

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, if the Senator from Minnesota will yield, I have a suggestion to make.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. It will be possible to obtain a quorum more quickly if the piles of junk in the basement which are termed "tramway cars" begin to operate at 50 percent of efficiency, rather than 10 percent.

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**JOHN S. KNIGHT WRITES THAT SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT WORTH THE COST**

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in view of the previous generous waiving of the 3-minute rule, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the day before yesterday, Tuesday, March 10, in an address on the Senate floor of considerable length—an address on Vietnam—I gave my view that the United States ought to get out of Vietnam. I reviewed the history of our 10 years there. I gave my view that President Johnson had inherited the mess in Vietnam and that he now had the opportunity to reappraise the policies and errors of the past decade and to make the important decision as to whether we would continue or not to sacrifice the lives of American boys in what has proved a disastrous venture, of fighting for a people that shown no disposition to fight for their own freedom.

I realize that the decision is not an easy one and that there are substantial differences of opinion on this subject. Some of these differences were voiced on the floor of the Senate yesterday by some of our able colleagues, whose views were expressed forthrightly, eloquently, and with deep conviction and sincerity. I respect their views, although I do not agree with them.

I find substantial support of my view that the United States should get out of Vietnam, from a very distinguished newspaper editor and publisher, John S. Knight, now nearing the respectable age of 70. He has been a past president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and is the publisher of papers in Chicago, Miami, Detroit, and elsewhere. He has a distinguished military record, being a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, and the Forty and Eight.

In a widely read, syndicated column under the general heading: "John S. Knight's Notebook," entitled "Vietnam: It Isn't Worth the Cost," he writes as follows:

If it were my decision to make \* \* \* I would not get the United States involved in a major war to save South Vietnam and southeast Asia.

My personal view—stated many times—is that the white man is through in Asia and that there is nothing we can do to turn the tide of rising nationalism.

Furthermore, even a swift military victory over North Vietnam would produce no permanent and peaceful solution in that area.

The winning of such a war must inevitably be followed by prolonged occupation, a ted-

ious and dreary task which will win no friends for the United States.

There is also, as I have mentioned, the risk of escalating the war and finding ourselves locked in mortal combat with millions of Red Chinese. In such a struggle, the United States would have no allies at our side.

How the Soviet Union might react under these circumstances is left to your imagination.

If the United States couldn't muster up enough courage to throw Fidel Castro out of neighboring Cuba, why should we be hellbent upon saving South Vietnam from the Communists?

Cuba is far more important to our security and that of the hemisphere than South Vietnam. Yet we failed miserably when tested at the Bay of Pigs. And the Communist subversion of Latin America continues unabated. If the South Vietnamese begin to show more willingness to fight their enemy than in the past, let us continue to support them with limited military assistance. Ultimately, southeast Asia will be lost to the West no matter which course we pursue.

If this be true, and I am convinced it is, why should we sacrifice countless American lives in a southeast Asian death struggle when the subversionists and saboteurs are free to carry on their diabolical work in this hemisphere where our true interests lie?

And, Mr. Knight concludes, in reply to a question posed by his grandson, John, as to what we should do in Vietnam, by writing that he hopes that his reply "will help him to understand the folly of going to war for unrealistic and unattainable objectives."

Mr. President, Mr. Knight is well-known and respected throughout the Nation. He is a person of conservative and enlightened views. He is an outstanding molder of public opinion. I believe time will show, as indeed it should already have shown, that we committed a folly when we moved into Vietnam over 10 years ago, and that it is high time that we reassessed our policy and our past actions.

I repeat my view that we should withdraw our men from combat in Vietnam, where they are presumably serving as advisers. This is a war which the South Vietnamese have to fight and win, if they can be brought to show—which they have not to date—their willingness to fight in their own defense and for their own freedom, as did the South Koreans at the time when the United States—not singlehandedly and alone, as in South Vietnam, but under the auspices of the United Nations and with the forces of a dozen other nations fighting by our side—went into Korea.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield with pleasure.

Mr. MORSE. Once again I commend the Senator from Alaska for his courage—for it requires courage—in warning the American people about the shocking international fiasco the United States is conducting in South Vietnam.

