

both income and employment in the United States.

I also presented that the policy would appear to be a subsidy to Canadian manufacturers; and if so, the Treasury Department could impose now a countervailing duty under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

As of April 24, the Treasury Department has notified us that they are considering whether or not the Canadian system is a "bounty or grant" within the meaning of this section of the Tariff Act; and that the matter is on the agenda for the inter-ministerial meeting scheduled to take place in Ottawa later this week.

If this tariff action is not a subsidy, then it is a rebate; and the latter is legally contrary to our tariff agreements.

As the plan has been developed, Canadian manufacturers will not only be producing for their own market, but also for the market in this country—and it has been reported that Canada expects to gain some 60,000 jobs, again at the expense of the industry in this country.

Shipments of automotive parts from Canada were some \$8 million in 1962, \$32 million in 1963, and will approach \$100 million during 1964. In addition, if the present policy is allowed to stand, the real jump in Canadian business will occur in 1965.

In an effort to meet this condition, we understand that one of the large American automobile producers is now constructing an engine plant in Canada.

Recently the piston and pin standardization group, another trade association whose members consist of the U.S. manufacturers of pistons and pins used in internal combustion engines, have joined with the automotive parts association in protest against this Canadian action. We have also heard from several unions in protest against this loss of jobs, including the machinists and the auto workers.

If there are further developments such as Studebaker moving its entire automobile production to Canada as a result of this tariff manipulation, not only will thousands of additional jobs be lost in this country, but there can only be a further dollar outflow from the United States; and that can only further increase our unfavorable balance of payments.

There are now rumors that, if this Canadian scheme is successful in the automobile industry, it will be applied to other industries such as aircraft and chemicals.

At the meeting yesterday morning I presented a letter as of April 20 from the Eaton Manufacturing Co. of Cleveland, Ohio, in which it was pointed out that this policy would result in a loss to their business of some 800,000 man-hours, \$11 million in business.

In this connection, the Ottawa meeting later this week is of the utmost importance. If the Treasury decides the matter comes within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act, unless the Canadians are willing to base their position on efficiency, reciprocal action can and should be taken by the United States.

I believe this Government should do whatever is necessary to protect these jobs, especially as their loss is in spite of the superior efficiency of American manufacturers.

Unless the Ottawa meeting results in a correction of this unfortunate development, I plan to request an open hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We cannot afford to lose more jobs as a result of this unilateral tariff action.

OUR SEATO ALLY PAKISTAN, AND THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

During the delivery of Mr. THURMOND'S speech,

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, among the valid reasons why the United States should get out of its unilateral engagement in South Vietnam is that our SEATO allies have run out on us. We are carrying on that war—and it is a war—all alone and getting our American boys killed. Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan are partners in the Southeast Asia Treaty. But no British boys are in the firing line; no French boys are in the firing line; no New Zealand boys are in the firing line; no Thai boys are in the firing line; no Pakistani boys are in the firing line. Only American boys. American boys are being killed in combat. But no British boys; no French boys; no Australian boys; no New Zealand boys; no Thai boys; no Pakistani boys.

Recently President Johnson urged their participation at least by a show of flags. But what has been the response? It has been negative.

The latest rebuff comes from Pakistan. The New York Times devotes a column to it under the heading "Pakistan Rebuffs United States on Saigon Aid."

I ask unanimous consent that this article from the New York Times of April 28 be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, now the details of this Pakistan refusal to play its part are interesting. Addressing the National Press Club, according to the Times account, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Tulfikar Al Buitto stated that on the contrary Pakistan would pursue its program of normalizing relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union despite its defensive alliances with the United States.

We may well ask just what value to the United States is this defensive alliance. All it has done apparently is to cost Uncle Sam a lot of money and to have created dissatisfaction with the United States in India, another large-scale beneficiary of U.S. aid.

The New York Times story goes on to say Mr. Bluitto's comments were interpreted "as an indication that on Asia policy the United States and Pakistan were still at odds and that their relations continued to be troubled."

Well, Pakistan is in Asia. India is in Asia. South Vietnam is in Asia. So, if

Pakistan is at odds with us on our Asia policy, just what good is our defensive alliance with Pakistan and what results have come from our lading out to Pakistan of \$1½ billion?

Yes, my friends, that is the amount to date. It consists for the 14 years ending in 1963 of \$710.5 million in grants and \$623.2 in loans.

Now what are the terms of these so-called loans? We are loaning our taxpayers' dollars at three-fourths of 1 percent.

Moreover, these so-called loans are repayable in 40 years, with no repayment of principal for the first 10 years. There is, of course, a great question whether they will ever be repaid.

They include loans for so-called "commodity assistance"; that one is for \$15 million.

Then there is a loan of \$90 million for iron and steel imports.

There is a loan of \$31 million to help Pakistan rehabilitate its railroads.

There is a loan of \$26 million to build a thermal electric power generating station—a profitmaking enterprise as soon as it is built.

There is also an \$8,600,000 loan to expand Pakistan's power system.

There is a \$2,100,000 loan for airport airways equipment.

There is a \$30 million loan for "general commodities."

There is a \$2 million loan for "feasibility studies."

There is a \$10,800,000 loan for salinity control and reclamation.

There is a \$3,600,000 loan at three-fourths of 1 percent for the Chalna Anchorage project.

Let it be clear that this Anchorage project is not Anchorage, Alaska; it is an Anchorage project in Pakistan.

Anchorage, Alaska, has not been offered any loan at three-fourths of 1 percent.

I ask unanimous consent that two tables showing the loans and grants made to Pakistan totaling \$1,333.7 billion and one showing the development loans be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a fine ally—this Pakistan. The more we give them the less they cooperate.

There is a second valid reason why the United States has no business in Vietnam. We are pretending that we are there to help and advise the government—that of self-imposed Nguyen Khanh—on winning its war against the opposing Vietcong. But our 15,000 or more boys who are presumably there as advisers are in combat. That's why they are losing their lives.

A graphic account of how these so-called advisers are involved in combat is the posthumously published story of one of them. He was Capt. Jerry Shank, of Indiana. Extracts of some of his letters to his wife are published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report. They are the testament of one of the American

boys, sent to South Vietnam supposedly as an adviser and killed there on March 24 of this year.

I quote a few of the passages:

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 4, 1964]

A CAPTAIN'S LAST LETTERS FROM VIETNAM:
"WE ARE LOSING, MORALE IS BAD; IF THEY'D
GIVE US GOOD PLANES . . ."

(This is an American pilot's own story of the role of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. They are far more than "advisers" to South Vietnam's armed forces. Americans are in the thick of a "hot war," a shooting war. And, often, they are fighting with obsolete weapons against a Communist enemy who is highly skilled and well armed. A vivid picture of the war, the elation and excitement, the frustration and bitterness, emerges from the pilot's letters home—a correspondence ended by his death in combat.)

November 27, 1963: Sunday all hell broke loose with the VC (Communist Vietcong guerrillas). We had a big airborne operation against them—both choppers and parachutes. I woke up at 4:30 to fly my first night attack—darker than hell. . . . By 9 o'clock in the morning we had launched 12 sorties, which is a lot for our little operation. The Vietcongs got one chopper and one B-26 that day, but we (T-28's) hurt them bad.

December 21, 1963: It's so mixed up over here—there are over 3,000 Air Force in Vietnam, yet there are only 50 combat crews (B-26 and T-28). What a ridiculous ratio. Also, the Army tried to show the Air Force is no good and vice versa. Ridiculous. Down at Soc Trang, Army and Air Force will die for each other, but up with the colonels and generals it's a big fight for power. And most of these idiots don't even have any idea of what it's like out in combat. . . . They're trying now to find out why we pick up so many hits. The dumb b-----s. We get hit more now because the VC have very fine weapons. There are Chinese over here now.

I think the next few months will tell. Either the VC will quit or this will turn into another Korea. I hope it doesn't take the United States too long to realize this.

December 22, 1963: Flew another mission today. We escorted three trains across no man's land and then struck some VC's. Our F4D (the guy in the L-19 who tells us where to hit) received three hits, but we got them. I'm credited with destroying a .50-caliber antiaircraft gun. Bombed him out of this world. I guess I'm a true killer. I have no sympathy and I'm good. I don't try to rationalize why I do it. No excuses. It's a target and I hit it with the best of my skill. It's a duel; only, I repeat, only the best man wins. You can't afford to be second.

January 3, 1964: Down at Soc Trang, one of the airmen came up with the idea of putting chunks of charcoal in our napalm tanks. Napalm is a gasoline which is jelled into a mass about the consistency of honey. We carry two tanks of it, each weighing 500 pounds. When you drop it, it ignites and spreads fire about 200 to 300 feet. With charcoal in it, the charcoal is thrown about another 200 feet farther, like a burning baseball, and does further damage to VC houses. We've had it at Soc Trang and it works real well.

Tomorrow three birds are going out with one-half of their load of straight napalm and the other half with charcoal napalm (Madam Nhu cocktails). A photo ship is going along to take pictures. If higher headquarters thinks it's all right, then they'll buy us the charcoal. So far we've been buy-

ing it ourselves or else "borrowing" it from the kitchen.

January 7, 1964: Morale's at a big low over here, especially among the combat crews. It's the same old stuff we got in MATS. No consideration for the crew.

Lost two guys today. One was a pretty good friend of mine. The only guess is—the airplanes just came apart. B-26—third or fourth that have done that now. . . . Pretty bad day—just hard to find any good news to write. Can't even talk to anybody—nobody has anything to say. Just a blue day.

I don't know what the United States is doing. They tell you people we're just in a training situation and they try to run us as a training base. But we're at war. We are doing the flying and fighting. We are losing. Morale is very bad.

We asked if we couldn't fly an American flag over here. The answer was "No." They say the VC will get pictures of it and make bad propaganda. Let them. Let them know America is in it.

If they'd only give us good American airplanes with the U.S. insignias on them and really tackle this war, we could possibly win. If we keep up like we are going, we will definitely lose. I'm not being pessimistic. It's so obvious. How our Government can lie to its own people—it's something you wouldn't think a democratic government could do. I wish I were a prominent citizen or knew someone who could bring this before the U.S. public. However, if it were brought before the average U.S. family, I'm sure all they'd do is shake their heads and say tch-tch and tune in another channel on the TV.

January 20, 1964: I have never been so lonely, unhappy, disappointed, frustrated in my whole life. None of these feelings are prevalent above the other. I guess I should say loneliness overshadows the others, but that's really not true.

