

1962

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. HRUSKA, and Mr. KEATING conferees on the part of the Senate.

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE REPORT ON SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL

Mr. HOLLAND. Madam President, earlier in the day a colloquy ensued on the floor of the Senate relative to the last supplemental appropriation bill. I have already advised the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] that I intend to file the report on the bill without fail as soon as possible after the convening of the Senate on Monday, or even prior thereto, if that be within the rule. I desire that all Senators be advised of that fact.

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank my colleague.

NOMINATION OF REPRESENTATIVE KATHRYN GRANAHAAN, OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO BE TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SCOTT. Madam President, I heartily endorse the nomination of Representative KATHRYN E. GRANAHAAN, of Pennsylvania, to be Treasurer of the United States. Her nomination was reported favorably this afternoon by the Committee on Finance and will be on the Executive Calendar on Monday. I am certain that she will do honor to the post of Treasurer of the United States.

I served in Congress for many years with KATHRYN GRANAHAAN. She is a woman of very attractive personality and has made innumerable friends.

The nomination of a woman to this high Federal post is recognition of the fact that there are many more qualified women who could and should be appointed to more posts in Government than are now being appointed.

NEED FOR REVISION OF SENATE RULES

Mr. SCOTT. Madam President, I desire to echo the statement made by the senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] that we must again do our level best to amend the archaic and often inoperable rules of the Senate. I believe a hard battle must be waged next January for the amendment of rule XXII. I think it is obvious that only the abstention of certain Senators from the floor enabled the cloture petition to succeed this year. I believe the original obstacle still prevails, so far as the clearance of civil rights measures to the floor is concerned. In that and other matters, I believe the rules of the Senate should be made more realistic in accordance with the needs of Congress and the rights of the people involved.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF CLOTURE RULE

Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President—

Mr. SMATHERS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator from Florida.

Madam President, it was the hope of a number of Senators that the sine die adjournment would occur tomorrow. However, we now know that will not be possible.

However, before the sine die adjournment of the 87th Congress, certain Senators, including myself and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART], wish to know about the situation in regard to the determination of certain Senators to work for a change in rule XXII at the beginning of the 88th Congress, in January 1963. A letter signed by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] and myself has been sent to certain Senators, in order to alert our colleagues as to our intention to request their support of our effort in January 1963, to bring about a change in rule XXII.

There has been a clear demonstration of the need for a clear-cut antifilibuster rule which would permit a majority of the Members of the Senate to proceed to vote after full and fair debate. The time to make this proposal is at the opening of a new Congress. We hope other Senators will join us in supporting that effort.

It is said that the successful cloture vote this year demonstrates the workability of the present antifilibuster rule. However, I disagree with that argument. It is apparent that the present rule will not be successful if there is strong opposition to ending debate on a measure of considerable controversy. For example, I do not believe that under the present rule there is a real chance to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote in order to end debate and obtain action on meaningful civil-rights legislation.

The letter which has been sent is very much in line with the statement I am making now. As I have said, the letter was signed by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] and myself.

We are seeking the advice of Senators in regard to how to proceed in January. We hope that in January we shall be able to arrive at a consensus of opinion as to the type of rule change to be proposed, and we hope to be able to enlist the support of the overwhelming majority of Members of the Senate. We feel strongly that such a change in the rule is needed; and I shall do my best to secure the adoption of a rule change which will make it possible to have the vote on a controversial measure taken after full and fair debate has been had, so that a majority of the Senate will be able to work its will.

Mr. HART. Madam President, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, he and I have addressed to a number of our colleagues a letter indicating our intention again to join—at the opening of the next Congress—in the endeavor to obtain an effective anti-filibuster rule.

Very considerable progress has been made in the past 10 years in bringing to

the attention of the Senate and the Nation the difficulties which are presented when a majority of the elected Members of this body attempt to get to a vote, after a full and fair debate, on a proposition to which there is strong sectional opposition.

Madam President, the precedents already established at the opening of Congress in previous years clearly indicate that this is the orderly and proper time for the Senate to consider the rules which will govern its procedures. Both party platforms support a change in the antifilibuster rule. Both party platforms support meaningful civil rights legislation. There is no doubt in my mind that a further modification of rule XXII must occur if, in fact, we expect the Congress to meet its responsibilities in the area of long overdue civil rights legislation.

Efforts have previously been made to change the rules. The record shows a growing number of supporters. Such a rule change was first proposed at the opening of Congress in January 1953. In that year, those seeking to take up the rule question at the opening of the 83d Congress mustered only 21 votes. In January 1961, 48 Senators wanted to change the rule at the opening of the 87th Congress.

There are those who would argue that the experience this year on the cloture vote during the debate on the communications satellite bill demonstrates the workability of the present rule. But I believe it would be a real pipedream to imagine that the filibuster used today by those who represent strong sectional interests could be effectively broken under the present cloture rule.

I hope that in the weeks and months ahead we shall be able to develop support for such a change. At the opening of the 88th Congress, the Senate will have an opportunity to free itself from a most restrictive practice, one which prevents the Senate from meeting its responsibilities at mid-20th century in the critical area of legislation necessary to protect basic human and civil rights.

Mr. JAVITS. Madam President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Madam President, on our side, in the absence of the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], who is taking the lead in the matter on our side, I wish to state that five of us are today sending to our Republican colleagues a letter which is precisely the same as the letter which the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] have sent out. At the moment I can name only four of those five; they are the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], my colleague [Mr. KEATING], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and myself.

In this connection, we have an informal liaison with Senators on the Democratic side; and we shall give our utmost support in the fight to amend rule XXII.

I hope that the change in the rule which will be made in January will be in accordance with the so-called Douglas plan, which provides that after 30 days of debate, debate may be ended by the

21384

affirmative votes of a constitutional majority of the Senate.

At the time of the debate on the satellite bill and the successful cloture vote in connection with that bill, I said I thought the invoking of cloture at that time would not be harmful to the attempt we proposed to make in January 1963, to amend rule XXII. I stated that I felt sure that the cloture vote on the satellite bill would clearly indicate that an attempt to invoke cloture under the present rule could be successful only when a very special situation existed; namely, only when a substantial number of Senators were willing to absent themselves, rather than participate in the vote on the question of invoking cloture; and I said that that situation was a clear indication that, in terms of dealing with legislative proposals generally, it is necessary that rule XXII be amended. In short, I stated that the action taken by the Senate in invoking cloture in connection with the debate on the satellite bill constituted an important precedent in favor of effecting an amendment to rule XXII.

