

hacks and defeated officeholders. While enjoying public sinecures they do little except talk vaguely about survival, plan alerts to annoy their neighbors, and distribute countless reams of literature.

Daily, I—and I am sure all of my colleagues likewise—receive phone calls and letters from mayors and other municipal officials requesting assistance in having their applications for public work projects expedited. Funds for the accelerated public works program, which is operated on a matching basis, have been virtually depleted. At the same time the Federal Government is encouraging these officials to spend about \$19 million for salaries, not to mention the additional millions required, for civil defense employees. If we cut off the head of the bureaucratic octopus in Washington, its wasteful satellites in States and cities will soon wither away.

Mr. President, the amount requested for civil defense is about half that requested by the President for the war on poverty. It is more than three times the amount requested for the Peace Corps. Wherever and whenever possible our President and we in the Congress are trying to effect economy in Government without curtailing vital programs both foreign and domestic. In good conscience we cannot appropriate anywhere near the huge sum requested for civil defense purposes. To do so would be to make a sham of efforts toward more economy in Government, to encourage waste of taxpayers' money at all levels of Government, and a slap in the face to taxpayers.

Mr. President, when I first began my fight against wasteful civil defense spending early in 1959 I was virtually alone in the Congress. Today I know that many of my colleagues share my views as evidenced by rollcall votes at various times on efforts to reduce such spending, and by the recent action of the Armed Services Subcommittee on which I have the honor to serve. The recent thaw in the cold war coupled with greatly advanced nuclear technology has raised the question of whether we should continue our civil defense program, such as it is. At any rate these events have made it imperative that the entire program—its objectives and its structure—need drastic redefinition and revision.

Furthermore, the American people and the American press have become increasingly disgusted with this waste of money, time, and effort. One newspaper that has for many years called for a halt to such waste and for the adoption of a realistic civil defense program—if such a thing is possible—is the Cleveland Press, one of Ohio's great newspapers and one of the great newspapers of the Nation. In an excellent editorial entitled "The Mess in Civil Defense" published on May 16, 1964, this newspaper concisely and clearly stated the case against civil defense as now operated. I commend this to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE MESS IN CIVIL DEFENSE

The Office of Civil Defense wants Congress to appropriate \$358 million for next year. For what?

The recent thaw in the cold war has brought about a deterioration of civil defense's functions. This entire program—its objectives and its structure—needs drastic redefinition.

Several communities in Greater Cleveland have either pulled out of civil defense or are threatening to pull out. They understandably do not want to drop their money down a reinforced concrete rathole.

The atrophy in Cleveland has reached the point where the county's civil defense chief, John Pokorny, was shifted to workhouse superintendent last month without anyone yet being named to replace him.

Only Washington can stop the civil defense drift by coming up with a realistic, meaningful program—if one is possible.

Meanwhile, the national CD office wants \$358 million new money, a fraction of which is to pay half the salaries of 6,769 persons hired by local CD agencies. Without useful services for these people to perform, CD is in severe danger of becoming a vast boondoggle—if it not already is so.

As long as an economy-conscious (with other departments' money) Congress is available, with civil defense's chief critic, Senator STEVE YOUNG, on the job, the administration may yet face up to the floundering Office of Civil Defense.

#### U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as a Senator from Montana, I wish to speak on the situation in southeast Asia.

Before I do so, it may be recalled that several years ago I made a speech on the floor of the Senate in which I advocated that consideration be given to the unification of both East Berlin and West Berlin into a united whole. At that time the reaction was somewhat critical. The interpretation of my speech was to the effect that I was advocating the internationalization of West Berlin alone, rather than the unification of the two Berlins, and thereby furthering the difficulties which were inherent in the German question at that time.

Subsequent to that speech, the possibility of the unification of the two Berlins, both East and West, has gone out the window, and the result of not taking any action has been the erection of a wall which has made a definite division between those two cities, one now a part of East Germany. East Berlin is, in fact, the capital of East Germany. The other, West Berlin is a member of the Federal Republic—at least, in a certain sense. So instead of unity, there is division; and that division has been further emphasized through the erection of the wall, which has made a bad situation worse.

In February of this year, I made a speech about Vietnam. At that time I suggested that the United States give some attention to the proposals then being advanced by President de Gaulle, of France, who was seeking to bring about neutrality for all of what formerly was known as Indochina. Following that speech, there was, again, some critical reaction. But now I believe the situation calls for a further examination of the developments in that portion of Asia. I refer to reports in this morning's news-

papers of a proposal by President de Gaulle to reconvene the Geneva Conference on the situation in Laos. The Geneva Conference to which he refers was, of course, the one held in 1962, when an agreement was made by 14 nations to guarantee Laotian neutrality. This would appear to be an extension of the urgent suggestion of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and is in accord with the diplomacy which the United States has been pursuing for the last several days. All of these efforts point toward the same end. They are designed to prevent a final collapse of the tottering situation in Laos and, in reality, throughout the Indochinese Peninsula.

I have said it on a previous occasion and I repeat it now: the diplomatic initiatives of General de Gaulle in southeast Asia ought not to be dismissed lightly. They are designed to preserve a measure of peace, stability, and national sovereignty in southeast Asia, where all three are on the brink of collapse in the gathering chaos. In my judgment, these initiatives now, as in the past, are consistent in every respect with the interests of the United States in that part of the world.

To be sure, neutralism in Laos, an uncertain affair for several years, is not all that we might desire. But that does not mean that it is not desirable to exert ourselves, and to welcome from others every effort to save it. We might well ask ourselves what would have happened in Laos in the past 3 years without this truce, however shaky. The answer is clear: either Laos would now be incorporated into the expanding orbit of North Vietnam and Asia communism or thousands of American soldiers would be engaged in that remote country. The harrowing conflict in Vietnam, which involves Americans only indirectly, does not begin to compare with what would have been our situation in Laos in the absence of the Geneva agreement of 1962.

May I say, further, that in my judgment there is no inconsistency between President Johnson's efforts to shore up the situation in South Vietnam and General de Gaulle's proposal for a conference on Laos. Indeed, there can be no peace in Indochina, except a Communist-dictated peace, unless an improvement is brought about in the situation in South Vietnam such as the President is striving to achieve. But, conversely, there is little likelihood that the situation in Vietnam can be improved without an understanding in Laos along the lines which General de Gaulle is apparently hopeful of achieving.

It is true that the conference which he proposes could conceivably expand into a general discussion of the Cambodian and Vietnamese situation. But is that something to be feared? Are we afraid of words of criticism from China or the Vietnamese Communists at an international conference? That would hardly be a new experience. We have been raved and ranted at before and have always managed to survive.

So long as our purposes remain clear in Vietnam, so long as we continue to recognize that questions of propaganda and prestige, of "face," East or West, are

secondary to both the questions of the peace, well-being, and freedom of the people of southeast Asia and the achievement of our own basic but limited national objectives in Indochina, we have nothing to fear from such a conference.

