portrait printed in red, the words "Yankee Assassins!"

It is an odd feeling to walk through the courtyard at the Moncada School where these pictures are tacked to every tree, and have a smiling Cuban teenager come up and ask you for an American cigarette.

Contrasts like that are common here. CTC, the Communist labor union, put on a show in the square Thursday night. A feature was a teenage band playing rock-and-roll music, complete with electrified guitar.

There are about 15 American reporters staying here at the Casa Grande Hotel overlooking Cespedes Square, the city's chief center for park bench sitters and all who want to rest their feet awhile. So far, the Cuban Government has abided by a promise to let reporters go where they please.

INIT (National Institute of the Tourist Industry) has been busy moving the reporters around in Czech buses on Government-guided tours, but when they are over no one stops you from wandering off by yourself.

One of the stops Friday was a mammoth tent city, erected in Antonio Maceo baseball park to take care of thousands of campesinos coming to town for this weekend rally.

Beneath mammoth circus tents, double-decked bunks hammered together out of wood await the guests. The cots have steel springs and thin mattresses and they are crammed so close together you have to walk sideways to get between them.

In such close quarters, hundreds of farmers will be able to sleep free. A big mess hall at the end of the grounds is set up to serve them box lunches for 50 cents each.

The boxes are about half the size of a cigarette carton. Friday noon they were filled with rice, tuna fish, and sweet potatoes and early arrivals were eating them as though they enjoyed them.

Within the tiers of bunks beneath the tents, the sexes are not segregated. "My job was to furnish beds for the campesinos," said Oscar More, who is in charge of the grounds. "The rest is their problem."

Santiago's most obvious problem is a shortage of some items. At a nearby 5-and-10-cent store the other night, the two middle aisles were open and shoppers wandered through them freely to look at novelty items.

The aisles on either side were blocked off and a store employee admitted shoppers five at a time as others left. There was a line of about 20 people waiting to get in to look at women's blouses, and a line of about 100 waiting to examine a counter full of pots and pans.

You can buy food in the restaurants and prices are less than exorbitant. Chicken and rice cost two pesos (\$2 even) at the Hotel Imperil Thursday night.

The most expensive item on the menu was shrimp for \$3.25.

Breakfast Friday at the Casa Grande cost \$2.20. The prices of individual items were 10 cents for coffee, 20 cents for toast, 30 cents for pineapple juice, and \$1.60 for an order of ham.

There doesn't seem to be any resentment among Santiagueros toward individual Americans. An American walking through the streets draws no suspicious glances and no rudeness. Sometimes there is more than that. Friday in a small shop near the square, an old man who wandered in learned that one of the shoppers there was an American. The old man was carrying a Bible.

"God bless you," he said. "I am a Christian."

He wouldn't say any more.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, July 26, 1964]

CROWDS HAIL CASTRO AT SANTIAGO FIESTA

(By Lee Winfrey)

SANTIAGO, CUBA.—Excitement mounted in Santiago Saturday as the last few hours passed before the climatic 26th of July Revolutionary rally today.

The colorful presence of Premier Fidel Castro helped add to the hubbub.

A feature of Saturday's festivities was a gymnastic exhibition at Sports City, a 10,000-seat baseball stadium built here by the Castro government.

Along the route to the stadium Saturday morning, militiamen were posted on the roof of every building taller than one story.

"They have learned their lesson from President Kennedy," said a source who is not with the government. "They never had this before, the militia on the roof. But since President Kennedy [was shot], they have this."

The stadium was completely full. Castro, wearing his customary green fatigues and a pistol on his hip, entered a few minutes before 10 a.m. and took a seat in the center of an elevated wooden stand, above the concrete seats in the rightfield bleachers.

The crowd set up a cheer and began to clap. Their enthusiasm seemed genuine: they craned their necks to see the Premier and they were grinning with apparent delight.

After the applause died down, a trained cheering section began a series of chants, ending in the cry: "Comandante en jefe ordene." (Commander in chief, order us.)

The applause then became less pleasant to hear: it assumed a metronomic heavy-handed beat, an exercise in adulation. It went on for several minutes.

Castro looked tired. He has been in town since Thursday night, doing things like visiting the local carnival at 2 a.m. and pitching baseball in the afternoon and he obviously has been getting little sleep. Other than that, he appeared well.

Militiamen were scattered throughout the stands but security did not appear to be excessive. Most of the uniformed men behaved like spectators rather than guards, watching the festivities on the field most of the time.

The entertainment was a series of tableaux in which hundreds of young Cubans acted out various phases of the revolution, in pantomime.

The first one was entitled "Cuba, Free and Sovereign." Six hundred young men and 400 young women took part, each dressed entirely in white and carrying a brilliant flag of solid scarlet.

They marched around for awhile to the accompaniment of music, blaring from a loudspeaker. Then they spelled out the words "26 de Julio," knelt in pattern and all bowed their heads like Moslems praying.

The audience applauded and the marchers left through a gate in the right field fence.

Perhaps the most unusual of the eight tableaux, which took 2 hours to unwind, was one entitled "The Victory of Free Baseball Against Enslaved Baseball."

Dressed in identical baseball uniforms of bluish-green, 640 young men took part. Lining up in long rows, they first laid their bats, balls, and gloves on the ground.

While dirgelike music groaned over them, they went halfheartedly through the motions of pitching and catching. Then they all fell flat illustrating the slavery of the old days when Havana had a team in America's professional International League.

The music quickened and they sprang erect. Revolutionary athletes now, they plucked up their equipment and ran through a spirited pantomime of pitching and batting.

