pand the Community Relations Service to provide mediation and conciliation facilities for disputes arising under this title.

Fourth, provides for a speedy remedy for any aggrieved person.

The median lag time from the filing of a charge to the issuance of a complaint was 49 days in 1963, which included a 15-day period reserved to let the parties settle their differences voluntarily. I understand that the median time from the issuing of a complaint to the entry of an order by the Board ranges around 90 days, or a total median lag time of about 5 months.

Since the Board's order is not self-enforcing, but must be enforced by a court of appeals, the appeal time must be included. The median time interval for a case in the court of appeals is 7.3 months to final disposition. Hence, for this approach we are talking about a 1-year proposition.

Under title VII enforcement comes through the district courts where the dockets are inordinately crowded. The median timelag is almost 2½ years with close to 10 percent of all civil cases taking more than 3 years to settle. Add to that the time in the court of appeals, and the early cases will surely be appealed, and relief under title VII can be expected to take almost 3 years without reference to the time it takes the new Commission to make its investigation.

Fifth, eliminates the need for the recordkeeping requirements of title VII.

The Board has always operated on the proposition that the investigative powers granted it under NLRA, which, incidentally, are in some respects less potent than the powers to be granted the new Commission by title VII, were sufficient to make a full and fair determination of the question of discrimination.

Sixth, keeps the same 4-year period for phasing in the effective date of the provisions as is done by title VII.

Seventh, provides that the States with effective FEP laws shall have jurisdiction over cases arising there unless the NLRB determines that the State law is being administered inconsistent with the Federal act. The legislative branch could veto this administrative determination.

Again, let me state that this offering should not be construed as a request that all parties recede from their divergent thinking of title VII and meet at this common ground. My sole hope at this time is to ask interested parties to consider the potential of the approach and keep its availability in mind in case negotiations on title VII become bogged down.

WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO DO TO HELP ALASKANS WHO LOST THEIR HOMES IN THE EARTHQUAKE

Mr. THURMOND obtained the floor.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the able and distinguished Senator from Alaska, under the same conditions under which I yielded to the Senator from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator from South Carolina for his customary courtesy.

Mr. President, the Alaskan citizen whose home was damaged or destroyed as a result of the March 27 earthquake and subsequent tidal waves has been awaiting news as to what action the Federal Government would take to relieve his distressing plight.

On May 6, following my request that the interest rate on new rural housing loans to Alaskans be lowered, Secretary Freeman responded affirmatively, by lowering the interest rate from 4 percent to 3 percent, effective immediately. The loans may be repaid over a period of up to 33 years.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to applaud the action of Secretary Freeman. It is a heartening and a positive step in what I trust will be continuing action in the important area of the interest rates charged on domestic loans.

Secretary Freeman has the authority to lower interest rates further. I hope he will; and I urge him to do so.

The Federal Government makes loans to the private sector of the foreign countries at three-fourths of 1 percent interest, and allows a 10-year moratorium on capital payments. Double standards ought to join other extinct animals. We must move ahead, and we must do at least as much for our own as we do for people of other lands.

Secretary Freeman's action of yesterday is commendable. So are other recent actions, following my requests, by the Administrator of the Small Business Administration, in liberalizing certain loan procedures. So, too, are the actions of the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Dr. Robert Weaver, and those of the Commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration, Mr. Philip N. Brownstein, in coming to the assistance of homeowners in Alaska who have FHA mortgages on homes which have been destroyed.

We are moving slowly in the right direction.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of press releases issued by the Department of Agriculture and the Housing and Home Finance Agency, concerning new loan procedures, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the releases were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INTEREST RATE LOWERED ON HOUSING AID TO ALASKA QUAKE VICTIMS

(Press release by U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 6, 1964)

Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman today announced a cut in the interest rate on new rural housing loans to Alaskans whose homes were damaged or destroyed by the March 27 earthquake.

The interest rate on loans made by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration is being lowered from 4 to 3 percent, effective immediately. Loans may be repaid over a period up to 33 years.

The Department's move is being taken as a further step to soften the financial distress suffered by farm and other rural families in the earthquake-torn area.

On April 8, the Department announced that an additional $2 million in housing loan funds was being allocated to Alaskan families.

Alaskan farm families and rural residents in towns and small villages up to 2,500 population may use the Farmers Home Administration credit to build a new house or to repair a home damaged by the quake.

In addition to helping families obtain the housing, construction financed by these loans will provide employment to local residents while their regular job opportunities are being restored, according to Secretary Freeman. The Secretary also pointed out that the Farmers Home Administration has taken steps to insure that adequate funds are available for farm loans to assist eligible farmers in continuing their farming operations.

To be eligible for a Farmers Home Administration loan, an applicant must be unable to obtain the needed credit from other sources.

County offices in Alaska where Farmers Home Administration loan applications may be filed are at Palmer, Fairbanks, and Soldatna.

PRESS RELEASE BY HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, MAY 6, 1964

The Federal National Mortgage Association, the Small Business Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, and the Veterans' Administration announced today an agreement to assist Alaskan owners of homes destroyed or irreparably damaged as a result of the earthquake on March 27. It was stated that "the actions are aimed principally at disposing of the overhanging mortgage debt on the destroyed property not covered by earthquake insurance. This is essential in order to qualify the owners for a loan to rebuild."

Two Federal agencies holding mortgages on properties in Alaska have agreed to afford relief to borrowers. J. Stanley Baughman, President of Federal National Mortgage Association, and John S. Gleason, Jr., Administrator of Veterans' Administration, will accept payment of $1,000 in return for a release of the borrower from personal liability on the indebtedness covering the property destroyed. In order to enable the lender to recover any amount salvageable from the damaged property, the lender will also acquire title, ordinarily through a deed in lieu of foreclosure.

The Federal Housing Commissioner, Philip N. Brownstein, said that where an FHA insured loan is involved the lender can turn the property over to FHA for debentures. However, FHA will reduce the mortgage amount by the estimated cost of restoring the property.