On the contrary, we might indeed welcome not only the conference proposed by General de Gaulle but even its expansion into the general question of stability in Indochina and southeast Asia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Montana has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 4 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the conference proposed might well be the place to lay all the cards on the table with respect to Indochina and to determine how the peace and freedom of that region is best to be secured. As a nation which is no longer directly involved but whose contacts and cultural influences in Indochina are still extensive, France is clearly in a position to initiate such a conference in all good faith.

As the late President Kennedy said:

We must not negotiate from fear, but neither should we fear to negotiate.

In accordance with that wise counsel, we must continue our economic and military assistance to Vietnam, but we should also consider most carefully the conference proposed by President de Gaulle. It may well be the last train out for peace in southeast Asia.

It should be noted; furthermore, that the question of raids into Cambodia is now pending before the United Nations in this connection. This morning, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations made a speech, a part of which I should like to quote for incorporation in the RECORD. It is contained in Associated Press bulletin No. 66 and reads as follows:

UNITED NATIONS.—Stevenson declared there is a very simple way to restore order in southeast Asia and to bring about the end of the U.S. military aid to South Vietnam.

"Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos," he said.

"Let all states in that area make the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of southeast Asia.

"The people of Laos want to be left alone.

"The people of Vietnam want to be left alone.

"The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

"When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforceable terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in southeast Asia as we have elsewhere."

Two significant articles were also published in today's press, one of which, in the New York Times, indicates that there is an interconnection between the situation in Laos and the Cambodia charge in the United Nations and the situation in South Vietnam.

I quote the following from the editorial—referring to Secretary McNamara:

He has also said that "we have no objection in principle to neutrality in the sense of nonalignment." And Secretaries McNamara and Rusk both have indicated that the United States is prepared to abide by the Geneva accords of 1954, which neutralized all the Indochina States, including Communist North Vietnam. As a result of these accords, French troops and 120,000 Communist guerrillas were withdrawn from South Vietnam. While neutralization can hardly be said to have been a roaring success in Laos, the story might be different if neutralization could ultimately be applied to all of what was formerly French Indochina.

Also the following:

To suggest this does not mean that we can afford, in the meanwhile, to lessen our military effort in South Vietnam. Quite the contrary—we must make it clear to the world that we are willing and able to wage war as well as to negotiate for peace.

And further in the editorial:

We must make clear our willingness at the proper moment to seek a political settlement based, of course, on a non-Communist South Vietnam, independent, neutral—free of Communist guerrillas as well as of foreign troops and bases—and guaranteed by the Great Powers. We must make it clear that we are fighting to get out of, not to stay in, South Vietnam. The aim should be a return to the Geneva settlement of 1954, an objective that might even be supported by the French. In a little noticed statement a few weeks ago, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville indicated that this is really what President de Gaulle has in mind.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the morning hour limitation, the time available to the Senator from Montana has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I quote now from an article written by Walter Lippmann, and published this morning in the Washington Post:

On the contrary, the main objective of French policy is to save southeast Asia from conquest by China and to avert a disaster which would affect the whole Western World in its dealings with Asia. Let us not blind ourselves by a prejudiced refusal to take seriously the French intervention in Asia.

Further on in the article, Mr. Lippmann states:

If we analyze the situation fully, we shall conclude, I believe, that French policy and American are not competitive in Asia but are in fact complementary. This is to say that what De Gaulle is trying to accomplish is the only conceivable solution of what is certainly an otherwise interminable military conflict. But it is to say also that what the United States is continuing to do, which is to sustain the resistance of the Saigon government, is necessary to the success of the French action.

It is in this sense that the two policies are complementary. They would become fused into one policy if the administration adopted as its slogan a modification of Churchill's remark "We arm to parley" and said that "in Vietnam we fight to parley."

Mr. President, I was one of those who felt that the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, the only civilian ruler South Vietnam ever had, was a serious mistake. He was the one man who could have held that country together. When I speak of Ngo Dinh Diem, I am speaking only of Ngo Dinh Diem, a man who would be considered, in a sense, the founder of modern, free Vietnam, a man who devoted his life to that country, and still had much to contribute to it, reports to the contrary notwithstanding, at the time when he was gunned down.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I have listened with close attention to the remarks of the Senator from Montana. If he means essentially the policy which he has laid out for our Government—and without relying upon General de Gaulle's activities but at the same time being willing to recognize and accept him as an ally as long as he performs a useful function as outlined in these ideas and the editorial and the article—I join the Senator from Montana in approving this policy as a political objective for the United States.

Heretofore, I have in a most friendly way differed with the Senator from Montana on ideas to neutralize this area, and also with respect to the situation in Berlin. But I believe the Senator from Montana now has put his finger upon a consistent outline of policy. It is most useful that he is the majority leader.

I believe the criticism that has been made; namely, that our forces are in South Vietnam at so much danger and cost, but without an objective—is answered by this kind of coordinated policy; and I hope very much the distinguished Senator will make clear to the country that this is a consistent line of policy, and is not for a repetition of any previous situation; that we are not fighting blindly, but that we are working to preserve the essential conditions under which this area may have a chance.

The situation is very difficult, and we are all broken-hearted at the losses; but what we are doing is the constructive road to peace, and it must be accepted. I believe the Senator from Montana has sounded exactly the right note on America's political objectives. I consider it an honor to join him in subscribing to that view.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from New York. However, at the outset I made clear that in making these remarks, I spoke only as a Senator from Montana.

Mr. JAVITS. However, I express the hope that this will be the coordinated line of policy the President will pursue, although I am aware that the Senator from Montana is always very careful in stating that he is expressing only his own view.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; it is one man's view.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield briefly to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Montana has stated that our forces should stay in South Vietnam, to give the South Vietnamese confidence that we will continue to support them and will take whatever part we need to take to keep that country free. At the same time, as he suggests, no question of weakness will be involved in any agreement to confer, as President de Gaulle has suggested, on the problem of Laos and Cambodia and the other areas of that part of the world. In other words, we shall be exhibiting, not a sign of weakness, but a sign of strength, by staying in Vietnam and at the same time agreeing to try to confer, in an effort to solve this problem on a political level. That is what the Senator from Montana has said, is it not?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, in general. So far as the first part of the Senator's statement is concerned—his references to staying in—we have no choice. So far as the second part of his statement is concerned, I believe it is the better part of wisdom to negotiate. As our late President said, we should never fear negotiations or fear to negotiate, because I think we can hold our own at any conference table. That is not a sign of weakness or appeasement. It could perhaps be looked upon as a facing up to reality, so to speak.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator from Montana.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield briefly to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. PELL. I congratulate the very wise and thoughtful Senator from Montana on the thoughts he has just expressed. They are thoughts that have not heretofore been stated, but they needed to be stated.

Having accompanied him on his trip to this area, and knowing him to be the best informed Member of our body on that part of the world, I only hope that although he has spoken as a Senator from Montana, the policies his words represent may, before too long, be those of the administration.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island, who has contributed so much to a better understanding of southeast Asia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record excerpts from a speech I made on the Senate floor on February 19, 1964, on the Vietnamese situation and General de Gaulle's proposals. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record excerpts from a report in January 1963, in which I was joined by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL], the then Senator Benjamin Smith, of Massachusetts, and the distinguished Senator from Delaware [Mr. Boggs].