I hope that we shall be able to repeat that argument most strongly at the time of the convening of the new Congress in January, which is the proper time, according to the rulings by former Vice President Nixon, for changes in the rules to be made.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President, I join the Senator from New York in expressing the hope that by means of a bipartisan effort, we shall be able to succeed in this endeavor.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.

Madam President, as I have said, the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], who is taking the lead on our side in connection with the letter, is due to return to the Chamber in a moment or two.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President, I discussed this subject with the Senator 2 days ago, and it was clearly understood that on the Republican side, action similar to that already taken on the Democratic side would be taken. In short, we are working together, and also with our respective groups; and, as I have said, in January the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], myself, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON]—who has been a strong leader in this fight—and other Senators will join forces in the effort to agree on the rule change we shall propose and to agree on the strategy we shall follow; and, in light of our experience during the past year, I think that at that time we shall be in a better position than ever to proceed with the fight to make such a change in the rule.

Mr. JAVITS. Yes. Does not the Senator from Minnesota agree that it is fair to say that we are pledging a bipartisan effort to amend rule XXII, in order to endeavor to reduce the power of the filibuster, and in order to give us a more effective means of effecting cloture; and we are pledging that we will undertake that effort at the opening of the new Congress, which—according to the rul-

ings by former Vice President Nixon and according to the Constitution—is the proper time to do so.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. KEATING. Madam President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. KEATING. In January, when we make our bipartisan effort to change rule XXII, we shall surely be met with the argument that in 1962, the effort to invoke cloture was successful, and therefore no change in the rule is needed. However, that is a fallacious argument. All of us know that the method by which cloture was obtained in 1962 could have been successful only on this one issue, and only then because a substantial number of Senators were willing to absent themselves from the Chamber and not participate in the cloture vote. It would not enhance the prestige of the Senate to continue under a rule that necessitates that if cloture is to be invoked, certain Senators must absent themselves. Obviously, this is the only way by which cloture could have been obtained in the debate on the communications satellite bill.

In short, it is still absolutely essential that a meaningful change be made in rule XXII to make possible the enactment of meaningful civil rights legislation.

I am sure that the rule envisioned by the distinguished assistant majority leader and the other interested Senators will allow more than ample time for debate on any issue on earth. I stress that I am referring to earth-bound issues, like civil rights, not esoteric subjects that are off in outer space. Madam President, certainly there must come a time, in a government of the people, when their legislative body can come to grips with this very fundamental problem. It must not be stymied by a minority, with the result that minority rule, rather than majority rule, exists in the Congress.

I pledge myself to the majority leader and to the other Senators that I will exert my full efforts to bring about a meaningful change in rule XXII at the beginning of the next session.

Auto
 THE CHANGING SITUATION IN CUBA

Mr. SMATHERS. Madam President, I wish to discuss for not more than approximately 15 minutes the changing situation in Cuba.

At the outset I wish to state that, like many others, I am greatly pleased with the progress which has been made in recent days, and particularly with the announcement made yesterday by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States and by our Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, at the conclusion of the meeting of foreign ministers representing the Latin American countries.

I cannot help but think that the resolution which they have adopted demon-

strates a unanimity which has thus far been lacking, and demonstrates an awareness on the part of the countries of Central and South America of the real menace of communism in Cuba to all those countries.

I was delighted to see that such countries as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina were willing to go along with such a strongly worded resolution. I think, overall, it means that great progress has been made.

I think much of the credit for it is deserved by the President of the United States. I was not privileged to be at the luncheon which was held in the White House on, last Tuesday, I believe, at which he invited all the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere. It is my information that he talked to them in rather straightforward and stern language about the need for action on the part of the Central American countries particularly the Caribbean countries, and all the other countries in the Western Hemisphere for united and strong action in opposing the Communist government of Cuba. What he had to say in the White House had a great deal to do with the satisfactory results which we saw were accomplished only yesterday, when the foreign ministers wound up their meeting.

I also wish to take a moment to congratulate the Secretary General, Mr. Jose Mora, for his leadership and his expressed belief that the time had long since passed when all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, all the countries of the American States, should do more than they had done with respect, first, to proscribing Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere, and, second, getting rid of communism in Cuba. I congratulate Secretary General Mora for the statement he made and the leadership which has been provided. My only regret now is that it did not occur a little sooner. However, I am happy that it has finally happened.

In that connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial which appeared in the Washington Evening Star of Thursday, September 27, 1962, entitled "The Menace in Cuba."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. NEUBERGER in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE MENACE IN CUBA

The threat in Cuba grows apace. Now we have been told by Fidel Castro and his mentors in the Kremlin that a special port is to be built down there to service and supply a Soviet "fishing" fleet made up of as many as 130 trawlers. Actually, of course, as the State Department has indicated and as Pentagon sources have warned, the development certainly involves much more than a desire by the Russians to catch seafood in waters they have never tried before.

To begin with, the following facts, among others, need to be kept in mind: (1) The normal Soviet fishing grounds in this hemisphere have been limited up to now to the North Atlantic. (2) Most Russian trawlers are semimilitary in the sense that they are elaborately equipped with radar and other devices designed to spy upon such things

as our Polaris missile launchings. (3) A Cuban port for these vessels could easily accommodate Red submarines and Red torpedo boats. And (4) the ports thus could serve the Kremlin as a sort of naval base that would be almost within shouting distance of our shores and capable of threatening the Panama Canal, vital inter-American shipping lanes and places like Cape Canaveral.

True, it may be argued that the United States—with its base at Guantanamo, its awesome arsenal of nuclear weapons, its wide variety of missiles, its great fleet of bombers, and its amphibious forces—has little or no reason to fear the building of such a port, which could be wiped out as easily and as swiftly as a fly can be swatted. But that is not the real point of the matter. The real point is that the Kremlin, with studied arrogance, has chosen to be deliberately provocative to an exceptionally intense and dangerous degree. It has done so by ostentatiously ridiculing the Monroe Doctrine, by using the insufferable Fidel Castro to make captives of the betrayed Cuban people, and by planting itself, noisily and insolently, on a foothold in the Western Hemisphere—a foothold from which it apparently intends to launch a war of subversion and indirect aggression against the Americas.