Eugene Foley, Administrator of the Small Business Administration, agreed to make up to 30-year, 3-percent loans to finance new homes, physically equivalent to those that had been destroyed for owners who wished to rebuild. In addition, these SBA loans will include the $1,000 to settle the outstanding mortgage debt. SBA is prepared to offer the same terms to homeowners where private mortgage lenders make similar settlements on totally destroyed or irreparably damaged properties.

Senator CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Chairman of the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, stated: "I hope this action may lead to settlements of other mortgage claims on a favorable basis. If this is done, the families who lost their homes as a result of the earthquake can acquire new homes without unbearable financial burden."

Methods are also being formulated by the Federal agencies for helping homeowners whose properties were seriously damaged but are still repairable.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF HOMES COMPLETELY DESTROYED OR IRREPARABLY DAMAGED

1. A homeowner who, prior to the earthquake, had a 30-year, 5¾-percent interest rate mortgage with an outstanding balance of $25,000: The monthly payments for interest and principal on this loan would be $146. Assuming that a new home comparable to the one destroyed could be built for $35,000 (including land) and that the homeowner would obtain from Small Business Administration a new $36,000, 30-year mortgage loan at a 3-percent interest rate, the monthly payment would be $152. The $36,000 new mortgage loan would finance the $35,000 new home plus $1,000 of the outstanding debt on the old mortgage.

2. A homeowner who, prior to the earthquake, had a 25-year, 7-percent interest rate mortgage with an outstanding balance of $25,000: The monthly payment for interest and principal on this loan would be $177. Assuming that a new home comparable to the one destroyed could be built for $35,000 (including land) and that the homeowner would obtain from Small Business Administration a new $36,000, 25-year mortgage loan at a 3-percent interest rate, the monthly payment would be $171. The $36,000 new mortgage loan would finance the $35,000 new home plus $1,000 of the outstanding debt on the old mortgage.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF FRANCE'S DISASTER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA—DIENBIENPHU: A LESSON FOR THE UNITED STATES

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, 10 years ago, Dienbienphu, in what was then known as Indochina, fell. That marked the end of an epoch in southeast Asia. It ended French dominion in that part of the world. The war to keep Indochina had cost France the lives of tens of thousands of her young men. It had cost a fortune, to which the United States had contributed.

Unfortunately, the United States picked up the tattered remains of France's banner. That was a tragic error; and it has now resulted in the sacrifice of the lives of several hundred young Americans. Unless President Johnson reverses the mistaken policy which he inherited, it will cost the lives of many more young Americans.

Mr. President, the United States of America is now waging war in South Vietnam—an undeclared war. Quite wrongly, our country is participating in a civil war there. The war there is not our war. It is a war which can be won or decided only by the Vietnamese people. It is a war which the United States cannot win. It is a war in which we should never have engaged.

I repeat what I have said before: All South Vietnam is not worth the life of one American boy.

Our SEATO allies have "run out" on us. Perhaps they are wiser than we. Nevertheless, we do not see any British boys on the firing line in the steaming jungles of South Vietnam. We do not see any French boys fighting there. We do not see any Australian boys being killed there. Neighboring Thailand has not sent a single Thai boy to the South Vietnamese front. We do not see any New Zealand boys being sacrificed there. Only a week ago the Pakistan Government made plain that—far from being willing to participate in the war—it would strengthen its relations with Red China.

I repeat, Mr. President, that all South Vietnam is not worth the life of one American boy. Far too many lives of our young men have already been sacrificed there.

Again I ask the following quesiton of my colleagues: If your son were drafted into the U.S. military forces, and sent to South Vietnam, and if he lost his life in the fighting there, would you feel that he had died for his country?

For myself, I answer that question by saying that I would not feel that he would have died for his country. I would feel that he was being sacrificed in pursuit of a tragic folly, an inheritance of past mistakes.

Mr. President, many persons have forgotten, or are unaware of, the fate that befell France in that tropical southeast Asian trap. Our country is falling into the same trap. It is well that we be reminded of what happend to France, lest it happen to us; and it will happen to the United States if we do not have enough sense to call in the United Nations and to work with other nations for a negotiated peace.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Dienbienphu: Battle To Remember." The article was written by Bernard B. Fall, an historian who is an expert on that region of the world, and has written a definitive book about it.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DIENBIENPHU: BATTLE TO REMEMBER

(By Bernard B. Fall)

On May 7, 1954, the end of the battle for the jungle fortress of Dienbienphu marked the end of French military influence in Asia, just as the sieges of Port Arthur, Corregidor, and Singapore had, to a certain extent, broken the spell of Russian, American, and British hegemony in Asia. The Asians, after centuries of subjugation, had beaten the white man at his own game. And today, 10 years after Dienbienphu, Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam again challenge the West's ability to withstand a potent combination of political and military pressure in a totally alien environment.

On that day in May 1954 it had become apparent by 10 a.m. that Dienbienphu's position was hopeless. French artillery and mortars had been progressively silenced by murderously accurate Communist Vietminh artillery fire; and the monsoon rains had slowed down supply drops to a trickle and transformed the French trenches and dugouts into bottomless quagmires. The surviving officers and men, many of whom had lived for 54 days on a steady diet of instant coffee and cigarettes, were in a catatonic state of exhaustion.

As their commander, Brig. Gen. Christian de la Croix de Castries, reported the situation over the radiotelephone to Gen. René Cogny, his theater commander, 220 miles away in Hanoi in a high-pitched but curiously impersonal voice, the end obviously had come for the fortress. De Castries ticked off a long list of 800-man battalions which had been reduced to companies of 80 men and of companies that were reduced to the size of weak platoons. All he could hope for was to hold out until nightfall in order to give the surviving members of his command a chance to break out into the jungle under the cover of darkness, while he himself would stay with the more than 5,000 severely wounded (out of a total of 15,094 men inside the valley) and face the enemy.

