

tor from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] for the purpose of enabling him to introduce a bill in memory of the late Representative Clarence Cannon, of Missouri, and to make any remarks that he may deem appropriate to make at this time, with the understanding that by so doing I shall not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I appreciate the gracious courtesy of the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. President, tomorrow afternoon, the Honorable Clarence Cannon, one of the great statesmen of our time, will be taken to his last resting place in Elsberry, Mo., his hometown in the northeast part of our State for all of his 85 years.

The Nation will honor his memory for the some 53 years he served in Washington; and the more than 18 years during which, with superb effectiveness, he carried the responsibilities of chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

The people of northeast Missouri could never forget Mr. Cannon's personal friendship, expressed during long and devoted service to all of them over the years of his service in Washington.

One of the works which will stand as a monument to Clarence Cannon is a multipurpose dam and reservoir—the first in north Missouri—soon to be built in Ralls County, not more than an hour's drive from his farm home in Lincoln County.

Mr. Cannon's standard as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee was that public investment must be recovered with ample margin of benefit to the people; and when the project now known as Joanna Dam was proved to have met this standard, Mr. Cannon became its champion and saw it through to approval by the Congress.

Several years ago, when it first appeared certain this project would be built, a number of leaders in his district suggested that it bear his name.

However, with characteristic modesty, Mr. Cannon declined the honor during his lifetime.

Because of his great interest in the development of Missouri, especially its rural areas, and because this dam, to which he contributed so much will be close to his permanent resting place, on behalf of my colleague, Senator EDWARD V. LONG, of Missouri, and myself, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to rename the Joanna Dam the Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir, as a permanent memorial to the memory of our honored and beloved colleague, a great Missourian and a great American, Hon. Clarence Cannon.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2835) authorizing the change in name of the Joanna Dam and Reservoir, Salt River, Mo., to the Clar-

ence Cannon Dam and Reservoir, introduced by Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself and Mr. Long of Missouri), was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Public Works, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Joanna Dam and Reservoir, Salt River, Missouri, authorized by the Flood Control Act of October 23, 1962, in accordance with the provisions of House Document Numbered 507, Eighty seventh Congress, shall hereafter be known and designated as the Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir, in honor of the late Representative Clarence Cannon of the Ninth Congressional District of Missouri. Any law, regulation, document or record of the United States in which such project is designated or referred to under the name of the Joanna Dam and Reservoir, Missouri, shall be held and considered to refer to such project by the name of Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the able and distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina for yielding.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, it was a privilege to yield to the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri for the purpose of introducing a bill to name a dam and reservoir in Missouri in honor of the late distinguished Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri. Representative Cannon had a long and honorable career in public life. All of us who were privileged to know him and to appreciate the fine work he did in behalf of his country over the years will be conscious of the fact that we shall not see his like again. He was a distinguished Member of Congress.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able Senator from North Carolina for his gracious remarks, especially because of the high regard in which the Senator from North Carolina is held not only in the Senate but throughout the Nation. I know that Mrs. Cannon and her two gracious daughters will be most appreciative of the Senator's statement.

Mr. ERVIN. I thank the Senator from Missouri.

MORE ABOUT THE INTEREST RATE ON ALASKA DISASTER LOANS

During the delivery of Mr. ERVIN's speech,

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the long-established morning daily of our northernmost major west coast seaport and State metropolis, a member of the Hearst newspaper chain, published this week an excellent lead editorial entitled "Alaska Aid."

It calls attention to the fact which I have spoken of repeatedly—that disaster loans to Alaska are being made at the maximum rate allowable by the Disaster Loan Act. It contrasts, as I have, this maximum 3-percent interest rate with three-fourths of 1 percent made on development loans to private enterprise in foreign countries under our foreign aid program.

Now, the Disaster Loan Act sets no minimum rate of interest. The Administrator of the program has confirmed

to me that he could make these loans at any rate he chooses lower than 3 percent. He has, to be sure, indicated that an these loans he would grant no repayment of interest the first year, and no repayment of principal for 5 years. But, under the development loans made to foreign private enterprises, the United States not only grants a three-fourths of 1 percent interest rate, but permits no repayment of principal for 10 years—a period twice as long as that granted our domestic borrowers, who, moreover, have suffered a disaster, which the foreign beneficiaries of our loans have not. This, to me, is an unfortunate example of "the double standard." I cannot see why our American citizens—disaster victims—should not be treated at least as well as those in foreign lands, who have suffered no disaster.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer supports my view and reports that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, who has had more familiarity with Alaska than any other Member of Congress from the 48 older States, does also.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, "Alaska Aid," published in the May 11 issue of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ALASKA AID

Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON has joined Senator ERNEST GRUENING and this newspaper in criticism of the Small Business Administration for charging the maximum allowed interest on loans to Alaska firms.

The law allows the SBA to charge a maximum of 3 percent. The law also allows the SBA to impose less interest—or no interest at all, as in the case of many U.S. loans to foreign governments.

But the SBA is imposing on Alaskans all the interest that the law allows. As Senator MAGNUSON says, "There's no reason why the SBA cannot make the interest rates lower." Nonetheless Senator MAGNUSON and others in Washington, D.C., defend the pace and degree of the Federal Government's assistance to Alaska generally.

