

Under the protective provisions of the fifth amendment no person can be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law. These guarantees are as operative against legislative action as they are against action of the courts. Due process is as much denied by arbitrary and unjustified congressional action as it is by judicial action which deprives an individual of his day in court or his right to justice. Due process demands that the legislative body, in performing its functions, justify any legislation which would curtail the time-honored right of a property owner to use his property as he sees fit. This has not been done in the case of the legislation commerce.

No respected legal scholar has ever suggested such a far-fetched theory. If the commerce clause can be stretched to such an extreme, then Federal power and authority could be used to achieve a completely planned economy by regulating all business—local and intrastate as well as interstate—in matters connected with alleged civil rights.

I should like to say that again with emphasis. If under the emotional impulse of civil rights we are to stretch the commerce clause far enough and broadly enough to reach all the matters outlined in the bill, I submit to the American people that the last barrier of protection they might have in any of their private or business or social affairs is broken. The only exception is very innermost parts of the private homes.

Congress has jurisdiction over interstate commerce. If interstate commerce is to be extended, to the limits attempted here under authority of the commerce clause of the Constitution, there are no boundaries to it.

Incredibly, we are asked to stretch the commerce clause to reach even the tiniest of the allegedly covered businesses, even though it is admittedly not in interstate commerce, if cumulatively the "total operations" of it and all the other similar businesses taken together would exercise a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce.

In other words, the courts have held that a fragmentary or remote effect on interstate commerce will not give us jurisdiction. There must be a substantial impact. Those who argue for the bill say that a single little restaurant will not itself affect commerce substantially, but, they say, "There are a great number of little restaurants on the highway; and if we add them all together they have a substantial effect cumulatively on interstate commerce."

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. HART. Accepting the Senator's statement as a statement of fact, let us suppose that for 100 miles on the highway there are only tiny little restaurants, but, judging from a distance of 50 feet, a man is excluded from being served in any of those little restaurants because he is colored. Would that not affect interstate commerce?

Mr. STENNIS. It would have a very remote effect.

Mr. HART. It depends on how hungry a person becomes in a hundred miles, and how much he needs shelter.

Mr. STENNIS. The point I am arguing is that one little restaurant A would not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Mr. HART. I was not talking about restaurant A. I was talking of restaurants A through AAA, in a stretch of road. I ask the Senator if such a situation does not affect interstate commerce.

Mr. STENNIS. To obtain jurisdiction over the little restaurant A under the theory of the proponents of this bill, it is necessary to consider all its activities, all its customers, all its present and expected business, and everything else, and to throw it in with a great many others. Then, and only then, according to the bill's proponents, can it be said that that small restaurant has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. My point is that we have no jurisdiction over it because its business is so remote from the standpoint of interstate commerce. I understand the Senator's position.

I ask Senators to listen again to Mr. Kennedy's testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee. He said:

We intentionally did not make the size of a business the criterion for coverage because we believe that discrimination by many small establishments imposes a cumulative burden on interstate commerce.

I wish to make it clear that that was not my conclusion, but that Mr. Kennedy's conclusion.

Based upon the interpretation of the Nation's highest legal official even before the bill is enacted, it is not too difficult to envision what this would mean to the lives, the property, the fortunes, and the very existence of the small restaurant owners, motel owners, theater owners, lodging house owners, and the like, who would allegedly be covered by this bill and forced to answer a charge that they were engaged in interstate commerce—not because of what they did—but because they and other cumulatively were engaged in operations which collectively affected interstate commerce.

The testimony of Mr. Kennedy evoked a pertinent comment from the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE], and I commend him for it. It was:

Many of us are worried about the use of the interstate commerce clause will have on matters which have been for more than 170 years thought to be within the realm of local control under our dual system of State and Federal Government, based on the doctrine that those powers which were not specifically granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution are reserved to the States.

Let me also point out that Mr. Kennedy's testimony before the Commerce Committee revealed that he apparently does not recognize the distinction between a statute which compels racial segregation and one which grants freedom of choice. When he appeared he placed

in the record a document entitled "State or Local Laws Compelling Racial Segregations in Public Accommodations." Under the heading "State Segregation Statutes," he listed section 2046.5, Mississippi Code of 1942. He would have found, if he had bothered to completely read this statute, that it does not compel segregation. To the contrary, it provides for freedom of choice and authorizes the owner of an establishment to sell to whom he pleases and, if he so desires, to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve a person that he does not desire to do business with.

This is a right which I believe is one which is inherent in the concept of individual liberty and which is protected by the fifth amendment. This means, in my judgment, that the Federal Government cannot—even in pursuance of a nebulous concept of public welfare—pass a law dictating to the owner of an establishment those customers he must serve. It means that a private owner has the basic liberty to choose, according to his own desires—be they arbitrary, capricious, or even irrational—the persons with whom he will do business.

More and more, Mr. President, there has been an intrusion of national authority into matters which were heretofore conceded to be of purely local consideration and concern. It therefore becomes increasingly imperative that the Federal Government respect those principles which mark the line of demarcation between Federal and State authority. As we debate this new and radical proposal for a quantum jump in Federal intrusion, let us remember the words of the Court in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 297 U.S. 238 (1936). They were:

Every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step, and the danger of such a step by the Federal Government in the direction of taking over the powers of the States is that the end of the journey may find the States so despoiled of their powers, or—what may amount to the same thing—so relieved of the responsibilities which possession of the power necessarily enjoins, as to reduce them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain.

Let us not, in misguided but impassioned enthusiasm, undermine our great Constitution—the repository of all our liberties. Instead let us dedicate ourselves to upholding the principles upon which the Constitution was built. Let us reject title II and thereby insure that individuals will have the right to say what they please, to associate with those whom they choose, to use their property as they see fit, and to operate their private businesses in the manner which they desire.

In closing, Mr. President, if I may be permitted to paraphrase a popular safety slogan, I would say this to my fellow Senators: Be careful of what you do. The constitution you destroy may be our own.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I compliment the Senator from Mississippi most heartily on an excellent presentation.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Mr. SPARKMAN. I was thinking as the Senator was speaking—and I wish to ask if the Senator agrees with me—of a quotation from Justice Brandeis, given yesterday by my colleague, the senior Senator from Alabama. Justice Brandeis was one of the all-time liberal Justices, and a clear thinker.

Justice Brandeis is quoted as saying: Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.

Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning, but without understanding.

Does the Senator from Mississippi think that is very real and pertinent at this time?

Mr. STENNIS. Very real; and it certainly is applicable. The Senator from Mississippi, along with the Senator from Alabama, I am sure, as young men, or perhaps only boys, remember when Justice Brandeis was nominated for the Supreme Court of the United States.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I do. Mr. STENNIS. I remember that Justice Brandeis was opposed in the Senate on the ground that he had extremely liberal views. Many people believed his views were not in keeping with our constitutional principles. Justice Brandeis was known as a man of impeccable character, lofty standards, and a great mind. He adorned the Court with great learning and pointed out clearly the fundamentals of our Constitution, our liberties, and our rights.

I thank the Senator for making that very fine remark, which is an excellent closing.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 74 Leg.]

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|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| Allott | Hart | Morton |
| Anderson | Hartke | Moss |
| Bartlett | Hayden | Muskie |
| Bayh | Hickenlooper | Neuberger |
| Beall | Hill | Pastore |
| Bennett | Holland | Pearson |
| Bible | Hruska | Pell |
| Boggs | Humphrey | Proxmire |
| Byrd, Va. | Inouye | Ribicoff |
| Byrd, W. Va. | Javits | Robertson |
| Cannon | Johnston | Russell |
| Carlson | Jordan, N.C. | Saltonstall |
| Case | Jordan, Idaho | Scott |
| Church | Keating | Simpson |
| Clark | Kennedy | Smathers |
| Cooper | Kuchel | Smith |
| Curtis | Lausche | Sparkman |
| Dirksen | Long, Mo. | Stennis |
| Dodd | Long, La. | Talmadge |
| Dominick | Magnuson | Thurmond |
| Douglas | Mansfield | Walters |
| Eastland | McClellan | Williams, N.J. |
| Ellender | McGovern | Williams, Del. |
| Ervin | McNamara | Yarborough |
| Fong | Metcalf | Young, N. Dak. |
| Goldwater | Miller | Young, Ohio |
| Gore | Monroney | |
| Gruening | Morse | |

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inouye in the chair). A quorum is present.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD GET OUT OF VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the mess in Vietnam was inherited by President Johnson.

Over 10 years ago, after a careful study of the situation in Indochina, a report was made to the Senate outlining the following conditions for success in that troubled area of the world:

The basic problem which confronts all three governments and particularly that of Vietnam is to put down firm roots in their respective populations. They will be able to do so only if they evolve in accord with popular sentiment and they deal competently with such basic problems as illiteracy, public health, excessive population in the deltas, inequities in labor, and land tenure, and village and agricultural improvements. Finally, it is essential that there be a constant rising of the ethical standards of government and a determination to use the armies, now the process of formation, strictly for national rather than private purposes. Failure in these fundamental responsibilities of self-government will result in the achievement of the shadow rather than the substance of independence. It could also mean the rapid reduction of the three nations to chaos and the subsequent intrusion of some new form of foreign domination from close at hand.

The date of that report was October 27, 1953, over 10 years ago.

The person making the report was our very able and distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), whose knowledge of that area of the world is most extensive. With respect to South Vietnam, the recommendations of the Senator from Montana, were prophetic, but they went unheeded.

History shows that the major causes of the deterioration, not only of the U.S. position, but also of the position of the South Vietnamese governments, have been actions by the South Vietnamese government contrary to the advice offered by the distinguished majority leader 10 years ago.

The war in South Vietnam is not and never has been a U.S. war. It is and must remain a fight to be fought and won by the people of South Vietnam themselves. The will to fight and win must come from the spirit of the South Vietnamese. The United States cannot instill that will in them.

For 14 years now the United States has helped the South Vietnamese with men, money and material in generous amounts. I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in my remarks a table showing the amounts of aid loaned or granted for this area over the years.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. military and economic aid to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, fiscal years 1954 to 1963, inclusive

[In millions of dollars]

Year	Laos	Cambodia	South Vietnam
1954			0.1
1955	40.9	38.2	325.8
1956	78.5	70.8	383.6
1957	48.7	55.3	391.6
1958	36.9	38.1	242.0
1959	32.6	29.6	249.0
1960	55.5	26.0	251.4
1961	64.2	28.1	209.6
1962	64.1	39.9	287.2
1963	38.8	29.2	208.1

Mr. GRUENING. Why have these been unavailing in bringing security to South Vietnam from the Communist-led attacks of the Vietcong? As Sam Castan, Look senior editor, wrote on January 28, 1964:

But in spite of our noble intent, our massive aid and all the small acts of selfless heroism our men have performed in its behalf, South Vietnam's path to peace is cluttered by the debris of mistakes that America either made or endorsed.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article by Mr. Castan entitled "Vietnam's Two Wars" be printed in full in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. It is to the past then, rather than to the events of recent days and months, that we must look for the answer to the "why" of the present dilemma of the United States in South Vietnam.

When President Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the war in Indochina was not going well. It was a French war, fought with French troops as well as the troops of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. U.S. military and economic aid had been going to the French in ever-increasing amounts as the drain of maintaining a fighting force of a quarter of a million men and of supporting three Indochinese national armies numbering 120,000 men increased.

In reviewing the situation on January 27, 1963—6 days after taking office—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated:

Now the Soviet Russians are making a drive to get Japan, not only through what they are doing in northern areas of the islands and in Korea, but also through what they are doing in Indochina. If they could get this peninsula of Indochina, Siam, Burma, Malaya, they would have what is called the rice bowl of Asia. That's the area from which the great peoples of Asia, great countries of Asia, such as Japan and India, get in large measure, their food. And you can see that if the Soviet Union had control of the rice bowl of Asia, that would be another weapon which would tend to expand their control into Japan and into India. That is a growing danger and it is not only a bad situation because of the threat in the Asian countries that I refer to but also be-

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cause the French who are doing much of the fighting there are making great effort and that effort subtracts just that much from the capacity of their building a European army and making the contribution which otherwise they could be expected to make.

In terms of fighting men, France was there as the only major power on the scene because the three countries had been and were French colonies. While they had been given independence in 1949, the independence was with respect to internal affairs only. They were still within the French Union and France had an obligation to them to help fight the Communist-supported internal fighting they faced.

But the long supply lines and the fierce fighting continued to sap French strength.

Then came the tragic events at Dienbienphu in March 1954. The Communists under Ho Chi Minh attacked that fortress in force.

Those were the days of brinkmanship, of massive retaliation and of the domino theory—policies proclaimed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

While the fighting was taking place, Gen. Paul Ely, French chief of staff, flew to Washington to inform the Eisenhower administration that the French could not hold out much longer and needed direct U.S. intervention.

This request precipitated a behind the scenes struggle at the highest levels of Government circles both here in Washington and in London.

While General Ely was still in town, Secretary of State Dulles held a news conference in which he stated that what military aid was given to France was a military matter and that "if there are further requests of that kind that are made, I have no doubt that our military or defense people will attempt to meet them."

I ask unanimous consent that the text of Secretary Dulles' news conference on March 23, 1954, be printed in full in the RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. Fletcher Knebel, well-known Washington correspondent, in an article in Look on February 8, 1955, gave a forceful account of maneuverings in high places in Washington and London in those fateful, early days of 1954 when the United States stood on the brink of an all-out invasion of Vietnam.

According to Mr. Knebel, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocated an immediate airstrike from carriers; Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, was opposed since he believed that such a strike could lead to all-out intervention; Admiral Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, felt that, while an airstrike might help the French at Dienbienphu, more force would be needed to win the fight in Vietnam.

President Eisenhower, according to Knebel, agreed with Admiral Radford on two conditions: That the United States be joined in the action by other allies;

namely, Great Britain; and that congressional approval be obtained for the action. Since neither condition could be met, the United States moved back safely from the brink.

I ask unanimous consent that that portion of Mr. Knebel's article dealing with Indochina be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. GRUENING. Dienbienphu fell on May 7, 1954.

At Geneva on July 21, 1954, delegates from Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the Vietminh came to a settlement to resolve the fighting in Vietnam. The main provisions of the agreement concerning Vietnam were as follows:

First. Vietnam was to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam.

Second. Regulations were imposed on foreign military personnel and on increased armaments.

Third. Countrywide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, were to be held by July 20, 1956.

Fourth. An International Control Commission—ICC—was to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements.

The United States was not a signatory of the agreement, but issued a statement, unilaterally, stating that—

It (1) will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the Geneva Agreements; (2) would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security," and (3) shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N. to insure that they are conducted fairly.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield with pleasure.

Mr. MORSE. I may say to the Senator from Alaska that I had planned to sit through every word of his speech. I had expected it would come earlier this afternoon. Unfortunately, I must go to an official conference. I assure the Senator from Alaska that I have read every word of his speech. I would have the RECORD today show that the senior Senator from Oregon thinks this is one of the great speeches in this session of the Congress on foreign policy. I associate myself with every word of the speech.

I am awaiting my Government's answer to it. In my judgment, there is no answer to the Senator's speech. There is no justification for killing a single American boy in South Vietnam. It is about time the American people awakened to what is going on in South Vietnam and recognized that South Vietnam is beyond the perimeter of American defense. There is no justification for murdering a single American boy in South Vietnam, for the issue has now become one of murder.

Everyone knows that if we got into a war with Russia or Red China it would

be a nuclear war, not a conventional war. I do not know what we are doing over there with a conventional program.

Furthermore, as the Senator pointed out, where are our alleged allies in South Vietnam? In contrast with South Korea, where are our friends there? So long as we are willing to pay 99 percent of the bill and spill American blood, they will be satisfied.

If my Government wants to make this an issue across the land, I am willing to have it become an issue; but I do not intend to vote for a single dollar for operations in South Vietnam or to give support to the American Secretary of Defense who is bespeaking American foreign policy with no right to do so.

South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy. I say to my administration that I have no intention of giving any support whatsoever to continuing the cost in blood and money for operations in South Vietnam that cannot be justified on the ground of American defense or on any other ground.

The Senator from Alaska has set forth the issue in his speech in terms so unanswerable that the American people have a right to say to the administration, "What is your answer?" I wait for the answer.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator for his helpful comment.

Within 2 months, on September 8, 1954, the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States signed a collective security pact at Manila, known as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam were not parties to this treaty, but by a simultaneous protocol to the treaty all the parties to the original treaty agreed to include the territories of those three nations in the territory protected by the treaty from "armed attack and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability."

The United States made it clear to all the signatories that the type of aggression it considered itself bound to prevent was Communist aggression. As Secretary of State Dulles explained it:

We stipulated on behalf of the United States, however, that the only armed attack in that area which we would regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a Communist armed attack.

In his address to the Nation on September 15, 1954, explaining the action taken at Manila, Secretary Dulles first reiterated his concept of the domino theory of possible events in southeast Asia in the following words:

Any significant expansion of the Communist world, would, indeed, be a danger to the United States, because international communism thinks in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States. Therefore, we could honestly say, using the words that President Monroe used in proclaiming his Doctrine, that Communist armed aggression in southeast Asia would, in fact, endanger our peace and security and call for counteraction on our part.

Secretary of State Dulles had explained the domino theory at an earlier

news conference on May 11, 1954, in the following words: Asked if the plan for collective security could succeed if one or more of its segments were lost to the Communists, Secretary Dulles replied:

The situation in that area, as we found it, was that it was subject to the so-called domino theory. You mean that if one went, another would go? We are trying to change it so that would not be the case. That is the whole theory of collective security. You generally have a whole series of countries which can be picked up one by one. That is the whole theory of the North Atlantic Treaty. As the nations come together, then the domino theory, so-called, ceases to apply. And what we are trying to do is create a situation in southeast Asia where the domino situation will not apply. And while I see it has been said that I felt that southeast Asia could be secured even without perhaps Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, I do not want for a minute to underestimate the importance of those countries nor do I want for a minute to give the impression that we believe that they are going to be lost or that we have given up trying to prevent their being lost. On the contrary, we recognize that they are extremely important and that the problem of saving southeast Asia is far more difficult if they are lost. But I do not want to give the impression, either, that if events that we could not control and which we do not anticipate should lead to their being lost, that we would consider the whole situation hopeless, and we would give up in despair. We do not give up in despair. Also, we do not give up Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

In his nationwide address on September 15, 1954, on the Southeast Asia Treaty, Secretary of State Dulles also expounded his massive retaliation theories of how to contain communism anywhere in the world, anytime, at the least cost:

We considered at Manila how to implement the treaty. One possibility was to create a joint military force. However, I explained that the U.S. responsibilities were so vast and so far flung that we believed that we would serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves.

This viewpoint was accepted. Thus, the treaty will not require us to make material changes in our military plans. These plans already call for our maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. The deterrent power we thus create can protect many, as effectively as it protects one.

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of events in Vietnam from the time of the Geneva agreements as prepared by the Library of Congress be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, by January 1, 1955, U.S. aid began to flow directly to South Vietnam and on February 12, 1955, a U.S. military assistance advisory group took over the training of the South Vietnamese army. Previously, U.S. aid had been given through France.

In October 1955, the Eisenhower administration picked Ngo Dinh Diem to rule South Vietnam.

There may be some room for disagreement as to whether Diem was a poor

choice for the job to begin with or whether, after having come to power, the thirst for more and more power on his part and on the part of his many relatives, whom he placed in high governmental posts, became insatiable.

Seven months before the former emperor, Bao Dai, was deposed on October 23, 1955, in a national referendum in which Diem received 98 percent of the votes, Diem met and greatly impressed Secretary of State Dulles. In a nationwide broadcast on March 8, 1955, Secretary Dulles said:

I was much impressed by Prime Minister Diem. He is a true patriot, dedicated to independence and to the enjoyment by his people of political and religious freedoms. He now has a program for agricultural reform. If it is effectively executed, it will both assist in the resettlement of the refugees and provide his country with a sounder agricultural system. I am convinced that his Government deserves the support which the United States is giving to help to create an efficient, loyal military force and sounder economic conditions.

Ngo Dinh Diem ruled South Vietnam from October 23, 1955, until the coup of November 2, 1963, deposed him. As the guerrilla fighting intensified through the years, so did the mismanagement and corruption of the Diem government. It became increasingly oppressive, trampling the rights of individuals and ignoring the necessity for economic reforms to benefit the people.

