

While the rest of the excellent speech by Mr. Warden does not deal directly with the field of education for Negroes, there are some other fine statements in it which I think I should quote at this time. These statements, all of which bear directly on the problems of the Negro people, are as follows:

America has attracted to its borders persons from Ireland, France, England, China—from all over the world. After these persons came to America, they made a decision: that you get nothing for nothing, but with hard work and initiative, and sacrifice, we can build ourselves and the country into something worthwhile.

These groups did not come to America with the idea of disappearing. The Chinese began to say that "I am Chinese-American"; the Japanese, because they came from Japan, "Japanese-American," the Irish, "Irish-American."

There is no Negro land. My ancestors came from Africa, and I don't want anyone to forget it. That's the reason we call ourselves Africans or Afro-Americans; to describe our history and our heritage.

Another quotation from Mr. Warden:

Throughout the bay area (San Francisco Bay), approximately 67 to 70 percent of the arrests are persons of African descent. If a white person were to make this allegation, he would be immediately accused of being a bigot, and I am immediately accused of being an Uncle Tom.

Mr. Warden further stated:

The issue is that the very race (the Negro) that he belongs to is the race that we have been trying to get away from. We have not had the respect and pride in our own race. Every time a person gets a little money, they want to run away from the race, move away from the race. Someone has to come back into the race to build up the race. You can't do it if everyone moves.

In Birmingham, Ala., Martin Luther King, the merchants have told me, "I just hate you. Maybe I shouldn't. Maybe I should. But I'm honest. I just hate you. I've told you that."

Mr. Warden continued:

Reverend King says, "I don't care if you do hate me. I'm going to sit-in, roll-in, crawl-in, beg-in, knee-in, steal-in until you take my money." Now the merchant is richer, we are poorer, he has our money, and he still hates us.

Again I quote Mr. Warden:

If we put up business and factories, which I feel must be done, this isn't a complete solution—but it's a partial solution. It's what the Chinese have done. If you go to Chinatown, you're not going to say, "I'm not going to go back there anymore. Those people are practicing segregation. I don't think that's right." It's all a Chinese community. No one says it's inferior. The Chinese own one-half of Russian Hill in San Francisco. They could move there tomorrow. But they prefer to take the money to continue to rehabilitate and build up Chinatown, because they love Chinatown. They love to be with each other and they take pride in their accomplishment and achievement.

Mr. President, that young Negro was talking a great deal of commonsense in the speech made in California. I continue with another quotation from him:

Civil rights leaders come to California and say that California is as bad as Birmingham, Ala. Now, if it is as bad, why should I spend millions and millions and millions of dollars to get the same laws in Birmingham?

Mr. Warden is recognizing a fact which has been recognized several times in the course of the debate. Not only California, but many of the other States where the problem of race as it affects the Negroes has become most serious, have all the laws that are suggested in the pending civil rights bill, and some others besides.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator aware of the fact that there is a much higher percentage of Negroes unemployed in States that have FEPC laws than there is in States that do not have such laws?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am aware of that. The distinguished colleague of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] placed in the RECORD of the debate a list compiled by the Department of Labor which showed conclusively that the number of Negro unemployed persons in all the States of the South was decidedly smaller than the number in the States of the East and other parts of the country in which there are large concentrations of Negroes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. For example, is the Senator aware of the fact that in the great State of Michigan, which has an FEPC law similar to that which is sought to be imposed on the States of the South, according to the latest figures, the percentage of unemployment was 6 percent among the white workers, but more than 16 percent of the Negro workers were without jobs? Illinois is another great example of the self-righteousness that we have seen. The latest figures relating to Illinois showed that 3.4 percent of the white workers in the State of Illinois were without work. But is the Senator aware of the fact that in that State more than 13 percent of the Negro workers were without work?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not aware of the exact number because I have not seen the official list in the past few days. But I remember distinctly that in each State which the Senator has mentioned, the number of unemployed Negroes is very high, and in each State the percentage of unemployment vastly exceeds the percentage of unemployment in the Southern States among Negroes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I wonder if the Senator knew about that fact. The FEPC laws seem to boomerang against the colored man when theoretically they are supposed to be for his benefit. Does the Senator know that in the so-called FEPC States a small business man getting ready to hire someone does not place an advertisement stating his need in the newspaper, because if he did place such an advertisement and a colored man should show up in response to the advertisement and the employer did not hire the colored man, the employer might be hauled before the FEPC Commission, so an employer is afraid to hire colored people for fear of being dragged before the FEPC? If he should hire a white man and the employee were no good, the employer could fire him and be done with him. If the employer should hire a Ne-

gro and he were no good, the employer would be confronted with the prospect of being hauled before the FEPC Commission. I ask the Senator if he knows that as a result there is a tendency to work out in such a way that an employer does not hire a Negro because the employer cannot get rid of him if he is not qualified.

Mr. HOLLAND. I know from talking to employers from two States, at least—the States of New York and Connecticut—that employers have to procure people to fill important vacancies in important positions on their staffs of personnel before they ever allow any knowledge to come out that there is to be a vacancy, for the very reasons which the distinguished Senator has suggested. I am very sure that the practice is broader than merely in those two States or on the part of the relatively small number of executives with whom I have talked.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Based upon the figures that my colleague [Mr. ELLENDER] had printed in the RECORD—and, if need be, I shall supply them again—does it not stand to reason that if people wanted to help a colored man to get a job they would repeal the FEPC laws, because it is in States in which such laws exist that Negroes are being hurt the worst?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, that may be the case. Certainly they would be hurt worst in the so-called FEPC States. I should like to think that there may be some other causes.

It may be that the ones who have remained at home in the South and stuck to their jobs and their farms represent the ones with greater initiative, greater industry, and greater energy, the ones who are willing to work, and that those who roam to other places are of some other type; but the fact is that the statistics conclusively show, as the Senator has stated, that the percentage of unemployed Negroes in the FEPC States is vastly greater than it is in the Southern States.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If a colored man is required to take an examination to compete for a job against a well educated Jew or a well educated gentile of the Caucasian race, who, on the average would win the competition?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should think, if there were freedom of choice on the part of the executive, it would be the better trained man in that case.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Based on educational qualifications, who would it tend to be—the colored man or the white man?

Mr. HOLLAND. It would tend to be the white man under the standards of educational qualifications prevailing at this time.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does that fact not show why the Negroes are not asking for FEPC laws in the North any more, but are asking for quota systems?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is one explanation. Whenever we have dependable statistics on this subject, I think we shall always find that the serious-minded Negroes, those who want to elevate their own race and carve out their own future, have remained in the South, and too

many of the other kind have gone to other parts of the country. I would like to think that. But the fact is that in the FEPC States, none of which are in the South, the level of unemployment among Negroes is poor, and vastly exceeds the level of unemployment among Negroes in the South.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not contending that the record in the South is all it should be. We would like to do better by the colored people than we are doing. But before one points the finger of scorn and shame, I think he should come in with clean hands, as one is required to do in a court of equity. When the figures for the State of Michigan, which has an FEPC law, show that 16 percent of the Negroes are unemployed and only 6 percent of the whites are unemployed, and in Illinois, which has an FEPC law, 11 percent of the Negroes are unemployed, and only 3 percent of the whites are unemployed, and when the record is almost as bad in Pennsylvania, does the Senator believe it comes with good grace to be told by people who come from those States that we must pattern our conduct after them?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not believe they come with good grace or with reasonable cause.

Let me reread the terse statement of the Negro attorney speaking at the California convention. He said:

Civil rights leaders come to California and say that California is as bad as Birmingham, Ala. Now, if it is as bad, why should I spend millions and millions and millions of dollars to get the same laws in Birmingham?

That speaks very loudly for this conclusion. Apparently, the same conclusion was reached, based on the viewpoint of one of another race, by one who lives in one of the FEPC States, that has been reached by my friend the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I shall again provide the figures for the RECORD before the debate is over. The record shows very clearly that the record of the FEPC States in providing jobs for Negroes as compared with whites is not nearly as good as it is in the Southern States.

Mr. HOLLAND. I completely agree with the Senator. I hope he will place this compilation in the RECORD again. If he can place it in the RECORD before the permanent RECORD is printed, I hope he will place it in the RECORD at this point, so that those who read may use the statistics as a reference.

Quoting again from Mr. Warden, a young Oakland Negro lawyer:

We can reduce crime because we're going to build up racial love and respect in a race. We're going to give our women more respect than they've ever had. We apologize to our women for the way we've acted in the past. We're telling people that we're going to get off welfare and get jobs. If the blind people thought enough of themselves to come away from the corners with their cups begging and to put up factories and businesses because they knew that it would reinforce their pride and their self-image, I think it's good enough for us to try it for a little while.

I read one short additional quotation from Mr. Warden:

The civil rights groups have not put up one business or one factory in their entire

history. Not one. Not even as a token, or a symbol of what could be done. We need images to give the race confidence in itself. As we teach racial pride in history, people don't commit crimes against themselves or anyone else.

The Chinese came to America poor but you never found any crime rate. The Japanese came to America poor but you never found a crime rate because of the degree of love and unity. This is what we are attempting to do.

Mr. President, that completes the quotation from Mr. Warden's able speech.

I am now about to yield to the distinguished Senator from Oregon (Mr. MORSE).

#### AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON'S SPEECH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be allowed to yield, without losing my right to the floor, to the distinguished Senator from Oregon (Mr. MORSE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. And with the further understanding that when the Senator from Florida starts his speech again, it will not count as a second speech, and with the further understanding that my interruption will appear elsewhere in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the speech delivered before the Security Council of the United Nations today by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE CAMBODIAN COMPLAINT, MAY 21, 1964

(Approximately as Delivered)

Mr. President, the facts about the incidents at issue are relatively simple and clear.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam already has confirmed that in the heat of battle, forces of the Republic of Vietnam did, in fact, mistakenly cross an ill-marked frontier between their country and Cambodia in pursuit of armed terrorists on May 7 and May 8, and on earlier occasions. That has been repeated and acknowledged here again today by the representative of Vietnam.

The Government of Vietnam has expressed its regrets that these incidents occurred with some tragic consequences. It has endeavored to initiate bilateral discussions with the Cambodian Government to remove the causes of these incidents.

But these incidents can only be assessed intelligently in the light of the surrounding facts: namely, the armed conspiracy which seeks to destroy not only the Government of Vietnam but the very society of Vietnam itself.

Mr. President, it is the people of the Republic of Vietnam who are the major victims of armed aggression. It is they who are fighting for their independence against violence directed from outside their borders.

It is they who suffer day and night from the terror of the so-called Vietcong. The prime targets of the Vietcong for kidnaping, for torture and for murder have been local officials, schoolteachers, medical workers, priests, agricultural specialists and any others whose position, profession, or other talents qualified them for service to the people of Vietnam—plus, of course, the relatives and children of citizens loyal to their government.

The chosen military objectives of the Vietcong—for gunfire or arson or pillage—have been hospitals, schoolhouses, agricultural stations, and various improvement projects by which the Government of Vietnam for many years has been raising the living standards of the people. The Government and people of Vietnam have been struggling for survival, struggling for years for survival in a war which has been as wicked, as wanton, and as dirty as any waged against an innocent and peaceful people in the whole cruel history of warfare. So there is something ironic in the fact that the victims of this incessant terror are the accused before this council and are defending themselves in daylight while terrorists perform their dark and dirty work by night throughout their land.

II

Mr. President, I cannot ignore the fact that at the meeting of this Council 2 days ago, Ambassador Federenko, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, digressed at great length from the subject before the Council to accuse the U.S. Government of organizing direct military action against the people of the Indo-Chinese peninsula.

For years, too many years, we have heard these bold and unsupported accusations. I had hoped that these fairy tales would be heard no more. But since the subject has been broached in so fanciful a way, let me set him straight on my Government's policy with respect to southeast Asia.

First, the United States has no—repeat "no"—national military objective anywhere in southeast Asia. U.S. policy for southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.

I trust my words have been clear enough on this point.

Second, the U.S. Government is currently involved in the affairs of the Republic of Vietnam for one reason and one reason only: Because the Republic of Vietnam requested the help of the United States and of other governments to defend itself against armed attack foisted, equipped, and directed from the outside.

This is not the first time that the U.S. Government has come to the aid of peoples prepared to fight for their freedom and independence against armed aggression sponsored from outside their borders. Nor will it be the last time unless the lesson is learned once and for all by all aggressors that armed aggression does not pay—that it no longer works—that it will not be tolerated.

The record of the past two decades makes it clear that a nation with the will for self-preservation can outlast and defeat overt or clandestine aggression—even when that internal aggression is heavily supported from the outside, and even after significant early successes by the aggressors. I would remind the Members that in 1947 after the aggressors had gained control of most of the country, many people felt that the cause of the Government of Greece was hopelessly lost. But as long as the people of Greece were prepared to fight for the life of their own country, the United States was not pre-

pared to stand by while Greece was overrun.

This principle does not change with the geographical setting. Aggression is aggression; organized violence is organized violence. Only the scale and the scenery change; the point is the same in Vietnam today as it was in Greece in 1947 and in Korea in 1950. The Indochinese Communist Party, the parent of the present Communist Party in North Vietnam, made it abundantly clear as early as 1951 that the aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to take control of all of Indochina. This goal has not changed—it is still clearly the objective of the Vietnamese Communist leadership in Hanoi. Take them to U.N.