I am over here to do the best job possible for my country—yet my country will do nothing for me or any of my buddies or even for itself. I love America. My country is the best, but it is soft and has no guts about it at all.

I'm sure nothing will be done over here until after the elections. Why? Because votes are more important than my life or any of my buddies' lives. What gets me the most is that they won't tell you people what we do over here. I'll bet you that anyone you talk to does not know that American pilots fight this war. We—me and my buddies—do everything. The Vietnamese students we have on board are airmen basics. The only reason they are on board is in case we crash there is one American adviser and one Vietnamese student. They're stupid, ignorant sacrificial lambs, and I have no use for them. In fact, I have been tempted to whip them within an inch of their life a few times. They're a menace to have on board.

February 17, 1964: All B-26's are grounded, so we are the only strike force left.

A B-26 crashed at Hurlburt last week. Another came with the wing just coming off. Finally, the Air Force is worried about the airplanes—finally, after six of my friends have "augered in."

February 21, 1964: Tuesday evening ——— got shot down. He fell in his airplane next to a Special Forces camp and got out without a scratch. The airplane burned completely up, though. [Another airman] was going in on his seventh strafing pass and never came out of it. Don't know what hap-

pened—whether he got shot or his controls shot out. That was two airplanes in 2 days. Kind of shook us up.

Not only that, the B-26's have been grounded since Monday because the wings came off one again at Hurlburt. So after the last crash the whole USAF fighter force is down to six airplanes. This should set an example of how much Uncle Sam cares. Six airplanes. Might as well be none.

Rumor now is that B-26's will fly again only with greater restrictions. . . . I'm pretty well fed up. Poor B-26 jocks are really shook. That airplane is a killer.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of "A Captain's Last Letters from Vietnam" from the May 4 issue of U.S. News & World Report be printed in full at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, there is a third valid reason why the United States should get out of its unilateral, needless, and tragic involvement in South Vietnam, with its mounting toll of American lives.

Reviewing the past history, the failure of the French with their large army and heavy losses, and our own failure to date to prevent the war from going from bad to worse, is the obvious conclusion that we cannot win. To have even the slightest chance to win, the United States would have to engage in a full-scale major war, with ground forces of several hundred thousand men, backed by the most modern missilery and airpower. Even then, in that remote and difficult terrain, attainment of victory would be far from assured and the costs in human life and treasure staggering. We might indeed be inviting a far larger war.

But a new aspect forces itself upon our attention. Do we really want to win? That issue has been thrust into public consciousness by an article by Jim Lucas, veteran war correspondent for the Scripps-Howard newspapers.

I ask unanimous consent that his article in the Washington News of April 27 entitled: "U.S. Fails To 'Go All-Out for Victory,'" be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Mr. Lucas quotes an American major as saying:

We're really not trying so much to train these people to win their war; rather we're training ourselves.

And Lucas goes on to state that:

The United States is—and has been for the past 3 years—using Vietnam as a sort of military test laboratory, an extension of Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and all the others back home.

What a shocking reason for sacrificing the lives of our young Americans.

Meanwhile, we are facing other dire aspects of our unilateral exposure in this tropical trap. It is lucidly set forth in an article by Hanson W. Baldwin, the knowledgeable military expert of the New York Times, which appeared in that publication on April 28, headed: "Terrorism in Vietnam: Violence Against

1964-

Civilians Complicates U.S. Efforts and May Force Policy Shift.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 5.)
 Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, let us hope that this, as well as all the other valid reasons, do force a policy shift. It is time that our civilians and dependents were evacuated. It is being contemplated in neighboring Laos, where our misguided policies in the Far East are reaping their bitter fruit.

The development in Laos were discussed in an article in the April 28 issue of the New York Times, in a United Press dispatch from Vientiane, Laos, headed: U.S. Dependents in Laos on Alert to Leave." I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 6.)
 Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, my mail continues to run almost unanimously in favor of my position, first stated on the floor of the Senate on March 10, that the United States should get out of South Vietnam.

I share the view so well repeatedly expressed by the able senior Senator from Oregon that we should bring the United Nations into the picture, arrange for a cease-fire, and work for a negotiated peace. I repeat my view that South Vietnam is not worth the life of an American boy.

On a previous day I introduced some 50 letters from all parts of the country supporting my position. I ask unanimous consent that another 50 be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 7.)

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, Apr. 28, 1964]
PAKISTAN REBUFFS UNITED STATES ON SAIGON AID—BHUTTO REITERATES PROGRAM OF CHINA AND SOVIET LINKS

(By Hedrick Smith)

WASHINGTON, April 27.—The Foreign Minister of Pakistan rebuffed today President Johnson's suggestion that Asian allies of the United States contribute more to the war against Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam.

The Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, also said at a National Press Club luncheon that his country intended to pursue its program of normalizing relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union despite its defensive alliances with the United States.

During the last 18 months Pakistan has signed several agreements with Communist China to demarcate their borders, exchange commercial airline service and provide for economic trade.

Mr. Bhutto's comments were interpreted as an indication that on Asia policy the United States and Pakistan were still at odds and that their relations continued to be troubled.

There were new indications of the continuing coolness. Contrary to custom for foreign dignitaries, no ranking State Department official was on hand for Mr. Bhutto's luncheon address.

Earlier, the Pakistani Government refused to permit five Pakistani newsmen to come to the United States to cover the meetings of the Central Treaty Organization. The meetings start tomorrow.

LACK OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Mr. Bhutto, who is here to attend the sessions, said at the luncheon that "sheer lack of foreign exchange" had prevented Pakistan from allowing the newsmen to come.

But qualified sources said Washington had proposed their visit and had offered to fly them here and pay their expenses. Ten newsmen from Iran and Turkey have arrived under a similar arrangement.

Britain is the other member of the treaty organization. The United States is a member of certain leading organs of the organization and is represented at its meetings by observers.

The sources said Pakistan's refusal to permit the correspondents to come was apparently an effort to prevent their reports from giving the appearance at home of heavy dependence by Pakistan on U.S. aid. An informant here said it was "another sign of their lukewarm attitude toward CENTO."

Last fall a large part of the Pakistani Navy took part in a training exercise with elements of the United States, British, Iranian, and Turkish fleets, but there was an almost total news blackout in Pakistan on the exercises, officials said.

Most recently, Washington was disturbed by Foreign Minister Bhutto's decision not to attend the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization's ministerial meeting in Manila. He chose instead to attend the preparatory talks for an African-Asian conference sponsored by Communist China.

In the recent discussions in Manila the United States was reported to have urged its allies to carry a larger share of the Vietnamese war effort. Last Thursday, President Johnson said at a news conference he hoped to see some more flags represented in the Vietnamese conflict.

Mr. Bhutto told a questioner today that it would "be dishonest to say we could make a contribution" to the war in Vietnam. He said the "menace" of a Western-armed India made it impossible. The Indians and Pakistanis are involved in a bitter dispute over the status of Kashmir.

Pakistan, which has yet to commit forces to Western alliances, is one of two members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization that have not sent some military, technical, or economic aid to the Government of South Vietnam. The other is Thailand.

EXHIBIT 2

Loans and grants made to Pakistan under the Agency for International Development and predecessor agencies

(In millions of dollars)

Year	Loans	Grants
1949-52		10.6
1953-57	103.0	227.3
1958	38.6	54.3
1959	63.2	99.5
1960	102.0	96.6
1961	27.2	97.0
1962	207.1	33.0
1963	169.4	4.9
Total	710.5	623.2
Total of loans and grants	1,333.7	

Development loans made to Pakistan (repayable in dollars)

Borrower and purpose	Repayable, number of years	Interest rate (percent)	Amount
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN			
Commodity assistance	45	2 1/2%	\$15,000,000
Iron and steel imports	40	3 1/2%	90,000,000
4th railways project	40	3 1/2%	31,000,000
General commodities imports	40	3 1/2%	42,000,000
Expansion of power system	40	3 1/2%	8,600,000
Thermal electric power-generating station	40	3 1/2%	26,000,000
Malaria eradication program	40	3 1/2%	3,800,000
Airport and airways equipment	40	3 1/2%	2,100,000
Salinity control and reclamation project No. 2	40	3 1/2%	10,800,000
General commodities (2d)	40	3 1/2%	30,000,000
Chalna anchorage project	40	3 1/2%	3,600,000
Feasibility studies	40	3 1/2%	2,000,000
Total			264,900,000

EXHIBIT 3

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 4, 1964]

A CAPTAIN'S LAST LETTERS FROM VIETNAM: "WE ARE LOSING, MORALE IS BAD; IF THEY'D GIVE US GOOD PLANES"

(This is an American pilot's own story of the role of U.S. troops in South Vietnam.)

(They are far more than "advisers" to South Vietnam's armed forces.)

(Americans are in the thick of a "hot war," a shooting war. And, often, they are fighting with obsolete weapons against a Communist enemy who is highly skilled and well armed.)

(A vivid picture of the war, the elation and excitement, the frustration and bitterness, emerges from the pilot's letters home—a correspondence ended by his death in combat.)

(Air Force Capt. "Jerry" Shank is dead—a combat casualty of the war in Vietnam.)

(While he lived and fought "Jerry" Shank wrote to his wife and family in Indiana every chance he got—sometimes twice a day. Those letters make up a moving "battle diary" of a war in which more than 15,000 Americans are fighting and dying in combat against the Communists.)

(Excerpts from his letters are presented here with the permission of his widow. All references, by name, to his Air Force companions have been eliminated to spare them any possible embarrassment.)

November 14, 1963: We're using equipment and bombs from World War II and it's not too reliable. This is an interesting place here. Everybody works together, officers and enlisted. We're out there lifting bombs and such. Every possible time, we give the men a chance to ride. On a test hop or something like that—it gives them a little motivation. We can't take them on missions, 'cause we have to have our VNAF [Vietnamese Air Force] student pilot along.

We 23 Air Force run the whole T-28 war in the Mekong Delta. This will give you some idea of Uncle Sam's part in the war.

November 22, 1963: Been real busy with the armament job—really makes a day go fast. Got all kinds of problems—can't get parts or books or charts describing the different bombs and systems. The Air Force hasn't used any of this equipment since Korea, and everybody seems to have lost the books. The main problem is personnel—no good officers or NCO's over here that really know their business. Most of them are out of SAC [Strategic Air Command] and have dealt

only with nuclear weapons. This doesn't apply over here; what we need is someone from World War II. Some days it's like beating your head against a brick wall.