By 3 p.m., however, it had become obvious that the fortress would not last until nightfall. Communist forces, in human-wave attacks, were swarming over the last remaining defenses. De Castries polled the surviving unit commanders within reach, and the consensus was that a breakout would only lead to a senseless piecemeal massacre in the jungle. The decision was made then to fight on to the end, as long as the ammunition lasted, and let individual units be overrun after destruction of their heavy weapons. That course of action was approved by the senior commander in Hanoi at about 5 p.m., but with the proviso that "Isabelle," the southernmost strongpoint closest to the jungle, and to friendly forces in Laos, should be given a chance to make a break for it.

Cogny's last conversation with De Castries dealt with the dramatic problem of what to do with the wounded piled up under incredible conditions in the various strongpoints and in the fortress' central hospital—originally built to contain 42 wounded. There had been suggestions that an orderly surrender should be arranged in order to save the wounded the added anguish of falling into enemy hands as isolated individuals. But Cogny was adamant on that point:

"Mon vieux, of course you have to finish the whole thing now. But what you have done until now surely is magnificent. Don't spoil it by hoisting the white flag. You are going to be submerged [by the enemy], but no surrender, no white flag."

"All right, mon general, I only wanted to preserve the wounded."

"Yes, I know. Well, do as best you can, leaving it to your (static: subordinate units?) to act for themselves. What you have done is too magnificent to do such a thing. You understand, mon vieux?

There was a silence. Then De Castries said his final words:

"Bien, mon general."

"Well, goodby, mon vieux," said Cogny. "I'll see you soon."

A few minutes later, De Castries' radio operator methodically smashed his set with the butt of his Colt .45, and thus the last word to come out of the main fortress, as it was being overrun, came at 5:30 p.m. from the radio operator of the 31st Combat Engineer Battalion, using his regulation code name:

"This is 'Yankee Metro.' We're blowing up everything around here. Au revoir."

Strongpoint "Isabelle" never had a chance. While the main defenses of Dienbienphu were being mopped up, strong Vietminh forces already had tightened their grip around the thousand legionnaires, Algerians, and Frenchmen preparing their breakout. At 9:40 p.m., a French surveillance aircraft reported to Hanoi that it saw the strongpoint's depots blowing up and that heavy artillery fire was visible close by. The breakout had been detected. At 1:50 a.m. on May 8, 1954, came the last message from the doomed garrison, relayed by the watchdog aircraft to Hanoi:

"Sortie failed—Stop—Can no longer communicate with you—Stop and end."

The great battle in the valley of Dienbienphu was over. Close to 10,000 captured troops were to begin the grim death march to the Vietminh prison camps 300 miles to the east. Few would survive. About 2,000 lay dead all over the battlefield in graves left unmarked to this day. Only 73 made good their escape from the various shattered strongpoints, to be rescued by the pro-French guerrilla units awaiting them in the Laotian jungle. Eight thousand miles away, in Geneva, the North Vietnamese and Red Chinese delegations attending the nine-power conference which was supposed to

settle both the Korean and the Indochinese conflicts toasted the event in pink Chinese champagne.

What had happened at Dienbienphu was simply that a momentous gamble had been attempted by the French High Command and had backfired badly. The Indochina war, which had broken out in December, 1946, after Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh forces felt that France would not agree to Vietnam's eventual independence, had slowly bogged down into a hopeless seesaw.

Until Red China's victorious forces arrived on Vietnam's borders in December 1949, there had been at least a small hope that the French-supported Vietnamese Nationalist Government, headed by ex-Emperor Bao-Dai, could wean away from the Communist-led Vietminh the allegiance of much of Vietnam's population. But with the existance of a Red Chinese "sanctuary" for the Vietminh forces, that became militarily impossible. By October 1950, 23 regular Vietminh battalions, equipped with excellent American artillery coming from Chinese Nationalist stocks left on the mainland, smashed the French defense lines along the Chinese border and inflicted on France its biggest colonial defeat since Montcalm died before Quebec. Within a few weeks, the French position in North Vietnam had shrunk to a fortified perimeter around the Red River delta; a continuous belt of Communist-held territory stretched from the Chinese border to within 100 miles of Saigon. For all practical purposes the Indochina war was lost then and there.

What changed the aspect of the war for a time was the influx of American aid, which began with the onset of the Korean war. With communism now a menace at both ends of the Far Eastern arc, the Indochina war, from a colonial war, became a crusade—but a crusade without a real cause. Independence, given too grudgingly to the Vietnamese nationalist regime, remained the catchword of the adversary.

But, militarily at least, disaster had temporarily been averted. The key Red River delta was more or less held by the French—at least during the daytime, for at night the enemy was everywhere—and the rice-rich Mekong delta in South Vietnam, where anti-Communist Buddhist sects were fighting on the French side, was held more solidly by Western forces in 1953–54 than in 1963–64.

In Laos, the situation was just as grim then as it is now: the Laotian and French forces held the Mekong valley and the airfields of the Plain of Jars, and the enemy held the rest. Only Cambodia, then as now, was almost at peace: Prince Sihanouk—then King—had received independence from France in 1953 and galvanized his people into fighting against the guerrillas. They were so successful that, at the ensuing Geneva cease-fire conference, Cambodia did not have to surrender a province as a regroupment area for Communist forces.

This totally stalemated situation left the French with but one choice: to create a military situation of the kind that would permit cease-fire negotiations on a basis of equality with the enemy. To achieve this, the French commander-in-chief, General Henri Navarre, had to win a victory over the hard core of Communist regular divisions, whose continued existence posed a constant threat of invasion to the Laotian kingdom and to the vital Red River delta with its capital city of Hanoi and the thriving port of Haiphong. And to destroy those divisions and prevent their invasions into Laos, one had to, in American military parlance, "find 'em and fix 'em."

General Navarre felt that the way to achieve this was by offering the Communists a target sufficiently tempting for their regular divisions to pounce at, but sufficiently strong to resist the onslaught once it came. That was the rationale for the creation of Dienbienphu and for the battle that took place there.