Hanoi seeks to accomplish this purpose in South Vietnam through subversive guerrilla warfare directed, controlled and supplied by North Vietnam. The Communist leadership in Hanoi has sought to pretend that the insurgency in South Vietnam is a civil war, but Hanoi's hand shows very clearly. Public statements by the Communist Party in North Vietnam and its leaders have repeatedly demonstrated Hanoi's direction of the struggle in South Vietnam. For example, Le Duan, first secretary of the party, stated on September 5, 1960, "At present our party is facing [a] momentous task: to strive to complete \* \* \* revolution throughout the country." He also said this: "the north is the common revolutionary base of the whole country." Three months after the Communist Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam was set up pursuant to plans outlined publicly at that Congress.

The International Control Commission in Vietnam, established by the Geneva accords of 1954, stated in a special report which it issued in June 1962, that there is sufficient evidence to show that North Vietnam has violated various articles of the Geneva accords by its introduction of armed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities against the Government and armed forces of South Vietnam.

Infiltration of military personnel and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has been carried out steadily over the past several years. The total number of military cadres sent into South Vietnam via infiltration routes runs into the thousands. Such infiltration is well documented on the basis of numerous defectors and prisoners taken by the armed forces of South Vietnam.

Introduction of Communist weapons into South Vietnam has also grown steadily. An increasing amount of weapons and ammunition captured from the Vietcong has been proven to be of Chinese Communist manufacture or origin. For example, in December 1963, a large cache of Vietcong equipment captured in one of the Mekong Delta Provinces in South Vietnam included recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, carbines, and ammunition of Chinese Communist manufacture.

The United States cannot stand by while southeast Asia is overrun by armed aggressors. As long as the peoples of that area are determined to preserve their own independence and ask for our help in preserving it, we will extend it. This, of course, is the meaning of President Johnson's request a few days ago for additional funds for more economic as well as military assistance for Vietnam.

And if anyone has the illusion that my Government will abandon the people of Vietnam—or that we shall weary of the burden of support that we are rendering these people—it can only be due to ignorance of the strength and the conviction of the American people.

We all know that southeast Asia has been the victim of almost incessant violence for

more than a decade and a half. Yet despite this fact, it has been suggested that we should give up helping the people of Vietnam to defend themselves and seek only a political solution. But a political solution is just what we have already had, and it is in defense, in support of that political solution, that Vietnam is fighting today. The United States has never been against political solutions. Indeed, we have faithfully supported the political solutions that were agreed upon at Geneva in 1954 and again in 1962. The threat to peace in the area stems from the fact that others have not done likewise.

The Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 were, quite precisely, political agreements to stop the fighting, to restore the peace, to secure the independence of Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to guarantee the integrity of their frontiers, and to permit these much-abused peoples to go about their own business in their own ways. The United States, though not a signatory to the 1954 accords, has sought to honor these agreements in the hope that they would permit these people to live in peace and independence from outside interference from any quarter and for all time.

To this day there is only one major trouble with the political agreements reached at Geneva with respect to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1954 and again with respect to Laos in 1962. It is this: the ink was hardly dry on the Geneva accords in 1954 before North Vietnam began to violate them systematically with comradely assistance from the regime in Peking. Nearly a million people living in North Vietnam in 1954 exercised the right given to them under the Geneva agreement to move south to the Republic of Vietnam. Even while this was going on, units of the Viet Minh were hiding their arms and settling down within the frontiers of the Republic to form the nucleus of today's Vietcong, to await the signal from outside their borders to rise and strike. In the meantime, they have been trained and supplied in considerable measure from North Vietnam—in violation of the Geneva agreement, the political settlement. They have been reinforced by guerrilla forces moved into the Republic of Vietnam through Laos—in violation of the Geneva agreement, the political settlement.

This is the reason—and the only reason—why there is fighting in Vietnam today. There is fighting in Vietnam today only because the political settlement for Vietnam reached at Geneva in 1954 has been deliberately and flagrantly and systematically violated.

As I say, Mr. President, this is the reason why my Government—and to a lesser extent other governments—have come to the aid of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as it fights for its life against armed aggression directed from outside its frontiers in contemptuous violation of binding agreements. If the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is fighting today it is fighting to defend the Geneva agreement which has proven undefendable by any other means. If arms are being used in Vietnam today it is only because a political solution has been violated cynically for years.

The same disregard for the political settlement reached at Geneva has been demonstrated—by the same parties—in Laos. Violation has been followed by a period of quiet—and then another violation. Limited aggression has been followed by a period of calm—and then another limited aggression. Throughout the period since July 1962, when the Laotian settlement was concluded, the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has with great patience and fortitude sought to maintain the neutrality and independence of his country. He has made every effort to bring about Pathet Lao cooperation in the government of national union.

Now, in the past few days, we have seen a massive, deliberate, armed attack against the forces of the coalition government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The attack was mounted by a member of that coalition government, with the military assistance of one of the signatories of the Geneva accords. These violations are obviously aimed at increasing the amount of Lao territory under Communist control.

The military offensive of recent days must be seen as an outright attempt to destroy by violence what the whole structure of the Geneva accords was intended to preserve. Hanoi has persistently refused to withdraw the Vietnamese Communist forces from Laos despite repeated demands by the Lao Prime Minister. Hanoi has also consistently continued the use of Laos as a corridor for infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

It is quite clear that the Communists regard the Geneva accords of 1962 as an instrument which in no way restrains the Communists from pursuing their objective of taking over Laos as well as South Vietnam.

The recent attempt to overthrow the constitutional government headed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma was in large part attributable to the failure of the machinery set up with the Geneva accords to function in response to urgent requests by the Government of Laos. This machinery has been persistently sabotaged by the Communist member of the International Control Commission, who has succeeded by misuse of the so-called veto power in paralyzing the machinery designed to protect the peace in that area and thereby undermining support of the Souvanna government. Today, however, that government which was created under the Geneva agreements remains in full exercise of its authority as the legitimate government of a neutral Laos.

The other Geneva signatories must live up to their solemn commitments and support Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in his efforts to preserve the independence and neutrality which the world thought had been won at Geneva. These solemn obligations must not be betrayed.

Mr. President, my Government takes a very grave view of these events. Those who are responsible have set foot upon an exceedingly dangerous path.

As we look at world affairs in recent years, we have reason to hope that this lesson has at last been learned by all but those fanatics who cling to the doctrine that they can further their ambitions by armed force.

Chairman Khrushchev said it well and clearly in his New Year's Day message to other heads of government around the world. In that letter he asked for "recognition of the fact that territories of states must not, even temporarily, be the target of any kind of invasion attack, military occupation or other coercive measures, directly or indirectly undertaken by other states for any political, economic, strategic, boundary, or other considerations, whatsoever."

There is not a member of this Council or a member of this Organization which does not share a common interest in a final and total renunciation—except in self-defense—of the use of force as a means of pursuing national aims. The doctrine of militant violence has been rendered null and void by the technology of modern weapons and the vulnerability of a world in which the peace cannot be ruptured anywhere without endangering the peace everywhere.

Finally, Mr. President, with respect to southeast Asia in general, let me say this. There is a very easy way to restore order in southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of U.S. military aid to the Republic of Vietnam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide

May 21

by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone. The people of Vietnam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforceable terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

VI

Now, Mr. President, if we can return to the more limited issue before this Council today: the security of the frontier between Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam. My Government is in complete sympathy with the concern of the Government of Cambodia for the sanctity of its borders and the security of its people. Indeed, we have been guided for nearly a decade in this respect, by the words of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference of July 21, 1954: "In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs."

With respect to the allegations now made against my country, I shall do no more than reiterate what Ambassador Yost, the U.S. delegate, said to this Council on Tuesday morning: the United States has expressed regret officially for the tragic results of the border incidents in which an American adviser was present; our careful investigations so far have failed to produce evidence that any Americans were present in the inadvertent crossing of the Cambodian frontier on May 7 and May 8; and there is, of course, no question whatever of either aggression or aggressive intent against Cambodia on the part of my country.

Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that my Government has the greater regard for Cambodia and its people and its Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, whom I have the privilege of knowing. We believe he has done a great deal for his people and for the independence of his country. We have demonstrated our regard for his effort on behalf of his people in very practical ways over the past decade. We have no doubt that he wants to assure conditions in which his people can live in peace and security. My Government associates itself explicitly with this aim. If the people of Cambodia wish to live in peace and security and independence—and free from external alienation if they so choose—then we want for them precisely what they want for themselves. We have no quarrel whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go its own way.

The difficulty, Mr. President, has been that Cambodia has not been in a position to carry out, with its own unaided strength, its own desire to live in peace and tranquility. Others in the area have not been prepared to leave the people of Cambodia free to pursue their own ends independently and peacefully. The recent difficulties along the frontier which we have been discussing here in the Council are only superficially and accidentally related to the Republic of Viet-

nam. They are deeply and directly related to the fact that the leaders and armed forces of North Vietnam, supported by Communist China, have abused the right of Cambodia to live in peace by using Cambodian territory as a passageway, a source of supply, and a sanctuary from counterattack by the forces of South Vietnam, which is trying to maintain its right to live in peace and go its own way, too. Obviously Cambodia cannot be secure—her territorial integrity cannot be assured—her independence cannot be certain—as long as outsiders direct massive violence within the frontiers of her neighboring states. This is the real reason for troubles on the Cambodian border; this is the real reason we are here today.

Now it is suggested that the way to restore security on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border is to reconvene the Geneva Conference which 10 years ago reached the solemn agreement which I just read to you.

Mr. President, we can surely do better than that. There is no need for another such conference. A Geneva conference on Cambodia could not be expected to produce an agreement any more effective than the agreements we already have. This Council is seized with a specific issue. The Cambodians have brought a specific complaint to this table. Let us deal with it. There is no need to look elsewhere.

We can make—here and now—a constructive decision to help meet the problem that has been laid before us by the Government of Cambodia—to help keep order on her frontier with Vietnam—and thus to help eliminate at least one of the sources of tension and violence which afflict the area as a whole.

Let me say, Mr. President, that my Government endorses the statement made by the distinguished representative of Cambodia to the Council on Tuesday when he pointed out that states which are not members of the United Nations are not thereby relieved of responsibility for conducting their affairs in line with the principles of the charter of this Organization. We could not agree more fully. Yet the regimes of Peking and Hanoi which are not members of this Organization are employing or supporting the use of force against their neighbors. This is why the borders of Cambodia have seen violence. And this is why we are here today. And that is why the United Nations has a duty to do what it can do to maintain order along the frontier between Cambodia and Vietnam—to help uphold the principles of the charter in southeast Asia.

As for the exact action which this Council might take, Mr. President, my Government is prepared to consider several possibilities. We are prepared to discuss any practical and constructive steps to meet the problem before us.

One cannot blame the Vietnamese for concluding that the International Control Commission cannot do an effective job of maintaining frontier security. The troika principle of the International Control Commission which is to say the requirement under article 42 of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam that decisions dealing with questions concerning violations which might lead to resumption of hostilities can be taken only by unanimous agreement, has contributed to the frustration of the ICC.

The fact that the situation in South Vietnam has reached the crisis stage is itself dramatic testimony of the frustration to which the International Control Commission has been reduced. With the exception of the special report on June 2, 1962, to which I referred, condemning Communist violations of the Geneva accords, the Commission has taken no action with respect to the Communist campaign of aggression and guerrilla warfare against South Vietnam.

The representative of Cambodia has suggested that a commission of inquiry in-

vestigate whether the Vietcong has used Cambodian territory. We have no fundamental objection to a committee of inquiry. But we do not believe it addresses itself to the basic problem that exists along the Vietnam-Cambodia border. More is needed in order to assure that problems do not continue to arise.

Several practical steps for restoring stability to the frontier have been suggested and I shall make brief and preliminary general remarks about them. I should like to reiterate what Ambassador Yost said, that we have never rejected any proposal for inspection of Cambodian territory.

One suggestion is that the Council request the two parties directly concerned to establish a substantial military force on a bilateral basis to observe and patrol the frontier and to report to the Secretary General.

Another suggestion is that such a bilateral force be augmented by the addition of United Nations observers and possibly be placed under United Nations command to provide an impartial third-party element representing the world community. We also could see much merit in this idea.

A third suggestion is to make it an all-United Nations force. This might also be effective. It would involve somewhat larger U.N. expenditures than the other alternatives. But if this method should prove desirable to the members of the Council, the United States will be prepared to contribute.

We would suggest, Mr. President, that whether one of these or some other practical solution is agreed, it would be useful to ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to offer assistance to Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam in clearly marking the frontiers between the two countries. One of the difficulties is that there are places where one does not know whether he stands on one side of the frontier or the other. Certainly it would help reduce the possibility of further incidents if this uncertainty were to be removed.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me repeat that I am prepared to discuss the policy and the performance of my Government throughout southeast Asia. But the issue before us is the security of the Cambodia-Vietnam border. I have expressed my Government's views on that subject. I hope other members of the Council also will express their views on that subject and that the Council, which is the primary world agency for peace and security, can quickly take effective steps to remedy a situation which could threaten peace and security.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this speech was delivered by our Ambassador as the first reply of the United States to the charge leveled against us in the United Nations' Security Council by Cambodia. I would not want the day to close without going on record in the Senate in disagreement with the speech. Of course, it was a speech that was written primarily for the Ambassador by the State Department. Yet I am sad that Adlai Stevenson permitted himself to be so used, for an ambassadorship is not worth that. I think that Adlai Stevenson abdicated his position of world leadership in the field of world affairs. It is a serious casualty of leadership.