There being no objection, the excerpts from the speech and the report were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Feb. 19, 1964]

It seems to me that President de Gaulle has done well to speak out on southeast Asia. He has again demonstrated a sense of history and statesmanship in seeking new ways for dealing with the continuing instability and insecurity which prevails in Vietnam and much of southeast Asia. President Johnson, in pointing to the differences of view between ourselves and France, most appropriately noted in comment on President de Gaulle's remarks that, "If we could have neutralization of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam, I am sure that would be considered sympathetically." The President was, in my opinion—and today I am speaking only personally—referring to true neutralization—a status based on guarantees and not on words or promises or continued infiltration from the north.

The possibilities of such a neutralization may be extremely difficult to realize, but they ought not to be dismissed out of hand. There are the possibilities of the international patrol and control of borders in which U.S. forces in Vietnam and those of other nations prepared to do so could make a significant contribution. Indeed, Cambodia has indicated that it would welcome and do everything possible to accommodate such an international patrol. And it would seem to me that the Government of Laos under Prince Souvanna Phouma would have much to gain from a similar arrangement and, indeed, so would Thailand.

In that kind of a situation, there would most certainly be a role for France. We may or may not agree with President de Gaulle's approach in whole or part. That is our right and responsibility, even as the French have the right and responsibility to speak and act as they see fit even though I thoroughly disagree with De Gaulle's recognition of Communist China and, along with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Humphrey], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Lausche], and others, consider it a tragic mistake.

But whatever our differences, it seems to me most glib to make light of the admittedly unsatisfactory situation in Laos or the unhappy state of our relations with Cambodia as a basis for any offhand rejection of De Gaulle's essay at a new approach to Indochina and southeast Asia. Indeed, we might well ask ourselves: Do we ourselves, in terms of our national interests as seen in juxtaposition to the cost in American lives and resources, prefer what exists in South Vietnam to what exists in Laos or in Cambodia? Do we prefer another Vietnamese type of American involvement or perhaps a Korean-type involvement in these other countries and elsewhere in southeast Asia? Are we eager for expenditure of the great additions of foreign aid which they would entail? Are we to regard lightly the American casualties which would certainly be involved?

These questions, Mr. President, are very much to the point of the serious situation in southeast Asia, particularly in the Indochinese region, and of President de Gaulle's approach to it. If we face these questions fully and in all candor, if we do not seek to achieve lightly with words what can only be accomplished with blood and other sacrifices on the part of the people of this Nation, it seems to me that we will welcome a contribution of thought and effort from France to the possible solution of the problems of that troubled region. We will not deplore, ridicule, discourage, or denounce a French contribution. Rather, we will hope that, in spite of our doubts and certain of our experiences, the contributions will prove constructive, and we will do whatever we are able to do to bring the hope to fruition.

[Excerpts from report in January 1963]

CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON VIETNAM

Those who bear responsibility for directing operations under the new strategy are optimistic over the prospects for success. Indeed, success was predicted to the group almost without exception by responsible Americans and Vietnamese, in terms of a year or two hence.<sup>1</sup> The word "success" is not easy to define in a situation such as exists in South Vietnam.<sup>2</sup> It would mean, at the least, reduction of the guerrillas to the point where they would no longer be a serious threat to the stability of the Republic. If that point is reached, road and rail communications would once again become reasonably safe. Local officials would no longer live in constant fear of assassination. Rice and other major commodities would again move in volume to the cities. Development throughout the nation would be feasible. In short, the situation in South Vietnam would become roughly similar to that which eventually emerged in Malaya, and it is significant that a good deal of the present planning in South Vietnam is based upon the Malayan experience.

While such a situation would fall far short of the development of a "bastion" in South Vietnam, as the objective has been described on occasion, it would, nevertheless, be adequate to the survival of free Vietnam. It would not necessarily permit any great reduction in U.S. aid to the Vietnamese Government for some years but it would, at least, allow for a substantial reduction in the direct support which American forces are now providing to Vietnamese defense.

Great weight must be given to the views of those who have direct responsibility in the conduct of the new strategy. But even if success is envisioned in the limited sense described above, experience in Vietnam going back at least a decade recommends caution in predicting its rapid achievement. The new strategy is not entirely new. Elements of it have appeared over the past decade or more in various unsuccessful plans for resolving the guerrilla problem in Vietnam. What makes it new, perhaps, is that these elements have been interwoven, along with certain Malayan counter guerrilla tactics into a cohesive pattern which is supported more heavily than ever by the United States.

At this time, experience under the plan does not appear adequate for drawing the kind of optimistic conclusions with respect to it which have been drawn. The reported number of Vietcong casualties has gone up but, so too, has the estimated total of active Vietcong guerrillas. There are indications of improvements in the security of travel and in the movement of rice and other commodities through the countryside, but they are not yet conclusive. The newly strengthened armed services of the Republic, supported by U.S. forces, have scored some striking victories, but the Vietcong have recently shown a capacity to devise new tactics to counter the increased mobility and firepower of the Government's forces. Most frequently pointed to has been the success in winning over the montagnards to the Government. This could be an achievement of great importance in terms of its effect on Vietcong supply lines from north to south through the western mountains, but there are other supply lines by land and by sea. Moreover, the winning over of these scattered and quite primitive tribal peoples who, incidentally, were also won over in Laos, is not to be

<sup>1</sup> More recent estimates as, for example, that of Adm. Harry Felt on Jan. 30, 1963, speak in terms of 3 years.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Felt defines victory as government control of at least 90 percent of the rural population.

confused with the winning over of the Vietnamese peasants. The attitudes of the 15 million of Vietnamese in city and countryside, not those of the relatively small group of montagnards, will ultimately determine the future of the Republic and its Government.

It is with the Vietnamese peasant, of course, that the "strategic hamlet" concept is primarily concerned. The concept is based on the assumptions that the Vietcong are sustained by the rural populace primarily out of fear, and in part, because the peasants are not aware of the superior social, economic, and political advantages which are offered by support of the Government and participation in its processes. Assuming the accuracy of the assumptions successful military action within the dimensions of the present effort is conceivable within the foreseeable future. But even to give an initial military victory meaning will require a massive job of social engineering. In the best of circumstances, outside aid in very substantial size will be necessary for many years. However large such aid may be, it will not suffice without a great mobilization of selfless Vietnamese leadership in all parts of the country and at all levels.

It is in this area that criticism and doubt of the new strategy finds most persistent expression. And it is not a service to the people of Vietnam or to this Nation to ignore or to make light of the existence of this criticism and doubt. The fact must be faced that the practices of political organization which have been relied upon most heavily to date in South Vietnam are, in many respects, authoritarian. While the plans for the strategic hamlets are cast in a democratic mold, it is by no means certain at this point how they shall evolve in practice. The evolution of the practices of the Central Government, to date, are not reassuring in this connection.

