

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

4135

complishment, properly understood and properly sustained, can be a major reinforcement to our whole society—as a demonstration of effective action for high purposes. It is time for us to speak and work a whole lot harder to this end, so that the winds may blow, the windmills work—and all of us be proud.

PROBLEMS OF URBAN GROWTH

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, we are all pretty much aware of the tremendous population growth and changes that are taking place in the major metropolitan areas of the country, but we have badly ignored the problems that have arisen and neglected ways of coping with them, so that we might achieve the best possible living environment for the vast majority of the American people who are urban and suburban dwellers.

A most interesting article on this subject recently appeared in the Jersey Journal, February 4, written by Dr. Stanley Worton, of Jersey City State College.

After describing the implications of downtown deterioration, suburban sprawl, and traffic congestion, Dr. Worton suggests that our metropolitan areas consider reviving "the old natural corridor-type development that came with the railroads in the last century" as a way of shaping a more satisfying environment for all.

While obviously no one solution will meet the almost infinite variety of needs and desires of our urban areas across the country, this pattern of development certainly warrants very careful study.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be included in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A BROADER REGIONAL APPROACH WILL HELP SOLVE URBAN BLIGHT—JCSO PROFESSOR CONSIDERS "SPREAD CITY" PROBLEM

(By Dr. Stanley N. Worton)

The bulldozers are busy. The countryside is being subdivided into larger and larger plots for ranch-style, split-level, and colonial homes. Shopping centers are springing up like mushrooms. Industry is spreading out in all directions along the highways or on scattered sites.

Meanwhile, urban blight continues to spread. The problems of congestion, dirt, noise, air pollution, and lack of parking and play space are on the increase. There is an exodus from the older cities of families with children.

Does this mean that the great metropolises of which we are a part is on the way out, fated to extinction like the dinosaur or the dodo bird?

Will the entire region soon become a sprawling mass of continuous residential and industrial development without 1 inch of open space?

Will our central cities be left to the old couples, the single people, the wealthy, the very poor, and to minority groups who are not welcome elsewhere?

The answer to all these questions must be an emphatic "No."

The New York metropolitan area is the greatest region in the Nation, if not in the entire world. It is unsurpassed as a center of industry, commerce and finance, of entertainment and culture, of education, and, yes, of living as well.

More than 16 million persons—1 out of every 11 Americans—live here. They inhabit 22 counties in 3 States; 9 of the counties—our own Hudson is 1 of them—are in New Jersey.

How can this region change the direction of its development and avoid its fate? It can do so only when we the people who live and work in it recognize what will be happening to us and then decide to do something about it.

But first we must see how we got to be the way we are.

Basic to any human settlement are the opportunities for jobs present in the area. The New York metropolitan region got its start as a port of entry for people and for goods. It continued to grow, not only because it developed into a great port, but because of the forms of economic activity that developed out of its role in commerce.

In addition to light and heavy industry and all forms of transport, there are concentrated here the financial community, the printing trades, advertising, public relations, and management experts, designers, wholesale and retail centers, nonprofit corporations and foundations, health and welfare leadership, cultural and entertainment facilities, and a host of specialized services.

Such an economic mix requires a tremendous reservoir of manpower, skills, and talent. The residents of this region provide these qualities to a degree unmatched anywhere in the world.

So concentrated are the enterprises involved that one-third of the more than 6½ million jobs are in lower Manhattan. Another one-third are in the harbor band—the rest of the core area—in cities like Jersey City, Bayonne, Kearny, Hoboken, Weehawken, Union City, West New York, and North Bergen. One-fifth are in the inner ring of suburbs, and the remainder in the outer ring, or hinterland.

However, in recent years there has been an outward movement of jobs. The trend has been to go suburban. Industry has found that the time factor is more important than the distance factor and it has been locating along the highways or in industrial parks. Here they establish themselves on large tracts of land in sprawling, one-story plants with plenty of parking space. Acreage is cheap and taxes are low—at first.

The movement to the suburbs got its start at the end of World War II because of the pent-up demand for housing and the fact that it was cheaper to buy a house in the suburbs under a veterans' or FHA mortgage than to rent an apartment in the city.

But it was more than just a matter of economics. Suburbia became a form of status and a choice of a way of life—open space, grass and trees, a big backyard, community life, small local government, good schools, and low taxes.

Many of those who rushed into suburban life soon found that although each had more space in his backyard, he also had space to cover to reach his destination—the job, stores, and other facilities. Hence the two-car family and the need to chauffeur the children around from activity to activity. As more people moved to the suburbs, the countryside was pushed farther and farther away. In addition, the price tags on homes rose rapidly.