But the Post-Intelligencer believes that the Federal Government's action on Alaska's plight is both slow and piecemeal. Alaska is a special case, our youngest State and one with economic problems that predate the earthquake disaster.

That debate on the civil rights bill is interfering with congressional attention to Alaska is no excuse. The current announcement that four Federal agencies have agreed to help Alaska homeowners only adds to the confusion and may mean that Alaska homeless will be engaged in a game of buck passing. That is usually what happens when more than one Government agency is involved.

There should be a centralized effort on the Alaska problem.

That effort should be fast.

And it should be adequate.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, may I make a very brief statement at this time on this same subject?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none and it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I should like to inform the Senator from Alaska—

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I take it that the statement which the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON] may make will be covered by the same unanimous-consent agreement just made a moment ago.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I invite the attention of the Senate, and the Senator from Alaska in particular, to the fact that I introduced the bill now known as the Disaster Loan Act. It called for a lower rate of interest. It went to the committee and they discussed it. If the Senator will read the act closely, he will see that it provides that not more than 3 percent can be charged, but any rate lower than that may be charged. Up until that time, the rate of interest could go up to 5 percent. It had been raised to 5 percent. That was about 10 years ago. Some borrowers were being charged a 5-percent rate of interest. We believed that was too much. So we put the figure 3 where the figure 5 had been, with the understanding that borrowers could be charged even less than that amount.

I hope the Senator will continue to tell Senators about the problems in his State, especially in connection with the recent earthquake there. We should let them have these loans as cheaply as they can get them anywhere else in the world.

Mr. GRUENING. I appreciate the important contribution which the sponsor of the Disaster Loan Act has made, because it certainly has been of invaluable merit in cases of disaster. But I still find it impossible to understand why, when our citizens have suffered such a disaster, they should not get as low a rate of interest as is made available to hundreds of private enterprises abroad to the extent of billions of dollars, who have suffered no disaster.

I have called this a double standard. This is a shocking example of it.

I have long held the idea—and it might be reactionary—that Americans should have priority, but they do not even get equality in this field.

I am grateful to the Senator from South Carolina for his contribution in calling attention to his authorship of this valuable act, and making clear the legislative intent that disaster loans could be made at less than the maximum rate of 3 percent interest.

NASSER AND KHRUSHCHEV—FELLOW FISHERMEN IN JORDAN'S TROUBLED WATERS

During the delivery of Mr. ERVIN's speech,

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yesterday in addressing the Senate, I called attention to serious developments—which were to me not surprising—in the Middle East. In fact, I foretold them in my 472-page report, which I made to the Senate last year after a 10-week study of our foreign aid program in 10 Middle Eastern countries. It was plain to me, at the time, that Nasser, the dictator of Egypt, whom U.S. aid and sup-

port has kept in office, would soon be completely revealed as an ally and associate of the ruler of the Kremlin, Mr. Khrushchev.

The news dispatches emanating from Cairo amply demonstrate that fact.

The Associated Press sent out a story from Cairo on May 11 which was printed in the New York Daily News, under the heading: "K Backs Arabs in Row With Israel on Water." This is both a figurative as well as a literal illustration of the way the rulers of the U.S.S.R. and of the United Arab Republic like to fish in troubled waters.

Israel, a tiny country, a large part of whose surface is desert, desperately needs water for irrigation. By an arrangement postulated years ago, it, as well as its neighbors, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, are entitled to a share of the waters of the River Jordan. Actually, the United States is, through our foreign aid program, paying most of the costs of Jordan's irrigation projects.

The Arab nations, under the leadership of Nasser, and now even including Jordan, speaking through King Hussein, intent on Israel's destruction, have already served notice that they would oppose Israel's legitimate right to its share of these waters. Now, Khrushchev has joined them. This unholy alliance and its declared purpose runs directly counter to the ideas on the subject expressed correctly by President Johnson over 3 months ago when, in a New York address, he offered to assist any nations needing water, adding:

Water should never be a cause for war; it should always be a force for peace. Peace is first on our agenda.

But, more clearly than ever, is it now apparent that if the United States wishes to preserve the uneasy peace in the Middle East and avert a war there, it must reverse the policy which President Johnson has inherited of appeasing and aiding Nasser. Our financial aid has supplied him with the means to wage aggressive warfare in Yemen, where he has been engaged for 20 months at a cost of not less than a half a million dollars a day. It may be conservatively estimated at \$300 million to date. Meanwhile, he is also building up a tremendous armament of sophisticated weapons—missiles, rockets, jet planes, tanks and submarines. His purpose, which he has never ceased to declare, is to destroy Israel.

I ask unanimous consent that the article published in the New York Daily News of May 11, entitled "K. Backs Arabs in Row With Israel on Water," may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

K. BACKS ARABS IN ROW WITH ISRAEL ON WATER

CAIRO, May 11.—Soviet Premier Khrushchev gave his support to the Arab world today in its opposition to diversion of the Jordan River waters by Israel.

Speaking to the United Arab Republic's one-party National Assembly, Khrushchev said Israel planned to "rob the Arab world of its own water."

Khrushchev called on Israel to implement UN resolutions on Palestine, which would reduce Israel's present frontiers.

The assembly rose en masse in boisterous cheering at Khrushchev's new declaration of support for the Arabs.