All this brings to mind these recent words of President Kennedy: "If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way * * * then this country will do whatever must be done." Unhappily, that time seems to be rapidly approaching, if it is not already here. Our friends and allies should respond accordingly. Some of them have suggested that only the United States needs to worry about the matter. They could not be more wrong. The menace is global, and it must be met head on by all men and nations who still cherish freedom.

Mr. SMATHERS. Madam President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial which appeared in this morning's Washington Post, entitled "With One Voice," which calls attention to the great statement made by the ministers representing the Western Hemisphere.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WITH ONE VOICE

In an admirable show of unanimity, 19 Latin American republics have joined with the United States in emphatically, clearly, and bluntly condemning Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba. There are no weasel words in the final communique released by the foreign ministers who have been informally conferring in Washington. Messrs. Castro and Khrushchev have accomplished the unlikely miracle of bringing countries as diverse as Costa Rica and Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay into fundamental accord on the single most controversial question before the hemisphere.

The communique explicitly condemns Soviet intervention in Cuba and states that the threat this poses to the hemisphere requires "the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective." It calls on hemisphere governments to intensify countermeasures against Communist-Cuban subversion. Significantly, the declaration extends sympathy to "the victims of the present regime" and expresses the hope that the island will soon return to a form of government compatible with the principles of the inter-American system.

This unanimous declaration makes it abundantly clear that the real issue in dispute is not Fidel Castro or the social system that prevails in Cuba today. It is instead Soviet intervention. The Castro regime

thus stands unanimously judged a satellite for a hostile foreign power—and the fact that Mexico, Brazil and Chile joined in this condemnation should have massive impact on hemisphere opinion.

The declaration also opens the way for the kind of collective response envisaged by the Rio Pact, a response that would comport with international law and not violate a single treaty. While the United States did not obtain agreement on an airtight economic embargo at this stage, a consensus is forming that will surely lead to collective sanctions. Meanwhile, bilateral agreement ought to be reached with Chile on ending yearly purchases of some \$10 million worth of Cuban sugar.

Meanwhile, the proposed closing of U.S. ports to foreign ships carrying goods to Cuba could also have a palpable psychological effect in releasing North American frustration. If European countries do not respond to requests for an embargo, the United States can show the earnestness of its intent by unilateral action. Hopefully this can demonstrate to the Europeans that Washington does not see the Cuban conflict in terms of a feud with a flyweight dictator but rather as a direct confrontation with Soviet power.

Despite expectations to the contrary, the informal foreign ministers meeting did yield important results. Credit for this belongs to all who participated, but it is noteworthy that the final communique reflected the suggestions made on Sunday by Secretary General Jose Mora of the Organization of American States. Let it also be remarked that Secretary of State Rusk showed sure political instincts in helping to find the unifying denominator in an assembly of 20 nations.

Mr. SMATHERS. Madam President, before I discuss the resolutions which I proposed in the Senate, I wish to say that while we greatly appreciate what has been stated at the foreign ministers' meeting and the demonstration of a hardened attitude with respect to Fidel Castro and Communist Cuba on the part of those countries, I am sure we also appreciate the fact that the administration recently announced that it would be the policy of our Government to tell the other nations of the world whose shipping has been carrying goods into the Communist-controlled country of Cuba, and then has come to the United States to pick up additional goods to carry back home, that their ships will no longer be welcome in our ports; that, in some measure, ships that deal with Cuba and carry goods into Cuba, no matter of what nature, will be looked upon as outlawed ships as far as the United States is concerned. I think that will have a salutary effect on the free people of this hemisphere. I think it will further restrict the activities of Fidel Castro and communism in Cuba. It will put great pressure on him. I congratulate the administration on the adoption of that particular program. I am happy that I, along with others, recommended that such a course be adopted by the administration about 2 or 3 weeks ago.

However, I think we all recognize that we still need to take further action. So far as I am concerned, I do not really believe that, in the final analysis, merely the adoption of the resolution of the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere nations, standing by itself, will bring down Castro or bring down com-

munist in Cuba. I think we need to go further.

In that connection, I recently introduced in the Senate two resolutions dealing directly with Communist Cuba.

One resolution called for U.S. recognition of a Cuban revolutionary government-in-exile. The second urged the U.S. support in the establishment of an inter-American military alliance.

If adopted, I believe that these resolutions would be positive and effective steps leading toward the eradication of communism from this hemisphere.

I think they are logical next steps which we should take in view of our objective and the objective of the free people of this hemisphere in getting rid of Castro communism in Cuba.

More important even than that, these recommendations would demonstrate that the American people have made up their minds on a vital issue—that we will no longer tolerate the existence of aggressive communism in any form in any part of this hemisphere, and that we have set about to do something realistic about it.

Once that resolve is made, then the resolution which I offered can be made a viable part of our national policy. These resolutions are not a magic formula. They are not a roadmap to utopia. They are a means to an end—if we choose to take action against the Communists.

There is, of course, another alternative—to do nothing. That is to say, to sit, and hope, and wish that Castro would fall and communism will disappear, and let it go at that. If that is our choice, then communism will soon dominate, in my judgment, other sections of our Western Hemisphere through subversion and Red-fomented internal upheaval, and the threat to the peace and security of our neighbors to the south, and to us, will be increased 100 times over that which it is today.

But assuming that action of some kind will be taken, and that it will be intelligent and reasoned, looking toward elimination of communism in Cuba, then I strongly recommend consideration of my two suggestions embodied in the two resolutions.

With regard to the resolutions, I ask unanimous consent that Senators BUTLER, HOLLAND, HICKEY, LONG of Louisiana, SCOTT, THURMOND, TOWER, and YOUNG of North Dakota be named as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 393, introduced by me on September 18 resolving that it be declared to be the sense of the Senate that the U.S. Government should support the formation of an inter-American military alliance joined by all nations in the Western Hemisphere who voluntarily wish to do so, take such action as may be deemed necessary to drive communism out of this hemisphere.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMATHERS. I also ask unanimous consent that Senators ALLOTT, BUTLER, HOLLAND, HICKEY, LONG of Louisiana, SCOTT, THURMOND, TOWER, and YOUNG of North Dakota be named as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 394,

21386

introduced by me on September 18, resolving that it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should recognize as the true government of Cuba, a Cuban revolutionary government in exile, whose avowed purpose is to lead the Cuban people in the liberation and recovery of their homeland.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMATHERS. Let us first consider the resolution calling for the establishment of a Cuban revolutionary government-in-exile. The resolution itself says:

Resolved, That it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Senate that the United States should recognize as the true government of Cuba a Cuban revolutionary government-in-exile whose avowed purpose is to lead the Cuban people in the liberation and recovery of their homeland.

