

Inter-American Affairs; the U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress; and the Special Adviser to the President. The President said:

We expect to speak with one voice on all matters affecting this hemisphere, and Mr. Mann will be that voice.

In the past, the conduct of our policy in Latin America has suffered from a chorus of different and often discordant voices. There was no office, no agency, no man—below the President or the Secretary of State—who could speak with authority for all our agencies—financial, cultural, technical, and diplomatic—to the often confused governments of Latin America.

I remember when I visited Tom Mann in 1961, while he was our Ambassador to Mexico, he was distressed by the division of authority—especially with regard to the application of aid funds—which tended to work at cross-purposes with our Nation's political objectives. To Tom Mann's way of thinking, politics and economics are indivisible in today's world, and they must go hand in hand in the conduct of our foreign policy.

Mr. President, I heartily approve of this approach. In a speech on the Senate floor on August 16, 1958, I strongly urged a change in our existing divided policy and the adoption of the centralized authority approach. But then, my words went unheeded; so it was a source of satisfaction to me that President Johnson, within a few weeks after assuming office, clearly recognizing the need for such centralized authority, brought about the reorganization within the Latin American Division of the Department of State which funneled power for immediate and final decisions on both political and economic matters into the capable and experienced hands of Tom Mann.

Tom Mann has—and will continue to have—many difficulties in dealing with the complex and challenging problems of countries that are chronically bedeviled by political instability, social injustices, illiteracy, poverty, and a population explosion.

But he is qualified for his delicate and difficult job, for he is a man who is thoroughly American, deeply committed to the heritage and ideals of the United States, and intimately familiar with Latin American affairs and, most importantly, Latin American thinking. Tom Mann has spent almost all of his 22 years in Government service in positions, both here in the United States and abroad, directly connected with Latin America.

He was a U.S. representative at the Chapultepec Conference, which established the bases for hemispheric defense later incorporated in the Rio Treaty of 1947.

Later, as Ambassador to Mexico, Mann earned high praise when he successfully negotiated the Kennedy-Johnson settlement of the Chamizal dispute between Mexico and the United States. In this historic settlement, the United States ceded back to Mexico a long-disputed portion of the city of El Paso, which Mexico lost during a shift of the Rio

Grande River. The return of the Chamizal to Mexico signaled the willingness of a great power to rectify its past errors in policy, and Mann's name will always be identified with this treaty by a grateful Mexican people.

Behind Secretary Mann's indisputable record of achievement lies a sure and comprehensive understanding of Latin American reality. He recognizes that this area cannot be treated as a package deal. Each of the 20 nations south of the border is a distinct entity; each has its own heritage, traditions, and problems. Each must be treated accordingly. As Mann himself says:

Cultures, conditions, and problems vary from country to country, and exact conformity is neither practical nor desirable. Each country has to be studied as an individual case with individual idiosyncracies and approaches.

Tom Mann's sensitivity toward the many-sided Latino is facilitated by his fluent knowledge of Spanish. This all-too-unusual linguistic ability has enabled him to grasp the hidden implications behind the sometimes elaborate Spanish phraseology. In tradition-minded Latin America, where the highest premium is placed upon dignidad, where the maintenance of face is an ingrained social moré, frankness is often mistaken for boorishness and frequently creates the embarrassments and occasionally tragic misunderstandings that have plagued our lesser equipped envoys. Mann is keenly sensitive to these cultural subtleties.

Thus, while he considers himself a pragmatist and takes a realistic approach in his dealings with Latin Americans, he is careful to gear it to their cultural framework. This primary emphasis on a correct tactical approach, and his firm adherence to his own motto "Lo Cortez No Quita Lo Valiente"—"Courtesy is not inconsistent with valor"—have been important intangibles in enhancing the effectiveness of our Latin American policies.