November 27, 1963: Sunday all hell broke loose with the VC [Communist Vietcong guerrillas]. We had a big airborne operation against them—both choppers and parachutes. I woke up at 4:30 to fly my first night attack—darker than hell. . . . By 9 o'clock in the morning we had launched 12 sorties, which is a lot for our little operation. The Vietcongs got one chopper and one B-26 that day, but we (T-28's) hurt them bad. There is far more detail to this, but I don't want to put it in a letter.

I'm up to 20 missions now and am real confident in myself. I do good work, I feel like a veteran and I feel like a different man. I think I am older.

I have changed my opinion about the VC. They are not ornery little fellows. They are mean, vicious, well-trained veterans. They are killers and are out to win. Although this is called a dirty little war and it is far from the shores of old United States of America, it's a big, mean war. We are getting beat. We are undermanned and undergunned. The United States may say they are in this, but they don't know we need help over here.

If the United States would really put combat people in here we could win and win fast. It seems to be the old story of a halfhearted effort.

December 4, 1963: I have debated for a week and a half now over telling you of Black Sunday—November 24, 1963. I'm going to tell you, and if you don't want to hear about these things again, well, say so. You do have a right to know.

This was not a typical day. We flew 20 sorties. But the VC hurt us bad. All in all that day, 23 airplanes were hit, one B-26 crew lost their lives, three choppers crashed. The VC won.

What they had done was pull into the little village and commit their usual atrocities, then pull out. But all they had were small arms and rifles on them. So headquarters thought they would teach this little group of VC's a lesson and sent this operation I spoke of in after them.

But the crafty little b——s withdrew from the town into foxholes and bunkers and hiding places they had been secretly building for a week. Also, they had many friends in three plus large antiaircraft guns, and all sorts of machineguns. So when the first wave of troops went in, they thought it was just a routine chase of VC's. But they soon ran against the VC wall and we pilots soon discovered that they had more weapons than pistols and homemade guns. Shrewd plan—and they won.

We could have won but I could write a chapter on that. I hope you were able to follow that, Connie. A lot happened that day and it happened fast and furious. It's not a good thing to tell a wife, but she has to know—no one else will say it—no one else can or will, I guess. There are no heroes over here but there are a lot of fine men—America better not let us down. We can use help. We can win, but America must come over, for the Vietnamese will never hack it alone. We've either got to get in all the way, or get out. If we get out the VC will be in Saigon the next day.

December 14, 1963: I do get a kick out of the Vietnamese people. They're poor, dirty, and unsanitary according to our standards, but they're happy and some are hardworking.

December 16, 1963: The VC's [Communist guerrillas] sure gave them a rough time.

The VC are kind of a Mafia. They terrorize and then they sell "insurance" so that the people will not be harmed again. They strike especially villages where Americans have been seen. They terrorize these

villages and then blame it on Americans by saying, "If Americans hadn't come to your village, we would not have plundered and killed, so if you don't want it to happen again, pay us money and don't let Americans into your village."

So you see, they gain from this. First of all, they get money or food; second, they instill a dislike for Americans—dirty b——s. But I do like the Vietnamese I've met and talked to. They are friendly, happy, and childlike—good people.

December 21, 1963: We got a briefing today of the total result of that operation on November 24. I'll repeat it briefly.

The air power got credit for 150 to 200 killed. No one can be sure of the amount, for the VC carry off all their dead and wounded. They never let you know for sure how bad you hurt them.

Anyway, there were approximately 700 VC's dug in with three 50-caliber antiaircraft guns and three 30-caliber antiaircraft guns, plus many hundred other machineguns. They were waiting for us, but we hurt them even though we lost. We lost because we had them trapped and they got away.

It's so mixed up over here—there are over 3,000 Air Force in Vietnam, yet there are only 50 combat crews (B-26 and T-28). What a ridiculous ratio. Also, the Army tried to show the Air Force is no good and vice versa. Ridiculous. Down at Soc Trang, Army and Air Force will die for each other, but up with the colonels and generals it's a big fight for power. And most of these idiots don't even have any idea of what it's like out in combat. . . . They're trying now to find out why we pick up so many hits. The dumb b——s. We get hit more now because the VC have very fine weapons. There are Chinese over here now.

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December 30, 1963. Well, here goes. I got shot down yesterday. We were escorting a C-123 and I picked up three slugs in my airplane. One went into my fuel strainer and I lost all my fuel. I made it to a field called Pan Tho and landed safely. Me and the airplane are both okay, not a scratch except the three bullet holes. No sweat.

January 8, 1964. Down at Soc Trang, one of the airmen came up with the idea of putting chunks of charcoal in our napalm tanks. Napalm is a gasoline which is jelled into a mass about the consistency of honey. We carry two tanks of it, each weighing 500 pounds. When you drop it, it ignites and spreads fire about 200 to 300 feet. With charcoal in it, the charcoal is thrown about another 200 feet farther, like a burning baseball, and does further damage to VC houses. We've had it at Soc Trang and it works real well.

Tomorrow three birds are going out with one-half of their load of straight napalm and the other half with charcoal napalm (Madame Nhu cocktails). A photo ship is going along to take pictures. If higher headquarters thinks it's all right, then they'll buy us the charcoal. So far we've been buying it ourselves or else "borrowing" it from the kitchen.

January 7, 1964: Morale's at a big low over here, especially among the combat crews. It's the same old stuff we got in MATS. No consideration for the crew.

Lost two guys today. One was a pretty good friend of mine. The only guess is—the airplane just came apart. B-26—third or fourth that have done that now. . . . Pretty bad day—just hard to find any good news to write. Can't even talk to anybody—nobody has anything to say. Just a blue day.

I don't know what the United States is doing. They tell you people we're just in a training situation and they try to run us as a training base. But we're at war. We are doing the flying and fighting. We are losing. Morale is very bad.

We asked if we couldn't fly an American flag over here. The answer was "No." They say the VC will get pictures of it and make bad propaganda. Let them know America is in it.

If they'd only give us good American airplanes with the U.S. insignias on them and really tackle this war, we could possibly win. If we keep up like we are going, we will definitely lose. I'm not being pessimistic. It's so obvious. How our Government can lie to its own people—it's something you wouldn't think a democratic government could do. I wish I were a prominent citizen or knew someone who could bring this before the U.S. public. However, if it were brought before the average U.S. family, I'm sure all they'd do is shake their heads and say tch-tch and tune in another channel on the TV.

January 9, 1964: Had a good target today finally. Felt like I really dealt a blow to the VC. On my second bomb I got a secondary explosion. This means after my bomb exploded there was another explosion. It was either an ammo dump or a fuel-storage area. Made a huge burning fireball. You really can't tell when you roll in on a pass what is in the huts and trees you are aiming at. Just lucky today, but I paid them back for shooting me down.

January 15, 1964: Another B-26 went in yesterday. Nobody made it out. A couple of guys I knew pretty well "bought the farm."

One of the new guys busted up a 28 (T-28) also yesterday. He thought he had napalm on but he had bombs. So at 50 feet above the ground he dropped a bomb. It almost blew him out of the sky. But he limped back to Bien Hoa and crashlanded. The airplane burned up, but he got out all right.

That news commentary you heard is absolutely correct—if we don't get in big, we will be pushed out. I am a little ashamed of my country. We can no longer save face over here, for we have no face to save.

We are more than ever fighting this war. The Vietnamese T-28's used to come down here to Soc Trang and fly missions. But lately, since we've been getting shot so much, they moved up north. I kid you not. First they didn't want to come to Soc Trang because their families couldn't come. Second, because they didn't get enough per diem [additional pay]. Third, because they didn't want to get shot at. There were a couple of more reasons, but I can't remember them. These are the people we're supposed to be helping. I don't understand it.

January 20, 1964: I have never been so lonely, unhappy, disappointed, frustrated in my whole life. None of these feelings are prevalent above the other. I guess I should say loneliness overshadows the others, but that's really not true.

I am over here to do the best job possible for my country—yet my country will do nothing for me or any of my buddies or even for itself. I love America. My country is the best, but it is soft and has no guts about it at all.

1964

I'm sure nothing will be done over here until after the elections. Why? Because votes are more important than my life or any of my buddies' lives. What gets me the most is that they won't tell you people what we do over here. I'll bet you that anyone you talk to does not know that American pilots fight this war. We—me and my buddies—do everything. The Vietnamese "students" we have on board are airmen basics. The only reason they are on board is in case we crash there is one American "adviser" and one Vietnamese "student." They're stupid, ignorant sacrificial lambs, and I have no use for them. In fact, I have been tempted to whip them within an inch of their life a few times. They're a menace to have on board.

January 28, 1964: I've done almost nothing all week. I needed the rest very badly. I actually think I was getting battle fatigue or whatever you call it. I've got 50 missions, almost all without any kind of a break, and it was telling on my nerves and temper. I feel real good today after all that sleep. I kinda hate to go to work tomorrow, for we start 2 weeks of combat again. But I'm rested for it now and am ready.

January 31, 1964: All you read in the paper is the poor leadership of the Vietnamese, but we are just as bad. Everyone over here seems to be unqualified for his job. Like me—I'm a multi-pilot, but I'm flying TAC fighters. We have no fighter pilots in our outfit. I'm not complaining, but, if the Air Force was serious, they would have sent over experienced fighter people. The same on up the line.

February 2, 1964: I'm getting to like Vietnam. Maybe I didn't say that right. I think it is a pretty country. These little villages in the Delta are about as picturesque as you'll find. Tall palm trees, fields of rice, and all kinds of flowers. The people seem happy enough, if it wasn't for the terror of VC raids.

February 6, 1964: We scrambled after a fort under attack. We hit and hit good, but it got dark so we headed up here for Bien Hoa. Pretty hot target and we both were hit. Coming in here to Bien Hoa they warned us that VC were shooting at airplanes on final approach. Well, we made a tight, fast approach and held our lights (it was pitch black) until almost over the end of the runway. I forgot my landing gear and went skidding in a shower of sparks down the runway. Airplane's not hurt too bad. I'm not even scratched. My pride is terribly wounded. That was my 62d mission. I thought I had it "wired" after that much combat experience. Then I go and goof so badly.

February 17, 1964: All B-26's are grounded, so we are the only strike force left.

A B-26 crashed at Hurlburt last week. Another came with the wing just coming off. Finally, the Air Force is worried about the airplanes—finally, after six of my friends have "augured in."

