

1964

be determined only by a survey of each of the third class cities, but the Pennsylvania Bureau of Social Security for Public Employees is receiving communications from such municipal employees inquiring whether they can now elect social security coverage.

These single coverage members did not choose social security coverage for a number of reasons:

1. They had social security coverage through other employment than in the schools, State or municipality.
2. They would become eligible for social security benefits as dependent wives or widows through their husband's coverage.
3. They were not sure of the benefits of their being covered by social security because of their husband's membership in the Railroad Retirement System.
4. They could not acquire sufficient quarters of coverage at the time of establishment to be eligible for a benefit.
5. They resented the reduction of public employees retirement allowances because of the offset established in the joint coverage plan.

In fact, the offset reduction played a significant role in the decisions of many of those who did not elect social security coverage. Under the joint coverage plan when a public employee retired at an age when he could and did receive social security benefits, his retirement allowance is reduced by 40 percent of the social security benefits he receives. For example, if his retirement allowance were \$300 and his social security benefit were \$100, his retirement allowance would be reduced by \$40 (40 percent of \$100) and he would receive only \$260 as his reduced retirement allowance together with his social security benefit of \$100.

In many cases there was so little difference between the employees total retirement income from social security under joint coverage in the public employees retirement system plus his retirement allowance reduced by the offset and his total retirement income from social security under other coverage (or as a dependent of a covered spouse) plus his full retirement allowance without offset that it was not to his financial advantage to elect social security coverage in the public employees retirement system.

For example—a male employee with a retirement allowance of \$300 per month and a social security benefit of \$100 under joint coverage in the public employees retirement system would have a total retirement income of \$360: Reduced retirement allowance—\$260 (\$300 minus 40 percent of \$100) plus \$100 social security benefit; \$360.

If the same male employee had social security coverage through employment outside of his public employment which entitled him to a social security benefit of \$50, his total retirement income would be \$350. Unreduced retirement allowance of \$300 plus his social security benefit of \$50.

In the above example electing joint coverage would have meant only an additional \$10 per month. It would take a number of years of retirement during which he would be receiving an additional \$10 per month to recover the additional social security taxes he would have to pay if he elected social security coverage under the public employees retirement system.

Now legislation has been enacted in Pennsylvania which creates a new class of membership called dual coverage and joint coverage members may elect to eliminate the offset reduction in their retirement allowance. This legislation becomes effective on July 1, 1964, and those who so elect will, upon retirement, receive the full retirement allowance without offset reduction and the full social security benefit to which they are entitled.

It now becomes financially advantageous to virtually every single coverage member to elect social security coverage. Without the offset reduction the total retirement in-

come from public employees retirement and social security will be increased so substantially that it will be to their advantage to elect coverage even though they will have to pay the social security taxes retroactive to January 1, 1956.

For example, in the case of the male employee in the example above—if he elects social security coverage under the public employees' retirement system his total retirement income would be \$400—unreduced retirement allowance of \$300 plus social security benefit of \$100—rather than the \$360 he would receive under the previous State legislation. This will be \$50 per month more than the total retirement he would receive through his coverage outside his public employment of \$350. At \$50 a month in additional benefits he would recover the cost of the additional social security taxes in a very short period following retirement.

In addition every amendment to the Social Security Act since social security coverage became effective for public employees in Pennsylvania in 1956 has made it increasingly more advantageous for single coverage members to elect social security coverage under the public employees retirement system. All these are capped by the recent Pennsylvania legislation permitting the elimination of the offset reduction.

H.R. 9650 makes it possible for "single coverage" public employees in Pennsylvania (and perhaps other States) to greatly improve their total retirement income.

The Pennsylvania State Education Association supports passage of this legislation.