There are, to be sure, extenuating circumstances in Vietnam which counsel great patience. The situation which was inherited by the Republic in 1955 was one of great corruption, repression, and divisiveness. Apart from the relatively peaceful period 1955-58, moreover, there have been continuous guerrilla pressures designed to weaken the Government and bring about its collapse. In spite of the difficulties some significant political, economic, and social reforms have been essayed over the years. Indeed, the basic political form of the central Government is democratic.

When that has been said, however, it is also necessary to note that present political practices in Vietnam do not appear to be mobilizing the potential capacities for able and self-sacrificing leadership on a substantial scale. Yet, such a mobilization is essential for the success of the new strategy and, hence, the survival of South Vietnam and of freedom within Vietnam.

It is most disturbing to find that after 7 years of the Republic, South Vietnam appears less, not more, stable than it was at the outset, that it appears more removed from, rather than closer to, the achievement of popularly responsible and responsive government. The pressures of the Vietcong guerrillas do not entirely explain this situation. In retrospect, the Government of Vietnam and our policies, particularly in the design and administration of aid, must bear a substantial, a very substantial, share of the responsibility.

We are now reshaping the aid programs in a fashion which those responsible believe will make them of maximum utility. We have intensified our support of the Vietnamese armed forces in ways which those responsible believe will produce greater effectiveness in military operations. This intensification, however, inevitably has carried us to the start of the road which leads to the point at which the conflict in Vietnam

could become of greater concern and greater responsibility to the United States than it is to the Government and people of South Vietnam. In present circumstances, pursuit of that course could involve an expenditure of American lives and resources on a scale which would bear little relationship to the interests of the United States or, indeed, to the interests of the people of Vietnam.

If we are to avoid that course it must be clear to ourselves as well as to the Vietnamese where the primary responsibility lies in this situation. It must rest, as it has rested, with the Vietnamese Government and people. What further effort may be needed for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam in present circumstances must come from that source. If it is not forthcoming, the United States can reduce its commitment or abandon it entirely, but there is no interest of the United States in Vietnam which would justify, in present circumstances, the conversion of the war in that country primarily into an American war, to be fought primarily with American lives. It is the frequent contention of Communist propaganda that such is already the case. It should remain the fact that the war in Vietnam is not an American war in present circumstances. The words, "in present circumstances," are reiterated lest they be overlooked by those who may assume that there are no circumstances in which American interests might require even greater efforts in southeast Asia than those which we are now making.

#### LAOS

##### Background

In contrast to Vietnam, policies since 1961 have involved a lightening of commitment in Laos. As in Vietnam, the United States began to supply aid to Laos about a decade ago. In the early years, this burden was shared with the French. The aid went to a government headed by the then Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma whose internal policy succeeded in bringing about partial integration of the dissident Pathet Lao political faction headed by his half brother Prince Souphanouvong. Various U.S. aid and other activities increased in the kingdom. At the same time the French role declined. Once again, an internal political divisiveness appeared. Souvanna Phouma was compelled to withdraw from the Government. There followed the coups and countercoups of 1959-60 which ended with an anti-Communist military government in control in the administrative capital of Vientiane. Its position, however, was challenged by two other factions, the Pathet Lao looking to the Vietminh of North Vietnam for support and by a group under a U.S. trained military officer, Kong Le, which advocated the return of Souvanna Phouma to the Government. By that time, U.S. agencies had assumed almost total responsibility for outside assistance to the military government in power in Vientiane.

##### The U.S. involvement

The growth in U.S. personnel in Laos and the overall cost of military and other aid to that country is indicative of the rapid engrossment of the United States in internal Laotian affairs. From a total of two American officials permanently stationed in all of Laos in 1963,<sup>2</sup> the number of U.S. personnel rose to 850 at its height in 1961, a total which has now declined to 250. Through the years 1955-62, the United States provided over \$450 million in aid of all kinds to Laos.

In relation to the size and nature of the country this aid effort has been more intense

<sup>2</sup>In that year, the U.S. mission in Saigon was accredited for all three Indochinese states—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—and the U.S. Minister in Saigon paid only occasional visits to what was then a small legation in Vientiane.

than anywhere else in the world. Laos has only 2.5 million inhabitants, most of whom live in scattered and primitive villages. The land is located in one of the most remote regions of Asia and is largely covered with inaccessible jungle. A decade ago, political leadership on a national scale was nonexistent. Politics centered on the small group of intellectuals in the administrative capital of Vientiane, with ramifications reaching to the Royal Court in Luang Prabang. In 1953, the Laotian Army had two battalions in process of formation, less than a thousand men in all. There were also several hundred Pathet Lao dissidents under arms in the northeast. Outside its immediate neighbors and France, the existence of the Kingdom of Laos as a political entity was almost totally unknown abroad.

Yet scarcely a decade later, 100,000 Laotians were bearing arms. There were three major military factions engaged in conflict. The peaceful little Buddhist kingdom had become both a mirror reflecting the principal ideological stresses of our times and a bloody setting for international competition and intrigue on a massive scale. The transition had gone so far by the spring of 1961 that this Nation was compelled to consider seriously the possibility of a major and direct military involvement of U.S. forces in Laos, with overtones not unlike those of the Korean conflict.

There were, however, different characteristics in the Laotian situation which held some promise that a satisfactory solution to the problem could be achieved through negotiations. An international conference of 14 nations was convened in Geneva on the Laotian question in an effort to find a peaceful solution along lines which had long been advocated by Cambodia. Fourteen months later on July 23, 1962, an agreement was signed by the participating nations and a measure of peace returned to the embattled kingdom.

##### The current situation

The signatories of the Geneva accord of 1962 pledged themselves to respect the neutrality of Laos and not to interfere in its internal affairs. In addition, they promised to withdraw such military forces as they had in Laos and not to use the territory of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Concomitant with the Geneva agreement, the leaders of the three principal Laotian political factions agreed to establish a unified government and administration under the king. The key figures in the latter settlement were Prince Souvanna Phouma who, having served as the first Prime Minister of an independent Laos, became Prime Minister once again in the provisional government. He was joined in the new government by Prince Souphanouvong, his half brother and the leader of the northern dissidents and by Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, leader of a southern faction who had had close ties with Thailand and U.S. executive agencies.

It is too soon to judge the efficacy of the international and Laotian accords which have been introduced into the situation. Insofar as the larger powers are concerned, U.S. forces have been withdrawn in keeping with the agreement. On the basis of available information, there are neither Soviet Russian nor Chinese forces in Laos in violation of the agreement. But there is every likelihood that Vietminh forces are still present among the Pathet Lao, and there are allegations that foreign elements are also active in other military factions.

Responsibility for determining that all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Laos rests with an International Control Commission. But this group of Indians, Canadians, and Poles has yet to carry out the responsibility, largely because of disagreement among the factions within the provisional government.