The Senator from Alaska has referred to South Korea; but the situation in South Vietnam has nothing in common with the situation in South Korea. The action in South Korea was a United Nations action, whereas the present action

in South Vietnam is not even a SEATO action.

Of course, we have no business there unless SEATO is in, for the only possible legal connection that we can make between the activity of the United States in South Vietnam and international law is SEATO. All the SEATO nations did was to join the United States, for we, too, are a signatory to the SEATO treaty. At the time those nations signed the SEATO treaty they agreed among themselves that South Vietnam was an area of concern to the SEATO nations—not merely to one, not merely to the United States, but to all of them—and yet our so-called SEATO allies have done absolutely nothing in connection with the question of South Vietnam. They are perfectly willing for the United States to pick up what the Secretary of State testified the other day was 97 percent of the cost and to sacrifice American blood.

I do not welcome the idea of a national debate on South Vietnam, but it has started. The editorial to which the Senator has referred is only one of many being written these days. There will be a full scale national debate on South Vietnam because the American people are entitled to it. They will participate in it by increasing millions. The program cannot be justified as unilateral American action in southeast Asia.

Whom are we deluding? If we got into a war with Russia tomorrow, we would not keep a boy in South Vietnam. We all know that if we got into a war with Russia, the war would be a nuclear war. The great danger is that the situation in Vietnam might be an ignited fuse that could start such a war. Let us face the issue. There are those who wish to escalate the war. There are those who wish to start using nuclear power in North Vietnam. I believe that the first nuclear bomb dropped in North Vietnam would start a holocaust.

What makes us think that the United States can call unilateral shots in the field of foreign policy in areas far beyond the perimeter of American defense? We should keep ourselves in a position in which we are always defensibly right, and where there is no question about the fact that we are following a nonaggression course of action. But if we escalate the war into North Vietnam, I can hear our so-called allies dissociate themselves from us on the ground that we are following an aggressive course of action.

I will make one other point, if the Senator from Alaska and other Senators will permit me to do so. Take a look at the population of South Vietnam. The American people need to be told that the overwhelming majority of the Vietcong—that is, the Communist Vietnamese—are South Vietnamese.

The sad fact is that many of the families of South Vietnam are split. Uncles, cousins, and brothers are on opposite sides and, in some instances, I understand, fathers are on one side and sons on the other. That situation has all the characteristics of a civil war.

What are we doing in a civil war in South Vietnam? Can any Senator tell me? I do not know. The American people are entitled to all the facts. The

Senator has heard me say previously that in a democracy there is no substitute for full public disclosure of the public business.

There is a great deal of monkeybusiness in South Vietnam that the public does not know about. It is about time that the Congress proceeded to find out all the facts and disclose them to the American people, because the sons of American mothers and fathers are dying in South Vietnam and, in my judgment, that cannot be justified.

As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee—and my colleagues on the committee know it and many disagree with me—I do not propose to vote another dollar for South Vietnam. I was against going in; I have been against staying in. I am for getting out immediately.

As I suggested to the administration a while back, I wish to see that long list—and it ought to be a long list—of honorary pallbearers selected from the personnel of the Pentagon and the State Department to meet the ships laden with flag-draped coffins that will start coming into western ports in much larger numbers if we escalate that war.

A serious public policy is involved. It had better be debated openly and frankly. I am for debating it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, in view of the circumstances, that I may proceed for an additional 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator from Oregon for his pertinent and perspicacious contribution. He is quite correct in what he has said. He has added greatly to the value of the discussion. I shall proceed.

We should continue to furnish the South Vietnamese with arms and ammunition, but we should not sacrifice another American life and add to the tragic number of our American boys who have already lost their lives there. I deeply believe that South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from "John S. Knight's Notebook," printed in the Chicago Daily News on Saturday, March 7, 1964, entitled "Vietnam: It Isn't Worth the Cost," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks, as well as an accompanying article by Peter Lisagor, Washington bureau chief of the Chicago Daily News, entitled "Viet Solution: It Just Ain't That Easy."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Vietnam: It Is Not Worth the Cost

(By John S. Knight)

Views on the news: Our young people have an embarrassing way of asking the blunt, direct questions which disconcert their elders.

