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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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desire independence in those countries is to revolt against the international empire of Soviet Russia. We are gratified that Laos is able to celebrate its independence day this May 11. Let us hope that many more May 11's will come and go in Laos with freedom and happy celebrations.

On May 11 the people of the United States honor Laos, a gallant nation, and send our words of hope for freedom and peaceful resolution of conflicts. In the words of the Master Buddha Sakyamuni spoken 2,500 years ago:

The middle course is the course in which eyes will be opened and intelligence enlightened. It leads to peace, lucidity and serenity.

Civil Rights Bill—Titles VII—XI

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 12, 1964

Mr. RYAN of New York. Mr. Speaker, I wish to bring to the attention of those of my colleagues who might have missed them the last two New York Times editorials regarding the civil rights bill. These editorials were published on May 8 and 9. I believe that the New York Times deserves commendation for the thoughtful and incisive series of editorials on the individual titles of the bill. This series is a much needed contribution to the debate on the civil rights bill.

[From the New York Times, May 8, 1964]

CIVIL RIGHTS BILL—V

The disadvantage suffered by the average Negro in this country because of the color of his skin is nowhere more burdensome than in the area of job opportunity. The unemployment rate is twice as high among Negroes as among whites; median family income is about half as much.

This is a national, not a southern, problem. Commonly in the North, as in the South, Negroes are confined to menial jobs. Throughout the country, large locals of some major unions that control access to skilled employment will not admit Negroes. We need look no further than the disgraceful behavior of a plumbers' local in New York for an example.

Title 7 of the civil rights bill now before the Senate is an ambitious proposal for a national attack on discrimination in employment. It prohibits racial or religious discrimination by companies with 25 or more employees and unions with 25 or more members, after a 4-year transitional period.

To enforce its provisions, this title creates an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which would investigate complaints of discrimination and could sue in the Federal courts if persuasion failed. The misrepresentations by opponents of the civil rights legislation are at their wildest in discussion of this title. It would not, as has been suggested, require anyone to establish racial quotas; to the contrary, such quotas would be forbidden as a racial test. The bill does not require employers or unions to drop any standard for hiring or promotion or membership—except the discriminatory standard of race or religion.

It must be candidly recognized that title 7 would not overnight wipe out inequality of job opportunities for Negroes. This is a

large and diverse country, and one Commission in Washington cannot effectively check the hiring practices of every company. The probability is that the greatest effect of a new Federal fair employment statute would lie in the mere fact of its passage by Congress: A standard would thereby be set for the great majority of management and union leaders who want to do justice and obey the law.

What is important is that the enforcement method provided be strong and clear enough to constitute a meaningful warning.

The millennium will not arrive if title 7 is enacted. But there must be a beginning; and it is surely time for a Federal undertaking to end an injustice that is damaging the American economy and, more important, imposing misery and frustration on Americans for no other reason than their color.

[From the New York Times, May 9, 1964]

CIVIL RIGHTS BILL—VI

The last four titles of the pending civil rights bill, whose other major provisions we have already discussed in this series of editorials, logically round out the Federal Government's role in protecting equality under law.

Title 8 is designed to provide information in an area where it is curiously inadequate, the statistics of registration and voting. The Census Bureau would be directed to determine the numbers of persons eligible to vote, by race, in States designated by the Civil Rights Commission. Those will undoubtedly be the handful of States in the Deep South where intimidation and gross defiance of law now keep citizens from the polls because of their color. It is plain that the country should have accurate information on the extent of such denials of the franchise.

Title 9 addresses itself to the sadly common situation of State criminal trials in which defendants have reason to fear they will be denied justice because of their race. Federal law has long allowed defendants to remove their cases to the Federal courts where they can make a showing of jeopardy to their civil rights in State tribunals. But lower Federal judges often send the cases back to the State courts, and these decisions to remand have been held unappealable. Title 9 allows defendants to appeal such orders.