The Israelis have announced that some time this summer they will begin diverting waters of the Jordan to irrigate the Negev Desert. The Arabs have threatened counter action to cut off the headwaters of the Jordan.

The 70-year-old Soviet Premier also assailed British occupation of military bases in Cyprus and Aden. His government supports the "just and reasonable" demands of local populations for the evacuation of these and all other foreign bases, the Soviet leader said.

"The presence of foreign armies is the source of danger, tension, and disputes between countries," Khrushchev added.

He denied that there was any contradiction between the Soviet Union's stated policy of seeking international understanding and its shipments of arms to foreign trouble spots.

"It is true that we give arms for the struggle against imperialism and for the sacred struggle of national liberation," he said. "Our armaments will always be available for peoples seeking self-determination."

The 360 members of the assembly cheered and applauded throughout the speech, which Khrushchev delivered in Russian. It was translated into Arabic by a Soviet interpreter whose polished Arabic has drawn awed praise from Egyptians.

Khrushchev warned the assembly against "imperialist stooges" he said the colonial powers left behind when they gave up their rule in Africa.

In a veiled attack on Communist Chinese efforts to assume leadership in Africa and Asia, Khrushchev said "the unity of all revolutionary forces in the world . . . can never be supplanted by blocs based on color and races." Moscow has accused the Chinese of seeking to bar the Soviet Union from African and Asian councils on racial grounds.

Introducing his guest to the assembly, President Nasser pointedly cited the Russian revolution as a force in Asia.

"Khrushchev," Nasser said, "is one of the leaders of a great revolution which started vast and unlimited transformations of the world's continents, especially in Europe and Asia, and liberated millions of human beings."

Nasser put on a display of pageantry reminiscent of a Hollywood extravaganza for his guest last night.

More than 100,000 exuberant Egyptians jammed a giant German-built stadium for a program of gymnastics, dancing girls, prancing Arab stallions, music from a 380-man military band, and the blare of 27 medieval trumpets.

Khrushchev read the first and last parts of his 20-minute speech and let an interpreter give the rest. The speech praised Egyptian socialism and denounced colonialism in Africa.

At the close, fireworks erupted and fiery lights spelled out slogans of welcome in Russian and Arabic.

"ERROR UPON ERROR" IN SOUTH VIETNAM

During the delivery of Mr. ERVIN's speech,

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal, a conservative and well-edited publication, carries as its leading editorial in the May 13 issue a discussion of the U.S. role in South Vietnam entitled "Error Upon Error."

I recommend its reading to the Congress and to those who would pursue and continue the folly of our participation in this civil war in southeast Asia.

The final paragraph is worth repeating and commenting upon at this time:

No nation should count on military success, even limited, in the most unfavorable circumstances. No piece of territory is beyond all price, worth any cost, as the French finally discovered 10 years ago after such great cost. And the United States, for all its great power, cannot forever police the world alone and unaided.

How long is it going to take for our administration in office, which inherited this mess, to face up to the realities? Why should the United States, all by itself, rush into every troubled area in the world, no matter how unfavorably situated, not merely with our heavy financial and material aid, but far more tragic, with the lives of our young Americans?

If the battle is worth fighting—which I dispute—it is certainly not worth fighting all alone. Again and again I have asked, as has Senator Morse: "Where are our SEATO allies?" Their boys are not on the firing line. Our SEATO allies are Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, seven of them. But we see no British boys on the firing line. The French, having learned by bitter experience that this is a lost cause, are certainly not sacrificing any more of their young men to add to the tragic toll of tens of thousands of Frenchmen whose bones lie in the tropical infested jungles of southeast Asia.

The Australians have sent no contingent to battle with us; neither have the New Zealanders. The Philippines have recently made some promise of a token force of—believe it or not—75 soldiers. That is hardly more than a meaningless gesture, although we should, perhaps, applaud even this gesture if it is translated into action. The people of Thailand, right next door, who might be presumed to have a stake in whatever happens in southeast Asia, have sent not a single soldier to the South Vietnamese front. As for the Pakistanis, to whom we are giving large quantities of money for military aid, to say nothing of hundreds of millions of dollars for economic aid, are using that aid to prepare to fight India over Kashmir, and not the Communists, either from China or in southeast Asia.

Likewise, Mr. President, there is an article in the May 18 issue of U.S. News & World Report, entitled "True Story of War in Vietnam." The various subheads which appear throughout this article are suggestive of what a real mess our war there is. Let me quote them:

First, "Lacking: A Will To Win"—that, of course, refers to the Government of South Vietnam forces.

Second, "Advisers in Combat"—this refers to the fact that our men who are fighting and losing their lives are supposed to be advisers—a piece of totally unjustifiable hypocrisy.

Third, "Officers Picked by Politics."

Fourth, "Luxury in Midst of War."

Fifth, "Cowardice and Laziness."

Sixth, "Graft and Corruption."

Seventh, "Redtape and Delay."

Eighth, "U.S. Equipment Wasted."

Ninth, "Why Villagers Desert."

And what is the conclusion of the writer of this article—Mr. Robert L. Moore, Jr., who, U.S. News & World Report says, lived 4 months with United States and Vietnamese soldiers and went on combat missions with them? His conclusion is as follows:

Until the Vietnamese military develops the will to win and the courage to face the enemy unflinchingly by day or by night, even if outnumbered, the war against communism in Vietnam will not be won—no matter if we pour in \$3 or \$4 or \$5 million a day in aid.