My grandson, for instance, is interested in South Vietnam and recently gave a talk on that baffling situation at Lawrenceville School.

But now he writes: "I have been following your editorials with interest and note your

constant pleadings to avoid a 'needless and bloody war in southeast Asia.' But what specifically do you suggest?"

Well, Johnny, if I knew the single, simple answer to that question, I'd request a White House appointment with our President and unfold my plan. But even this would be an impertinence since no individual has access to the classified information on South Vietnam which is available only to the President and his advisers.

As background, Vietnam was occupied by Japan in 1940 and used as a base for the invasion of Malaya. At war's end, the Communist forces began a long guerrilla struggle with the French which ended with defeat of France's expeditionary troops at Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954.

A cease-fire signed at Geneva in July of the same year divided Vietnam along the Ben Hai River. South Vietnam was to comprise 39 provinces with the country's future status to be determined by a plebiscite. These elections have never been held.

Under the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of attempting to oppose the expansion of communism, the United States became involved in the protection of South Vietnam from the Vietcong guerrilla fighters of the north.

Our protegee was the late Ngo Dinh Diem, an obstinate man with an obsessive sense of mission but who had little to offer his people as a counterattraction to communism.

The Americans trained the South Vietnamese Army for a conventional war which never took place. By 1961, it was recognized that different measures were needed. The emphasis was shifted to counter guerrilla tactics with U.S. military "advisers" directing the struggle.

#### ALL REGIMES ARE THE SAME

What has happened since is well known. Mr. Diem was murdered in a palace coup and his successor ruled only briefly before he, too, was overthrown.

Meanwhile, the Vietcong became stronger. Their forces are now 10 times as large as back in 1959. Even with American aid and military assistance, the South Vietnamese can point to no significant victories.

Gen. Nguyen Khanh, current leader of South Vietnam, is attempting to popularize himself, as the economist of London's correspondent reports, "by kissing babies, handing out money to village headmen, raising the pay of the demoralized soldiery, while keeping an anxious ear cocked for portents of the next coup."

General Khanh is said to be the ablest and toughest man available to lead his people. Yet "che do nao, cung vay" is the comment. It means "all regimes are the same."

So we find ourselves today in a deteriorating situation, with U.S. military advice largely ignored, diplomacy uncertain and wavering, and the South Vietnamese having little appetite for the struggle.

Our late President once told me that he recognized we had become overcommitted in southeast Asia but, like the rest of us, had no sure solution for the problem.

And that is the dilemma facing President Johnson today.

#### ONLY TWO CHOICES WE CAN MAKE

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and other Presidential envoys are once again in South Vietnam on another "factfinding" tour and will presumably bring home recommendations for a future course of action.

As I see it, there are only two choices we can make.

The first is to recognize the impossibility of a military victory and negotiate for whatever political advantages can be found in a stalemate. This is the plan advocated by Gen. Charles de Gaulle who says we can't win and should settle for the "neutralization" of what used to be French Indochina.

The second alternative is to carry the war into North Vietnam and risk another Korea.

Neither would settle anything with finality. The first is merely an accommodation with reality, yet humbling and bitter to the taste.

The second could involve a war of major proportions if carried to the limit with no privileged sanctuaries in North Vietnam.

The latter course would surely lead to Chinese intervention and could precipitate a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

#### TWO VIEWS: HAWKS VERSUS DOVES

However, there are some White House advisers, known as the hawks, who think there is little danger of massive retaliation from the Communist bloc. Others, called the doves, believe that U.S. sorties across the 17th parallel would cause Moscow and Peking to resolve their ideological differences and make common cause against this country.

President Johnson is convinced that we cannot afford to lose South Vietnam to the Communists lest other guerrilla wars break out and all of southeast Asia be doomed.

He is also sensitive to Republican charges that his administration is pursuing "soft" policies with respect to the Communists.

The only thing that can be said with certainty about South Vietnam is the urgency of decision making in a rapidly deteriorating situation.

It is a trying judgment to make, President Kennedy believed the South Vietnamese, with our aid, could hold off the Vietcong indefinitely. But Mr. Kennedy's view was too optimistic, and the troubled man who succeeded him must now act.