With the need for more schools, sidewalks, sewers, and new services, taxes shot sky-high. Taking care of home and lawn became almost a second job. Direct personal contacts proved to be no more effective in influencing local government than the energetic civic organization with know-how in the city.

If this is the way things are now, what does the future hold for us? What will the metropolitan region be like 25 years from now?

The Regional Plan Association, a non-

profit civic organization engaged in research on the development of the metropolitan area, has made a number of projections on the region's growth. It is estimated that by 1985 the population of the 22-county area will increase from 16 million to 22 million, an addition equal to the present populations of Chicago and Philadelphia combined. The increase will be the largest of any 25-year period in our history, even including the years of heavy immigration early in the century.

As for the kind of residential development that is taking place outside our cities and will continue to develop if present trends continue, Regional Plan Association has coined a phrase to describe it: "spread-city."

It is a sparsely settled, homogenized Los Angeles. It is not a true city because it lacks centers. It is not a suburb because it is not attached to a central city. Nor is it truly rural, for it is loosely covered with houses and urban facilities.

There will be no "downtown" where shops, restaurants, movies, and specialized services are concentrated. The pulse and excitement, the variety, the culture that has attracted man to the city throughout history will be gone.

The effects of spread-city will not be felt only by those who live in it, but by all the inhabitants of the metropolitan region. Traffic congestion and travel time will continue to mount. Although factories may move farther out in the hinterland, their workers will not follow because they won't be able to afford the new one-family houses on large lots. It will be the executive-professional classes who will move out, but their jobs will continue to be in the core areas. This will result in a form of reverse commuting.

As Mason Gross, president of Rutgers University, has so aptly put it: "The greatest evil that we face is not the slum or even the inextricable traffic jam, but rather an emptiness or meaninglessness of our day-to-day existence. A tremendous amount of time which could be lived through and enjoyed has been thrown carelessly away on utterly meaningless experiences—most of them behind the wheel of the automobile. I suggest to you further that meaninglessness is a malignant disease. If we allow it to feed on 2 hours of our day, it will soon begin to spread to the rest."

What is bringing about the development of spread-city? Do the people of the metropolitan region prefer this mode of living? If we can find a cause, perhaps a solution will follow.

The answers to these questions can be found in the fact that the vacant land now being subdivided for housing is zoned at an average of two-thirds of an acre for a one-family house. This land is found in about 200 towns in the metropolitan area with an average population of 10,000 each.

The main reason for this policy is local taxes. Bigger lots mean fewer houses, fewer houses mean less families and fewer children, fewer children means fewer schools, fewer schools mean less taxes. Apartment building and industry would help, but they cause a loss of prestige.

What is at the heart of the problem, then, is the best use of land—new land to be developed and the reuse of old land.

A workable solution to the problems of the region already exists. What needs to be done is to revive the old natural corridor-type of development that came with the railroads in the last century. As the railroads fanned out in different directions from the major cities into the countryside, towns sprang up along the way spaced like beads on a chain. If this pattern were repeated again, we would have commercial centers and industrial clusters springing up around train stations and highway interchanges. Here, too, would be most of the apartment houses. Spread-

4135

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

March 15

ing out from these centers probably would be garden apartments and attached houses; further out would be one-family houses on small lots; still further one-family houses on large lots.

The alternative to building the region around exclusive automobile travel would be investment in a much faster and cheaper commuter rail service. The railroads are losing money on their commuter lines and seem most willing to abandon them. A public agency could supervise the region's rail network as a whole and fit it to total needs. It could set standards and fares and provide higher speed, up-to-date equipment, frequent service, and more convenient stops and transfers.

A loop system or network of rapid transit facilities connecting cities and inner suburbs and in turn linked to the outer towns by express buses or existing rail lines would provide a logical pattern for the industrial and residential development of the future. A start has been made with the port authority's takeover of the Hudson and Manhattan lines. But this is just a beginning. All these programs would have a direct effect upon improving the core cities. But specific action must also be taken along the following lines to make urban life more attractive:

1. Dramatically increase State aid for low- and middle-income housing and for improved schools.

2. Revamp taxation so that high-rise apartment houses (the potential slums of tomorrow) are not the sole form of urban renewal. Congestion is bad for family life.

3. Encourage individual home improvement; do not discourage it by penalizing the owner with a higher assessment when he makes improvements.

4. Spread public housing into the suburbs, rather than raise the density of the core cities.

5. Recognize that a city is more than just a mass of buildings. Families, especially new arrivals, need training and education in group living and civic responsibility.