Further resolved, That the United States should recognize only a Cuban revolutionary government-in-exile which agrees, prior to recognition by the United States, that it will, upon the liberation of Cuba, transfer its power and authority to the Cuban people by the holding of free elections.

The first objection raised against this resolution is that there is no precedent for the United States recognizing an exile government other than one which was established and subsequently was forced to abandon its native territory.

May I say that this statement is incorrect. For instance, during World War I, a Czechoslovak National Council was formed for the purpose of waging a war of independence for Czechoslovakia, then merely a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The Council was founded on the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918, which served to unify diverse exile elements. On September 3, 1918, the United States recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government. This meant that we recognized an organized opposition to the de jure government of the territory in question.

I would like to stress that the United States took an important hand in working toward the establishment of this government and that its founding agreements were signed in two American cities. I might also add that strong and effective diplomatic relations were established between the United States and this newly recognized government and that it actually received six U.S. loans.

In addition to U.S. recognition, the Czechoslovakia National Council was ultimately recognized by Great Britain, France, and Italy.

A second example occurred during World War I when the Poles, under the leadership of Paderewski, and with the cooperation and aid of the Polish movement in Chicago, formed a Polish National Committee for the purpose of attaining a free Polish state, since 1863 under the occupation of Russia. On November 1, 1918, the Polish Army was recognized by the United States as a co-belligerent, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee.

Again during World War II another Polish government-in-exile was recog-

nized by the United States during the Nazi occupation. This government was not the Polish Government which existed prior to the invasion, since many Polish leaders were detained in Poland or Rumania by the Germans, and the exile government was formed by other Polish leaders.

Although the United States did not give formal diplomatic recognition to the free French movement during World War II, in August of 1943 it did recognize the French Committee of National Liberation—Charles De Gaulle's movement—as administering certain French oversea territories.

It is for international lawyers to appreciate these distinctions between formal recognition of an exile government by the United States and the partial recognition given to such exile groups as De Gaulle's which had neither continuity nor a relationship with any previous government in France. The important thing is that the United States showed its overwhelming desire to cooperate in an extraordinarily close manner with the free French movement and its leader who was ready to oppose a totalitarian conquest of his country.

The term "government-in-exile" may acknowledgedly be misleading. What is needed is a Cuban juridical personality under international law; and it is in this sense that the resolution should be interpreted.

It should be noted that this proposed government or authority is to be created and recognized by the United States for a single purpose, well defined in the resolution; to wit: for the purpose of leading the Cuban people in the war of national liberation in which they have been engaged during the past 2 years against their Communist oppressors. Such an authority, it must be clearly understood, cannot and shall not pretend to govern the Cuban people, once their liberation has been assured. It was for an identical purpose that the United States recognized and supported the Czechoslovak National Council in 1918.

A second argument raised against my proposal is that recognition of a government-in-exile would give Castro an excuse to abrogate the treaty concerning the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.

This is an argument which has been made to the able Senator from New York (Mr. KEATING), when he has advocated the recognition of a Cuban Government in exile. There are those who say that would give to Fidel Castro authority to abrogate the treaty which we have entered into with the previous Cuban Government for a long-term lease at Guantanamo Bay.

Any government holding itself out to be the representative of the state and accepted as such by other states is bound to observe the rules of international law and to abide by the treaty obligations of the state. The continuity and character of the state as an "international person" undergoes no change because of a change in the governing body which represents it. This is a unanimous accepted principle of international law. Were this not so, treaties would be abro-

gated by every election or other change occurring in any government.

Again according to one of the keystones of international law, in any such two-nation agreement, when no specific time limit is established for the duration of the treaty—which was the case at Guantanamo Bay, then the treaty itself holds in force unless it is cancelled by both parties.

That is a well established principle of international law.

As a practical matter, the upholding of our treaty rights in Guantanamo depends in the final analysis not on the Castro government's interpretation of international law, but on the Marine garrison at Guantanamo.

Therefore, Madam President, I do not feel that this argument, made against the recognition of a government-in-exile on the basis that we might lose our rights in Guantanamo Bay, has any merit whatever.

A third criticism of my resolution is that recognition of a government-in-exile would end the current U.S. representation in Havana through the Swiss Government, thereby preventing us from the protection, representation, and so forth, of any U.S. citizens remaining in Cuba.

To this objection, let me say that whatever representation we have in Cuba today, through the fine and cooperative offices of the Swiss Government, in the last analysis is effective only to the extent that Castro, or more precisely Khrushchev, wants it to be effective. Whatever cooperation we might seek—and there are times when these can be justified, such as in the case of American craft being shipwrecked off the coast of Cuba—can only be obtained at the sufferance of the Castro government.

To the plea that we would, by recognizing a government-in-exile, be jeopardizing the safety of Americans still in Cuba, I recall on several occasions the State Department has urged that Americans should leave the country and that the U.S. Government could no longer guarantee their protection.

Ours would certainly be a hobbled, ineffective, and distorted Cuban policy if we were to shape it to the needs of a handful of Americans who have been urged by our Government to leave Cuba, but who do not do so for some personal reason of their own.

A final argument against a government-in-exile is that the Cuban refugees are too disorganized to form a government-in-exile worthy of recognition.

In the previously stated examples of Czechoslovakia and Poland during World War I, Poland during World War II, and the Free French movement during World War II, there was a great deal of controversy, competition, and strife between various elements of the exiled groups. Masaryk, Paderewski, and De Gaulle had to struggle mightily for the unity of their people, and it is difficult to say just how the promise of recognition by the United States interacted with the unification attempts.