There were other considerations also. Laos had signed a treaty with France in which the latter promised to defend it. Dienbienphu was to be the lock on the back-door leading into Laos. Dienbienphu was also to be the test for a new theory of Navarre's. Rather than defend immobile lines, he wanted to create throughout Indochina "land-air bases" from which highly mobile units would sally forth and decimate the enemy in his own rear areas, just as the Vietminh guerrillas were doing in French rear areas. All that rode on Dienbienphu; the freedom of Laos, a senior commander's reputation, the survival of some of France's best troops and—above all—a last chance of coming out of that 8-year-long frustrating jungle war with something else than a total defeat.

But Navarre, an armor officer formed on the European battlefields, apparently (this was the judgment of the French Government committee which later investigated the disaster) had failed to realize that "there are no blocking positions in country lacking European-type roads." Since the Vietminh relied largely on human porters for their frontline units, they could easily bypass such bottlenecks as Dienbienphu or the Plain of Jars while bottling up the forces contained in those strongholds at little expense to themselves.

The results were evident: soon after French forces arrived at Dienbienphu on Nov. 20, 1953, two of General Vo Nguyen Giap's regular 10,000-man divisions blocked the Dienbienphu garrison, while a third bypassed Dienbienphu and smashed deeply into Laos. On Christmas Day, 1953, Indochina, for the first time in the 8-year war, was literally cut in two. The offensive stabs for which Dienbienphu had been specifically planned became little else but desperate sorties against an invisible enemy. By the time the battle started for good on March 13, 1954, the garrison already had suffered 1,037 casualties without any tangible result.

Inside the fortress, the charming tribal village by the Nam Yum had soon disappeared along with all the bushes and trees in the valley, to be used either as firewood or as construction materials for the bunkers. Even the residence of the French Governor was dismantled in order to make use of the bricks, for engineering materials were desperately short from the beginning.

Major André Sudrat, the chief engineer at Dienbienphu, was faced with a problem that he knew to be mathematically unsolvable: By normal military engineering standards, the materials necessary to protect a battalion against the fire of the 105-millimeter howitzers the Vietminh now possessed amounted to 2,550 tons, plus 500 tons of barbed wire. He estimated that to protect the 12 battalions there initially (5 others were parachuted in during the battle) he would need 36,000 tons of engineering materials—which would mean using all available transport aircraft for a period of 5 months.

When he was told that he was allocated a total of about 3,300 tons of airlifted materials, Sudrat simply shrugged his shoulders. "In that case, I'll fortify the command post, the signal center, and the X-ray room in the hospital; and let's hope that the Viet has no artillery."

As it turned out, the Vietminh had more than 200 artillery pieces, reinforced during the last week of the siege by Russian "Katyusha" multitube rocket launchers. Soon, the combination of monsoon rains, which set in around mid-April, and Vietminh artillery fire smashed to rubble the neatly arranged dugouts and trenches shown to eminent visitors and journalists during the early days of the siege. Essentially, the battle of Dienbienphu degenerated into a brutal artillery duel, which the enemy would have won sooner or later. The French guncrews and artillery pieces, working entirely in the open so as to allow the pieces all-around fields of fire, were destroyed one by one; replaced, they were destroyed once more, and at last fell silent.

The artillery duel became the great tragedy of the battle. Colonel Piroth, the jovial one-armed commander of the French artillery inside the fortress had guaranteed that his 24 105-millimeter howitzers could match anything the Communists had and that his battery of 4 155-millimeter heavy field howitzers would definitely muzzle whatever would not be destroyed by the lighter pieces and the fighter-bombers. As it turned out, the Vietminh artillery was so superbly camouflaged that to this day it is doubtful whether French counterbattery fire silenced more than a handful of the enemy's field-pieces.

When on March 13, 1954, at 5:10 p.m., Communist artillery completely smothered strongpoint "Beatrice" without noticeable damage from French counterbattery fire, Piroth knew with deadly certitude that the fortress was doomed. And as deputy to General de Castries, he felt that he had contributed to the air of overconfidence and even cockiness—had not De Castries, in the manner of his ducal forebears, sent a written challenge to enemy commander Giap?—which had prevailed in the valley prior to the attack.

"I am responsible. I am responsible," he was heard to murmur as he went about his duties. During the night of March 14–15, he committed suicide by blowing himself up with a hand grenade, since he could not arm his pistol with one hand.

Originally, the fortress had been designed to protect its main airstrip against marauding Vietminh units, not to withstand the onslaught of four Communist divisions. There never was, as press maps of the time erroneously showed, a continuous battleline covering the whole valley. Four of the eight strongpoints were from 1 to 3 miles away from the center of the position. The interlocking fire of their artillery and mortars, supplemented by a squadron of 10 tanks (flown in piecemeal and reassembled on the spot), was to prevent them from being picked off one by one.

This also proved to be an illusion. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap decided to take Dienbienphu by an extremely efficient mixture of 18th-century siege techniques (sinking TNT-laden mine shafts under French bunkers, for example) and modern artillery patterns plus human-wave attacks. The outlying posts which protected the key airfield were captured within the first few days of the battle. French losses proved so great that the reinforcements parachuted in after the airfield was destroyed for good on March 27 never sufficed to mount the counterattacks necessary to reconquer them.

From then onward the struggle for Dienbienphu became a battle of attrition. The only hope of the garrison lay in the breakthrough of a relief column from Laos or Hanoi (a hopeless concept in view of the terrain and distances involved) or in the destruction of the siege force through aerial bombardment of the most massive kind. For a time a U.S. Air Force strike was under consideration but the idea was dropped for about the same reasons that make a similar attack against North Vietnam today a rather risky affair.

Like Stalingrad, Dienbienphu slowly starved on its airlift tonnage. When the siege began, it had about 8 days' worth of supplies on hand and required 200 tons a day to maintain minimum levels. The sheer magnitude of preparing that mass of supplies for parachuting was solved only by superhuman feats of the airborne supply units on the outside—efforts more than

matched by the heroism of the soldiers inside the valley, who had to crawl into the open, under fire, to collect the containers.

But as the position shrunk every day (it finally was the size of a ball park), the bulk of the supplies fell into Communist hands. Even De Castries' general's stars, dropped to him by General Cogny with a bottle of champagne, landed in enemy territory.