February 21, 1964: Tuesday evening — got shot down. He fell in his airplane next to a Special Forces camp and got out without a scratch. The airplane burned completely up, though. [Another airman] was going in on his seventh strafing pass and never came out of it. Don't know what happened—whether he got shot or his controls shot out. That was two airplanes in 2 days. Kind of shock us up.

Not only that, the B-26's have been grounded since Monday because the wings came off one again at Hurlburt. So after the last crash the whole USAF fighter force is down to six airplanes. This should set an example of how much Uncle Sam cares. Six airplanes. Might as well be none.

Rumor now is that B-26's will fly again only with greater restrictions. I'm pretty

well fed up. Poor B-26 jocks are really shook. That airplane is a killer.

February 24, 1964: We're down to five airplanes now, all of them at Soc Trang. We have actually got nine total, but four are out of commission because of damage. The B-26's aren't flying yet, but they've been more or less released. I don't know what United States is going to do, but whatever it is I'm sure it's wrong. Five airplanes can fight the war—that's just ridiculous. Tell this to my dad. Let him know, too, how much the country is letting everyone down. * * * We fight and we die but no one cares. They've lied to my country about us.

February 29, 1964: We've got a new general in command now and he really sounds good. Sounds like a man who is out to fight and win. He's grounded the B-26's except for a few flights. But they have to level bomb, not dive bomb—no strain for the aircraft that way. He has ordered B-57's (bombers—jets) to replace them, and has asked for immediate delivery. He has also demanded they replace the T-28's with the AD-6. The AD-6 is a much more powerful single-engine dive bomber. It was designed for this type of work and has armor plating. We are pretty excited about all the new airplanes. We can really do good work with that kind of equipment.

March 13, 1964: McNamara (Secretary of Defense) was here, spent his usual line, and has gone back home to run the war with his screwed-up bunch of people. We call them "McNamara's Band." I hope and pray that somehow this man does something right pretty soon.

Just one thing right will help immensely. He did send a representative over here. All he did was make the troops sore.

One of our complaints was that we can't understand the air controller, so he suggested that we learn Vietnamese. We said we didn't have that much time, so he suggested we stay here for 2 years. A brilliant man. He's lucky to be alive. Some of the guys honestly had to be held back from beating this idiot up. This man McNamara and his whole idiot band will cause me not to vote for Johnson no matter how much I like his policies.

McNamara is actually second in power to Johnson. But, as a military man, he finishes a definite and decided last—all the way last.

Rumors are fast and furious. Nothing yet on B-57's. Rumors that B-26's are all rigged up with extra fuel tanks for long overwater flights. B-26 should never fly again, even if rejuvenated. Also a rumor that B-26 pilots will get instruction in the A-1H—another single-engine dive bomber. All is still in the air—all rumors.

March 22, 1964: Been flying pretty heavy again. We've only got 20 pilots now and 11 airplanes. It keeps us pretty busy. Also got two more airplanes they're putting together in Saigon, so we'll soon be back up to 13 airplanes again. Hope these last for awhile.

(That was Captain Shank's last letter. He was killed in combat 2 days later.)

EXHIBIT 4

[From the Washington Daily News, Apr. 27, 1964]

COMMENT: WE'RE REALLY TRAINING OURSELVES IN VIETNAM—UNITED STATES FAILS TO GO ALL OUT FOR VICTORY

(By Jim G. Lucas)

CAN THO, SOUTH VIETNAM, April 27.—One often overlooked factor that contributes to the long drawn out, no-win war in South Vietnam is this:

The United States is—and has been for the past 3 years—using Vietnam as a sort of military test laboratory, an extension of Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and all the others back home.

As one American major here told me: "We're really not trying so much to train these people to win their war; rather, we're training ourselves."

In that light it can be more easily understood why we've run 35,000 to 40,000 American military personnel through the mill here in 3 years—though we've never had more than 16,000 men here at any one time.

ONE YEAR

The normal assignment is for 1 year. It's damned unpleasant duty in a terrible climate. And practically no man, if he's on duty outside of Saigon, would want to stay longer.

But this doesn't help win the war. In fact, it slows it up.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, in a recent interview in Life magazine, made the point that U.S. advisers should be sent here for at least 2 years and preferably longer.

He's right—though I'll make no friends among U.S. servicemen in the field by saying so. And neither has the Ambassador.

But all this criticism back home of the South Vietnamese for appearing indifferent to whether they win the war needs a new examination in face of our own policy of seeming not to go all out for victory.

Especially so when it comes to committing our personnel to any needful lengthy periods.

TYPICAL

Take the case of a typical American adviser to a South Vietnamese battalion. He would be a captain.

Fresh out from the United States, our man needs 3 to 4 months to get acquainted, learn his job, scout the terrain, and establish an effective working arrangement with the commander of the Vietnamese unit.

Beginning the fourth month, if he's any good, he knows what he's about.

But—

U.S. Army policy is to yank him out of the field after 6 months and give him a staff job, probably in Saigon.

That means he's had at most 2 months to do a cracking job with his unit in the field.

I know one Vietnamese battalion commander who said he had had—"put up with" was his phrase—no less than 11 U.S. advisers in 2 years.

Each, of course, wanted to change something basic in the way the battalion was being run.

But our Army's policy is to keep shuffling the advisers along—evidently so that more Americans can get the guerrilla-warfare experience, and also because the Army says it feels sorry for the poor guys undergoing the jungle heat and all that.

Actually, I think three out of five of our battalion advisers—as pros eager to do their job—want to stay on longer in their field assignments. They feel they're just starting to prove themselves.

But the Army says they can't. It needs their slots to train more Americans how to advise Vietnamese battalions.

Maybe our Army is getting overinfused with a peacetime posture—or maybe it's the old question of whether we are in a real war or not.

A soldier's life is traditionally a hard one. Soldiers exist chiefly for one reason: To fight and win wars. Meanwhile, there are many fringe benefits in their contracts.

True, long family separations—when the national interest dictates—are also written into their contracts.

Most understand this. So do their wives. Some don't, however—especially when there's no formal war on.

Could it be that we are basing our personnel policies here in Vietnam on the clamor of this minority?

Somewhere along the line we've got to buckle down.

EXHIBIT 5

[From the New York Times, Apr. 28, 1964]
**TERRORISM IN VIETNAM: VIOLENCE AGAINST
 CIVILIANS COMPLICATES U.S. EFFORTS AND
 MAY FORCE POLICY SHIFT**

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

The beginnings of a campaign of terrorism by the Communist forces in South Vietnam complicate the problems faced by the United States in the undeclared war there.

The Pentagon and State Department must try to find the best answer to a new and dangerous technique that threatens, from a standpoint of morale, if not physically the American presence in South Vietnam. The terrorist campaign so far has been episodic and intermittent, but it could blossom into full-scale viciousness that might be effective against U.S. morale. The terrorism is directed essentially against noncombatants, but precisely because it marks women and children for death or maiming it strikes at the morale of the combatants.

In a recent book, "Modern Warfare—A French View of Counterinsurgency," Col. Roger Trinquier describes terrorism as the principal weapon of what he calls modern warfare. It is warfare without uniforms, silent, deadly, stalking: the thrown bomb, the attack in the night. The targets are homes, restaurants, schoolhouses, theaters, playing fields—any place where a few people are gathered.

Terrorists are usually organized in cells and three-man teams; the terrorist may know his teammates but probably no others in the clandestine organization.

The French in Indochina and Algeria and the British in Palestine and Cyprus experienced years of this kind of warfare—warfare in which every man is a potential enemy, death lurks in every doorway, and vigilance can never be relaxed.

There is no good and simple answer to terrorist tactics. The defensive reactions are obvious: Barbed wire, barracades, wire netting over windows, intricate pass systems, and inspections, armed guards everywhere. These measures can reduce, but not eliminate terrorist acts.

In 1957 French paratroopers, among them Colonel Trinquier, eliminated terrorists from the city of Algiers. But they did it with what Bernard B. Fall describes in the introduction to "Modern Warfare" as "cold ferocity" and the employment of torture, "the particular bane of the terrorist."

Torture forced terrorists captured in the act to disclose the names of their teammates or cellmates and led to the destruction of the underground terrorist organization.

However, these Draconian measures backfired against the French. Many in France were horrified at the methods employed and world opinion was effectively mobilized against Paris, in part because of the "cold ferocity" of the paratroops in Algiers.

In South Vietnam, U.S. military men are not in full control and command (as the French were in Algeria). They are essentially advisers. Therefore, effective defense against terrorism will be handicapped—as the war itself has been handicapped—by what amounts to a dual command system.

Moreover, the United States is unlikely to adopt the ruthless measures employed by the French paratroopers, although the first American schoolchild killed by a terrorist bomb may challenge this restraint.

A campaign of terrorism, if pressed, could hasten basic policy decisions in Washington.

To combat terrorism—in fact, to put the waging of the counterinsurgency struggle in South Vietnam on a sound footing—most military observers believe it essential to establish a unified U.S.-South Vietnamese command, with U.S. officers acting in command as well as advisory roles. The commitment of some U.S. tactical air units and

battalion-size combat ground units may also be necessary.

If the terrorist campaign is intensified, two U.S. military police units withdrawn from South Vietnam just before Christmas—ironically, just before the terrorist campaign started—may have to be returned. Counterintelligence specialists may also be needed.

Finally, if worst comes to worst, the U.S. dependents in South Vietnam may have to be withdrawn. However, if this were done without compensatory measures, the action might appear to represent the beginning of a "scuttle-and-run" policy, with loss of prestige to the United States and damage to the morale of the American and South Vietnamese forces.

EXHIBIT 6

[From the New York Times, Apr. 28, 1964]

**UNITED STATES PUTS DEPENDENTS IN LAOS ON
 ALERT TO LEAVE—SAYS WITHDRAWAL IS POSSIBLE
 IF POLITICAL CRISIS GROWS—FRANCE
 AND BRITAIN ALSO ACT—TENSION RISES IN
 CAPITAL**

VIENTIANE, LAOS, April 27.—The United States, Britain and France placed their dependents in Laos on emergency alert today for immediate removal should the political crisis worsen.

New fears and tension filled the capital as Gen. Siho Lamphouthakoul, chief of security forces, appeared to have seized effective power in defiance of diplomatic pressure to restore the status quo.