#### WHITE MAN ON WAY OUT

If it were my decision to make—and I hope my grandson will not think me cowardly—I would not get the United States involved in a major war to save South Vietnam and southeast Asia.

My personal view—stated many times—is that the white man is through in Asia and that there is nothing we can do to turn the tide of rising nationalism.

Furthermore, even a swift military victory over North Vietnam would produce no permanent and peaceful solutions in that area.

The winning of such a war must inevitably be followed by prolonged occupation, a tedious and dreary task which will win on friends for the United States.

There is also, as I have mentioned, the risk of escalating the war and finding ourselves locked in mortal combat with millions of Red Chinese. In such a struggle, the United States would have no allies at our side.

How the Soviet Union might react under these circumstances is left to your imagination.

If the United States could not muster up enough courage to throw Fidel Castro out of neighboring Cuba, why should we be hell-bent upon saving South Vietnam from the Communists?

Cuba is far more important to our security and that of the hemisphere than South Vietnam. Yet we failed miserably when tested at the Bay of Pigs. And the Communist subversion of Latin America continues unabated.

If the South Vietnamese begin to show more willingness to fight their enemy than in the past, let us continue to support them with limited military assistance.

#### THREE BIG QUESTIONS

Why cannot South Vietnam conduct as effective guerrilla operations as their foes to the north?

Is it because the South Vietnamese lack the will to protect themselves, or have they no confidence in their leadership?

Or, is it because they have found no real counterattraction to communism?

Ultimately, southeast Asia will be lost to the West no matter which course we pursue.

If this be true, and I am convinced it is, why should we sacrifice countless American

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lives in a southeast Asian death struggle when the subversionists and saboteurs are free to carry on their diabolical work in this hemisphere where our true interests lie?

This is a long reply to Johnny's one-paragraph question.

But I hope it will help him to understand the folly of going to war for unrealistic and unattainable objectives.

For, as they say in Saigon, "all regimes are the same."

VIET SOLUTION: "IT JUST AIN'T THAT EASY"  
(By Peter Lisagor)

WASHINGTON.—The Johnson administration may soon wish it had sneaked Defense Secretary Robert McNamara out of town on his present mission to Saigon instead of allowing it to be ballyhooed as the key to this country's future course in South Vietnam.

Ol' Doc Mac may be the resident genius at the Pentagon, but nothing in the record suggests that his diagnosis of what's wrong in the war against the Communist Viet Cong will be any more precise or any less misleading than almost all of the fever charts of the recent past.

Yet it is part of the prevailing Washington mentality to dispatch factfinders and balm dispensers to the trouble spots and expect them, through some occult gift for discovery or healing, to settle matters.

Assistant State Secretary Tom Mann tried it in Panama, without success; Under Secretary of State George Ball came away from Cyprus with an empty bag, and now McNamara goes to Vietnam burdened by the President's stated conviction that he will correctly appraise the situation and return with appropriate recommendations.

Thus, a desirable periodic inspection tour is turned into a major exercise in divination and prophecy. South Vietnam has proved to be a boneyard for the prophets, and those who thought that the removal of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu would solve everything are now struggling to keep their heads above the quicksands of doubt.

"It just ain't that easy," as the ivy-encrusted experts in the Government will tell you. Both the White House and Emissary McNamara may regret the swollen view of the mission that has been encouraged in high places.

By almost every account available, the campaign in Vietnam corresponds to the judgment of Wesley R. Fishel, a Michigan State University specialist in Asian politics and a onetime consultant to the Diem regime in Saigon.

In a recent analysis of the Vietnam situation for the Foreign Policy Association, Fishel bluntly states that the United States is in for a long and costly haul and that the tide of battle now "flows in the Communists' favor."

The bleak alternative of neutralizing Vietnam, North and South, or carrying the war across the 17th parallel into the Communist North are viewed as unlikely by Fishel, the first because it would eventually lead to a Communist takeover and the second because it would risk a war against Communist China, or another Korea.

But more pertinent to the McNamara mission, Fishel quotes a supporter of neutralization, Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, to show how difficult it is to determine the status of the fighting, to "correctly appraise" the situation.