There is no room for disagreement concerning the fact that the United States condoned or ignored actions by Diem and his ruling relatives calculated to antagonize the people on whose support any stable South Vietnamese Government must rest—or fall.

As Jerry A. Rose stated in the New Republic on October 12, 1963:

For some reason, diplomats, soldiers in the field, and politicians in Washington are unable to grasp the importance of the people. While forever raising wet fingers to the wind of public opinion in the United States, the policymakers appear to operate on the belief that Asian people have no opinions, and even if they did have an opinion, it would carry no weight. A good Gallup poll would easily disprove the former proposition, and history has proved time and again the fallacy of the latter.

I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Rose's article entitled "Dead End in Vietnam" be printed in full in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 5.)

Mr. GRUENING. The recent spate of optimistic announcements from the Pentagon on how well the war in South Vietnam is going—despite contrary reports from trained observers on the scene—only carries on a tradition begun in the earliest days of U.S. participation in the fighting in Vietnam.

Thus, in July 1956, in the face of continued Vietcong sabotage and virulent propaganda, Vice President Nixon addressing the first Constituent Assembly of South Vietnam, stated that "the militant march of communism has been halted." But by the middle of the next year, Vietcong guerrilla bands stepped

up their attacks, bombing U.S., MAAG and USIS installations and attacking settlements near Saigon.

Mr. Nixon's overoptimistic statement in July 1956 is on a par with his statement in October 1960, when he stated:

As far as Indochina was concerned, I stated over and over again that it was essential during that period that the United States make it clear that we would not tolerate Indochina falling under Communist domination. Now, as a result of our taking the strong stand that we did, the civil war there was ended, and today we do have a strong free bastion there.

Vietcong guerrilla activities, reinforced by arms and men from North Vietnam, increased greatly during Diem's regime.

So did corruption and the oppression of the people.

As Castan states in his article already referred to:

To his [Diem's] personal credit, he allegedly managed, again with American aid, to amass a personal fortune of some \$50 million during the same period. Diem changed—too slowly for our then Ambassador Frederick J. Nolting, an intimate friend of both Diem and his charming sister-in-law, Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, to notice. Too slowly for Gen. Paul D. Harkins, boss of our military-assistance command, to notice. No one, in fact, noticed until we found that we had been duped into complicity, and were compounding by assent the mistakes of Diem and his family.

In the face of the increasingly serious guerrilla activity, the so-called strategic hamlet plan was instituted in 1961. It was copied from Malaya, but served only to make it easier for the guerrillas to capture arms and supplies. It was a failure also as a means of isolating Diem's opponents.

Two accounts illustrate the hows and the whys of the failure of the strategic hamlet plan:

The first is related in the article before referred to by Castan:

Plei Ia Miah, one of the hamlets, is an example. "The soldiers forced us out of our huts," said the village chief, shortly before the November coup d'etat, "and told us that a fortified village was ready for us in the valley. 'Can we take our land?' we asked. Two men refused to leave our ancestral home and were shot. It took us 60 days to march here. We have no land to farm, and if the Government doesn't give us food soon, we'll have to sell the pigs and buffalo we brought with us. The Vietcong come at night for our weapons. We give them the weapons. Why should we die for weapons?"

The second is from a Reporter article by Bernard Fall in the October 24, 1963, issue. I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 6.)

Mr. GRUENING. Reading from the Fall article:

There is not one plantation that has not been attacked or partly pillaged several times by the Vietcong during the past 5 years, and which has not seen several of its French personnel kidnaped and held for ransom or killed. During the Indochina war, the plantations had been allowed to arm themselves and maintained militia forces at their own expense. When Ngo Dinh Diem came to power he ordered all plantations disarmed and they thus became military liabilities.

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The plantation managers now keep in business by closing their eyes to the Vietcong emissaries who come to the workers' villages and exact tribute; they silently pay millions of plasters of ransom to the Vietcong—and as much again to bribe South Vietnamese authorities to allow them to operate. Here and there, the Saigon-controlled press announces that a French plantation was fined tens of millions of plasters (a million dollars or more) for "economic violations." Everybody knows what that means, and business goes on as usual.

The oppression of the people by Diem's secret police was intensified.

In the summer of 1963, Diem turned on the Buddhists and the students, with wholesale arrests and imprisonments.

And yet all through these years from 1955 to the November 1963 coup, Diem was shored up and kept in office with billions of American dollars and as at present as many as 17,000 American troops. The people of South Vietnam knew this. The United States won no friends and influenced no Vietnamese people when Buddhist priests were driven off to concentration camps in AID vehicles by Diem's secret police, who were paid by U.S. funds.

In the light of Diem's long years of corrupt and repressive rule, the two coups in Vietnam last year should have come as no surprise to anyone. The surprise lies in the fact that they did not occur sooner.

As I have said, the roots of the present dilemma of the United States reach back to 1955 and to the years of condoning corruption, misrule, and repression. Diem lost whatever support he had from the people through the use of U.S. money and U.S. arms.

Where do we turn now for our solution in South Vietnam?

The United States must start with one basic truth which should be constantly reiterated: the fight in South Vietnam can be won only by the South Vietnamese. Even if the United States would or could, the fight in South Vietnam cannot be won by making of that country a colony of the United States. The French tried and failed, even though they used a quarter of a million troops.

The question is this: After 20 bloody years of conflict, have the people of South Vietnam and the Government of South Vietnam the will and the capacity to fight to win? Putting it in other terms, Mr. President, has the present Government of South Vietnam the ability and the stability to wage the fight or is it obliged to look over its shoulder constantly in fear of another coup?

If there is no heart to fight in the people of South Vietnam, the sooner we face that fact the better off we shall be. Since a victory in South Vietnam can come only through a victory by the South Vietnamese themselves, if the people and the Government do not want to continue the fight in a manner conducive to victory, it is contrary to the best interests of the United States to remain there.

Some urge stepped-up military activity on the part of the United States, including carrying the war to North Vietnam. Even disregarding—which we

should not—the grave possibility of drawing Red China into the fray in a Korean-type engagement, there are serious drawbacks to such a course of action. The first is the unwillingness of the South Vietnamese to follow such a course of action. The second, of course, is the fact that this is not solely an engagement between South and North Vietnamese. South Vietnamese are fighting South Vietnamese in a country divided within itself.

A comparison with Korea is not appropriate. There we had South Koreans who had the will to fight and win. And secondly, South Korea was not a country divided within itself.

And finally, there is one important difference between the situation as it exists in Vietnam and the situation as it existed in Korea. This is a difference which many people who are urging an escalation of U.S. armed effort in South Vietnam conveniently do not mention. In Vietnam we are alone—in Korea we were in there as part of a United Nations effort.

Fighting side by side with American troops in Korea were troops from Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.

Where are our allies in South Vietnam?

The 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed by eight nations—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

We do not read in the headlines about the officers and men of the other signatory countries being killed in the jungles of South Vietnam. We do not read about them because they are not there. Over 200 Americans have been killed in South Vietnam, 115 of them in direct combat. The United States is all alone in the fight there and the prospects are that it will continue to fight alone there.

To give my colleagues some idea of the confusion prevailing in South Vietnam in the military command there and of the conditions under which U.S. troops are fighting, I ask unanimous consent that an article in the Washington Daily News by Jim Lucas on March 6, 1964, be printed in full at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 7.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, describing the "Spoils for Generals" after the most recent coup by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, Time magazine for February 14, 1964, stated:

It is far from certain that all the military are behind him. But he has rewarded his chief collaborators handsomely. Maj. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem, whose III Corps troops arrested former Junta Boss General Duong Van (Big) Minh, got the No. 2 military job as Defense Minister and Commander in Chief. But among the ranks of Khanh's new, expanded, 53-man junta (8 major generals, 9 brigadier generals, 25 colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 1 major), there was endless wrangling over the lesser spoils. Many a junior officer was disgusted.

The theory has been advanced that the United States has no alternative but to remain in South Vietnam regardless of the course of action followed by the people and the government of South Vietnam. This theory follows the line that if we pulled our support out of South Vietnam now, it would quickly be taken over by the Vietcong who in turn would be controlled by North Vietnam which in turn would be controlled by Red China. The theory then continues that if this happens then Cambodia and Laos would also fall "like a row of dominoes" to Red China. This is a continuance 10 years later of Secretary Dulles' domino theory.

Recent actions on the part of Cambodia in seeking its own neutralization cast considerable doubt on this theory. Cambodia, the middle domino, fell out of its own accord. The \$300 million we have spent there was totally wasted. Moreover Cambodia action took the United States by surprise. We were ill informed. How well informed are we in this whole area? The repeated optimistic statements of our officials in the past have been promptly refuted by events.

The distinguished majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], on Monday, March 2, stated:

I think the best thing our country can do is reassess its foreign policy insofar as it is possible to do so, face up to the realities of today, and not depend so much on the wishes of yesterday.

In no area of our foreign policy is such a reassessment of our foreign policy needed than with respect to the policy we are pursuing in Vietnam.

The United States should no longer permit the dead hand of past mistakes to guide the course of our future actions in South Vietnam.

President Johnson, by virtue of the fact that his control of U.S. foreign policy is so recent, is in the best possible position to make the reassessment of our foreign policy suggested by Senator MANSFIELD and not permit himself to be bound by a past made by his predecessors. The domino theory is not President Johnson's—it is a theory advanced by Secretary of State Dulles during the Eisenhower administration and, as in the case of Cambodia, already proven fallacious.

A few days ago, the senior Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] took an enlightened stand with respect to the attempt by the President of France to put forth a solution for the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. He stated:

It seems to me most glib to make light of the admittedly unsatisfactory situation in Laos or the unhappy state of our relations with Cambodia as a basis for any offhand rejection of De Gaulle's essay at a new approach to Indochina and southeast Asia.

I commend the majority leader for his statesmanlike approach to an admittedly difficult situation and join him in his statements on this subject. His statement of February 19, 1964, should be carefully studied in any reevaluation of our foreign policy in Indochina.

I also wish to commend my able colleague, Senator BARTLETT, for his excel-

lent analysis of the Vietnam situation a few weeks ago and for his plea for less rigidity in our policy in Indochina; he stated:

It is important, however, in our Asian policies, that we strive to achieve flexibility, flexibility which our policies in recent years have failed to have. We cannot allow ourselves to be frozen forever with a rigid policy hoary with age. In Asia as elsewhere we must be willing to discuss anything with anybody who is willing to discuss in a rational and responsible manner. We are the greatest power on earth and we have no need to fear Red China and no need to fear negotiations.

I also wish to commend the able senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] for his splendid speech last week on this same topic. Senator MORSE pointed out cogently that—

American unilateral participation in the war in South Vietnam cannot be justified and will not be justified in American history * * * we have always considered Southeast Asia to be beyond the perimeter of U.S. defense. Southeast Asia is not essential to U.S. defense. Southeast Asia may very well be essential to the defense of some of our allies, but where are they? They ran out on us.

And more pointedly, in response to a question from Senator ELLENDER what Senator MORSE would advise we should do in South Vietnam, Senator MORSE answered with his usual forthrightness:

We should never have gone in. We should never have stayed in. We should get out.

And Senator ELLENDER seconded that clear—and in my judgment thoroughly correct and realistic counsel—by saying:

I have been advocating such a course of action. After my last visit there, I again stated that we should never have gone in there and that we should get out. My advice was never heeded. That is my advice today.

Had this advice of Senator ELLENDER given some time ago, now repeated by him and reaffirmed by Senator MORSE been heeded 200 precious American lives would not have been lost. These are far more important than the billions of dollars we have now wasted in seeking vainly in this remote jungle to shore up self-serving corrupt dynasts or their self-imposed successors and a people that has conclusively demonstrated that it has no will to save itself.

I consider the life of one American worth more than this putrid mess. I consider that every additional life that is sacrificed in this forlorn venture a tragedy. Someday—not distant—if this sacrificing continues, it will be denounced as a crime.

I would ask my colleagues and indeed American fathers and mothers this question:

If your drafted son is sent to Vietnam and is killed there would you feel that he had died for our country?

I can answer that question for myself. I would feel very definitely that he had not died for our country, but had been mistakenly sacrificed in behalf of an inherited folly.

Let us do a little hard rethinking. Must the United States be expected to jump into every fracas all over the world, to go it all alone, at the cost of our youngsters' lives, and stay in blindly and

stubbornly when a decade of bitter experience has shown us that the expenditure of blood and treasure has resulted in failure?

Shall we not, if taught anything by this tragic experience, consider that of the three alternatives: First, to continue this bloody and wanton stalemate; second, to go in "all out" for a full-scale invasion and the certain sacrifice of far more lives and a scarcely less doubtful outcome; or, third, to pull out with the knowledge that the game was not worth the candle.

This last is the best of these choices.

In the event of determining on that last and least unhappy alternative, we shall no doubt be told by some that the United States will lose face in Asia.

I doubt whether we should lose face, whatever that may mean. But if it be so interpreted by some whose opinion should give us small concern, I say better to lose face than to lose the life of another American boy, or a score, or another 200 of them, doomed in varying numbers as long as we stay on.

President Johnson, let me repeat, inherited this mess. It was not of his making. As he approaches the difficult task of making the necessarily hard decisions with respect to the problems in South Vietnam, problems created long before he was President, he should feel no compunction to act in such a way as to justify past actions, past decisions and past mistakes. He should feel entirely free to act in such a manner and to make such decisions as are calculated best to serve the interests of the United States and the free world—a world changed greatly from the time President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles initiated our southeast Asia policies.

Would South Vietnam go Communist if we get out? Probably, but it will doubtless do so in any event. What would the loss of a million men, or 2 million, or 5 million matter to the jam-packed nation of 700 million that is mainland China, that can and will unconcernedly pour its cannon fodder into an adjacent, long-coveted area, and peopled with its fellow Asiatics. Their lives mean nothing to their own bloody rulers who have liquidated vast numbers of their own. But our American boys' lives would mean everything to our own Government and people if sacrificed in a cause in which we should never have engaged.

Of course, it is a source of regret whenever a new political entity appears to be falling behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtain. But why should we persist in seeking to prevent what is ultimately inevitable, in impossible terrain, for a people who care not, in the most distant spot on the globe. It makes no sense.

Moreover there is considerable question whether South Vietnam, even if overrun by the indigenous Vietcong, or by the North Vietnamese, will not constitute another problem for Peiping as it was for the French, as it has been for the United States. It might well prove an aggravation of Red China's considerable internal troubles.

But surely we have no business there any longer, if indeed we ever had.

The time has come to reverse our policy of undertaking to defend areas such

as South Vietnam, whose people are so reluctant to fend for themselves. Let us keep on, by all means, supplying them with arms. Let us continue to give them the means if they wish to use them. But not our men.

The time has come to cease the useless and senseless losses of American lives in an area not essential to the security of the United States.

Only yesterday the report came in of two more American fighting men killed in Vietnam.

Last Wednesday the report was made that three American officers had been killed there. Part of the UPI story reads as follows:

Two U.S. officers were killed yesterday in separate battles with the Vietcong, military sources reported. A U.S. Navy officer was killed yesterday in a helicopter crash.

One of the Army officers died as he attempted to rally Government paratroopers for an assault on a Communist position near the Cambodian border.

There were few details on the death of the other Army officer. Reports reaching Saigon said he was killed in a battle at Trung Lap village 27 miles northwest of Saigon.

It is obvious from this story, as it has been for some time now, that the United States so-called training mission is actually engaged in fighting the Vietcong in a war which the South Vietnamese are themselves reluctant to fight.

I urge the President to take steps to disengage the United States immediately from this engagement.

All our military should immediately be relieved of combat assignments. All military dependents should be returned home at once. A return of the troops to our own shores should begin.

I also urge the President to go to the American people and explain in detail how the United States got involved in Vietnam; when we got involved in Vietnam, and why we are getting out of there.

I sincerely hope that President Johnson will heed the advice of our distinguished majority leader, Mr. MANSFIELD, and others in this body, as knowledgeable as Senators MORSE, ELLENDER, and others reassess the Dulles doctrine of seeking to engage communism on its own grounds—12,000 miles away—and bring our boys home.

This is a fight which is not our fight into which we should not have gotten in the first place. The time to get out is now before the further loss of American lives.

Let us get out of Vietnam on as good terms as possible—but let us get out.

President Johnson is in an excellent position to reverse the previous unsuccessful policies in Vietnam which he did not make.

EXHIBIT 1

[From Look magazine, Jan. 28, 1964]

VIETNAM'S TWO WARS

(By Sam Castan)

To a larger extent than we have admitted, the United States is responsible for South Vietnam's agony. We were behind the scenes at its birth in 1954. We hand-picked its leaders, trained its troops and paid for its economic and military survival. We didn't push it into war; the Communists did that. But in spite of our noble intent, our

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massive aid and all the small acts of selfless heroism our men have performed in its behalf, South Vietnam's path to peace is cluttered by the debris of mistakes that America either made or endorsed.

Ngo Dinh Diem was one.

In 1954, after an 8-year losing war to preserve its colonial holdings in Indochina, France took the knockout punch at Dien-bienphu. The United States had a heavy interest in Southeast Asian developments. We had underwritten fully 60 percent of France's military costs—about \$2 billion—and were considering direct military intervention when the end came. France sued the victorious Vietminh—a largely Communist guerrilla force led by a wily old Asian Marxist, Ho Chi Minh—for peace, and the Geneva Conference of 1954 divided the former French colony into four independent states: North Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh; neutralist Cambodia, Laos, and pro-Western South Vietnam. The West knew that Ho Chi Minh had for years been preparing his share of the spoils for self-sufficiency. A civil service was ready, factory sites were laid out, teachers and industrial workers were trained, and a communications system was already buzzing messages to Peiping. The West also knew that South Vietnam had been left unprepared by France, and that with all the help we might give the new nation, its first, shaky steps toward democratic independence would be menaced by Vietminh cells left behind for purposes of disruption. We badly needed a man in Vietnam, and Diem was in.

Descended from a family of central Vietnamese mandarins, Ngo Dinh Diem was an ascetic Catholic bachelor who had once lived in a Lakewood, N.J., monastery. As a civil administrator under the French, he had enjoyed a certain measure of popular support. Most important, he was an avowed anti-Communist. That was it. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles picked him, Senator Mike Mansfield endorsed him, Francis Cardinal Spellman praised him, Vice President Richard M. Nixon liked him, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower OK'd him.

Although 80 percent of South Vietnam was, and is, Buddhist, Diem's Catholicism was good politics in the United States. The Catholic Bishops' Relief Fund and the Catholic Relief Service assumed major roles in the resettlement of refugees streaming out of predominantly Catholic provinces of North Vietnam. Cardinal Spellman kept showering praise on Diem and his brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc. At this point, some American Catholics were beginning to vote Republican anyway, and the Eisenhower administration, with a wary eye toward John F. Kennedy in 1960, stressed its own role in creating an Asian haven for Catholics.

Out in the Vietnamese backwoods, however, Diem's Catholicism didn't mean a thing. Both America and Saigon were remote from the peasant huts along the muddy canals of South Vietnam, where 80 percent of the population lives, and the nation's real strength lies. It was not religion that turned the people against Diem, and, aside from the extra aid it may have brought in, it was certainly not religion that helped him sustain the nation through those early, critical years. Diem managed, with half a billion dollars per year in American aid and his own skill, to keep South Vietnam afloat in the flood of propaganda and subversion let loose by the old Vietminh cells—now called Vietcong.

That much was to Diem's administrative credit. To his personal credit, he allegedly managed, again with American aid, to amass a personal fortune of some \$50 million during the same period. Diem changed—too slowly for our then Ambassador, Frederick J. Nolting, Jr., an intimate friend of both Diem and his charming sister-in-law, Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, to notice. Too slowly for Gen.

Paul D. Harkins, boss of our military assistance command, to notice. No one, in fact, noticed until we found that we had been duped into complicity, and were compounding by assent the mistakes of Diem and his family.

In 1958, the Vietcong turned from subversion and propaganda to violent guerrilla insurgency. "And Diem," says a Vietnamese Army lieutenant, who was later called away from his post in the field to police Saigon during a martial-law period, "made things so easy for them that every time the sun rose on South Vietnam, the Vietcong was stronger than they had been the night before."