The fact remains that the task of exiles to form a united political front is an extremely delicate and thorny one,

1962

which is disguised by the fact that all exile elements have a common purpose, and therefore should have no insurmountable difficulties in working together. If recognition were held out as a promise to the Cuban exiles, the condition being that they form an effective, unified, viable organization, it would necessarily exert tremendous pressures in the direction of this desired unity. As it stands, there is now no real reason for unity.

To further supplement that particular argument, I point out that we should remember that at the time of the unfortunate Bay of Pigs invasion all the Cuban exile groups at that particular moment, when they realized the battle had been joined, forgot their political differences and immediately joined up, tried to volunteer, and tried to get into the fray. Unfortunately, at that time there was not a sufficiently well-trained organization to receive them.

At that point I should like to add that I have heard it said that one of the reasons we should not go forward and exercise any kind of force in the case is that if we should do so, it might turn other Latin American nations against us. It is a significant fact that at the time of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, while the outcome was still in doubt for some 48 hours—72 hours in some areas, in the understanding of some countries—not a single Latin American country criticized the action which was taken. The first time any criticism came about was when it became evident that the operation was a failure. Many of my Latin American friends have told me that when the invasion was in progress and they thought the United States was really supporting it, they had the first good feeling that they had had about the United States and what we were willing to stand up and do that they had had in almost 2 years. Many of them said that they walked down the street feeling a great deal more proud of their association with the United States.

However, unfortunately, when the operation began to collapse and we withdrew our support, those people began to slink back into their corners. It was then that the so-called liberal forces far to the left egged on by the Communists, began to get their governments to criticize the United States for the part which we had taken, because it then appeared that the United States would not stand firmly in support of its friends.

So the contention that we could not get the Cuban exiles or the Latin American people to stand with us should we recognize a Cuban government-in-exile is not borne out by the facts, reason, or logic.

Today the United States has opened its military service for the admission of Cuban refugees. Though the program has been in effect for only a short time, already somewhere between 2,500 and 3,000 young Cubans have joined. They come from every political climate. What they are interested in is action. I cannot help but believe that if the day should come when the United States should urge upon these foreign political

groups that they get together—putting them in a room, if need be, and saying, "You must come out with some leadership or else we will pick someone"—we would hear no more argument among the divided political groups, particularly when they understand that the government which is recognized by the United States is only a government of liberation and will itself dissolve and not seek political power after the liberation of Cuba has been accomplished.

I think it is appropriate to bring up at this time the fact that one of the soundest and most influential organizations in matters of national security and foreign affairs is the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States. It is, I believe, extremely significant that the Veterans of Foreign Wars at its recent national convention, the latter part of August 1962, in Minneapolis, Minn., unanimously adopted a resolution urging the recognition of governments-in-exile as a means of countering Communist aggression.

This action by the VFW, which has a national membership of 1,300,000 overseas combat veterans, reflects a firm knowledge and grasp of the issues involved in our continuing crises stemming from Communist aggression.

Furthermore, this VFW action demonstrates a clear realization on the part of this great veterans organization that there are things that can and should be done in order to sustain the spirit of those who resist Communist aggression to take the initiative from the Kremlin strategists, and, as a result, enhance our ability as a nation to persevere through to victory against the Red tide of conquest.

Because of its importance and pertinency to the current crisis, I wish to refer at this time to Resolution 227, calling for U.S. recognition of governments-in-exile and support thereof.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the resolution of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION 227—SUPPORTING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL LEADERS WHO OPPOSE COMMUNISM

Whereas the ruthless march of Communist aggression has overthrown various governments which have resisted Communist encroachment; and

Whereas various governmental leaders have left their countries rather than submit to Communist oppression and serve as puppets of the Red rulers; and

Whereas those who have refused to stay and serve the Communist cause of conquest have continued in foreign lands their resolute resistance to communism; and

Whereas the vigorous anti-Communist actions of such leaders, who have refused to serve as Red puppets, have been a source of inspiration to freedom-loving peoples everywhere, and a source of embarrassment to Communist aggressors; and

Whereas the cause of freedom would be well served by recognizing the heroism and determination of such governmental leaders in exile; and

Whereas recognition of such fighters against aggression would be both morally

and strategically sound: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the 63d National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, That the United States officially recognize such Red-displaced governments as governments-in-exile, and extend to such persons and governments moral, diplomatic, and material support.

Mr. SMATHERS. At that particular point, with respect to the Cuban government-in-exile, I hear people who are experts on the question—and increasingly everyone is becoming an expert, which is only right, because we are giving the question more and more attention—say that what we really need is not a Cuban government in exile, but an indigenous revolution from within Cuba. We are told that that is really the way to overthrow Fidel Castro.

Madam President, I could not agree with that statement more. But I maintain that the only possible way in which we shall ever bring about any kind of successful revolution in Cuba is through some outside help. I doubt if it ever could be successful without some outside help. But we will not have any kind of pressure upon the Communists within Cuba and on Fidel Castro's government until we are able to get some help to the people of Cuba. They must have guns, sustenance, and the equipment that is needed to put pressure on Fidel Castro.

I submit that there is no other way to get the equipment to the people in Cuba except through a government-in-exile.

I do not believe the United States wishes officially to say, "We are going to try to move in ourselves at this particular moment," for obviously that would bring us into open war between ourselves and Cuba.

What I am about to say is not intended to be in disparagement of the CIA. I do not believe the CIA, in the manner in which it operates, is equipped to bring large numbers of weapons, ammunition and equipment to the freedom fighters in Cuba. The only way that could be accomplished would be through a Cuban government-in-exile, or whatever else we wish to call it. It should be a government that the United States can recognize as we recognize the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. We give to Chiang Kai-shek upward of \$500 million equipment every year to oppose the Red Communist government on the mainland of China. If we can do that, we can at least give some amount of help to the Cuban juridical government, whatever we wish to call it, and no matter where it is located.

We can do it legally. Cubans outside their country have ways and means of sending the equipment into Cuba. I am told that it is much more difficult to get the equipment away from the shores of the State of Florida. There is much more difficulty in getting by our own immigration officials and sheriffs, who try to prevent Cuban patriots from going to Cuba with the kind of equipment they expect to use to overthrow Castro. It is more difficult to get it out of the State of Florida than it is to get it to the shores of Cuba.

If we were to recognize a government-in-exile, that government could call on us for help, and we could openly and frankly give that government the help which it would require, and it could be used to bring pressure on Fidel Castro.