MANSFIELD wrote in 1963, when the French were mired in Indochina, that the "war is a grim one. It is a strange and elusive struggle, a shadowy war without battle lines. It is a war of sudden raids in the night, of parachute drops on scattered supply dumps, of interminable patrol actions, of ambush, terrorism and sabotage \* \* \* fought in dense

jungle, in remote mountain passes, and in the great river deltas."

This terrain, MANSFIELD noted, "favors an enemy whose tactics are hit-and-run, plunder and retreat."

The strategic hamlet plan of defense, established on the antiguerrilla plan that worked in Malaya, changed the picture somewhat from the 1953 depiction by MANSFIELD, but not, according to Fishel, enough to matter materially.

If McNamara succeeds in making an accurate appraisal of the will and wisdom of the latest coup leader, Gen. Nguyen Khanh, he may deserve a medal. The Khanh regime, for example, reportedly is considering a break in relations with France on the ground that Paris is actively promoting President Charles de Gaulle's neutralization plan.

France has a firm cultural and economic stake in Vietnam. Nearly half of South Vietnam's exports go to France, and French interests keep the coal mines working and help keep the railroads running, among other enterprises there. Uncle Sam would have to pick up the entire tab in Saigon if the French were thrown out—a prospect viewed with no enthusiasm here.

#### THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE SUPPORTS LEGISLATION TO REVITALIZE THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Legislature of the State of Alaska has taken note of the grave plight of our gold mining industry.

This industry has suffered a discrimination in the United States which is unique not only in our free enterprise economy but unique among the gold producing nations of the world. The United States alone during World War II issued an order closing our gold mines. This was done under the mistaken view that the production of gold was not necessary to the war effort. But no other country took such a step, including those that were associated with us in the war effort—Canada, South Africa, and Australia. They all kept their gold mines working as did all other gold producing nations.

In addition to that, our Federal Government has imposed upon the industry the restriction to sell gold at the price fixed 30 years ago in 1934 at \$35 an ounce. Obviously, since that time all costs have risen sharply; the costs of labor, equipment, materials, and so forth, have more than doubled. But the Government persists in forbidding our gold mining industry to sell its gold at other than this price and only to the U.S. Government.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If anyone should look for a moment at what high interest rates are costing our Government—our action being justified on the balance-of-payments argument—he would find that it would be very cheap, by comparison, to subsidize the production of gold compared with what it costs us even to maintain the national debt alone. I estimate that that cost is about \$6 billion a year. That is the cost merely to take care of the national debt at the higher interest rates that have

prevailed since President Eisenhower came into office about 11 years ago. For a fraction of that cost we could subsidize the production of gold and have no problem about our balance of payments.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator is correct. For not much more than the one-hundredth part of that cost we could take care of the needs of the gold-mining industry. We could revive a once great American industry, which has played so great a part in our history for whose extinction the Federal Government is uniquely responsible, and bring a whole economy back to life. By creating employment where there is now unemployment, it would contribute greatly to the success of President Johnson's declared war on poverty. I thank the Senator for his contribution.

In consequence, of Federal action, unique and arbitrary, and constituting an unprecedented and unparalleled discrimination in our free enterprise system, our gold mining industry is virtually extinct.

Over the years valiant efforts have been made to sponsor legislation that will relieve this situation. Our able colleague, the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE], when a Member of the House and chairman of its Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, sponsored such legislation and held extensive hearings on it. He did the same 2 years ago in the Senate. More recently, these attempts have been renewed and various approaches to a solution of this problem have been tried. They always run against the stubborn opposition of some theorists in the Treasury Department who insist that aid to the gold-mining industry will somehow have an adverse effect on the stability of the dollar.

Those of us who attended these hearings consider this claim to be without merit. But, unfortunately the Treasury Department has so far been able to make its views prevail. And while stubbornly opposing all such efforts it declines to cooperate in proposing any alternatives.

