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plan by the American people. We know to our mortification the final ransom paid for the prisoners with chemicals and drugs dragooned from the American companies by U.S. officials of this administration. We know, to our bewilderment, the dispersal of the refugees; the orders prohibiting Cuban exiles from use of any of our shoreline for attacks on the Castroites and the persistent denial during 1962 by the U.S. Government of the clear evidence that Cuba was being made a major Communist arsenal in this hemisphere. We remember with soaring pride the sudden, dramatic, and courageous recognition of the direct threat to our country posed by a missile armed Cuba; the unequivocal demand on Russia that all surface-to-surface missiles and long-range aircraft be removed from Cuba; that her territory be open to on-the-spot inspection by neutral teams or Red Cross inspectors. We remember the initial success of this program with the announced withdrawal of missiles and aircraft, and with a sinking heart we recognized that the inspections were to be dropped as high U.S. officials stated that Mr. Khrushchev must not be pushed too far. We have seen the building of Cuba as a front line, first-class arsenal and training camp for militant communism; and the arrogant contempt with which they supported the Panamanian riots and then contemptuously cut off our water supply at Guantanamo while we said and did nothing of substance.

After 4 years of Democratic foreign policy, Cuba has been transformed into an island firmly in Communist control; with the second largest arsenal of military weapons in the hemisphere; with around-the-clock Communist propaganda pouring into Central and South America; exporting arms and trained saboteurs to Central and South American countries; convicted by the Organization of American States as guilty of exporting aggression to other countries in this hemisphere; and a training camp for Communist provocateurs active from Venezuela to Ghana, to Gabon, to Zanzibar, to Burma. A record no citizen of this country, regardless of party, can view with pride or satisfaction. The vacillating, wavering inconclusive policy of this administration with respect to Cuba must be changed.

The second plank of that 1960 campaign was devoted to the low prestige of the United States in Europe and in other portions of the world and the need to regain leadership and direction of the free world struggle. This plank was repeated endlessly during the 1960 campaign; and as purported evidence, statements were made that the NATO countries had not accepted U.S. programs for strengthening the Alliance; that the Communists continued to advance in South Vietnam; that the solution to German reunification had not been reached; and that U.S. sanction of U-2 flights over Russia had lost us respect in all countries.

Shortly after inauguration in 1961, the President stated in a worldwide television news conference that we would come to the aid of Laos, a small but strategic country in southeast Asia under attack by the Communists.

Shortly thereafter, we retracted this stated position, advocated a cease fire, actively solicited a coalition government, and forced this upon that defenseless country, with the Communists given the key posts of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. These are the two governmental posts historically used by Communists to take over control of a country. Thereafter, the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred. Then the President met with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna and upon his return to this country stated that Mr. Khrushchev had made no new demands upon him. A short 10 days later, Mr. Khrushchev published a written memorandum

of points and demands submitted at that conference. In August 1961, in violation of all agreements and all decency, the Communists constructed the Berlin wall. A major city and the families in it were divided, and the flood of refugees from Communist East Germany and East Berlin subsided to a slow trickle. The only reaction from the United States was a verbal protest and a speech stating that we would support the remaining half of the city. Nuclear test ban discussions had been continuing and the United States had preserved a moratorium on testing, when suddenly the Soviets undertook a new program of testing, unprecedented in scope and in size of blasts. The United States did nothing. Communist attacks in South Vietnam increased substantially and civil disorders broke out. Despite warnings, the United States took no action to discourage a coup against the Nhu government and the apparent murder of Diem and his brother. Since then, the first government has been overthrown, a military dictator replaced it, and the process of defending against Communist attacks grows weaker. The United States supported the unprepared African nations against our traditional allies, jeopardized the faith of our allies, and released in the United Nations and on the world scene many countries wholly unprepared for self-government.

We supported Sukarno, the militant dictator of Indonesia, in seizing Dutch-held property in West New Guinea. We castigated Portugal for holding Angola and said nothing about India's armed invasion and seizure of Goa from Portugal. We refused to share nuclear competence with France as we have with Great Britain. We reneged on our agreement to supply Great Britain with nuclear air-to-ground missiles, and have recently tried to placate the rapacious Sukarno, who is slaving over newly created Malaysia. Panama is now physically as well as verbally attacking U.S. military personnel, Venezuelan bandits have raided U.S. military quarters, stripped U.S. offices, despoiled the U.S. flag, and even kidnaped a U.S. colonel. Communists led by Cubans in Zanzibar, attacked the U.S. consulate, imprisoned consulate officials, ransacked the premises, and as punishment get recognized by our Democrat regime. A prominent German has summed up our foreign policy activity by the following:

"American foreign policy seems to be hostile to her friends, friendly to the neutrals, and neutral to her enemies."

As the National magazine has said: "America today is going from defeat to defeat in almost every corner of the world."

For 4 years Democrat foreign policy has been based on the principles that communism will evolve into something with which we can live if we do nothing to disturb its leaders; that Khrushchev is the most moderate of Communists and cannot be forced into a corner lest we get someone worse; and that communism thrives amongst the poor and uneducated and hence can be overcome by scattering Yankee dollars. Each of these planks have been demonstrated failures of self-delusions. After 4 years of these policies the free world is in disarray, the NATO Alliance is shattered at the political level, the last strongholds of freedom in Asia are tottering, and communism is on the march in Africa and South America.

Our prestige about which we were so concerned in 1960 is now non-existent and every pip-squeak nation in the world is taking turns first kicking us around and then demanding foreign aid.

It would seem that the worst must be over. To the contrary, the worst was and is still to come. The floodgates of cynicism were opened when the United States,

long the leading exponent of trade and aid barriers with Communist countries, wholly lost its direction. The wheat sales to Russia, negotiated, directed and demanded by the Democrat administration, sales which are subsidized by the American taxpayers and with Communist credit guaranteed by the American taxpayers, have loosened the floodgates and successfully undercut any and all efforts to cut off trade with our enemies. Against our protests, Great Britain has sold 400 buses to Cuba with another 600 on order; four British airliners are being reconditioned for delivery and negotiations are almost complete for delivery to Castro of \$1.4 million heavy road building machinery. France is negotiating for the sale to Castro of \$10 million worth of trucks. Spain is completing plans for the sale of 100 fishing boats and two freighters. Italy is negotiating for an increase in sales and Prime Minister Ishibashi, a leading Japanese advocate of trade with Red China, has not only been given a basis for the renewed trade negotiations between these two countries, but publicly hailed the wheat deal as the "big turning point" in trade with Communist countries. But the most serious reaction was France's opening of trade relations and almost immediate recognition of Red China—Red China, the most aggressive of all Communist nations; the butcher of 18 million of its own citizens, as well as the raper of Tibet; Red China, the power behind the Korean war and responsible for the deaths of so many American and free world soldiers; Red China, the activating agent in the Communist takeover of southeast Asia; Red China, the attacker of India, Quemoy, Matsu, Formosa, and the despoiler of Outer Mongolia; Red China, still branded as an aggressor by the United Nations; still preaching war and terror as national policies; still castigating the leader of the free world; and still preaching universal communism spread by force, revolution and aggression.