Conciliation is the noncontroversial objective of title 10, which would set up a new Community Relations Service in the Commerce Department to mediate racial disputes. The one mystery is why the service would be limited to seven permanent employees. This is a ceiling that the Senate would do well to remove.

The final section, title 11, makes sure that the measure would not repeal existing Federal or State law against racial discrimination. And it contains the usual clause to protect the act's constitutionality—as to which we entertain no doubts. Nor are we in doubt about the desirability of speedy passage of the entire bill.

True Story of the War in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 12, 1964

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call the attention of the Members of this House to the May 19 issue of the U.S. News & World Report which carries

yet another disturbing story about the conduct of the war in South Vietnam.

This firsthand report places much of the blame for the failure to destroy the Vietcong to an attitude prevalent presumably among many of the Vietnamese military officers who apparently prefer to enjoy the blessings of the \$2 million a day flow of American aid to fighting the Vietcong, and who are, therefore, less than enthusiastic about eliminating the Communist menace which stimulates such aid. Consequently, the question is raised as to whether the American investment in South Vietnam is being so handled as to discourage the South Vietnamese from effectively responding to Communist aggression and subversion.

Similar disquieting reports have been persistently appearing. For example, it has been recently alleged that our military personnel have been supplied with defective and wornout equipment. Certainly, regardless of what policy the Government adopts to meet the Communist aggression in South Vietnam, in view of the steadily growing list of American casualties, I, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, find it is most difficult to understand why our country has not provided our American personnel with effective fighting equipment.

The deepening concern of many Americans over the situation there has reached the point, I believe, that the repeated trips of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to Saigon, because of the lack of substantial results, are no longer a sign of encouragement, but of embarrassment.

The time is long overdue for the American people to be given a full accounting of U.S. policy in South Vietnam, for it is clear that if we do not vigorously and decisively defeat Communist aggression in South Vietnam and rally the southeast Asian peoples' confidence and respect for the free world, the Communist Chinese will be greatly encouraged and we will be faced with a much greater military threat in that area. It is now abundantly clear that success in South Vietnam and southeast Asia cannot be achieved through a never-ending series of halfway measures. Either we are committed to defeat Communist aggression or we are not. Only an all-out effort by both this country and the South Vietnamese will be effective. It would be better that we were not there at all than to be there and to fail in our mission.

The article follows:

TRUE STORY OF WAR IN VIETNAM

(NOTE.—Go out to the frontlines, in the jungles of South Vietnam, and you get a view of the war that Secretary McNamara and other high Washington officials do not see. One American writer did that, Robert L. Moore, Jr., lived 4 months with United States and Vietnamese soldiers, went on combat missions with them. What this writer saw raises important questions about the way that war is being fought. He found incompetence, cowardice, graft—and no will to win—among many of the Vietnamese officers and public officials directing war operations. In this report, he tells why he thinks the war will not be won until the United States takes over control.)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—“In his trips to South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was never exposed to the hard,

unpleasant facts facing those Americans who are actually fighting the war against the Communist Vietcong."

These words were written by an American who has spent 4 months living in the field with the United States and Vietnamese fighting forces—actually going with them into combat.

From firsthand experience, this on-the-spot American observer has reached these conclusions:

"The basic problem that America faces in Vietnam is not that of defeating the Vietcong Communists. That could be done in a year or less.

"Our problem is to be allowed to win—to be permitted by our Vietnamese allies to prosecute this war aggressively and end it. This does not necessarily have to involve bringing U.S. battle groups into Vietnam to fight the war. Vietnam has the soldiers and equipment to win.

"But, as U.S. advisers in the field say privately: The war can't be won under the present ground rules because of the inability of most Vietnamese military leaders to lead."

The American who wrote these conclusions is Robert L. Moore, Jr., from Boston, Mass. He was an Air Force nose gunner in World War II. After graduation from Harvard in 1949, he worked in television and in public relations and then turned to writing. His output includes two books.