The first major crisis in this hemisphere to test the Johnson-Mann team was the explosive dispute with the Republic of Panama. Significantly, this was the first major foreign policy crisis to face the Johnson Administration and was therefore of special concern and interest to the world at large. Everyone watched to see how our new President would respond in this difficult situation. President Johnson promptly sent Tom Mann, along with then-Army Secretary Cyrus Vance, to discuss the situation with Panama's Chief Executive, Roberto Chiari. The story of the protracted negotiations which led to the final restoration of normal and friendly relations without jeopardy to our position, our legal rights, or our continued use of the canal needs no detailed retelling here. What is of the utmost significance, however, is that the United States firmly but politely refused to accept any preconditions to the resumption of our relations or our negotiations with the Republic of Panama.

Yes, our stand was firm, but it was just. We did not shoot from the hip, nor did we permit others to shoot their way into

the negotiating room. President Johnson and Tom Mann indicated clearly that the United States would negotiate fairly and forthrightly, on an equal footing. They did not adopt the false position, as some of our own people suggested, of assuming that because we were big, because we were strong, we were somehow wrong.

Rather, understanding that it is not in the Latin temperament to admire a nation that would capitulate to those who slap it in the face, the Johnson-Mann team used skilled diplomacy to calm a dangerous conflict without compromising our basic rights.

In short, they maintained our dignidad while remaining simpatico.

If the world learned from our response in Panama that we will be firm in the right, it later learned, in April of this year, that firmness does not mean inflexibility.

Take the case of Brazil. I recall our concern a few months ago when it appeared likely that the Brazilian giant, with its 70 million people and untold natural resources, would be carried into the Communist camp by the demagogic and Communist-oriented Joao Goulart. Such an occurrence would have been catastrophic for the cause of freedom in this hemisphere and, indeed, throughout the world. Had Brazil gone Communist, it would have become the Red Pied Piper of the hemisphere, working with Castro to lead the other Latin American nations into the Communist camp.

But the Christian and democratic elements in Brazil were not prepared to accept such a fate. At the risk of bloody civil war, they deposed Goulart, ousted the Communists from their midst, and reestablished a democratic, fiscally responsible government in April of this year.

I am proud to say that the Johnson-Mann team did not hesitate in extending its full moral and material support to the new constitutional Government of Brazil. It quickly tailored policy to the new developments. On June 24, the United States, through the Alliance for Progress, granted a \$50 million loan to Gen. Humberto Castello Branco's government to help to ease Brazil's financial crisis. At the same time, the payment of much of Brazil's outstanding long-term debt was renegotiated.

As President Castello Branco, in an eloquent address to the graduating class of the Brazilian Foreign Service Academy on July 31, 1964, pointed out, his government and his country have made a fundamental commitment and have declared their cultural and political loyalty to the democratic system of the Western World. And as our actions demonstrated, the United States of America stands ready to help them fulfill their commitment.

Undoubtedly, the Brazilian revolution is one of the great anti-Communist victories of our time. It represents an emphatic repudiation by a free people of Communist totalitarianism. It has significantly bolstered the ground swell of resentment against Castro-communism which is sweeping the Americas.

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I wish to say, too, that the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], who is necessarily away from the Chamber today on official business, was instrumental in evolving and establishing these safeguards which have proved to be so practical and sound.

I wish to underscore, too, the cooperation that we have had from the armed services, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other related agencies of Government. They have cooperated toward carrying out these safeguards in a fine way.

The other members of our subcommittee, the Senator from Maine [Mr. SMITH] and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] could not be present in the Chamber at this moment, but they have had briefings on this subject, and they have been interested in it.

I see that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], a member of the subcommittee, is present. I know he is interested. I am glad that he is in the Chamber at this time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield.

Mr. THURMOND. I wish to commend the able Senator from Mississippi for the great work he has done in connection with the subject referred to in the report he has made to the Senate today. I have had the pleasure of working with him in the Preparedness Subcommittee for several years. It has been a very fine experience to be with him on the subcommittee.

I should like to propound to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi a few questions concerning what appears to be the one outstanding inadequacy in the administration's implementation of the safeguards which were promised as an inducement to the Senate to ratify the Moscow Treaty.