It seems apparent that after the last 4 years, American prestige is not merely low, it has totally disappeared; that new policies must be developed and new programs instituted if we are to regain even self-respect; and that future problems must be foreseen and plans developed now. For 4 years those in charge of this administration have been chanting the defects in our system. These defects are now predominant in the minds of many people who do not know our country and our heritage.

For 4 years, recognition of the dangers faced by the free world have been studiously avoided. For 4 years the steady downhill progress of freedom has been overlooked by use of oratory instead of organization; palliatives instead of plans; and forensics instead of foresight. Action is needed now if we are to regain self-respect, stability in foreign fields, opportunity to resist Communist encroachments, and success in future problems.

This fall we will be faced with a fight over admission of Red China to the United Nations. French recognition will add great weight to this annual exercise and there is a very great chance that Red China will be admitted unless the United States takes definite steps now to offset this threat. Certainly admission of Red China to the United Nations would constitute a cynical disregard of the ideal and purpose of the organization and would make membership an award for aggression. Just recently, I was informed by "authoritative sources" in the State Department that the United States will continue its objection to Red China's admission, but that no plans had been made as to our course of action if our objections should be unsuccessful.

A mere outline of the situation we now face after the last 4 years of bumbling, vacillating, inefficient foreign policies indicates clearly that a crossroad is directly ahead. Either we change direction or we continue stumbling and weaving down the dusty road to oblivion.

Positive programs are needed and they are needed now. Many have been made and more will be made, but I would group the overall need for a change under the title "The Will To Live."

1. Announce a new Western Hemisphere doctrine specifically excluding from governmental power in this hemisphere communism or Marxism, whether imposed from without or infiltrated from within.

2. Form as rapidly as possible an English-speaking military and political alliance with announced goals in opposition to Communist aggressions in the world.

3. Start negotiations to create a common market with Canada and announce policies designed to encourage Latin and South American common markets.

4. Create governmentally sponsored training courses in this country for all U.S. personnel desiring to go into governmental foreign service, emphasizing in the process the history, background and culture of the United States and the tactics of the Communist conspiracy, as well as the language, culture, and credo of the country to which each may be assigned. The principal institution under this program should combine the concept of a Foreign Service Academy and the need for a Freedom Academy.

5. Eliminate all U.S. aid and trade to Communist governments and extend trade or aid to the people of those countries only where it is managed, distributed, and organized under direct U.S. supervision.

6. Announce our positive intent to retain Guantanamo Bay and the Panama Canal and the will to use such force as may be necessary for such purpose.

7. Institute a quarantine of Cuba as a health and military menace to the world.

8. Actively encourage the millions of freedom loving people in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas to resist communism.

9. Recognize that the economy of this country is the first and strongest bulwark against communism and institute trade programs and policies which will enhance that economy instead of injuring domestic industries.

10. Stop apologizing for the very factors which have made this country the greatest Nation on earth and make it known that we intend to take such steps as may be necessary to give people existing under Communist terror the hope of living under freedom's banner.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] that the Senate proceed to consider the bill (H.R. 7152) to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I have consulted with some of my colleagues with reference to the address which is about to be delivered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. I ask unanimous consent, despite the rule of germaneness, that the Senator from Connecticut may be permitted to speak for not to exceed 45 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am grateful to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota for his assistance.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

#### SOUTH VIETNAM: LAST CHANCE FOR FREEDOM IN ASIA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if the American people could see 9,000 miles toward the Orient with the eyes of history, they could discern a dark, funnel-shaped cloud spinning on the far horizon and beginning to twist across southeast Asia. Like a natural tornado which leaves in its wake ravaged terrain, shattered buildings, and twisted wreckage, so this political and military tornado menaces the continent of Asia with ravaged nations, shattered peoples, and twisted patterns of history.

#### TODAY WE ARE LOSING

The struggle to preserve South Vietnam, the key to the independence of southeast Asia, is at a critical peril point.

Two South Vietnamese governments have gone down in 4 months; a third is suffering repeated hammer blows at the hands of subversion and intrigue at home, and counsels of despair and surrender from abroad.

This unhappy nation, in the midst of a mortal combat for survival, has had to suffer the traumatic shock of a complete turnover in leadership all the way from the smallest village compounds up to the presidential palace.

The Communist Vietcong guerrillas, following the toppling of the Diem regime last October, have scored a series of impressive military and psychological gains. They now control one-half of the Mekong Delta, the most crucial prize.

France has made an ignominious bid to return to Asia as an influential force, first by recognizing Red China and then by counseling the free world to throw in the towel in South Vietnam, thus adding appeasement to a French legacy in Asia which historically has been characterized by exploitation in peace, capitulation in war, and abandonment of responsibility at the surrender table.

Some prominent American newspapers support France's plea for neutralization and distinguished U.S. Senators are sympathetic to this proposal and publicly question the continuation of military and economic assistance there.

Even our Defense Department added to the flood of contradictory official statements and unofficial news leaks by announcing a substantial withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam by 1965, notwithstanding the worsening mil-

itary situation there and despite the internal disintegration for which we bear a measure of responsibility.

The situation, therefore, is critically grave. We must assume that at this moment, we are losing. Only a supreme effort by the South Vietnamese and an increased effort by the United States will turn back the Communist tide.

#### INDIFFERENCE AND DEFEATISM

Yet, forces are at work within the free world whose effect is to sap our will to win this crucial struggle.

A significant number of Americans, highly placed in private and in Government circles, look upon what is happening in South Vietnam as something of marginal concern to us.

For a long time they engaged in the now familiar luxury of becoming all lathered up over the mote in the eye of an embattled ally while remaining serenely indifferent to the beam in the eye of its aggressor.

They chose for their crusade, not the cause of turning back Communist aggression, but the cause of destroying the Diem regime, which, whatever its faults—and they were vastly exaggerated—was energetically leading the anti-Communist war in South Vietnam.

They had their way. Diem was overthrown and murdered; and the result was a complete catastrophe, a catastrophe that can be measured in terms of political chaos, military defeat, and psychological defeatism. The heralded attempt to liberalize and democratize the South Vietnam Government resulted, as was easily and often predicted, in gun barrel rule by a succession of military juntas, lacking even a facade of legitimacy.