JN

Prof. Klaus Pringsheim on U.S. Policy in South Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 9, 1964

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, in the Lawrence (Kans.) Daily Journal-World's well known weekly feature, "Opinions From the Hill," Prof. Klaus Pringsheim has set forth a thoughtful and penetrating analysis of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I commend it to my colleagues here in the Congress:

OPINIONS FROM THE HILL

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—Klaus H. Pringsheim was born in Berlin, Germany; emigrated as a 9-year-old boy to continue his education in England, and at 16 moved on to Japan where he stayed until the end of World War II. For 12 years he was a teacher of the German, Japanese, and English languages, spending 4 of these years at the U.S. Army Language School in Monterey, Calif., as an assistant professor of Japanese. He served in the U.S. Army for 4 years and became a U.S. citizen in 1952 in Richmond, Va. Later he entered UCLA and there obtained his A.B. in political science, graduating Phi Beta Kappa. Subsequently he obtained five consecutive Ford Foundation fellowships to do graduate work in East Asian studies at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University. He obtained the certificate of the Institute and an M.A. in comparative government at Columbia University in 1959. He is currently completing his Ph. D. dissertation in the department of public law and government at the same institution. He was lecturer in German at the University of Hong Kong and lecturer in comparative government at New York City College and has also widely lectured in

Europe, Asia, and the United States. Specializing in contemporary Chinese politics and foreign policy, he went to Hong Kong in 1959 for dissertation research and came to Kansas University from Hong Kong in September 1961. He is now an instructor in Kansas University's Department of Political Science and a member of Kansas University's East Asian Studies Committee. He has published one book on Sino-Soviet relations, and a series of articles and monographs on Japanese and Chinese politics in scholarly journals in the United States, Europe, and the Far East. He married Mrs. Hsiuping Pringsheim, a Hong Kong girl, in 1962 and now lives at 700 Indiana Street in Lawrence.)

Next to the cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union and our humiliating inability to banish communism from Cuba, the most vexing foreign policy problem faced by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations during the past 10 years, has been their failure to enable successive governments of South Vietnam to achieve the defeat of Communist insurgency in that country. The continuing frustration of this South Vietnamese-American common aim has recently been dramatized by the announcement on February 26 that Mr. Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has suddenly resigned his important position in the Johnson administration. It is generally known in Washington that Mr. Hillsman felt that his policy recommendations were frequently overruled or ignored or that he was not even consulted when important decisions in the area of his responsibility were taken. His resignation is therefore almost certainly a reflection of his dissatisfaction and/or disagreement with the Johnson administration. To this we add Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's various contradictory statements on the state of affairs in Vietnam when, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, he continued to insist that things were going well. However well intentioned, these have contributed to the general public loss of confidence in the Johnson administration's ability to handle our Vietnamese commitment successfully. While President Johnson does reaffirm that we shall not abandon our friends in Vietnam and that the Communists are playing a dangerous game in their stepped up guerrilla operations and anti-U.S. personnel terror, the Senate majority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, on February 19 urged the Johnson administration "to encourage rather than spurn French efforts to negotiate with Communist China for the neutralization of southeast Asia. Senator MANSFIELD added that a major commitment of American lives to the 10-year-old guerrilla war is not now justified and that we should therefore welcome a negotiated settlement, at a time when it has become abundantly clear that the war cannot be won by the methods now being employed and that it is probably slowly but surely being lost."

The Government's lack of candor in regard to the Vietnamese situation has been a disservice to millions of Americans who have been led to believe that our efforts have been progressing successfully, and that by 1965 (or as the latest McNamara release puts it " * * * before the end of 1965") we will be able to go home and leave the rest of the task to the Government and army of South Vietnam. One rather suspects that if present trends continue neither the army nor the Government of South Vietnam are likely to survive until 1965. But, whatever the objective situation in South Vietnam may be today (and the contradictory reports which emerge seem to indicate that no one can really be too sure about this), it is surely time that President Johnson went beyond his vague generalizations at UCLA last week, and took us into his confidence, so that we will be better able to understand precisely what our policy

now is, and what, if any, realistic alternatives are open to us. A continuation of the present policy of equivocation, self-contradiction, and propaganda can only be helpful to the enemies of the United States, who seize every opportunity to use our own words against us. It would also be helpful to the Republican candidates and noncandidates who hope to unseat President Johnson in the upcoming presidential elections. The "mess in Vietnam" has been a favorite topic for all leading Republican spokesmen for months, and as Senator DIRKSEN stated on February 27 will be used as a major foreign policy issue in the presidential campaign. The sooner President Johnson reveals what the Government's policy will now be and why, the easier it should be to gain substantial support for such a policy, before it becomes too much of a domestic political football. The following are generally regarded as the five major policy alternatives open to the Government at this time:

1. Complete American withdrawal from Vietnam; this would most likely result in a complete Communist takeover and the consequent loss of U.S. prestige all over Asia and the world, plus the complete loss of Cambodia, Laos, and possibly the rest of southeast Asia. It is therefore not a realistic alternative.

2. A continuation of the present policy of military and economic aid, with some 15,000 U.S. military advisors attempting to help the South Vietnamese Army to defeat the Communist Vietcong. It is difficult to surmise why such a policy should be any more successful in the future than it has been in the past, but given the unacceptability of the other four alternatives, it is the most likely policy for the immediate future.

3. The commitment of major U.S. military forces (Marines, Army, Air Force, Navy) in an all-out attempt to achieve military defeat of the Vietcong guerrilla units. Some military men shudder at this prospect, pointing out that the French tried this and failed and that it is unlikely that we could do any better, even if we could find the enemy which it has been virtually impossible to do whenever large-scale operations against the Vietcong have been undertaken. The Johnson administration also seems to fear adverse domestic reaction to the dispatch of troops at this time.

4. A massive attack by U.S. naval and air units on the "privileged sanctuary" of North Vietnam where the Vietcong supposedly derive their supplies, manpower, weapons, and the organizational direction for their operations. An alternative suggestion along this line is an "American blockade" of the North Vietnamese, similar to our "quarantine" action against Cuba, in an attempt to strangle North Vietnam by economic pressure. Apart from the fact that a Sino-Soviet "airlift" and truck convoys could nullify a blockade, observers on the scene frequently point out that the principal support for the Vietcong is derived from captured U.S. weapons and supplies, and from hundreds of thousands of Vietcong sympathizers among the rural population of South Vietnam, rather than from North Vietnam. The use of South Vietnamese guerrillas in North Vietnam has also been suggested as a potentially helpful measure, but South Vietnamese ineffectiveness against Vietcong guerrillas even in territory nominally controlled by the South Vietnamese Government makes this a most doubtful proposition.

5. The neutralization of South Vietnam, along lines similar to Laos, with the possible mediation efforts of Gen. Charles de Gaulle to secure Communist China's agreement to such neutralization. Few observers expect "neutralization" to be anything more than a temporary face-saving device for the West, so that we can exit gracefully from the scene, knowing full well that a Communist

takeover by infiltration, subversion, or coup d'etat would follow fairly closely upon our departure. Such a decision would be politically disastrous for the Johnson administration right now.

When I recently submitted the above five alternatives to some one hundred of my students at the University of Kansas they voted as follows:

	Percent
1. For withdrawal.....	4 1/4
2. For continuation of the present policy.....	6 1/4
3. For U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam.....	45 1/2
4. For U.S. military action against both South and North Vietnam.....	31 1/2
5. For neutralization.....	12 1/2

If these sentiments are representative of how the majority of Americans feel about the Vietnamese dilemma, and that may well be, President Johnson will increasingly be pressured to take vigorous military action. If he expects to be elected President in 1964, he must then either yield to this pressure or come up with convincing arguments why he rejects alternatives 3 and 4. In my view, only an almost total collapse of the South Vietnamese position would persuade Secretary McNamara and President Johnson that risking greater U.S. involvement would be justified. We may therefore soon be told the hard, sad facts of life in regard to the Vietnamese situation: that there is no military solution to a 20-year-old dilemma which is basically social and political; that we are not prepared to commit a large military force to a jungle war which provides little chance for decisive military engagements; that President Johnson's economic program does not provide for another Korea, and that we do not consider victory in Vietnam to be so vital to our world position, that it would be worthwhile to risk Chinese or Soviet Russian large-scale intervention.