6. Allow minority groups, whose purchasing power has risen meteorically in recent years, to make their contribution to urban living.

No metropolitan area in the world can offer more than this one. Whether we allow it to get out of joint or make use of the technology and planning at our disposal to improve conditions depends on how many people care and how much they care.

THE CUBAN SITUATION

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, were it not for the fact that it comes 10 years too late, I would be most gratified by the unprecedented interest expressed in this body in the conduct of our foreign relations with Latin America—particularly Cuba—and our newly developed attention to the political and economic conditions existing on that continent.

PRESENT INTEREST IN CUBA

There used to be whole weeks, indeed months, when no word concerning the aspirations and needs of our Latin neighbors was spoken in the Congress. Sometimes years would go by without any tangible action being taken by this body to alleviate the problems in Latin America, or to enable those people to better solve their own problems. Latin America was not in vogue then. Headlines proclaiming what a prominent American statesman or ordinary Member of Congress said about South America did not

come easily in those days. Now it seems the whole Nation, including those—or perhaps I should say especially those—who were most quiet then talk of little but the southern continent. There has been a change in interest and focus. What brought about the change? It was the admission of Communist adherence by a man, named Fidel Castro, who followed the typical pattern of shouting for liberty and democracy, while totally crushing the Cuban people and burying their once bright aspirations for a better life in an improved democracy.

I hope that after the present danger exemplified by Castro's Cuba has ceased to exist—and one day it will, for I fully believe the Cubans will again one day be free—our interest in the welfare of our Latin neighbors will continue.

I hope that we will not quickly forget these dangerous and unhappy days, but will forever be mindful that our own Nation's security and well-being are inextricably bound up with that of Cuba and our Latin neighbors to the south.

One of my deepest convictions is that in today's world, where jet-powered airplanes, missiles, and rocketry pull us ever closer physically, our dependence on and need for each other grow proportionately. The two continents of this Western Hemisphere are indissolubly bound together. Like the legendary Siamese twins, one cannot maintain a viable existence without the other. Recognition of this fact by the Congress is a necessary step in insuring that our own Nation's future remains economically and politically secure.

SMATHERS' LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA

It was with this in mind that, over the past 12 years, I spoke more than 170 times in the Senate—sometimes briefly, often at length—trying to call attention to the progressive deterioration in our relations with Latin America from that time in World War II, when we collaborated closely with them in joint efforts to stop the Nazis.

I recall, shortly after reaching the Senate in 1951, warning, I believe in my first speech on this Senate floor of our indifference to our Latin neighbors, and urging our Government to increase its economic assistance to the countries of Central and South America. When the Foreign Relations Committee in August of that year proposed to reduce even the small amount of technical assistance proposed by the administration for Latin America, I told the Senate:

It seems to me that we must not lose sight of our own security, which means of course the well-being and welfare of the entire Western Hemisphere. Above all, we should remember who our friends are. One of the great errors for us to make would be to forget these people who not only are in our own neighborhood, but with whom we have had friendly and beneficial relations for many years.

In July 1954, in another effort to direct our thinking southward, I warned of the Communist threat in that area by saying: "We must assist the anti-Communist forces in Latin America to eliminate the conditions of poverty and

illiteracy in which the seeds of communism blossom and flourish. The time for action is now."

With administration and congressional apathy continuing, I declared in June 1956, that "today the Soviet Union is moving into Latin America in an attempt to fill the vacuum we have left there."

Our national leaders in those days were apparently acting on the premise that the good neighbor policy, enunciated and started in the mid-1930's, would somehow work in the 1950's, even though we as a nation did no more about it than, from time to time, make a speech calculated to assuage their feelings, but nothing more.

And so, while the United States with generosity and good will unparalleled in world history granted or loaned over \$85 billion to foreign countries around the globe during the years 1947-60, the 21 nations of Latin America—our neighbors, our friends, with 180 million people and with the fastest growing population on the face of the globe—received on the average less than one-fourth of 1 percent of this \$85 billion total.

FIDEL CASTRO COMES TO POWER

Fidel Castro's coming to power in January 1959 was the beginning of the change in attitude.

We all remember that in the early months of 1959 Castro was the most heroic figure in all the hemisphere in the eyes of the general public. He was the modern Robin Hood, or, more appropriately, a Cuban "Zapata," the legendary hill fighter who fought always against tyranny.