The airdrops were a harrowing experience in that narrow valley which permitted only straight approaches. Communist antiaircraft artillery played havoc among the lumbering transport planes as they slowly disgorged their loads. A few figures tell how murderous the air war around Dienbienphu war: Of a total of 420 aircraft available in all of Indochina then, 62 were lost in connection with Dienbienphu and 167 sustained hits. Some of the American civilian pilots who flew the run said that Vietminh flak was as dense as anything encountered during World War II over the Ruhr.

When the battle ended, the 82,926 parachutes expended in supplying the fortress covered the battlefield like freshly fallen snow. Or like a burial shroud.

The net effect of Dienbienphu on France's military posture in Indochina could not be measured in losses alone. It was to little avail to say that France had lost only 5 percent of its battle force; that the equipment losses had already been more than made good by American supplies funneled in while the battle was raging; and that even the manpower losses had been made up by reinforcements from France and new drafts of Vietnamese. Even the fact, which the unfortunate French commander in chief, Navarre, was to invoke later, that the attack on Dienbienphu cost the enemy close to 25,000 casualties and delayed his attack on the vital Red River delta by 4 months, held little water in the face of the wave of defeatism that not only swept French public opinion at home but also that of her allies.

Historically, Dienbienphu was, as one French senior officer masterfully understated it, never more than an "unfortunate accident." It proved little else but that an encircled force, no matter how valiant, will succumb if its support system fails. But as other revolutionary wars—from Algeria to the British defeats in Cyprus and Palestine—have conclusively shown, it does not take pitched "setpiece" battles to lose such wars. They can be lost just as conclusively through a series of very small engagements, such as those now fought in South Vietnam, if the local government and its population loses confidence in the eventual outcome of the contest and that was the case of both the French and of their Vietnamese allies after Dienbienphu.

But as the French themselves demonstrated in Algeria, where they never again allowed themselves to be maneuvered into such desperate military straits, revolutionary wars are fought for political objectives and big showdown battles are necessary neither for victory nor for defeat in that case. This now seems finally to have been understood in the South Vietnam war, as well, and Secretary of Defense McNamara may well have thought of Dienbienphu when he stated in his major Vietnam policy speech of March 26 that "we have learned that in Vietnam, political and economic progress are the sine qua non of military success. * * *" One may only hope that the lesson has been learned in time.

But on May 7, 1954, the struggle for Indochina was almost over for France. As a French colonel looked out over the battlefield from a slit trench near his command post, a small white flag, probably a handkerchief, appeared on top of a rifle hardly 50 feet away from him, followed by the flat-helmeted head of a Vietminh soldier.

"You're not going to shoot any more?" said the Vietminh in French.

"No, I'm not going to shoot any more," said the colonel.

"C'est fini?" said the Vietminh.

"Oui, c'est fini," said the colonel.

And all around them, as on some gruesome judgment day, soldiers, French and enemy alike, began to crawl out of their trenches and stand erect for the first time in 54 days, as firing ceased everywhere.

The sudden silence was deafening.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "The Road From Dienbienphu—A Decade Later, No One Is Certain Where It Will End." The article was published on May 3 in the Washington Post and was written by its able staff reporter, Chalmers M. Roberts.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 3, 1964]

THE ROAD FROM DIENBIENPHU—A DECADE LATER, NO ONE IS CERTAIN WHERE IT WILL END

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

Ten years ago this week the French fortress of Dienbienphu in Indochina fell to the Communists in what was a resounding blow to American prestige.

The fortress, in what is now Communist North Vietnam, fell on May 7, shortly after the collapse of a massive effort by the late John Foster Dulles to save its besieged defenders by use of American Navy and Air Force planes.

Though Dulles went close to the brink and though President Eisenhower was prepared to ask Congress for a joint resolution authorizing such action, it never came off. As General Eisenhower has since indicated in his memoirs, it was chiefly British opposition that killed American military intervention.

Because the United States had come so close to intervention, because it had paid much of the cost of the French war effort and because President Eisenhower had applied the falling-dominoes thesis to Indochina, the French defeat rubbed off on this country.

But the domino thesis did not prove correct—or has not thus far, to be more precise. Indochina was divided into four nations, world attention turned elsewhere, and the United States survived the damage of the debacle at Dienbienphu.

We now know, however, that what occurred a decade ago was but one phase of the story. Today some 15,000 Americans in uniform are in South Vietnam, one of the four fragments of French Indochina. They may not be directly fighting the war but they, and the American Government, are deeply involved in it.

It is indeed something of an oddity that the United States is so involved in an area so far on the other side of the globe. Until 1940, few Americans had ever heard of Indochina and fewer still cared about it, the U.S. Government included. It was simply a far-off lotus land.

American involvement began in 1940, on about August 30, when the Vichy government of France (set up after Hitler had overrun Paris and Marshal Petain had organized a collaborating regime in that southern town) made its first deal with Japan. France recognized Japan's "preeminent position" in the Far East and granted the then aggressive Japanese certain rights in the north of Indochina.

That was 14 months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan's entry into Indochina was part of a movement to the south which so misled American leaders that they could not believe that an attack on Hawaii might be in the Japanese mind.

When the French on the scene in Indochina stalled over implementing the accord with Vichy, the impatient Japanese, then the occupiers of much of the Chinese mainland, launched an attack from Kwangtung and Kwangsi across the border on the French forts at Lang-Son and Dong-Dang.

In the end the French gave in and the Japanese moved in. A widely quoted American newspaper editorial warning against U.S. involvement was captioned: "Who Wants To Die for Dear Old Dong-Dang?" The answer then in still isolationist America was clear: no one.

The Japanese held the country throughout the war. In early 1944, in discussing postwar arrangements, President Roosevelt told the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, that he felt that Indochina should not go back to France but should be administered by an international trusteeship. To this and other anti-French talk by F.D.R. Churchill objected. He could not visualize "a civilized world without a flourishing and lively France"—without a French Empire as well as a British Empire.