And so the anti-Diem crusaders in this country and elsewhere, apparently shamed by the sorry consequences of their effort, but unwilling to admit their error, have decided that the situation is hopeless and that the only reasonable alternative left is to pull out of Vietnam altogether, or to make a shabby deal to turn this area over to the Communists piecemeal, a process which they call "neutralization."

So I take the floor of the Senate because I feel it is the duty of everyone who believes that South Vietnam must be preserved to counter, each in his own way, the attitudes of indifference and defeatism which threaten to paralyze our national policy.

First of all then, I say that we must preserve the independence and freedom of South Vietnam for exactly the same reason that we must preserve the independence and freedom of West Berlin—because the cause of freedom everywhere in the world, and the efficacy of the United States as the leader of that cause, is squarely on the line in the Mekong Delta.

Let us not join the querulous, faint-hearted chorus of those who always ask the price of victory.

Let us ask, "What is the price of defeat?"

And having soberly assessed the price of defeat, let us determine upon victory, and then we shall find the ways to achieve it.

## THE MORTAL STAKES

What is the price of defeat?

What is primarily at stake is the capacity of the free world to deal with a particular method of aggression that is peculiarly suitable to the Communists.

In Korea, whatever else we failed to accomplish, we did prove that we could effectively deal with open, traditional military aggression; and we have had no major confrontation of that type since Korea.

The Communists are now testing us with a different method, guerrilla warfare, with its accompanying complex of military, psychological, and propaganda tactics. Through this method, they intend to subjugate Asia, and if we prove unable to overcome it in Vietnam, all Asia is within their grasp.

Guerrilla warfare is made to order for the Communists because it enables them to turn their weaknesses into strengths, while it transforms into weaknesses the strengths of its victims.

It puts a premium upon a small investment of men and material, upon stealth, terror, upon limitless patience, upon the avoidance of head-on confrontation with basically stronger foes. It does not require the armament, the logistics and the economic support necessary for other types of combat. And, so long as we submit to its rules, it effectively prevents the forces of freedom from making use of their massive superiority in traditional military power, in air and sea might, and in economic strength.

It takes 20 South Vietnamese soldiers to deal with 1 Vietcong guerrilla. This is no reflection on the South Vietnamese; it is inherent in the type of warfare, as proved true in previous guerrilla conflicts in the Philippines and in Malaya.

And so the North Vietnamese and their Red Chinese backers, stricken with poverty, hunger, economic collapse, and demoralization at home, through the relatively inexpensive device of fielding 20,000 or 30,000 guerrilla soldiers, lightly equipped and able to live off the land, can successfully maintain a war of deadly attrition against a nation superior in every respect and backed by the wealth and power and training of the United States.

They can tie down an army of 400,000 South Vietnamese, half regular soldiers and half militia. They can engage in this riskless warfare indefinitely without jeopardizing their own home base because, up to now, free nations have not treated guerrilla invasion as a kind of war which merits retaliation on the homeland of the aggressor.

Guerrilla warfare enables the Communists, through prolonged terror to gradually destroy the will to resist of the peoples it invades.

It has enabled them to assassinate 1,000 local South Vietnamese officials each month for sustained periods of time.

It has destroyed communications and transportation in large areas of the country.

It has forced a whole population to live in thousands of barbed wire entangled encampments, in constant fear.

It places terrible pressures upon any government, and upon the very conduct of civilized life and thus, if unchecked, threatens with inevitable demoralization the whole fabric of the attacked society.

If the United States cannot deal with this method of aggression in South Vietnam, where we have invested so much in terms of aid and training, where we have developed and equipped an indigenous army with great possibilities and where, therefore, our entire credibility is at stake; if we cannot successfully assist the South Vietnamese to turn back a relatively puny enemy weakened by famine, discontent, and economic collapse, is there any reason to hope that we can succeed in the other countries of Asia?

On the contrary, if South Vietnam falls to guerrilla warfare as North Vietnam did, it is inescapable that the predictions of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy will be borne out and that the nations of Asia will fall to communism like a string of dominoes.

There are those who scoff at what is called the domino theory. I do not think it is anything to be scoffed at. This theory was one of the strong ideas behind the NATO Alliance. We recognized that if one European country fell at a time, they would fall in just that fashion, like dominoes. I think it is even more true in Asia.

If South Vietnam is yielded to the Communists, Laos and Cambodia, already with one foot in the grave, are automatically doomed.

Thailand, comparatively helpless, with its 1,000 miles of frontier adjoining Laos and Cambodia, will then be immediately imperiled.

If Thailand goes down, nothing can save Malaya and Singapore. When Malaya has been subjugated, Indonesia, with its huge Communist movement, will be a pushover.

With communism thus solidly entrenched in the Pacific all the way from the Arctic Circle to Indonesia, the defense of Australia and New Zealand, even with Anglo-American naval assistance, would become hazardous and extremely difficult.

Inevitably the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Formosa will be swept into the maelstrom and the whole Pacific will indeed become a Red ocean.

And this is only part of the cost of defeat in South Vietnam. The freedom of half the world is dependent upon alliances which are based upon confidence in the capacity of the United States to stand up effectively to Communist aggression. What would be the posture of the United States if we permit ourselves to preside impotently over such catastrophes?

Three Presidents of the United States have committed us to the defense and assistance of South Vietnam. If we do not have the will and the capacity to carry out that relatively modest commitment, why should anyone have confidence in us? And why should we have confidence in ourselves?

More than two decades ago, immediately following the Japanese attack upon

the United States and Great Britain, Winston Churchill said to the Congress of the United States:

What kind of a people do they think we are? Is it possible that they do not understand that we shall never cease to persevere against them until they have been taught a lesson which they and the world shall never forget?

The Congress rose in a mighty ovation to those words, representing the unanimous determination of the American people.

Surely we are today opposed by a threat in Asia which, if less spectacular, is equally grave. And surely, once we understand this, our determination will be equal to whatever we are called upon to risk and endure.

## NEUTRALIZATION

There are those who agree openly that the consequences of a Communist victory in South Vietnam would be disastrous, but maintain that the solution is "neutralization" of the contested area.

Even in its most charitable interpretation, neutralization is a philosophic monstrosity.

Heretofore, our concept of collective security has been that if an independent nation were attacked by the Communists, the concert of free nations would assist that nation to defend itself. Now it is contended that the nation which is attacked must be disarmed, must have some sort of coalition government imposed upon it from without, and must have its future existence entrusted to some sort of international supervisory body, over which its enemies exercise a veto power. What is to be done with the aggressor state which attacked the non-aggressor nation has never been made clear.