Last year Mr. Moore got the consent of the Department of the Army to live among the U.S. Special Forces in South Vietnam to gather material for a book about them. In preparation, he took parachute training at Fort Benning, Ga., went through Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Now, after 4 months in Vietnam, Mr. Moore is returning to write at length about what he has observed there. But he feels that some of his findings are so important and so timely that they should be published quickly. So he has given U.S. News & World Report permission to quote from the first draft of one article that he is preparing.

The story that Mr. Moore tells is a story of a war that Secretary McNamara has not seen. Mr. Moore says:

"Many U.S. fighting men expressed disappointment that the Secretary did not visit American units in daily combat with the Vietcong and find out at first hand from his soldiers what their problems are.

"The U.S. high command in Saigon does not encourage its men to pass their problems along to the Pentagon Chief."

Following, from Mr. Moore's report, are some of those problems that Americans face in Vietnam.

LACKING: A WILL TO WIN

One major problem is the attitude of the Vietnamese. Mr. Moore says:

"The will to fight, endure privations and win is just not in the majority of the Vietnamese military officers."

Mr. Moore questions whether some of the high officials and military officers of that country really want to see the war end. Why? He writes this:

"Never before have so many Vietnamese officers and public officials lived so well in such a booming economy—injected as it is with a daily dose of almost \$2 million of American money.

"It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are benefiting from this dote that when the war is over this massive aid will cease, or at least be drastically modified."

ADVISEES IN COMBAT

The official role of U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam is that of advisers to Vietnamese combat forces. But Mr. Moore reports that these so-called "advisers" have suffered more than half the U.S. combat casualties, although they make up only about 6 percent of the total U.S. force in Vietnam.

Here, from Mr. Moore's account, is how the U.S. Special Forces actually operate:

"The basic Special Forces combat unit—technically referred to as an 'advisory' unit—is a 12-man team known as an A team. There are 42 such units, directed and supported by four B teams, located in the four military-corps areas of South Vietnam, with a headquarters unit known as the Special Forces Operating Base in Saigon.

"Each A team is strategically situated in an area dominated by the Communists. Anywhere from 300 to 600 Vietnamese civilians—trained by the Special Forces—are quartered in an A-team camp and are used to reconnoiter Vietcong positions and raid their concentrations.

"Also in each camp there is a Vietnamese Special Forces A team which, in theory, parallels the American team in capabilities, composition, and organization—that is: two officers and 10 enlisted men."

Actually, however, Mr. Moore finds a great difference between the United States and Vietnamese "Special Forces."

OFFICERS PICKED BY POLITICS

Mr. Moore gives this description of the Vietnamese Special Forces—and of how they are selected: "The Vietnamese Special Forces—or Luc-Luong Dac-Biet, to use the Vietnamese designation—were primarily a unit of political troops organized under the regime of the late President, Ngo Dinh Diem, to serve as the President's private police and riot squad.

"Coveted positions in this elite group were given out as political favors to the sons of friends and supporters of President Diem and his family. To give the group status and equip it with the finest U.S. military hardware, Diem allied his Special Forces with U.S. Special Forces—thus saddling the Americans with Vietnamese teams made up of youths who had no taste for combat and whose only training was as palace guards.

"To make things worse, instead of the Vietnamese going out to learn from their highly trained American counterparts, the Vietnamese team captain was made camp commander over the experienced American, who can only advise.

"Despite the two recent coups, each supposedly dedicated to a more aggressive war effort, the character of the Vietnamese Special Forces seems to be changing all too slowly. Vietnamese officers move into and out of jail as power changes hands, but their overall quality still stands at a dismally low level."

LUXURY IN MIDST OF WAR

You get this description of how officers of the Vietnamese Special Forces live in the midst of a war:

"Most of the officers have a batman to serve them tea in bed in the mornings. Frequently they refuse to see their American counterpart, particularly if they think he is going to goad them into a combat operation. When they do go out on operations, the officers make their men carry all their equipment. Americans carry their own gear.