Henry Wallace, then Vice President, has recorded that sometime later he, at F.D.R.'s request, personally told Chiang Kai-shek that F.D.R. was offering Chiang all of Indochina (what is now two Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia) as an outright grant. In a display of wisdom, Chiang turned down the offer, saying rightly that the Indochinese were "not Chinese. They would not assimilate into the Chinese people."

At the wartime Teheran and Postdam Conferences with Stalin, the West agreed that Indochina would be occupied by Chinese Nationalist troops down to the 16th parallel with British Commonwealth forces occupying the southern half of the peninsula. That was in fact done, but before long these forces withdrew as the French, who had first come in 1884, now returned to reassert authority in their old colony.

The French, however, found that Ho Chi Minh, then as now the Communist leader of Indochina, was already leading an insurrection. He had created a Democartic Republic of Vietnam and seized Hanoi in 1945. A founding member of the French Communist Party and an aid to Stalin's agent in China, Borodin, Ho led the 9-year war against the French. It ended soon after the capitulation of Dienbienphu.

By then Dulles' intervention talk had faded, and he was concentrating on creating what came to be SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, to protect the new status quo. The war formally ended with a division of the Vietnams at the 17th parallel, a product of the Geneva conference in July. The United States, like the new regime set up for South Vietnam, did not sign the Geneva accords, but it did agree not to try to overturn them by force.

Nearly 900,000 refugees from the North fled south, and a few from the South went north. But in the South, as recounted in Bernard Fall's excellent book, "The Two Vietnams," a small group of Ho's elite guerrillas quietly buried its well-greased weapons, hid its portable radio transmitters, and simply returned for the time being to the humdrum tasks of sowing and harvesting rice.

The Ngo Diem Dinh regime began in the South as the war halted. It ended 9 years later with his murder during a coup against his regime last November. Whatever his virtues or his vices, Diem's country was under massive Communist guerrilla attack at the time of his death. And American prestige once again was deeply involved, this time in a struggle to contain and destroy that internal cancer.

Slowly the United States "slid into the second Indochina war," as Fall put it, in the lat-

ter part of the Eisenhower administration and during the Kennedy years.

President Eisenhower had pronounced the falling dominoes theory, and President Kennedy agreed with it; the loss of Vietnam could or would lead to the loss of adjacent Laos and Cambodia, then Thailand and Malayia (now Malaysia) and finally Indonesia and Burma. President Johnson has not publicly said the same thing, but his policies are premised in the same way.

Since the massive inflow of American forces, that is, from January 1, 1961, to April 22 of this year, 129 Americans have been killed in Vietnam. However tragic each individual death has been, the total is less than the number—262—of persons killed during 1963 in automobile accidents in Metropolitan Washington.

Such, however, is part of the price of world power and of trying to use that power in a faraway place in a limited fashion.

Today in the United States there is a discordant chorus of voices on what this Nation should do. Senators MORSE and GRUENING say we should get out completely. Senator MANSFIELD says we should explore General de Gaulle's talk of neutralization. Richard Nixon and Senator GOLDWATER say the war should be carried to Communist North Vietnam.

Reports that Henry Cabot Lodge is about to resign as Ambassador to Vietnam, return home and denounce the administration's conduct of the war are denounced by administration officials as totally false. But Senate GOP leader DIRKSEN says he has heard "rumors" that Lodge, the Republican presidential front runner in the polls, "is unhappy about the policy over there and is coming back." He says, however, he has no proof of such "rumors."

Thus the Republicans, hungry for a sharp foreign policy issue against President Johnson, are themselves divided. Darkhorse Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania is against carrying the war to the north.

Does the bell toll in Vietnam for the United States? Is that faraway land important in the world conflict between communism and democracy? Is it any more or less important to the United States than it was a decade ago?

Central to the administration's argument of Vietnam's importance today is Secretary of State Rusk's contention that Red China must not be allowed to find that aggression pays. Yet neither Rusk nor anyone else in the administration has firmly and directly connected the war in South Vietnam with the regime in Peiping. It is said only that the Communist direction comes from Hanoi, the North Vietnamese capital, with some vague line of authority running from Hanoi to Peiping and, even vaguer, perhaps to Moscow. But nobody professes to be very clear about those connections.

Of itself, Vietnam in 1964 as in 1954 is of no real importance in a power sense to the United States. American power in Asia is essentially in the air and on the seas, sustained by bases from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines to friendly ports and airfields in Australia.

Indeed, it can be argued that Saigon is no more important to us today than was "dear old Dong-Dang" nearly a quarter century ago. It can be urged that American power still would be present and massive in Asia whatever happened to South Vietnam if American support were withdrawn, that the dominoes would no more fall in that event than they did after the loss of North Vietnam to the Communists. It can be argued, too, that a Communist Vietnam would have considerable independence of Peiping and Moscow.

But, contrariwise, it can be and is argued that retreat from Saigon today is as impossible as retreat from West Berlin; that our presence in support of indigeneous people, Vietnamese or West German, is an earnest sign of our determination to yield no more ground to aggressive communism.

It can be and is argued that a Communist takeover, even if a so-called neutralist regime in Saigon came first, would massively increase Red China's power and prestige in Asia. This would be to the detriment chiefly of the United States but also of the Soviet Union, whose more cautious approach, at least in words, the United States has been applauding.

No one wants to die for Saigon any more than for Dong-Dang. But that is not the issue; rather, it is this: Is it in the vital interest of the United States that, even at a cost of further American lives, this country continue to bolster the regime in Saigon against its Communist led and oriented foes?

And on that point, in this election year, neither party is fully agreed either among its leaders or with the opposition. That is the agony of uncertainty which troubles so many in the United States today.

AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield briefly to me?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, with the same understanding, I am glad to yield to the Senator from New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KEATING. I thank the Senator from South Carolina for his courtesy.

Mr. President, this month, one of America's foremost industrial unions, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, will be celebrating, at its national convention, its 50th birthday. Spawned of the sweatshop, the Amalgamated has, in its 50 years, shown extreme dedication to the cause of improving the lot of the working man, through the vehicle of collective bargaining.