The only realistic solution that most Americans see in Vietnam is for the United States to take operational control of the war away from the luxury-loving, coup d'etat minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer corps until such time as they can develop the leadership necessary to win the war. If we do not take operational control, we merely waste lives and money in a hopeless stalemate.

What a tragic prospect that is for the American people. I am confident that if a referendum were taken in the United States of our fellow citizens, the position that I have upheld—that we should get out of Vietnam—would be supported overwhelmingly.

My mail continues to run, with impressive unanimity, in favor of my recommendations, which I herewith repeat: We should get out of South Vietnam, make the best possible arrangement; and strive within the United Nations for a negotiated settlement. We should not sacrifice another American boy. I strongly reiterate at this time my conviction that all of South Vietnam is not worth the life of one of our fellow Americans. We have lost far too many already.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial "Error Upon Error," which appeared in the Wall Street Journal of May 13, as well as the article by Robert L. Moore, Jr., appearing in the May 18 issue of U.S. News & World Report, entitled "True Story of War in Vietnam," be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1964]

ERROR UPON ERROR

Ten years almost to the day after the fall of Dienbienphu, Secretary McNamara is in Saigon—for the second time in the past couple of months. Yet no matter how many high officials visit Vietnam, or how frequently, nothing gets clarified. Except, that is, the continuing failure of U.S. policy.

Though the conjunction of the Secretary's trip with the anniversary of the French defeat is accidental, it could be unpleasantly symbolic. With a far greater force than the United States has committed, the French fought the Communists for some 8 grisly years, and lost.

Vietnam was then divided North and South, Korea-like, but unlike Korea the border

was fluid and not patrolled by large contingents of U.S. or any other troops. The Communists predictably made the most of their opportunity, first as infiltrators and guerrilla fighters; now they are so strong they can and do attack in force.

Today the French wonder aloud how the United States expects to win at the rate it is going. They are not the only ones; American servicemen and reporters have long been saying we are losing the war. U.S. officials are alternately reassuring and gloomy.

Part of the official attitude appears to be that we are not supposed to win in a formal sense; only help the South Vietnamese drive the Communists out and keep them out. But even this limited objective keeps going glimmering. After all the U.S.-supported fighting, the Communists are said to be in effective control of sizable and important parts of South Vietnam.

In view of that, it is almost impossible to figure out what is the U.S. strategy, if any—that is, how it thinks it can in fact drive the Communists out and keep them out. Not that anyone expects the Pentagon to reveal its war plans in detail; it is rather that the evidence indicates the lack of any plan which promises to be workable against the varied and successful tactics of the Communists.

Not even the commitment of many more American soldiers or the bombing of Communist bases in the north, which has been talked of off and on, would be guaranteed to accomplish the objective. In other circumstances perhaps, but not necessarily against this particular enemy, in this particular terrain, with this particular ally.

At the same time the French solution of neutralizing all of Vietnam sounds like a proposal in a vacuum, at least for the present. Why should Ho Chi Minh, the dictator of the north, want to neutralize when he is doing so well as it is? Or if he did want to, we may be sure he would see it as a means of continuing the conquest.

We do not rule out the possibility that the United States may somehow someday turn the tide, any more than we rule out the possibility that the realities of the situation may finally dictate withdrawal. But whatever happens, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam reveals a series of classic military and political errors from which it may be hoped the Government will eventually profit.

First, the United States drifted into the war, initially intending only to advise. It evidently overestimated the fighting capacity of the South Vietnamese troops while underestimating the Communist Vietcong.

Second, the United States got into a war where the enemy chose the field. The field, moreover, is extremely disadvantageous for us not only in terms of terrain but of distance from our shores.

Third, it got into a war without allies, even though the interests of many nations are affected. If its allies care at all, they are willing to let the United States do it. Its only ally, South Vietnam itself, has never given an impressive demonstration of a will to win, on the part of the people, the troops, or the successive governments.

To all this it may well be objected that the alternative was to let South Vietnam go down the Red drain, and perhaps the rest of southeast Asia with it. The objection, we think, begs the real issues:

No nation should count on military success, even limited, in the most unfavorable circumstances. No piece of territory is beyond all price, worth any cost, as the French finally discovered 10 years ago after such great cost. And the United States, for all its great power, cannot forever police the world alone and unaided.

[From the U.S. News & World Report, May 18, 1964]

FROM THE FRONT: TRUE STORY OF WAR IN VIETNAM

(Go out to the frontlines, in the jungles of South Vietnam, and you get a view of the war that Secretary McNamara and other high Washington officials do not see. One American writer did that. Robert L. Moore, Jr., lived 4 months with United States and Vietnamese soldiers, went on combat missions with them. What this writer saw raises important questions about the way that war is being fought. He found incompetence, cowardice, graft—and no will to win—among many of the Vietnamese officers and public officials directing war operations. In this report, he tells why he thinks the war will not be won until the United States takes over control.)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—"In his trips to South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was never exposed to the hard, unpleasant facts facing those Americans who are actually fighting the war against the Communist Vietcong."

These words were written by an American who has spent 4 months living in the field with the United States and Vietnamese fighting forces—actually going with them into combat.