"Many 35 or 40-year-old lieutenants and captains—whose lack of political connections accounts for their lack of promotions—are sent to some of the most dangerous areas where the majority of Vietnamese officers refused to be posted.

"With increasing effort by the Vietnamese Government to make the Army more effective, it is usually possible now for a U.S. Special Forces A-team captain to have his Vietnamese counterpart relieved from command. Unfortunately, such officers are merely transferred as camp commander to another Special Forces team in another corps area to begin anew the same cycle of embezzlement of U.S.-supplied funds and deterioration of fighting efficiency."

COWARDICE AND LAZINESS

Mr. Moore tells of the difficulties often encountered in trying to get Vietnamese officers to go out and fight the enemy: "I participated in six combat operations throughout the four corps areas and the pattern never

deviated. As soon as it was ascertained that a Vietnamese patrol was closing in on a Vietcong concentration, antinoise discipline disintegrated. Shots were accidentally fired and canteens rattled to let the enemy know that he was being pursued.

"When, in spite of these precautions, the Vietcong appeared ready to dig in and fight, the Vietnamese commander inevitably came up with some excuse for pulling back.

"One excuse for turning from the enemy particularly sticks in my mind. It was uttered by a Vietnamese officer in Tay Ninh Province. We had to ford a river to get at what we judged to be a platoon of Vietcong on the other side. We had a full company. The two American advisers were exuberant at the opportunity of engaging a Vietcong unit. But the Vietnamese officer turned to the Americans and said his men could not cross the river because there were too many alligators in it.

"There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule of cowardice and laziness in the Vietnamese Special Forces.

"I spent some time in the camp of a U.S. Special Forces officer who had nothing but praise for his former counterpart, a Vietnamese lieutenant in his early thirties. This Vietnamese officer was an aggressive fighting man, able to inspire great courage and loyalty among the civilian defense troops.

"The American officer wrote a letter of commendation for the Vietnamese officer, recommending that he be given a promotion to captain. Two weeks later the lieutenant was transferred to Saigon and replaced by a more typical Vietnamese officer—a 22-year-old anti-American captain who has failed to go out on a single operation to date.

"U.S. Special Forces men can hardly be blamed for their bitterness toward the Vietnamese officers who make a difficult job almost impossible."

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

Among the things that make American soldiers angry are the graft and corruption that are widespread in Vietnam—even in combat areas. Mr. Moore cites a few examples. Here is one:

"In April I visited several camps where Vietnamese camp commanders had under them 200 or 300 Montagnard troops. Montagnards are mountain tribesmen who are the best fighting men in the Vietnamese Army. But the Vietnamese despise the darker-skinned and coarser-featured Montagnards. These Vietnamese camp commanders made the lives of their Montagnard men so miserable by degrading punishment and cutting down on their food that desertions soared.

"The camp commanders failed to report the deserters until after payday. They collected from the Americans the pay for the entire camp roster, indicating on the payroll that all the deserters had been paid while in actuality the commanders kept the deserters' pay for themselves.

"Yet if Americans object too strenuously to such things they are severely reprimanded for not being cooperative with their Vietnamese counterparts."

Another example:

"On patrols, one Vietnamese commander made his Montagnards hunt deer instead of Vietcong. The commander drove out on the patrols in a weapons carrier. After several days during which he ate heartily while refusing to give the troops any of the meat they provided, the commander drove his load of deer carcasses into town and sold them. This same camp commander had just tried to jail the interpreter who had told the American captain that the commander had pocketed the pay of almost 100 deserters.

"Such stories are so common that Americans begin to take it for granted that they are expected to put up with Vietnamese graft and cowardice as part of their job.

"One U.S. sergeant told me ruefully: 'They took \$1,700 out of my pay for taxes last year,

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and I have to keep my mouth shut and see it wasted over here."

Mr. Moore reports: "There is little confidence among Americans working at the combat level that corruption will be significantly diminished by the announcement of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the new South Vietnam leader, that he will jail embezzlers of up to \$1,000 and shoot anyone who steals more than that."