A recent Moscow Tass report warned that U.S. military action of the kind contemplated above was "a venture fraught with the most serious consequences." President Johnson thus probably feels that it would be inexpedient during a presidential election campaign to start what would undoubtedly soon be called "Johnson's war" by the President's Republican opponents. Messrs. Nixon, Rockefeller, Goldwater, et al., could then offer to "go to Vietnam" if elected. Since it is not possible to ascertain at this moment whether a particular policy choice led to Mr. Hilsman's resignation and Senator MANSFIELD's trial balloon, the President can now no longer afford to keep us in the dark or leave us to the mercy of Secretary McNamara's erudite equivocations. The time for greater candor on Vietnam has come, and I for one hope that for the sake of his own political future President Johnson will find the courage to tell the American people the unvarnished and unequivocal truth. If he does, this will gain him our respect and—in some cases, our support, which he surely needs at this critical juncture. If nothing else, the President must make it clear to the panacea-hungry public that there are no "easy solutions" to the staggering problems of the global war against communism and that our failure to act vigorously is a matter of prudence rather than of indecision or the inability or unwillingness to face a challenge. In his televised press conference on February 29 President Johnson stated that too much speculation on the situation in Vietnam did our cause there a disservice. I could not agree more and would add that the best way to terminate such speculation is by fully and candidly informing the American people of our assessment and our plans there (within the limits of security) as soon as Secretary McNamara returns from his latest fact-finding mission to the area.

Resolutions Adopted by the New York Board of Rabbis

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JAMES C. HEALEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 9, 1964

Mr. HEALEY. Mr. Speaker, under permission previously granted, I wish to call the attention of my colleagues in the House to several very significant resolutions adopted at the annual meeting of the New York Board of Rabbis, on January 29, 1964. This association of Jewish spiritual leaders is one of the largest of its kind in the world. In addition to conducting a chaplaincy program in hospitals, homes for the aged, youth shelters, and correctional institutions, the board devotes its efforts toward social and civic betterment. I heartily and personally endorse their stand in their battle for human rights.

The resolutions follow:

CIVIL RIGHTS

The New York Board of Rabbis calls upon the Congress of the United States to adopt President Johnson's civil rights program. We urge the President and his colleagues in Government, as well as the citizens of the land, to do all they can through enforcement and through the power of leadership to see to it that the evil of segregation be removed and the deprivation of civil rights be ended as speedily as possible.

RACIAL JUSTICE IN SYNAGOGUE POLICIES

Cognizant of the failure of our country to confer full and equal rights for all its citizens, and recognizing the special role that religious groups play to help in the correction of this failure, we call upon the synagogues of our city and State to confront the issue of race and to bring to bear upon it the religious principles enunciated by their national movements.

We urge the synagogues of New York to continue to implement a program of action to achieve the following goals: (1) To teach the principle of racial justice in the congregations' educational, cultural, and worship programs; (2) racial justice in the congregations' cooperative relations with other institutions; (3) racial justice in the lives of individual congregants.

IMMIGRATION

The New York Board of Rabbis welcomes the recent statement of our President in support of changes in our immigration laws which will remove the discriminatory legislation based on the national, ethnic, and racial origins of prospective immigrants.

FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION

America's system of public education is not fully meeting the needs of our citizens, or of the Nation as a whole. Outmoded school facilities, understaffed school personnel, and the lack of adequate material endanger the quality of education for our society.

Throughout American history there have been programs of Federal aid to public education. Because we regard our system of education as crucial to the preservation of democracy, we urge the enactment of legislation that would provide for increasing Federal assistance for this purpose.

MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AGED

In a time of rapidly increasing longevity and rising medical costs, our society cannot