From firsthand experience, this on the spot American observer has reached these conclusions:

"The basic problem that America faces in Vietnam is not that of defeating the Vietcong Communists. That could be done in a year or less.

"Our problem is to be allowed to win—to be permitted by our Vietnamese allies to prosecute this war aggressively and end it. This does not necessarily have to involve bringing U.S. battle groups into Vietnam to fight the war. Vietnam has the soldiers and equipment to win.

"But, as U.S. advisers in the field say privately: The war can't be won under the present ground rules because of the inability of most Vietnamese military leaders to lead."

The American who wrote these conclusions is Robert L. Moore, Jr., from Boston, Mass. He was an Air Force nose gunner in World War II. After graduation from Harvard in 1949, he worked in television and in public relations and then turned to writing. His output includes two books.

Last year Mr. Moore got the consent of the Department of the Army to live among the U.S. special forces in South Vietnam to gather material for a book about them. In preparation, he took parachute training at Fort Benning, Ga., went through Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Now, after 4 months in Vietnam, Mr. Moore is returning to write at length about what he has observed there. But he feels that some of his findings are so important and so timely that they should be published quickly. So he has given U.S. News & World Report permission to quote from the first draft of one article that he is preparing.

The story that Mr. Moore tells is a story of a war that Secretary McNamara has not seen. Mr. Moore says:

"Many U.S. fighting men expressed disappointment that the Secretary did not visit American units in daily combat with the Vietcong and find out at first hand from his soldiers what their problems are.

"The U.S. high command in Saigon does not encourage its men to pass their problems along to the Pentagon chief."

Following, from Mr. Moore's report, are some of those problems that Americans face in Vietnam.

LACKING A WILL TO WIN

One major problem is the attitude of the Vietnamese. Mr. Moore says:

"The will to fight, endure privations and win is just not in the majority of the Vietnamese military officers."

Mr. Moore questions whether some of the high officials and military officers of that country really want to see the war end. Why? He writes this:

"Never before have so many Vietnamese officers and public officials lived so well in such a booming economy—injected as it is with a daily dose of almost \$2 million of American money.

"It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are benefiting from this dole that when the war is over this massive aid will cease, or at least be drastically modified."

ADVISERS IN COMBAT

The official role of U.S. Army special forces in Vietnam is that of advisers to Vietnamese combat forces. But Mr. Moore reports that these so-called advisers have suffered more than half the U.S. combat casualties, although they make up only about 6 percent of the total U.S. force in Vietnam.

Here, from Mr. Moore's account, is how the U.S. special forces actually operate:

"The basic special forces combat unit—technically referred to as an advisory unit—is a 12-man team known as an A team. There are 42 such units, directed and supported by four B teams, located in the four military corps areas of South Vietnam, with a headquarters unit known as the special forces operating base in Saigon.

"Each A team is strategically situated in an area dominated by the Communists. Anywhere from 300 to 600 Vietnamese civilians—trained by the special forces—are quartered in an A-team camp and are used to reconnoiter Vietcong positions and raid their concentrations.

"Also in each camp there is a Vietnamese special forces A team which, in theory, parallels the American team in capabilities, composition and organization—that is: 2 officers and 10 enlisted men."

Actually, however, Mr. Moore finds a great difference between the United States and Vietnamese special forces.

OFFICERS PICKED BY POLITICS

Mr. Moore gives this description of the Vietnamese special forces—and of how they are selected: "The Vietnamese special forces—or Luc-Luong Dac-Biet, to use the Vietnamese designation—were primarily a unit of political troops organized under the regime of the late President, Ngo Dinh Diem, to serve as the President's private police and riot squad.

"Coveted positions in this elite group were given out as political favors to the sons of friends and supporters of President Diem and his family. To give the group status and equip it with the finest U.S. military hardware, Diem allied his special forces with U.S. special forces—thus saddling the Americans with Vietnamese teams made up of youths who had no taste for combat and whose only training was as palace guards.

"To make things worse, instead of the Vietnamese going out to learn from their highly trained American counterparts, the Vietnamese team captain was made camp commander over the experienced American, who can only advise.

"Despite the two recent coups, each supposedly dedicated to a more aggressive war effort, the character of the Vietnamese special forces seems to be changing all too slowly. Vietnamese officers move into and out of jail as power changes hands, but their overall quality still stands at a dismally low level."

LUXURY IN MIDST OF WAR

You get this description of how officers of the Vietnamese special forces live in the midst of a war:

"Most of the officers have a batman to serve them tea in bed in the morning. Frequently they refuse to see their American counterpart, particularly if they think he is going to goad them into a combat operation. When they do go out on operations, the officers make their men carry all their equipment. Americans carry their own gear.

"Many 35- or 40-year-old lieutenants and captains—whose lack of political connections accounts for their lack of promotions—are sent to some of the most dangerous areas where the majority of Vietnamese officers refused to be posted.

"With increasing effort by the Vietnamese Government to make the army more effective, it is usually possible now for a U.S. special forces A-team captain to have his Vietnamese counterpart relieved from command. Unfortunately, such officers are merely transferred as camp commander to another special forces team in another corps area to begin anew the same cycle of embezzlement of U.S.-supplied funds and deterioration of fighting efficiency."