When I think of those great speeches of Adlai Stevenson of another day, when I think of his historic defenses of the application of the rule of law for the settlement of disputes that threaten the peace of the world, when I think of the eloquence of Adlai Stevenson of a bygone day in support of a great ideal that must be put into practice if mankind is to save itself from annihilation from a nuclear

war—and contrast the eloquence and nobility of those speeches, with the speech of rationalization, alibing, excusing, that his lips were used to deliver today in the Security Council of the United Nations—I find it impossible to select words to really portray the depth of my feeling of sadness. Something has gone out of our national leadership. A great light has been extinguished, and a great voice has been misused. We find not one word in the Stevenson speech that meets head on the great issue that he ought to have been talking about—the issue that is being raised by many, not only in our country, but in the other free nations of the world. Why, oh, why has the United States turned its back on the United Nations? Why, oh, why has the United States violated the Charter of the United Nations in South Vietnam? We have, Mr. President. And we shall stand in the pages of history convicted of violating the United Nations Charter—all the alibing of Adlai Stevenson to the contrary notwithstanding.

I never thought that I would live so long as to see Adlai Stevenson fail to meet an issue squarely, even though it might mean the casualty of an ambassadorship, which as I said on the floor of the Senate the other day, is a minor sacrifice compared with the sacrifice of the lives of American boys in South Vietnam. They are being sacrificed there in violation of U.S. obligations under the United Nations in respect to our unilateral and illegal military course of action in South Vietnam, not only in violation of the United Nations Charter, but also in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

I will repeat and repeat in the months to come that the United States cannot justify sending an American boy to his death on a battlefield in the absence of a declaration of war and without seeking first to settle the dispute in the United Nations.

The American military operation in South Vietnam is clearly unconstitutional. It cannot be justified in the absence of a declaration of war. We are engaging in a subterfuge. Now there is a proposal before the committees of Congress to obtain a form of congressional approval of the unilateral, American military action in South Vietnam outside the framework of the Constitution, by approving appropriations for it. What has happened that we do not meet the issues forthrightly, directly?

One of the saddest things is that the United States has been undercutting the United Nations Charter in South Vietnam, thereby weakening the United Nations Charter and playing into the hands of our Communist enemies—or, as Adlai Stevenson has been heard to say in years gone by, and I paraphrase him, but accurately—"The United Nations is essential to peacekeeping in the world."

As we weaken the United Nations by flouting, circumventing, and violating our obligations under it, we, of course, strengthen the hands of the Communists in following a similar course of action elsewhere. We shall find ourselves in a rather untenable position when we seek to have the United Nations peace-

keeping power applied to Russia, Red China, Nasser, or any other power in the world that seeks to resort to threats to the peace, when it can with justification say—as I have suggested on the floor before—"See who is talking—the United States. What about South Vietnam?"

I was disappointed with the Stevenson speech today because he did not discuss any of the articles of the United Nations Charter to which our signature is attached. Of course, it is obvious why he did not discuss them. He could not discuss them and sustain his rationalizing position before the Security Council today. But, the record should be made on the same day. In this discussion of Mr. Stevenson before the Security Council today about the alleged violations of the Geneva accords of 1954, as I have said before, and repeat, the word "alleged" can be stricken if there is any question about the fact that the Geneva accords have been violated and are being violated. But it is disappointing that in his speech Mr. Stevenson did not take note of the fact that the United States did not sign the Geneva accords of 1954. He raises a great hue and cry about their being violated. Certainly Mr. Stevenson knows, or should know, that the United States, not signing the Geneva accords, has no right to take the position that it can enforce them unilaterally on the basis of the U.S. findings.

Mr. President, if the Geneva accords are being violated, the first duty of the United States, or any other country that wants to keep faith with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, is to prove it. We do not prove it with a speech. We prove it with evidence before a body that has jurisdiction to take evidence.

For Mr. Stevenson to stand before the Security Council—and thereby before the world—and seek to rationalize the American unilateral military action in South Vietnam on the basis of the assertion by the United States that the Geneva accords are being violated by North Vietnam and others is, in my judgment, inexcusable.

Mr. Stevenson is a good enough lawyer to know that he ought to go to court to make his charges and submit his evidence. Mr. Stevenson has not been willing to go to court as the representative of the United States; or, apparently, so far as we know, he has not been willing to recommend to the United States that the United States go to court. We have no right to judge for ourselves whether the Geneva Accords are being violated, and then assume unto ourselves the right to enforce the accords against the nations that we have decided have violated them.

One of the saddest things about the situation is that we could prove our charge. The saddest thing about it is that in my judgment the United States has a case it can prove against North Vietnam, against China and, I believe, against Laos, that the Geneva Accords are being violated and have been violated. We ought to have done that. We ought to have kept faith not only with our commitments under the United Nations Charter, but also with the primary

purpose of the United Nations to preserve the world where the peace is threatened anywhere in the world by the application of the rule of law, instead of using unilateral military might, which the United States is doing in South Vietnam.

What a great historic opportunity the South Vietnam crisis has offered the United States, and how sad and unfortunate it is that the United States has run away from its obligation to strengthen the rule of law, purpose, and objective of the United Nations, by taking unto itself the prerogative of acting unilaterally, outside the United Nations, when it is not even a signatory to the Geneva accords.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. After I yield to the Senator from Kentucky I shall proceed to show why we are not a signatory to the Geneva accords. However, if I yield to the Senator from Kentucky, it must be with the understanding that all the rights of the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] heretofore guaranteed to him by my unanimous-consent request that he yield to me under the full protection of the points that I raised be continued.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. I should like to ask the Senator a question, so that it may appear in the Record as a matter of information. Is it the Senator's view that at the time the Geneva Conference was held, and the accords were made, a procedure was included in the agreement for reference to the United Nations of any breach of the agreement?

Mr. MORSE. Of course not. That would not be required.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is arguing the principle. I understand that. I am trying to ascertain his recollection. I know that he is familiar with this subject, because he has spoken on it several times. Is it the Senator's recollection that any specific procedure was included in the accords requiring a reference of any breach of the accords to the United Nations?

Mr. MORSE. It does not need to be. Mr. COOPER. I know that, but I wish to have that clearly spelled out.

Mr. MORSE. I am perfectly willing to spell it out, but it is quite irrelevant to the point I am making; namely, that there has been a violation of the Geneva accords. It is a violation of the Geneva accords which threatens the peace of the world. We are not a party to them. It is not our business to go around the world enforcing everyone else's treaties and agreements. What is happening in South Vietnam is a threat to the peace of the world. That puts it under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. It is the clear duty of the United States to file a complaint before the United Nations in respect to the violation of the Geneva accords, and not to take unilateral military action, which action has intensified the threat to the peace of the world, flowing from the violation of the accords.

Mr. COOPER. I feel it should be spelled out as a matter of record that the powers involved did not refer the

matter to the United Nations in 1954 or at any other time during the 10 years in which the troubles have continued. During all the troubles in Laos and Vietnam all of the powers have refrained, for some reason, from referring any breaches to the United Nations. I believe that is historically true.

Mr. MORSE. I do not quarrel with that fact. I only say to my friend from Kentucky that it is completely irrelevant to what the duty of the United States as a signatory to the United Nations Charter has been all this time.

Mr. COOPER. I do not believe it is irrelevant in this case. I have been paying a great deal of attention to what the Senator from Oregon has said about the situation. It is a situation of great difficulty and great concern. However, I must say that I believe he has gone somewhat far, in light of the history of the Vietnam situation. At the inception of the accord there was no agreement to refer the matter to the United Nations, and there has been no reference of breaches since that time by any of the powers, it is not fair to say that the United States has broken the Charter of the United Nations. I cannot accept that.

Mr. MORSE. I do not care whether the Senator from Kentucky can accept it. It happens to be the undeniable fact.

Mr. COOPER. I cannot accept in my mind, that we have broken the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. MORSE. I can read the United Nations Charter, and the Senator from Kentucky can read it. Under that charter no nation has the right to carry on a course of action which threatens the peace of the world anywhere. The United States has been a party to doing that. What the Senator is saying is that we are not the only ones who have been doing it. I have been pointing that out for a long time. I have been pointing out, as the Senator knows, that as a nonsignatory to the Geneva accords, it was the clear duty of the United States to complain of their violation to the United Nations, and not proceed to send American boys to die in South Vietnam. Let us not forget that the Geneva accords did set up a council, consisting of an Indian, a Pole, and a Canadian. Let us also not forget—and Mr. Stevenson failed to point this out in his speech today—that that council found that the accords had been violated not only by North Vietnam, but also by South Vietnam, citing as their evidence as to the violation by South Vietnam the U.S. military action in South Vietnam.

Mr. COOPER. When was that?

Mr. MORSE. In 1957. We have been guilty, and the lapse of time involving the guilt does not justify it, because there is no statute of limitations which provides an excuse.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is arguing what he believes the United States should have done, and what it should do today. What I have pointed out is that for all of the powers involved to leave the problem on a regional basis, to see if it could be settled.

Mr. MORSE. That does not exclude it from the United Nations.

Mr. COOPER. But that course has been followed by all the nations in an effort to reach a settlement as they have a right to do under the charter. The basic reason for the problem of South Vietnam is the aggression from North Vietnam, not the United States.

North Vietnam is where the aggression started; this aggression has continued. The United States moved in troops for military training. Unfortunately, the number has increased now to 16,000 or 17,000. I do not know what the end will be. But I would not place the blame on the United States for what has occurred in Vietnam. I do not believe that is a fair representation of the facts.

Mr. MORSE. But they are the facts.

Mr. COOPER. With my great respect for my friend from Oregon, I have to say that we have now reached a point where we must decide what is best to do. I have my views, but I will wait until the Senator has completed his comments.

Mr. MORSE. I have no intention of letting the Senator from Kentucky leave the Record as it is at this point, because he is just as wrong as he can be as to the responsibility of the United States—\$5.5 billion worth of responsibility, besides 16,000 American boys, with more than 200 casualties thus far. That cannot be erased from the picture, so far as responsibility is concerned. The United States has been operating a war in South Vietnam, and we have not taken the problem to the United Nations.

I go back to my major premise: The United States has no right to conduct a war in Vietnam. It had a duty under the treaty to take the issue to the United Nations for action. We did not do so. We ignored the United Nations. The fact that North Vietnam committed aggression and some other countries did likewise does not excuse the United States. The Senator from Kentucky knows as well as I do that a wrong committed by us cannot be adjusted because someone else committed a wrong.

Mr. COOPER. I did not say that.

Mr. MORSE. The United States has followed a wrongful course of action. I interpret the remarks of the Senator from Kentucky as an effort, to cover it up or erase it. But it is indelible. It cannot be covered up, and it cannot be erased. It is there for history to read.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator from Kentucky is not covering anything up. He is saying that the United States is not the aggressor, and has not breached the charter.

Mr. MORSE. Yes, the Senator is.

Mr. COOPER. No, I am not.

Mr. MORSE. I know the Senator says he is not, but I can interpret his language. It is coverup language.

Mr. COOPER. That can be judged by those who will read this exchange. I remember well in 1954 when the situation arose. I was a Member of the Senate in 1953 and 1954. I felt strongly about the situation then. I said on the floor of the Senate in 1954, although it has perhaps been long forgotten, that the United States should not try to take

the place of France in Vietnam; that we should not send troops there.

Mr. MORSE. That is correct. So did I.

Mr. COOPER. But the United States entered into a regional agreement, which can be entered into under article 52 of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. MORSE. Not with immunity—

Mr. COOPER. Let me finish. The Senator will not let me finish my argument.

Mr. MORSE. I will not let the Senator make implications.

Mr. COOPER. The way the United States entered into that regional arrangement in 1954 was a proper way to enter into it under the United Nations Charter. It was a case of bad judgment. I thought so at the time, and I said so. But it was proper to do it under the charter. It was not a violation of the charter, because under article 52 it could be done, and it was done under a regional arrangement. It was a case of bad judgment, but it was not a breach of the charter.

Since that time things have gone badly. But even if men have been lost and we have spent money, that would not mean there had been a breach of the charter, if in fact we have done right. I stood on the same ground 10 years ago that the Senator from Oregon is standing on today.

What I rose to say, and what I still hold—I do not wish to retain the floor longer—is that I think the Senator from Oregon has gone too far in saying that the United States has breached the charter with respect to what has happened. I say that with all respect for the Senator from Oregon.

I would not leave my statement stand at that. I would not take my seat without saying what I think. I think we ought to ask the conference to reconstitute itself and see if it has any helpful recommendations to make. The conference still has jurisdiction, under the Charter. If the conference makes any recommendations which might form the basis of an agreement then I think a solution might be attained. If the conference has no recommendations to make, and no solutions to offer, then I would follow the suggestion of the Senator from Oregon and say that the problem should be taken to the United Nations.

If not we must stand by our commitments. I do not leave my position sterile as the Senator from Oregon contends. I could not stand here and listen to a charge that the United States is the country which has breached the Charter, when I know that the Viet Minh of North Vietnam have aggressed and continued the war.

It can be argued that we are furnishing our assistance, our men, and our troops to resist aggression, as we have a right to do under the regional arrangement. But I must say that we have come to the time when we must find a solution. The Senator from Oregon proposes taking the issue immediately to the United Nations. I say that it should first be taken to the conference.

Mr. MORSE. Has the Senator from Kentucky finished?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. MORSE. Now, I shall reply to the Senator from Kentucky. He is wrong on fact after fact. The United States never signed the Geneva Accords.

Mr. COOPER. Of course, we did not, and I did not say so. I know the facts.