Under the creative and inspiring leadership of Sidney Hillman and Jacob Potofsky, the Amalgamated has set an example of responsible collective bargaining for the settlement of labor disputes. It has found mutual cooperation and discussion to be a successful method of meeting the needs of its members—so successful that the union has gone 50 years without an industrywide strike.

Particularly notable is the duration of the 1911 arbitration agreement between Amalgamated's predecessor and the Hart, Schaffner, and Marx Co., of Chicago. To end an unusually costly strike of men's garment workers at the Hart, Schaffner, and Marx plant, in Chicago, in 1911, the union and the company agreed on a settlement providing for binding arbitration if the two primary parties were unable to work out a settlement. Thus, the union was fully a generation ahead of its time.

Ed Townsend, the labor editor of Business Week magazine, has paid tribute to this fine labor organization in an article in the American Legion magazine. I ask unanimous consent that his article, entitled "Fifty Years Without an Industrial Strike," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the American Legion Magazine, May 1964]

FIFTY YEARS WITHOUT AN INDUSTRIAL STRIKE—BORN OF A BLOODY CONFLICT, THE AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS SET A PATTERN FOR LABOR PEACE THAT ENDURED

(By Ed Townsend)

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America is 50 years old this year, and will officially celebrate its first half century as a labor union at its national convention in May. It was born in 1914 out of a bloody strike in 1910–11 in Chicago in which its leaders, then part of another union, joined with management in setting precedents for healthy labor-management relations from which we are still learning and still have more to learn.

Amalgamated, made up chiefly of workers in the men's clothing industry, was among the first "industrial unions" in the country. As such it has had the power to pull the whole industry out on strike, rather than just the workers having one particular skill, as in the "craft unions."

But though it has been mixed up in local labor turmoil (usually during organizing struggles) from New York's Mohawk Valley to the Deep South, Amalgamated has not pulled an industrywide strike since the day it was founded, 50 years ago, nor, except once in New York over 40 years ago, has it struck any of the major manufacturers in its field.

Together with the management of Hart Schaffner & Marx, Amalgamated in 1911 virtually invented successful arbitration as the solution to a deadlock between workers and employer—and both of them were thereby more than a generation ahead of their time.

On the record, the union has much more to boast about on its 50th anniversary. It cites (1) the establishment of commercial banks back in days when laboring men and women hardly felt welcome in most other banks; (2) construction of public housing; (3) resistance to Communist infiltration (perhaps because many of its early members were old European Socialists who were more sophisticated about communism than the Americans of a generation ago); and (4) militant action to keep racketeers out of their industry and their union.

But none of the pioneering of which amalgamated can boast matches, in national importance, the industrial peace formula that its founders evolved with Hart Schaffner & Marx (still the biggest employer in the field) out of their violent conflict in 1910–11.

Big and brutal strikes—sheer tests of economic power—are an ineffectual and undesirable way of resolving disputes over work terms. They hurt labor, they hurt management, and they hurt that innocent bystander, the whole nation. We still have industrywide strike deadlocks and threats of them in many industries. But for 53 years Hart Schaffner & Marx and its employees have not lost a single day's work as a result of a contract dispute (perhaps the longest uninterrupted contract relationship in American industrial history)—and as their formula long ago spread to almost all major union contracts in the men's clothing field, it revolutionized company-worker relationships and replaced chaos with law, order, and justice. The formula has been well tested. Today's problem is to get others to follow it.

In the years before 1910, the men's and boys' garment industry in New York, Chicago, and other production centers had seen many spontaneous stoppages to protest sweatshop conditions. Working conditions were bad and earnings meager. Weekly wages of $7 for 60 hours of work were above average. The walkouts were quickly squelched. The workers' union, the United Garment Work-

ers, with headquarters in the old Bible House in New York, gave them little support. It was principally interested in skilled workers—the industry's well-treated craftsmen—at the expense of unskilled workers, more than half of them women and young girls, largely European immigrants.

Discontent over the lack of support from the United Garment Workers built up steadily along with anger at and fear of the employers. UGW's leadership was sharply criticized. Its predominantly immigrant rank-and-file charged that their interests were being ignored. But, although vocal, the immigrant group lacked strong leadership that could pull it together.

But on September 22, 1910, a group of Hart Schaffner & Marx pantsmakers in Chicago—14 girls led by Bessie Abramowitz—walked out rather than accept an arbitrary cut in piece rates for pants seaming. (Miss Abramowitz later became Mrs. Sidney Hillman and is a vice president of Amalgamated today.)

The girls' walkout set off a slow-burning fuse in a keg of dynamite.

Emboldened by them, others quit the plant over the next 3 weeks. By mid-October, 8,000 Hart Schaffner & Marx workers were out. As word of the wildcat strike spread, nearly 40,000 garment workers laid down their shears and needles in other Chicago plants. Before long almost all of the city's clothing manufacturing was shut down by a general strike. A historic struggle had begun.

Pickets trudged through snow and fought icy winds off Lake Michigan as winter set in early. As before the United Garment Workers showed little sympathy for the strike. It tried to get workers back into the plants with only minor concessions. Strikers shouted down the proposals. UGW aid to them grew slimmer.

The strikers tightened their belts for a hard and angry battle without substantial labor help from outside Chicago. Local leaders emerged, notably Sidney Hillman, an immigrant from Lithuania, once a rabbinical student. Hillman and other strike leaders welded together a tight and strong organization.

They had important friends in the Midwest who closed ranks behind the strikers, including social workers like Jane Addams of Hull House and Ellen Gates Starr; attorneys Clarence Darrow and William O. Thompson and other public figures, and civic leaders like Mrs. Raymond Robins.

These friends were welcome in months of suffering and hardship. Companies tried to produce garments using strikebreakers with the support of the Chicago police against "rebellious" strikers. Countless strikers were clubbed down, a few were shot; two were killed. Thousands were arrested.

When the union needed $25,000 for bail Jane Addams got it for the strikers. She also permitted the union to hold strike strategy meetings in Hull House and Hillman lived there. He long afterward referred to Hull House as "my school" and said that he learned more there about humanity than anywhere else. A year or so ago, when Hull House was threatened by razing, the Amalgamated repaid a debt. It helped raise some $300,000 to preserve the historic building.