COWARDICE AND LAZINESS

Mr. Moore tells of the difficulties often encountered in trying to get Vietnamese officers to go out and fight the enemy: "I participated in six combat operations throughout the four corps areas and the pattern never deviated. As soon as it was ascertained that a Vietnamese patrol was closing in on a Vietcong concentration antinoise discipline disintegrated. Shots were 'accidentally' fired and canteens rattled to let the enemy know that he was being pursued.

"When, in spite of these precautions, the Vietcong appeared ready to dig in and fight, the Vietnamese commander inevitably came up with some excuse for pulling back.

"One excuse for turning from the enemy particularly sticks in my mind. It was uttered by a Vietnamese officer in Tay Ninh Province. We had to ford a river to get at what we judged to be a platoon of Vietcong on the other side. We had a full company. The two American advisers were exuberant at the opportunity of engaging a Vietcong unit. But the Vietnamese officer turned to the Americans and said his men could not cross the river because there were too many alligators in it.

"There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule of cowardice and laziness in the Vietnamese special forces.

"I spent some time in the camp of a U.S. special forces officer who had nothing but praise for his former counterpart, a Vietnamese lieutenant in his early thirties. This Vietnamese officer was an aggressive fighting man, able to inspire great courage and loyalty among the civilian defense troops.

"The American officer wrote a letter of commendation for the Vietnamese officer, recommending that he be given a promotion to captain. Two weeks later the lieutenant was transferred to Saigon and replaced by a more typical Vietnamese officer—a 22-year-old anti-American captain who has failed to go out on a single operation to date.

"U.S. special forces men can hardly be blamed for their bitterness toward the Vietnamese officers who make a difficult job almost impossible."

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

Among the things that make American soldiers angry are the graft and corruption that are widespread in Vietnam—even in combat areas. Mr. Moore cites a few examples. Here is one:

"In April I visited several camps where Vietnamese camp commanders had under them 200 or 300 Montagnard troops. Montagnards are mountain tribesmen who are the best fighting men in the Vietnamese

Army. But the Vietnamese despise the darker skinned and coarser featured Montagnards. These Vietnamese camp commanders made the lives of their Montagnard men so miserable by degrading punishment and cutting down on their food that desertions soared.

"The camp commanders failed to report the deserters until after pay day. They collected from the Americans the pay for the entire camp roster, indicating on the payroll that all the deserters had been paid while in actuality the commanders kept the deserters' pay for themselves.

"Yet if Americans object too strenuously to such things they are severely reprimanded for not being cooperative with their Vietnamese counterparts."

Another example:

"On patrols, one Vietnamese commander made his Montagnards hunt deer instead of Vietcong. The commander drove out on the patrols in a weapons carrier. After several days during which he ate heartily while refusing to give the troops any of the meat they provided, the commander drove his load of deer carcasses into town and sold them. This same camp commander had just tried to jail the interpreter who had told the American captain that the commander had pocketed the pay of almost 100 deserters.

"Such stories are so common that Americans begin to take it for granted that they are expected to put up with Vietnamese graft and cowardice as part of their job.

"One U.S. sergeant told me ruefully: 'They took \$1,700 out of my pay for taxes last year, and I have to keep my mouth shut and see it wasted over here.'"

Mr. Moore reports:

"There is little confidence among Americans working at the combat level that corruption will be significantly diminished by the announcement of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the new South Vietnam leader, that he will jail embezzlers of up to \$1,000 and shoot anyone who steals more than that."

REDETAPE AND DELAY

Mr. Moore says: "The biggest single fault in the Vietnamese military system is its chronic inability to react quickly." He cites "a heartbreaking example":

On March 26, two Americans were reported overdue and presumed down on a flight over a jungle area. Vietnamese rangers were asked to join the ground search.

It took 2 days just to get permission—first from a Vietnamese general and then from the district and provincial political chiefs.

Ranger officers then refused to move until they got reserves to stand by in their absence—and a special round of field rations. This cost 3 more days of delay.

On April 1, the rangers finally were flown to a camp from which they were to start a search. Then came word that a new Vietnamese commander was arriving the next day for an inspection—and the rangers had to provide an honor guard.

It was April 3—8 days after the plane went down—when the search finally got underway.

HOW TO HANDLE SNIPERS: "WITHDRAW"

Here is an example, cited by Mr. Moore, of how Vietnamese can turn U.S. military tactics into tactics of retreat: "If the Secretary of Defense really wants to see at firsthand some of the reasons we cannot win this war in Vietnam without some policy changes, he should spend a week at one of the special forces B teams. They are truly microcosms of the entire war. Most of our basic frustrations and quandaries are reflected in a B team's daily incidents.

"At one B team I found the operations officer laughing wryly over the translation of a recent directive. Vietcong snipers picking off a few men were routing whole companies and battalions. U.S. advisers

showed the Vietnamese how to dispatch squads to kill or drive off the snipers. The Americans were pleased when a directive on their methods of dealing with snipers went out from corps headquarters.

"A few weeks later, however, the tactical genius of the Vietnamese military mind came forth in a new communiqué. It instructed units coming under Vietcong sniper fire to withdraw—leaving ambushes in case the sniper charged."