He and Gen. Kouprasith Abhay led rightwing generals in a coup d'etat 8 days ago against the coalition regime of the neutralist Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Since that time, the other officers have dropped into the background, leaving Siho Lamphouthakoul as an apparent strongman prepared to "go it alone."

The U.S. Ambassador, Leonard Unger, ordered American women and children to stay off the streets and to keep their suitcases packed.

CIRCULAR DISTRIBUTED

"Circumstances in Vientiane may at some time require actual evacuation," the U.S. Embassy said in a circular distributed to members of the American community. "This is not contemplated at present but, as a preparation for any eventuality, the normal preemergency steps should be taken."

It ordered American parents to keep their children out of school unless schools were close at hand. It instructed women to stay indoors unless they had to go out for medical treatment or to purchase necessities.

Each family was ordered to pack a suitcase of a maximum of 50 pounds. U.S. Government employees reported for work and, although shops were open and business went on, an air of tension filled the city.

The French Ambassador, Pierre Millet, in a similar order, told members of the French community to pack their belongings and obtain visas for Cambodia and Thailand.

The British Embassy told its community to be ready to move out on 24-hour notice.

There was speculation that the alerts were designed to bring new pressure on the junta to restore Prince Souvanna Phouma to power. All three countries maintain diplomatic missions here and the United States is a major contributor of foreign aid to Laos.

RETURN OF MINISTERS URGED

VIENTIANE, April 27.—The Vientiane radio broadcast an appeal today to all Cabinet ministers, including those of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Xat Party, to return and get the coalition Government working properly.

The statement was issued in the name of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, rightwing Vice Premier, who publicly dissociated himself from

the rightwing army junta that seized power last week.

It said the new Government lacked power because of a separation of ministers.

The statement added that Prince Souvanna Phouma, who is also Defense Minister, would have full power to unite the armed forces, including rightwing troops.

Each minister would have full responsibility for his department, the broadcast said, and the Interior Minister would be fully in control of the policy.

The Foreign Minister, it went on, would follow a neutral policy and would not support leftists or be controlled by foreign embassies.

The statement added that Prince Souvanna Phouma would move his office to the Defense Ministry and both rightwing and neutralist forces would dissolve their "special military Cabinet."

EXHIBIT 7

LITTLE COMPTON, R.I.,

March 21, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank God Alaska has become a State, so that we can have two more sensible and courageous Senators—there never seem to be enough.

Today on the radio I heard that you criticized the war in Vietnam—but no details. If the AP doesn't carry it, will you send me a copy? Please keep hammering, to give the Vietnamese an end to bloodshed, a guaranteed neutrality, and a chance to vote what they want—which incidentally will give the United States and free world more prestige in Asia, after all we lost by supporting a torturing dictator there for 8 years. True patriotism requires opposition to the military policy, and I thank you for your courage in this.

Sincerely Yours,

Mrs. JESSIE LLOYD O'CONNOR.

HEWLETT, N.Y.,

March 25, 1964.

Hon. Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: You are to be commended for your courageous statement regarding our involvement in Vietnam.

The day after I saw this, I also noted a photo in the New York Times which showed a Vietnamese child burned when one of our napalm bombs hit his village. We are fighting to save Vietnam and its people are destroyed in the process. We also risk a much larger war with China.

There must be some honorable way out of the swamps of Vietnam. Perhaps neutralization is the answer, or having the U.N. handle the problem. All our efforts have only produced more Vietcong and more corpses. You, at least, have the wisdom and the courage to suggest another alternative.

Sincerely yours,

SAUL SCHINDLER,

Chairman, Five Towns Committee for a
 Sane Nuclear Policy.

WALNUT CREEK, CALIF.,

April 7, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: We simply want you to know we were ever so glad to hear you speak out for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. We have long been concerned over our right to be there and what is and is not necessary for U.S. security. It seems that provoking and prolonging wars in one small country after another can only add to our insecurity.

We are grateful for what you have said.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. ROBERT RANDOLPH.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
March 25, 1964.

Senator GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is to support your position regarding a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam.

I am in favor of having that whole area neutral if it can be arranged.

Sincerely,

Mrs. VIOLA SURIAN.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
April 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I congratulate you on your stand on Vietnam and earnestly wish you well—you and Senator MORSE and all others who work to achieve a negotiated settlement in this disastrously cruel war.

Sincerely yours,

MARIAN E. SITTLER.

ADELPHI, MD.,
March 17, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am enclosing a letter which was written on behalf of the Committee on Vietnam of the Women Strike for Peace.

We are writing others of the same substance to other national news media.

We are glad that someone is attempting to bring about some kind of change in this unhappy area of the world.

Sincerely,

Mrs. BERNIECE THOMPSON.

COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM,
WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE,
March 17, 1964.

The WASHINGTON POST,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR EDITORS: In the last month there have been some very important speeches made by various Senators on Vietnam. Some of them have been given attention in the Post. Not until Senator MORSE accused the press of a blackout, though, did his speeches get any notice and then only a very small fraction of the important points which he brought out; and it was on page 5.

Senator GRUENING made a very informative speech. Senator KEATING asked some very pertinent questions, which were in the Post.

There are always front page assertions by politicians who are running for office, but how often does a politician running for office ever say anything? These men in the Senate are saying something. It is very important that the public know the substance of these speeches. The America people know far too little about Vietnam.

The reporters on TV and radio are telling us one thing while our officials in Washington are telling us another. While all this is going on Governor Rockefeller and Senator GOLDWATER are playing football with the whole works and not telling us anything. How can the voter make an intelligent decision on the basis of such contradictions as these?

This kind of flagrant abuse of one of the most important elements of the democratic process, education of the electorate, is most irresponsible, especially in an election year.

Our Committee on Vietnam obtained these speeches from the Senators who made them, but how many people will read them if they have to gain access to them in this way? Every one of these speeches should have had front page notice and the general substance of them should have been on radio and TV.

Is it possible that the Bobby Baker case (which was in the news extensively) can be more important than Vietnam where lives

are being lost and a million and some dollars a day are being spent?

Sincerely,

Mrs. BERNIECE THOMPSON.

CRESCENT CITY, FLA.,
March 19, 1964.

MY DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May we express our gratitude for your courageous stand on South Vietnam. We hope that you will continue to advocate the withdrawal of our armies there, and for a negotiated peace, and for the creation of a neutral zone in all southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

EVELYN TULLOS.
WILL TULLOS.

PATERSON, N.J.,
March 23, 1964.

The Honorable Senator ERNEST GRUENING:

I wish to thank you for your timely and courageous position on the question of our withdrawal from South Vietnam as being in the best interests of our Nation.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT SMITH.

HUNTER COLLEGE OF THE
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK,
New York, N.Y., March 22, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SENATOR: Please accept my hearty congratulations and warm thanks for the stand you have taken on the Vietnam issue.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN SOMERVILLE.

HARTFORD, CONN.,
March 21, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I wish to congratulate you on your intelligent stand concerning our terrible foreign policy in South Vietnam.

I urge you to continue your efforts in this regard and hope that you may influence your fellow Senator and other members of the U.S. Government.

Very sincerely,

HERBERT N. SCHWARTZ, M.D.

EAST ELMHURST, N. Y.

DEAR MR. SENATOR: I read your remarks on South Vietnam and was happy to hear that a voice of opposition was being raised. It is certainly not reasonable to undertake to follow the policies which proved so disastrous to the French.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH SHILL.

HANCOCK, MICH., March 23, 1964.

Hon. Senator GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Having read in the press your splendid criticism of our dirty Vietnamese war, I together with other citizens want to commend you and hope you can wake up other Members to see the downright crime in sacrificing American boys in this unjust affair. Will carry this clipping with me and have as many of my friends read this as possible and will also write to our two Senators, McNAMARA and HART.

Kindest regards and best wishes.

JOHN AUERBACK.

MENLO PARK, CALIF.

DEAR MR. GRUENING: Thank you heartily for your outspoken advocacy of reason and justice in the Vietnam situation.

I should think that the French ought to know about the utter futility of trying military ways in that unhappy land.

I believe there is simply no tolerance left in the world for the old military methods.

Science has truly outlawed war as a tool for settling men's differences. Now it is indeed time to give Christ's teaching serious thought.

Sincerely,

ANN B. SIMS.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
April 18, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I heard the talk you made about the situation in South Vietnam over our 24-hour KNXT radio station.

Every word you said, we agree with 100 percent.

Everybody used to scream when Dulles was alive with his "brinkmanship."

But it seems like things get worse and worse lately.

Except for what you said, Senator MORSE, Senator BARTLETT, Senator MANSFIELD, and too few others, the people making U.S. policy in this Vietnam business seem to be losing their sanity.

Why should U.S. troops precipitate a full-scale American war—possibly nuclear—out of Vietnamese problems.

I say let's get out of there and let them settle their own business.

Can you send me your speech?

Mrs. M. SIEGEL.

SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.,
March 17, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Capitol,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I saw in the Christian Science Monitor of March 18, 1964, that you and Senator MORSE, of Oregon, want to stop the war with China over Vietnam.

I agree. Thank you for your stand.

Yours truly,

Mrs. CATHERINE SEGGIE.

HIGHLAND PARK, N.J.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your recent comments on the Vietnam question are most heartening. Please continue. Perhaps if you and the few others who seem to be honest about the situation talk long enough—some of our "responsible" newspapers will pick up the clue and attempt to give us a better idea of what's really going on there.

Sincerely,

Mrs. A. SCULLY.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
March 14, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for your talk over Capitol Assignment, and your words about sacrifice of young American lives in Vietnam.

As a reserve medical officer in World War I and II, I have seen many of our young boys die and it hurts me to hear of the deaths; no one seems to give a damn, and what are the countries doing to us that we have helped since.

J. GUY STROHM,
Colonel, Marine Corps, Retired.

NATIONAL ELECTRICAL
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION,
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, March 24, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,

New Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I have read with great interest your newsletter No. 10.

I wish to take this opportunity to make a personal comment and applaud your stand on the needless expenditure of American manpower and money in South Vietnam.

I am particularly proud to be represented by a Senator who has the courage to speak out against the many evils of our foreign assistance program.

Yours truly,

JOHN A. SCHEFFER.

April 28

SANTA ANA, CALIF.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Have just read an Allen-Scott report in our local paper the Santa Ana Register, where you and several other Senators are very much concerned over the actions of McNamara over in South Vietnam; namely, promising that U.S. aid will from now on be total, unlimited, and without conditions.

Senator, I agree with you and your concern; you are to be congratulated. Stick with it and do not give up until you get the answers to all of your questions.