RETAPE AND DELAY

Mr. Moore says: "The biggest single fault in the Vietnamese military system is its chronic inability to react quickly." He cites "a heartbreaking example".

On March 26, two Americans were reported overdue and presumed down on a flight over a jungle area. Vietnamese rangers were asked to join the ground search.

It took 2 days just to get permission—first from a Vietnamese general and then from the district and provincial political chiefs.

Ranger officers then refused to move until they got reserves to stand by in their absence—and a special round of field rations. This cost 3 more days of delay.

On April 1, the rangers finally were flown to a camp from which they were to start a search. Then came word that a new Vietnamese commander was arriving the next day for an inspection—and the rangers had to provide an honor guard.

It was April 3—8 days after the plane went down—when the search finally got underway.

HOW TO HANDLE SNIPERS: "WITHDRAW"

Here is an example, cited by Mr. Moore, of how Vietnamese can turn U.S. military tactics into tactics of retreat: "If the Secretary of Defense really wants to see at firsthand some of the reasons we cannot win this war in Vietnam without some policy changes, he should spend a week at one of the Special Forces B teams. They are truly microcosms of the entire war. Most of our basic frustrations and quandaries are reflected in a B team's daily incidents.

"At one B team I found the operations officer laughing wryly over the translation of a recent directive. Vietcong snipers picking off a few men were routing whole companies and battalions. U.S. advisers showed the Vietnamese how to dispatch squads to kill or drive off the snipers. The Americans were pleased when a directive on their methods of dealing with snipers went out from corps headquarters.

"A few weeks later, however, the tactical genius of the Vietnamese military mind came forth in a new communique. It instructed units coming under Vietcong sniper fire to withdraw—leaving ambushes in case the sniper charged."

U.S. EQUIPMENT WASTED

Here is another problem reported by Mr. Moore, from his own observations:

"Secretary McNamara talks about sending more supplies and equipment to help the Vietnamese win their war against communism. This is fine, except that by and large the Vietnamese have no concept of maintenance, much less preventive maintenance. Unless Americans are maintaining the equipment here it quickly deteriorates from sheer lack of care—and then the Vietnamese ask for more."

RESCUE—OR FLIGHT?

Vietnamese pilots were taught to fly U.S. helicopters, then eight helicopters were turned over to them. The Vietnamese painted parts of the helicopters yellow—the color of their flag. Then the Vietnamese took over the flying of rescue flights to evacuate Vietnamese wounded from jungle combat areas.

Mr. Moore tells how this worked out.

"I had heard so many stories about the Vietnamese pilots flying over the evacuation site at 5,000 feet, well out of range of ground fire, and then flying back without even try-

ing to pick up the wounded that I decided to go along on an all-Vietnamese evacuation flight.

"For 15 minutes the chopper pilots circled the clearing. Finally the chopper in which I was riding descended almost into the clearing. Then it popped up into the air like a cork released under water. The crew chief examined the fuselage for bullet holes. There were none. So the chopper started to drop in again. Lower and lower we hovered. I saw a wounded man, smiling, being helped toward the helicopter. Then suddenly the helicopter began to rise again. The last thing I saw was a sudden hopeless expression wipe out the game smile on the wounded man's face. Vietcong ground fire had apparently frightened the Vietnamese pilot off, although he later told me he was afraid the clearing was too small and the rotor blades would hit the trees—this after he was already less than a foot from the ground."

"Over and over again," Mr. Moore says, "U.S. advisers reported the terrible fall in morale among the Vietnamese troops when they realized that their own pilots were afraid to come down in Vietcong-invested jungles to pick up the wounded. The ground troops automatically gave up hope when they saw the yellow streak on the choppers high above."

WHY VILLAGERS DESERT

Vietnamese strategy is to clear an area of Vietcong Communist forces—and then try to hold that area while clearing other areas. But Mr. Moore reports:

"So far, holding operations by the Vietnamese alone have not been successful."