Diem installed virtually all of his relatives in key positions, and insured their tenure by rigged elections. Family friends became district and province chiefs; their sons received commissions and cushy Army spots. Whatever dissidence this caused among the population was left to Diem's brother, Nhu, to handle, through 18 separate secret police agencies and the Vietnamese Special Forces, which were not a branch of the regular militia, but in effect a private police force.

Under cover of the 1961 rainy season, Vietcong forces were bolstered by heavy reinforcements, along the famous "Ho Chi Minh trail." Vietcong raids became more frequent and more ferocious. By this time, corruption in Saigon was well known throughout the provinces. The Ngo's, influenced by Malaya's experience, devised a plan to contend with increased guerrilla activity and, at the same time, contain pockets of internal dissidence. It was called the strategic hamlet program, and it had still another benefit. For public relations, the fortified villages could be passed off as a reminder of the pioneer stockades of early America. This device would bring in still more aid money.

It worked for everyone—everyone being Diem and the Vietcong. Diem got his money, the Vietcong got clearly marked and easily taken resupply points for food, weapons, and ammunition. But it didn't work for the people. Plei Ia Miah, one of the hamlets, is an example. "The soldiers forced us out of our huts," said the village chief, shortly before the November coup d'etat, "and told us that a fortified village was ready for us in the valley. 'Can we take our land?' we asked. Two men refused to leave our ancestral home, and were shot. It took us 60 days to march here. We have no land to farm, and if the government doesn't give us food soon, we'll have to sell the pigs and buffalo we brought with us. The Vietcong come at night for our weapons. We give them the weapons. Why should we die for weapons?"

Buddhists, who comprise the great bulk of South Vietnam's population, became special targets of Nhu's secret police last summer. Like the university students who followed them into the torture cells and concentration camps ringing Saigon and Hue, they were too cohesive, too vocal to be allowed freedom. South Vietnam owes them a profound debt, for their protests, along with Madame Nhu's arrogant tirades about "Buddhist barbecues" and "American adventurers," focused world attention on the police-state measures Diem had adopted. The United Nations sent a special commission to investigate religious persecution in South Vietnam, but it arrived too late. On November 2, 9 days after the commission reached Saigon, Diem fell, and a wildly jubilant Saigon crowd carried newly released Buddhist monks on their shoulders through a free city.

The coup d'etat of last November was entirely predictable, despite the contentions of certain American journalists, notably Joseph Alsop and Marguerite Higgins, and the official word from the Public Information Office of our Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MAC-V) that Diem was winning the war and enjoying popular sup-

port. "You Americans wouldn't understand," said one coup leader. "Diem betrayed us in the critical hour of our fight against communism. We had to kill him." Added another, "Diem started a second war—himself, his family, and his American allies against the people. That was the important war as far as he was concerned. In another month, the Vietcong would have controlled every province in the country."

What sort of war have Diem's mistakes, and ours for allowing them, left us to face in the bloody showdown ahead?

South Vietnam's new military government estimates that hard-core Vietcong guerrillas total upward of 35,000 men, with around 100,000 part-time irregulars joining them each night. Nearly all are armed with the best weapons America has been able to manufacture. The homemade rifles they began with in 1958 are used as drill weapons for recruits. The number of Vietcong rose sharply last year, when Diem's political interference in the military campaign was at its height, and popular resentment against the regime was sharpest. "Diem hated large casualty reports," relates one ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) colonel. "Our orders were to surround the enemy on three sides, and let the main body out to avoid pitched battles. We had to head back for the barracks at dusk, even if it meant letting a boxed-in group we could easily handle get away."

These factors, combined with outright neglect in some provinces, and the existence of isolated and vulnerable "paper hamlets," to which Diem could point as proof that he was "showing the flag," have so strengthened the Vietcong that they no longer operate in marauding cutthroat gangs. "They've got regular battalions," says one American adviser, "with heavy-weapon sections, radio communication—the works." Says a chopper pilot, "I half expect to see a Vietcong jet fighter waiting for me every time I go up."

The most critical factor in any guerrilla war is still popular support. The Vietcong, for all their newly gained strength, do not have the staying power in any one area to set up hospitals, rest areas, training camps, etc. In many areas, they don't need them, for every hut is a place to eat and rest and have wounds treated. "Five miles down the canal, there's a Vietcong village," says a U.S. Army Special Forces sergeant at Tan Phu. "There are never any men around when we come through, but every hut's got a Vietcong flag on the wall, and there's a school with paper Vietcong pennants on every desk. I knew this was a strong Vietcong area, but the first time I hear about a Vietcong PTA, I'm getting the hell out."

We are faced, then, with a dedicated enemy grown strong on an endless string of mistakes we endorsed, fighting on his own ground and calling the tune. None of this has changed substantially since the coup. The new government will need months to replace commanders, district, province and village chiefs, and institute the civil reforms that will give South Vietnam its first real chance for democracy. Meanwhile, as soldiers and peasants wait to see how the new government will go, some of the old habits remain. And the Vietcong have taken every opportunity during this transitional period to strike and strike again. In the 4 weeks following the coup, Vietcong activity rose 50 percent.

South Vietnam's uppermost need is to regain the military initiative. No one in the new government deludes himself with the notion that we are winning the war, or that we even have the balance to jab back when we are hit. The common people of South Vietnam are tired after 20 years of fighting (against Japanese invaders, French colonialists and now Communist guerrillas). The new government must show its will to prosecute the war until a workable peace is in sight.

How well the regime does depends upon the unity of the junta. Behind a facade of strength, strains are appearing among the 14 generals who wrested power from Diem. Most are loyal to Gen. Duong Van Minh, chairman of the revolutionary council, but some observers see the youngest general, 38-year-old Ton That Dinh, as a comer. He is an ambitious man who assumed nearly all the credit for the coup's success, and his high personal ambitions remain unsatisfied. It was Dinh's weight that swung crucial troops against Diem. Immediately after the Presidential palace surrendered, he promoted himself from two- to three-star general. "I was the coup," says Dinh. "It was my planning, my courage, my leadership that brought Diem down. I did it for the people—not for money, not for another star. I have no personal ambitions." To prove that it belived him, the revolutionary council named Dinh Minister of Security, a considerably lesser post than he may have planned for himself.

If disension is actually developing within the provisional military government, the war effort may be adversely affected. So may the peace effort, if the generals decide, and if the United States, which pays their salaries, agrees, that the war cannot be won, and some sort of neutralism, such as that envisaged by France's President Charles de Gaulle, is the best way out of a bad thing.

As long as there is shooting, the American involvement will, of course, continue. The removal of over 1,000 Americans last month was characterized by one personnel officer as "trimming some of the fat off our Saigon surplus. Those boys had nothing to do but create a problem for the MP's, and stuff more money into Saigon's black market."

Our field forces stand at their highest level of 2,700 officers and men. There will be more American fatalities, more wounded and more captured. And more, too, of the weirdly funny tales that are part of any war. There was the young Army pilot who, shook up by the presence of Gen. Paul Harkins as a passenger, forgot to drop his wheels for a landing. Harkins climbed out of the wreckage, saying, "That's one way to stop the damned thing." And those two sergeants in Pleiku who measured their remaining time in Vietnam by the number of weekly malaria pills they still had to take. "I'm down to 22 pills," boasted one to the other. "How many pills do you have left?"

Thanks in part to our blunders, to our old policy of seeing, hearing and thinking no evil of anyone who labels himself "anti-Communist," and to our love of bucking reality, a tired, bloodied nation is approaching its critical hour.

How many pills does South Vietnam have left?

[From Look magazine, Jan. 28, 1964]

AN INTERVIEW WITH TON THAT DINH

Question. General Dinh (full name pronounced Tone Tuck Dinn), what made you turn against Diem? You are the general who led his August pagoda raids against the Buddhists and ruled Saigon as military governor when he declared martial law.

Answer. Diem did not order the raids. It was his brother Nhu who ordered me against the Buddhists, and as a soldier, I had to follow. They must have thought me a fool, those two. The very morning of the coup, I visited them in the Presidential Palace. I asked Diem how his head cold was coming. I was very pleasant. Then I mustered troops against them.

Question. What made you decide to join in a coup d'etat?

Answer. As a soldier, my resentment was building up for a long time. I was in the French colonial army as a private, and later became a cadet at St. Cyr, the French equivalent of your West Point. I have attended

your General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. I did not like being told how to fight the Vietcong. I did not like seeing them win because of Diem's and Nhu's interference. The last straw came when the national elections of last October were fixed. I knew then that Diem intended to stay in power, to keep interfering and never to institute reforms.

Question. Which reforms specifically?

Answer. He had promised to institute religious freedoms, to end press censorship, to insure justice in the courts, to restore the legitimate authority of ministers and army commanders. I knew that none of these would ever come about, and that he had no intention of removing Nhu and his wife, or of lessening the air of discord and suspicion that was everywhere. We all became masters of subterfuge and intrigue under Diem. That much he taught us, and we used it against him.

Question. How do you think the war against the Vietcong will go now?

Answer. In some areas, the situation is very bad. We will have to start from scratch. But now we will push much harder. We will try to control the Cambodian border, where many of their supplies come through. We'll step up night operations—until now, the Vietcong has been fighting at night. And we have been fighting in the daytime, and we'll take risks. I was not frightened of risks when I fought Diem. I led the attack. I was at the palace, hurrying the troops through breaches in the wall. I did it. And now I can do it against the Vietcong.

Question. Would you consider taking a higher government post than the one you now hold as Minister of Security?

Answer. I have no personal ambitions. I am a soldier. But if the people ask me to serve, I will obey—not for myself, for them. I only want to serve, as I served Diem. I was sorry that we had to kill him. I cried.

EXHIBIT 2

[Department of State press release, Mar. 23, 1954]

INDOCHINA

Asked at his news conference today about the situation in Indochina, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made the following statement:

"I do not expect that there is going to be a Communist victory in Indochina. By that I don't mean that there may not be local affairs where one side or another will win victories, but in terms of a Communist domination of Indochina, I do not accept that as a probability.

"There is a very gallant and brave struggle being carried on at Dienbienphu by the French and Associated States Forces. It is an outpost. It has already inflicted very heavy damage upon the enemy. The French and Associated States Forces at Dienbienphu are writing, in my opinion, a notable chapter in military history. Dienbienphu is, as I say, an outpost position where only a very small percentage of the French Union Forces are engaged, and where a very considerable percentage of the forces of the Vietminh is engaged.

"Broadly speaking, the United States has, under its previously known policy, been extending aid in the form of money and materiel to the French Union Forces in Indochina. As their requests for materiel become known, and their need for that becomes evident, we respond to it as rapidly as we can. Those requests have assumed various forms at various times. But I think that we have responded in a very prompt and effective manner to those requests.

"If there are further requests of that kind that are made, I have no doubt that our military or defense people will attempt to meet them.

"As soon as this press conference is over,

I am meeting with Admiral Radford. But so far I have not met General Ely, and I do not know what requests he has made, if any, in that respect because that would be primarily a matter for the defense people in any case. The policy has already been established so far as the political aspects of it are concerned.

"We have seen no reason to abandon the so-called Navarre plan which was, broadly speaking, a 2-year plan which anticipated, if not complete victory, at least decisive military results during the fighting season which would follow the present fighting season, which is roughly a year from now.

"As you recall, that plan contemplated a very substantial buildup of the local forces and their training and equipment. It was believed that under that program, assuming there were no serious military reversals during the present fighting season, the upper hand could definitely be achieved in the area by the end of the next fighting season. There have been no such military reverses, and, as far as we can see, none are in prospect which would be of a character which would upset the broad timetable and strategy of the Navarre plan."

Asked whether that ruled out any possibility of a negotiated peace at Geneva, Mr. Dulles replied:

"At any time if the Chinese Communists are willing to cut off military assistance, and thereby demonstrate that they are not still aggressors in spirit, that would, of course, advance greatly the possibility of achieving peace and tranquility in the area. That is a result which we would like to see.

"To date, however, I have no evidence that they have changed their mood. One is always hopeful in those respects, but, so far, the evidence seems to indicate that the Chinese Communists are still in an aggressive, militaristic and expansionist mood."

EXHIBIT 3

[From Look magazine, Feb. 8, 1955]

WE NEARLY WENT TO WAR 3 TIMES LAST YEAR BUT IKE SAID NO

(By Fletcher Knebel)

Three times within the past 10 months, the United States stood on the brink of war with the Communists in the Far East. Three times the proposal of war in the Orient was advanced in the highest councils of the Eisenhower administration. Twice it was rejected. Once it was abandoned—but only after a veto by Great Britain.

Last April, America came to the threshold of war to save Indochina from the Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh, a venture that might or might not have involved us in hot war with Red China.

In September, the United States was but inches away from a decision to go to war to prevent the little island of Quemoy, off the Chinese mainland, from falling into Communist hands.

In November, America was stayed from a naval and air blockade of Red China—an act of war—by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

The story of how America narrowly missed armed conflict in Asia is a fascinating interplay of the convictions of powerful men, all of them high-principled, all of them sharing the Nation's top secret intelligence reports and all of them determined to guide America's destiny to the eventual goal of world peace.

WERE IKE'S DECISIONS RIGHT?

History may credit a number of men with helping to keep America out of war in the last 10 months. They were Eisenhower, Dulles, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Anthony Eden and even, curiously, Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

The strongest voice for peace was that of President Eisenhower. Whether his deci-

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sions for peace were right or wrong is a matter of violent dispute in the Nation's Capital. "Thank God for Eisenhower," says one Democratic Senator who was consulted during the Indochina crisis. "Ike has but postponed the day of reckoning," says another well-briefed legislator who believes that the United States has taken the downhill path of appeasement.

Right or wrong, Ike weighted the balances for peace in the secret councils of his administration, far from the headlines and the public eye. Without President Eisenhower, hundreds of thousands of American boys today might be plowing across the Pacific in Army transports—destination Red China.

The men who urged war were sincere and dedicated leaders who believed that bold American action would check the Communists without plunging the Nation into all-out land war with Red China. Ike believe otherwise.

The struggle for war or peace in Washington was contested on an oddly shaped triangle, its points resting on the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon across the Potomac River in Virginia.

Here is the inside story, as gathered from many of the participants, of how the United States looked into the pit of war—and turned away.

INDOCHINA

Last March, the Communist warriors of Ho Chi Minh besieged the French fortress of Dienbienphu in tremendous strength, seeking a knockout blow to win the dreary, 8-year-old conflict.

Six days later, Gen. Paul Ely, French chief of staff, arrived in Washington and secretly informed U.S. leaders that American intervention was needed to save Indochina. This set in motion a month-long chain of private Washington huddles and frenzied diplomacy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, America's top military body, met in the Pentagon.

Adm. Arthur W. Radford, a carrier and air-power naval officer and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocated U.S. intervention through a carrier strike from the U.S.S. *Essex* and *Boxer*, both then in the Gulf of Tonkin, and by Air Force bombers from the Philippines. Radford had long favored a display of force in the Far East, was already an advocate of blockading Red China.

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army chief of staff and former Korean commander, declared himself flatly against American intervention. He declared that an air strike would lead inevitably to action by American troops as soon as the first planes were shot down. He contended that his limited army, with commitments around the globe, could not fight in the jungles of Indochina short of all-out mobilization at home.

Adm. Robert B. Carney, chief of naval operations, and Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Force chief of staff, took a middle ground between Radford and Ridgway. They expressed belief that an airstrike would be effective in aiding the defenders of Dienbienphu, but doubted the aerial blow alone could win the war for the French.

Radford took his recommendation for U.S. intervention to the National Security Council. President Eisenhower accepted Radford's opinion that an airstrike would be effective, but quickly laid down the rule that the United States would intervene only if joined by other allies. In the circumstances, "other allies" meant Britain, which had a carrier in the area.

President Eisenhower also stipulated that any move of intervention in Indochina required approval of Congress. But the President and Dulles were convinced that Congress was in no mood to give a blank check for war measures at that time, before Britain had signed on the dotted line. To give Rad-

ford an idea of congressional opinion and to give congressional leaders Radford's viewpoint, Dulles summoned three top Republicans and five Democrats to a Saturday-morning meeting, April 3, at the State Department.

This secret briefing left the legislators bug-eyed, for it was the first time they realized that the administration was actually considering war in Indochina.

The legislators said "No" in various ways to the suggestion of congressional authorization for U.S. solo intervention. And Dulles indicated that the President had no thought of asking this anyway, since the principle of "united action" had been determined.

The Secretary of State flew to London and Paris in mid-April, got British and French agreement to proceed with united action talks. A communique was issued, after Sir Winston Churchill himself made penciled changes.

BRITISH MOVE ANGERS DULLES

Back in Washington, Dulles arranged an eight-power conference on methods of stopping the Reds in Indochina. On Easter Sunday, however, Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, called Dulles at home to say he had been instructed not to attend the talks. Angry at the apparent British retreat, Dulles changed the meeting into a 16-power Korean peace conference as a face-saving device.

The transatlantic maneuvering generated terrific tensions behind the scenes. At one congressional briefing, a Republican legislator blurted out to Dulles, "You are either a liar or Eden is a doublecrosser." Dulles vowed he had told the exact truth of the negotiations with the British, that London suddenly had switched signals on him.

On April 25, the British Cabinet met in emergency session and decided finally against military action in Indochina. The decision was relayed to Dulles in Paris by Anthony Eden. U.S. officials learned that Nehru in India had influenced the British Cabinet's decision by voicing violent objection to British-American military action in Indochina.

Radford flew from Paris to London the next day, conferred with British leaders in an effort to arrange some other joint action in Indochina. But this mission failed. This ended all thought by U.S. leaders of intervening to save Dienbienphu, and on May 7 the fortress fell to Ho Chi Minh's troops.

QUEMOY

Two months after the Indochina armistice was signed in Geneva, July 21, the United States again moved to the edge of war in the Orient. This time, however, there was no question of "united action." This time, the joint chiefs proposed that America go it alone.

In early September, Red Chinese artillery began shelling the Nationalist Chinese island of Quemoy, a few miles off the Asiatic mainland and about 125 miles from Chiang Kai-shek's stronghold on Formosa.

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, fearing preparations for the long-promised Red invasion of Formosa had begun, met at the Pentagon. They decided to urge President Eisenhower to use the 7th Fleet to thwart an invasion of Quemoy, should it develop.

The joint chiefs split 3-to-1 on the recommendation. Radford, Carney, and Twining favored American strafing and bombing alongside Chiang's planes if a Red invasion of Quemoy actually got underway. Ridgway opposed it, again because he feared it meant eventual use of ground troops, leading to an all-out land war with Red China. The other three believed such "clean" air and sea action could do the job without involving troops.

Ike summoned the National Security

Council to extraordinary session at Denver to discuss war in Quemoy. The meeting was held in the Officer's Club at Lowry Air Force Base.

Dulles was in Manila, signing the south-east Asian collective-defense treaty. He cabled that he had two questions: One. Was Quemoy essential to the defense of Formosa (which the United States is committed to defend)? Two. Was Quemoy itself defendable?

Dulles got the answers to his questions from Radford. Quemoy could be defended, but Quemoy was not absolutely essential to the defense of Formosa. Dulles then took a stand against any ironclad assurance to Chiang that we would help defend Quemoy. Vice President Nixon also opposed American aid for Quemoy.

President Eisenhower in the end decided that we would make no definite commitment to Chiang to defend Quemoy. On the other hand, if the Reds attacked Quemoy in force as an obvious prelude to an invasion of Formosa, we would be free to strike if we wished. President Eisenhower cast his deciding vote against war.

THE BLOCKADE

Barely 2 months later, strong men in the administration and the Republican Party again propelled the United States toward war with Red China.

In late November, the Chinese Communists announced they had imprisoned as spies 11 U.S. airmen and 2 civilians, captured in the Korean war.

Secretary Dulles was vacationing at his home on Duck Island in Lake Ontario, where the chief blessing is the absence of a telephone. When Dulles stepped ashore Sunday, November 28, in Jefferson County, N.Y., he learned of the gathering thunderclouds.

Senate Republican leader William F. Knowland, of California, had called for a naval blockade so tight that "no vessel can get in or out of China until these Americans are released." He was then backed by other Republicans. Also, Dulles knew that Admirals Radford and Carney on the joint chiefs favored a blockade, not specifically because of the spy "conviction" of the American airmen, but as a tool to yank the fangs of militant Red China.