First, is it not true that the Preparedness Subcommittee found, and so reported to the Senate, that one of the greatest disadvantages to our defense effort which would result from the treaty was the impairment of the U.S. ability to test for weapons effects?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; the Senator is correct. That is what we called, I believe, the soft area or the soft spot. That is the most difficult area in the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. THURMOND. Is it not a fact that not one underground test solely for weapons effects has been conducted by the United States since the ratification of the treaty?

Mr. STENNIS. There have been some tests which involved weapon effects experiments. This phase of the safeguards has been most difficult and the slowest in getting started. It should be emphasized, in fairness, that it is a very difficult area. We found, too, that they have begun to move, and it is believed they are now on the way. We have had underground tests to develop weapons, but the effect on weapon systems is what the Senator has in mind and about which he is concerned. We are continuing our surveillance and hope that that part of the program will move faster.

Mr. THURMOND. Is it not also true that the Defense Department has still not completed its personnel reorganization and staffing which were planned to expedite weapons effects testing for which the Department of Defense is responsible?

Mr. STENNIS. Generally, that is true. To get the right man in the right place and to implement this kind of program has proven to be very difficult. Some progress has been made in that field, and it is believed that the efforts will continue.

Mr. THURMOND. My last question is this: Is it not also true that the \$22.6 million requested by the Department of Defense for funding the testing in fiscal year 1965 is clearly inadequate to finance a vigorous program of weapons effects testing, and is inadequate even to finance the programmed underground testing for weapons effects?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi does not have the exact figure in mind at this time.

I understand that they are able to draw funds from other sources by reprogramming and otherwise. I know that the Appropriations Committee intended that there would be no lack of funds if they should be needed.

I know that we made inquiry along these lines.

Even though I cannot give the Senator a figure that I could stand on firmly as to the total, I believe we have arranged for the funds to be available.

Mr. THURMOND. I know the Senator's generous interest in this matter. I wish to commend him for his work in protecting our national security.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator's assurance. That assurance is backed up by deeds. The Senator has been very helpful in the past. I know he will continue to be so in the future. He has a very thorough knowledge of the subject matter.

I yield the floor.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it adjourn to meet at noon on Monday next.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PRESENT CONDITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, since the dark days of the Cuban missile crisis, we have witnessed in Latin America a breakthrough of brilliant sunlight.

What was, just 2 years ago, an ominous and threatening area has quickly undergone a metamorphosis and is now entering that bright future historians promised.

Some of the steps in this remarkable change—such as the April revolution in Brazil and the recent OAS sanctions against the Castro regime in Cuba—have been more dramatic than have others. But these and the others, which I shall

shortly cite, have all served to further the cause to which our Nation has dedicated itself in this hemisphere; that is to say, the establishment of social justice and economic prosperity within independent, enlightened, and humane political frameworks.

This is a great cause, a noble cause, rooted in our devotion to the cherished democratic ideals, and to the moral precepts for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which inspired our independence and guided our growth.

It is shared by the people of this hemisphere and has the greatest meaning for all of us, because it constitutes a strong and enduring bond between our Nation and the nations of Latin America.

One of President Johnson's first acts upon moving into the Presidency was to make it unmistakably clear that Latin America is of major concern to him. He quickly and vigorously recommitted this Nation to a defense of the Western Hemisphere and to a continuation of the noble goals and programs of the Alliance for Progress.

In his first major address to Congress, the President said:

Let all the world know, and none misunderstand our determination to strengthen freedom in the Americas.

He subsequently reiterated this pledge on January 8, 1964, in his State of the Union message, when he said:

We must become better neighbors with the free states of the Americas, working with the councils of the OAS, with a stronger Alliance for Progress, and with all the men and women of this hemisphere who really believe in liberty and justice for all.

He stated this Nation's commitment to Latin America again on March 16, when he spoke to the Ambassadors of the Organization of American States; again, on April 20, in an address to the membership of the Associated Press; again, on May 11, at the White House to Latin American Ambassadors and to the leaders of the Alliance for Progress; but he expressed it most eloquently in a letter of last December 15, when he said:

Next to keeping the peace—and maintaining the strength and vitality which makes freedom secure—no work is more important for our generation of Americans than our work in this hemisphere.