The only practical experience we have had with this strange concept is in Laos, where the Communists have used it as a cover under which they have continued their piecemeal subjugation. The protective devices that were supposed to maintain peace in this area have proven, as was predicted, absolute nullities.

However, there is another variety of neutralization with which we do have long practical experience. When there is an internal struggle going on within a nation between the forces of communism and liberty, the neutralization concept is applied in the form of a coalition government in which both Communists and non-Communists divide the cabinet posts. We have assisted or acquiesced in the establishment of many such governments, with uniformly tragic results: Through this Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have been totally enslaved by the Communists.

China was lost in part because during the very period when the Nationalist Government could have taken firm control of China it was immobilized and demoralized for a protracted period of time while we sought to impose upon mainland China a neutralized coalition government made up of Communists and non-Communists.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to emphasize the point the Senator from Connecticut has made in regard to so-called coalition governments, in which Communist representatives are included, supposedly in an effort to ease them off, so to speak, from their campaign of subversion and terror. Certainly that does not work; the Senator from Connecticut is absolutely correct. We have learned from the cruel facts of history that either the Communists or the Fascists will turn any cabinet in which they are a part to their own use, and ultimately to the destruction of democratic institutions. That was the record of Hitler in Germany, and it has been the record of every so-called Socialist-Democrat regime which included Communist representatives, and including the experience in Czechoslovakia. If Communists are placed in a cabinet, the Communists insist on having the posts at the head of the ministry of interior, the ministry of labor, or the ministry of transport.

Mr. DODD. Or the ministry of information.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; and that means that if they hold those posts, they can control the secret police and the communications and the labor movement. When the Communists obtain control, as a result of having control of those three posts, the record shows that they take over.

Regardless of one's views on South Vietnam or on any other part of the world, it is a fact that there is no safety in a coalition government; it means slow death, and nothing else.

I thank the Senator from Connecticut for emphasizing this point.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator from Minnesota. His words of approval give me great comfort and encouragement.

It is difficult to discuss neutralization in the context of southeast Asia, because of the vagueness with which the proposition is advanced; but let us try to do so, nonetheless.

If neutralization of the current conflict means that both North Vietnam and South Vietnam should be disarmed and placed under some kind of international supervision which effectively removes both from the cold war, then it is futile and absurd even to discuss it.

It is futile and absurd, because the Communists reject it utterly, openly, and contemptuously, both as an abstract concept and as a practical solution to any conflict in which they are involved. They have specifically and violently condemned it as a solution to the current conflict in Vietnam.

True neutralization can thus be dismissed; it has never been a possibility. Only false neutralization has any chance of being considered.

Under false neutralization, South Vietnam would be disarmed, given a half-Communist government probably, and placed under the so-called protection of some international body which has no substance, and exists only on paper.

The victim of aggression, not the aggressor, is to be neutralized; and this neutralization serves only to delay for a short time complete Communist enslavement.

So let us be candid about neutralization. If we use the term, let us define what we mean by it.

If we mean that both the Communist aggressor and its victim are to be neutralized—and even this would be an injustice on the face of it, since it treats equally the aggressor and the victim—let us immediately dismiss it until we receive some indication that the Communists have totally abandoned their philosophy and their tactics and are willing to entertain a suggestion so contrary to their doctrine and their history.

The above situation would be similar to that of a quarrel between two men, in which one of them was entirely innocent and had not been doing any wrong; if, when he was attacked by a hoodlum, the police rushed up and said, "We are going to punish both of you"—obviously an injustice.

And if we mean by neutralization that only the victim of aggression is to be neutralized, let us call this term what it is—a dishonest substitute for unconditional surrender.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield briefly to me?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I appreciate very much the Senator's comment. It is so important that I believe it should be repeated; and, with the permission of the Senator from Connecticut, I shall do so now:

And if we mean by neutralization that only the victim of aggression is to be neutralized, let us call this term what it is—a dishonest substitute for unconditional surrender.

That is what neutralization in South Vietnam would do at the present time, would it not?

Mr. DODD. It most certainly would. I am happy that the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has risen to call our attention to that point.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. ERVIN. Many years ago I read a statement to the effect that even the best of men cannot have peace unless their wicked neighbors are willing to permit them to do so. Is it not true that up to the present moment the neutralization of a country has resulted, in a sense, in denying that country the power to defend itself, making it subject to the will of its wicked neighbors?

Mr. DODD. In every case. There has been no exception. The most recent has been the case of Laos. That has been the rule in so-called neutralization.

Secretary Rusk recently made an excellent statement on neutralization which put it in its proper perspective.

I applaud, also, the repeated rejections of neutralization by both President Kennedy and President Johnson. The only ends served by treating neutralization as a possibility are to hearten our enemies and dismay and demoralize our friends.

#### THE KEY TO VICTORY

Over and over again we hear it said that the key to victory is the morale of the South Vietnamese people; their belief in their way of life; their willingness to stand up and fight for it.

This is a vast oversimplification. Obviously, the morale of a people under attack is a very important element. But in this war, in which South Vietnam is actually a battleground between the Communist world and the free world, the morale of the people should not be the key to victory or defeat.

The real key is our capacity to respond effectively to the method of guerrilla warfare, supplied and directed from the privileged sanctuary of North Vietnam.

Were it not for this one-sided method of warfare which gives all the initiative to the enemy, which permits hardened guerrilla soldiers to terrorize an entire people for years on end, to turn a whole nation into a series of barbed wire encampments—were it not for all this, the durability of the South Vietnamese would not even be in question.

Armies exist for the purpose of saving civilian populations from having to fight. It is the failure to deal effectively with the military threat that makes the morale and courage of the people a vital element in the war.

Let us be frank. Let us ask ourselves how our own people would stand up in such a contest if they were subjected to ceaseless attack year in and year out, from which their own army seemed powerless to protect them.

Does anyone suppose that under the same conditions the people of North Vietnam would fight to protect their status? Of course not. But that does not prevent their enslavers from successfully carrying forward aggression against their neighbors.

Our task is to change the nature of this conflict.

If we continue to permit the war in South Vietnam to be, in considerable measure, a contest between professional guerrillas against helpless civilians, most certainly we are in grave danger of losing. But what a monumental abdication of responsibility it would be to attribute our defeat, if we suffer such, not to our own unwillingness to change the terms of battle, but to the morale of the people whom we are asking to live in constant danger by day and by night for a period that is apparently to have no end.

Those who are entrusted with the responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam can reverse this situation almost overnight by carrying the struggle to its source: North Vietnam.

The key to victory in South Vietnam is the effective carrying of the war into North Vietnam until the forces of Ho Chi Minh have sustained such terrible attrition that they cease their aggression against the South. How can it be done?