My bill, S. 2125, which has no relation whatever to the price of gold but would merely subsidize gold mining, to compensate the mining enterprises for the differences in cost that have taken place in the last quarter of a century—and from which the industry cannot escape because of Federal action—has been approved unanimously by both the Subcommittee on Mines, Materials, and Fuels, of which I am chairman and by the full Interior Committee. It now awaits action before the Senate. But it is highly desirable that that action be preceded by a moratorium on the Treasury Department's unwarranted opposition.

The Legislature of the State of Alaska, which State was once one of our great gold-producing States, has taken cognizance of the situation, and its Senate Resolution 17 urges action on my bill.

I ask unanimous consent that this resolution be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## SENATE RESOLUTION 17

Resolution relating to Federal assistance to the domestic gold production industry

Whereas the mining of gold in the United States has declined sharply for years because of enormously increased costs of production as contrasted with a gold price that has remained fixed; and

Whereas a sharp reflection of the decline of the domestic gold production industry is found in the State of Alaska, which produced 850,000 ounces of new gold in 1940, contrasted with 114,000 ounces in 1961, and employed 4,000 men in gold mining in 1940, contrasted with 500 men in 1962; and

Whereas the domestic gold production industry cannot fairly be expected to continue production in a situation in which profit is impossible; and

Whereas the Honorable ERNEST GRUENING, U.S. Senator from Alaska, in a bill cosponsored by the Honorable E. L. BARTLETT, U.S. Senator from Alaska and four other distinguished U.S. Senators, has proposed legislation to authorize payments to individual miners of gold so as to compensate for their costs of production today as compared with the peak production year of 1940; and

Whereas the Legislature of the State of Alaska holds to the view that a modest subsidy of the domestic gold production industry would in no serious way weaken the dollar or add to international balance-of-payments problems; and

Whereas this Nation should not neglect adequate development of the ample resources of gold with which it has been favored, but rather should develop a gold production industry capable of fulfilling all domestic requirements for gold in industry, commerce and the arts: Be it

Resolved, That the Congress of the United States is respectfully urged to take favorable action on the legislation proposed by Senator GRUENING to assist the domestic gold mining industry; and be it

Further resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent to the Honorable Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable Wayne N. Aspinall, chairman, House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee; the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, chairman, Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee; and the members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

Passed by the Senate March 3, 1964.

FRANK PERATROVICH,  
President of the Senate.

Attest:

EVELYN K. STEVENSON,  
Secretary of the Senate.

### MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES MERELY PROMOTES ARMED STRIFE

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, one of the numerous follies committed in our foreign aid program is to offer military aid to the numerous newly born African countries. Most of these countries are desperately poor and if aid in American dollars is to go to them, it should be economic aid—aid designed to give them education; to give them some know-how in fields that will aid their economy; to give them aid which will promote their health; but under no circumstances military aid, which is not only money wasted, but leads to conflict with their neighbors, and wastes the needed substance of all involved.

A graphic account of how damaging to these countries is the support of their military cliques is found in an article: "Africa: The Mutinous Armies," by

David Hapgood, which appeared in the March 2 issue of the Nation.

I hope that the contents of this article will register not only with my colleagues in the Senate and House, but with the executive agency that is responsible for promoting and supporting military aid to these new countries.

I shall expect to move, when the foreign aid bill comes up for discussion, that this item be eliminated except where the President finds that it is in the national interest that it be granted to a specific country and so notifies the Congress with his reasons for this exception.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by David Hapgood entitled "Africa: The Mutinous Armies," be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### AFRICA: THE MUTINOUS ARMIES

(By David Hapgood)

When Tanganyika's soldiers mutinied in late January, President Julius K. Nyerere was helpless until, at his reluctant request, British troops returned to disarm the nation's own army. Nothing could more dramatically illustrate the weakness of African governments. A series of army interventions—seven in the last 13 months—have shaken the continent's rulers, and as in Asia and Latin America, the military are showing their power over the civilians.

Some of the African victims of the military, like President Fulbert Youlou of the Brazzaville Congo, deposed last August, are clownish figures whose overthrow was not surprising. But Nyerere was probably the most respected of African Presidents. Though there had been grumbling over some of his measures, Tanganyika seemed, after 2 years of independence, to be off to a better start than most African nations. Elected almost unanimously, Nyerere had no organized opposition and was apparently supported by the great majority of Tanganyikans. He is, also, an extraordinarily appealing figure among politicians, a man whose dedication is tempered with enough humor to prevent fanaticism. But popular as he is, the people stood by while a handful of soldiers made a mockery of his authority. It is a measure of Nyerere's desperation that he, like the leaders of Kenya and Uganda, was forced to call on the British for troops—the most humiliating request that an ex-colony could make.