President Johnson has said and done a great deal in connection with this area. He has put his personal stamp on many aspects of our policies there. He couples compassion and sympathetic understanding with unquestioned firmness in dealing with problems affecting our national interests in that area.

But nothing better shows the President's understanding of the situation in Latin America, nor is there a better demonstration of his judgment of men, than his appointment of Thomas C. Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. This was the first major appointment of the Johnson administration.

It was of great significance because it was a departure from previous practice in that it vested in one person, Tom Mann, complete authority over all three Latin American bureaus: the Bureau of

From time to time we will give further reports to the Senate on the facts developed during the course of our surveillance.

One additional word. A great deal of work has been done by an added member of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Col. Glenn Smith, who is very conversant in this field and who has a background of training and knowledge with the Army and with several other agencies. He has done a remarkable job in the last 6 or 8 months for us. Our conclusion and report are based in large part upon his excellent and fine work.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts, who has taken a special interest in this matter and has given much attention to it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I merely want to add a few words. First, I commend the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, who, as chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, has directed the efforts of the staff in maintaining a watchful surveillance over the implementation of these safeguards by the executive agencies involved. The chairman of the committee has done a responsible and thorough job.

It has been almost a year since the Senate voted to give consent to the nuclear test ban treaty, by which the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater would be denied to those nations which would agree to be bound by its terms.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of becoming a party to the treaty were fully discussed and properly identified in the debate immediately preceding ratification on September 24, 1963. Although the provisions of the treaty would restrict us somewhat in the full military application of our nuclear technology, nevertheless the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended that the treaty be approved—an approval, however, that was conditioned upon the vigorous implementation of the treaty safeguards which were considered to be essential.

As the chairman of the subcommittee pointed out, those safeguards were four in number.

Underground testing is perhaps one of the most difficult of the safeguards to carry out and further our knowledge of advanced nuclear technology, but we are making progress on it.

Mr. STENNIS. Particularly, the effects tests which affect our ballistic missile systems. These are as important as are weapon development tests.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. One of the points that concerned us when the question of voting on the treaty was before us, was the matter of maintaining our nuclear laboratories. That has gone forward, satisfactorily from the testimony that has been given to us. The personnel there have been maintained to a better degree than we had thought they could be maintained. The people have stayed on. Their work is going on.

We are informed that perhaps the readiness to test in the atmosphere has not gone on quite as well and that we are not as ready as we had hoped to be; but that phase is going forward.

Finally, improving our detection system is difficult, but we believe progress has been made in that field.

I commend the chairman of the committee and the whole committee, including the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], and others, upon their commendable interest in seeing that these four safeguards are vigorously maintained in order to have our support of the treaty effective, in the interest of preparedness and readiness and security for our country and peace in the world.

I thank the Senator from Mississippi for making his statement.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. I think he has succinctly stated the points involved, the work of the subcommittee, and our expectations for the future.

I am glad now to yield to the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] who is quite conversant in this field and who has shown an interest in this subject for many years.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I have the honor to serve on the committee of which the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] is the chairman, and the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] the ranking member. It is a privilege to serve on a committee that has the type and character of staff the chairman has built up. Typical of the way we operate is that when we get into a particularly technical subject of this character, where it is relatively difficult for laymen to understand the scientific details, the chairman gets someone comparable to Colonel Smith, in this instance, one thoroughly conversant with the technical problems involved.

Without exaggeration, this committee could be the most important committee of its kind in the country today.

When the question came up as to whether we should have or should not have a nuclear test ban treaty, for many months we discussed that problem; and later the Senate ratified the treaty. However, anyone who has read the Record knows that the ratification was made with reservations—the four points the able chairman of the committee brought up this morning.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I shall be glad to yield in a moment.

Those of us who have had some experience in this field know the apprehension that comes into the minds and hearts of many, including the fighting forces, when they realize that a weapons breakthrough has been made by a possible adversary in the technological field.