#### A PROGRAM FOR VICTORY

I fully recognize here the limitations of Members of the Senate; I do not present myself as a military tactician. Yet, those who believe that we should

1964

push on in Vietnam—as I do—have as much information at our disposal and as much occasion for speaking up as those who believe we should pull out.

One does not have to be an architect to know that a house is falling down, and one does not have to be a military expert or a foreign service officer to know that our military and political effort in South Vietnam is going badly and that the course of our efforts must be changed if we are to succeed.

Our first task is to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political situation in South Vietnam. There are a number of ways in which we can help to bring this about and I shall cite only three:

First, we must make clear our irrevocable determination to see this struggle through to victory, as long as the South Vietnamese carry their part of the burden.

President Johnson's statement of February 21, and subsequent statements contained just such a commitment and have helped a great deal to stem the confusion and demoralization resulting from statements by other Americans. Secretary McNamara's clear assertions have had a good effect.

On the radio this morning I heard a report of a speech by Secretary McNamara in which he told the people in Vietnam that we would render whatever aid was necessary for as long as it was necessary. I say, good for him.

There must be other statements by the President and by other top American leaders.

There should be statements in the Congress, perhaps congressional resolutions.

There should be pledges by leaders of both parties, until our posture with respect to South Vietnam is as clear as our posture concerning West Berlin.

Second, we should help the present Government of South Vietnam, under General Khanh, to ride out its present difficulties. We have no choice but to support this Government as it is, with its strengths and its weaknesses.

In doing so, we must seek to help it overcome its shortcomings, through persuasion and example, not only for the immediate purpose of strengthening its resistance to communism, but so that it may ultimately become a beacon of justice and progress for all the peoples of southeast Asia.

General Khanh is probably as good a man as can be found in the Vietnamese armed forces, and we may count ourselves fortunate that the second coup was not instigated by a man of less stature. He has a reputation as a capable and aggressive commander and as a careful planner.

According to all the reports I have heard, he is also a man of integrity and strong personal loyalty. He has displayed sound political instinct in retaining the popular Gen. Duong Van Minh as Chief of State and in bringing certain prominent political leaders and intellectuals into his Cabinet; while his energetic visiting to villages and to soldiers at the front suggests that Vietnam may at last have found the benevolent strong man it so sorely needs. His ini-

tial pronouncements, moreover, suggest that he recognizes the imperative need for constructive village programs if the people's loyalty is to be won and retained.

Instead of standing on the sidelines, waiting to see how General Khanh will shape up, we must do everything in our power to help the government of General Khanh stabilize itself and to help the general himself develop the popular image that is essential to effective national government.

We must make it unmistakably clear to the other officers in the Vietnamese Army that we are opposed to any more coups and that we shall support the Government against any attempted coup. This is mandatory because another coup or two and even the Marines will be unable to save South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara has performed admirably in this regard during his visit.

Third, we must use our influence and our aid to assist the new Vietnam Government to build upon a beginning that has already been made in encouraging the development of village democracy; in improving agriculture, education, and public health; and in giving the Vietnamese people the feeling that they have something to fight for and something worth daily risking their lives for. The plan announced by General Khanh last Saturday, if properly implemented through our aid, will mark a significant step forward.

We must help turn the war against North Vietnam.

We must explain to our own people, to our allies, and to the world the reasons which impel us to carry the fighting to the home base of the aggressor.

One method of doing this would be the publication of a white paper on North Vietnamese and Red Chinese aggression in South Vietnam, setting forth in detail all the massive information that has been accumulated about guerrilla infiltration and the smuggling of arms from the North, the evidence that the war is in fact directed from the North, and the evidence of Red Chinese involvement.

We have the truth; and we have the means to disseminate the truth to all who are disposed to believe it. Having made this attempt to solicit favorable world opinion, we must go forward and do what the facts of the situation require of us.

We now come to the critical point of our policy. What should be the nature of our attempt to take the offensive in this war which has been forced upon South Vietnam from the North?

It is, of course, for our military leaders to decide upon the tactics and for our diplomatic leaders to assess the possible repercussions.

But it is the direction of our efforts, not the details, that is my principal concern.

As a minimum, I believe we must permit, train, and assist South Vietnamese guerrilla forces to begin hit-and-run raids along the coast of North Vietnam, directed against targets like marshaling yards, harbor facilities, refineries, factories, bridges, dams, and so on. As ex-

perience and confidence are gained, it should be our goal to assist the South Vietnamese to open up sustained guerrilla operations in North Vietnam and give the Communists a full taste of their own medicine.

Every day that this war continues, the Red regime in Hanoi should be hurt in a very material way. And every day that we allow them to ravage South Vietnam with complete impunity to their home base, we give them an advantage which they should not have and which could be decisive in the war.

That is the minimum.

The maximum operation against North Vietnam would be to build up South Vietnamese air and sea forces so that they could launch air strikes against industrial and military targets and conduct naval blockades against commerce.

We have all read that this alternative is under serious consideration by the administration. We know that action of this kind would be a very bold step and that there are many reasons why any administration would be reluctant to undertake it. But if it is necessary it should be done, and I believe that the Congress and the American people will support this action if our best advice tells us that it is the quickest and most effective way to end the agony of South Vietnam and redeem our commitments in southeast Asia.

Three years ago, upon my return from Laos and South Vietnam, I urged that we not continue a purely defensive war but that we enable the forces of freedom to go over to the offensive. I stated the objectives of such an approach in words which I should like to repeat now:

The best way for us to stop Communist guerrilla action in Laos and in South Vietnam is to send guerrillas in force into North Vietnam, to equip and supply those patriots already in the field; to make every Communist official fear the just retribution of an outraged humanity; to make every Communist arsenal, government building, communications center and transportation facility a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying point for the great masses of oppressed people who hate communism because they have known it.

Only when we give the Communists more trouble than they can handle at home, will they cease their aggression against the outposts of freedom.

I think these words are even more applicable today than they were when I first spoke them 3 years ago.

Finally, I believe that we should make an effort to involve the other nations of the area in the task of keeping South Vietnam free.

As late as April of 1961, the SEATO nations in the immediate area, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan, all favored common action against the Communist menace in Laos. But the British and French were opposed to such action, and we ourselves set on the fence; and the result was that nothing was done.

In the absence of American leadership, SEATO has inevitably become an organization of questionable effectiveness. When I was in the Philippines in May of 1961, Foreign Minister Serano made a



statement to me which I shall never forget. "We are prepared to fight and die with you if necessary," he said, "but we cannot fight without American leadership." Our failure to react to the challenge in Laos is one of the chief reasons for Pakistan's loss of confidence and her consequent erratic behavior.