Dulles decided to call the President, who was in Augusta, Ga., for Thanksgiving, but the President got him first at the home of friends in the hamlet of Chaumont on the shores of Chaumont Bay, Lake Ontario. They talked for 15 minutes and agreed that a blockade would be an act of war, that America should not commit its armed might in response to what they believed was a carefully timed provocative act by the Communists.

Dulles sketched a proposed revision of his scheduled speech in Chicago Monday night and Ike approved it. The next morning, Dulles called to dictate the text of his revision, and an aid took it to Ike, who was out playing golf. As he sat on a bench beside a tee, the President made a few changes and approved the rest. The speech flatly rejected a blockade.

The decision again was against war.

Twice in 1954, the President turned down proposals, that America fight Red China. Once he approved war action, but only on condition that our allies join us—they never did.

In the search for peace, an American President must finger many tools. Once Ike used the hammer. To understand the peace quest of recent months, it is necessary to go back 2 years—to the time when Ike got tough.

On December 8, 1952, the heavy cruiser *Helena* rolled in the seas off Wake Island, carrying President-elect Eisenhower from Guam to Hawaii after his promised post-election trip to Korea. A helicopter brought

aboard Secretary of State-designate Dulles and other future Cabinet members. For the better part of 3 days, Ike and Dulles discussed the Korean conflict as the *Helena* cut eastward.

Ike took the firm position that "this war must end." Dulles agreed. American casualties then had mounted to 128,000, including 22,000 killed. Both men agreed that Red China wanted the conflict prolonged, that the Reds must be made to quit. "We've got to make them want peace" is the way Ike put it.

Ike and Dulles reached a basic decision. If the Reds did not come to terms, the United States would bomb the new industrial complex of Manchuria above the then-sacred Yalu River and smash Red China's will to fight.

IKE PUTS IT UP TO THE REDS

By May, 1953, the truce talks still drifted in the Communist doldrums, despite an April agreement for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. The Reds were playing the same old game of delay, frustration and obstruction.

Ike decided the time had come to let Red China know we meant business. Dulles, accompanied by FOA Director Harold E. Stassen, set off on a global flying tour. For 3 days, May 20 to 22, Dulles held confidential talks with Nehru in New Delhi, impressing on him that U.S. patience had come to an end in Korea. The Reds must either come to terms or face that all-out bombing of Manchurian factories, he told Prime Minister Nehru.

There is no concrete evidence outside the secret files of India that Nehru relayed this "ultimatum" to Red China, but circumstantial evidence indicates that he did. Within 48 hours, our military negotiators reported to Washington that the Communist attitude had softened.

The fits and starts of haggling at Panmunjom continued, but the Reds had decided to quit. On July 27, the long-sought truce in Korea was signed. Three years and 32 days short of the duration of our fight against Germany in World War II.

America had been at peace for 18 months. No man is certain how peace should be maintained. Ike seeks many ways. Men of deep conviction differ with some of his methods. The debate continues in Washington.

EXHIBIT 4

SOUTH VIETNAM: A SUMMARY OF EVENTS 1 1954

May 8-July 21: Geneva Conference on Indochina: The delegates are from Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. (joint chairmen), France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the Vietminh regime. Agreements are signed on July 21 and the main provisions concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign military bases and personnel and on increased armaments, (3) countrywide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, are to be held by July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Commission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to the agreements. The United States issues a unilateral declaration stating that it (1) "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva Agreements, (2)

¹ This chronology has been compiled primarily on the basis of: Deadline Data on World Affairs, Deadline Data, Inc., New York, and memorandum RFE-14, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Jan. 10, 1962.

"would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security," and (3) "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N. to insure that they are conducted fairly."

July 7: Head of state and former Emperor Bao Dai appoints Ngo Dinh Diem Premier.

August: Flow of almost 1 million refugees from North to South Vietnam begins.

August 31: Gen. Paul Ely, French High Commissioner for Indochina, states that France is unequivocally committed to support the South Vietnamese Government as the legal government in Vietnam and to grant it total independence.

September 16: South Vietnam's independence established as France turns over to the Diem government control of the police, justice and security departments, public utilities, and civil aviation.

October: National Revolutionary Movement, mass political party in South Vietnam, is founded.

October 11: The Communist Vietminh regime formally takes over control of Hanoi and North Vietnam.

October 24: President Eisenhower sends a letter to Premier Diem of South Vietnam stating that American assistance will be given hereafter not through the French authorities, but directly to the Government of South Vietnam. The letter also states that the U.S. Government "expects this aid will be met by . . . undertaking needed reforms."

1955

January 1: United States begins to render direct assistance to South Vietnam, on the basis of the existing pentilateral agreement of December 1950, for the support of the Vietnamese armed forces.

January 24: Premier Diem states, in an interview with a New York Post correspondent, that Vietnam would do everything possible to help the ICC and would wait to see whether conditions of freedom existed in Communist North Vietnam at the time stipulated in the Geneva Agreement for holding Vietnam-wide elections.

February 5: Premier Diem decrees the first of a series of laws initiating important and extensive land reform program.

February 12: The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) takes over the training of the South Vietnamese army, following the relinquishing of command authority by the French.

February 19: Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO)—with its protocol covering Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—comes into force.

March 7: United States and South Vietnam sign agreement which supplements existing economic cooperation agreement of September 1951.

March 29: Armed revolt is precipitated in Saigon by the Binh Xuyen political-bandit group, spreading ultimately into large-scale dissidence in the southern provinces with the participation of elements of the Cao Dai and Hon Hao religious sects.

March 31: French-North Vietnamese agreement provides for a North Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC to operate in South Vietnam.

April 17: South Vietnamese Government appeals to the U.N. against the North Vietnamese Communists, who, in violation of the Geneva agreements, prevent northerners from migrating to South Vietnam.

May 10: Premier Diem forms a new Cabinet composed largely of his own followers.

May 16: Time limit given by Geneva agreement for exodus of refugees from North to South Vietnam (and vice versa) is extended to July 20.

July: Communists initiate the first overt propaganda moves in South Vietnam by dis-

tributing literature signed by North Vietnam's National United Front.

July 1: French formally relinquish command authority over the Vietnamese Navy.

July 7: French formally transfer Nha Trang Air Base to Vietnamese control.

July 20: Mass demonstrations by anti-Communists in Saigon, Capital of South Vietnam. The demonstrators accuse the ICC of not preventing Communist violations of the Geneva agreements. On the same day, talks were scheduled to begin (according to Geneva agreement) for the preparation of all-Vietnam elections to be held on July 20, 1956, to reunite the country. The Government of South Vietnam rejects the North Vietnamese Government's invitation to discuss the elections, on the grounds that in North Vietnam the people would not be able to express their will freely and that falsified votes in North Vietnam could overrule the votes in South Vietnam.

August 16: Last French High Commissioner in Vietnam departs.

October: Binh Xuyen is defeated as an organized armed insurgent force.

October 23: A national referendum deposes Bao Dai, former emperor and since March 7, 1949, Head of State of Vietnam. Ninety-eight percent of the votes expressed preference for Premier Diem.

October 26: A republic is proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem who becomes the first President of South Vietnam.

December 5: President Diem decrees a new Vietnamese nationality law.

December 30: Government plan is published for resettlement of 100,000 refugees from North Vietnam. The government will induce landlords to sign contracts with refugee tenants, and if the landlords refuse to sign, the government will take over the contracts on behalf of the refugees.

1956

January: South Vietnamese army units occupy Tay Ninh, principal Cao Dai political center, leading to breakup of the organized Cao Dai armed insurgency. Agreement with Cao Dai leaders on February 28 legalizes Cao Dai religious practices and forbids its political activities as a religious sect.

February 12: Tran Van Soal, leader of an important Hoa Hao faction, surrenders. Ba Cut, another principal Hoa Hao leader, is captured on April 13, leading to breakup of organized Hoa Hao armed insurgency.

February 23: Communist North Vietnam calls for a new meeting of the participants of the Geneva Conference. North Vietnam accuses South Vietnam of violating the agreement by refusing to participate in all-Vietnam elections and by preparing separate elections in South Vietnam.

March 4: General elections for South Vietnam's first National Constituent Assembly, which is to have 123 members, result in the victory of the National Revolutionary Movement and other political parties supporting President Diem.

March 22: French-Vietnamese agreement is signed for withdrawal of the remaining French expeditionary forces by June 30, 1956.

April 6: The Vietnamese Government announces it will continue to cooperate with the ICC and reiterates its position of support on Vietnam-wide elections at such time as conditions in Communist North Vietnam permit genuinely free voting.

April 28: French Military High Command in Vietnam is dissolved.

July 4: Constituent Assembly approves unanimously a draft constitution providing for a strong executive with safeguards for individual citizens. The President, whose term of office is to be 5 years, has veto power over all legislation of the unicameral parliament and may rule by decree when the National Assembly (elected for 4 years) is not in session.

July 6: U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon visits Vietnam, hands to President Diem of South Vietnam a letter in which President Eisenhower declares he is looking forward to many years of partnership between the two countries. As guest speaker before the Constituent Assembly, Nixon declares that "the militant march of communism has been halted."

July 30: Vietnamese liaison mission to ICC is established preparatory to the transfer of functions from the French liaison mission.

August 21: President Diem issues decree regulating the status of Chinese born in Vietnam. The decree declares them to be Vietnamese citizens; those who refuse to accept their new status must leave the country.

September 14: President Diem reshuffles his Cabinet.

September 19: French Air Force officially transfers the Tourane Air Base to Vietnamese control.

October 26: South Vietnam's first constitution is promulgated and the National Constituent Assembly is officially transferred into a national assembly.

November 16: Radio Hanoi broadcasts admit peasant resistance and armed clashes in North Vietnam's Nghe An Province.

November 29: President Diem denounces the North Vietnamese Communist regime's military actions in Nghe An Province as a violation of human rights and a forceful suppression of persons wishing to move to the southern zone and urged the U.N. to take the matter under consideration; Vietnam also protests to the ICC, charging the North Vietnamese Communist regime with violation of article 14c of the Geneva Agreements.

December 28: Nguyen Ngoc Tho confirmed by the National Assembly as Vietnam's first Vice President, following his appointment by President Diem.

1957

January 3: International Control Commission reports that between December 1955 and August 1956 neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam have been fulfilling their obligations under the 1954 armistice agreement.

February 22: Attempted assassination of President Diem at a rural fair in Ban Me Thuot by a Cao Dai adherent.

March 5: President Diem enunciates a new national investment policy.

March 27: Asian People's Anti-Communist League begins its third conference in Saigon. Vietnam established as the site of the permanent secretariat.

April 11: Lucien Cannon, chief of the Canadian delegation to the ICC, is murdered.

May 2: In South Vietnam a national military conscription program is decreed.

May 5-19: President Diem visits the United States. He addresses on May 9 a joint session of Congress. In a joint communique (issued May 11), President Eisenhower and President Diem declare that both countries will work toward a peaceful unification of Vietnam. The United States will continue helping South Vietnam to stand firm against communism.

June: French naval and air force training mission withdrawn.

June 10: U.S. Export-Import Bank grants South Vietnam a \$25-million loan for economic development.

October 22: Bombing of the U.S. MAAG and USIS installations in Saigon; U.S. personnel injured in the incident.

November 15: United Nations Secretary General announces plan for the development of the Mekong River basin, which is to be carried out in cooperation with Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, assisted by the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).

1958

January 4: Large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantation north of Saigon,

reflecting steady increase in Communist armed activity since mid-1957.

February 20: Fire sweeps Gia Kiem refugee settlement center leaving 20,000 persons homeless.

February 26: President Diem announces cabinet changes.

March 7: Premier Pham Van-dong of North Vietnam (in a letter to President Diem of South Vietnam) proposes a conference of the two Governments to discuss reduction of their respective armed forces.

April 26: Declaration by the Government of South Vietnam on measures to be taken by North Vietnam in order to create conditions for the holding of free elections as stipulated in the Geneva agreements.

May 9: President Diem distributes land ownership certificates to 1,819 landless farmers.

May 17: North Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC withdrawn from Saigon.

June 25: Cambodian royal proclamation, alleging that South Vietnamese troops have "invaded" and occupied several Cambodian border villages, accuses South Vietnam of 19 cases of violation of Cambodian territory since January 1957. Allegation is repudiated by the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam.

August 5: Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Diem, travels to Cambodia to try to settle the drawn-out border dispute.

August 10: Large Communist guerrilla force attacks in Tay Ninh.

September 10: France and South Vietnam sign agreement under which France provides aid for the Vietnam Government's agrarian reform program—1,490 million francs.

December 26: Premier Pham Van-dong of North Vietnam proposes a conference to discuss limitation of military commitments and establishment of commercial and other exchanges between the north and the south.

1959

April 22: United States and South Vietnam sign an agreement for cooperation for research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

May 13: Japan signs a World War II reparations and loan agreement with South Vietnam.

June 11: Laos and South Vietnam sign series of agreements, on judiciary cooperation, commercial exchanges and payments, and border control.

July: Vietnam Government publishes official publication, "Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet Minh Communists." Annual installments published in July 1960 and May 1961.

July 8: Communist guerrillas attack Vietnamese military base at Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several U.S. MAAG personnel.

July 10: In Belgian Communist publication Red Flag, Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnamese Communist regime, states "we are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

August 3: Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in South Vietnam on official visit.

August 30: Second national elections give the National Revolutionary Movement and other pro-Government political parties overwhelming majority in the National Assembly.

October 30: Spokesman of the Vietnamese Army discloses that a campaign against Communist guerrillas in the country's southernmost region, the Camau Peninsula, resulted in heavy guerrilla losses.

November 14: French Minister of Finance and Vietnamese Vice President initial (in Saigon) agreements for the settlement of financial claims between the two countries and for a French loan of 7 billion (old) francs (about \$14 million) and a credit of 11 billion (old) francs (about \$22 million) for the purchase by South Vietnam of capital equipment.

1960

January: In an article in Hoc Tap, journal of the Communist Party (Lao Dong) in North Vietnam, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, head of the North Vietnamese armed forces, states "the North has become a large rear echelon of our army" and "the North is the revolutionary base for the whole country." A Communist guerrilla band attacks Vietnamese Army installation in Tay Ninh.

March: Communist guerrilla force attacks leprosarium in Bien Hoa Province. President Diem inaugurates first agrovillage in Phong Dinh Province.

March 24: France and South Vietnam sign agreement on outstanding financial and properties issues and on trade relations.

April 17: North Vietnam protests to the chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Britain and the U.S.S.R.) against a formidable increase of personnel in the American military assistance and advisory group in South Vietnam; and accuses the United States of turning South Vietnam into "a U.S. military base for the preparation of a new war."

April 30: An opposition group of 18, calling themselves the Committee for Progress and Liberty, send letter to President Diem demanding drastic economic, administrative, and military reforms.

May 5: United States announces that at the request of the Government of South Vietnam, the U.S. military assistance and advisory group will be increased by the end of the year from 327 to 685 members.

June 3: U.S. Development Loan Fund approves \$9,700,000 loan to South Vietnam for purchase in the United States of diesel locomotives and railway cars.

June 18: Government announces that the Governor of Vinh Kong Province and his driver were assassinated and a bodyguard wounded by Communist terrorists.

June 26: Government announces that South Vietnamese troops kill 34 Communist rebels in a battle along the Cambodian border on June 22.

June 28: Defense Ministry announces that Government troops killed 41 Communist guerrillas and lost 2 soldiers in a clash west of Saigon.

June 29: Communist guerrillas ambush and kill the inspector of South Vietnam's youth and sports organizations. "Each month, from 250 to 300 Government officials are murdered by Red guerrillas * * * South Vietnam is clearly the target of a new Communist offensive." (Time, July 11, 1960.)

July 16: Government discloses that in clashes with Communist guerrillas on July 9, Government troops killed 76, wounded at least 100, and captured 28.

July 20: Vietnam National Assembly delegation leaves Saigon for 6-week visit to the United States.

September 5: In addressing the opening of the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh states "the North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification."

September 10: The resolution adopted by the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong Party declares clearly that an "immediate task" of the "revolutionary struggle of our compatriots in the South" is to overthrow President Diem's government.

October: Series of attacks by large Communist guerrilla force in the Kontum-Pleiku area.

October 18: President Diem reshuffles his cabinet and replaces the Secretaries of State for Justice, Interior, and National Defense.

October 26: President Eisenhower assures President Ngo Dinh Diem, in a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

November 2: Development Loan Fund announces signing of an agreement for a \$17,500,000 loan to South Vietnam. The loan is for the improvement and expansion of the water supply of the Saigon metropolitan area.

November 5: In a daylight ambush a U.S. public safety adviser, Dolph B. Owens, and his driver are killed by guerrilla machinegun fire near seaside resort, Long Mal. On the same day the National Assembly passes bill empowering the Government to mobilize "popular fronts" and to strengthen existing military measures to "better insure the security of the nation."

November 10: South Vietnam Government sends letter to the ICC charging that Communist attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area in October (1) involved regular army forces from Communist North Vietnam through Laos, (2) constitute open aggression which was well prepared, commanded by high-ranking officers, and conducted by regular forces trained in North Vietnam, and (3) employed weapons made in North Vietnam and other Communist countries.

November 11: Military coup attempt against President Diem's regime. Paratroop battalions led by Col. Nguyen Van Thy and Lt. Col. Vuong Van Dong besiege the Presidential palace. An order of the day issued by Col. Thy declares that struggle against the Communists will be intensified, that President Diem is guilty of autocratic rule and nepotism and has "shown himself incapable of saving the country from communism and protecting national unity."

November 12: Loyalists troops enter the capital and subdue the rebels. According to press reports from Saigon, an estimated 200 soldiers and civilians were killed during the fighting.

November 13: U.S. State Department expresses satisfaction at the failure of the coup against President Diem and also hope that "his powers will be established on a wider basis with rapid implementation of radical reforms and energetic action against corruption-suspected elements."

November 16: Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother and political adviser, announces that President Diem plans to appoint a new Government and introduce a far-reaching reform program based on reports of the Ford Foundation and of a French study group.

1961

January 29: Radio Hanoi praises establishment of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), allegedly founded in December 1960. On January 30, Radio Hanoi, quoting the press organ of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam, states that the "sacred historical task" of the NFLSV is to overthrow the United States-Diem clique and to liberate the south.

February 6: President Diem announces (at the first press conference held by him in 5 years) his administrative reform program.

February 7: President Diem announces he will be a candidate for reelection in the presidential elections to be held on April 9.

March 10: The Communist-led newly formed National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam announces that a guerrilla offensive against the Government will be started to prevent the holding of the April 9 elections. The National Front also declares that it will fight with every means the dictatorial regime set up by the Americans, that it stands for the peaceful reunification of the country.

March 27: Cambodian and South Vietnamese representatives reach agreement in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on settling the Cambodian refugee problem which has recently strained relations between the two countries. Large numbers of Cambodians settled in Vietnam crossed into Cambodia during the past weeks complaining that both Com-

munist guerrillas and Government forces have committed atrocities against them.

April 3: United States and South Vietnam sign a Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations in Saigon.

April 4: President Diem appeals to the ICC to make an immediate and energetic investigation of growing Communist terrorism and subversion throughout South Vietnam.

April 6: U.S. President John F. Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan discuss (according to press reports from Washington) the steps to be taken to prevent a deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam. On the same day, Government of South Vietnam announces details of nine engagements between Government forces and Vietcong guerrillas in widely separated areas.

April 9: President Diem and Vice President Tho are elected by an overwhelming majority in Vietnam's presidential elections.

May 2: North Vietnam calls for a cease-fire in Laos.

May 4: Chairman of U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. W. Fulbright, declares to the press (after a conference with President Kennedy) that he would not oppose direct military intervention in South Vietnam and Thailand to counteract the threat of a Communist takeover in those countries. He also emphasizes that he is opposed to the United States becoming the primary defensive factor in southeast Asia over a long time, and says that role should be up to India and Japan.

May 5: President Kennedy declares at a press conference that consideration is being given to the use of U.S. forces, if necessary, to help South Vietnam resist Communist pressures. He declares that this will be one of the subjects discussed during the forthcoming visit of Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam.

May 11-13: U.S. Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam. Joint communique on May 13 declares that additional U.S. military and economic aid will be given to help South Vietnam in its fight against Communist guerrilla forces.

May 29: President Diem reorganizes his Cabinet.