We all know about the first use of gas in World War I.

During the Battle of Britain, it is fair to say that if it had not been for a technological breakthrough in the radar field, through which they were able to put

radar on Beau fighters, the Germans would have had largely a free hand over Britain at night, and possibly won the Battle of Britain.

It is also interesting to note that radar was discovered on about the same day by three different countries—England, the United States, and Japan.

Therefore, followup work of this character, properly supervised by a committee of this character, is essential to the security of the country.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor I can remember Admiral Davidson telling me that we did not know the Japanese had hundreds of Zero fighters. For many weeks and months they gave us a bad time.

Later the British and all the rest of us were greatly upset at inauguration by the Nazi of the V-1 buzz bombs. If it had not been for a lucky picture taken of Peenemunde, the later second generation missile, the V-2—the first ballistic missile in world history—this new weapon, a clear technological breakthrough, might have changed the course of World War II, or at least prolonged it.

I again wish to commend the able Senator from Mississippi for the care he takes in recalling the warnings the military made at the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the signing of the test ban treaty. One cannot imagine anything more important to the future of the country than the work being done, as outlined in the able address he has made on the floor today, as emphasized by the able senior Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator has emphasized the fact that the Senate ratified the treaty and gave its approval to it. I know that the Senator agrees with me that the reason or the underlying foundation, for such approval was the fact that the four military conditions were put on and we wanted to insure their implementation. Does the Senator agree that the four conditions which were made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff really assured the ratification of the treaty?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Without reservation. Speaking for myself, I would not have voted for the treaty if it had not been for these four recommendations, and am confident my able friend from Massachusetts would not have voted for it either. Nor do I believe a majority of the Senate would have voted for it without the four points in question. Therefore I think their emphasis is of significance.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Missouri for his fine remarks and his advice and counsel. As in many other matters, they have proven themselves highly valuable and effective in the subcommittee's work generally, and particularly in connection with the test ban hearings and the planning and carrying out of the surveillance, as well as our findings on it.

of the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in the last war. This means that just one of these modern tactical bombs has a force equivalent to 100,000 tons of TNT.

There are other less powerful tactical nuclear weapons in Europe today—antidemolition weapons, air defense weapons, etc.—with a force of 18 kilotons, or approximately the force of the Hiroshima bomb, yet he proposes that these tactical nuclear weapons be “thought of in terms of conventional weaponry” and controlled not solely by the President but by the NATO commander.

The Republican candidate has also been concerned that much of the Nation's nuclear power would be lost by 1970 unless we produced new delivery systems. He has charged that “deliverable nuclear capacity may be cut by 90 percent,” in the next decade under present plans, and he has issued detailed figures to sustain his point.

Yet the odd thing about this is that his own friend, Gen. Curtis LeMay, gave him accurate figures on this problem, which he ignored in favor of his own inaccurate figures.

There is a powerful case to be made against the foreign and defense policies of this administration, but Senator GOLDWATER is spoiling it by shooting from the lip.

#### THE OTHER QUESTIONS

The real question about Cuba is not, as GOLDWATER suggests, that we didn't go far enough at the Bay of Pigs but that we got involved in it against our treaty commitments in the first place.

The telling charge in Vietnam is not, as GOLDWATER implies, that the administration is too timid in attacking the Communist supply lines, but that it plunged into a war on a misconception and has misjudged the problem and misled the country most of the time ever since.

The really important question about the atomic power of this Nation is not, as GOLDWATER asserts, that it is declining, but that it is piling up at astronomical cost long after we already have enough explosive power to incinerate the entire human race several times over, and contaminate the earth in the bargain.

GOLDWATER is certainly right on one thing: foreign policy, as he said this week, is an issue and should be debated, but he is not likely to benefit from that debate unless he gets the available facts and asks the right questions.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11380) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1234, proposed by Mr. McCARTHY (for himself, Mr. JAVITS, and Mr. HUMPHREY) as a substitute for the so-called Dirksen-Mansfield Amendment No. 1215.