Given American leadership and given the evidence of our determination to defend southeast Asia, it is not too much to hope that SEATO can be reactivated. Certainly it would be salutary and helpful to have other Asians fighting alongside the South Vietnamese and Laotians, in defense of their common freedom.

Conceivably, France might object to the reactivation of SEATO, now that De Gaulle seems bent on the appeasement of Mao Tse-Tung. But if France should take this stand, then in my opinion she no longer belongs in SEATO, and we should ask for her withdrawal.

#### THE CONTINUING CRISIS

In South Vietnam, as at so many other pressure points around the globe, the American people are being tested as never before, and as no other people have been tested.

In the past our Nation, like other nations, has risen to direct challenges which brought us under open attack and which clearly imperilled our survival.

In such conflicts our danger was obvious, our objective was clear, and our people could throw themselves into a total national effort with confidence that our sacrifices were only temporary and that total victory was attainable and foreseeable.

Such have been the challenges of the past. But the current crisis is not a clear military challenge emanating from definite sources, combatable by traditional means, and subject to total retaliation.

We are challenged on every continent, in every country, by every means, but not directly, not overtly. It is always some other nation that is under direct attack, and the attack comes disguised in many forms, subversion, infiltration, revolution, espionage, propaganda, psychological warfare, economic warfare, guerrilla warfare, and on and on—war without form, war without limitation, war without end.

It has fallen to us to lead the defense of freedom against this omnipresent but illusory onslaught. And we have undertaken to do so, for our own sake, and for the larger cause of humanity. That we have often failed in individual instances is to be grievously regretted; that we have tried, that we have attempted to mount a many dimensioned global defense equal to the challenge, is to our eternal credit.

Our sons at this hour are stationed in military bases in the farthest and most remote corners of the earth. Our aid missions and Peace Corps units and technical assistance teams are functioning in fourscore nations and more. Our information programs seeking to combat falsehood with truth are operating around the globe. In outer space, in the air, on the land, on the sea, and under the sea we have mounted a tireless de-

fense against the ultimate enemy attack, a defense for ourselves and for all people.

The struggle in South Vietnam is a crucial part of this larger struggle; perhaps the most vital part at the moment because it is the most challenged at the moment.

In the normal course of my duties as a Senator, I have had the privilege of visiting and talking with our American soldiers in South Vietnam just as I have had similarly rewarding experiences in meeting the young men who man our Polaris fleet, and those who go out into outer space in an attempt to insure our predominance even in that remote sphere.

It is in pondering the sacrifices and achievements of these men and in confronting the challenges which have caused them to undertake these tasks that we begin to grasp something of the meaning of being an American in this sixth decade of the twentieth century.

In the early years of our Nation Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine had an exchange which prophetically outlined the course of our history and explained our present posture in the world today. Franklin said, "Wherever freedom is, that is my country." Paine responded, "Wherever freedom is not, that is my country."

This seeming contradiction has been harmonized by the development of our history. There is no free nation which has not had the active and continuing assistance of the United States in the effort to fulfill and defend its liberty. There is no free nation under attack today whose survival is not dependent upon this American involvement. There is no enslaved nation whose hope for ultimate freedom does not rest with us.

Americans of our day realize more completely even than did Franklin and Paine the indivisibility of freedom. To preserve our own freedom we must see to it that the South Vietnamese preserve theirs. That is why we are there. That is why we must continue there until victory is assured.

And that is why Americans of this decade, like their predecessors, are earning a place in history which, in Lincoln's words, "the world will forever applaud and God will forever bless."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD a statement I prepared early in February for the February 17 issue of the Washington Report of the American Security Council.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Washington Report, Feb. 17, 1964]

#### FORMULA FOR VICTORY IN VIETNAM

We are rapidly approaching the moment of truth in southeast Asia. The events of the coming year will, in all probability, decide whether freedom has any future in this strategically vital area, or whether the few free flags that still wave there will all be replaced by the hammer and sickle.

If we minimize the gravity of the situation, if we continue to engage in half-measures, if we permit the Communists to operate from privileged sanctuaries, if we again permit ourselves to become involved in plots

against our allies, then southeast Asia is doomed.

I believe southeast Asia can be saved. But it can be saved only if we are prepared to face up to the facts in all their gravity and ugliness and act with the utmost resoluteness.

There are those who say that the United States is overextended, that we cannot defend Asia as well as Europe, that we must reduce our commitments in southeast Asia, even though this might result in a Communist takeover. I find this proposal as lacking in logic as it is in morality.

For better or for worse, our own fate is intertwined with that of southeast Asia. Indeed, the Communist conquest of the area would produce so serious a shift in the world balance of power, that our very ability to survive would be called into question. Moreover, our prestige is so heavily committed in South Vietnam that if we accept defeat there, or if we accept defeat on the installment plan under the name of neutralization, no nation could in the future place any confidence in America's commitment to its defense.

The gravity of the situation in southeast Asia and the continuing downward spiral of our fortunes there simply do not jibe with the optimistic reassurances of the Department of State.

In Laos, the hard-pressed royalists, now supported by the neutralist forces of Gen. Kong Le, have been forced back from one position after another by a series of limited but carefully calculated offensive actions, initiated by the Pathet Lao forces of Prince Souphannavong. The coalition government triumphantly put together by Mr. Harriman, for all practical purposes does not exist. The Americans have withdrawn from Laos, the North Vietnamese have not. The tripartite supervisory committee has been able to operate in the non-Communist portions of the country; but it has not been able to inspect those areas under Communist control, sometimes because of the obstruction of the Polish member of the committee, more frequently simply because they have been denied access by the Pathet Lao.

In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, himself an anti-Communist, has sadly accepted the inevitability of Communist rule throughout Asia, and has severed relations with Britain and America and terminated their assistance programs. He has been remarkably frank in stating that his only purpose in doing so is to buy a bit more time for himself and his people. There is mounting evidence that the Vietcong has been using his territory for hit-and-run attacks on South Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the war has been going disastrously for our side ever since the overthrow of the Diem government last November 1. The military junta which overthrew President Diem has, in turn, been overthrown, and no one can tell where the damage done to the political stability of the country will end.

Internationally, our position has been undermined by the decision of President De Gaulle to recognize Red China. Perhaps the most single serious consequence of De Gaulle's action is that it may induce a weakening of U.S. policy by emboldening these elements in the Department of State who have always believed that the way out of the southeast Asia crisis lies via coalition governments and neutralization and disengagement. Already some of our pundits and editors are saying that if a brave and staunch anti-Communist like De Gaulle accepts the inevitability of the recognition of Red China and the neutralization of southeast Asia, we might do well to heed his example. Almost without exception, these pundits are opposed to all those things De Gaulle has stood for in Europe. But they do not hesitate to

1964

invoke the authority of his name in pressing for appeasement in southeast Asia.