This is but one example of the difficulties besetting the government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, which operates on the principle of unanimity of the three factions on matters of significance. There are many others. In particular, there is the problem of military demobilization. An agreement in principle has been reached to reduce the total of more than 100,000 men under arms in Laos to a national force of 30,000 and a police force of 6,000 drawn equally from the three major factions. As of the time of our visit, however, the agreement was still awaiting action. There have also been sporadic violations of the cease fire directed especially at Meo tribes people in Pathet Lao controlled territory. And American planes have even been shot down while carrying relief supplies to isolated troops at the request of the Prime Minister.

#### *Present U.S. policies*

It is the policy of the United States, as expressed by the President, to support fully both the Geneva agreement of 1962 and the efforts of Prime Minister Souvanna to establish a unified government in Laos. In keeping with the Geneva accords, the United States has already withdrawn its military aid mission personnel of 650 as well as 400 Filipino contract technicians.

At the same time, and at the request of the Prime Minister, the United States is supplying maintenance material to the armed forces under the control of General Phoumi and those responsive to Souvanna Phouma and has offered to assist in the orderly demobilization of the military when it becomes feasible. The United States is also continuing economic help to the Laotian Government, but the program is shifting from aid designed to permit the economy to sustain large military burdens to aid designed essentially to help in reconstruction and development, with stress on education.

In effect, U.S. Laotian policy is now acting to extricate this nation in an orderly fashion from the position of virtually sole outside support of the Government of Laos. A substantial reduction in the cost of Laotian policy has already been achieved by the withdrawal of the military aid mission. Aid going to Laos, moreover, has been reduced from a peak annual level of \$73 million in 1962 to the present level of about \$40 million.

While this reduction has been taking place, both France and Britain have agreed to share in new programs of economic reconstruction and development. So far, however, the French have been reluctant to assume any increase in responsibilities for military aid although France is the only power permitted by the Geneva accords to maintain military personnel in Laos.

The Soviet Union is also providing economic assistance to the provisional government, largely through a new commercial payments agreement. The Russians have also given Laos 10 aircraft for transport purposes. They have offered to build a hospital and a radio station and to provide credit for the construction of a large hydroelectric station.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Concluding comments*

Solution to the Laotian problem along the lines of international neutralization and national unification would be immensely difficult to achieve in the best of circumstances. Geographic and cultural factors in the situation are such as to encourage internal political fragmentation, and the sense of Laotian nationality is not widely developed among the populace. At the same

time, ideological and predatory forces from without have historically tended to press in, as wedges, upon the region in which the little kingdom is located. To these obvious difficulties must be added lingering personal suspicions among the principal Laotian leaders, growing out of the experiences of the past.

What the outcome of the attempted solution will be is still very uncertain. Much hinges on the perseverance of Prince Souvanna Phouma, who as Prime Minister, has undertaken the principal responsibility. Alone among the present leaders he enjoys a stature which is larger than any faction. Much depends, too, on the willingness of France to play a significant part in providing disinterested assistance along with other outside nations. The tenuous peace, moreover, can be jeopardized if there is continued use of the facility which Laos offers for the transshipment of supplies from North Vietnam to the guerrillas in the south.

At this point, half year after the conclusion of the agreement, it must be counted an achievement that the military conflict remains substantially in abeyance. There have been, as noted, sporadic and isolated outbreaks of hostility. In general, however, the cease fire has held. Moreover, major outside powers—notably the United States and the Soviet Union—have been giving substantial constructive aid to the provisional government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

On the other hand until the removal of all foreign forces from Laos is ascertained, until the authority of the unified government is generally accepted throughout the country, until the military forces are reduced and unified, the situation is bound to continue to hang in precarious balance. Attempts by either an outside nation or a faction within Laos to take advantage of the delicate transition could readily upset the situation, and might well bring about the abandonment of the effort at unification by Souvanna Phouma.

From the point of view of the United States, the situation is improved over that which prevailed when the Geneva Conference convened in 1961. At that time it was evident that only military intervention by SEATO, and primarily by U.S. military forces in considerable strength, in a war of uncertain depth and duration, offered the hope of preventing further deterioration in the position of the Vietiane Government.<sup>5</sup> The Geneva Conference interposed a cease-fire at that point, and the accords to which it led helped to forestall a deepening of U.S. involvement. At least the prospect now exists for a peaceful solution and that alone has already permitted a reduction in both aid costs and numbers of U.S. personnel in Laos.

#### OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

Outside Laos and Vietnam, the United States has commitments of varying depth with respect to the other countries of southeast Asia. The ties range from those of intimate alliance with the Philippines and to a lesser extent with Thailand to what might be termed friendly but essentially routine relations with Malaya and Burma. Relations with Cambodia are in an intermediate stage, in which U.S. aid is still a factor but one of declining significance.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Cambodia*

Cambodia has developed into one of the most stable and progressive nations in south-

<sup>4</sup> Indications, at the time, were that only Thailand was prepared to use troops in significant numbers. The Philippines and other non-Asian members also offered small contingents. The forces of both Thailand and the Philippines, in any event, are heavily dependent on U.S. aid.

<sup>5</sup> Indonesia was not visited during the course of the mission.

east Asia. Apart from difficulties on its borders with Thailand and Vietnam, the kingdom enjoys complete peace and has registered a remarkable degree of economic and social progress in a decade. The leadership of Prince Sihanouk has been a key factor in this achievement. Abdicating the throne in order to participate actively in political affairs, the Prince has led the kingdom with an understanding of his people, with personal dedication, and with immense energy. He has maintained cooperative relations with France on the new basis of full national independence and equality and the French, today, continue to play a major part in the development of the country. Cambodia's contacts with the rest of the world have been greatly expanded and now encompass all of the major powers, Communist and non-Communist. In international circles, Cambodia has come to occupy an influential role among the smaller nations and was a prime mover in the convening of the Geneva Conference on Laos.

Outside assistance has been supplied to Cambodia by many countries, including Soviet Russia and Communist China. The United States has provided over \$300 million in assistance from 1955 to 1962. But the level has been declining, with Cambodian encouragement and concurrence.<sup>7</sup>

In spite of this assistance, however, Cambodian-United States relationships have encountered repeated difficulties from the outset. In retrospect, many of these difficulties appear superficial and avoidable. Whatever the difficulties, there is not and can hardly be any legitimate basis for a direct conflict with this remote Asian kingdom. There are, on the other hand, possibilities for deepening cultural and economic contacts of mutual benefit. Indeed, Cambodia's inner progress and declining dependence on United States-grant aid points to a foreseeable termination of these programs, not in chaos but in a transition to an enduring relationship of mutual respect and mutual advantage. Finally, Cambodia's existence as an independent nation at peace with all of the great powers is of exemplary value if there is ever to be a durable and peaceful solution to the basic problems of southeast Asia.

It would appear very much in order for the United States to make every effort to understand the position of the Cambodians and to use its good offices in every practicable way to encourage settlement of the border difficulties with Thailand and Vietnam. Our military aid to these countries is undoubtedly a factor in exacerbating Cambodian fears and, hence, has intensified the difficulties which have characterized United States-Cambodian relations. However they may appear to us, these fears are very real to the Cambodians and exert a powerful influence on the course of its policies which of late have tended toward an extreme neutralism.