One instance is cited where Americans trained thousands of mountain tribesmen, cleared the area. Then the camp was turned over to the Vietnamese. Result: "Less than 2 months after the Americans pulled out, the Vietcong attacked, drove the Vietnamese out of the fort and destroyed it." Another example:

"In a program to get the Montagnards away from the Vietcong—preventing them from feeding the Communists or joining them, either willingly or by impressment—the tribesmen were taken from their villages in the mountains and brought into new villages built around forts garrisoned by Vietnamese troops. But the Vietnamese troops refuse to leave their forts after dark. So the Vietcong come into the villages at about 6 p.m. and stay the night, giving political orientations, eating, imposing taxes, and punishing villagers suspected of cooperating with the Government. In the morning, the Vietcong leave and the Vietnamese troops take over until evening.

"Until the Vietnamese muster the courage to go out at night and patrol the areas they are supposed to be securing, the entire 'clear and hold' concept is a joke.

"With no protection at night, the villagers know that death and torture will be their lot if they cooperate with the Government. Hundreds of tribesmen are moving back into the hills. As long as they are going to be dominated by the Vietcong anyway, they prefer to be in their own home mountains. And then, of course, they are turned into hardcore Communists when the Vietnamese Air Force bombs and strafes their villages because they deserted their Government hamlets to go back to Vietcong territory."

SOLUTION: U.S. CONTROL

After watching the war in Vietnam for 4 months, this American writer has reached this overall conclusion:

"Until the Vietnamese military develops the will to win and the courage to face the enemy unflinchingly by day or by night, even if outnumbered, the war against communism in Vietnam will not be won—no matter if we pour in \$3 or \$4 or \$5 million a day in aid.

"The only realistic solution that most Americans see in Vietnam is for the United

States to take operational control of the war away from the luxury-loving, coup d'état-minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer corps until such time as they can develop the leadership necessary to win the war. If we do not take operational control, we merely waste lives and money in a hopeless stalemate."

As Brave Men Die

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BRUCE ALGER

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 12, 1964

Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, as the House meets today in all probability an American boy will die in South Vietnam. It is likely he will be plunged to death in a piece of obsolete equipment fighting a war that is not a war. In those last agonizing moments he may wonder why he is fighting in South Vietnam and why he is dying.

For all those brave young Americans who have already died there, we in Congress must find the answers. We must demand to know why our boys are being sent into battle with old and wornout equipment. We must demand of the administration that we win the war there or get out. To pursue our present policy is to condemn to death more young Americans.

In the Washington Daily News of Monday, May 11, there is a story of the tragedy in South Vietnam written by a correspondent on the ground there, Jim G. Lucas. The News also had an editorial on the Lucas article, "Brave Men Betrayed." I would like to include both these items as a part of these remarks.

I would also like to ask at this time, in the name of the families of Capt. Jerry Shank, Robert N. Brumet, and all the others who have been killed in this Communist inspired war, Mr. President, do we want to win the war in South Vietnam? Why haven't our fighting men been given proper equipment? Is this a political war, Mr. President, that will be called off after the election next November? The people have a right to know and they haven't been told the facts about South Vietnam. What is your answer to the Lucas article, Mr. President?

The two items from the News follow:

JIM G. LUCAS TELLS HOW OBSOLETE AIRCRAFT, USED AS BOMBERS, ARE DEATH TRAPS FOR OUR VIETNAM PILOTS

(The accompanying story from South Vietnam by Jim G. Lucas was submitted in advance of publication to U.S. Air Force headquarters here. It was read but official comment was declined.)

(By Jim G. Lucas)

SOC TRANG, SOUTH VIETNAM, May 11.—The Communist Vietcong didn't kill Jerry Shank.

His plane did.

Nor did they kill Bob Brumet, of 9211 Shelton Street, Bethesda.

His plane killed him.

Here we are, the most powerful nation on earth, boasting every day of our superiority in modern arms, and we send our young men out to fight a ruthless, determined foe with equipment long past its prime.