We shall hear more such opinions and witnesses more such pressures over the coming months.

Against this otherwise bleak background, there is at least one faintly hopeful ray. The new government of General Khanh, although it has still not been able to repair the damage done to the apparatus of administration and command by the overthrow of Diem, appears to be a definite improvement over the first junta. General Khanh has a reputation as a resourceful and courageous commander, and as a careful planner; and it was impossible not to be impressed by the swiftness and smoothness with which he executed his coup. All the news indicates that he has taken power firmly into his own hands and that he is shaping up as the wise and benevolent strong man his country so desperately needs. General Khanh's reputation for personal loyalty should be a definite asset, in his relations with his fellow officers and in his relations with us.

He has shown his political astuteness in retaining the popular Gen. Duong Van Minh as head of state. Although the generals guilty of plotting with the French have been imprisoned, there has been none of the wholesale dismissals and reshuffling of commanders that characterized the military junta. And whereas the junta had been foolish enough to give all key posts to the so-called southerners, General Khanh, himself a northerner, has wisely distributed his posts between people coming from the north, south, and center.

To add to all this, Khanh seems to have the political instinct and gregariousness of an American presidential candidate, and an ability to move from one point to another on the fighting fronts that reminds one of the way Mayor La Guardia played the role of inspector-general in New York. In short, everything about Khanh looks good. In him Vietnam may well have found a man capable of unifying and leading its diverse peoples. Let us hope that we will give him our unstinting support, that we will do our utmost to help him develop the national image essential to the task of leadership, that we will let it be known that we stand by this government, and that we will use all our influence to discourage any new plots or coups. For the fact is that Vietnam cannot afford more coups. Another two or three coups and even the American marines would not be able to save South Vietnam.

The firming up of the Khanh government is the first task in any formula for saving southeast Asia. In helping to firm it up, I hope we will not insist on a dilution of authority, in the name of democracy, because no civil war can be successfully prosecuted without a strong government.

Second, it is essential that we let the world know in unequivocal terms that we will not abandon southeast Asia, that there will be no neutralization of Vietnam, and that we will have no part of a conference to neutralize Cambodia.

Third, by way of preparing the ground for a political and military counteroffensive, the Government of South Vietnam should be encouraged to bring out a white paper incorporating all the massive evidence that the Vietcong guerrilla war is not of indigenous origin, but has been planned, armed, organized, and led by the agents of Ho Chi Minh. Similarly, the anti-Communist elements in the Laotian coalition should be encouraged to prepare a white paper detailing the repeated violations of the cease-fire and of the terms of the Geneva Treaty by the Pathet Lao and the evidence of the continuing presence of North Vietnamese forces in Laos.

Fourth, having given these facts to world opinion, we should then unleash the South Vietnamese and put an end to the one-sided set of rules under which the war in

South Vietnam has heretofore been conducted. Up until now, the war has been fought entirely on the territory of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Army has had to spread its forces thin to protect bridges and railways and powerplants and other installations against territory attacks. The North Vietnamese have operated under no such penalty. Not a week goes by without the murder of several hundred South Vietnamese village leaders and local officials by the Vietcong. But the political commissars in the North have been able to carry out their work of political control and repression in absolute safety.

The situation in Vietnam, indeed, provides a classic example of our tacit acceptance of the Communist ground rule that the cold war and hot wars, both, must always be fought on the territory of the free world and never on the territory of the Communist world.

We must put an end to this imbalanced situation. Ho Chi Minh must be made to pay a penalty for his aggression in the south. Sustained guerrilla warfare may be difficult to conduct in a country under the iron control of the Communists. But North Vietnam, because of its long coastline, is exceedingly vulnerable to hit-and-run raids from the sea. The minute the South Vietnamese are given the green light to mount such raids, the minute they start blowing up bridges, and dams and generators and factories in the north and ambushing patrols and political commissars, it will have an immediate impact on the conduct of the war in the south.

Fifth, Ho Chi Minh conducts his activities in the south under the ostensible auspices of a front for the liberation of South Vietnam, which maintains representatives in 15 countries. There are capable and determined men among the refugees and defectors from the north who would like nothing better than to be granted permission to set up a front for the liberation of North Vietnam from the tyranny of communism. We must encourage, not inhibit, the creation of such a front, committed to a program of liberation and social reform and we must provide it with the necessary propaganda facilities.

Sixth, it can be taken for granted that the Communists will again attack in Laos. We must respond to the next attack by announcing that we consider the Geneva agreement to be abrogated, by encouraging General Phoumi and Gen. Kong Le to counterattack, and by giving them the necessary support. We should make it our strategic objective to assist the anti-Communist forces in securing at least the southern half of the country, including the Laotian panhandle through which the Ho Chi Minh is infiltrating men and supplies into South Vietnam. No measure we could take would do more to take the pressure off South Vietnam or would have greater psychological impact throughout Southeast Asia than the liberation of Tchepone, the chief Communist base in the panhandle.

Senator THOMAS J. DODD,  
Guest Editor.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am grateful to the Senator for making so clear our responsibilities in the cause of freedom. We have a real cause today for which to work and to fight, in assisting the South Vietnamese in the Far East.

Yesterday, we listened to a speech on the floor of the Senate by another distinguished Senator, who took a contrary position to the one the Senator from Connecticut has taken today.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I personally believe that we should help them in every way we can so long as we are advancing the cause of freedom by doing so.

While the Senator feels at the present time that we have this cause, and that we should go forward with it, ultimately we must make decisions that may have to be changed because the situation changes and new factors of the different facts involved are introduced. Our role in South Vietnam is related, not only to our relationships with the South Vietnamese but also with other countries in the Far East and in the world, where our prestige may be involved. Does the Senator feel that that is a correct interpretation of the remarks he has made?

Mr. DODD. Exactly so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has expired.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Connecticut may proceed for an additional 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 15 additional minutes.

Mr. DODD. I believe we are faced with a situation in which we have no alternative. My view is that if we should back out, or give up in South Vietnam, all of Asia ultimately would be lost; and I do not believe that fateful day would be too far away. That is, of course, of the gravest importance.

But besides that, I believe the rest of the world would lose confidence in us. Whether we like it or not, we are the leaders of the free world. I believe it is true, as I have tried to say that there is not a free country in the world that we have not helped. There is not an enslaved country in the world whose hope for freedom does not rest with us. We have friends and we have allies who help us; nevertheless, it rests with us. If we pull out, if we take the advice of those whom I call "the fainthearted ones," I believe one disaster after another will attend us, and we shall face a time and an hour when we shall be alone. There will be no allies to help us and we shall face the accumulated might of a foe the like of which has never been seen on earth.