June 12: Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van-dong (in Peiping on a visit) accuse the United States of aggression and intervention in South Vietnam.

June 19-July 15: U.S. group of financial, economic, and military experts, headed by Eugene A. Stanley, in South Vietnam to study methods of countering guerrilla activities and to establish long-term plans to assist the South Vietnamese economy.

June 29: ICC decides it is competent to investigate North and South Vietnamese complaints of violation of the agreement on Vietnamese partition.

July 8: Attempted assassination of U.S. Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting.

July 16: Government forces win an important battle 60 miles southwest of Saigon in the swampy region of the Plaine des Jones, a guerrilla-infested territory.

July 17: U.S. Agriculture Department announces an agreement to sell South Vietnam \$11 million worth of U.S. surplus wheat, cotton, and tobacco, to be paid for in Vietnamese currency.

July 24: Two National Assembly deputies assassinated by Communist guerrillas.

August 2: President Kennedy declares that the United States will do all it can to save South Vietnam from communism. On the same day, the Government of South Vietnam orders all men between the ages of 25 and 35 to report for military duty.

August 17: Government forces win another victory over Communist guerrillas on the Plaine des Jones.

September 1-4: Series of attacks by 1,000 Communist guerrillas in Kontoum province.

Army command communique states that during the month of August there were 41 engagements between Government forces and Communist rebels.

September 17: British advisory mission on administrative and police matters, headed by R. G. K. Thompson (former Permanent defense secretary in Malaya), leaves for South Vietnam.

September 18: Communist forces estimated at 1,500 men attack and seize the capital of Phuoc Thanh Province, only 60 miles from Saigon.

September 25: President Kennedy, addressing the U.N. General Assembly in New York, declares that a threat to peace is "the smoldering coals of war in southeast Asia."

October 1: Military experts of SEATO meet in Bangkok, Thailand, to consider the increasing Communist menace to South Vietnam. Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Navy commander in chief in the Pacific, declares that there is no immediate prospect of using U.S. troops to stop the Communist advance in southeast Asia, but he indicates that among the plans evolved for "every eventuality" some do call for the use of American troops.

October 2: President Diem declares at the opening of the National Assembly's budgetary session: "It is no longer a guerrilla war we have to face but a real war waged by an enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who seeks a strategic decision in southeast Asia in conformity with the orders of the Communist international." The President also says that the U.S. committee headed by Dr. Eugene Staley recommended an increase in aid both for military measures and for economic and social development.

October 11: President Kennedy announces (at his news conference) that he is sending Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, his military adviser, to South Vietnam to investigate there the military situation and to report on it to him personally.

October 18: State of emergency is proclaimed in South Vietnam by President Diem. On the same day the President also begins a series of consultations with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

October 24: Government of South Vietnam sends letter to the ICC charging the North Vietnamese Communist regime with organizing and carrying out "elaborate and intensive" program of subversion, terror, and direct aggression against South Vietnam.

October 26: On the sixth anniversary of South Vietnam as a republic, President Diem issues a message stressing the theme of national emergency and the need for greater effort and dynamic solidarity against "Communist imperialism." He demands the "complete destruction of Communist aggression," for which purpose the state of emergency has been declared. On the same day, President Kennedy, in a letter to President Diem, assures the South Vietnamese President that the United States "is determined to help Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins and build a better life through economic growth."

October 28: Government announces that Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops clashed in An Giang Province in the border region where Cambodian troops crossed into Vietnamese territory.

November 16: Following closely the recommendations in General Taylor's report, President Kennedy (with the approval of the National Security Council, decides to bolster South Vietnam's military strength, but not to commit U.S. combat forces at this time.

November 20: Discussions between U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting and President Diem on measures to be taken by both Governments to implement General Taylor's report on South Vietnam and on possible reforms in the Diem administration.

1964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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December 8: U.S. State Department publishes white paper that South Vietnam is threatened by clear and present danger of Communist conquest.

December 15: U.S. President Kennedy pledges increased aid to South Vietnam.

1962

January 4: A joint United States-South Vietnamese communique announces "broad economic and social program [to raise living standards] * * * measures to strengthen South Vietnam's defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously."

February 7: Two U.S. Army air support companies totaling 300 men arrive in Saigon, increasing (according to the New York Times) the total of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam to 4,000.

February 8: United States reorganizes its South Vietnam military command, establishes new U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam under four-star Gen. Paul D. Harkins.

February 24: In a Peiping radio broadcast, Communist China declares her security seriously threatened by an "undeclared war" being waged by the United States in South Vietnam. The broadcast demands the withdrawal of U.S. personnel and equipment.

February 27: Two fighter planes, piloted by members of the South Vietnam Air Force, bomb and strafe Presidential Palace in Saigon for 25 minutes. President Diem and his staff not injured.

March 7: U.S. Operations Mission Director Arthur Z. Gardiner discloses that the United States will spend \$200 million to support South Vietnam's economy this year and help raise living standards.

March 17: Tass Soviet news agency publishes Soviet Ministry note to the signatories of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The note charges the United States with creating "a serious danger to peace" by its "interference" in South Vietnam, in contravention of the Geneva Agreements, and demands immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.

March 22: Operation Sunrise, a comprehensive plan to eliminate the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, begins with a mopping-up operation of rebels in Binh Duong Province.

April 16: In answer to the Soviet note of March 17, the British Foreign Office rejects the Soviet charges and recalls that U.S. measures in South Vietnam were adopted long after the North Vietnamese Government had begun its campaign to overthrow the Government of South Vietnam, and that these North Vietnamese activities "are at the root of the present trouble in South Vietnam."

April 20: National Assembly pledges full support to President Diem's plan to establish thousands of strategic hamlets in the Communist infested Mekong Delta during the current year.

April 26: Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau accuses the Polish team on the ICC of "acting more like a Communist delegation than a neutral body," and says the Government is considering boycotting the delegation.

May 9: At meeting of ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Defense Pact) Council in Canberra, Australia, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeals for "a helping hand" in South Vietnam.

May 12: Communist forces in Laos gain control of large territories; about 2,000 Laotian Royal Army troops with their commander flee into Thailand crossing the Mekong River.

May 15: U.S. troops land in Thailand to help deter a possible Communist attack.

May 22: President Diem promulgates the protection of morality law, which prohibits all dancing and beauty contests, and makes prostitution and unnatural methods of birth control illegal.

May 25: Canadian and Indian members of the ICC find North Vietnam guilty of sub-

version and covert aggression against South Vietnam. The Polish delegation to the commission rejects the charge.

May 28: President Diem refuses a U.S. proposal that \$1.5 million be set aside for direct aid by Americans for emergency counter-insurgency projects.

June 23: North Vietnam's Central Committee of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam orders intensified attacks against the strategic hamlets in South Vietnam.

June 26: South Vietnam's National Assembly votes to extend its term of office by 1 year, to August 1963. The explanation given is that it is impossible to hold elections now, because it would tie down troops needed against the Communist guerrillas.

July 2: Fourteen-nation Geneva Conference on Laos reconvenes, and on July 23 the Foreign Ministers of the 14 nations sign a declaration on the neutrality of Laos.

July 6: U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declares that, while a final victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is years away, he is encouraged by the increased effectiveness of U.S. aid to the South Vietnamese forces.

July 17: Leader of the Communist-run South Vietnam National Liberation Front Nguyen Van Hieu (in Moscow for a World Peace Congress) calls for the neutralization of South Vietnam similar to the 14-nation agreement on the neutrality of Laos.

July 24: U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara in Honolulu, Hawaii, confers with the commander of U.S. military forces in southeast Asia Gen. Paul Harkins and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick Nolting.

August 19: U.S. aid mission in Saigon discloses that the South Vietnamese Government has agreed to embark on a program of deficit financing to help pay for the struggle against the guerrillas.

August 25: U.S. Embassy in Saigon announces that it will provide \$10 million to be distributed by South Vietnamese authorities for emergency projects to help refugees of the guerrilla war.

August 26: Dr. Pham Huy Co, president of the banned Free Democratic Party, announces in Tokyo, where he lives in exile, that he has been clandestinely in South Vietnam and that a meeting of the opposition to the Diem government has been held on a junk off the coast of South Vietnam. The meeting appointed a 30-member National Council of the Revolution to head the anti-Communist, anti-Diem movement.

September 11: Prince Uorodom Sihanouk, of Cambodia, warns that if South Vietnam undertakes two more incursions into Cambodian territory, he will break off diplomatic relations with South Vietnam and establish diplomatic relations with Communist North Vietnam.

September 12: General Taylor, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visits the Central Highland of South Vietnam where mountain peasants (montagnards) are being trained by the U.S. Special Forces for war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas.

October 8: United States publishes American war casualties in South Vietnam. Between December 31, 1961, and October 1, 1962, 46 Americans dead, 56 Americans sick or injured.

October 26: National Assembly extends by 1 year President Diem's emergency powers to rule by decree.

November 8: South Vietnam breaks off diplomatic relations with Laos as a result of Laos establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.

December 6: South Vietnamese Government protests to the ICC against the introduction of Chinese-made weapons and ammunition. A large cache was discovered by a patrol in the Central Highlands.

December 8: President Diem signs a Re-

organization of the Army Act creating a fourth Army corps area and making several changes in military command posts.

December 12: Government announces plans to transfer provincial and district administration from military to civilian personnel.

December 29: Government in Saigon announces that 4,077 strategic hamlets have been completed (of a total of 11,182 to be built) and that 39 percent of South Vietnam's population is now living in these communities.

1963

January 2: Vietcong guerrilla force estimated at 200 and armed with automatic weapons engages in an all-day battle against 1,200 government troops and inflicts heavy casualties at Ap Bac, in the Mekong River Delta 35 miles southwest of Saigon.

January 9-11: Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific confers with Gen. Paul D. Harkins and declares, before his departure, that the Vietcong guerrillas face "inevitable" defeat, and he says: "I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war."

January 20: Press reports states that a captured Vietcong document (dated September 1962 and written by a senior Vietcong official) outlines the future of the war in Vietnam as a long and difficult struggle. Reviewing the expansion of U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam within the last year, the document says that the United States is the Vietcong's main enemy and that United States presence will drive many uncommitted Vietnamese to the Communist side. The document foresees a negotiated settlement of the war patterned on the Laotian agreement and it stresses the importance of understanding so-called transitional steps to the achievement of victory.

February 1: U.S. Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk says (at a press conference) that there are "both pluses and minuses" in the U.S. aid program to South Vietnam and he adds that "there is no more difficult, disagreeable, and frustrating type of operation than those that are required to deal with guerrilla action supported from outside of a country, such as we find in that country."

February 2: Pham Huy Co, president of the National Council of the Vietnamese Revolution, claims (in Paris where he is a political exile) that his organization is the source of terrorist bombings which have occurred in Saigon and its suburbs since mid-January. He says the aim of these activities is to hasten the overthrow of the Diem Government.

February 11: U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting asks (in a Saigon speech) for greater frankness between U.S. and Vietnamese officials in the fight against the Communist guerrillas.

February 16: Times of Vietnam (in an editorial) attacks U.S. press and demands United States consider censorship of American dispatches from South Vietnam, accusing U.S. correspondents of helping Communist guerrillas and of responsibility for the deaths of United States and Vietnamese personnel engaged in the war.

February 24: U.S. Senate study group, headed by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, submits a report on southeast Asia made at the request of President Kennedy, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The report warns that the fight against Communist guerrillas in Vietnam is becoming an "American war" which is not justified by U.S. security interests and calls for a "thorough reassessment of our overall security requirements on the southeast Asian mainland." While expressing doubts concerning the results of \$5 billion in U.S. aid to southeast Asia since 1950, the report recommends "extreme caution" in reducing military and economic assistance in this area.

February 28: Nguyen Ton Hoan, Secretary General of the Dai-Viet Nationalist Party and a political exile living in Paris, declares (in a letter to President Kennedy) that "President Ngo [Dinh Diem] is incapable of leadership and unamenable to reform. His government may suddenly collapse in the near future and leave a vacuum into which the Communists will gladly step—unless both the American authorities and Vietnamese nationalist leaders are prepared to cope with such an emergency together instead of working at cross purposes."

March 6: U.S. military sources report that the Vietnamese Navy has taken over patrol of South Vietnam's coast from the U.S. 7th Fleet.

March 9: Soviet newspaper Red Star, official publication of the Soviet Defense Ministry, charges that "American interventionists have again used poison substances in South Vietnam" resulting in the killing of hundreds of people. On the same day, U.S. Defense Department denies the Soviet charges. Of the chemical now in use, the Department says, "It is nontoxic to humans when used in the prescribed manner, that is sprayed on trees and under bushes in the open air."

April 8-10: SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris (to discuss the Communist threat to southeast Asia) issues communique on April 10 expressing "concern over the continuing and widening threats to the security" of the treaty area; takes note of the "considerable progress" made in South Vietnam in the fight against Communist subversion and rebellion; emphasizes that effective measures to "prevent and counter subversion continues to be a major task facing the member countries"; and notes the improvements in the "plans for defensive action, in the light of changing and anticipated situations."

April 14: U.S. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman (in a television interview) says that President Kennedy has decided that the United States must not become involved in the continuing conflict in Laos. He says that there are no plans to commit U.S. troops, and military supplies will only be sent if requested by the Laotian Government.

April 17: President Diem proclaims an "open arms" campaign to induce Vietcong guerrillas to give up their weapons and return to the side of South Vietnam.

April 22: U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the situation in South Vietnam "difficult and dangerous," and says that the United States "cannot promise or expect a quick victory" and that its role is "limited and supporting."

May 8: Riot erupts in northern city of Hue, former imperial capital, 400 miles north of Saigon. Involves Buddhist celebration of the anniversary of Buddha's birth and the flying of flags on the special day. Twelve persons are killed, including some children. Buddhist leaders charge that Government troops fired into the crowd, while Government officials say that Communists were responsible for the explosion.

May 9: South Vietnam concludes agreement with the United States in which South Vietnam will finance the local cost (\$17 million) of operating its strategic hamlet program and transporting U.S. economic and military equipment, food and other supplies to these settlements.

June 3: Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hue. Martial law is swiftly imposed.

June 7: President Diem (in a broadcast) appeals for calm and makes a partial concession to Buddhist demands that the Government accept responsibility for the incidents in Hue.

June 11: Buddhist monk (Thich Quang Duc) commits suicide by burning himself to death with gasoline in front of the Cam-

bodian legation. Further aggravates religious crisis involving South Vietnamese Buddhists.

June 14: Press reports state that the United States has warned President Diem that unless he takes immediate steps to alleviate Buddhist grievances the United States will publicly condemn the treatment they have received.

June 15: Tentative agreement is reached between Buddhist leaders and representatives of President Diem to end alleged religious discrimination and meet Buddhist demands.

June 16: Government troops use tanks, tear gas, clubs, firearms, and barbed wire to suppress riots in Saigon which follow an agreement between Buddhist leaders and the Government.

June 27: President Kennedy announces (in Ireland while on a European tour) the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as the next American Ambassador to South Vietnam, effective September 1963, to succeed Frederick Nolting.

July 5: Trial of 19 Vietnamese paratroopers, admitted leaders of a revolt against the Diem government in November 1960 opens in Saigon. Prosecutor accuses former U.S. Embassy personnel of aiding the conspiracy to overthrow regime. Denied by the United States.

July 7: Nine correspondents for U.S. news services in South Vietnam, including seven American, are physically assaulted by secret policemen armed with rocks at the scene of a memorial service for a Buddhist monk who committed suicide on June 11.

July 9: Trial of 34 civilians, including Dr. Phan Quang Dan, leader of the Free Democratic Party, allegedly involved in a plot to overthrow President Diem in 1960, opens before a military tribunal in Saigon. Nguyen Tuong Tam, a Buddhist and a prominent author, scheduled to be tried, commits suicide by poison.

July 11: U.S. Ambassador Nolting returns to South Vietnam after consultations in Washington and issues a statement assuring continued U.S. support to President Diem and warning that "unity of purpose and purpose in action" must not be weakened by "internal dissension."

July 15: Buddhist supreme leader, Thich Tinh Khiet, in a letter to President Diem, charges the Government with bad faith concerning the agreement of June 15 and says that there have been "acts of a terrorist nature" against Buddhists throughout the country.

July 17: Armed policemen use clubs against 1,000 Buddhists protesting religious discrimination in front of a pagoda in Saigon. On the same day, President Kennedy says (at his news conference) that the religious crisis in South Vietnam is interfering with the war effort against the Vietcong guerrillas and expresses hope that President Diem and Buddhist leaders will "reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also in respect for the rights of others."

July 18: President Diem asks Buddhist leaders to meet with Government officials and say that he has instructed a special committee to cooperate with Buddhists in implementing an earlier agreement and that all Government officials have been instructed to cooperate actively in this effort. However, Buddhist leaders indicate an unwillingness to negotiate with Government officials until certain conditions are fulfilled: secret policemen who have attacked Buddhist demonstrators must be publicly identified; prisoners being detained for their part in earlier riots must be released; permission to print missing persons notices in newspapers to locate Buddhists who have disappeared must be granted.

July 23: Militiamen, war veterans, and widows parade through the streets of Saigon

to demonstrate support for Government policies in the Buddhist dispute.

July 30: Memorial services for Thich Quang Duc who committed suicide to protest alleged persecution by the Government are attended by thousands of Buddhists in Saigon, Hue and other cities. Peaceful demonstrations are staged without Government interference.

August 1: Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem, declares in an interview for television: "The only thing that they (the Buddhists) have done * * * (is that they) have barbecued one of their monks whom they have intoxicated. And even that barbecuing was not even with self-sufficient means, because they used imported gasoline."

August 3: Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Diem, says (in an interview) that if the dispute with the Buddhists is not settled "it will lead toward a coup d'etat" which would be anti-American, anti-Buddhist, and against "weakness by the Government."

August 4: Young Buddhist monk suddenly immolates himself during a hunger strike at Phan Tiet.

August 13: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hillsman declares (at a Washington press conference) that there are signs that the Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam "is beginning to affect the war effort and to benefit the Communists, which none of the Vietnamese want, either the Government or the Buddhists."

August 17: Forty-seven faculty members at the University of Hue resign to protest Government indifference in the Buddhist crisis and the dismissal of the university's rector.

August 20: Vietcong guerrillas overrun and burn 137 homes in the Ben Tuong strategic hamlet, 30 miles north of Saigon. It was the showplace of the strategic hamlet program.

August 21: Martial law is proclaimed throughout South Vietnam by President Diem after hundreds of armed police and Government troops raided the main Buddhist Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon.

August 22: Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau (a Buddhist) submits his resignation to President Diem. Also on the same day, South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States Tran Van Chuong (father of Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu) resigns. Both resign in disapproval of Government policies toward Buddhists.

August 23: Student demonstrations at Saigon University in opposition to Government disperse before police arrive on the scene. But the following day there are direct clashes, and many students are confined to jail.

August 26: U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents his credentials to President Diem and confers with him at a second meeting on the same day. On the same day, U.S. State Department declares: "Present information is that the top leadership of the Vietnamese Army was not aware of the plans to attack the pagodas, much less the brutal manner in which it was carried out."

August 28: Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Army issues a reply to the U.S. statement insisting that "These allegations are entirely and absolutely erroneous."

August 29: French President de Gaulle issues controversial policy statement on South Vietnam. He declares that France is able "to appreciate the role this people would be capable of playing in the current situation of Asia for its own progress and for the benefit of international understanding once it was able to exercise its activity in independence from foreign influence, in internal peace and unity, and in concord with its neighbors. Today, more than ever, this is what France wishes to all of Vietnam."

August 30: French Ambassador to the United States Herve Alphand declares, after

meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that General de Gaulle's statement is part of a long-range French political solution which would reunify North and South Vietnam in "independence and neutrality" and that his declaration is not meant as a slap at the United States.

September 1: Three Buddhist monks, including Thich Tri Quang, take refuge in U.S. Agency for International Development mission headquarters in Saigon.

September 2: Times of Vietnam charges that U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents had planned a coup d'etat for August 28 to overthrow President Diem. On the same day, U.S. President Kennedy declares (in a television interview with CBS Correspondent Walter Cronkite) that the United States is prepared to continue to assist South Vietnam "but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months, the Government has gotten out of touch with the people."

September 3: Group of 56 African and Asian UN members decides to ask the U.N. General Assembly to consider "the question of the violation of human rights in South Vietnam" at its next session which begins September 17.