Mr. MORSE. Our signature is not on the Geneva accords. We have been acting outside the Geneva accords. We are not even a party to the Geneva accords. We persuaded South Vietnam not to sign the Geneva accords.

Mr. COOPER. We are not a party to the accords, but we have been acting under them, as we are permitted to act, by sending in troops as advisers to assist.

Mr. MORSE. And we have been violating the Geneva accords.

Mr. COOPER. We are allowed to send military advisers.

Mr. MORSE. No; we are not allowed to violate the accords. We have no rights under the Geneva accords, because the accords themselves forbid the sending in of additional military aid above 1954 levels. That is what the Commission found in 1957. We did not even sign the accords, and we have been violating them ever since. We have started to send in our boys and have spent a total of \$5,500 million in aid to South Vietnam.

That was the point at which we ought to have called either for a new conference or for taking the issue to the United Nations. As far as a regional treaty to which we are party is concerned, the only one at all relevant is SEATO, and no action has been taken under that. SEATO has not been involved in South Vietnam.

The Senator from Kentucky will not find me in disagreement with the proposal to ask for a new conference. That is the proposal of France. But Adlai Stevenson today, in behalf of the U.S. Government, rejected it.

Mr. COOPER. I have not read his speech.

Mr. MORSE. I have. I know what I am talking about in regard to what the position of the United States is. We rejected the proposal by France to ask for a new conference. I hoped that there would be one. I hoped that this time we would be a party to it, that this time we would help to negotiate an agreement, and that this time we would sign it.

Mr. COOPER. I assume that as Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, Mr. Stevenson supports the policy of this country. If the Senator from Oregon objects to what Mr. Stevenson said today, what he really is attacking is the policy of the President of the United States.

Mr. MORSE. If I have not made that clear in the past 6 weeks, I have not made anything clear. I surely am in disagreement with the policy of the United States.

Mr. COOPER. I do not attack the President when he is right. Vietnam is not the responsibility of Mr. Stevenson as our representative to the United Nations. He is charged with guiding and

directing, so far as the United Nations is concerned, the foreign policy of this country. Vietnam is one aspect of his representation. I should think we would have to know that and not charge him with a great moral lapse.

Mr. MORSE. I still hold him responsible for what he has supported; that is all. I should much prefer to see him resign as Ambassador to the United Nations rather than to have him support a policy that clearly violates our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Let me enlarge on the point brought forth with respect to the Geneva accords, in view of the remarks of the Senator from Kentucky. Some weeks ago, on the floor of the Senate, I traced the history of the Geneva accords and stated that Dulles, who was then Secretary of State, took the position that the United States would not sign the accords. He had our observer, Bedell Smith, sit at Geneva and say, after the accords had been signed, that the United States would not sign the accords, but would recognize them as binding international agreements.

But the record is clear—and I documented it in my speech—that Dulles was very much upset because France was going to leave Indochina; and Dulles did everything he could to get France to continue the war in Indochina. He went to France; he went to London, and tried to get the British to enter into a tripartite arrangement with France and the United States—a tripartite arrangement between France, the United States, and Great Britain—to send British and American troops into Indochina, to carry on the war. It was the great Churchill—as reported in his memoirs by Anthony Eden—who said that proposal of Dulles would deceive the U.S. Congress, because it was being carried on in great secrecy.

That was when Nixon tried to send up his lead balloon in New York, at the secret meetings with the publishers—about which word got out—in which he proposed that American soldiers be sent into Indochina, when Dulles was trying to negotiate the same kind of deal with the British Prime Minister; but Dulles failed.

Dulles was very much opposed to the French withdrawal from Indochina.

The Geneva accords of 1954 accomplished the splitting of Indochina four ways—into Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia and North Vietnam were involved in the Geneva accords; but, under the pressure exerted by John Foster Dulles, South Vietnam refused to sign them, as did the United States.

As I said in my long speech in regard to this situation, that was the beginning of American foreign policy in South Vietnam. From the very beginning, the United States circumvented not only the United Nations, but also the Geneva accords, themselves, by our relationship with and our conduct in connection with and our support of South Vietnam.

Mr. President, other countries have violated the Geneva accords. But we met those violations with violations of our own. Not only that, but the United States has made war in South Vietnam, instead of making peace—although as a

nonsignatory of the Geneva accords, the United States had no right, in my judgment, to attempt to enforce them unilaterally. Instead, the United States had an even greater obligation, as a nonsignatory of the Geneva accords, to file before the United Nations a petition of complaint, asking the United Nations to take jurisdiction.

So let us face the ugly reality of this situation. The United States is a mighty nation, the mightiest nation in the world. The United States is recognized generally as the most powerful nation in the world. The other powerful nation, comparatively speaking, is Russia. When the mightiest nation in the world follows the course of action our country followed, the Senator from Kentucky should not be surprised to find other nations not challenging it. Of course Russia had no desire to challenge the United States action, because, in my judgment, Russia realized that the United States was weakening the United Nations; and, in my judgment, Russia has no interest in the United Nations, except as a platform for a debating society. So we should realize that Russia has no interest in the enforcement powers of the United Nations; but the United States should have, for I believe that is where the hope of mankind for peace hinges.

But instead of following such a course of action, the United States proceeded to spend \$5.5 billion in South Vietnam and to sacrifice the lives of more than 200 Americans, and the United States committed what I believe could properly be described as mayhem against the Charter of the United Nations. That is the situation which confronts us in the United Nations today. But what a glorious record we could have made, instead of the record Adlai Stevenson made today in New York City.

Mr. President, I believe it is necessary tonight to place in the Record a few provisions of the United Nations Charter that Adlai Stevenson did not even whisper about in his speech today.

There is no aggression or breach of the peace or threat to the peace that is not one which the United Nations Charter requires to be brought before the United Nations. That is a fact. Wherever there is an aggression or a breach of the peace or a threat to the peace, the United Nations Charter creates an obligation to bring that fact situation before the United Nations.

Article 33 requires "the parties to any dispute"—and I ask the Senator from Kentucky to note this language—"the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," to try to settle it by peaceful means.

I wonder whether the Senator from Kentucky or any other Senator wishes to argue that the situation in South Vietnam does not involve a threat to the peace, or wishes to argue that it is not a "dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

The sad fact is, I say to the Senator from Kentucky, that if our country continues its course of action in South Viet-

nam, the United States will run the grave risk of escalating that war, and also of escalating it into North Vietnam and elsewhere. Once our forces cross the border into North Vietnam, our Nation becomes an aggressor nation, and in that event the United States will have lost, in my judgment, any justification for a claim of self-defense, in international law, and will have opened the danger of a third world war, because it is out of just such incidents that great wars are born.

So, Mr. President, we are dealing with a dispute—and I do not intend to let Members of Congress or of the executive branch of the Government forget it—and a danger that has all the potentialities of causing the death of tens of thousands of American boys in the years to come, because I am satisfied that if we escalate this war, we shall get into an Asian war. If it remains only an Asian war, it will be a bogged down war that will cost us the lives of tens of thousands of American boys.

Mr. President, the American people need to know that and need to face up to it when they come to give to Members of Congress advice as to whether they should vote to give to the President of the United States indirect approval, by means of increased appropriations, to carry on what amounts to an executive military action in South Vietnam. That shows how serious I believe this matter is.

I repeat that the Charter of the United Nations requires that parties to a dispute avail themselves first of all possible peaceful means for settling it. That is required by article 33. I am sure Adlai Stevenson knows it by heart; but he could not very well cite it today and still make his speech, because his speech cannot be reconciled with article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Moreover, article 37 of the charter requires that parties unable to settle a dispute by peaceful means of their own choosing, shall refer it to the Security Council. The word is "shall." It is not a discretionary matter.

The course of action of the United States in South Vietnam cannot be reconciled with article 37 of the United Nations Charter. My dear friend from Kentucky does not like to hear one suggest that perhaps our Government is wrong in the course of action that it is taking. But our Government has been dead wrong in the course of action it has taken in South Vietnam in respect to its obligations under article 37 of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. In a moment. I pointed this out in some detail a couple of weeks ago in my so-called foreign policy speech, so far as international law is concerned. I am pointing it out tonight I shall continue to point it out, because all the verbiage that can be poured out cannot change the language of article 37. Article 37 placed upon the United States the clear obligation to take the case to the United Nations and not take it to war. But instead of taking it to the United Nations, the United States took

the case to war. That is why Adlai Stevenson had to deliver his very unsound and disappointing speech alibiing for our Government before the Security Council today.

I yield to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me, under the previous understanding that the Senator from Florida will not lose his right to the floor?

Mr. MORSE. I yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. I do not want verbiage, either that of the Senator from Oregon or my own, to color what I have said and what I intend to say again. I said that we may have differences over the policy of the United States. I had some differences over the policies of the United States in 1954 in Vietnam and have had some since that time. The Senator from Oregon can make his statement, and stand on it, that the United States had a duty to take the case to the United Nations. But I say, and I stand on the statement—and it is at this point that I disagree with the Senator from Oregon—that the United States has not committed aggression in Vietnam. I say that North Vietnam and not the United States, has committed the aggression. I wish to make clear that I do not believe the United States has violated the Charter of the United Nations by any act of aggression. That is what I said and that is what I mean. If the Senator from Oregon takes a contrary view, I disagree with him. I shall not say that my country committed an act of aggression in Vietnam, when it has been helping to defend and protect Vietnam people against aggression.

Mr. MORSE. I repeat my former statement. The United States violated the Geneva accords when it went into South Vietnam with men, billions of dollars, and military aid. It was at that point that the United States violated the United Nations Charter. It was at that point that it violated articles 33 and 37. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] can call it what he wishes. The Senator from Oregon has called it a violation of articles 33 and 37 of the United Nations Charter. He has called it a violation of the Geneva accords.

It is very interesting that the so-called neutral council that was set up under the Geneva accords in 1957 found South Vietnam, along with North Vietnam, violating the Geneva accords because South Vietnam took military assistance, military aid and military help from the United States. One of the purposes of the Geneva accords was to stop additional outside military aid in all the four partitions that had been set up in Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam.

I wish to say most respectfully, and out of the deep affection that I have for the Senator from Kentucky, that I so interpret his remarks, although he does not seem to think that the impression is there. He seems to think that our wrong is lessened because, in his opinion, North Vietnam has committed a wrong.

That does not change the position of the United States one iota. On this issue it does not make any difference what wrongful acts North Vietnam may have committed. We cannot justify wrongful acts in our part in violation of these articles of the charter. Furthermore, we cannot be judge, jury, and prosecutor at the same time. We had the clear duty to take the case before the United Nations and present our proof, and we could have done it. We still can do it. But we could have done it. North Vietnam was violating the Geneva accords and thereby threatening the peace of that part of the world and endangering the peace everywhere, because in this modern day of nuclear power, a threat to peace anywhere in the world is a threat to the peace everywhere in the world.

Article 37 pinned the United States down to the mat. It did the same with every other country that was violating the charter, too.

Mr. President, I am talking about the obligations of the United States. I am expressing deep regret at the course of action which my country has followed in respect to southeast Asia. Article 37 makes it perfectly clear in the language "they shall refer it to the Security Council" that the United States never did, and had no intention of doing so. We acted unilaterally. We threw our weight around. Contrary to our principles, we created the impression that we still believe that might makes right. Of course, it does not. It will not in southeast Asia, either. All the exercise of United States might in South Vietnam is likely to produce is an escalated war and the death of tens of thousands of American boys.

I continually refer to the death of American boys, but they will not be the only human beings who will be killed. Many South Vietnamese are being killed.

The Secretary of Defense speaks of high casualties among the South Vietnamese as though they were something to be proud of. They are all children of God, too, Mr. President. That is a part of the awfulness of what is happening. We are out of character as a nation in South Vietnam. We are untrue to our ideals. We are in shocking violation of our professions about wishing to set up a system of international justice through law, to the procedures of which will be submitted disputes which threaten the peace of the world. I ask, "When will the United States return to that sound ideal?" It is a sound ideal; it is also a sound practicality.

I listened on the floor of the Senate today to the statement of a colleague in which he said that the case did not go to the United Nations because it would not be practical. I asked him for his definition of what is practical. That is what I meant when I said a few moments ago that I am not persuaded by semantics and verbiage. It sounds plausible to say that something is not practical. When one who uses the term is pinned down and asked what is practical about it, the one making the original statement is overcome with a loss of words. What is ever practical about



war? What is impractical about taking a dispute to the United Nations in keeping with our obligations under article 33 and article 37?

Mr. President, Adlai Stevenson has been heard to say over the years, in eloquent terms, what a great ideal that is. I would not walk out on practicing it even if I were ambassador. I would walk out on the ambassadorship first.

We cannot accuse North Vietnam of aggression in South Vietnam or Laos without being obliged to ask the United Nations to deal with it. I have been pleading for many weeks to put North Vietnam and Laos and Red China on the spot by taking our proof to the United Nations.

I have been pleading to put Russia and Red China on the spot, too, and particularly Russia, procedurally, because she is a member of the United Nations and a member of the Security Council.

We should put Khrushchev on the spot and ascertain whether or not he would veto our request for United Nations action in South Vietnam. If he did, it would help prove to the world who it is that is seeking peaceful procedures for settlement of the dispute, rather than finding ourselves in the posture we are in worldwide tonight, in which I am sure millions upon millions of people in the world charge us with making war in South Vietnam. And we are. Then if Khrushchev had vetoed the procedure in the Security Council, the policy of my Government should have been to call for an extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly and lay the matter before the delegates of the members thereof.