My second resolution says "that it be the sense of the Senate that the U.S. Government supports the formation of an inter-American military alliance, joined by all nations in the hemisphere who voluntarily wish to do so, for the purpose of carrying out the principles previously enunciated."

First, I think it would be well to point out that the resolution does not contemplate a general alliance of the Organization of American States within the framework of the Organization of American States, because such an alliance already exists.

Nor does time allow the United States entering into a protracted series of negotiations involving many nations in the hemisphere which have demonstrated less concern with the penetration of Communists into the hemisphere than has the United States, and hence do not consider themselves endangered by the presence of an extra-continental power in the Caribbean. This resolution is primarily directed to those nations in the hemisphere who already consider themselves, their governments, and their peoples harassed and menaced by aggressive Soviet military and subversive power, exercised through the puppeteering of Castro Cuba.

The resolution which I offered the Senate does not propose to exclude any American state, nor to pressure nor entice those who presently remain indifferent to the Soviets in the Americas. This resolution rests on the principle of self-protection recognized by international law and by the Charter of the United Nations. It contemplates a military pact or understanding which would properly function when the danger of aggression becomes imminent.

It has been a traditional practice in international relations to consider mobilization of military forces by a neighboring country as a preparation for aggression, indeed as in itself an act of aggression. And in such cases, the response can be no other, pending further developments, but an equal mobilization on the part of the country or countries so menaced. Under the circumstances, and if the military buildup in Cuba continues, it is but natural that the Caribbean nations proceed without delay to mobilize their forces of land, sea, and air at least in the same proportion as Cuba has already done.

That has already happened. Cuba has on its shores many more arms and munitions and many more men than it could possibly need for the maintenance of law and order in Cuba. I do not know what is a defensive weapon or an offensive weapon. I have never seen a rifle or a mortar, or even a missile used for defense which could not be used for offense as well, by aiming it in a different direction. Certainly the time has come when the nations of the Caribbean should be looking to their own defenses and means of protecting themselves, if

these weapons, sometimes called defensive weapons, which Cuba has in great abundance, are turned into offensive weapons.

In other words, it is time for these people to meet the challenge of arms with arms. Any other course on the part of the governments so affected would be a delinquency in duties to their own people. Such being the case, they not having a Soviet Union to support them and to supply them with large sums of money and large stores of equipment, they should join with other nations which are equally endangered; and it is likewise logical and proper that they should join in so disposing their forces that the enemy may best be deterred or vanquished.

That is the purpose of the resolution. I think it is highly significant that the Finance Minister of Panama, Dr. Gilberto Arias, proposed in Miami on September 23, which was 5 days after I introduced my two resolutions in the Senate, a meeting of 10 Central American and Caribbean Nations to establish a United Front Against Communism in Cuba. He went on to say that other Latin-American countries and the United States should be called on to support measures to contain the Communist regime of Fidel Castro, and he further urged, according to the front-page article in the New York Times of September 24, "the formation of a NATO-type military alliance for defensive as well as offensive purposes, if such need arises."

Dr. Arins said that—

Although he could not at present commit the Government of Panama to the 10-nation meeting, he felt sure the proposal would have its approval as well as that of the other regimes concerned.

He declared that the 10 countries—Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, were "in the path of Communist aggression and must now take a united and positive stand to protect their own security."

We went on to say that—

The recent intensifications of the Communist take-over in Cuba once more confirms that Moscow proposes to use that Caribbean island for the propagation of communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. The threat of communism resulting from the establishment of a Soviet base of operations in Cuba could seriously deter private investment in the Caribbean area.

The other day I read an article which apparently was based on facts obtained from the Department of Commerce, to the effect that in 1957 there was invested in that year in Central and South American countries from the United States \$1,200 million. In 1961 private capital going into Central and South American countries dropped to \$147 million. I am satisfied, as we all are, that the reason we have seen that drop is because of the threat of confiscation on the part of some of these countries and also the fear that a government of the type of Fidel Castro's government will take over in some Central and South American countries, and therefore people up here, who would normally make

an investment there will not make it under the conditions which obtain now.

I point out that the alliance which I have proposed is different from NATO or SEATO. NATO assumes that the interests of all member countries will continue the same and to the same degree. However, in the hemisphere, there are also regional responsibilities and commitments. Those nations in the Caribbean which feel themselves threatened must be permitted to act in their own defense without the approval, but with the acquiescence, of the hemisphere as a whole.

Such an arrangement would be a refinement of the Rio Treaty, and perhaps should be formally written into it at a subsequent date. It would provide that those Caribbean nations that feel most threatened by Castro and the Soviets would meet to decide on what steps—diplomatic and military—they should take. Temporary integration of military forces, for example, could be undertaken to meet a specific threat.

Furthermore, there would be no need for a forum of Caribbean nations, which would lend itself to debate, evasion, and delay, as no country would need to participate in any action unless it should feel itself threatened, and feel that it was desirable for it to participate.

However, some collective defense mechanism must be formed. The presence, legally sanctioned, of other Latin American troops will be extremely important when the time comes to force out communism in Cuba. There is also the point to be made of international legality in the preparation of a force to take the island. Castro claims today we are training an invasion army. If we recognized an exile government and got open commitments from Caribbean allies, we could boast of the fact that we were taking action to meet a regional threat.

Regarding my second resolutions, I have seen and heard much interesting and some illuminating comment on the proposal.

But I think none of these is more pertinent than the urgent recommendation by Panama, which I cited earlier, calling for the formation of a NATO-type organization.

I have since heard that in addition to the 10 nations cited by the Panamanian spokesman as being most directly threatened by Soviet Cuba and, therefore, most interested in such an alliance, Peru might also give support to this type of endeavor. Of all the commentary that I have heard, none is more valid or more pointed than the fact that the nations most endangered are seriously considering joining themselves in a mutual security alliance.

In the Washington Post of September 19, there appeared an article objecting to my resolution and quoting certain "U.S. civilian and military officials" as objecting to the plan, although it did not give any specific names.

I only bring up this point because in discussing my proposal with various, and obviously not the same, U.S. military and civilian officials, I found that they held a different view than that expressed

1962

in the article. The military and civilian officials with whom I discussed the alliance, I might add, were all highly qualified in their respective fields as well as being experienced and knowledgeable in Latin American affairs.