Jerry Shank and Robert N. Brumet died because they were ordered to fly planes that might better have been consigned to the scrap heap.

TRAINERS

They were T-28's. The "T" stands for "trainer," and that's all it was intended to be. It was outmoded in 1953. It is practically the last two-seated propeller-driven craft in the Air Force's inventory.

Yet out here we've loaded this antiquated trainer's wings with 500-pound bombs and napalm so that if one is flown long enough it's inevitable that its wings will drop off. The men who fly them know that.

Politically, of course, the T-28 has its points. No one, including the Reds, could seriously object to it.

By using it, we're respecting the armistice terms of the 1954 Geneva Convention, in that we're not introducing new equipment into Vietnam.

BODY FOR PROOF

Also, we can put a Vietnamese in the rear seat, contending he's a student pilot.

Actually, few of them even speak English and instruction is nonexistent.

But if a T-28 crashes, there will be a Vietnamese body in the wreckage, and apparently that's important in this game of hide-and-seek we're playing here.

I'm glad I don't have it on my conscience.

As for Jerry Shank and Bob Brumet—every time they put their planes into a dive they must have wondered if they would come out.

On April 9, Capt. Robert Brumet, 36, put his craft into a dive and it didn't come out. His buddies, flying nearby, saw the wings fall off and watched in horror as the plane plowed into the paddies.

They called over their radios for the choppers to come in and pick up what was left. The choppers didn't get there soon enough. The Vietcong got there first.

I hope Bob was dead when they found him, because these are the same people who ceremoniously broke the arms and legs of a district leader's wife at Kien Long recently and then killed her. That's the kind of enemy we face.

We need equipment we can count on to keep us out of their hands.

Captain Brumet was full of love of living and as fine a fighter pilot and a man as you could want.

ANOTHER ONE

On March 24, Jerry Shank put his ship into a dive between Soc Trang and Back Lieu and its wing separated from the fuselage.

Jerry was Capt. Edwin G. Shank, 27, from Winamac, Ind. When they shipped his body back, every shop and office in his hometown closed for the day.

Jerry was liked by everybody, and most everybody felt the same way about him. He left a wife and four children.

MATE PILOT

Before he came to Vietnam, he was a MATS transport pilot. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1959 with a degree in architectural engineering.

He did his stint in the Air Force Reserve, liked it and decided to make flying his career.

Jerry had one consuming ambition: He dreamed of being the first American to land on the moon. Maybe he could have done it. He had all the qualifications.

It makes you wonder what kind of official thinking justifies taking the lives of two such young men—and there have been at least two others—and you make up your mind you will find out when you get home.

Such decisions may be easy to come by in Washington, where men are statistics and casualty rates are a wavering line on a weekly chart.

But they're harder to take when you know

the brave men who honestly fear their planes—because they can't trust the craft to do the job they're asked to do in their country's name.

REPLACEMENT

The Pentagon says it's replacing the T-28 with a Navy carrier plane, the AD-6, more adaptable to dive bombing. And that's good. But why wait until now?

Moreover, the Pentagon didn't say when this would be done. And every day brave fighting men take off from Soc Trang in their T-28's, hoping the wings will stay glued until those new jobs get here.

BRAVE MEN BETRAYED

Air Force Capt. Jerry Shank is 1 of 131 American fighting men who have lost their lives in combat since the United States began its program of massive assistance to South Vietnam in December 1961. In common with the rest of these brave men, Jerry Shank left a legacy of heartbreak, of a widow's empty, endless loneliness, of little children for whom a smiling photograph must forever be the inadequate substitute for a father's strong arms and loving counsel.

But Jerry Shank left something more than that. He was an articulate, angry man, and he left behind a poignant recital of how courageous young Americans are being betrayed by ancient equipment that is no longer equal to the demands of modern aerial combat.