I always thought the Senate and the Congress had something to say about how our country was run; looks like now we have some civilian appointees who think they are running things, and if we do not like it we can lump it.

One thing for sure Senator if I had a son or a grandson in the service over in South Vietnam I would raise H..... I would start asking questions, and I would not stop until I got the answers.

Where is our wonderful U.N. peace army Senator? Over in Cypress maybe.

Sincerely,

CLAUDE MASTIN.

WASHINGTON, D.C., March 21, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your realistic understanding that U.S. troops do not belong in Vietnam and your courage in urging that the real facts in that tragic situation be brought to the attention of the American people is greatly appreciated.

As you continue your efforts in this direction you may be pleased to know that you have the strong support of many of us, of whom I am only one.

With thanks and appreciation.

JANET N. NEUMAN.

BERKELEY, CALIF.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SIR: This is with reference to your speech, reported in the New York Times of March 21, insisting on the withdrawal from South Vietnam. I wish to compliment you on that speech very heartily. It is unfortunate that of the papers I have seen the New York Times is the only one in which your's and Senator Morse's speeches are reported.

Yours respectfully,

J. NEYMAN.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
March 16, 1964.

HON. SENATOR GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. GRUENING: I commend you for speaking out against our undeclared war in South Vietnam.

I quote you daily "No one American life is worth all of Vietnam."

I wish we had more men like you, also like your colleagues Senator Morse and Senator Mansfield, who have the courage to speak the truth and let themselves be heard.

The news, as of today is appalling—six American lives lost over the weekend. When will our people wake up and let themselves be heard.

Sincerely yours,

IDA MESSINGER.

BROOKLYN HEIGHTS, N.Y.,
March 22, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: It was gratifying to read of your remarks in the Senate on March 10

concerning our involvement in South Vietnam and the need to withdraw.

Considering the extent of our commitment and responsibility in that bloody and tragic situation, it will require both courage and magnanimity to get out: we hope your words will help imbue a sense of both among our leaders.

Please continue your efforts to educate your colleagues and the American public.

Yours very truly,

SHEILA MENASHEE.
LOUIS MENASHEE.DALLAS, TEX.,
March 29, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you very much for your words in opposition to U.S. fighting in South Vietnam (or anywhere else). We heard you on NBC program "Sunday" March 29. Very good.

We teach our children that the noblest thing a man can do is fight and die for his country. Thus taught, there is nothing wrong with a man who volunteers to die for his country, but there is something radically wrong with a country which asks a man to die for it.

Thank you again—speaking out as you and Senator Morse did today takes courage.

Sincerely,

EULA M. McNABB.

SHORT HILLS, N.J.,
March 30, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I want to congratulate you on your courageous and realistic stand on the neutralization of southeast Asia and the withdrawal of our troops from that area.

Very truly yours,

A. ROSS MEEKER.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
March 24, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to applaud your recent statements calling for a withdrawal of our forces from the conflict in South Vietnam. Clearly, no purpose is being served by our continued participation in that country's situation, nor is our participation morally or strategically defensible.

The suggestions that we "escalate" the conflict, and that we invade North Vietnam, combined with the news of the recent attack upon a Cambodian village are alarming in their implications.

Although I am not one of your constituents, I wish to assure you not only of my admiration and support, but to assure you that many other citizens feel as you do on this subject. To many concerned persons our policy in southeast Asia seems one not only doomed to failure but one which, instead of defeating communism, is leading the natives of war-torn areas into an embracing of Communist doctrine.

Assuredly, a peaceful solution could be worked out by the convening of the Geneva Powers, implemented, perhaps, by a U.N. peacekeeping force.

I am grateful to you for your wisdom and courage.

Sincerely,

M. CLAIBORNE MEREL.

VAN NUYS, CALIF.,
April 1, 1964.

SENATOR GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am in complete agreement with your stand on South Vietnam.

Please continue to fight to see that we get out of South Vietnam and stay out of North Vietnam.

Very truly yours,

R. MOREE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING,
March 24, 1964.

Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: My thanks go to you for opposing the continued presence of American troops in Vietnam. Supporting a dictatorial military government against a rebellious people strikes me as being little different from the crushing of the Hungarian revolt by the Russians.

Please keep it up—you are desperately needed.

Sincerely yours,

E. F. MASUR.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
March 22, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.:

Honor and glory to you for your courageous stand regarding our policy in South Vietnam.

There is hope for mankind when men like you are in the Senate.

Millions of decent people in the United States of America and, yes, in the rest of the world are behind you.

Keep up your good work.

Respectfully,

W. MANEALOFF.

BERGEN, N. DAK., March 25, 1964.

HON. SENATOR ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to say that I am fully in agreement with you on the situation in Vietnam. The Vietnamese should settle their own problems. We here in the United States would strongly resent any foreigners sending troops here to solve our problems. We must do this ourselves if we are to get satisfaction. I hope that you will organize some action, together with those of similar thinking, to bring our soldiers back from Vietnam, which does not belong to us, but to the Vietnamese. It is impossible for me to believe that the cornerstone of American democracy is located in Vietnam. It is rather in our Congress where the civil rights bill must be passed to give justice and equality a firmer hold in our country.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM MOXNESS.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
March 23, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We heartily support your courageous opposition to the war in South Vietnam. U.S. intervention has prolonged this barbaric and unpopular war for over 5 years.

Sooner or later the American people will come to recognize the shameful activities the U.S. Government has undertaken in southeast Asia under the cloak of anticommunism.

We urge you to continue demanding an immediate withdrawal of all American troops from South Vietnam and the starting of negotiations aimed at reuniting the Vietnamese people.

It is good to see that dissenting voices can still be heard in the U.S. Senate.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS F. MAYER.
SARA C. MAYER.

DELAWARE, OHIO,
March 30, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. GRUENING: You have our full and continued support in your stand for a review of our Vietnam policy.

The time has come for our Government to enter into negotiations to end the war in South Vietnam. The continuance or enlarging of the present hostilities can only mean more bloodshed and even escalation into a nuclear war.

With best wishes,

ROBERT W. MULADORE.

St. Louis, Mo., April 17, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for your Senate speech on March 4 in regard to our efforts in South Vietnam.

If more people like you will speak out, perhaps, our elected leaders will realize that the people of the United States are not behind this thankless effort in South Vietnam.

Sincerely yours,

H. LORINE PICKETT.

BRONX, N.Y.,
April 18, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
The Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: It is a long time since I read in the New York Times of March 21, 1964, the report of your speech on March 10, 1964, with respect to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. However, your words have remained with me, and I feel impelled to write to you.

You expressed in your speech, clearly and (I am glad to note) with passion, thoughts and sentiments that I have had about this matter for a long time. You spoke for me, better than I could, and, obviously, more effectively. I believe that you have probably also spoken for many Members of Congress, who have not yet had the courage to speak as you did, but who may have been inspired by your speech to shed their fears of State Department reaction.

I ask that you continue to respond to Mr. Rusk in the same manner as reported in the New York Times, and hope that Senator MORSE will also continue to respond in the manner reported in the New York Times. I did not vote for Mr. Rusk. No one voted for Mr. Rusk, or for anyone else in the State Department. I insist that people who are voted for, and elected, be permitted to express their views.

I am grateful to you for the new hope you have given me that the immoral policy of the United States with respect to South Vietnam may yet be discontinued before more lives are senselessly destroyed.

Very truly yours,

JULIUS GOLDSTEIN.

DAVIS, CALIF.,
April 16, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to congratulate you on the very sensible remarks you have made recently on Vietnam and southeast Asia. It has long been a source of great concern to me that our country has been supporting a government in Vietnam that was not elected and does not properly represent the people, and that our military forces have been involved in the inhumane tactics that have been common in this senseless war.

President de Gaulle's imaginative and bold call for neutralization of South Vietnam

should be given support. I hope that you will continue to urge consideration of it.

Sincerely,

MARY E. BOLTON.

EUGENE, OREG.,
March 30, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I have read your March 10 Vietnam speech which you sent at my request.

I like it. I fully agree with your position. Your direct and unequivocal language is most appropriate, and your supporting evidence convincing.

Such a speech was at least 2 years overdue in the Senate. As soon as practicable after this error has been corrected, I would like to see the rest of Mr. Dulles' Asian blunders liquidated.

Much of the money we are squandering in Formosa, Korea, and Japan, could be usefully employed in a federally operated program for the exploration and development of Alaskan resources, to equal or excel Russia's work in Siberia.

Many thanks for your speech.

Y. H. TODD, Sr.

CHRISTIANA, PA.,
April 19, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to add my voice to those who support your stand on South Vietnam. Our participation in and encouragement of this dirty war has already done irreparable damage to the American image. We have needlessly inflicted suffering of the most grotesque variety upon millions of innocent people. In the light of this fact what right do we have to be critical of a Hitler or a Stalin?

The American Government has a moral obligation not only to its own people and the tormented people of South Vietnam but to the entire world as well to negotiate a peaceful settlement in this area immediately.

With respect and admiration, I am,

Sincerely yours,

JACK LINDEMAN.

WAUKESHA, WIS.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to express my gratitude to you for your courageous stand on Vietnam policies.

Of the five newspapers and seven magazines which come to our house only one made any mention of your speech as concerns Vietnam, that was the Guardian. It frightens and angers me to think that matters of such importance are being suppressed by our various news media.

Again, thank you Senator. Men such as yourself offer us a way of light in an otherwise darkened world.

Sincerely,

OLGA MARTIN.

LIVINGSTON, N.J.,
April 19, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR: I was very pleased to read recently of your statements concerning the war in Vietnam and our participation in it.

Would that there were more Senators of courage like you. We would then be guaranteed peace in our world.

Keep up the good work for peace.

Very truly yours,

LEON M. MOSNER.

KETCHIKAN, ALASKA,
April 11, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations on your stand toward our policy in South Vietnam. It is encouraging to hear and read that you are asking for withdrawal of our American troops from there. I so heartily

agree with you and do hope you can get it over to the American people as am sure many are unaware of the situation there. Last night just one news report stated four of our men had been killed that day. No doubt we have lost a couple hundred there already.

I wonder if Secretary McNamara and Richard Nixon had young sons there if they would be so anxious to carry on such a useless war.

More power to you and keep up your good work.

Sincerely,

Mrs. LOUIS SALAZAR.