As noted, there has already been a decline in the level of one-sided United States aid to Cambodia and apparently, the Government of that country desires a continuance of this process. We should seek to meet this desire in an orderly fashion. At the same time, far greater emphasis should be placed on expanding more mutual relationships. Educational and other exchanges and the promotion of tourism, for example, can be of great value in this connection. The possibilities of stimulating investment and enlarged trade should also be fully explored. It would appear greatly in our interest to make every reasonable effort to encourage a transition from what has been a stormy and one-sided aid relationship to a new relationship of greater understanding and mutuality.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I should like to have the attention of the Senator

<sup>7</sup> Several months ago, Prince Sihanouk stated that he was prepared for the complete termination of military aid.

<sup>4</sup> Other bloc countries and Communist China have also indicated interest in supplying aid. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan has visited Moscow and Peking on an economic aid mission, and a state visit by the King to the Soviet Union, the United States, and other Geneva participants is in progress.

from Montana while I speak briefly in my own time.

I join the Senator from Rhode Island in congratulating the Senator from Montana on his proposal that favorable consideration be given to De Gaulle's proposal for a conference in regard to the southeast Asia problem. Not only should it not be limited to Laos, and not only should it involve Cambodia and North Vietnam, but it should also include South Vietnam.

As the Senator from Montana has said, we should not fear to negotiate. The sad fact remains that our Ambassador to the United Nations this morning rather threw cold water on the suggestion of proceedings to negotiate.

I ask the Senator from Montana if he believes that, within the framework of the suggestion that we not fear to negotiate, we should not fear, either, to have the United Nations take jurisdiction over the whole southeast problem.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for an answer—

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not believe that I would go that far at the present moment, but I point out, as the Senator well knows, that a Cambodian charge is now pending in the United Nations. I would not be at all surprised to see the allegations being made by that particular country, which I think has, in view of the circumstances, performed quite well in maintaining its freedom, extend to other areas that used to be known as French Indochina—Vietnam and Laos.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Montana question the right of the United Nations to take jurisdiction over the conduct of any country in southeast Asia, including the United States, under a charge that such conduct threatens the peace of that part of the world?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would doubt at the moment that the United Nations had that right, although that question could be brought up. I do not think that it would be wise at the moment to take in all of southeast Asia in that respect, but out of the Cambodian allegations something of the sort could develop.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Montana question the authority of the United Nations to investigate whether or not the Geneva accords are being violated by any country, including the United States?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do, at least on the first instance, because, as I recall, the Geneva agreements of 1954, which split North and South Vietnam into 2 countries, and the Geneva agreements of 1962, in which 14 nations participated—and I could be wrong about that—were arrived at apart from the United Nations and on the initiative of those sovereign powers.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Montana question the fact that whenever there is a threat to the peace of the world, anywhere in the world, under the United Nations Charter, every signatory to the charter comes within the jurisdiction of the United Nations to take what steps it can within the terms of the charter to enforce the peace?

Mr. MANSFIELD. If I understand the Senator correctly, I point out that South Vietnam itself is not a member of the United Nations. I believe that it has an observer in the United Nations. Laos and Cambodia are members. I daresay that any member of the United Nations is at liberty to bring up any question at any time, the validity of that question to be determined by the membership.

Mr. MORSE. Is the position of the Senator from Montana that the jurisdiction of the United Nations to maintain peace in the world is limited only to illegal conduct of member nations, and that the United Nations has no authority to proceed to maintain peace in the world, no matter who the violator is?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Oregon has expired.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would not deny that statement. But it is a matter which I believe would have to be considered on an individual basis.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, later I shall discuss in some detail the speech of our Ambassador to the United Nations this morning, which in many parts I believe was a most unfortunate speech, and one that will do great harm to our country in worldwide opinion. But I wish to say now that we should never hesitate to go to the conference table at any time on any question involving the foreign policy of the United States. This morning, in my judgment, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations ducked and hedged that clear obligation of the United States in respect to the question of negotiating. Of course, we ought to embrace with open arms the proposal of France or any other country to seek to go to the conference table for the purpose of promoting peace and ending war, and for the purpose of seeing what can be done to get the United States out of the indefensible position it now occupies in South Vietnam, where the United States is making war.

Think of it. The United States is making war in 1964 in South Vietnam, and we hear the U.S. ambassador in the United Nations hedging on whether or not we should welcome negotiations with countries that want to sit down and see what can be done to promote peace in southeast Asia. That includes North Vietnam, which I believe is clearly in violation of the Geneva accords—and we have so charged—but unfortunately we have tried to justify our illegal course of action in South Vietnam on the basis of North Vietnam's violation of the Geneva accords, which we never signed. We have a clear obligation to take our charge to the United Nations and to prove it. And we can prove it. We have never had a stronger case to uphold the rule of law than we have against North Vietnam, and, I happen to think, Red China, too. But instead of that we adopt the same tactics.

We can never justify the "end justify the means" program that the United States is following in South Vietnam, because article 37 of the U.N. Charter requires parties to any dispute to refer it to the Security Council if they cannot settle it by pacific means. I shall have something to say within the rules and of my own right under the doctrine of secrecy about the position of the Secretary of State in regard to his attitude concerning negotiating within the United Nations to bring to an end the war in South Vietnam. The United States ought to welcome an opportunity to have the United Nations take a look at the facts, instead of giving the impression around the world that in this case we think American military might can make right. Of course, military might has never made right, and we are not making right by the exercise of American military might in South Vietnam.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for the interjection of a question?

Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Oregon has expired.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator can speak on his own time.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is allowed 3 minutes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to ask the Senator from Montana a question which would follow the line of questions which the Senator from Oregon asked. In the opinion of the Senator from Montana would it be practical for the United Nations to take a greater responsibility in the South Vietnam, Cambodian, and Laos situation at the present time? Is it practical, aside from any question of illegality or anything else?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I could not answer the question in its broad application, but I will say that the United Nations is now taking up the allegations made by the Kingdom of Cambodia on the question of violations of its borders with South Vietnam. If it is applicable to one country in that respect, I assume it would be applicable to other countries in that area as well.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As I interpreted the statement of the Senator from Oregon, he would go a little further and possibly bring in the United Nations as a body with responsibilities for keeping peace in that section of the world and maintaining peace. My question was whether it would be impractical.

Mr. MORSE. What would be impractical about it?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It would be impractical for the United Nations to gather a force from other countries of the world to place there to keep the peace of the world.

Mr. MORSE. Why does the Senator make that statement, in view of the assistance that has been rendered by the United Nations to the Congo, the Middle East, and Cyprus? Does the Senator mean that it is impractical because the

United States is involved, and there must be no reflection upon the United States; but that if some other country is violating the Charter of the United Nations elsewhere in the world, it is practical for the United Nations to go in? That is pure nonsense.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I most respectfully disagree with the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I know the Senator is respectful about it, but that does not make it logical.

#### "PACEM IN TERRIS" CONFERENCE

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, in recent days a most important conference has been held to plan a major international convocation on the last encyclical of Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris"—"Peace on Earth." I have taken a deep interest in these plans since their inception.