U.S. EQUIPMENT WASTED

Here is another problem reported by Mr. Moore, from his own observations:

"Secretary McNamara talks about sending more supplies and equipment to help the Vietnamese win their war against communism. This is fine, except that by and large the Vietnamese have no concept of maintenance, much less preventive maintenance. Unless Americans are maintaining the equipment here it quickly deteriorates from sheer lack of care—and then the Vietnamese ask for more."

RESCUE—OR FLIGHT?

Vietnamese pilots were taught to fly U.S. helicopters, then eight helicopters were turned over to them. The Vietnamese painted parts of the helicopters yellow—the color of their flag. Then the Vietnamese took over the flying of rescue flights to evacuate Vietnamese wounded from jungle combat areas.

Mr. Moore tells how this worked out:

"I had heard so many stories about the Vietnamese pilots' flying over the evacuation site at 5,000 feet, well out of range of ground fire, and then flying back without even trying to pick up the wounded that I decided to go along on an all-Vietnamese evacuation flight.

"For 15 minutes the chopper pilots circled the clearing. Finally the chopper in which I was riding descended almost into the clearing. Then it popped up into the air like a cork released under water. The crew chief examined the fuselage for bullet holes. There were none. So the chopper started to drop in again. Lower and lower we hovered. I saw a wounded man, smiling, being helped toward the helicopter. Then suddenly the helicopter began to rise again. The last thing I saw was a sudden hopeless expression wipe out the game smile on the wounded man's face. Vietcong ground fire had apparently frightened the Vietnamese pilot off, although he later told me he was afraid the clearing was too small and the rotor blades would hit the trees—this after he was already less than a foot from the ground."

"Over and over again," Mr. Moore says, "U.S. advisers reported the terrible fall in morale among the Vietnamese troops when they realized that their own pilots were afraid to come down in Vietcong-infested jungles to pick up the wounded. The ground troops automatically gave up hope when they saw the yellow streak on the choppers high above."

WHY VILLAGERS DESERT

Vietnamese strategy is to clear an area of Vietcong Communist forces—and then try to hold that area while clearing other areas. But Mr. Moore reports:

"So far, holding operations by the Vietnamese alone have not been successful."

One instance is cited where Americans trained thousands of mountain tribesmen, cleared the area. Then the camp was turned over to the Vietnamese. Result: "Less than 2 months after the Americans pulled out the Vietcong attacked, drove the Vietnamese out of the fort and destroyed it." Another example:

"In a program to get the Montagnards away from the Vietcong—preventing them

from feeding the Communists or joining them, either willingly or by impressment—the tribesmen were taken from their villages in the mountains and brought into new villages built around forts garrisoned by Vietnamese troops. But the Vietnamese troops refuse to leave their forts after dark. So the Vietcong come into the villages at about 6 p.m. and stay the night, giving political orientations, eating, imposing taxes, and punishing villagers suspected of cooperating with the Government. In the morning, the Vietcong leave and the Vietnamese troops take over until evening."

"Until the Vietnamese muster the courage to go out at night and patrol the areas they are supposed to be securing, the entire 'clear and hold' concept is a joke.

"With no protection at night, the villagers know that death and torture will be their lot if they cooperate with the Government. Hundreds of tribesmen are moving back into the hills. As long as they are going to be dominated by the Vietcong anyway, they prefer to be in their own home mountains. And then, of course, they are turned into hardcore Communists when the Vietnamese Air Force bombs and strafes their villages because they deserted their Government hamlets to go back to Vietcong territory."

SOLUTION: U.S. CONTROL

After watching the war in Vietnam for 4 months, this American writer has reached this overall conclusion:

"Until the Vietnamese military develops the will to win and the courage to face the enemy unflinchingly by day or by night, even if outnumbered, the war against communism in Vietnam will not be won, no matter if we pour in \$3 or \$4 or \$5 million a day in aid.

"The only realistic solution that most Americans see in Vietnam is for the United States to take operational control of the war away from the luxury-loving, coup d'etat-minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer corps until such time as they can develop the leadership necessary to win the war. If we do not take operational control, we merely waste lives and money in a hopeless stalemate."

AMENDMENT TO ALASKA OMNIBUS ACT

During the delivery of Mr. Ervin's speech,

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 965, Senate bill 2772.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2772) to amend the Alaska Omnibus Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs with an amendment on page 1, line 6, after the word "of", where it appears the second time, to strike out "\$22,500,000" and insert "\$23,500,000"; so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That subsection (a) of section 44 of the Alaska Omnibus Act (73 Stat. 141) is amended by striking the word "and" following "1962" and

the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu of the period "; and the sum of \$23,500,000 for the period ending June 30, 1966."

Sec. 2. Subsections (b) and (c) of section 44 of the Alaska Omnibus Act are amended by striking "June 30, 1964" wherever it appears therein and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1966" and subsection (a) of section 45 of that Act is amended by striking "July 1, 1964" and inserting in lieu thereof "July 1, 1966".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, this bill is an emergency measure to provide urgently needed assistance to Alaska in recovering from the earthquake disaster of March 27. Consideration at this time has been cleared with the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader.

The bill authorizes grants of up to \$23½ million to provide emergency assistance to the State government of Alaska and its local governmental entities.

There has been some discussion that more than \$23½ million should be authorized at this time. I wish to state that the question was carefully considered by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs at our public hearings on S. 2772, and the members came to the conclusion that the \$23½ million would meet the State's essential needs at this time.