ONEONTA, N.Y.,
April 19, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING, I salute you on your statement concerning our policy in South Vietnam. Quite apart from any consideration as to the potential benefit to U.S. short- or long-run interests that might result from a withdrawal of our military support and direction of General Khanh's war against the Vietcong, is the categorical imperative of insisting on morality and reason in government conduct. Of course, the greater the immorality and unreason, the more urgent the imperative.

To put it another way, Senator, I believe our country is characterized by two attitudes: one is a callous unconcern for virtually anything that doesn't touch immediate interests; the other is a "We're-doing-God's-work-here kind of sanctimonious arrogance. One runs up against both in trying to appeal, as you have, to the very opposite of these postures. So it's hardly surprising when your remarks and those of Senator MORSE, on a subject of the first importance, get the silent treatment from most of the news media.

All the same, there seems to be a growing uneasiness over the running of foreign policy. It may just be (one may as well be optimistic.) that we're on the edge of an awakening. However, it is, you spoke well and courageously, Mr. GRUENING. I fully share your view that we should never have intervened as we did in South Vietnam, and we should pull out forthwith. There can be no strategic justification for using napalm bombs on Vietnamese villages and propping up governments that practice murder and torture as a matter of course. It's a grand feeling to be proud of one's country and one's government. I'm proud that voices counseling decency are still heard in the Senate, even if by only a few. Please persist in this worthwhile cause, Senator. There is no alternative.

Respectfully,

STANLEY E. WEISBERGER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
March 31, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am extremely pleased to learn of your voluble protest to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Also, I understand that Senator BARTLETT supports your position.

I have written letters to McNamara, Rusk, and Senator KUCHEL in this regard.

Please continue your position—for in the final analysis the fate of the world lies in the hands of our top leadership. The people are ignorant of the facts, for the newspapers suppress so much.

I would appreciate receiving a copy of your speech.

Sincerely yours,

ANN ADAMS.

FOREST HILLS, N.Y.,
March 27, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: While I am not one of your immediate constituents, I would

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like to congratulate you on your speech this week on Vietnam.

As one citizen, I feel your call for an approach to peaceful solutions there was in the deepest and most long-range interests of our country.

Very truly yours,

JAMES H. DURBIN.

PORTLAND, OREG.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Several members of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom met at my house today to read literature on Vietnam. And I want to commend you for your remarks on Vietnam in the Senate on February 20, 1964. A copy was sent to me from F.C.N.L. in Washington, D.C.

I believe the problem should have been taken to the U.N. before 1954 and I believe the United States wanted to do so. However, that was not done then but I believe it should be done now.

In my opinion we should never have given in there in the first place. And I agree with Senator Morse that we should withdraw all military personnel and weapons at once.

Thank you and sincerely yours,

Mrs. K. C. TANNER.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,

March 21, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
The Capitol, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing to you to indicate my approval of your remarks calling for the withdrawal of American troops from the Vietnam mess. Time after time, the New York Times correspondents have indicated that the reason for the Government's failure to win the war against the guerrillas has been the unpopularity of the various South Vietnamese governments with the very people they are supposed to save. Unfortunately most newspapers, including the very Times, and the U.S. Government continue to propagate the nonsense that the major reason for the Vietnam conflict lies in some sort of "alien or foreign supported" infiltration. We evidently have forgotten how effective our own Swamp Foxes and local guerrillas (Minute Men, Mountain Boys, etc.) were against the local Tories of 1776 and the foreign soldiery that forced the American Revolution to continue for 7 longer years that it should have.

At this moment your opinions are unpopular with the administration. Amongst the grassroots there are more who support you than support Secretary Rusk or the Defense Secretary. You are one of the few who has shown the integrity and courage to speak out properly on this issue. I believe you are right, and I believe that a mountain of evidence could be found to prove that we never should have attempted to impose our wills on those people in the first instance.

Do not lose heart. Do not backtrack. Do not betray the need to air this entire issue before the American people.

You are the first Senator I have written to. I am sorry that I am not in Alaska to provide you with political support.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. CHIARADIA.

MIAMI, FLA.

HONORABLE SENATOR: I commend you on your stand on withdrawing troops from Vietnam.

Sincerely,

MARY E. PETERSEN.

LEMONT, ILL.,

March 20, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am grateful for your courageous statements against the continuing of the war in South Vietnam.

Please spare a moment to read the enclosed copy of my letter to the editor, Daily News-Miner, Fairbanks, Alaska, and please continue your efforts toward an immediate, peaceful settlement of the war in South Vietnam.

Very sincerely yours,

MARY PHILLIPS.

LEMONT, ILL., March 20, 1964.

EDITOR, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR COLUMN,
Daily News-Miner, Fairbanks, Alaska.

SIR: My heartiest congratulations and deepest gratitude to the citizens of Alaska for electing two of the wisest and most courageous statesmen in the U.S. Senate: the Honorable Messrs. ERNEST GRUENING and E. L. BARTLETT.

I am particularly grateful to both of them for their outspoken stand against continuing the pointless, cruel, futile war in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese people obviously are sick unto death of the war and would immediately negotiate a settlement of it, if it were not for the presence and advice of some 15,000 U.S. special forces in their country.

May Messrs. GRUENING and BARTLETT and their many enlightened colleagues, including Senators MORSE, of Oregon, WILLIAMS, of Delaware, CASE, of New Jersey, and others continue their efforts until the administration's policymakers consent to reevaluate their policies and put an end to the war in South Vietnam. Negotiations should begin now.

Very sincerely yours,

MARY PHILLIPS.

BRONX, N.Y., March 31, 1964.

Hon. Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: This is to express my thanks and my admiration for the courage with which you tackled the question of our engagement in Vietnam. The daily press and the other media have built up this matter so strongly in the prevailing official direction that it cannot be very popular to express an opinion that goes contrary to this trend.

I am convinced that this adventure is much too costly measured in lives and money as that it could justify the goal. Many of my friends raise the same doubts.

A great nation as ours can very well afford to confess a mistake or blunder, and will by that not lose the esteem of its citizenship nor of the world. It might not be easy to make a turn, but it should be done.

That you showed us some realities and tries to open a road to reason, is something to be grateful for.

Wishing you success.

Very sincerely yours,

RUDY BLESTON.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

April 3, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate

DEAR SIR: I fully support your stand on U.S. participation in the war in South Vietnam. It is not our war. It is a civil war to be fought (if need be) and solved by the people and Government of South Vietnam. Day by day we spend more money and involve more Americans in this civil war.

Since Poland, Canada, and India were designated to comprise the International Control Commission without authority to enforce agreements made by Geneva convention I feel these countries should be provided with authority to enforce these agreements.

The United States could then pull out of South Vietnam and really abide by our word, namely that we would honor the Geneva convention agreements.

Sincerely,

Mrs. CAROL W. RENDE.

MOUNT VERNON, N.Y.,

April 1, 1964.

Senator E. GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I should like to commend you for your strong stand to end the war in Vietnam. Your support of Senator MORSE and your constant requests for reevaluation of Asian policy, for public information on policies and your pledge to continue to work until the war ends serve the best interests of peace throughout the world.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. ANNE PHILLIPS.

WINNETKA, ILL.,

April 2, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: It is encouraging to note the fact that you have spoken up in the Senate on our participation in the Senate Vietnam conflict. I heartily agree with you and hope that you will try to get your point of view before the public. Unfortunately, the mass media at the present time is not doing its job in presenting the facts to the public.

The television documentary of April 1 only serves to reinforce my conviction that all human values are being violated by our presence in South Vietnam.

I would like to receive your recent comments, on the Vietnamese war, in the Senate.

Yours sincerely,

SARAH SHORES MAN.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

April 6, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to commend you and the other Senators who have courageously spoken out against the part our country is taking in the war in Vietnam. This action on your part will give voice to the opinions and feelings of millions of inarticulate Americans.

Be assured that you are supported by many people who are more than happy because of your efforts on their behalf and for the true welfare of our country.

Sincerely,

LUCILE A. REESE.

NEW ROCKFORD, N. DAK.,

April 6, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: As a reader of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD I have learned to have a very high regard for you and your thinking. I was very happy when you spoke on the South Vietnam situation.

I do not believe we have any business half way around the world when we have so many problems right here at home. I assure you it gives many of us a lift to read what you and Senator MORSE and others had to say and we here support your position. I read many letters introduced in the RECORD by Senator MORSE and must say I agree with those letters. . . . It seems like our country is supporting every reactionary country around the globe.

Yours,

OLIVER ROSENBERG.

PORTLAND, OREG.,

March 27, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Your recent comments concerning the war in South Vietnam are welcome. It is time we realized there will be no military victory. Our foreign policy has been anything but realistic. We cannot ex-

pect the world to conform to our image. It won't.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. O. G. ROGERS.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 18, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your letter of yesterday, accompanied by tearsheets of your speeches and other material, from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, arrived today. I want to thank you for it. I also want to thank you for copies of your press release of March 10 which your office sent my wife, Margaret, in response to a phone request.

I have not had time to read the material, but Mrs. Russell has covered most of it and has told me some of the important aspects of it. For one thing, the forthright and direct statement that we should get out of Vietnam. Perhaps I should do better to call it a demand. You have quoted from a wide variety of sources in your speeches, indicating how generally people who have expertise or personal contact with southeast Asia, are in accord in describing the terror and torture, but above all, the futility of our operations as advisers to the Vietnamese oligarchy.

The chronology, exhibit 4, starting on page 4666, is a very valuable contribution to understanding what has gone on in Vietnam, according to Mrs. Russell. She says that having that data made so accessible is an important weapon in the hands of those who would try to change our policy and practices in that unfortunate country.

It is difficult for me to understand how come there is any significant number of Vietnamese left in the country. You would think they would get out rather than endure the rapine, indignities, and slaughter that has beset them. I suppose the reason they remain is that they have no place to go. That is unfortunate.

We have noticed that more Senators are getting in line with you on this effort to bring sanity into our southeast Asian actions. Not only Senators, but a few Congressmen as well. And, of course, a lot of public figures of one kind or another, Walter Lippmann among them, and also James Reston.

Sincerely,

RALPH RUSSELL.

OAKLAND, CALIF.,

March 31, 1964.

Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: In view of the fact that only the National Guardian among several much larger publications which I read regularly reveals the fact that it is you who first had the courage to agree with Senator MORSE that we never did have any business in Vietnam and it published only your last name. You will please excuse me for doing likewise. This is just to congratulate you.