I know it is much easier to say, "Let us get out."

All of us are conscious of the sacrifices of American boys there.

I have four sons, and all of them are of military age. Two are in the Army Reserve. I do not want my boys in a war any more than I want the boys of others to be in a war. But I believe the surest way to be certain that my sons and the sons of others will not be involved in a war is to do what is required of us, and to do it now. If we do not, our sons will be in that war, and what will be worse, the chances of their surviving it will be greatly reduced.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. What we must do, if the Senator will permit me to comment, is to accomplish our objective of furthering the cause of freedom. We must use methods which we believe will be most helpful in attaining that ob-

jective. That is what we are doing today in many places.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. So long as we maintain our prestige, so long as the opportunity of achieving our objective exists we should go forward. Does the Senator from Connecticut believe that to be a fair statement?

Mr. DODD. Yes; I believe the Senator from Massachusetts is absolutely correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator for his comment.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield for an observation?

Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield.

Mr. ERVIN. I commend the able and distinguished senior Senator from Connecticut for making a most illuminating speech. The speech should receive the consideration of the public, as well as the consideration of those who make our military and diplomatic policy in southeast Asia.

I believe the Senator has expounded in most eloquent fashion what Kipling said in a beautiful poem he wrote at the beginning of the First World War, the substance of which was that free men can keep their freedom in this precarious world only by keeping their hearts in courage and in patience and by lifting up their hands in strength.

The Senator's able address has been a fine exposition of the same thought.

Mr. DODD. I am very grateful to the Senator.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may make an observation on what the Senator from North Carolina has said?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If we were to agree to neutralization in South Vietnam today, as the Senator from Connecticut has said, we would be agreeing to neutralization by only one side, with no commitment by the other side. That would really lead to defeat.

Mr. DODD. I believe that is correct.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Connecticut for what he has brought before the Senate today. We must remain strong and do everything that we possibly can to help South Vietnam at this time. If we do not remain firm, our allies will become weaker and weaker. If that were to happen, of course, it would be harder and harder for us to remain there. We must stay there under all the circumstances at the present time. If we do not, it will appear to the world that we are a very weak nation.

Mr. DODD. I believe the Senator has stated the reality of the situation. I am grateful for his comments.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I commend the Senator for his forthright statement. This kind of debate is always helpful. Neutralization, as has been indicated, cannot be very helpful; it could be detrimental, unless it were applied to the entire peninsula. I shall not go into a detailed discussion of the Senator's address. I claim no

expert knowledge in this area. However, these debates are helpful, and I am sure the administration welcomes such discussions. We must have a national consensus on this subject if our policy is to succeed.

Mr. DODD. I agree with the Senator. That is one of the reasons for my remarks today.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senator from Connecticut has discussed our problems in Vietnam on the basis that he has in the course of his distinguished speech to the Senate.

I do not necessarily agree with every aspect of the matter, as he discussed it. However, the fundamental thrust of his remarks demonstrates two things:

First, a need to expose the situation to the view of the American people. In that regard, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]—who has discussed this matter with the Senator from Connecticut and with me and with other Senators—also is rendering a service in presenting his point of view. Certainly the people should know the points on both sides; and, as Members of the Senate, it is our duty to make that analysis available to the people.

Second, although I do not necessarily agree with all the points the Senator from Connecticut has made in the course of his speech, certainly its fundamental thrust is that our people should understand that the great stake we have in South Vietnam—namely, to keep that country from going over to communism—is fundamental. The casualties which already have occurred there are tragic; but it is clear that our choice now is between those casualties and perhaps much greater casualties later on—including the possible casualty of the loss of freedom there.

In that respect, Mr. President, the speech of the Senator from Connecticut is most valuable; and I am grateful to him.

Mr. DODD. I thank the distinguished senior Senator from New York.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, is there any time remaining under the unanimous-consent agreement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes remain.

#### THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION IN VENEZUELA

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, today is an important day for those in this hemisphere who believe that political liberty, social progress, and economic development go together. Today is an important day for those who wish to see a successful example of the Alliance for Progress at work. For today in Venezuela a new President will be inaugurated, the first constitutional President in Venezuelan history to succeed another constitutional President. Today President-elect Raul Leoni will succeed Romulo Betancourt as President of Venezuela. President Leoni was chosen in a free election in December, an election held despite continuous violent harassment by Communist and Castroite groups. His victory, together with the

impressive showing of COPEI, the partner of Action Democratic in the Betancourt coalition, is assurance that Venezuela will continue the same enlightened progressive domestic policy and pro-Western foreign policy that characterized the Betancourt government.

The successful peaceful transition from one freely chosen government to another is a triumph for the principles underlying the Alliance for Progress, a triumph for the Kennedy policy in Latin America. And no one would have been more pleased today to witness this triumph of Venezuelan democracy than our late President John F. Kennedy.

The election which brought President Leoni to the Presidency showed that the people of a wealthy, rapidly developing country like Venezuela support the political parties whose objectives and programs are virtually identical to the aims of the Alliance for Progress. But if the new Venezuelan Government is to have a chance to continue the work of the Alliance for Progress in Venezuela, it must have the firm support of its allies in this hemisphere. It must have—and I believe it will have—the firm support of the United States under President Johnson, just as President Betancourt enjoyed the full support of President Kennedy. As a new government, it should merit special consideration from other republics in this hemisphere for protection against Communist subversion directed and financed from Cuba.

The report issued last month by the OAS makes it indisputably clear that Cuba has smuggled arms to terrorists in Venezuela. It has presented photographic evidence of the plan and the plot to subvert the Betancourt government at the time of the election in December 1963.

I wish my position on this subject to be crystal clear. Our national policy should be one of clear, unequivocal support for taking the necessary steps to cut off arms shipments from Cuba to Venezuela. We can no longer condone Cuba being an arsenal for terrorism, revolution, and chaos. It is about time, instead of merely worrying about governments of friendly countries being able to stay in power and resist violence, that we choke off the source of that violence.

We have stated before that we will not permit the Castro regime to subvert the democratic governments of its neighbors through armed aggression, whether covert or open. We have repeatedly stated this as our policy. Today we have a clear, carefully documented case of arms shipments into Venezuela. The Venezuelan Government has presented convincing photographic evidence of the smuggled arms shipments. The OAS report has confirmed the accuracy of the Government's allegations.

What is our response to the situation? I believe we should mean what we have been saying. We should take all steps necessary to prevent further arms shipments from Cuba into Venezuela. And I mean all steps—whatever steps are required in terms of naval operations, or any form of activity to stop these arms from crossing over into the Caribbean areas and Latin America.