After the second striker was killed in disorders at the Hart Schaffner & Marx gates, a conscience-stricken Joseph Schaffner, one of the founders of the company and its president, intervened personally to seek peace with the union. As public and governmental pressures built up for a settlement, he placed two proposals before the strikers. Both were rejected. A third, strongly endorsed by strike leaders, was then accepted.

Schaffner acknowledged that many of the workers' complaints were warranted. Workers were exploited. Wages of the easily hired unskilled were indeed kept low so that scarcer skilled workers could be paid more and kept contented. The work pace and pressures were intense. And young women had to submit to indignities from foremen in order to keep jobs.

While Schaffner pledged that many of the more deplorable conditions would be relieved, he pointed out an economic reality. Cutthroat competition among garment manufacturers, mostly small plants, would serve as an effective brake against improvements. The strike leaders conceded this. They still hold to a policy of protecting contract employers against cutrate competition by organizing efforts and firm enforcement of standard contract terms.

The settlement, in January 1911, took less than a page as compared with today's inchthick labor agreements. It made only three points: (1) All strikers would be taken back, (2) there would be no penalties or discrimination against any of them, (3) issues still in dispute would be submitted to binding arbitration.

The third provision was the all-important one.

It called for arbitration of disputes by a board whose decision both labor and management agreed to accept in advance.

Arbitration was not new—but it was still little known and rarely accepted. The extent of the proposed Hart Schaffner & Marx arbitration was unheard of then. It was shattering news for other employers.

Under the 1911 plan, the union and its counsel, and management and its counsel, would bargain together. If all went smoothly, well and good. But if they locked horns on a question where neither side would budge, a third neutral party—agreeable to both—would be called in, to act as chairman and have the controlling vote.

In coming to arbitration in 1911, Schaffner and union representatives accepted two premises that have become, in the 1960's, the basis of a new approach to collective bargaining generally:

(1) Many controversial matters can be handled best outside the tension and hot tempers of a labor-management negotiating room.

(2) More basically, industrial warfare of the kind that raged through Chicago must be ended—not just for the short duration of a labor contract but through the foreseeable future.

What they acknowledged then, many thoughtful people in management and labor are echoing now:

Large-scale strikes, such as the 116-day strike in basic steel in 1959 and the more recent east coast longshoring and New York newspaper strikes, seldom settle anything. The issues become lost in a massive power struggle. Positions polarize; collective bargaining collapses. In the end, Government or other outside aid is necessary to resolve the differences.

Also, big strikes are much too costly for everyone—employers, unions, wage earners and the public. When they elect to fight, unions are seldom able to hurt employers without hurting their own members more. Mechanization and automation make it easier for employers to keep plants operating with minimum supervisory and white-collar forces. On the other hand, established unions seldom can be broken. Strikes can go on indefinitely, as impasses, hurting both sides and offering promises of real gains to neither—meanwhile trying the ragged patience of the public.

They waste resources that could be put to better economic and social use to improve profits and jobs and for the security and welfare of workers.

And, most important, industrial warfare need not be inevitable in a live and dynamic society. Sharply opposed positions of free management and free labor can be adjusted peacefully, by voluntary means. Alternatives to industrial strife can and must be devised. Level heads are preferable to tough muscles.

Recognition of these things 53 years ago turned Hart Schaffner & Marx and its garment workers' union to binding arbitration on two levels: (1) "In-plant" arbitration of day-to-day grievances, and (2) major arbitration of any and all contract issues that could not be resolved in collective bargaining.

Recognition of the same things in 1959 and early 1960 turned the basic steel industry and United Steelworkers from a dangerous practice of deadline bargaining—negotiating with a strike threat just ahead—to a new and now twice successful policy of year-round consideration of mutual problems through a human relations committee.

It also has led to predictions—probably overoptimistic still—that the big strikes in America are nearing an end.

Outside the men's garment industry, there are still too few alternatives to strikes when bargaining deadlocks. Few employers and unions have been willing to go along with Hart Schaffner & Marx and the Amalgamated all the way in their labor peace plan. Arbitration is now almost universally accepted for settling routine grievances, but it still is only rarely used—voluntarily—as a way out of bargaining impasses.

Most employers and unions remain firmly opposed to submitting pay and other contract issues to binding decisions by arbitrators. They fear the consequences of judgments by "a relatively unsophisticated outsider" who can write an award and be done with it—without having to work with and live under the terms he orders. A bad arbitration decision in a contract case could have lasting damage on a company's economic structure, one of the country's leading industrialists warned earlier this year.

After 53 years, Hart Schaffner & Marx and the Amalgamated remain thoroughly satisfied with the machinery set up in 1911. As with any machinery, no matter how well tended, it has had some friction, whines, and groans through its years of service. But the machinery works for the garment manufacturer and union and they see no reason why it shouldn't work as well for other employers and unions willing to adopt such a mechanism—and to apply themselves to making it work smoothly and effectively.

Ordinarily, today, issues to be submitted to arbitrators are narrowly limited to interpretations of contract clauses. Hart Schaffner & Marx and the Amalgamated imposed no limits. They agreed to submit to the board all issues that might come up between them, including rates of pay, and to abide by the arbitrators' decision.

Initially, the plan worked reasonably well. No neutral board member was needed or appointed. The first arbitration award, 2 months after the plan went into effect, dealt with the issues involved in the 1910–11 strike. Sidney Hillman and Clarence Darrow, representing the union on the board at first, were able to work out "a just and reasonable" award with Hart Schaffner & Marx Attorney Carl Meyer and Prof. Earl Dean Howard of Northwestern University, representing the company.

The terms included a minimum wage of $5 a week for women and $7 for men; increases of 10 percent for tailors and 5 percent for cutters; a 54-hour workweek with time-and-a-half for overtime; shared work during the slack season; improved sanitary conditions; a regular dinner hour, and grievance machinery with the board of arbitration the final recourse. A half century ago those meager-sounding provisions were improvements for labor, but many workers were dissatisfied. They argued they should have had