Jim G. Lucas, a combat correspondent who has shared danger and despair with American troops in three wars, tells Captain Shank's story that no reader will soon forget. He tells it, we think, with cold indignation that is wholly justified. Letters written to his wife by Captain Shank have been published in Life magazine and in U.S. News & World Report. With Jim's story, written from the Soc Trang airstrip in the steaming guerrilla-infested Mekong Delta, they give a shocking account of American men whose courage and devotion is being made a grisly mockery by obsolescent equipment.

Captain Shank died in a T-28, an aging, propeller-driven trainer that was never designed for combat. Loaded with 500-pound bombs and napalm tanks, it cannot indefinitely endure the stresses of repeated dive-bombing runs. Eventually the wings come off. That happened to Captain Shank's airplane on March 24. On April 9 it happened to the T-28 piloted by Capt. Robert Brumet.

Nor is the T-28 the whole story of courageous young American pilots being betrayed by war-weary, obsolescent aircraft. The B-26, a World War II attack bomber, was outmoded on V-J Day. Until recently it was flying combat sorties in Vietnam and, as Jerry Shank's letters have made brutally explicit, still killing American men. The H-21 ("Flying Banana") helicopter has done yeoman duty in Vietnam, but it is old and slow and is by no means the Nation's best combat-lift chopper. It, too, imposes unnecessary risks on the men who fly it.

Attempts to obtain an explanation of why we are asking our men to fight with inferior equipment have elicited no coherent reply. Some sources habitually insist the T-28 is ideal for antiguerrilla warfare because it is slower than modern aircraft. But no one would suggest that its habit of shedding wings fits it for anything other than a flying coffin.

The loss of Captain Shank and Captain Brumet emphasizes much that is wrong with our war in southeast Asia. The prevailing opinion of the men who are fighting it is that we are losing. Jim Lucas' sorrowing account of young Americans dying in the flaming wreckage of obsolete airplanes gives a tragic insight into one of the reasons we are losing.

Our men deserve better from those of us who remain safe back home.

Coin Shortage Must Be Solved**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. BOB CASEY

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 12, 1964

Mr. CASEY. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to contract with private industry for the minting of coins of the United States.

I was motivated to introduce this bill upon learning on one of my recent visits home of the tremendous shortage of coins in the Houston area and finding that this was not a localized condition but that the shortage is acute throughout the Nation.

Unless we turn to private industry for relief, I foresee no particular relief for several years. In fact, it may even grow more acute.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. William McC. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, sent me a letter which backs up my prediction. He also estimates that no relief will come for several years.

I sincerely hope, Mr. Speaker, that early action will be taken upon this measure to give the business community of the United States early relief in this crisis.

The following is the letter I received from Mr. Martin, which I think should be ample proof of the need of this legislation:

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
Washington, D.C., May 11, 1964.

HON. BOB CASEY,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CASEY: This refers to your letter of May 5, in which you ask about the seriousness of the shortage of coin, suspected causes, and possible remedies, and also request that additional supplies of coin be sent to the Houston, Tex., area.

The coin shortage is nationwide, as you mention you have read. The basic problem stems from the fact that production by the mint has not been able to keep pace with the rapid increase in the use of coin. Expansion in the demand for coin has been caused by a number of factors, including greater use of vending machines, parking meters, coin telephones, coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning machines, and toll roads; extension of school hot lunch programs and of the scope of sales taxes; a marked increase in the number of coin collectors, dealers, and investors; and basically, of course, the general growth in population. Also, any fear on the part of the business community that sufficient coin may not be available as needed tends to retard the flow of excess coin back to Federal Reserve banks for redistribution.

The Bureau of the Mint has asked Congress for additional appropriations to build a new mint in Philadelphia and to permit overtime operations at the existing mints in Philadelphia and Denver. While relief from the new Philadelphia Mint is at best 2 or 3 years away, funds to permit a full program of overtime operations at the existing facilities would somewhat ease present conditions and seems to be a move which would most quickly start the flow of additional coins to the commercial banks.