September 5: President Diem declares (in a press interview) that "the Government considers this [Buddhist] affair closed." He denies reports that his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu has taken control of the Government. On the same day, Ngo Dinh Nhu says (in a press interview): "I have never controlled the Government."

September 7: About 800 high school students are arrested by armed police and Special Forces (secret police) while engaged in anti-Government demonstrations in Saigon. "For the first time in student demonstrations here, the slogans they shouted included criticism of the United States" (New York Times, September 8, 1963).

September 8: David Bell, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, warns (in a television interview) that the U.S. Congress may cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem Government changes its policies. On the same day press reports emanating from "highly reliable sources" in Washington state that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has decided to continue making regular monthly payments of \$250,000 to support the special forces of Col. Le Quang Tung in South Vietnam.

September 9: President Kennedy (in a televised interview) says that "it would not be helpful at this time" to reduce U.S. aid to South Vietnam, because that might bring about a collapse similar to that of the Chiang Kai-shek Government in China after World War II. On the same day, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge confers with President Diem "The United States has directly advised President Ngo Dinh Diem * * * that it regards the removal of his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu as vital" (New York Times, September 12, 1963).

September 12: U.S. Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, introduces a resolution (sponsored by 18 Democrats and 4 Republicans) in the Senate which calls for ending all U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam and withdrawal of U.S. troops unless the Diem Government abandons its policy of "cruel repressions."

September 14: Presidential decree announces end of martial law on September 16.

September 16: Fourteen Afro-Asian nations demand a debate in the U.N. General Assembly (opening its fall session on September 17) on the "ruthless" suppression of Buddhist rights in South Vietnam.

September 20: U.S. Senate Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, speaking in the Senate calls on all U.S. agencies in South Vietnam to give full support to

U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Observers interpreted the speech as being directed against the CIA and some elements in the American military mission to Vietnam.

September 21: President Kennedy orders Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to go to South Vietnam to review the military efforts against the Communist Vietcong. McNamara and Taylor in South Vietnam during September 24 to October 1.

September 22: Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem, declares (in a press interview in Rome) that junior U.S. Army officers in South Vietnam are irresponsible "little soldiers of fortune."

September 27: Elections are held for the 123-member National Assembly. All candidates were approved in advance by the Government; many were unopposed, including President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife, Mme. Nhu.

October 2: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, report to President Kennedy and the National Security Council on their mission to South Vietnam. The statement says that the United States will continue its "policy of working with the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Vietcong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central object of our policy in South Vietnam."

October 5: Buddhist monk burns himself to death in Saigon—the sixth such suicide since June 11. Three U.S. journalists who see the suicide are beaten by police. On the same day, the head of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operations in Saigon (John H. Richardson) is recalled to Washington.

October 7: Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem, arrives in New York to begin a 3-week unofficial visit to the United States.

October 8: U.N. General Assembly agrees to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to investigate charges of Government oppression of Buddhists. The Diem government on October 4 had invited the U.N. to send such a mission.

October 17: Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief adviser of President Diem, declares (in a press interview in Saigon) that he cannot understand why the United States has "initiated a process of disintegration in Vietnam." He adds that "the confidence between the Vietnamese people and the American Government has been lost."

October 21: It is disclosed in Washington and Saigon that the United States will withhold financial aid to the special forces of Col. Le Quang Tung as long as they are not used to fight Communist guerrillas.

October 24: U.N. factfinding mission on the Buddhist situation in South Vietnam arrives in Saigon, and on the next day confers with President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

October 27: Buddhist monk burns himself to death in Saigon—the seventh such suicide since June 11.

October 31: Vietcong guerrillas attack on armored train north of Saigon, inflict heavy casualties on Government troops, and seize a large number of weapons.

November 1: Military coup (organized by the key generals of the armed forces) against the Diem regime. Rebels lay siege to the Presidential Palace in Saigon which is captured by the following morning. President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu escape from the palace, but a few hours later are taken by the rebels, and while being transported in an armored carrier to rebel headquarters they are assassinated. A proclamation broadcast by the leaders of the coup (a council of generals, headed by Maj. Gen.

Duong Van Minh) declares that they have "no political ambitions" and that the fight against the Communists must be carried on to a successful conclusion.

November 2: Military leaders set up a provisional government headed by former Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho (a Buddhist) as Premier. The Constitution is suspended and the National Assembly dissolved. Buddhists, students and other political prisoners arrested by the former regime are released.

November 4: Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho announces formation of a mixed military-civilian Cabinet which has been approved by the military leaders.

November 7: United States recognizes the new provisional Government of South Vietnam.

EXHIBIT 5

DEAD END IN VIETNAM

WE CAN'T WIN, BUT WE NEED NOT LOSE—I

(By Jerry A. Rose¹)

SAIGON.—The war in South Vietnam cannot be won. That is now the on-the-spot opinion of numerous Vietnamese, American and other foreign experts. After 4 years of closely observing the situation, I concur. But it is unlikely that the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, have reached a similar conclusion, though they have heard passionately contradictory viewpoints. There are powerful voices of optimism.

Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, is one such voice. To many of us long in the area, his voice is like a frightening echo of past American commanders. Gen. "Hanging Sam" Williams considered President Ngo Dinh Diem a near brother and felt that the Vietcong guerrillas could be eliminated with tanks and howitzers—and while he was molding the Vietnamese troops into standard warfare units, guerrilla terrorism increased. But Williams chose to ignore that lethal increase. Then came Gen. Lionel "Stonehead" McGarr, who once told me that "President Diem is a genius, a genius." McGarr, to the day he left Vietnam because of "heart trouble," stoutly contended that the guerrillas were being contained. The opposite was true to any rational observer. Strangely, the tradition of rosy optimism dates back to French commanders during the Indochina War who saw a final victory forever around the corner until one day they turned the corner and ran smack into Dien Bien Phu.

"Vietnam has been the burial ground for more generals and diplomats than any other place on earth," said a laconic reporter the day Ambassador Frederick Nolting departed. And indeed it has, though more realism and less wishful thinking may have saved their own necks and the nation's. Lesser officials and the much-maligned correspondents have called the hard, unpleasant but realistic shots. To do so is not difficult; it takes but a recognition of the basic factors involved in Vietnam and in guerrilla warfare. And the most basic of these factors is the attitude of the people toward their government and national leader. But for some reason, diplomats, soldiers in the field, and politicians in Washington are unable to grasp the importance of the people. While forever raising wet fingers to the wind of public opinion in the United States, the policymakers appear to operate on the belief that Asian people have no opinions, and even if they did have an opinion, it would carry no weight. A good Gallup poll would easily disprove the former proposition, and history has proved time and again the fallacy of the latter.

¹ Jerry A. Rose, former Far Eastern correspondent for Time magazine, now resides in Hong Kong where he does freelance writing on the Far East.

During their week's stay in Vietnam, McNamara and Taylor got little if any inkling of Vietnamese public opinion and of its significance in the war effort. Rather, they have been evaluating the war largely through military statistics. Such statistics—when accurate—indicate trends but not solutions. The trend is: greater Vietcong activity, increased casualties on both sides (with the Government suffering generally fewer), and the crucial ratio of weapons lost and gained favoring the enemy by at least 2 to 1. A recent tabulation within 1 week showed the guerrillas to have captured 360 weapons from the Government while losing only 150 to the national forces. These figures tell a clear story: the Vietcong are winning the ground battles, though they incur heavy casualties from Government airstrikes. Thus, with a steady flow of weapons from within South Vietnam—and an increasing stream of Communist-bloc weapons being smuggled to the guerrillas from the outside—it is not surprising that the hard-core Vietcong force has jumped by an estimated 8,000 men in the last several months. There are now some 31,000 Communist guerrillas, well above last year's figure of 20,000 to 25,000.

Nevertheless, \$1.5 million a day and about 17,000 active U.S. military men has had some positive effect. The keynote strategic hamlet plan to urbanize and control the population goes well north of Saigon. As of September 8,227 strategic hamlets have been built, encompassing 76 percent of the population or 9.6 million people. In coastal provinces such as Quang Ngai, once a Vietcong stronghold, the "hamletization" coupled with sound agricultural projects (small dams for irrigation, tons of fertilizer and pesticides) has gone far to winning back the support of the people. And here, notable military victories have been won—for it only takes one government-oriented peasant to inform on the movements of the Vietcong, one peasant actively supporting the Government. With solid information, the military can prepare itself. Just recently the Government caught the guerrillas by surprise and gained a decisive battle because one old lady came in to report the Vietcong's position.

"We're lucky to hold our own"

Incredible though it is, that one active individual is lacking in most areas of the Mekong Delta, the economic heart of South Vietnam. Americans working with the strategic hamlet plan in the delta readily admit that the program is floundering, has made little progress. Militarily, the situation is equally unsatisfactory. Commented an American general: "Below the Bassac River, we're lucky to hold our own." Many feel that we are not even doing that.

This economic heart of South Vietnam, the Mekong Delta, has suffered severe strokes over the last several years. In 1961, rice exports from the area—Vietnam's major export product—were totally suspended. The exports began to diminish in 1962. Now, they have again been halted. Despite the vast American aid, the Government is finding itself short of cash. For example, this year the strategic hamlet program was calculated to cost about \$30 million. The United States was to pay the first 6 months (to the end of June), the Vietnamese the latter half of the year. As of September, the Diem government had not yet started to fulfill its part of the agreement. From July of 1962 to July of this year, Vietnam's foreign and gold reserves fell from \$200 million to \$130 million. The national bank is reported to have a plaster reserve of only \$14 million. And Vietnam's debts to foreign banks amount to some \$140 million (which is one reason why hardheaded Hong Kong businessmen decided to cease trading with the country).

"Right now, our greatest danger," said a Vietnamese economist, "is national bankruptcy and wild inflation."

Part of this economic condition is due directly to President Diem. He will not listen to the counsel of his own trained economists.

Similarly, President Diem refused to listen to reasoning voices of moderation when the Buddhist trouble erupted. He took brother Nhu's advice and cracked down harshly. He has echoed his sister-in-law, the now infamous Madame Nhu, in calling the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk a murder. Then the Vietnamese students began to riot, and over 8,000 teenagers, both girls and boys, were imprisoned. Ministers of the state, civil officials, army officers went to the prisons with packages of clothing and food for their sons and daughters. Throughout the country, the word of these events—both with the Buddhists and the students—slowly seeps down. (Slowly seeps down, for news does not travel quickly.) Slowly seeps down and takes seed in the minds of the Vietnamese people, who are perhaps the most politically sophisticated people in Asia, for they have suffered the wars of politics for more than 20 years. They have listened to many political ideologies. They have learned to choose cautiously, but they have also learned that to survive they must, sooner or later, choose a side. The repression against the students and the Buddhists will inevitably affect their choice, for they are no different from any other peoples in the world. They do not like to see their religious leaders or their young people persecuted.

Yet, almost unbelievably, some U.S. officials maintain that the Buddhist and student demonstrations have not affected and will not affect the people and the "way the war is going." It has been said many times now, by U.S. Army officers, by disinterested observers, by journalists, by Communist guerrilla leaders themselves that "a guerrilla war cannot be won by military means alone," that "the people are the key to victory." It has been said so many times that the statement has become cliché. It is true nevertheless—except I believe that the roots of rancor now run so deep in South Vietnam that the people can no longer be won over, at least not enough of them to result in clear-cut stability.

"Outside of a miracle, a genius—like Mag-saysay—coming to the fore," said one American in Saigon who has dedicated all his energies over the last 3 years to South Vietnam, "this country is lost." Then, rather wearily, he murmured: "Leadership, leadership." Even as late as last year, popular leadership may have spelled the difference. Today, the grassroot strength of the Vietcong appears so strong, particularly in the delta, that it seems unlikely any leader could shake it.

On top of this a few hardheaded observers contend that the war could never have been won. Said one Australian diplomat: "We must clearly define what we mean by 'winning' the war. An outright victory is impossible. Stability as existed in 1957 might still be achieved—but as then, there will always be terrorism." While acknowledging the need of sound and popular leadership to gain that 1957 stability, this gentleman points to South Vietnam's long, gaping borders: a border with Cambodia, another with Laos, a third with North Vietnam. "Porous borders," he calls them—they could never be sealed off; they would always permit a shower of infiltrators, terrorists. Thus: "In that sense, the war cannot be won. Peace cannot be established."

According to good estimates, last year infiltration into South Vietnam ran in the neighborhood of 1,000 men per month. This year it fell off for awhile to almost nothing, now it is back to around 500 per month. But the shocking factor is not the actual number of infiltrators but the capacity for infiltration. An intelligence expert told me bluntly: "If North Vietnam wanted to, they could send down 20,000 infiltrators in one

swoop and it would be 2 weeks before we knew it."

Now let us review briefly the current situation in South Vietnam: (1) a national leader who is unpopular and whose family is detested; (2) a nation of discontented people, two segments of which (Buddhists and students) have overtly demonstrated their unhappiness, another segment which covertly demonstrates its unhappiness (by siding with the Vietcong), a final segment which remains for the time being passive (popular passivity helps the Vietcong—for the government needs active informers); (3) a shaky, inflationary economy; (4) a war that grows fiercer each week despite vast American aid in both money, materiel and personnel; and (5) "porous borders" with three countries that permit a steady influx of guerrillas.

Take these five elements, place them against the stated American policy in South Vietnam: "To win and get out," and it should be starkly clear that the United States is at a dead end. We cannot win.

But we do not necessarily have to lose. That is, though an outright victory over the guerrillas now seems impossible (and I believe that despite the borders it was once possible), an outright defeat can still be prevented. But U.S. thinking must undergo some radical changes. Washington must begin to consider the proposition that peace to South Vietnam will come not on the battlefield but only at the conference table. And I do not mean General de Gaulle's conference table. Within the foreseeable future, reunification of the North and South could only result in a final Communist victory. But there are other possibilities. To understand them, one must be aware of the difficult position of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam.

An Asian Yugoslavia?

In the slow-seething years before Red China and the Soviet Union split totally asunder, North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh tried to play the neutral moderator. He preferred the Russians, but the proximity of China did not permit him to take sides. He knew that to become an oriental Albania was to risk eventual destruction. Now, since the split, he has, by necessity, leaned more toward China. But the Chinese ruled Vietnam for almost 2,000 years, and China has never ceased to look hungrily at Vietnam's rice bowl, the Mekong Delta. In fact, it is the Mekong Delta which the North itself wants, and needs, to achieve a solid economy (the North has always been industrial, the South agricultural). All Vietnamese have a natural dislike, suspicion, and fear of the Chinese, and it is highly probable that Ho Chi Minh and the other Communist leaders of the North would do much to disengage themselves from China's sphere of influence. They could do this if they were able to trade for food with South Vietnam and for material with the West. And they likely would be willing to enter into trade relations, cease hostilities—become a sort of Asian Yugoslavia—providing they were convinced an outright victory could not be gained in the South within a reasonable length of time. The United States must convince the North it cannot win soon or easily.

This could be done if President Diem were removed, a better leader emerged, popular support gained to some degree, the morale and efficiency of the Vietnamese Army improved. As Diem obviously is not easily removed, alternatives must be examined. One alternative is to put a division or more of American combat troops into action. Coupled with this direct involvement would be the establishment of a dual chain of United States-Vietnamese Army commands that ignored and bypassed the President. We could continue to finance the Vietnamese Army, but through nongovernmental chan-

nels. We could also cut back on our budget-ary support.

North Vietnam's response to this challenge could only be to heavily step up infiltration with large units of soldiers. The moment it does, three important changes occur in the nature of the war: (1) North Vietnam will begin to suffer the financial burden of war, a burden which it can ill afford; (2) sooner or later one of these infiltrating units will be captured and North Vietnam will be inextricably caught in the act of aggression; and (3) with definite proof of aggression, North Vietnam will leave itself open to direct retaliation, as through bombing attacks. At such a point, would the war escalate?

The North Vietnamese do not want to be devastated, nor are they prepared to finance a war the size of the Korean conflict. Neither is Red China in any financial position to engage on a lengthy battlefield. The Soviet Union not only has been detaching itself from this part of the world, but also seems to wish peace as much as the United States. The conference table stands ready. The contract for peace is comparatively simple: trade relations in exchange for non-aggression.

To sum up: One solution now for the United States appears to be a show of power in South Vietnam which would pave the way toward a compromising settlement. But is the risk of a power play warranted? Southeast Asia has been likened to a "set of dominoes." If South Vietnam falls, the rest of the blocks go too. It would seem, therefore, that it is in the high interest of the United States, as a leader and a system of government, to risk much in stabilizing that tottering block.

CIA's "thirst for power"

In a scathing dispatch from Saigon dated October 2, Richard Starnes of Scripps-Howard reported that on two occasions the CIA in Vietnam "flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge." In one instance, "the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington, because the Agency disagreed with it." Mr. Starnes also said that:

"CIA 'spooks' (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon. * * * Few people other than John Richardson [Chief of the CIA apparatus in Vietnam] and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600."

"For every State Department aid here who will tell you 'Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policymaking is what they're doing here' there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations.

"One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer."

The story of the CIA in South Vietnam, said Mr. Starnes, "is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power."

NEGOTIATING WITH THE NORTH—II

(By Ho Thong Minh²)

When he returned to Vietnam in June 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem asked me to work with him. I resigned as Minister of National Defense on April 29, 1955, end of a brief 9-month

² Ho Thong Minh, a 43-year-old civil engineer, now lives in Paris where he is the moving spirit behind the group Pour Le Vietnam. His comments were first published in *Le Monde* of September 19.

period during which, as a result of the Geneva agreements, peace was temporarily restored. After 16 years of war, it did not seem to me that South Vietnam could continue moving toward its own reconstruction in a spirit of unity and harmony. All hope of positive advance had been made impossible by the nefarious activities of the Ngo clan.

At present South Vietnam has a population of 14 million (as many as the former Belgian Congo). Inside the nation a facade of republicanism conceals the sordid realities: corruption, informer tactics, stagnation, the denial of all democracy. It is a dismal and telling contrast to recall that under Syngman Rhee in South Korea there were some 90-odd opposition deputies in office at Seoul, whereas Diem refuses to tolerate a single one at Saigon. The Diem regime claims to be anti-Communist, but its thinking and its actions are patterned after the psychological warfare of the French colonels. It has successively gotten rid of Bao-Dai, of the various religious sects, of the French, of all domestic opposition, of the Buddhists, of the Vietnamese people themselves, and now, finally, it is in difficulty with the Americans.

The amount of U.S. aid to South Vietnam (and hence to the Ngo clan) is comparable to the contribution which France was making not so long ago to Algeria. Between direct military and economic aid and its own expenses for maintaining U.S. troops in Vietnam, the United States pours annually into the yawning South Vietnamese pit the sum of \$700 million. This expenditure enables the United States to equip an army of over half a million Vietnamese (510,000, to be precise) on territory only half the size of the area where, in 1954, the French and Vietnamese together mustered only 450,000 men. All that money and military manpower—only to be held at bay by 50 Vietcong battalions all told.

The whole world has become aware of the drama which is being enacted in South Vietnam, and the Diem regime is as sharply criticized abroad as at home. How is the impasse to be got around? Although the people of South Vietnam are resolutely committed to a program of defiance and insurrection, they aspire beyond this to surviving as a free and independent nation. They are certain that the Ngo regime must end and are already looking forward to the prospect of peace. But by what road is this peace to be achieved?

The current situation renders imperative (first of all) the overthrow of the Diem regime; for this the Vietnamese Army will be the ineluctable instrument, and in this connection, the Americans are increasing their efforts to dissociate the army from the present government at Saigon. Next should come the cessation of foreign intervention—in other words, both the Americans and the infiltrators from the North should depart. This, of course, can only be done by a truce, a suspension of hostilities, with the Vietcong. Thirdly, after the foreign bases have been eliminated, it will be necessary to have solid international guarantees so as to make the present SEATO troops unnecessary.

