

1964

lished companies away. How can industries and firms reasonably be expected to pay taxes which are used by the Government to finance a competitive organization so that in effect the taxpayers own money is being used literally to "cut their throats." I trust that the administration immediately takes note of this practice which I have mentioned, investigates and does something about it before another industry in our country is eliminated from the business world and our national economy.

(Mr. MOORE (at the request of Mr. SCHWEIKER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MOORE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. TAFT (at the request of Mr. SCHWEIKER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. TAFT'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

ARE MISSILES STILL IN CUBA?
PART II

(Mr. CRAMER (at the request of Mr. SCHWEIKER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, both the AP and the UPI carried news stories yesterday of the reported sightings of missiles in Cuba, which I discussed in the RECORD yesterday. This report took on the added significance in light of the report of the Stennis Preparedness Subcommittee of May 9, 1963, which expressed alarm over recurring reports of remaining missiles in Cuba and which stated as a finding of the committee that the only way to disprove these reports was with onsite inspections.

There are apparently those among us who find comfort in believing that these reports should be placed in the category of "false rumors." After carefully studying these reports, however, I find no such comfort. On the contrary, the alarm expressed by the Stennis committee is well founded.

As I mentioned on the floor yesterday, the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba made these latest revelations public. Naturally, the authenticity and reliability of the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba takes on great importance so that we can evaluate their reports in proper perspective.

I have been in close contact with the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba since its formation and have always found their information to be carefully screened before being released to the public. The latest report to which the committee refers came as a result of 12 explosions on March 20, 1964 in Pinar del Rio Province. The explosions followed a fire which broke out at the La Guatana military

base located in that province, according to the committee's report. This evidently necessitated removing a score of missiles to a Russian base located a short distance from the provincial capital of Pinar del Rio. Only partially covered with tarpaulins, the missiles were visible to onlookers who were quickly dispersed by Cuban militia.

An example of the painstaking effort the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba took in assessing this report is indicated by the fact that, before releasing this information, they checked this report for 1½ months before making it public. Naturally, they have underground sources in Cuba and on the basis of the past accuracy of certain members of the underground, they can assess these facts.

I have been informed by the committee that the underground reports used by them are the same as those which revealed on August 7, 1962, the missiles in Cuba at that time. At that time, the administration took these reports with a "grain of salt."

As we all well know, their reports turned out to be accurate—witness the 1962 Cuban crisis.

Likewise, over the past year, this committee reported the introduction of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba which has since proven accurate.

This committee also revealed details of the Cuban plan to subvert Venezuela with the introduction of arms and munitions. This was also proven to be accurate.

Mr. Speaker, the record of careful analysis and credibility of this organization made up of responsible—and concerned—people has been established.

This latest report by this organization is by no means isolated, but is the latest in a series of continuing reports they have been making of the missile potential in Cuba.

In view of past performance of this organization, the Russians and the administration, I can come to only one logical conclusion. The presumption in my mind is that missiles can still be in Cuba. It can be rebutted only by conclusive proof to the contrary, such as can be procured for instance by onsite inspections and I renew my request that the United States take the leadership in urging the OAS to make such onsite inspections possible.

I also feel that as all nations concerned are members of the United Nations, an effort should be made through that organization as well. Such an accomplishment would go a long way in quelling the legitimate criticism directed toward that organization. After all, all we're after is a fulfillment of the promises of onsite inspection made to this Government by the Soviet Union at the time of the missile crisis.

In view of these reports, onsite inspection is not only reasonable but it, or some equally reliable source of information, is essential.

At this point I am including, in the RECORD, the article from the August 10, 1964, issue of the Free Cuba News which discusses the recent reports of missile sightings in Cuba:

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN CUBA,
STATES INTELLIGENCE CENTER

Missiles, ranging in length from 40 to 120 feet, are located at the La Guatana military base in Pinar del Rio Province. This is the judgment of an intelligence report received from the underground resistance in Cuba. The exact number of missiles in La Guatana is not precisely known, but the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) claims that 85 of these missiles were installed at the base in late 1961 and early 1960. Only 55 were removed at the time of the missile crisis of 1962, according to the DRE report.

Other sources add to the missile picture in Cuba. They state that more missiles were introduced into the island last June, and that they are now installed underground in the Yumuri Valley of Matanzas Province, approximately 100 miles east of Havana.

According to the detailed four-page report submitted to Free Cuba News by the DRE, conclusive evidence of the presence of IRBM's came to light in a spectacular manner the 20th of March of this year. DRE intelligence sources in Cuba have been checking out the details since that time, and only recently arrived at the judgment that IRBM's are in fact still in Cuba. Here is the gist of the report:

At exactly 9:10 p.m. on March 20 of this year, a fire broke out at La Guatana Base. It was followed an hour later by a series of 12 giant explosions which sent debris flying to a height of 3,000 feet, covering an area of several miles. The fireworks themselves were visible for 15 miles, creating a state of panic throughout the Province.

The balance of the night, and the day following, great Russian truck-trailers moved a score of missiles from La Guatana to a Russian base located at the Granja Escuela Ludovico S. Noda, a short distance from the provincial capital of Pinar del Rio. Only partially covered with tarpaulins, the missiles were visible to on-lookers who were quickly dispersed by Cuban militia.