The sessions were conducted by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Wingspread, the Johnson Foundation conference headquarters in Racine, Wis. The foundation acted as host to the center.

As an indication of the wide scope of this conference and its equally broad representation of major religious and political communities throughout the world, the conferees included: Ambassador S. O. Adebo, of the Nigerian Mission to the United Nations; Father John F. Cronin, S.S., assistant director, social action department, National Catholic Welfare Conference; the Honorable, Xavier Denlau, rapporteur, Foreign Affairs Committee, French National Assembly; Dr. Marian Dobrosielski, Counselor of the Polish Embassy in Washington; Dr. Nelson Glueck, president, Hebrew Union College, Jewish Institute of Religion; the Honorable Brooks Hays, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, consultant to President Johnson; Dr. Hudson Hoagland, president, American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, president, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Mr. Georgi Kornienko, Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington; Msgr. Luigi Ligutti, permanent observer of the Holy See to FAO, Vatican City; Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, the University of Chicago; the Honorable C. V. Narasimhan, Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; Dr. Josip Presburger, Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington; Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; his Excellency Rashid el Rashid, Ambassador to the United Nations from Kuwait and his deputy, Ahmad Al-Nakib; Mr. Andrew Shonfield, director of studies, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, England; Mr. John Tomlinson, director of mission and world service liaison for the National Council of Churches; and Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Judge of the International Court.

Our own body was represented by two most able and distinguished Senators: Senator GAYLORD NELSON, of Wisconsin,

and Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN, of South Dakota. Although I was unfortunately unable to attend the conference in person, I was represented by my special assistant, Livingston Biddle.

Discussions at the conference were extremely frank and unusually free from the acerbity which so frequently accompanies debate on divisive international issues.

The conferees pursued their deliberations in accord with the mood of the encyclical which is addressed to "all men of good will," and in accord with the encyclical's fundamental premise that "all men are equal in human dignity." Participants spoke not necessarily as official representatives of their governments or of their organizations, but as individuals belonging to the whole human family. Thus the discussions were given maximum opportunity for honest exchange.

During the conference it was pointed out that mankind does not need to accept the theological reasoning through which Pope John in part reached his conclusions in order to accept the conclusions themselves. Thus the encyclical was discussed in a unique frame of reference—not primarily as representing a particular theology, although it does with extraordinary eloquence—but as setting forth guidelines to international conduct and those moral imperatives which coincide with the practical self-interest of all men and all nations, regardless of their separate beliefs or ideologies.

It is my own conviction that the principles involved in "Pacem in Terris" are universally applicable. I further believe that the International Convocation—to be held in New York City next February with participating leading statesmen and scholars from all over the world—can well become one of the most meaningful assemblages of our times.

Mr. President, in order to illustrate the scholarly research and reasoning which helped make the preliminary conference such a success, I ask unanimous consent that the schemata of the conference and three working papers, prepared by staff contributors of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, be inserted in the Record at the end of my remarks.

These papers are addressed to the principal themes of the conference.

I recommend them to my colleagues for their consideration. We may not agree with these documents in all respects, but in substance they are immensely thoughtful in providing a basis for free discussion.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**SCHEMATA ADOPTED BY "PACEM IN TERRIS" CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY CENTER FOR STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, MAY 1964**

The conferees agreed on these topics for the convocation:

1. How to obtain universal acceptance of the idea of coexistence of nations of differing ideological and social systems.
2. How to achieve sufficient flexibility so that all international conflicts can be set-

led by negotiation, and how to devise mechanisms for peaceful social and political change.

3. How to obtain recognition of the urgent need for rapid progress toward nuclear and conventional disarmament.

4. How to take actions and develop understanding to create mutual trust among the nations.

5. How to achieve the elimination of racism in all countries.

6. How to achieve international cooperation in assisting the developing countries in the interests of the prosperity of the world, and how to make full use of science and technology for developing cooperation among nations.

7. How to encourage further development of the United Nations so that its means and structure may become equal to the magnitude of its tasks.

#### THE ENCYCLICAL AS A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT

(By Fred Warner Neal)

The basic problem of international politics in the modern world is how individual, legally sovereign nations can serve their own interests without jeopardizing the common interest of which their own interest is a part. The problem was there in the prethermonuclear age, but it was not so crucial, nor was it so clear that there did, in fact, exist a common interest. The settlement of national disputes by violence could often be justified on practical grounds and sometimes even on grounds of justice. Today, with human existence hanging in a delicate thermonuclear balance, what was once utopian—the avoidance of war—has become a practical matter of life and death both for individual states and for the world community—for humanity—as a whole.

What "Pacem in Terris" does is to set forth a guide to international conduct in these precarious circumstances. It does so by identifying principles to which all statesmen truly devoted to the interests of their own peoples can subscribe. They do not need to accept the theological reasoning through which Pope John in part reached his conclusions in order to accept the conclusions themselves. Indeed, many of the same conclusions have been arrived at independently by those of different theological persuasion and by those who reject theology of any kind as a basis for dealing with world affairs. For the Pope's conclusions are based as much on secular reason and logic as on theology and altruism.

Thus the encyclical is truly ecumenical, and not only in a religious sense. It is clear that the Pope intended it this way. He addressed his encyclical not only to Roman Catholics, or even just to Christians, but "to all men of good will." And he emphasized that "meetings and agreements \* \* \* between believers and those who do not believe \* \* \* can be occasions for discovering truth and paying homage to it."

Although the papacy is perhaps the most thoroughly Western-based institution, Pope John, in "Pacem in Terris," rises above international sectionalism as above nationalism, while recognizing the fact of both. The principles enunciated are elementary and universal. Indeed, they are so simple that they are often ignored in formulations of foreign policy, and this may be one of the major reasons why so frequently the best-intentioned foreign policies fail to serve the interests either of their originators or of the world community.

International conduct, according to "Pacem in Terris," is based on these ideas and principles:

1. The world is organized into separate, individual nation-states and into differing ideological systems. The nation-states are

legally sovereign. They are individual and unique. They have particular interests which they seek to enhance, but they also have a common, human interest. Each nation-state is of equal "natural dignity." In all of them there is both good and evil; none is superior or inferior by nature.

2. The separate interests of the various nation-states are often in conflict.

The law of change applies to all finite things, including nation-states and relations between them.

4. Conflicts among nations can be solved either by force and violence; i.e., war, or by negotiation and compromise; there is no other way. But negotiation must involve a sincere desire to seek equitable compromise, based on objective appraisal of the facts.

5. The development of thermonuclear weapons means that solution of conflicts by war is no longer tenable. War can no longer serve the interests of individual nations or the common interest. Nor is the old distinction between just and unjust wars any longer tenable. "It is hardly possible to imagine that in the atomic era war would be used as an instrument of justice."

6. The existence of thermonuclear weapons is in itself a danger, even though there is no intention to use them, since "it cannot be denied that the conflagration may be set off by some unexpected and obscure event."

7. But under existing conditions, this danger inevitably increases. "If one country increases its armaments, others feel the need to do the same; and if one country is equipped with nuclear weapons, other countries must produce their own, equally destructive."