If these three steps could be taken, it would then at last be possible for the two Vietnams to sit down together and settle their problems. Of course national reunification continues to be the ultimate goal of the Vietnamese. But for the time being political realities require compromise solutions. Everyone knows that North Vietnam is directed by a Communist regime which seeks to maintain an attitude of neutrality as between Peking and Moscow. Under these circumstances and for the immediate present, the next South Vietnamese government can hardly be anything but non-Communist. In fact, if it were anti-Communist, practi-

cally nothing would be changed and there would be a danger of the country being swallowed up in Diemism without Diem. If, on the other hand, the new regime were to welcome Communists in the government, it could no longer speak as equal to equal in independent conversations with the North. Furthermore, one need look only as far as Laos to find an example of the very great difficulties which could rapidly become insurmountable if the Vietnamese Government were to be a three-headed coalition—and the example is still more compelling when one considers that Laos is all one country, not cut in two pieces like Vietnam. A future non-Communist regime in Saigon could, however, where domestic problems are concerned, invite the participation of all Vietnamese patriots, from the Buddhist clergy to the National Liberation Front, provided they are not Communists.

In the international sphere, such a regime could contribute to peace in southeast Asia by adopting the same neutralist attitudes as those of its neighbor, Cambodia. It would certainly not oppose the diplomatic recognition of North Vietnam by France. In this way, France would fulfill a privileged role—providing a connecting link for economic unity and, most particularly, for cultural unity, the lines of which would be laid down between the two Vietnams in their efforts to establish the united and independent Vietnam which General de Gaulle has recently and rightly envisaged.

There remains the crucial problem of the confrontation between China and the West in southeast Asia. Here it is possible to believe that the present conflict between Peking and Moscow has been brought about less by ideological differences than by differences in the level of economic development. When China attains the level of economic development that now prevails in the U.S.S.R., it too will surely feel that it must protect the progress it has made by practicing peaceful coexistence.

In any event, things being as they are, the foregoing program and prospects are those which seem to me within the realm of the possible.

A TALK WITH HO CHI MINH—III

(By Bernard B. Fall)

As the second Indochina war now grinds on into its 4th year, a large-scale reappraisal is under way both among Americans in Saigon and in Washington as to the ultimate objectives and outcome of that war. For the time being, no solution envisaged considers seriously the possibility of talks with the real enemy by proxy, North Vietnam. In fact, it is not without significance that the only open reference made to such negotiations came from no one else but South Vietnam's secret police chief, Ngo Dinh Nhu, in his recent interview with an American columnist, Nhu, beyond a doubt seeks to use at least the threat—if not the reality—of such south-north contacts as a counterblackmail against the United States which has thus far (and with conspicuous success) sought his and his wife's removal from Vietnamese politics.

Thus, negotiating with North Vietnam—or, for that matter, any kind of contact with that country—has become another bogey that, in the months to come, may supplant Cuba and even Red China in the public eye. Of course, as even a brief stay in North Vietnam shows, that attitude cuts both ways: in Hanoi, the only kind of demonstration that is allowed is directed against the United States, the Ngo family, or, on occasion, against the Indian and Canadian (not the Polish, of course) members of the lame-duck International Control Commission which still supervises the implementation of the civil liberties and disarmament provisions of the 1954 Indochina

cease-fire. The Commission's lack of effectiveness makes it a permanent monument to the impossibility of settling a dispute when it directly involves the prestige or interests of both of the major power blocs.

French non-Communist writers have been able, over the years, to visit North Vietnam, just as Canadian, Australian and British writers have been able to visit Red China. In my own case, the fact that I had written a solidly-documented (and, hence, unflattering) book in French about North Vietnam, perhaps incited the North Vietnamese leaders to be franker than usual. What follows is based on notes taken in the course of a conversation which took place in July 1962 supplemented by a tape recording made during that conversation and by notes made immediately afterward, while my memory was fresh. It is a verbatim translation from the original French, and leaves out only some of the usual banter.

A brief note on the North Vietnamese leaders involved: Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, born in 1906 in Central Vietnam, is of senior mandarin origin; in fact, say some, he outranks President Ngo Dinh Diem. While Diem's father was chief of cabinet to Emperor Thanh-Thi, Dong's father held the same post under Emperor Duy-Tan. A graduate of Chiang Kai-shek's own Whampoa Military Academy (class of 1925), Dong has been Ho's Prime Minister and probably closest associate since 1955.

Ho Chi Minh, born in 1890 in Central Vietnam, was a revolutionary since his age of 14, when to Europe in 1911, became a co-founder of the French Communist Party in 1920 and a French delegate to the Comintern in 1923. He founded the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 and became President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) on September 2, 1945. He unquestionably is the most important Asian Communist leader after Mao Tse-tung, and the last of the Old Bolsheviks in power anywhere in the Communist world.

All remarks made by Dong are preceded by "P"; those made by Ho by "H," and those made by myself by "F." My own explanations are placed in brackets.

[Pham Van Dong meets me in the corridor of the presidential residence; wears a khaki Mao Tse-tung suit; invites me to a sitting room overlooking the formal gardens.]

P. Please make yourself at home, Monsieur le Professeur, take off your jacket [takes off his own jacket]. I know how it is here during the rainy season. I hope you are enjoying your trip throughout North Vietnam, and that you find us cooperative.

F. Thank you, Monsieur le Prime Minister, your subordinates indeed have generally been cooperative.

P. I remember, however, that you said in your book *Le Viet-Minh* that we are not a democratic country. Do you still feel the same way about this?

F. Well, Monsieur le Prime Minister, all my color films were impounded upon my arrival at Hanoi Airport. I don't think you would call this in accordance with democratic procedures.

P. [laughing]. Oh, those are general rules which apply to everybody. [While theoretically true, the rule obviously applies to Westerners only. In addition, all black-and-white film has to be exposed prior to departure and the developed film submitted to the Foreign Ministry for censorship. Even so, the airport police again inspected my films prior to departure.]

F. Monsieur le Prime Minister, North Vietnam has had some serious economic difficulties. Do you believe that they have been mastered?

P. As you know, the recent Seventh plenary session of the [Vietnamese] Communist Party's Central Committee has decided to give priority to basic heavy industries, although attention will be paid to a proper

balance with agriculture and consumer goods production.

We base ourselves upon the Marxist economic viewpoint: heavy industrial development is essential to Socialist construction, but we also understand the importance of the "full belly." In any case, we do not seek to bluff and will not put emphasis on "show-piece" industries but on sound and useful economic development.

Yes, we have made economic mistakes, due mainly to our backwardness and ignorance in the field of economic planning. Not all of those errors have yet been corrected and some of their effects are still felt, but we try to overcome them rapidly thanks to help from friendly countries.

F. Monsieur le Prime Minister, President Ho Chi Minh made a declaration to the Daily Express [London] in March 1962, referring to the conditions under which North Vietnam would negotiate a settlement with the South. Has anything happened in the meantime which would change those conditions?

P. Our position has remained largely unchanged since President Ho Chi Minh's declaration. What has changed, however, is the extent of American intervention in South Vietnam, which has continued to increase and to take over increased responsibilities and control over the [Ngo Dinh] Diem regime.

The real enemy is American intervention. It is of little importance as to who the American agent in Vietnam might be.

F. Monsieur le Prime Minister, the International Control Commission [composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members] has recently accused the North Vietnamese Republic of aiding and abetting the South Vietnamese rebellion. What do you think of that accusation?

P. [deprecating gesture]. We understand, Monsieur le Professeur, under which outside pressures the [Indian and Canadian] members of the ICC labor. After all, India does depend for development upon large-scale American aid.

F. But would it not at least be conceivable that some of the almost 100,000 South Vietnamese who went north [of the 17th parallel] in 1954 and whose relatives are now fighting against South Vietnamese forces, would attempt to slip across your border back into South Vietnam in order to help their relatives—even without the permission of the North Vietnamese Government? Wouldn't that be at least conceivable?

P. Monsieur, in our country one does not cross borders without permission.

F. Would not a spreading of the guerrilla war entail a real risk of American reaction against North Vietnamese territory? You have been to North Korea last year, Monsieur le Prime Minister; you saw what American bombers can do.

P. [very seriously]. We fully realize that the American imperialists wish to provoke a situation in the course of which they could use the heroic struggle of the South Vietnamese people as a pretext for the destruction of our economic and cultural achievements.

We shall offer them no pretext which could give rise to an American military intervention against North Vietnam.

[Ho Chi Minh suddenly enters, unannounced. Mao Tse-tung suit in sultan cotton. Spry and tanned looking, springy step, arms swinging, firm handshake.]

F. I thought you were in Moscow on vacation.

H. You see, people say a lot of things that aren't true. [Looks at my jacket, tape recorder, book, next to me on sofa.] My, you have got a lot of things with you.

F. I am sorry, Monsieur le Président [Push things together. Ho sits down next to me, humorous gleam on face, slaps me on thigh.]

H. So, you are the young man who is so much interested in all the small details about my life. [In my book "*Le Viet-Minh*" and the forthcoming "*Two Viet-Nams*," I have attempted to include as complete a biographical sketch of Ho Chi Minh as possible. During my stay in Hanoi, I also interviewed many of Ho's old friends on Ho's life, and he apparently had been informed of this.]

F. Monsieur le Président, you are after all a public figure, and it certainly would not be a violation of a military secret to know whether you had a family, or were in Russia at a given date.

H. Ah, but you know, I'm an old man, a very old man [he's 73]. An old man likes to have a little air of mystery about himself. I like to hold on to my little mysteries. I'm sure you will understand that.

F. But—

H. Wait until I'm dead. [In spite of this, I received just before I left Hanoi a letter containing six manuscript pages of details about Ho's life, filling in most of the gaps—no doubt on his own orders.]

P. Monsieur Fall brought you a book on the Indochina war which contains a drawing of you by his wife.

H. [With an old man's impatience]. Where? Where? Let me see it. Providing she's got my goatee right. Providing the goatee looks all right. [Unwraps and looks.] Mmm—yes, that is very good. That looks very much like me. [Looks around, grabs a small flower bouquet from the table, hands it to me.] Tell her for me that the drawing is very good and give her the bouquet and kiss her on both cheeks for me.

P. Monsieur Fall is interested in the present situation in South Vietnam.

F. Yes, Monsieur le Président, how do you evaluate the situation in South Vietnam?

H. Monsieur Ngo Dinh Diem is in a very very difficult position right now and it is not likely to improve in the future. He has no popular support.

F. But would you negotiate with South Vietnam?

P. The situation is not yet ripe for a real negotiation. They [South Vietnamese] don't really want to negotiate.

H. That is absolutely true. They are showing no intention to negotiate.

F. But are you not afraid that the situation might degenerate into a protracted war?

H. [Earnestly, turning full face.] Monsieur le Professeur, you have studied us for 10 years, you have written about the Indochina war. It took us 8 years of bitter fighting to defeat you French in Indochina. Now the Diem regime is well armed and helped by many Americans. The Americans are stronger than the French. It might perhaps take 10 years, but our heroic compatriots in the south will defeat them in the end. We shall marshal world public opinion about this unjust war against the South Vietnamese people.

P. Yes, the heroic South Vietnamese people will have to continue the struggle by its own means but we watch its efforts with the greatest sympathy.

H. I think the Americans greatly underestimate the determination of the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese people has always shown great determination when it was faced with an invader.

F. But are you still willing to come to a negotiated settlement if the occasion presented itself?

H. Yes, but only with people who are willing to sit down with us at one and the same table and "talk." [French word: "causer" which means: "negotiate in good faith."]

F. You mean you would negotiate with any South Vietnamese Government?

H. Yes, with any.

F. But what kind of relations would you envisage?

H. Of whatever type they [South Vietnamese] wish. After all, the East and West Germans have flourishing trade relations in spite of the Berlin Wall, haven't they? [After some further amenities, Ho leaves.]

F. Monsieur le Prime Minister, what do you think of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem's personal position as of right now?

P. It is quite difficult. He is unpopular, and the more unpopular he is, the more American aid he will need to remain in power. And the more American aid he gets, the more as an American puppet he'll look and the less likely is he to regain popularity.

F. That sounds pretty much like a vicious circle, doesn't it?

P. [humorous gleam]. No, Monsieur le Professeur. It is a descending spiral.

F. But you must understand, Monsieur le Prime Minister, that South Vietnam is in a different situation than the non-Communist parts of Germany and Korea. In the latter two cases, the non-Communist part is by far the more populated, whereas in the case of Vietnam, the non-Communist part has 13.8 million people against your 17 million. You can clearly see that they have good reasons to fear North Vietnam which also has the larger army, and one with a fearsome reputation, as we French well know.

P. Certainly, we realize that we are in the stronger position. Thus, we are also willing to give all the guarantees necessary for the South to be able to come our fairly [pour que le Sud trouve son compte] in such a negotiation.

You will recall President Ho's declaration with regard to maintaining the South's separate government and economic system. The Fatherland Front embodies those points in its program, and the South Vietnamese Liberation Front likewise.

We do not envisage an immediate reunification and are willing to accept the verdict of the South Vietnamese people with regard to the institutions and policies of its part of the country.

F. What, then, would be the minimal conditions under which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam] would accept a settlement of the conflict which at present exists in South Vietnam?

P. [makes a statement as below].

F. Would you object to my making a tape recording of that answer? It is a reply that I would like to have verbatim, if possible.

P. [thinks it over, makes notes, agrees].

P. This is a very timely question: The DRVN [North Vietnam] government has made sufficiently explicit declarations on the subject [but] let me underline what follows: The underlying origin and immediate cause of the extremely dangerous situation in the South of our country is the armed intervention of the USA and the fascist dictatorship of Monsieur Ngo Dinh Diem, the creation and instrument of that [American] intervention.

It is obvious, then, that in order to normalize the situation in our whole country, those factors of dissension must disappear. We support with determination the patriotic struggle of our Southern compatriots and the objectives of their struggle—I mean, the program of the Southern Liberation Front.

We are certain that the massive help of all classes of South [Vietnam's] society and the active support of the peoples of the world, shall determine the happy outcome of the situation full of dangers which exist in the South of our country.

The people of Vietnam and the DRVN government remain faithful to the Geneva accords [of July 1954] which establish our basic national rights. We shall continue to cooperate with the International Control Commission on the basis of those accords, and hope that this cooperation shall be fruitful—providing that all members of the Commission respect the accords.

F. Thank you, Monsieur le Prime Minister, for that statement.

P. I would like to say something about a remark you made in your book on our Republic about our alleged "isolationism" from neutral and pro-Western countries, and from international organizations. No, no and no, we are not isolationists. On the contrary, we seek "open windows" towards any country or organization that will deal with us on a matter-of-fact basis. We are willing to trade with them and make purchases from them.

F. What would be the position of the foreign community in South Vietnam, if the war worsens? There are still 15,000 French citizens living there.

P. As you know, the Southern Liberation Front has repeatedly shown that it does not wish to hurt the legitimate interests of the Europeans who live in South Vietnam. We make a distinction between France's position and that of American imperialists.

F. What is the attitude of the DRVN towards Laos and Cambodia?

P. We shall respect the Laos accords [this was stated briefly after the signature of the 1962 Geneva accords on Laos. It has become obvious since then that North Vietnamese troops still operate in Laos to some extent, or travel through South Vietnam], and shall at all costs maintain good relations with Cambodia.

EXHIBIT 6

[From the Reporter, Oct. 24, 1963]

WHAT DE GAULLE ACTUALLY SAID ABOUT VIETNAM

(Bernard Fall)

President de Gaulle is used to being misunderstood by those to whom he directs his more Delphic remarks, and he is particularly used to being misunderstood by Washington. Indeed, there are times when one almost suspects he likes being misunderstood by Washington. The evidence is increasing that this is more or less what happened in the wake of De Gaulle's recent affirmation of France's abiding interest in the ultimate independence—"independence vis-a-vis the outside," as he put it—of all of Vietnam, North and South. These remarks prompted considerable wringing of hands in Washington (even though Walter Lippmann thought that De Gaulle was right if he meant what Lippmann thought he meant), and many seemed to feel that his remarks were meant as merely a nettlesome intrusion into U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. As usual, almost everybody was wrong.

The original version of the statement in question was drawn up in August, just after the Buddhist riots had begun in Hue and Saigon and while the French Foreign Ministry was working with a skeleton vacation-time staff. At De Gaulle's request, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had drawn up a short note on the subject of Vietnam. Most Foreign-Ministry aids seemed to feel that what was going on in Vietnam was far, far away, and that anyway for once it was something happening not to the French but to somebody else. Thus the original note hardly went beyond voicing pious hopes about religious tolerance, phrased in terms that were considerably weaker than the Pope's statement on the same subject.

At the Elysée, one of De Gaulle's civilian aids redrafted the note for his chief, but still without going much beyond the Quai d'Orsay draft. The new version was submitted to De Gaulle after his return from his mid-August vacation and disappeared from view until the President himself brought it up at the council of ministers on August 29, after Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville had made his oral report on recent developments in Vietnam. The text which De Gaulle then read was a radical departure from the Quai d'Orsay draft, with perhaps

the sole exception of its initial phrases referring to the "attention and emotion" with which "Paris views the grave events in Vietnam."

The operative paragraphs, which President Kennedy considered sufficiently disturbing to repeat 4 weeks later on the occasion of the departure of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for Vietnam, were entirely in De Gaulle's own hand:

"France's knowledge of the valor of the (Vietnamese) people permits her to discern the role they could play in Asia's present situation, for their own progress and to the benefit of international understanding; as soon as they could deploy their activity in independence vis-a-vis the outside, in peace and unity at home, and in concord with their neighbors.

"That is what France wishes, more than ever today, to all of Vietnam. It naturally is up to the (Vietnamese) people themselves, and to themselves alone, to choose the means of arriving (at that result) but any national effort undertaken by Vietnam with that aim will find France ready, within the means at its disposal, to enter into cordial cooperation with that country."

The statement, read to the assembled journalists at the end of the council meeting by Information Minister Alain Peyrefitte, had the effect of a brick in a birdbath. Yet it needs to be examined coolly to understand De Gaulle's meaning.

He wants Vietnam to be reunified in independence. That is a wish that every Western statesman trots out whenever he visits a divided country like Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, or a city like Berlin. It is, in fact, an explicit long-range aim of Western policy, and the price of reunification will in all likelihood be non-adherence to any bloc, as in Austria, for example, or nominally in Laos. In the case of Vietnam (as well as of Germany) such reunification would actually be dangerous to world peace if the reunified country, far stronger regionally than its neighbors, were to embark upon a policy of nationalistic revanchism. For Vietnam, that would mean starting where it left off when the French arrived in 1858: gobbling up and destroying Cambodia and Laos, presumably in collusion with Thailand.

According to De Gaulle's statement, Vietnamese independence should be arrived at by means chosen by the Vietnamese people themselves, and by "themselves alone." Any "national" effort, i.e., by the Vietnamese nation as a whole, would find France willing to give such support as it can afford. This kind of vague promise is hardly designed to commit France to immediate action in the Far East. It simply says that if by some unspecified miracle the Vietnamese arrive at reunification—a reunification in which both America and the Sino-Soviets would lose their most obvious reasons for continuing to pay the lavish bills of their respective Vietnamese client governments—France would be willing to take up, as far as possible, the slack of the transitional crisis. In quite a few cases where Russia or the United States or France, for one reason or another, cut a particular country off its payroll, another country (or the United Nations) paid the most urgent bills until an equilibrium of sorts was established. That was about all there was to the De Gaulle statement.

POOR HOMEWORK

It was downright amusing to see the bewilderment on the faces of French officialdom in Paris as the storm broke. Washington went into a flap and spoke unofficially but loudly of yet another "De Gaulle betrayal" of the West in general and the United States in particular. French Ambassador Hervé Alphand was hastily summoned to the State Department and met with Secretary Rusk for more than an hour. His subsequent

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statement, which stuck pretty closely to the text (always a sound policy when one tries to interpret Gaullist prose), obviously convinced no one, least of all the White House, which seems to have written off De Gaulle as Public Enemy No. 1. The American press, on cue, took up the cudgels to transform that two-hundred-word statement into an explicit bid for a French takeover in Indo-China, preferably in collusion with Hanoi, to make the treachery even blacker.

Interviewed by Walter Cronkite on a CBS television program on Labor Day, President Kennedy voiced this reaction to the De Gaulle statement on Vietnam: "It was an impression of his general view, but he doesn't have any forces there or any program of economic assistance, so while these expressions are welcome, the burden is carried, as it usually is by the United States and the people there. . . . What, of course, makes Americans somewhat impatient is that after carrying this load for 18 years, we are glad to get counsel, but we would like a little more assistance, real assistance."