The plight of Julius Nyerere proves how misleading the surface appearance of African politics can be. Much is said about the trend to one-party states and dictatorship in Africa; Nyerere himself was criticized recently for bringing labor unions under state control and making his Tanganyika African National Union the only political party. But the fact that a ruler jails his few opponents, makes and unmakes foreign policy at will, and is cheered by the crowds when he passes in his limousine does not make him a "dictator" in the western sense. On the contrary, as the army revolts have shown, weakness not strength is the characteristic of African states. Behind the authoritarian facade there is a pathetic lack of authority.

Popular indifference has greeted the seven recent displays of military power. The series began in Senegal, in ex-French West Africa, in December 1962, when a paratroop unit intervened in the struggle for power between President Leopold Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia. The paratroopers voted their guns for Senghor. Two weeks later, with his rival Dia in jail, Senghor commented: "After God, it is first to the armed forces that I must address the thanks

of the Nation." The next steps were unsurprising: Senghor proclaimed austerity, because of a huge budget deficit—and the military appropriation went up.

Other Presidents have had less cause to thank the army:

In January 1963, unemployed veterans assassinated President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo.

In August, the army ousted President Youlou of the ex-French Congo.

In November, the army ousted President Hubert Maga of Dahomey.

In January 1964, army units mutinied in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya.

In February, Léon Mba of Gabon was deposed from the Presidency by his own troops and restored by French force of arms.

In the ex-Belgian Congo, the army has of course been in politics since independence.

The example is contagious. Shortly after Olympio's assassination, the Government of Liberia announced the discovery of an army plot against President William V. S. Tubman. A Liberian officer is reported to have said to his fellow officers: "If 250 Togolese soldiers can take power, think what we can do with our 5,000 troops."

Once the pattern has been established, the soldiers can hardly fail to see that the government offers them a tempting target. The state inherited by African civilians from the colonial powers was based on military conquest. When the Europeans withdrew, they took with them the bayonets and gunboats on which their administrations rested. Their African successors can create armies but cannot control them. The palace is there for the taking.

When they move against the civilians, the soldiers do not seem driven by any particular ideology. They show no signs of being social revolutionaries along Middle East lines; no Ataturk or Nasser has appeared in Black Africa. Nor, at the other extreme, are they cynical exploiters of public power for private profit on the Latin model; Africa has produced no Trujillo or Batista. The governments the African military ousted or rebelled against have been among the continent's best (Nyerere and Olympio) and worst (Youlou).

In East Africa and in Togo, the soldiers were simply using their guns to get some butter. The Togolese President, Olympio, was an austere and stiff-necked realist who refused to waste money on the army, which he limited to 250 men. When the veterans pleaded with him one afternoon, Olympio contemptuously called them "mercenaries" (which they were; they had fought for the French in colonial wars) and dismissed them. That night about two dozen veterans surrounded Olympio's house and at dawn they killed him. Apparently Nyerere and the other East African leaders learned a lesson from Olympio's death; instead of confronting their mutinous soldiers, they temporized until they could call in the British. Once the troops had arrived, the essential pattern of colonial rule was restored: a civilian administration resting on foreign military force.

Though it is idle to seek political ideology in soldiers holding up governments for money, there were overtones of social revolution in the troubles that led to military intervention in Brazzaville and in Dahomey. In both countries the army takeover was preceded by riots in which labor unions demonstrated against the unemployment and inflation that curse most African capitals. In Dahomey, the rioters shouted "du pain, du travail" and—a sad commentary on the disappointing fruits of independence—"vive la France!"

Brazzaville is a city where many have suffered, and few have benefited, from independence. Corruption and waste were spectacular, and lavish French aid—President Youlou was a faithful client of General de Gaulle—went down the drain. Government funds were wasted on absurd projects like