I recognize the fact that subsequent to our committee's action there has been further discussion that the amount should be larger. As our committee report states, if more is required we will give prompt consideration to the matter. But I am convinced that the figure of \$23.5 million will meet the essential requirements for immediate help to the State government of Alaska. The State government has lost about one-half of its sources of revenue as a result of the Good Friday earthquake and accompanying disasters, including tidal wave and fire.

Mr. President, S. 2772, which was reported unanimously by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, is as I stated an emergency measure to enable the State of Alaska and its local governments to carry on local governmental functions.

Never in all our history has the economy of a single State been as hard hit by a natural disaster as that which struck the 49th State 6 weeks ago.

PROMPT ACTION BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Federal Government has moved to promptly to help alleviate the suffering and hardship of our fellow Americans. The present bill, S. 2772, is a measure designed to give emergency help to the public sector, as distinguished from the private sector, of Alaskan life. It would authorize grants to the State of up to \$23.5 million to make up, in part, for the revenues the State will lose as a result of the disaster.

Technically, the measure amends the Alaska Omnibus Act, which we enacted in the 86th Congress, by increasing the amount of transitional grants provided

in that law and by extending the time for such grants for an additional 2 years, or until June 30, 1966. The figures—both as to the amount and the time—are those submitted by the Bureau of the Budget with the exception of an additional million dollars provided by the committee amendment. This amendment was necessary to offset a short-term drop in the revenues of the Anchorage Independent School District which has not been taken into consideration by the Budget Bureau in submitting its original \$22.5 estimate.

The committee amendment was made with the full concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget.

ESTIMATES OF AMOUNTS NEEDED DIFFER

Mr. President, it should be emphasized that the \$23½ million is the Budget Bureau's figure for an 18-month emergency period. It is not that of the State. The State of Alaska has estimated that it needs transitional grants amounting to about \$48½ million for a 30-month period. However, if the State's estimates are reduced to the same 18-month base used by the Bureau of the Budget, the State total would be about \$27 to \$30 million.

The Interior Committee conducted public hearings on S. 2772, which was drafted by the Bureau of the Budget and transmitted to the Congress by President Johnson. In its unanimous report urging prompt favorable action on the bill, the committee recognized the fact that the amounts and the time period were estimates. They may be too little; more time may be needed. On the other hand, both figures may be more than actually needed.

The Bureau of the Budget stated unequivocally that its position is that there is no commitment, express or implied, to request appropriations in the full amount of the authorization. Rather, the Bureau stated that initial appropriation requests would be made only on its estimate of the amount needed to carry the State over until the beginning of the calendar year 1965. At that time more facts will be available and a better estimate can be made whether, and in what amounts, additional funds may be needed to offset the State's temporary loss in revenues.

Mr. President, prompt enactment of S. 2772 is urgently needed for the continued functioning of State and local governments in a State of the United States. It is an emergency measure for temporary aid.

I urge immediate approval by the Senate of this emergency measure.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I should like to make a statement at this time.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I should like to ask unanimous consent to yield to the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON] and to any other Senators who may wish to comment on this bill, on the same unanimous-consent agreement terms granted to me by the Senate a moment ago.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, if at a later time the State of Alaska should apply for loans, I believe the Senate should look into the possibility of lowering the 3-percent interest rate we have established. I believe that borrowers in an emergency such as that in Alaska should have the very lowest rate of interest possible under the circumstances.

I do not believe we should lend money to other countries more cheaply than to a State in the United States. For that reason I believe the Senate at this time should let it be known that we believe Alaska and any other State suffering a great disaster should have the lowest possible rate of interest. That is what I am urging.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I should like to thank the Senator from South Carolina for his comments.

This particular bill authorizes grants, rather than loans, in the amount of \$23½ million and there is no provision for repayment by the State, but I think the Senator's point is well taken.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The State of Alaska may need to borrow more money at a later time.

Mr. BARTLETT. The Senator is correct and I believe he has in mind also loans from the Small Business Administration.

Mr. JOHNSTON. People in the Senator's State well may need to apply for Federal funds through small business loans, is that not correct?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, out of the money already appropriated to that agency.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is correct. Funds are available in case of emergencies such as the Alaska disaster. I think interest rates should be as low as possible.

Mr. BARTLETT. I agree with the distinguished Senator, and I thank him. With respect to S. 2772, the amount of \$22½ million was suggested by the administration, and increased to \$23.5 by the Interior Committee, with the understanding announced by the Bureau of the Budget that should the State be in need of further funds, the State could come back and would have a prompt and sympathetic hearing before the administration and the Congress. As the Senator from Washington said, there is urgent need for money right now to tide the State and local governments over until such time as they can recover themselves in respect to tax revenues.

I join the distinguished chairman of the Interior Committee in urging prompt passage by the Senate of this administration-approved bill so that the State of Alaska can get funds immediately.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, while I highly approve the administration's approval of a transitional grant to make up for the State of Alaska's lost revenue—lost because of the earthquake disaster of March 27; a catastrophe unprecedented and greater in magnitude than has befallen any State since the beginning of the Nation's history but I feel the amount proposed is inadequate. The loss of business and employment wrought in Alaska's metropolis, Anchor-