8. "Justice, then, right reason and humanity urgently demand" disarmament.

For the preservation of peace among nations, the encyclical emphasizes, "political communities are reciprocally subject of rights and duties." And "this means that their relationships also must be harmonized in truth, in justice, in a working solidarity, in liberty." Here we have "moral imperatives" which coincide with practical self-interest.

Conflicts of interest between nations do occur. No nation, however, can serve its interest today by trying to settle these disagreements by violence. They must, therefore, be settled by "a mutual assessment of the reasons on both sides of the dispute, by a mature and objective investigation of the situation, and by an equitable reconciliation of differences of opinion."

To this end, conflicts of interest must be minimized and avoided where possible. To violate the rights of national self-determination or interfere in internal affairs of other states, to treat some political communities as by nature superior or inferior to others, to misinform oneself about the facts regarding others, to mistreat national minorities (or for minorities to claim undue measure), for richer nations to fall to aid poorer nations or to aid them "with strings attached"—all such actions create serious conflicts and, therefore, are both morally wrong and are against the self-interest of all states.

But even if states act according to such high precepts of conduct, the thermonuclear armaments race itself jeopardizes peace and "people live in constant fear lest the storm that every moment threatens should break upon them with dreadful violence." And since nations do not always conform to the precepts for international conduct that the encyclical sets forth, the danger is all the greater.

For this reason, disarmament has top priority in the Pope's prescriptions, and he sets forth the order in which it may be achieved. "Justice, right reason, and humanity," says the encyclical, "urgently demand that the arms race should cease; that the stockpiles which exist in various countries should be reduced equally and simultaneously by the parties concerned; that nuclear weapons

should be banned; and that a general agreement should eventually be reached about progressive disarmament and an effective method of control."

Disarmament, in the Pope's view, cannot be achieved by half measures. "All must realize," says the encyclical, "that there is no hope of putting an end to the building up of armaments, nor of reducing the present stockpiles, nor, still less, of abolishing them altogether, unless the process is complete and thorough and unless it proceeds from inner conviction."

But this involves the whole nature of international politics. "If this is to come about, the fundamental principle on which our present peace depends must be replaced by another, which declares that the true and solid peace of nations consists not in equality of arms but in mutual trust alone." Such a state, the Pope believed, "can be brought to pass" and moreover that "it is something which reason requires, that it is eminently desirable in itself and this it will prove to be the source of many benefits."

In terms of immediate international affairs, what is the practical significance of "Pacem in Terris?" One can hear many, perhaps all, statesmen saying: "We accept the Pope's principles and his precepts, but they don't." In short, "We alone are in step." The fact is that most nations are in step and out of step at the same time. Few nations indeed always conduct their affairs in consonance with all the principles and precepts of the encyclical; but also most, perhaps all, think they observe most of them most of the time. The concept of *raison d'etat* covers the sin of self-deception as well as others.

The obvious focus of the Pope's prescriptions for relations among states is on disarmament. But the encyclical further prescribes "mutual trust" as a prerequisite for disarmament. How can mutual trust be achieved? Almost certainly there is not meant here the kind of mutual trust that would, for instance, permit general and complete disarmament—or perhaps disarmament of any kind—without inspection. But it means the kind of mutual trust necessary to start the disarmament process in motion. Since this involves principally the major powers, it is hard to see how such trust can be achieved without a general understanding, a detente, among them and particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. For this two things are necessary: first, an awareness on each side that the other genuinely sees its own interest served by making progress toward disarmament; and second, the settlement by negotiations of disputes between them.

For the first, the distinction made in the encyclical between ideology and social systems is essential. Philosophies may remain the same, but systems cannot avoid change. Disagreement about philosophical truth is no necessary barrier to agreement on honorable and useful political ends. This together with the statement that no political communities are by nature superior or inferior or wholly good or wholly evil, amounts to a theory of "coexistence," which is a prerequisite for everything else.

In this connection, the Pope's exhortations about information are also pertinent. "Truth," the encyclical states, "demands that the various media of social communications made available by modern progress which enable the nations to know each other better, be used with serene objectivity. That need not, of course, rule out any legitimate emphasis on the positive aspects of their way of life. But methods of information which fall short of the truth, and by the same token impair the reputation of this people or that, must be discarded."

This point in the encyclical should not be interpreted as applying only to news media. It applies equally to diplomatic reporting

and official communiques and pronouncements. And it also applies to officially erected barriers to information and to travel. No society is altogether "closed" and no society is altogether "open." But there needs to be a recognition of the principle that the more open the better. At the same time, of course, the degree of openness depends, at least in part, on the degree of mutual trust and the extent to which there is mutual acceptance of one state by another, i.e., coexistence.

The matter of disputes is in some ways more complex and in some ways less. The only major specific dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of this writing, for example, concerns Germany. Unresolved, this dispute blocks progress toward disarmament not only by preventing achievement of mutual trust but also by barring the most likely next steps in the disarmament process, i.e., the freezing of nuclear weapon strength in Central Europe and then, perhaps establishing a nuclear free zone there. Here the chances for settlement would surely be improved if both sides would heed the Pope's injunction to seek equitable compromise based on objective appraisal of the facts.

Of course, there are other pressing international disputes besides that between the United States and the Soviet Union in central Europe, and, according to the encyclical, all of them should be truly negotiated. It should be noted in this connection that the encyclical's prescription for true negotiation involves not only meeting and talking but meeting and talking with the sincere purpose of reaching an equitable compromise, based on an objective appraisal of the facts, that is to say, some mutual giving in in the interest of both sides.

Admittedly, this may be a difficult process. But initial failure to reach accord must not deflect either effort or intent. Noting that systems and political situations are subject to constant change, sometimes of a profound nature, the Pope points out that agreements "formerly deemed inopportune or unproductive might now or in the future be considered opportune and useful." But he does not attempt to recommend specific solutions. These must be decided by the proper authorities and be reached "with the virtue of prudence."

The message of the encyclical is clear, however: the thermonuclear era requires changes in all things, and above all, "because of the dynamic course of events," flexibility and the readiness to adapt. The failure to do so violates both reason and moral precepts and risks mutual destruction.

The question of settling disputes, of reaching understanding between nations, involves more than specific geopolitical issues. Here the matter of intervention, so roundly condemned by the encyclical, arises. Where simple, direct military intervention is involved, the issue is usually clear enough. But there is intervention and intervention. One reality of international politics is that major states have "core interests" outside their national boundaries, i.e., "spheres of influence" of one sort or another, which they regard as vital to their security. This does not necessarily involve hegemonistic policies, but states invariably consider a challenge to their core interests by outside powers as a challenge to their very existence.

Two problems apparent in contemporary international politics arise here. One is the tendency of major states to challenge each other's core interests, not only by intervening or establishing military power on their periphery but also by propaganda and subversion. The other problem is the tendency of major states to extend their core interests to areas far distant from their homelands. It is indicative of the complexity of the matter that here both the United States and the Soviet Union will see each other as be-