Debate is in order on the amendment, but, under the unanimous-consent agreement entered into, a vote thereon is not in order until 2:30 p.m. September 15.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY SAFEGUARDS

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I should like to report to the Senate on the activities of the Preparedness Investigat-

ing Subcommittee regarding the implementation of the nuclear test ban treaty safeguards. The Senate will recall that last year the subcommittee held extensive hearings on the military aspects and implications of our various nuclear test ban proposals. The latter portion of the hearings focused on the treaty subsequently ratified by the Senate.

During the course of these hearings, several of the 24 witnesses heard, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed a need for positive action on the part of the United States which would tend to reduce to a minimum the adverse effect of the test ban treaty. These various expressions achieved a formal status during the testimony of the Joint Chiefs when their support of the limited treaty was conditioned on the effective implementation of some safeguards. Subsequently, on a motion by the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], unanimously adopted by the subcommittee and approved by all the members of the Committee on Armed Services, assurances on safeguards implementation were received from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Later, the late President Kennedy gave similar assurances to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.

The four treaty safeguards are:

First. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future.

Second. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and insure the continued application of our human scientific resources to these programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

Third. The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union.

Fourth. The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements.

The Senate will also recall that the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, in its interim report on the treaty hearings, said:

To permit the U.S. Senate to monitor the treaty safeguards it is necessary that the expressed good intentions be supplemented by definitive programs against which progress can be compared. \* \* \* If the treaty is ratified it is the intention of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to monitor the implementation of the safeguards.

The staff of the subcommittee has made an extensive review of the activities of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in implementation of the safeguards. This review covered the first year of the safeguards operation. During the course

of the safeguards review, numerous meetings, briefings, discussions, and visits occurred between the staff and the responsible officials of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the nuclear laboratories.

I might say at this point that one of the most encouraging aspects of the review was the expression by many of these officials of deep gratification that the Senate had established safeguards and was maintaining a continuing interest in seeing that they are implemented adequately.

By and large, although a few soft spots are evident, the safeguards implementation program carried out in fiscal year 1964 and planned for fiscal year 1965 appears to be extensive, vigorous, and effective. The large number of underground nuclear tests directed to the development of nuclear weapons which have been publicly announced make it clear that this area is receiving a great deal of emphasis and attention. The end result should be a strengthening of the military preparedness segment of our national security.

The soft spots appear to be in the area of underground nuclear testing which is directed to obtaining additional information on nuclear weapons effects. As the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee which was issued last year indicates, this is a vital and important area. At the same time, there is a clear and manifest difficulty in mounting underground tests which will yield meaningful information in this field. In any event, it does not appear that this area has been pursued as vigorously as has the area of underground testing directed to the development of nuclear weapons.

However, the information available to us indicates that these soft spots in the program have been identified and that corrective action has been initiated by the responsible officials. The efficacy of these corrective actions is yet to be determined. The subcommittee will maintain a continuing interest in and surveillance over the problem areas and all other areas in an effort to insure that the maximum benefits are obtained from all phases of the underground nuclear testing program.

The underground testing program that has been carried out—coupled with a fine, large, and imaginative laboratory research program—has added significantly to our nuclear weapons knowledge. The plans which have been made and implemented for the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, if this should become necessary, appear to be satisfactory and adequate.

The capability to monitor the terms of the treaty and to detect possible violations has been improved. In addition, the surveillance of the intelligence agencies has been increased to carry out the fourth safeguard.

The subcommittee will continue to give close attention to this matter. We believe that it is important to insure that the “euphoria” which the Joint Chiefs warned against does not develop.

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	Mr. Elder 7D5617		9/14/64	WJ	
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
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<p><b>Remarks:</b> Attached is an extract from the <u>Record</u> of 11 September 1964 containing a report to the Senate by Chairman Stennis of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on the nuclear test ban treaty safeguards. Items of particular interest have been marked.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 50px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> <p style="text-align: center;">Assistant Legislative Counsel</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Preparedness file Lott</i></p>					
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