Americans in the audience, who had not realized that Willie Mays and Mickey Mantle perform in chains, watched all this with close attention.

Beyond the outfield fence, the green and brown ridges of the Sierra Maestra, where Castro once took refuge, looked rough and steep. Within the well-built concrete stadium, however, there was only one direct reminder that the Cuban government considers itself threatened and besieged.

Midway through the program, 400 soldiers in uniforms fanned out across the field. They lined up in firing positions, some standing, some kneeling, some lying down, half of them pointing their rifles at the jam-packed left-field stands. None aimed at Castro.

In unison they shouted, "Comandante Ordene," then fired a shattering volley. A cry of amused relief went up from the left-field stands when no one fell wounded and the crowd realized the bullets were blanks.

The revolution's emphasis on youth was clearly apparent. Five hundred and forty children marched in one tableau entitled, "The Children Are the Hope of the World." None looked more than 10 years old and many as young as 5.

Among the spectators was Jerry Rubin, 26, of Berkeley, Calif., who has been traveling with a group of American students in Cuba since June 12.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, of July 26, 1964]

AN AMERICAN WALKS STREETS OF CUBA WITHOUT CHALLENGE
(By Al Burt)

SANTIAGO, CUBA.—Here within sight of the Sierra Maestra, in the heartland of Fidel Castro's Revolution, an American can walk streets lined by angry, anti-U.S. propaganda, without a challenge and hardly a stare.

The Cuban man on the street seems to feel that any strange-looking people running around should not be bothered because the government probably brought them.

In a restaurant or at a store counter, a Cuban may hear what sounds like an accent out of his past and ask its origin.

A self-avowed Yankee draws friendliness in some, in others only blankness of curiosity.

Little animosity is displayed. To be a Miami Yankee puts you in a special league—because Miami is looked on as exile headquarters.

One old fellow's eyes lighted up and his face took on a wise look. "Did President Johnson send you?" he asked. He could not be convinced otherwise and maintained a pleased, crafty look without explaining his pleasure.

But an American who stops too long and talks soon will find a man at his elbow to assist him. These men are courteous, businesslike and plentiful.

Sometimes they are helpful. There is nothing startling about Santiago, unless it is the flood of Castro's pictures and slogans. Even prepared for them, they overwhelm you with doomsday promises of fighting to the end, delivered in cheerleader style.

The overriding impression is that daily life is guided by necessity. People adapt to the shortages of food, clothing and manufactured items.

Revolutionary sacrifice is preached and must be practiced. This undoubtedly displeases and inconveniences some—but a newly arrived visitor sees no displeasure. There are no antigovernment signs, no scrawled messages on walls, no overt indication even in the revelry of the carnival, where the tipsy might grow brave.

The first meetings of the skeptical U.S. press and suspicious Cuban officials went off with barely a mutter. Conflicting opinions rarely have slipped past determined good humor.

However, there is an occasional jest with a message.

One militiaman, who had his picture taken standing by some boys putting together lunch boxes for the 26th of July celebrants, called out, "What will you call that picture—a militiaman making the boys work?"

Shepherd for the newsmen is Fabio Ruiz, who wears the customary fatigues and .45 and says he works for the Cuban Sports Institute.

"There is a total misconception about Cuba in the United States," he advised. "You will

not write this but I will tell you. Look around at the people you see. Could they be so happy if this were a slave country?"

In back of the Moncada Barracks, famous as the sight of Fidel Castro's first revolutionary attack, Ruiz joined in watching some boys get up a baseball game.

All but one chubby youngster scrambled to play. "Isn't Fatty going to play?" someone asked. "Sure," a boy replied. "It's his ball."

In the sweltering heat of Santiago, it would be difficult to perceive happiness even in the happy.

Philosophically, there seems to be some parallel between the Cuban people and those who play baseball with "Fatty."

If there is only one game in town, or one baseball in the park, that is the one you play.

MODERN THEOLOGY: THREAT OR PROMISE—ADDRESS BY ROBERT W. SARNOFF

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, a recent address by Robert W. Sarnoff, chairman of the board of the National Broadcasting Co., at the Bryant College commencement, in Providence, in my home State of Rhode Island, pointed up in meaningful fashion the promises and threats stemming from our rapidly accelerating developments in science and technology.

Mr. Sarnoff emphasized the point that enlightened education is needed today as never before. Youthful leaders, he advocated, should become both specialists and generalists, which will mean longer periods of schooling and broader preparations for careers.

In an environment of challenge and change—

He said—
education cannot end with formal training, but must continue as a lifelong process of developing habits of mind and thought, of sharpening one's comprehension of the influences that are reshaping our world.

He touched upon the question of Government regulation and the problem incident to the effect of broadcasting election results from one time zone to another. While I do not necessarily agree with Mr. Sarnoff, I do believe that these problems need ventilation.

Mr. President, this is an extremely thoughtful address. Because I believe it will be of great interest to my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MODERN THEOLOGY: THREAT OR PROMISE
(By Robert W. Sarnoff)

I am greatly privileged and honored to join you today and to become a fellow alumnus of your distinguished institution.

Since my own commencement 25 years ago, I have been aware that it is traditional for a guest on these occasions to attempt to impart, in a matter of minutes, more wisdom than members of the graduating class have accumulated in their years of concentrated study and some two decades of life. Such a task is a most imposing challenge both to speaker and to listener. And it is forbidding even to one engaged in a communications medium that has often covered a century or more in an hour, although it has sometimes been accused of reversing the process with a 60-second commercial that