The words clearly showed how poorly the President's entourage had done his homework for him. The flat assertion that the French do not have any program of economic assistance in Vietnam is simply incorrect. Furthermore, it clearly shows that, on a public level at least, the White House still does not know who exactly has a stake in Vietnam, and for what reason.

In Paris, Mr. Kennedy's statement was received with a shrug. "Obviously, the Americans haven't understood, or they don't choose to understand," was the reaction of a seasoned newspaperman from *Le Monde*. That paper and *Agence France Presse* had spilled out the French stake in South Vietnam: about 17,500 French citizens still live there, 60,000 of whom are French-born, the others being of Asian, Eurasian, Indian, or African origin; French investments in the country, including important rubber plantations, total close to \$500 million; and there is a fairly sizable French economic and cultural-aid program.

In terms of actual dollar expenditures, French aid is not large, but it affects some politically important sectors. There are more than 340 French teachers in Vietnam. They are to be found from grade school to the university level, but are concentrated above all in the lycées, where tomorrow's elite is being trained. Close to 30,000 Vietnamese children go to schools staffed and paid for by the French cultural mission, and more Vietnamese are now passing the difficult French baccalaureate examinations than at any time during the colonial period. But French economic aid is also felt in another key sector: agrarian reform. By a convention signed on September 10, 1958, France agreed to advance funds to Vietnam for the repurchase of more than half a million acres of French-owned rice land. This permitted the Diem regime to redistribute land free to the farmers without having to resort to the expropriation of land belonging to the Vietnamese landlords, many of whom were high officials in the regime. The French also financed the only working coal mine in South Vietnam, the only indigenous source of fuel; and they donated diesel locomotives for Vietnam's battered railroads.

But there is an even more important field in which France plays a key role, and that is Vietnam's trade. It is perhaps one of the unique tragedies of that poor country that it is more dependent now on France's taking its export products than at any time during the colonial era. The following table shows the whole grim problem at a glance:

	Percent of total		
	1950	1956	1962
Exports to—			
France.....	32.2	67.5	42.0
United States.....	12.0	18.1	4.3
Imports from—			
France.....	66.7	24.5	11.8
United States.....	4.2	28.0	37.0

Franco has been displaced in the import field, since imports now are financed by American aid; but in the export field few others but the French, who are used to them, seem to be willing to take Vietnamese goods. This French magnanimity is easily explained: Rubber, which in 1939 represented a healthy 21.4 percent of all Vietnamese exports, now represents an unhealthy one-crop 89.6 percent—and the rubber is produced largely by the huge French plantations. Like their counterparts in Malaya in the 1950's, French rubber planters are paying a heavy toll in lives and treasure to the insurgents. There is not one plantation that has not been attacked or partly pillaged several times by the Vietcong during the past 5 years, and which has not seen several of its French personnel kidnapped and held for ransom or killed. During the Indo-China War, the plantations had been allowed to arm themselves and maintained militia forces at their own expense. When Ngo Dinh Diem came to power he ordered all plantations disarmed and they thus became military liabilities.

The plantation managers now keep in business by closing their eyes to the Vietcong emissaries who come to the workers' villages and exact tribute; they silently pay millions of piastres of ransom to the Vietcong—and as much again to bribe South Vietnamese authorities to allow them to operate. Here and there, the Saigon-controlled press announces that a French plantation was fined tens of millions of piastres (a million dollars or more) for "economic violations." Everybody knows what that means, and business goes on as usual.

Those Frenchmen and their property are hostages to both sides in South Vietnam's messy war. A brief visit to the *Syndicat des Planteurs de Caoutchouc* in Paris gives an eloquent picture of what this means: "It means," says one of the officials, "that we are being told by the Vietcong that if we don't cooperate, our trees will be slashed and personnel killed. And when we do pay our 'blood money,' the Government's district chief comes and fines us exactly the same amount. There will come the day when the whole damned thing simply becomes too expensive to carry on, and we'll all go home, and Vietnam's last economic mainstay will collapse. After all, should the Americans pull out tomorrow, they'll simply create a beachhead around Saigon and fly out their military personnel and few local residents. But our 17,000 Frenchmen are spread out all over the country and there'll be a blood bath like back in 1945 when the Vietminh took over, or in 1960 in the Congo."

It is obvious, then, that renewed French preoccupations with Vietnam stem from reasons that are more realistic than the desire to nettle the young men in Washington while their policies are in disarray.

BY NHU OUT OF ALSOP

But that first row had barely simmered down when its second round broke out from a not entirely unexpected quarter. Joseph Alsop, who for the past 5 years has been a self-appointed spokesman for the Ngo Dinh Diem view of the outside world, arrived in

time in Saigon to discover evidence of ugly stuff, to which he gave maximum play in his syndicated column of September 18. Further embroidering on the theme of De Gaulle's alleged desire to inherit the Vietnamese mess, Alsop interviewed Ngo Dinh Nhu and came away with the following intelligence, all directly gathered from the lips of Diem's official political adviser, head of the secret police, and chief anti-American:

The French representative in North Vietnam, Jacques de Buzon, had seen Nhu together with French Ambassador Lalouette and had brought him an offer from Ho Chi Minh to negotiate—presumably via the French and behind the back of the United States.

The Polish member of the Indian-Canadian-Polish International Control Commission (ICC) in Vietnam had come to see Nhu at Lalouette's behest with a message from North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.

Nhu had not even told his brother Diem of all this for fear of causing a stir.

The reaction in France was immediate. To the French, who know of Alsop's close relations with President Diem, this seemed one more deliberate attempt to blame the French colonialists for everything that was going wrong in Vietnam. Officially, the *Quai d'Orsay* simply said the article "does not even merit a denial." Unofficially, however, the following facts soon came to light:

De Buzon, who had taken over his job in Hanoi only very recently, had never been to Saigon at all, as the flight records of the ICC aircraft testify, and there is no other way of getting from Hanoi to Saigon except by rowboat across the 17th parallel along the coast of the South China Sea.

The Polish "ICC" member, after years of being snubbed, had suddenly been invited to Diem's receptions—a fact which American newsmen had reported. Lalouette had never presented the Pole to Nhu.

As noted in the semi-official *La Nation*, the newspaper of De Gaulle's "UNR" party, if Nhu wanted to keep the whole thing a secret from his brother, why did he give the story to Alsop to plaster all over the world?

What had happened is that Nhu cleverly used Alsop to strengthen his own bargaining position in his life-and-death struggle with the United States. This was obvious from August 31, when Saigon almost immediately halted the De Gaulle statement as "not being critical of our position" and chose to interpret Diem's resistance to American demands for reform as an aspect of its own policy of struggle for "external independence." Nhu sought (and still seeks) to bolster the myth that he has two fallback positions: if the Americans let him down, he can always turn to the French; and if they let him down, he can always make a deal with Hanoi where, he says, he and his brother are greatly admired.

Alsop realized that he was out on a limb; in his next column he backtracked by giving the world a description of the Gia-Long Palace in Saigon (where the Ngo Dinh's hide from their people) which resembled H. R. Tervor-Roper's description of Hitler's bunker in its last days, and which makes both Diem and Nhu look like paranoids. But having said that Nhu's egotism goes "beyond normal vanity" and that Diem has "lost his ability to see events or problems in their true proportions," Alsop nevertheless returns to his idee fixe that Paris has nothing else in mind or in store for Saigon but a "Communist takeover . . . by courtesy of the French."

It is certain that De Gaulle, and for that matter any Frenchman seriously concerned with southeast Asia, is less than happy with

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the way things have been going in South Vietnam of late—but this is a view that many Americans share with them, including some leading personages in Washington. The real problem (beyond the extremely serious one of emotional overreaction in Washington whenever the name "De Gaulle" comes up) is that nothing better than "swimming with Diem"—and Nhu, of course—has been proposed anywhere. As a consequence, French Ambassador Lalouette was placed in the strange position of apparently lecturing newly arrived U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on the merits of the present Saigon rulers. In 1955, the French tried to get rid of Diem; they got thrown out of Vietnam for their pains and have not forgotten the lesson.

Alsop's suggestion of French negotiations on behalf of Hanoi might be an interesting, even a clever idea. But, as I was able to judge there for myself, De Buzon's predecessors in Hanoi were, in the words of Georges Chaffard in *Le Monde* of September 3, "filled with a visceral hatred of all that was Communist." They were not even received by Hanoi's top leaders, let alone used as messengers for negotiations. The French have no illusions about what their role would be in a reunified Vietnam dominated by Hanoi: almost all their properties in North Vietnam, worth close to \$1 billion, have been confiscated, all their missionaries were expelled, and for the privilege of being able to maintain two teachers of French and one school administrator at one lycée, they must pay for the upkeep of the whole establishment. French trade with North Vietnam is \$2 million a year; with South Vietnam it is far greater.

On the whole, it seems difficult thus far to ascribe much more to De Gaulle's statement than an understandable desire to be heard on an issue in which the French feel, rightly or wrongly, that they may once more become the scapegoats; or worse, the victims.

EXHIBIT 7

[From the Washington Daily News,
Mar. 6, 1964]

MACV, MACT, MAAG: PAPERWORK IS A TIGER TO UNITED STATES

(By Jim Lucas)

CAN THO, SOUTH VIETNAM, March 6.—To understand anything at all about this strange little war, it helps to examine some of the organization problems.

For one thing, the command structure—ours and the Vietnamese—is grotesque. Like Topsy, it just grewed.

On our part, we have MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) headed by Gen. Paul Harkins. General Harkins also is MACT (Military Assistance Command, Thailand).

ADVISORY TEAMS

Then, we have MAAG (Military Advisory Assistance Group) headed by Maj. Gen. Charles Timmes. MAAG has been here since the early 1950's. It controls the advisory teams.

Then there is a support command, headed by Brig. Gen. Joe Stilwell, Jr. It controls the operating troops, such as the helicopter crews. Theoretically, they are here to support the Vietnamese. In practice, they are fighting a war.

On top of all this, we have a "country team" headed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who is a major general in the Army Reserve.

HORRENDOUS

Men in the field often work for all three commands. They must submit reports to all three. The paperwork is horrendous.

There are rumors that Lt. Gen. William C. Westmoreland will abolish MACV or MAAG when he succeeds General Harkins. The troops devoutly hope this is true. Gen-

eral Westmoreland is now General Harkins' deputy.

The Vietnamese have four categories of troops in the field, some working for the Ministry of Defense, others for the Ministry of Interior.

At the lowest level, there is the hamlet militia. They work in squads. They have, at most, one automatic weapon. If they are paid at all, it is by the people they protect. Usually it is in rice.

Next, there is the Self-Defense Corps. It is organized in platoons, and slightly better armed. Its men are paid \$9 a month.

THIRD ECHELON

Third echelon is the civil guard. Roughly it compares with our National Guard. It is organized into companies. Its men draw \$12 a month.

Finally, there is the ARVIN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). It is organized into regiments, divisions and corps. Its men are much better paid. They have fairly modern weapons.

On top of this, there is the Vietnamese JGS (Joint General Staff), comparable to our Joint Chiefs of Staff. And to add to the confusion, the Province Chiefs (Governors) are majors, and the district chiefs under them captains and first lieutenants. Each has his own troops. Each Province Chief has a U.S. Army major as his adviser.

BETTER PAID

Though the ARVIN is better paid and better armed, it is the civil guard that bears the brunt of the war. The average ARVIN battalion goes 2 weeks without making contact with the Vietcong. An average civil guard company is fighting 2 days out of 3.

There are reasons for this contrast. The civil guard is smaller (company-size units). It has less fire power; no artillery. Its men are sketchily trained. It does not have enough good officers, consequently it is not so well led.

But the big reason the guard sees more action is psychological, and the Vietcong are canny enough to exploit that. A civil guard company is a local unit. These boys grew up in the province where they're stationed. Everybody knows them.

KILLED

If the Vietcong can chew up a civil guard company, they effectively assert their rule over that area. A man joins the civil guard one week, and they bring his body home the next. That night, the Vietcong slip in and tell his widow, "we killed your man because he opposed us."

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. McGOVERN. I regret that I did not hear the entire address by the Senator from Alaska. I do not know whether I am prepared to agree with all the conclusions he has drawn without having had an opportunity to study the text of his proposal. But as one Member of the Senate who is much interested in the security of our country and the peace of the world, I commend the Senator from Alaska for the thoughtful questions that he has raised today.

I wonder if the Senator is aware of the fact that 10 years ago, almost to the day, the then Senator John Kennedy, of Massachusetts, made a similar speech with reference to French involvement in French Indochina. On that day, the Senator from Massachusetts ticked off a list of overly optimistic estimates that had been made by French military leaders about the success of the war in French Indochina, some of those estimates being shared by our own military

strategists. Senator Kennedy warned against some of the sterile possibilities that faced the French if they continued what appeared to the Senator from Massachusetts to be a futile effort in Southeast Asia.

It is quite ironical that that speech should have been made in April 1954. Thirty days later, the French cause was abandoned in French Indochina, and for the past decade we have been seeking, with questionable success, to carry on the same policy.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his valuable contribution to the discussion. The fact is that Senator Kennedy as Senator did not make foreign policy. It was made by the Eisenhower administration—by the President and by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. When John Kennedy became President 6 years later, he inherited the situation and tried for 3 years to do something about it. Considering the experience of failure to rectify what had been done during those 3 years, there has now been a total failure for a whole decade, with a steady loss of American lives.

It is high time to reassess our policy and ascertain why we are in Vietnam, why we should continue to be there, and why we should continue to sacrifice the lives of American boys for people who will not fight for themselves. We should not remain there. We should make the best deal possible before withdrawing, but in any event we should withdraw our men from the fighting front immediately. We should supply the South Vietnamese with all kinds of arms. But this is their war. We should try, by reassessing our policy, to bring an end to the tragedy that has taken place in the last 10 years.

Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the point the Senator has made. Speaking for myself, I would view both our involvement in Vietnam and any possible re-evaluation of our position there as a bipartisan or nonpartisan matter. I would hope we could take the Vietnamese issue out of partisan politics and consider it from the standpoint of what is best for our country and what will make the most likely contribution to the cause of peace.

I thank the Senator from Alaska for yielding.

Mr. GRUENING. I agree that the policy should be nonpartisan and should remain nonpartisan. This issue is far too serious to be permitted to deteriorate into a matter of partisan politics.

The reason this question is pertinent is that President Johnson, only recently arrived in office, is the heir of all these policies, and now he has an opportunity to reassess them. I believe he should do so.

Mr. McGOVERN. I think the Senator from Alaska will agree that it is important to determine the best course for us to follow now, rather than to attempt to assess the blame for what has happened.

Mr. GRUENING. I agree that we should not assess the blame. But we should learn from experience.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alaska for yielding to me.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield briefly to me?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Alaska has made a very thoughtful speech, although I would not agree with some of the conclusions he has reached.

I certainly feel, as does the Senator from South Dakota, that this is not a partisan matter in any way, and that what President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles did 10 and 12 years ago was done under different conditions in the Far East and also under different world conditions. How well that policy finally work out, we cannot say at the moment.

But I wish to point out that the present administration has sent one of its leading and most responsible officials to Vietnam, to determine what we should do now; I refer to Secretary McNamara. In my opinion, our policy in regard to Vietnam also involves our policies in regard to other areas, including Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia, and also our concern in Korea, and even our relationships with the Philippines. All those questions and others are involved, as I see the matter, in our policy in regard to South Vietnam at the moment. Also involved is our prestige in Panama, in Cuba, and in the countries of South America, if we quit South Vietnam.

So, as the Senator from Alaska has said, the President has a very difficult decision to make; and certainly it cannot be made very quickly or with relation to only one situation.

All of us very much deplore the loss of the lives of Americans in South Vietnam, and we hope no more Americans will lose their lives there. However, I believe we must give the present administration an opportunity to view this matter—particularly after sending the Secretary of Defense there—in light of all the conditions in the areas I have named, as well as those existing in South Vietnam alone.

I agree with the Senator from Alaska that the people of South Vietnam must fight for themselves; if they do not, we cannot fight for them.

Mr. GRUENING. I confess that I was shocked to read in the newspapers of the extravagant promises which Secretary McNamara has been making—promises of all-out U.S. aid. In my judgment, he has no business to make such commitments. He went there at the direction of the President to study and report to the President, and what authority he has to make such promises, I do not know.

If we are to have an all-out war there, it is for Congress to declare such a war. So I believe it unfortunate that Secretary McNamara has spoken so freely. I believe it would have been much better if he had kept quiet, returned to this country and had reported to his chief and let him make the commitments.

I address this question to all Senators—not on a personal basis, because the question is already answered insofar as I am concerned: If a Senator's son

were to be drafted in the current draft, under the conscription act, and were sent to Vietnam, and were killed there, would that Senator feel that his son had died in the defense of our country? Personally, I would not.

In South Vietnam we have been support corrupt and evil regimes and we have done it all alone. We are losing men there every day; while the South Vietnamese people will not fight for themselves.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion of Mr. MANSFIELD to proceed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7152) to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

SPARKMAN DEBATES PROCEDURE ON H.R. 7152

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, we now have before us a motion to proceed with the consideration of H.R. 7152, the so-called civil rights bill. As the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia pointed out yesterday afternoon, in the normal course of events in the Senate, a motion to proceed to the consideration of any specific bill on the calendar is usually decided without debate. However, I could not agree more with the same distinguished Senator's further remarks to the effect that there has been nothing normal, usual, or ordinary about the processes which have brought H.R. 7152 to the calendar of the Senate.

Rather, the contortions involved in the parliamentary travels of this bill have been as extraordinary as any that I have witnessed since I first came to serve in this august body.

Let us now consider briefly the strange machinations which have brought this bill to its present place on the calendar of the Senate.

The first comprehensive hearings of this proposed legislation were held by a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. The members of this subcommittee were specially selected proponents of this type of legislation, seemingly chosen for their great support of this cause. Then, in executive session, that subcommittee wrote a bill which has been discussed in some detail by the full committee.

However, the proponents of the bill had some controversy among themselves as to where credit for the bill should go. The essence of the matter was that, overnight, the bill which the subcommittee had considered for 8 months was dropped like a hot potato. With no debate, no careful examination, a new bill was rammed through the committee. With reference to this new bill, six mem-

bers of the House Judiciary Committee stated:

This legislation is being reported to the House without the benefit of any consideration, debate, or study of the bill by any subcommittee or committee of the House and without any member of any committee or subcommittee being granted an opportunity to offer amendments to the bill. This legislation is the most radical proposal in the field of civil rights ever recommended by any committee of the House or Senate. It was drawn in secret meetings held between certain members of this committee, the Attorney General and members of his staff and certain select persons, to the exclusion of other committee members.

Thus were the rights of the minority trampled ruthlessly under foot.

I wish to make clear that that is not a charge which I am making; I am merely quoting from the minority views of the members of the House Judiciary Committee.

It was just as bad on the floor of the other body. The combined leadership of the House supported the bill, despite its unusual birth. Under this prod, along with what has been described as the most intensive and extensive lobbying seen in Washington in many years, the House passed the bill.

We all know that the bill went on the calendar of the Senate by a procedure which many of us felt to be in violation of the rules of the Senate, and certainly in disregard of the rules of the Senate. However, the proponents of this legislation defeated us by sheer numbers.

Legislation similar to certain portions of House bill 7152 has been given consideration by committees of the Senate. However, there has been no committee consideration of most of this bill, which is 55 pages long and has 11 titles.

Therefore, it is essential that the numerous aspects of this proposed legislation be given more careful consideration. If this consideration is not going to be given in committee, I propose, along with my teammates, to give it a thorough airing on the Senate floor.

My concern over following proper Senate procedures is especially magnified in view of the seriousness of the measure in question.

Mr. President, I digress to say that while over the next several weeks of debate on the long, intricate so-called civil rights bill, involving many legal and constitutional questions—questions that have not had a thorough going-over by committees, as is designed in our legislative setup, while we must of necessity spend considerable time on the floor of the Senate trying to find out what the bill proposes and what the constitutional questions involved are, there will be piling up a logjam of badly needed proposed legislation.

Today the Committee on Banking and Currency met. Three or four or five bills are ready for consideration. There is considerable interest in having some of them passed. We decided that there was no need to hold an executive session of the committee to consider the bills, because we knew they would be held up during the entire time occupied by the present debate.

There is a very important housing bill upon which hearings have been com-