Let me briefly answer some of the objections which have been made to the alliance which I have proposed.

First, it has been said that such an organization would circumscribe our country's freedom of action. This is not true. No such special alliance in the past has limited anybody's country's action, and if there were any doubt about this point, it could be made clear in the treaty itself that nothing in the treaty would hinder the taking of unilateral action by any of its signatories when anyone of them felt that its security was endangered, and that the alliance was not acting fast enough.

If this kind of alliance would inhibit action, you would find that those who take the so-called "soft line on Cuba," would favor it, while those who take the so-called "hard line on Cuba" would be opposed to it. Actually, it is for this very reason—that the alliance might hasten appropriate military action—that we find the so-called soft-liners against it. I am proud that for 3½ years I have either been accused of, or praised for, being a "hard-liner" on Castro's Cuba."

Secondly, it has been objected that such an alliance as I propose is not needed because there are no large enemy land forces in Cuba or Latin America.

Such an objection is irrelevant. One of the basic designs of such an alliance would be not with respect to land, sea, or air forces, but to the threat of internal subversion.

It is to meet just this kind of subversion that it is essential that we secure the assistance of other Latin American powers so that we will not be required to use American soldiers in combat against the nationals of a once friendly country.

Third, the Washington Post article contends that the Rio Treaty calls for "joint military action in the event of military aggression committed against an OAS member," and thus, there is no need for a new alliance.

However, the fact is that the OAS is a regional organization with the United Nations as its parent body. Hence, collective military action cannot be committed through OAS, because such a measure would have to be ratified by the Security Council of the United Nations, and there, of course, it would be blocked by the inevitable Soviet veto.

Finally, the purposes of an alliance such as I propose would be political as well as military. I do not think there has been a single NATO commander who has maintained that his military force was alone adequate to prevent Soviet aggression.

It has rather been the political unity which this force represented which has been important—a political unity which has now led on to an economic unity—the Common Market, in Europe, with the promise of further strengthening and formalizing the political ties of the member nations.

There has been much talk about a Central American common market. Actually, our Government has formally advocated the establishment of a Central American common market.

Also, there has been considerable talk about a subsequently to-be-formed Western Hemisphere common market. I think all such common markets are within the realm of possibility within our lifetime; and it might well be that such a military alliance as is proposed could, as was in the case in Europe, lead to similar economic and political gains, since the purpose of the alliance, military though it may be, must be political in nature if it is to combat Soviet aggression in the new world.

Mr. KEATING. Madam President, will the Senator from Florida yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from New York, who for many years has demonstrated a realistic interest in and understanding of the problem.

Mr. KEATING. I am grateful to the Senator from Florida. I shall detain the Senate but a moment. The purpose of my intrusion is to congratulate the Senator from Florida on a very thoughtful and clear analysis of his views concerning what further action should be taken.

I am entirely in accord with his views that the informal meeting of the ministers of the OAS is not sufficient. I am gratified by the progress which I feel is now, rather belatedly, being taken. I congratulate Secretary Rusk on the achievements to date. I shall discuss this subject more fully on Monday or Tuesday—probably Monday. I shall not go into it now.

I wish to emphasize one thing in particular which the Senator from Florida said. My information is exactly the same as the Senator's. At the time of the unfortunate Bay of Pigs episode, there was, as the Senator said, no criticism of the United States until the invasion failed. If we had supported it and it had succeeded, it is my judgment, based upon what I consider to be good information, that the countries which then began to criticize us would have supported us. They would have supported any forceful action. They might for local political purposes have had some criticism to voice; but they would in effect have supported our leadership. Moreover, they would have respected us for it.

The Senator from Florida has had many more dealings with Latin American nations than I have had, but I am sure he agrees that they desire to respect the United States, and that respect is the most important quality which we can inculcate in the Latin American countries, as in any other nation, friend or foe.

I wish to ask the Senator from Florida about one phase of his remarks. I assume that this subject has been researched by the Senator. It is not clear to me that the OAS must have its action ratified by the United Nations in order to be effective. In other words, the Senator's view is that the OAS of its own initiative cannot take any concerted ac-

tion unless it has been approved by the United Nations.

Mr. SMATHERS. The Senator from New York has asked if research has been done on this subject. It has. The finest Cuban lawyers now in exile—and they comprise most of the Cuban bar—and who live in my State, have taken it upon themselves to research the subject and present me with briefs. They came to the inescapable conclusion that officially they cannot act in a military fashion without first having the approval of the United Nations. That is what makes valid our other military alliance. That is why we became a party to NATO. We can thereby have our own organization and decide on our own volition when we wish to move.

Mr. KEATING. Is it the Senator's view that OAS is in a different category from NATO?

Mr. SMATHERS. Yes. NATO is merely a voluntary organization entered into by the countries of western Europe and the United States. It is military in its purpose. It is designed to stop Communist aggression, and if need be by fighting Communist aggression. That is its purpose.

The United Nations was established for many other reasons, as was OAS. OAS is generally a political-economic-cultural group having certain military rights; but those military rights must be cleared through the United Nations.

I regret to say that in my comments I did not give the exact section of the OAS charter which makes reference to the fact that these types of military action must be referred to the Security Council of the United Nations. However, I shall supply the Senator from New York with that information.

Mr. KEATING. I should like to have it. My thought was that all that was necessary was to notify the Security Council of the activities which had been undertaken. If, of course, the Security Council could agree on another course of action, that could supersede OAS moves, but the Security Council is not likely to agree on such a point.

Mr. SMATHERS. That was also my impression, as the Senator will remember. The Senator from New York and I on several occasions have talked about this subject and the need for doing something about it.

It was a speech I had made, urging the OAS to do something, which caused the Cuban lawyers to submit to me the briefs which they had prepared. They said, in effect, "You will never be able to get the OAS to do anything, because there are certain large countries that will not do anything anyway, including countries such as Brazil and Mexico." That was when I shifted from the idea that we ought to apply pressure to the OAS to take action.

I said the time had come when another organization should be established, similar to NATO, one which would be independent of the United Nations and could operate when its members decided that the time had come to operate in a military fashion.