The report also puts the number of Russian soldiers at the La Guatana base alone at slightly more than 1,500. The Soviets had 2,500 soldiers at La Guatana during the missile crisis, according to the DRE report.

One hundred of the Soviets were badly burned by the blaze on March 20, and were evacuated to the Asilo de Ancianos hospital, a hospital devoted exclusively to the care of the Soviets, and to selected militia and their families.

Other sources, among them the former proprietor of a finca (farm) located next to La Guatana, provided more information. Sr. Cuco Vinas stated that, according to his sources, the tremendous explosions were caused by leakage of liquid oxygen, the propellant used for missiles. The "pay-loads" for the missiles are, according to Sr. Cuco Vinas, stored in another base, known as the finca Cafetal.

The importance attached to the explosions at the missile base is attested by the fact that both Fidel Castro and the Russian Ambassador to Havana rushed to the scene of the catastrophe at 11 p.m. Castro tried to take charge, but was rebuffed by Soviet officers.

The following day, heavy-duty cranes were dispatched to nearby fincas where they removed parts of missiles and missile equipment which had been hurled there by the force of the explosions. The cranes were accompanied by Russian officers and several companies of Cuban militia whose commanders warned the peasants to say nothing about the missiles upon pain of death.

Dr. Luis Fernandez Mendiola, a recent escapee from Matanzas Province, states that IRBM's continue to come into Cuba. The end of the first week of June, said Dr. Mendiola, a convoy of Russian truck trailers bearing missiles passed his clinic in the city of

August 14

Matanzas. He spoke of the convoy and the extraordinary security precautions surrounding its movement in the following words:

"The convoy passed through the city in complete darkness. The authorities cut off all electric current in the city until the convoy was gone. This is exactly the type of security precaution Castro and the Soviets took in the summer and fall of 1962 when missiles were sent into Cuba."

Because of the great length of the missiles, the convoy was forced to traverse the wide thoroughfares of the city. Their diameter was estimated at between 6 and 8 feet by eyewitnesses. Said Dr. Mendioia:

"Police cars were placed at all the entrances to the main thoroughfares, and dispersed traffic and the curious onlookers who were attracted to the scene by the cutoff of electricity and the noise made by the convoy. I could easily tell that the cargoes were missiles, since the convoy passed directly in front of my clinic. The trucks came down the Via Blanca highway from the direction of Havana and went to the Yumuri Valley, near the city of Matanzas. The Russians have been working hard at excavations in that area, and the entrance roads to the valley are sealed off to all but military traffic."

Russian construction continues in Pinar del Rio Province, as well. Refugees from the area of La Guatana say that the base has been rebuilt, and another constructed at a nearby finca called El Inciso. The DRE report supplies more details to the eyewitness testimony. The two bases, states the DRE, are now "hardened" in extensive concrete abutments.

I am also including in the RECORD some of the pertinent material in the Interim Report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee known as the Stennis Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Senate, filed May 9, 1963, which certainly lends strong support to my position on this matter, and to the fact that it is quite possible that missiles still remain in Cuba and that on-site inspections are the only way of gaining "full and absolute assurance on the question."

INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
(EXCERPTS FROM STENNIS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, MAY 9, 1963)

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.

4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:

(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic

missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at preselected sites, with all equipment prelocated, the Soviet mobile medium range (1,100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours.

Par. 14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

Page 11. It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29 could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being employed for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.

Page 15. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence.

3. Reports of concealed strategic weapons in Cuba. Reports from refugees, exile, and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn. The current intelligence estimate that they are

not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This, of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.

There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with respect to this matter cannot be overemphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assumption that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near preselected sites in a state of complete readiness, mobile medium-range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious.

STATE DEPARTMENT AGAIN FAILS AMERICAN INVESTORS IN VENEZUELA

(Mr. BECKER (at the request of Mr. SCHWEIKER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Speaker, once again I take the floor to call attention to the seizure of the properties of the Venezuelan Sulphur Corp. This corporation is entirely owned by U.S. citizens as stockholders, as well as taxpayers.

In the light of the seizure of this multi-million-dollar investment, it is tragic that the Government of the United States has given to Venezuela aid totaling almost \$190 million. Loans have been granted to Venezuela by the United States with interest rates of three-quarters of 1 percent. This means that the U.S. Government is borrowing this money and charging its taxpayers 4 percent interest rates, while loaning the money to Venezuela at three-quarters of 1 percent. This three-quarters of 1 percent hardly pays the equivalent of the service charges. Despite the great amount of aid that the United States has been and is giving to Venezuela—financial and otherwise—the Government of Venezuela still refuses to make any settlement with the Venezuelan Sulphur Corp. for the seizure of their property.

It is hardly any wonder that our State Department has been inept, to say the least, in interceding for the U.S. investors when Dean Acheson and his law firm are the legal counsel for Venezuela in the United States, while at the same time Dean Acheson is a consultant to the State Department and is serving the State Department in other capacities, even though he may be doing this without direct compensation.

Mr. Speaker, the Venezuelan Sulphur Corp. has been forced to go into the U.S. courts. The court has asked that the State Department and Venezuela settle this matter in an equitable manner.