I served as a delegate in the General Assembly. My service in the United Nations left me with a burning conviction that the United Nations can be made to work. But it cannot be made to work if great powers such as the United States constantly walk out on their obligations to the United Nations as soon as their own spheres of influence are involved.

I would not hesitate a moment, I would not be the slightest bit afraid, to take any issue involving the preservation of the peace of the world by the use of the procedures of the United Nations to the General Assembly of the United Nations for its determination and response. I am satisfied that the response would, by an overwhelming majority vote, sustain United Nations intervention.

Delegate after delegate from the small nations of the world, including the new small nations of Africa, with whom I spent many hours in my weeks of service in New York City as a delegate to the United Nations, told me over and over again that the United Nations offers them their only hope for survival. They were talking about their only hope for survival in 1960 against the danger of Russian encroachment.

The small nations of the world know that their hope for protection against communism does not rest in the United States. It rests in the United Nations.

The United States has not the resources or the manpower to begin to police the world, without becoming bankrupt and insolvent. This country cannot be the policeman, the enforcement officer, for the peace of the world. There are many reasons why this country should get out of South Vietnam, but that is an important one.

It does not do us much good, so far as our future stability is concerned, to wave the American flag as Stevenson waved it today in the Security Council; to seem to beat our breast in some kind of overdeveloped national ego; to give the impression that we are going to protect freedom. Mr. Stevenson forgot to tell the American people that there is no freedom in South Vietnam. He forgot to tell the American people that we are dealing with a military tyranny. He forgot to tell the American people that we are dealing with an American puppet government. He forgot to tell the American people that we have supported three tyrannical puppet dictators; namely, Diem, Minh, and now Khanh.

Freedom in South Vietnam? Find it. It is a police state.

I want South Vietnam to become free. But the best hope for freedom in South Vietnam is the exercise of the United Nations jurisdiction and not U.S. jurisdiction. U.S. jurisdiction would involve the South Vietnamese people in war for a long time to come, in slaughter and bloodshed. What is needed is a peace-keeping corps in South Vietnam by the United Nations. The language of the United Nations Charter provides for it. But there was not one word from Stevenson today in his speech before the Security Council of the United Nations about the application of the principle of the United Nations for keeping the peace that we are supporting in the Congo, that we are supporting in the Middle East, that we are supporting in Cyprus, and that we ought to extend to South Vietnam.

If it is our wish to produce freedom for the South Vietnamese people, we ought to be supporting United Nations jurisdiction that would lead to the establishment for the next few years—10, 15, or 20—of a U.S. trusteeship in South Vietnam, that would develop freedom for the South Vietnamese people just as rapidly as they are trained to assume the responsibilities of freedom.

The sad thing about the colonial policy of France—and it was true of the colonial policy of the Belgian Government in the Congo—is that the colonists were not trained for self-government.

That is why in all the briefings we get—and I can say this without violating security—from the Secretary of State and others, one of our problems in South Vietnam is to develop political know-how on the part of the South Vietnamese to operate the Government. They do not have the political know-how because the French did not train them to develop political and administrative know-how.

I had not intended to speak as long as I have, but the Senator from Ken-

tucky has raised some points that must be answered in detail. I am led to say, for the benefit of the Senator from Kentucky, that the State Department does not like to have anyone mention the phrase "civil war." The officials in the Department like us to sweep that one under the rug. They like to give the impression that this is a war between South Vietnam and North Vietnam. As the Record will show, the Senator from Kentucky made some mention about the North Vietnamese who came down into South Vietnam. They certainly did. But the impression is left that they came down to fight.

The fact is that when the Geneva accords divided Indochina up into its four compartments—Cambodia, North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam. The richest part of what would be Vietnam if North and South Vietnam were one country, the most fertile part, the most productive part, was South Vietnam. Large numbers of farmers and peasants left North Vietnam and came down to South Vietnam to the rice paddies, to scratch out a living in the rich delta area.

That is why I say we need to analyze the semantics used by our State Department briefers. The overwhelming majority of North Vietnamese who came down did not come down to make war. They came down to make a living. So the apologists for the U.S. cross action create the impression in the public mind that North Vietnam sent down thousands upon thousands of cadres, as they are called.

The fact is that no evidence has been submitted yet that very many military North Vietnamese came down. Yet, if we read the Stevenson speech today, it is very cleverly worded in its semantics to give the impression that there is a terrific invasion of South Vietnam. He does not say, "military invasion," but he is a master in the use of words. And that is the impression that one gets.

I have cross examined witnesses for some time on South Vietnam from the Pentagon Building and from the State Department. When I put the question to them: "What military personnel have you found in South Vietnam from North Vietnam, Red China, Cambodia, or elsewhere?" the answer always is, "Practically none." Yet, the State Department does not like to hear me say that it is a civil war.

So when I press the witnesses further with the question, "Am I to understand that the Vietcong are South Vietnamese almost entirely?" the answer is "Yes."

Let us put this representation to rest once and for all. We do not help the American case unless we talk in terms of facts. And the fact is that so far as the Vietcong are concerned, the testimony to date has been that it is almost entirely South Vietnamese. There is some testimony that a few soldiers from North Vietnam have been found, and possibly a few from Laos. But there have not been found in South Vietnam any substantial contingent of foreign soldiers.

The same is true of their weapons. The Vietcong have long armed themselves from captured government stocks, not by foreign imports from Communist countries. The so-called supply lines that so many politicians want to bomb are little more than a myth. Leadership for the rebels undoubtedly comes from North Vietnam; but most of their weapons come from the United States.

The foreign soldiers in South Vietnam are U.S. soldiers, not North Vietnamese or Laotian soldiers. What a spot to be in. What a paradox. The United States is talking about invasions from North Vietnam and Laos, and yet, when we put our Government witness under examination, they have to admit that they have not been able to discover very many of them. Yet, the Communists charge us with violating the Geneva accords by having 16,000 foreign soldiers in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, it is true—and I would write it for all I was worth if I were representing my government in a case before the United Nations—that the Government of North Vietnam has engaged in a military training program for South Vietnamese. In my judgment, we cannot reconcile that with the Geneva accords. And I would prove it. The witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee have proved it to my complete satisfaction.

But, that does not justify our sending more American soldiers over there. It only makes its more compelling that we prove our case in keeping with our obligations under the United Nations Charter. There again, it is a case of the kettle calling the pot black. For we are training the South Vietnamese, too. The Government witnesses say, "Well, we have found some Russian weapons; we have found some Red Chinese weapons; we have found some North Vietnamese weapons; and we have found some Laotian weapons. That shows who is behind this movement today." I think it does, too. But it only calls upon us to prove it. And we can prove it before the United Nations. But there again, we are confronted with another kettle and pot argument, for we are supplying the South Vietnamese with all their weapons. And again, in my judgment, as the neutral council found in 1957, we have thereby for some years violated the Geneva accords.

Why not reverse the field? Are we not big enough to admit a mistake in policy? Must the great United States of America continue to misrepresent our position as, in my judgment, is the case in the speech made today before the Security Council. There are many misrepresentations to be found. There are many misrepresentations of the U.S. position in South Vietnam to be found.

No, Mr. President; peace is more important than U.S. face. Peace is more important than a temporary loss of U.S. prestige, if we lose any prestige by seeking to right a mistaken course of action. I believe the opposite would be true. However, the State Department, and apparently McNamara, in conducting McNamara's war in South Vietnam, place great emphasis on the matter of face.

I place none on it. I always thought that face-saving was an Oriental custom, not an Anglo-Saxon custom, or an American custom.

These last comments lead me to point out, even though the State Department rankles when we say it, that we are involving ourselves in a civil war. "Oh," they say, "this is no civil war. We are protecting the South Vietnamese from aggression from the north."

The situation in Vietnam is that in family after family—and families are very important to the Orientals—there is a father on one side and some of his sons on the other side; a brother on one side and brothers on the other side; an uncle on one side, and nephews on the other. It is a pretty sad internal state of affairs, which, according to my definition of words, spells civil war.

Let no one think that he has an "out" by saying that because it is a civil war, we have no obligation to take it to the United Nations. I will cover that point momentarily. At this moment in my speech I wish to say again, irrespective of denials from the State Department, according to the evidence the State Department has offered itself, and according to the testimony of witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee of which I have the honor to be a member, that it spells out a civil war.

In South Vietnam there is a contest between one side, which we characterize as Communist and which I believe are Communists, although we make the mistake of thinking that Communists have only one set of political philosophical beliefs and the other side. We know in the United States that when we speak of a political partisanship ideology, there are degrees of philosophies within a party. We do not have one Democratic Party; we have several Democratic Parties under the Democratic label. We do not have one Republican Party; we have several Republican Parties under the Republican label. Sometimes they are personified by being spoken of as the Goldwater Republican Party or the Rockefeller Republican Party or the Lodge Republican Party. Likewise, in the Democratic Party. We can refer to the leaders of our party and divide up the party in the same way.

The point I am making is that I believe the Vietcongs are Communists, totalitarians. I believe that the Vietcongs are under the ideological domination of Red China. To some extent they are also under the ideological domination of Red Russia, but they lean heavily toward Red China. I abhor it. However, we shall not beat communism with military might. To the contrary, military might will only end mankind.

The other side of the civil war is not composed of a group of democrats. For the most part, they do not understand the differences of political ideology, and could not care less. There is a situation which involves an internal strife in a country which we, more than any other force, have brought into being, and which we, more than any other power, have maintained since it was created as our puppet. It all spells out to me, so far as the conflict is concerned, a civil war.

Mr. President, does that justify our intervening without going first to the United Nations? It does not. We cannot come to the defense of South Vietnam without also bringing the issue to the United Nations so far as our obligations under the charter are concerned.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reads as follows:

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

I believe that is pretty clear. One of the remarkable things about the Charter of the United Nations is that in our time a group of statesmen such as our representatives at San Francisco, where the United Nations was born, was able, in an international convention, with all the differences that exist in worldwide views, as expressed in that San Francisco conference, to write an organic act as clear, as simple in its phraseology, and as easy to understand and interpret, as the United Nations Charter.

I hold to the point of view that, of course, the greatest organic act of providing for self-government ever penned by man was penned by our constitutional fathers when they wrote the Constitution of the United States. However, it is remarkable that the United Nations Charter should be written with language of acceptance to the delegates from so many nations, as clear and simple in its meaning as the charter.

Article 51 is no exception. Let me read it again:

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

That is very clear on the duties of the members of the United Nations. But, say some of the apologists for U.S. action in South Vietnam, South Vietnam is not a member of the United Nations. Those apologists become ensnared by their own rationalizing, for when they say that, they do not take into account other parts of the United Nations, to which I shall refer momentarily.

First, let me say that I consider that to be an argument that cannot be squared with ethics, because the United States is a member of the United Nations. We cannot square with ethics an attempted justification of unilateral U.S. military action in South Vietnam

on the ground that South Vietnam is not a member of the United Nations, even if there were not other provisions in the United Nations Charter that refer to "parties to a dispute" whether they are members or not. Yet we hear the argument made by alibiers for America's military action through McNamara's war in South Vietnam that South Vietnam is not a U.N. member.

But even if it should be claimed that article 51 does not apply because South Vietnam is not a member, that still does not relieve the United States of its United Nations obligations, because we are a member, and are bound by article 51. In addition, articles 33 and 37 apply not only to United Nations members but to any parties to a dispute. It is the dispute in southeast Asia that is threatening the peace of the world that gives the jurisdictional right to the United Nations to intervene. The fallacy of the argument of those who try to crawl out from a recognition of the U.S. obligation to take this dispute to the United Nations is that they apparently are laboring under the misapprehension that if a country is not a member of the United Nations, it can go ahead and threaten the peace of the world to its heart's content, and the United Nations will stand by and let it do so. This is the next point I wish to emphasize in my speech tonight.

The United Nations obligation to preserve the peace with respect to the signatories thereto is worldwide. It is global. So let me give a hypothetical. I hope it will always remain a hypothetical. The terrible thought is that it might not be some day—and not too far away, either. But suppose Red China should start on a course of world warmaking, and suppose that United Nations countries X or Y—or, if it is preferred, Russia—or any other Communist nation—should join with Red China by giving her assistance, and then argue that the charter does not apply because Red China is not a member of the United Nations. We all know that in that case we would see very clearly how wrong are the apologists for U.S. unilateral military action in South Vietnam. The task of the United Nations is to exercise its procedure in an endeavor to carry out its peacekeeping responsibility throughout the world, no matter whether the aggressor, the warmaking power, is a member of the United Nations or not. The charter makes ample provision for disputes involving parties who are not U.N. members.

So there is no excuse for the U.S. position in South Vietnam on the ground that South Vietnam is not a member of the United Nations and therefore we had no duty or obligation to report the threat of peace to the United Nations for its determination.

Furthermore, under articles 33 and 37, we are covered anyway, because those articles refer, in the following language, to parties to the dispute. Of course, we have made ourselves a party to the dispute, so that language would cover us. But it also covers South Vietnam, a non-member of the United Nations, for it is

the major party to the dispute on one side, and we ought to go to the United Nations and prove, by the evidence that we can submit, who the parties are on the other side. So I end that section of my speech—and the other section will be much briefer—by saying that under the United Nations Charter itself we are clearly indicted and stand self-convicted of violating our obligations under the United Nations Charter. But there was not one word about that from Adlai Stevenson today.