Mr. KEATING. That information comes to me as somewhat of a surprise,

as it relates to international law. I do not want to end the colloquy on the thought that there is any difference of opinion between the Senator from Florida and myself about the need for additional forceful action in this crisis. I should like to have him cite the reference which he has made and also should like to see the brief.

Mr. SMATHERS. I shall supply that information to the Senator.

Mr. KEATING. Again, I commend the Senator for a highly thoughtful and fine address.

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank the Senator from New York for his kind remarks.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President, I shall take a moment to say a word about the comments of the Senator from New York with respect to the views of the Senator from Florida.

I was not able to hear all of the Senator's address; but judging from what I have heard and also from my consultations with the Senator from Florida, I know of his deep concern over the situation in Cuba, in the Caribbean, and throughout Latin America. I, too, wish to say that the need for specific, definite, understandable action certainly exists. Such action is long overdue. I am pleased to see that the recent Conference of Foreign Ministers produced at least a more clearcut statement of policy on the part of all the participating countries represented by them, and I am particularly pleased with the statement made by our Secretary of State in regard to shipping to Cuba.

This subject has been discussed at some length in Congress. I believe these discussions are really helpful; I believe they help point out the possible alternatives to be followed by a responsible government.

Many times there is criticism of proposals or statements in regard to one situation or another. Certainly there have been very helpful discussions in regard to what should be done about Cuba and about subversion and possible aggression by Castro's communism, based in Cuba. I believe those discussions have given the State Department, the National Security Council, and the President a better insight into the possible alternatives, and have given opportunity for freer discussion of their possible effects.

It is true that the Senate does not have responsibility for the Nation's foreign policy; but the Senate does contribute to it. The Senate does not execute or administer it, but in a way the Senate helps to design it.

It is my view that although some of us may be somewhat scarred or cut up a little, as is said in the political parlance, because we offer suggestions, yet from the trials by fire in debate in the legislative body, good suggestions can—and do—come forth.

Mr. SMATHERS. I completely agree with the able Senator from Minnesota. He has made many valuable contributions by means of the suggestions he has made—as has the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], and in some instances I have seen some of the things I have discussed subsequently become the

national policy. I like to think that the policies are partly the result of the suggestions we make. I believe it is desirable, and is a much healthier situation, to have suggestions made by Members of Congress in the discussion of foreign policy—even though, as the Senator has said, we do not have the responsibility for the foreign policy. However, I believe it is very helpful to have our views reach the Secretary of State, the President, and his assistants.

I would shudder if I thought the President and the Secretary of State could obtain information only from persons who have long been in the State Department. In this connection, I do not criticize any particular person; but I have long deplored the fact that when a new President comes into office, of the approximately 19,600 employees in the State Department, the new President—regardless of whether the President be Mr. Truman, Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Kennedy, or any other—can appoint fewer than 200 persons in the State Department. Consequently, most of the administrative officials in the State Department continue year after year, with the result that some of them strongly defend papers they prepared 10 years before.

Therefore, if the President and the Secretary of State obtained their information only from the State Department, I think the country would be in really bad state.

So I agree that these discussions are most helpful. We know the foreign policy is not our responsibility, in the final analysis; but I agree that our suggestions can be helpful and constructive.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Several efforts have been made to delineate the role of the legislative body in connection with the formulation of foreign policy. Dr. Charles Hyneman, whom I knew first when I was attending Louisiana State University, is one of the foremost experts in the Nation in regard to the role of Congress in the formulation of foreign policy. I mention this because if it is said that the foreign policy is the responsibility of the executive—although it is indeed his responsibility in terms of administration and execution—yet ultimately a successful foreign policy must have public support; and in this country that is not obtained merely by announcing the policy and stating, "This is it." Instead, support for it is obtained by discussing it, arguing about it, and putting it together—sometimes even in a disorderly manner—as the result of discussions, both public and private.

In that connection, the Senator from Florida has done very well, indeed. I suppose that at times we may be in disagreement—but only in degree, not on the fundamentals. Certainly the Senator from Florida has made important contributions.

As to the discussion in regard to the OAS, I hope the Senator from Florida is mistaken in the interpretation that the OAS could take action without the concurrence of the United Nations. I am not in a position to make a definitive statement about that matter; however, I know that at the recent conference at

Punta Del Este, provision was made for a group within the OAS to take collective action for its common defense.

One of the things I have discussed with various Senators, including the Senator from Florida, is the possibility of a collective-action program with the Caribbean nations in the immediate vicinity of Cuba. I was delighted to note, the other day, that the President of Costa Rica—and, earlier, also one of the officials of Panama—suggested that there should be a kind of alliance or collective-security pact in the Caribbean area. I believe that should be done. Furthermore, I believe it should be more than a political pact; I think it should have some military overtones.

As my colleagues know, the other day I was very much surprised to hear a responsible official of our Government say that we are now working on a program, on a cooperative basis, between our country and Latin American countries, for political propaganda. At that point I "blew my stack," and almost "went into orbit," as we say, because I could not imagine that our country would wait from 1958 to 1962 to put into effect a counterpropaganda program. Certainly we should long ago have been doing that—using pamphlets and journalists and radio and television commentators—in other words, to make use of counterpropaganda, call it what one will. We cannot do that alone. We must do it in cooperation with our Latin American brothers and neighbors. In fact, they should be out in front, with our country backstopping. For example, I do not think we have done nearly enough to encourage the freedom fighters inside Cuba. I believe there is a way to help the freedom fighters inside Cuba; and if commentators sympathetic to such attempts—such as Howard K. Smith and others—have reason to point out the inadequacy of what is being done, it seems to me to be clear that more should be done, and we should be able to do it.

These suggestions, regardless of their merits—certainly are worthy of consideration by the Government; and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] has been in the forefront in that connection. I compliment him for it.

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank the Senator from Minnesota for his generous references to me.

OFFICIAL TRAVEL—USE OF AMERICAN FLAG AIRLINES

Mr. SMATHERS. Madam President, on September 6, 1962, the Senate passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 53, expressing the sense of Congress that, when travel on official business is to be performed on civil aircraft by legislative and Government employees, the travel shall be performed on U.S.-flag air carriers, except where travel on other aircraft (a) is essential to the official business concerned, or (b) is necessary to avoid unreasonable delay, expense, or inconvenience.

This resolution passed the House on October 1. Legislation requiring use of U.S.-flag vessels when travel is by sea