What is wrong with our news media that seems to be "calling the Kettle black" when they blame Government officials for suppressing news and when we have to wait for the little Guardian to learn such news?

Sincerely,

THELMA K. SHUMAKE.

ROCHESTER, N.Y.,

April 7, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations on your stand on South Vietnam.

Amid what seems to me general moral decline and a completely unrealistic and in-

human foreign policy, voices like yours give me some small hope.

Sincerely yours,

DOROTHY A. STEWART.

JACKSONVILLE, FLA.,

March 26, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to take this occasion to thank you for your recent statements concerning some phases of our foreign policy. These statements in my opinion are shared by many, many Americans, and are very timely.

It is unfortunate that we do not have more men of the caliber of you and your honorable colleague, Senator WAYNE MORSE.

Keep up the good work.

With best wishes for your continued good health and success.

Very truly yours,

R. C. SMITH.

MASSAPEQUA, N.Y.,

April 3, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to register approval of your stated attitude toward the current situation in Vietnam. Recognizing that the presence of U.S. troops there is contrary to the 1954 Geneva Conference, that the proposed general election has been discouraged, and that the political and military situation there is steadily deteriorating in the direction of the danger of multinational conflict. I urge you to use all your efforts toward insuring that the U.S. Government indicate its desire to participate in a reconvened conference and consider neutralization under international guarantees.

Sincerely,

KATHARINE K. SMITH.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,

April 5, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: If you have reprints of your foreign policy speech in March, in which you protested the U.S. policy in South Vietnam, I should very much appreciate having a copy. I am shocked—but perhaps should not be surprised—to learn that your speech was virtually ignored by important members of the press.

I hope very much that the debate on South Vietnam continues and that it leads to revision of our policy—which I consider untenable on moral grounds alone.

I know that a business letter should deal with only one point—but I do want to express my concern about the great distress which your State has so recently experienced.

Sincerely,

MISS MARGARET SHEETS.

RESIDUAL FUEL OIL IMPORT CONTROLS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, since March 1959, residual fuel oil import controls have been the subject of much controversy and discussion before this body.

I have followed developments closely and with considerable interest, since I am well aware how essential the availability of this fuel is to Massachusetts, to all of New England, to Florida, and to other east coast areas in between. On several occasions, I have joined with other Senators from affected areas in requesting the Secretary of the Interior to consider the economic welfare of the

50 million consumers with a direct interest in this program. I am pleased to report that I am in complete agreement with a recent statement by the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], made on this floor on March 24, in support of the "Wise procedures of Secretary Udall of the Interior in allocating desperately needed import of residual oil."

I think the Secretary is to be commended for his actions, often in the face of heavy pressure, and sometimes bitter criticism, from certain special interests who seek to make controls even more stringent.

However, in spite of everything that has been done to date, the basic hardships arising from the Government's control of imports of this fuel still remain. The ultimate solution should be, of course, the complete removal of residual fuel oil import controls. This, I am firmly convinced, could take place without endangering in any way the security of this country—a position, I may point out, supported by the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, who on February 13, 1963, after almost 2 years of investigation, reported to the President that—

A careful and meaningful relaxation of controls would be consistent with national security and the attainment of hemispheric objectives which contribute to the national security.

This recommendation still stands.

Many proponents of controls argue that their removal would have a damaging effect on the domestic petroleum industry, and particularly on domestic production of residual fuel oil.

Protection of a vigorous and healthy domestic petroleum industry in the interests of the national security was, of course, the main reason for imposing controls originally. The OEP, in its investigation, considered this in detail, and, as I mentioned earlier, concluded that a relaxation was consistent with national security. Thus, any attempt to justify maintenance of residual controls on the same grounds which necessitate crude oil controls is, I feel, misleading and unfair.

With regard to recent claims that domestic producers of residual oil are being hurt by imports, I fail to see the logic in such statements. On several occasions it has been necessary to increase allowable imports, mainly because domestic production has fallen off substantially, year after year, and gives every indication of continuing this trend. I would never suggest the adoption of any program which would be detrimental to American industries or products. However, I am informed that the potential demand for residual oil in our area is more than enough to absorb the domestic supply, making the resort to imports quite justifiable.

We had hoped these controls might have been dropped entirely this year; but early in March, Secretary Udall, in announcing that restrictions would remain in effect, set new quotas for the 1964-65 fuel year, which began on April 1.

Allowable imports, according to Mr. Udall, are to be increased by 11 percent, which amounts to 63,000 barrels daily,

and makes the daily import quota 638,000.

This increase will be helpful, but in no way does away with the basic inequities in the system. These can be eliminated only by complete removal of controls or by some modification whereby consumers would once again have the benefit of open competition for their business.

The fact that this will not come about because of this increase is, I think, clearly evident from statistics which have been furnished to me.

I have been advised that during this year, domestic supplies available for east coast consumption will decline by 32,000 barrels daily. Considering this factor, together with the urgent need to rebuild stocks, which had become dangerously low, we can expect then, at the most, not an 11-percent increase, but merely a 3-percent increase, and that total residual oil available during the year to east coast consumers will amount to 830,000 barrels a day.

This is a very moderate increase, and certainly much less than the expected growth in competitive coal and gas consumption on the east coast.

The need for this vital heating and industrial fuel is actually growing. Throughout the country, there is a trend to build more apartment houses and fewer one-family and two-family homes. A few, short years ago, multiple dwelling units accounted for less than a quarter of all new residential construction; today, they are more than one-third. Virtually none of the new apartment houses on the east coast are heated with coal. In the northern part of the east coast, the prevailing fuel is residual oil. The supply of this fuel must be permitted to grow; and the only possible source of growth is imports.

Or let us consider the needs of east coast utilities. In the second half of 1963, these utilities burned 191,000 barrels a day of residual fuel oil, an increase of nearly 13 percent over consumption in the same period of 1962. For the fuel year 1964-65, the Interior Department foresees a growth of about 16 percent, to 217,000 barrels. Thus, by the end of 1964, total residual fuel oil consumption of east coast utilities is likely to be more than 50,000 barrels more than the consumption in the last half of 1962.

According to the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., east coast utility consumption will rise to such an extent that by the first half of 1966, the bulk of the entire increase in imports may have to be channeled into the utility sector.

Mr. President, those of us concerned with the demands for this fuel have too often concentrated our attention on the problem after the summer months, when the need increases. I think it might be a wiser course to begin now to analyze the facts and to develop sound programs for eventual removal of these import controls.

I think we should continue to stimulate the attention of the Secretary of the Interior on this important issue, not just let the matter lie dormant until the winter is upon us.

Finally, I think we should frame our thinking within the scope of the entire market of fuel. What we in New England want is a reasonable cost for our power and for our heat. Residual oil provides a competitive spur toward achieving that goal.

There is still much to be done to reduce our expenses for energy; and we are hopefully seeking solutions to this problem. For the time being, residual oil is an essential addition to New England's fuel-supply market, as it is to those markets up and down the east coast. Our task is to obtain the fullest advantage of its resources available.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I commend the Senator from Massachusetts for his very timely statement, which has been very eloquently delivered before the Senate; and I associate myself with all he has said.

Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

	[No. 176 Leg.]	
Aiken	Hart	Moss
Allott	Hayden	Mundt
Bible	Hickenlooper	Nelson
Boggs	Humphrey	Neuberger
Burdick	Inouye	Pastore
Byrd, W. Va.	Jackson	Pell
Cannon	Javits	Prouty
Carlson	Jordan, Idaho	Proxmire
Case	Keating	Ribicoff
Church	Kennedy	Saltanostall
Clark	Kuchel	Smith
Cooper	Long, Mo.	Sparkman
Cotton	Mansfield	Stennis
Curtis	McCarthy	Symington
Dirksen	McGee	Thurmond
Dodd	McGovern	Tower
Dominick	McIntyre	Williams, N.J.
Douglas	Metcalf	Young, N. Dak.
Fong	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Gruening	Morton	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF APPALACHIAN REGION

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. NEUBERGER in the chair) laid before the Senate a communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide public works, and economic development programs, and the planning and coordination needed to assist in the development of the Appalachian Region, which, with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Public Works.

Mr. STENNIS obtained the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from New York without losing my right to the floor, and that the resumption of my remarks shall not constitute another appearance on the pending question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRESIDENT ANTANAS SMETONA OF LITHUANIA

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, it is most appropriate that the national organizations supporting Lithuanian freedom and self-determination gather on May 3 this year to honor Antanas Smetona, first and only President of the independent Republic of Lithuania.

Antanas Smetona's life was devoted to the welfare of his nation and offers the world an outstanding example of bravery and dedication in the face of extreme adversity.

When Lithuania was struggling against the foreign powers which sought to divide and conquer it, unity, cooperation, and stability were the important needs of the nation. The National Council of the Lithuanian National Assembly displayed admirable political understanding by electing Antanas Smetona its President in 1917, for he embodied these necessary virtues.

In the anxious months ahead President Smetona provided wise moral and political leadership by his own actions and through the pages of his newspaper *Lietuvos Aidas*.

Lithuania's declaration of independence of February 16, 1918, promulgated by the National Council, bears the patriotic imprint of President Smetona.

During the following 3 years while Lithuania fought against Bolshevik invasions, President Smetona was the outstanding member of the group of patriots including J. Staugaitis, S. Silingas, Augustinas Voldemaras, Mykolas Slezevicius, and many others, who built an army out of nothing and led the nation to victory over all enemies.

From 1922 until 1940 through every crisis, President Smetona maintained the office of President of the Republic, giving continuity and substance to Lithuanian sovereignty. In the final days of the Republic, when Soviet Russia was exerting every effort to subvert and conquer Lithuania, President Smetona stood firm, resisting to the very last the suppression of his nation. Only when there were few left with the heart to resist the overwhelming Communist invasion did he leave the country to organize resistance from abroad.

Unhappily, it is the 20th anniversary of his death in exile that is commemorated, May 3, 1964. In death as in life, Antanas Smetona is the symbol of Lithuanian independence and the example of patriotic devotion which has always characterized the Lithuanian people. His death removed from the scene one of the great national leaders of this century. He is due the highest honor and gratitude from everyone who desires a free Lithuania. Let us not forget his dedication, and great abilities. Let us carry on his struggle.

POLISH CONSTITUTION DAY

Mr. KEATING. Madam President, Poland is proud of its great and glorious history, and the people and friends of Poland are fully justified in the pride which is theirs. The Poles are well known as diligent and skillful workers,