Mr. Stevenson repeated another old fallacy that has popped up in this debate time and time again: that the U.S. Government is currently involved in the affairs of the Republic of Vietnam for one reason, and one reason only; namely, that the Republic of Vietnam requested the help of the United States and of other governments to defend itself against armed attack fomented, equipped, and directed from the outside. Whom does he think he is kidding? East Germany requested help from Russia, and East Germany is a puppet of Russia, as South Vietnam is a puppet of the United States.

Mr. President, it was the intervention of John Foster Dulles that had more to do with bringing South Vietnam into existence than any other force or factor.

I also read with interest the frequent reference in the Stevenson speech to the "Republic of South Vietnam." No one should get the idea from his use of the term "republic" that South Vietnam is a republic in political practice, policy, and organization. South Vietnam is a dictatorship; it does not have a democratic form of government.

But the point I wish to make is that because a country asks the United States to come in and make war does not relieve us one iota of our obligation and responsibility to take the issue to the United Nations. What an exit, what an escape hatch, that would be to get around the United Nations Charter. Stevenson knows better than that. His lips should not have been allowed to be used to spread that kind of fallacious argument on the record of history for future generations to read.

The South Vietnam Government asked us to come in. We should have said, "We will do everything we can to help to take your case to the United Nations and ask for immediate and expeditious action in the United Nations to preserve law and order and peace in South Vietnam." Even in coming to the defense of South Vietnam under article 51 we are permitted to do so only pending United Nations action, and we are obliged to report to the Security Council everything we do in aid of the victim.

Our Ambassador, however, said nothing of these provisions of article 51 when he spoke of our aid being sent at the request of South Vietnam.

Adlai Stevenson made quite a broad statement in another place in his speech, when he said:

Nor will it be the last time unless the lesson is learned once and for all by all aggressors that armed aggression does not pay—that it no longer works—that it will not be tolerated.

If that is not rattling the saber, I do not know what language could be used to describe a policy of saber rattling.

Is this a proposal on the part of the United States, through its Ambassador to the United Nations, that we are now setting ourselves up as the policeman for the world, to enforce peace in accordance with our sights, on the basis of our judgment? That policy enunciated by Adlai Stevenson must be repudiated not only by the United States; it must be repudiated by the other nations of the world. The United States should not be allowed to get by with that threat—for it is a threat—whereby we not only rattle the saber, but we threaten the world that we will set ourselves up to intervene whenever, in our judgment, we ought to intervene, irrespective of the fact that our intervention will threaten the peace of the world.

Mr. President, as one Member of this body, I repudiate it, I regret that our Ambassador to the United Nations enunciated it—even in a speech written for him, in the main, by the State Department.

On page 4 of my copy of his speech he is shown as having said:

The International Control Commission in Vietnam, established by the Geneva accords of 1954, stated in a special report which it issued in June 1962, that there is sufficient evidence to show that North Vietnam has violated various articles of the Geneva accords by its introduction of armed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities against the Government and armed forces of South Vietnam.

That is true; but Adlai Stevenson is a very able lawyer; and he knows, as a lawyer, that when one presents evidence to a court, he has the obligation to present all the evidence, not just self-serving evidence; and Adlai Stevenson had the obligation to include in his reference to what the Commission found a statement that it also found in 1957 that South Vietnam had violated the Geneva accords—as I said sometime ago, in my colloquy with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER]. One of the reasons why it was found to have violated the Geneva accords was U.S. participation in military action in South Vietnam, in the supplying of our military aid.

All I say to Ambassador Stevenson is that we should have reversed our position, and should have taken the case to the United Nations. We should not have waited for little Cambodia to drag us before the United Nations. For weeks I have warned the Senate that sooner or later the United Nations would call us to account. And now the little nation of Cambodia has done so—little Cambodia, whose governing prince, some months ago, kicked our representatives out of his country. He said to them, "We are done with you and your aid. Get out. We want to be let alone, so far as the United States is concerned." So he threw our representatives out of his country. Now Cambodia has filed these charges against us with the United Nations; but the reply made by our Am-

bassador to the United Nations is as full of holes as a swiss cheese.

In his speech Ambassador Stevenson also said:

The total number of military cadres sent into South Vietnam via infiltration routes runs into the thousands. Such infiltration is well documented on the basis of numerous defectors and prisoners taken by the Armed Forces of South Vietnam.

We ought to have the evidence of that. But that evidence has never been put before the Foreign Relations Committee. So the State Department and the Pentagon should get together with Ambassador Stevenson and should tell the same story in all places.

When the record is examined, I think it will be found that possibly the cadres Stevenson was talking about were South Vietnamese who had been trained in North Vietnam—a point I have already covered. Of course, I suppose it could be said that when we train military personnel, we are sending cadres somewhere, too.

All I wish to say is I shall be interested to see whether the State Department will now back up that broad generalization by Ambassador Stevenson. If they have found such facts, then I wish to say they have been derelict in not making those facts available to the Foreign Relations Committee; and they have been doubly derelict, Mr. President, because the record will show that when I have pressed them for information as to the number of foreign cadres in South Vietnam, I have always received the answer that they are minimal, and that the Vietcong consists, for the most part, of South Vietnamese.

In his speech, Ambassador Stevenson also said:

And if anyone has the illusion that my Government will abandon the people of Vietnam—or that we shall weary of the burden of support that we are rendering these people—it can only be due to ignorance of the strength and the conviction of the American people.

Mr. President, Mr. Stevenson had better get out in the country and talk to the American people. They do not want to abandon the people of South Vietnam; neither do I want to abandon the people of South Vietnam. I want to help the people of South Vietnam; and I am willing to have our country pour great amounts of support into South Vietnam, to help that country over the years develop the seedbeds of economic freedom out of which can grow the plants of political freedom.

But if Mr. Stevenson is laboring under the illusion that the American people stand ready and willing to sacrifice the lives of thousands of American boys in a bogged-down war in South Vietnam, he could not be more mistaken. As he and the rest of this administration will discover, the reaction of the American people in due course of time will be the same as the reaction of the French people after they had lost 240,000 of the flower of their manhood in the Indochina war. Then the French people said to their government, "We have had enough"; and they turned out their government.

Mr. President, I want to help the people of South Vietnam. But again I submit that it is not necessary to slaughter American boys, in order to do so.

What we need to do is use the great world influence of our Government in a peaceful pursuit of peace in South Vietnam, through application and implementation and effectuation of the procedures of international law encompassed within the charter powers of the United Nations.

That should be our course of action.

Mr. Stevenson was on rather thin ice when he said:

The United States has never been against political solutions. Indeed, we have faithfully supported the political solutions that were agreed upon at Geneva in 1954 and again in 1962. The threat to peace in the area stems from the fact that others have not done likewise.

Ambassador Stevenson would have been a little more accurate, even in that sentence, if instead of saying "we have faithfully supported the political solutions that were agreed upon at Geneva in 1954," he had acknowledged that we have violated them rather freely in our unilateral effort to enforce them.

Mr. Stevenson went on:

The Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 were, quite precisely, political agreements to stop the fighting, to restore the peace, to secure the independence of Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to guarantee the integrity of their frontiers, and to permit these much abused peoples to go about their own business in their own ways. The United States, though not a signatory to the 1954 accords, has sought to honor these agreements in the hope that they would permit these people to live in peace and independence from outside interference from any quarter and for all time.

That is not true. We violated the agreements when we proceed to take our unilateral military action in South Vietnam—a course of conduct that the accords were designed to seek to avoid. It is at that point that I respectfully suggest again that we should have taken the issue to the United Nations.

On page 8 of the copy of the speech that I have Ambassador Stevenson talks about our desire to have all foreign troops withdrawn from Laos. I agree. He said:

Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of southeast Asia.

The sad part about that kind of argument is that the other side of the coin constitutes similar charges against the United States as to what we ought to stop doing by way of a course of conduct that really has escalated the strife in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, we would not be in that position if we were presenting the case to the United Nations and asking for United Nations jurisdiction to be taken. I should like to see all those proposals that the Ambassador made in Laos carried out. Does he think that, by way of

U.S. unilateral military action, we will get them carried out? Does he think the day will ever come when foreign troops from America will drive other foreign troops from Laos and Vietnam and keep them out?

Anything but. What an irony that this same Ambassador so eloquently defended a U.N. action in the Congo on the ground that once one great power moved into the Congo, other great powers would move in, too:

Toward the end of the speech, Mr. Stevenson made what I believe is the major "bloop" of the speech, although it is hard to evaluate the chain of mistakes made throughout the speech.

I do not understand how an American Ambassador to the United Nations could in all seriousness take the position that he has taken on the most recent French proposal, for France, as an extension of its proposal weeks ago to reach some accord for the neutralization of southeast Asia, has now come forward with a proposal for reconvening a Geneva conference. We rejected it today in the United Nations Security Council. The language I am about to read I believe will show the correct interpretation. I thought that we were always willing to confer. I always thought that we recognized that by conferring and conferring, by negotiating, by resorting to diplomatic discussions, by seeking to hammer out differences of opinion on an anvil of conscionable compromise, we could best promote peace. I do not know all the details of what De Gaulle has in mind. As Senators know, I have been highly critical of some of De Gaulle's proposals, but I have never taken the position that they should not be considered.

We are living in such a critical era of history that we never can justify rejecting the conference table. That is another reason why I am so disappointed in Ambassador Stevenson's speech today. He said—

Now it is suggested that the way to restore security in the Cambodian-Vietnamese border is to reconvene the Geneva Conference which 10 years ago reached the solemn agreement which I just read to you.

My understanding of the proposal is that it is not limited to the Cambodia-Vietnamese border. It is limited to the whole area of Indochina—Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Cambodia. That is my understanding of what De Gaulle is proposing. I think we ought to embrace it and not repulse it. But our Ambassador continued—

Mr. President, we can surely do better than that. There is no need for another such conference.

What does he mean by the statement that there is no need for another such conference? The issue is crying out for the conference table. The situation in Asia demands, in my judgment, that we go to the conference table, and the sooner the better.

But returning to the Ambassador's speech—

A Geneva conference on Cambodia could not be expected to produce an agreement more effective than the agreements we already have.

How do Senators like that for pre-judgment? How do Senators like that for presumption? Why does he make this statement? Who knows until we try? All I am asking is that we try. He said:

This Council is seized with a specific issue. The Cambodians have brought a specific complaint to this table. Let us deal with it. There is no need to look elsewhere.

Ambassador Stevenson is too good a lawyer to make that statement. He knows that the Cambodia charge of South Vietnam and United States aggression against its border is but one part of a complex in a crisis that is threatening the peace of Asia and endangering the peace of the world.

I continue to read his speech—

Let me say, Mr. President, that my Government endorses the statement made by the distinguished representative of Cambodia to the Council on Tuesday when he pointed out that states which are not members of the United Nations are not thereby relieved of responsibility for conducting their affairs in line with the principles of the Charter of this organization. We could not agree more fully.

I want to ask my Ambassador: "Why not act accordingly? Why have we not acted accordingly in connection with the whole conflict from the beginning, by bringing it before the United Nations?" It involves nations which are members of the United Nations and nations which are not, but it involves a totality of nations whose course of conduct is threatening the peace of Asia, and potentially the peace of the world; and their conduct falls within the jurisdiction of the charter.

I wish my Ambassador had talked about that.

No, Mr. President; the rejection by Adlai Stevenson today in behalf of the United States to go back to the conference table constitutes a gross and unfortunate mistake on the part of my Government.

I close now by asking unanimous consent that an article appearing in the May issue of War-Peace Report, by Mr. Bernard Fall, setting forth some of the major policy problems that confront the United States in South Vietnam, be printed at this point in the RECORD. I think it particularly appropriate that this article should appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, along with Stevenson's unfortunate and unsound speech before the Security Council today.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ADVERSARY IN VIETNAM—SIGNS OF A MILITARY STALEMATE ARE ALREADY APPARENT IN VIETNAM, THIS EXPERT ARGUES, AND THE ONLY WAY OUT IS A CONFRONTATION AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE

(By Bernard B. Fall)

(NOTE.—Bernard B. Fall, a Frenchman, is the author of six books in English and French, including "Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina," and the recently published "The Two Vietnams." He is professor of international relations at Howard University, Washington, D.C., has studied Vietnamese affairs for the past 12 years.)

As the analysis published in the April issue of War-Peace Report clearly showed, there is some room for debate as to who

exactly the adversary is in what many already call the "Second Indochina War." Some see the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) as a genuinely local insurrection created out of despair in the face of the late Diem regime's absurd policies. Others (and this is the official view) consider the NLF solely an extension, for use in South Vietnam, of the North Vietnamese regime or even of Peking. Each side adduces its own evidence to prove its case: on one hand it is contended that even the NLF regulars are indeed southerners (which is true) and on the other one points to the captured Communist bloc weapons to substantiate outside Communist support (also true). Obviously, the actual facts lie somewhere in between.

In my view, and on the basis of my own experience in underground warfare in Nazi-occupied France and later in Indochina, it is possible to lead an insurrection politically and militarily even under guerrilla conditions. That such a fairly centralized direction exists in the South, and has existed at least since 1957 if not earlier, can be fully substantiated. When the killing of village officials began on a large scale in 1957 (an officially admitted total of 472 were killed that year), significant clusterings of the killings occurred in three Vietnamese provinces south of the Mekong River. That obviously did not happen simply because the village officials were more oppressive there than anywhere else, but simply because the guerrilla command had decided to clear those areas for the purpose of making them the permanent resistance bases they have since become. And the deliberate shift last year of Vietcong operations from the Vietnamese highlands to the Mekong Delta was another magnificently executed military tactic, with regular units slipping through the network of United States advised South Vietnamese units with almost impunity.

Unbelievably, that deliberate Vietcong move into the Mekong Delta was officially explained away by the United States as part of "our strategy \* \* \* to sweep them steadily southward and finally corner them"; i.e., sweep the Vietcong out of an area where recruits and food were hard to get and into an area where food and recruits are plentiful and where all of Vietnam's most sensitive targets lay, including Saigon, with its industries, airports and government installations.

True, there has been a great deal of exaggerated propaganda in Washington and elsewhere about "Chinese and Russian" help to the insurgents in view of the presence in South Vietnam of some Soviet- or Chinese-made antitank weapons and automatic rifles. As Arthur Dommen correctly assumes, the bulk of this ordnance comes from Laos. And the fact, for example, that some excellent Madsen submachineguns—produced in Denmark, a NATO ally—have been found among the Vietcong does not ipso facto prove that Denmark backs the Communists in Vietnam; it simply means that arms merchants have no national loyalties. Soviet-made guns (captured by the Israelis in Egypt and resold by them on the world's arms market) can be bought within a mile of the Pentagon on the Alexandria, Va., docks—and quite legally, too. The unfortunate fact is that nine-tenths of all modern weapons in Vietcong hands are standard American weapons captured from the South Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces. Officially, the loss of over 12,000 such weapons in 1963 is acknowledged. What the South Vietnamese may have lost but not reported to their own higher commanders or the U.S. military advisory command, may run much higher. It is obviously far better and easier for the Vietcong to capture matching ammunition for their American weapons from "our" Vietnamese than to get Soviet or Chinese ammunition from Hanoi. But aid in the form of political and mili-

tary cadres does come from the north, as well as some fully constituted regular units composed of southern Vietnamese and mountain tribal soldiers. The presence in the south of the 120th, 126th, and 803d Vietcong regiments has been well known for the past 2 years and, according to the New York Times of April 13, 1964, the 108th Regiment had recently been identified in central Vietnam. If that is true, then the Vietcong has reconstituted in central Vietnam all the regular regiments which I knew there during the French-Indochinese war. The 803d and the 108th were particularly dreaded for their junglegoing capability; in June 1954, they mercilessly destroyed a French regimental combat team equipped with tanks and artillery whose core units had successfully fought the Chinese and North Koreans while with the U.N. forces in Korea. Those regiments left South Vietnam in 1954 for the north. Their presence now inside South Vietnam certainly constitutes what the International Control Commission for the maintenance of the 1954 cease-fire provisions has called (with the vote of its Indian and Canadian members overruling the objections of its Polish member) "evidence \* \* \* that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities. \* \* \*"

#### NO LEGAL REDRESS

It is true, as my compatriot Philippe Devillers said in his article written in 1961 (i.e., long before the NLF developed to its present importance), that many simple farmers and even urban politicians and intellectuals chose to fight with the Vietcong rather than face the certitude of an indefinite stay in one of Diem's infamous concentration camps. That will always be the case when men with real grievances are put into a position where no legal redress is offered them. The same situation occurred in 1946 when the French, still hellbent upon rebuilding their colonial empire, offered no honorable way out to the nationalist Vietnamese opposition. The most active opposition members joined the Viet Minh in its armed struggle against the French—not for the purpose of making Vietnam Communists, but to make it free.

This history does not mean, however, that the Viet Minh was not Communist-controlled nor that it did not end by creating a wholly Communist-dominated state in the zone of Vietnam under its control. The same error, I fear, is being made in evaluating the NLF. The fact that its program does not at present contain Communist objectives offers little guarantee as to its future intentions. I defy anyone to find a single Communist inflection in Ho Chi Minh's 1946 Viet Minh constitution. It was a document designed to win maximum support among the broad population, and it did that most effectively. And the reason offered quite openly by North Vietnam in 1960 for the abrogation of the 1946 document and its replacement by a tough, Communist-line constitution was that the old constitution "no longer was in accordance with Socialist realities." That is in all likelihood what would happen to the present NLF program the day that front comes to power in Saigon.

This does not mean, however, that I agree with those who believe that the only way out of the present Vietnamese dilemma is a 20-year counterinsurgency operation. Here again, the historical precedents show various possibilities:

1. Communist guerrillas do not always win and the Soviet bloc does not always support them to the bitter end. The Communists abandoned their guerrillas in Greece, Azerbaijan, Malaya, and the Philippines—and in South Korea, where there was for a

long time a serious guerrilla problem. Milovan Djilas' conversations with Stalin has a magnificent passage on Stalin's cold-blooded decision to let the Greek Communist ELAS partisans die for nothing because he did not want to get war-exhausted Russia entangled in a conflict with the United States.

2. On the other hand, to negotiate with a Communist opponent when one's original war aims are no longer attainable does not automatically mean that one has to lose his shirt; or that native forces being supported will therefore be totally demoralized. In Korea some of the toughest fighting went on while American and Communist negotiators sat at Pan Mun Jom for 2 years. The ROK forces were not demoralized by the negotiations. My own experience has been that one fights harder if a reasonable end is in sight and one knows his side needs a victory to strengthen its negotiating position.

To be sure, the Laotian "sellout" of 1962 is usually dragged in at this point of the argument to prove how badly the West usually fares in such a situation. It was the late Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, a soldier-diplomat of the first rank, who said during the 1954 Geneva conference that it was "difficult to regain at the conference table what has already been lost on the battlefield." In Laos, thanks to a set of incredible illusions (now amply matched in Vietnam), it was believed that the Laotian rightwing forces could be made to fight. The hard fact is that had the military war in Laos continued for 1 more month, all of Laos would have been Communist. But as a result of the negotiations a wobbly neutralist government has, for the past 2 years, kept the Communist Pathet Lao away from the sensitive Mekong Valley which borders on Thailand. Considering the panic that gripped Bangkok in 1962 when it was erroneously announced that Communist forces had broken through to the Mekong near Ban Houei Sai, that surely is an achievement. A Communist advance there could never have been halted without at least very sizable American ground forces being committed at fantastic cost.

3. The North Vietnamese stand to lose at least as much (if not more) than the South Vietnamese if the present second Indochina war escalates. North Vietnam has not had a shot fired at it in anger in 10 years. One stands an awful lot of dictatorship (look at Franco's Spain) just for the sake of not being at war. A single American saturation raid on North Vietnam may do away with 10 years of back-breaking "Socialist construction" as well as with that feeling of peace. It would not (contrary to what some great oversimplifiers believe) bring an end to the insurgency in South Vietnam; on the contrary, with the gloves being off, North Vietnam would then throw her fearsome (and now unemployed) regular divisions into the fight—and who can say what Red China might throw in. That would "Koreanize"—or shall we say: "MacArthurize"?—the South Vietnamese conflict with all the unforeseeable international consequences (in 1950, the nuclear age was in its infancy and the U.N. still white-dominated) that might follow.

#### SOLE LOGICAL EXIT

It is my feeling that some sort of a mutually acceptable accommodation will eventually ensue from a more realistic appreciation of what the three above-cited factors really mean. It is understandable that Washington does not wish to negotiate with the NLF or Hanoi (one might well wonder whether this might not be more embarrassing in a tete-a-tete than at a multipower conference which is now being heatedly rejected) with as badly a deteriorated military situation as exists now—and just before a presidential election. And it is likewise obvious that General Khanh's regime in Saigon, whose rise to power was favored precisely because he violently rejects any thought of

negotiation, would view such contacts as a "sellout." There is, after all, in neighboring Laos the example of the rightist General Phoumi, who was first encouraged to overthrow neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma, only to be pressured 1 year later into accepting (and, in fact, supporting) the same Souvanna Phouma as premier of a "troika" regime. Khanh would understandably resent being placed in the same kind of predicament.

But signs of a military stalemate—harder to perceive in Vietnam where there is no battleline to draw on maps, as there was in Korea—are nevertheless apparent. And the sole logical exit from such a situation is sooner or later a confrontation at the conference table.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I next ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record as a part of my speech on the Vietnam issue an article entitled "Vietnam: Alternative to Disaster," written by Donald Grant and published in the May 25, 1964, issue of the Nation. Mr. Grant is U.N. correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### Vietnam: ALTERNATIVE TO DISASTER (By Donald Grant)

(NOTE.—Donald Grant is U.N. correspondent and foreign news analyst for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.)

It is not really very difficult to demonstrate that the U.S. involvement in the civil war in South Vietnam is a wasteful and futile exercise. Two correspondents in Saigon have just received a Pulitzer Prize for overcoming that difficulty: the story of ever-mounting casualties and expenditures and of diminishing returns for American policy objectives is on public record. Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, has assembled the facts and the evidence in a notable speech to his colleagues that is recommended reading.

Senator MORSE concluded that the mess in South Vietnam should be turned over to the United Nations, at the same time acknowledging, in part, the difficulties involved. The United Nations is not a world government; it lacks both the power and the political mechanism to force a peaceful solution to a direct confrontation between major powers. In the case of South Vietnam, however, the United Nations has real possibilities for usefulness that have not been explored. It is a pity that this unthinkable thought has never been pursued seriously in the State Department since the United States plunged recklessly into Vietnam in 1955.

There are a number of possible explanations for this paralysis of imagination in Washington. How can the United Nations act effectively in a situation that involves, among other nations, the People's Republic of China, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, none of which is a member of the United Nations? Moreover, as Senator MORSE so ably demonstrated, the American position in South Vietnam is legally and morally compromised. Would not exposure of this abominable reality before our enemies and quasi-friends in the U.N. further damage American prestige?

So we go on, spending \$1.5 billion a day, sending in upward of 15,000 American troops, some of whom return with full honors but quite dead. From time to time, figures are published to show that members of the Communist Vietcong have been killed or captured by the hundreds. And other figures show that the theoretical strength of the Vietcong is just about what it has been right along.

Periodically, we take a nervous glance at the areas surrounding Vietnam. There was

an American project a while back to upset the neutrality in Laos, in favor of the right wing; by now we would settle for neutrality in the Souvanna Phouma center, but find it not easy to restore broken eggs to their shells. Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk seems much too happy when visiting Peiping. The State Department people comfort one another by saying the Cambodian Premier is something of a playboy and does not really mean it. Even Thailand—the headquarters for John Foster Dulles' SEATO was established in Bangkok—is taking a second look at its all-out commitment to the United States. Historically, the Thais have been good judges of political reality; they maintained their independence through the era of colonialism by playing off the greater powers one against the other.

Instead of these rapid and anxious glances, the time has come for Americans to take a long and resolute look at their position in the whole of southeast Asia. Using a minimum of commonsense we could, I think, learn a good deal. For example:

The most useful area to deal with is not a swampy piece of real estate called the Mekong Delta, but the entire area covered by the successor states to the old French Indo-China—Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam.

The problem is not chiefly military, but political.

As such, it involves a number of nations, large and small—but no viable solution can be reached without consulting the People's Republic of China.

For reasons exhaustively detailed by Senator MORSE—reasons legal, moral, political, and practical—it is highly desirable to achieve a solution through the United Nations.

It is not very helpful to try to "internationalize the problem of Vietnam" through SEATO, by inducing a few troops from the Philippines to join the battle. NATO could not solve the Cyprus problem, and SEATO is a midget compared to NATO, the wounded giant.

What is required is peace, and the isolation of southeast Asia from the struggles between the great powers. That will not solve all the problems in the area: new nations everywhere are going for some time to have what U.N. Secretary General U Thant has called "teething troubles." But with some foresight these troubles can be prevented from escalating into dangerous confrontation between the large nations. That is what President Charles de Gaulle of France meant when he spoke of neutralizing southeast Asia. It is what Senator MORSE had in mind when he urged that the problem of South Vietnam be turned over to the United Nations.

Time is scarce. As Senator MORSE noted, even now there is talk of U.S.-led attacks on North Vietnam. He also suggested that Peiping could not be counted on to accept this offensive passively.

"This escalation on both sides," he told the Senate, "can only lead to a disaster for the United States. It can only lead from being bogged down in South Vietnam to being bogged down in North Vietnam and then to being bogged down in China. \* \* \* All the briefings on that subject matter that I have received thus far in my many years in the Senate show that is not the place to pick as a battleground with communism."

If that is where the present course is leading, it may not be so unthinkable, after all, to consider the obvious alternative to disaster. The U.N. must play a role in that alternative, but not an initiating role. The first step—and as soon as possible—is to convene another meeting of the nations involved in the South Vietnam affair, a meeting similar to the one in Geneva in 1954, which ended the Indo-Chinese war with France. This time the purpose would be to

hammer out an acceptable plan for neutralizing the entire area—Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. And this time there should be no nonsignatories to the agreement, as were the United States and its chosen government in South Vietnam in 1954.

The Geneva meeting included Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, France, the Soviet Union, Britain, the People's Republic of China, and the United States. There is no reason why other interested nations should not be invited. The Vietcong, which appears to operate with a considerable degree of autonomy, probably should be represented.

Negotiations designed to neutralize the successor states to the old French Indo-China should begin outside the United Nations because key nations, including Communist China, are not members. But the project would not end at such a meeting. A plan, once agreed upon, would be presented to the United Nations Security Council, and the Council would be asked to set up a peacekeeping force to guarantee that neutralization became and remained a fact.

Further, as the United Nations forces entered South Vietnam, United States forces would leave. U.N. forces would also be stationed in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. As an incident to peace, the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia would have to be settled. The most difficult task, however, would be to achieve an equitable ending to the civil war in South Vietnam.

A longing for peace certainly is not foreign to the people in South Vietnam. More important, it is a perhaps harsh reality of world relations that the representatives of small nations or fractions of nations in southeast Asia would find it extremely difficult to reject the concerted will of the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

But what do we mean by neutralization? A State Department official recently told me that any neutralization plan for southeast Asia was unrealistic because "no Communist nation ever gives up communism, and North Vietnam would not." The issue, however, is not whether the bus lines in Hanoi are state owned or the property of free, private enterprise. Yugoslavia is a Communist state—and a neutralist one. The essence of neutralization, in this context, is that the state in question must not be used as a pawn by any of the great powers.

Until an attempt is made to find out, it is impossible to know whether Peiping would accept a neutralization plan. But it is not totally unreasonable to assume that Mao Tse-tung would welcome the removal of U.S. forces from the proximity of his southern borders. Advantages for the United States are obvious. North Vietnam would be less subject to pressure from Peiping. The American expenditure of men and money would cease, and the danger of our involvement in a major conflict under the least favorable terms would be avoided.

Since neutralization of southeast Asia is fervently advocated by De Gaulle, one can assume French cooperation. British cooperation is almost as automatic; stabilization of the old Indo-China area would ease relations for them in Malaysia and Hong Kong. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev has staked his career on peaceful coexistence and the support of neutralism. This alone does not assure Soviet cooperation, but Moscow now runs the danger of overextended commitments in an area where the power of decision tends to rest with Peiping. This is not in the Soviet interest. Peace could hardly be unwelcome in Laos and Cambodia; both strive for neutralism now, with only partial success. Everything we know about Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese leader, leads

one to believe he would be delighted to escape from the role of the little fish ever about to be swallowed by the very large Chinese fish.

This plan for peace and neutralism in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam has been under private discussion within the United Nations. As UN diplomats turn it over in their minds some interesting facets appear. Laos and Cambodia are already members of the United Nations. It would be highly desirable, in connection with the neutralization plan, for North Vietnam and South Vietnam also to be admitted. They could come in as separate states, but without prejudice to future integration, as provided in the Geneva agreement of 1954. There are precedents for this in the merger of Egypt and Syria, and their later resumption of separate nationhood, and in the current merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. UN membership rules and practices readily encompass such developments.

Furthermore, the admission of North Vietnam and South Vietnam would itself be an interesting precedent. How about North Korea and South Korea? How about East Germany and West Germany? How about—for that matter—mainland China and Taiwan? This, to be sure, will also occur to the astute gentlemen in Peiping, but as U Thant noted recently, a few unthinkable thoughts may also be good for people other than Americans—among them the Chinese.

By participating in a conference of nations directly interested in the southeast Asia problem, and by seeing the decisions of that conference underwritten by the United Nations, Communist China would have a chance to test the winds blowing from the East River. The United States and the Soviet Union could test Chinese intentions at close quarters, and a step would have been taken toward including the dragon within the world system.

Policing neutralism in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam would be a tough assignment, and there is reason to believe that U Thant would welcome it. Peace is Thant's business. He also believes the United Nations grows in strength by using its muscles. With advance agreement among the great powers, he could anticipate vigorous and unanimous action by the Security Council, which would help make his task more feasible.

There still remains, of course, the business of the dominoes—the theory that unless the Vietcong is utterly effaced in South Vietnam, all of southeast Asia will fall to communism, piece after piece. The domino metaphor was always dubious; it loses all relevance if neutralism in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam is guaranteed by a United Nations peace force on the spot.

Southeast Asia is a complex of islands and peninsulas inhabited by a variety of human beings of several cultures, subcultures, religions and political and socioeconomic systems. None is really suitable as a counter in a parlor game, whether played in Moscow, Peiping, or Washington.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I close my speech by way of comment upon the Stevenson speech before the United Nations today by saying I am sorry that it was necessary to have to make the speech, but I could not let this day go by and permit anyone to think that any silence on my part might mean agreement with Stevenson's speech. The speech was a great mistake; and I still pray that our Government will reassess its South Vietnam policy and return to keeping its obligations under the United Nations, instead of continuing to act outside the framework of its United Nations obligations.

## AWARD OF LEGION OF MERIT TO MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. LAPSLEY

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on May 9 it was my pleasure to participate in the dedication of Cougar Dam at the site of the dam on the South Fork McKenzie River, Oregon.

In attendance at the dedication ceremonies were two outstanding officers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, both of whom are to be commended for their fine work in connection with Cougar Dam and other river and harbor projects in Oregon. I refer to Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley, North Pacific division engineer, and Col. Sterling K. Eisinger, district engineer, both of Portland, Oregon.

During my visit to Oregon to participate in the dedication ceremonies, it was my pleasure to read an article that appeared in the May 7 issue of the Portland Oregonian, indicating that Maj. Gen. Lapsley had been honored on May 6 of this year by the Legion of Merit Award. This news was most gratifying because, in my opinion, General Lapsley is a great credit to our Armed Forces and a dedicated public servant.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the May 6 announcement of the Chief of Engineers supplying the facts concerning the presentation of the award to General Lapsley, the text of the citation, and the Oregonian news item, be set forth at this point in my remarks:

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. LAPSLEY AWARDED LEGION OF MERIT

Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley, North Pacific division engineer of the Army Corps of Engineers, today was awarded the Legion of Merit.

The presentation was made at the Pentagon at a luncheon in connection with the annual spring Division Engineers Conference of the Army Corps of Engineers, being held this week in Washington.

The award was presented by the Honorable Stephen Ailes, Secretary of the Army, and Lt. Gen. W. K. Wilson, Jr., Chief of Engineers, in the presence of other division engineers of the Corps of Engineers and a number of civilian and military Department of the Army leaders from the Pentagon. The latter included: Harry C. McPherson, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (IA); Gen. Hugh P. Harris, Acting Vice Chief of Staff; Lt. Gen. James L. Richardson, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Lt. Gen. Ben Harrell, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development; Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Doleman, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; and Maj. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics designate.

The citation follows:

"Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service while serving in a position of responsibility as division engineer, U.S. Army Engineer Division, North Pacific, Portland, Oregon, from October 1962 to January 1964. General Lapsley represented the United States in a highly effective manner during the negotiations of the United States-Canadian Treaty relating to international cooperation in water resource developments of the Columbia River Basin. Through his diplomacy, professional knowledge, and skill in defining and suggesting arrangements, he insured the development of compatible terms. His professional competence and devotion to duty,

combined with his harmonious working relationship with officials of both nations and senior officers of the military service, contributed to the consummation of the protocol which was signed by the Secretaries of State in the presence of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada. General Lapsley's successful efforts earned for him the high regard of all associated with him and greatly enhanced the prestige of the U.S. Army. His distinguished performance of duty throughout this period represents outstanding achievement in the most cherished traditions of the U.S. Army and reflects the utmost credit upon himself and the military service."

[From the Portland (Oreg.) Oregonian, May 7, 1964]

#### CORPS FEETES ARMY EXPERT

Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley of Portland, North Pacific division Army engineer, Wednesday received the Legion of Merit at a luncheon in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., for his successful efforts and leadership in connection with the negotiations of the United States-Canadian Treaty on water resource development of the Columbia River Basin.

The presentation was a feature of the annual spring conference of division engineers and was made by Stephen Alles, Secretary of the Army, in the presence of Lt. Gen. W. K. Wilson, Jr., Chief of Engineers.

Among the high-ranking officials present were Harry C. McPherson, Jr., Deputy Secretary of the Army; Gen. Hugh P. Harris, Acting Vice Chief of Staff; Lt. Gen. James L. Richardson, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Lt. Gen. Ben Harrell, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development; Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Dolman, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; and Maj. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, designate.

The citation said General Lapsley distinguished himself while serving as division engineer at Portland from October 1962 to January 1964, "when he represented the United States in a highly effective manner during the negotiations of the United States-Canadian Treaty relating to international cooperation in water resources development of the Columbia River Basin.

"Through his diplomacy, professional knowledge and skill, and defining and suggesting arrangements, he insured the development of compatible terms," the citation stated.

General Lapsley came to Portland in December 1961, from Korea where he was commanding general of the 7th Logistical Command.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, General Lapsley's distinguished career constitutes a fine background for the award of the Legion of Merit. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1935 and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. Prior to World War II, he graduated from the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Va., and the University of California at Berkeley, where he received a master's degree in civil engineering.

General Lapsley was appointed district engineer at Norfolk, Va., in 1942, and in 1943 he served as the engineer supply officer, Mediterranean Base Section, Oran, North Africa. He commanded the 41st Engineer Regiment in its operations in Corsica and in the invasion of southern France.

After World War II, General Lapsley was assigned to the European theater I. & E. staff. He graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1947. In 1956, he became commander of the En-

gineer Maintenance Center in Columbus, Ohio, and was assigned as division engineer, Ohio River Division, in 1958. In 1961, he assumed his duties as division engineer in Portland.

Mr. President, I am sure that the people of the State of Oregon are proud, as I am, of the well-deserved award which was conferred upon General Lapsley on May 6.

#### ARTICLE BY ROBERT H. SNOW

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Dr. Robert H. Snow, who is program administrator of the Adult Education Division of Syracuse University last October published an article in volume 49, No. 3, of *Liberal Education* magazine, in which he straightforwardly challenged his colleagues to pay more attention to the average undergraduate student.

I am particularly pleased to have had the opportunity to review his article since his comments echo my own teaching experience. The challenge of the C student is one which should bring forth the best of our teaching talent in higher education since these are the young men and women who make up the backbone of our institutions of higher education while they are in college and who comprise the major leadership of our communities when they enter business and professional worlds.

What Dr. Snow is saying will not be popular with a good many educators, but I think his salty comments will be cause for self-searching on the part of conscientious and dedicated teachers.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have alluded be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE UNWANTED MAJORITY

(By Robert H. Snow)

(NOTE.—The current demand for increased attention to the superior student challenged as an evasion of the academic obligation to help every student gain access to intellectual life on his own terms.)

During the 1960's we have been urged to dedicate ourselves anew to the nurture of the superior student and the cultivation of intellect. The hounds are baying in pursuit of excellence. Those splendid catchwords: "advanced placement," "acceleration," "rigorous scholastic standards," "honors section" and their numerous counterparts have come bubbling forth in glorious profusion.

The litany is a familiar one. Having opened the floodgates to an unbookish multitude, we have admitted to our secondary schools and our colleges a vast horde of undesirables, with no love for learning, with little aptitude for serious study. As a result, academic programs have become de-vitalized, trivial, without substance. Nothing remains to challenge the gifted student, to spur him onward to high achievement. His precious talents are neglected as we cater to the frivolities of the mediocre and the inept. Our educational salvation demands that this woeeful state of affairs shall continue no longer. We must reaffirm the primacy of intellect, and once again render to the superior student the attention he deserves.

Within academic circles, there are many who support this crusade with enthusiasm. The prospect of dealing with a selected

clientele has numerous attractions. If one could be relieved of the burdens and frustrations involved in attempting to teach those who seem impervious to ideas, life would be considerably more pleasant. Plausible arguments uphold the view that colleges and universities should give major emphasis to serving those of exceptional ability. Resources are limited and should not be squandered upon those who are unresponsive, unable to benefit from intensive intellectual stimulation. Higher education is a privilege, not a right. Society gains most when those with superior talents achieve their full potential. These individuals will eventually occupy positions of leadership, and their contributions will filter down to benefit the total population. Our future progress and our national security as well are dependent upon the cultivation of the best minds. It seems obvious that if energies are diverted in service to the second rate the highly talented will be victimized. Did not Jefferson himself recommend that we sift out the rubbish?

Thus, once again, we are offered in appealing garb the concept of the education of an elite. Let the colleges and universities focus their efforts upon those of greater promise. Let the mediocre be dispatched to humbler surroundings more in keeping with their limited capabilities. It is a proposal to warm the hearts of academicians—and fundamentally vicious.

It is a vicious doctrine because it offers a spurious cloak of legitimacy for irresponsible conduct on the part of those who have accepted positions in colleges and universities. It is a tacit invitation for faculty members and officials to view the majority of their students with contempt, to deny them the opportunities to which they are justly entitled. It supplies a convenient pretext for continued failure to devise educational programs appropriate for those enrolled. It serves to reinforce and perpetuate the worst features of our educational system.

The notion that educators, during recent decades, have been giving an inordinate share of attention to average students is largely myth. The minority with high academic aptitude have always occupied a favored position, and the reasons for this are fairly simple.

Perceptive students are much more pleasant to deal with. They grasp ideas quickly, without need for labored explanations. They are polite, attentive, properly deferential. In general, they are capable of shifting for themselves. Talented people do not require teaching, in the usual sense of the term. Talent cultivates itself. The able students need leisure, access to study materials, opportunity to seek counsel as they desire it. Beyond this, they are relatively self-sufficient. They make substantial progress in a short time, and their achievements reflect credit on the college.

Furthermore, in dealing with highly capable students, the professor finds it easier to maintain a favorable self-image. It is comforting to feel that one's work proceeds on an elevated plane and is concerned with matters of profound significance. Association with superior students helps preserve this gratifying sense of academic dignity. When, on the other hand, one is compelled to deal with students who are obviously limited in their ability to handle abstract ideas, this concept is weakened. The professor is constantly reminded of the more pedestrian aspects of his calling.

Mediocre students are full of disappointments. Teaching them is a struggle. They are often inattentive and fail to appreciate what is done for them. One can deliver a perfectly straightforward lecture to them and it seems to make no impression whatsoever. When told to go to the library and read, they just seem to stare at the pages and understand nothing. They are easily