Here was that type of man, it was said, who could revitalize the Latin American nations, who could and would throw off the shackles of inequity and oppression, who would give the people dignity and self-respect, who could operate a government like our own—one of, by, and for the people.

However, Mr. President, there were some of us who never believed this propaganda.

On January 17, 1959, 2 weeks after he came into power, I stated on a television program:

I reserve judgment on the quality of his (Castro's) ambition, his capacity to administer the affairs of Cuba, his understanding of democracy and his judgment and tolerance.

I questioned if "the people of Cuba have improved their position by merely the change of governments."

These were unhappy and unpleasant days for me—unhappy because I saw communism taking a foothold in the Caribbean with the unwitting assistance and unstinting applause of many here in our own country; unpleasant because my opposition to Castro won for me the disapproval of not only a large portion of my constituents, but virtually all of the press.

During the first week in January 1959, following Batista's flight but before Castro had completed his triumphal march from the Sierra Maestra, I was so concerned about this youthful Caesar,

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

4137

and the danger he constituted to his own people and to the hemisphere, that I made special calls to Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom. I urged him, and subsequently Secretary of State Herter, not to recognize any government set up by Castro until that government had held at least one free election.

I shall never forget being advised by Mr. Rubottom that the American public demanded recognition of Castro's regime, and this recognition was blithely given on January 7. My records reflect that 2 days later, on January 9, Mr. Rubottom and I had further discussion about Castro in my office, and on January 11 I met with a State Department delegation in still further discussion of the subject of Castro, communism, and Cuba. However, the act had been done and frankly met with overwhelming approval.

I took a trip around Central and South America from January 19 until February 10, 1959, and wherever I went in my talks with labor leaders, clergymen, government officials, and others, there was quiet but nonetheless great apprehension as to the quality of Castro's intentions.

I remember well my personal dismay when Castro was invited to address the American Society of Newspaper Editors here in Washington in April 1959. I recall that he subsequently was invited and did appear before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

The chairman was kind enough to invite me to listen in, and I particularly remember the general warmth with which Fidel Castro was received. I endeavored to ask him a few questions, but had little success as he realized I had some doubts about him. When I kept asking him when he was going to have an election, I recall he responded that "the people of Cuba don't want an election." When I pressed him further on the question of elections, he said, "I might have one in 3 or 4 years."

Despite his ominous statements, support for him was so overwhelming that I began to have doubt in my own judgment about this man.

According to my files, that very day after his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, I stated in a written press release that—

Serious trouble is brewing in the Caribbean area. The source of danger is centered in Cuba, a country which historically has always been our friend. Cuba could easily become a prisoner of the Reds. Fidel Castro, during a meeting today with several Senators, told me that elections in Cuba were 3 or 4 years away. That is not very heartening news. I asked him about his anti-American statements and he denied having made them.

I went on to say:

It is clear that he has not yet learned you can't play ball with the Communists for he has them peppered throughout his government.

In early April 1959, even more disturbing news began to come. Because I had expressed doubt about Castro, others who had doubt began to call me about their concern. I received two cablegrams from the President-of Haiti ex-

pressing fear over an anticipated invasion from Cuba. I came to the Senate floor and stated:

The President of Haiti appealed to me for help by cablegram to help forestall an invasion of his country. I sent today, April 17, 1959, a telegram to Dr. Jose Mora, Secretary-General of the OAS, urging that he take immediate action to set up a voluntary police force to keep the peace in Latin America. I suggested this police patrol be made up of the 21 member states of the OAS including the United States. We have to relieve tension in the Caribbean and put a halt to Communist troublemaking. An inter-American police force could do the job but we don't have much time to act.

It was shortly after this warning of April 17, specifically on April 24, that Castro sent against the Republic of Panama an invasion force that he had permitted to be organized and trained in Cuba. Even after this act of aggression, I don't recall any concern having been expressed by any of the Senators or news commentators who are so loudly and persistently talking today. I do recall the late Senator from New Hampshire, Styles Bridges, talking about the danger of Fidel Castro to Central and South America, and all he got for his trouble was criticism.

However, there began to be some ripple of criticism of Castro in May of 1959 when he confiscated the property and assets of 117 companies, the bulk of which were American-owned. I recall at that time making a statement to the press and on television that we should not sit idly by—that the confiscation of American property should not be ignored and that immediate and effective steps should be taken to stop it.

A month later, in June 1959, the State Department began for the first time to express some concern about Castro's acts and specifically about the need of having adequate compensation paid to those Americans who had lost their property.

On May 26, 1959, I offered, on the floor of the Senate, amendments to the Mutual Security Act which were designed to create an Inter-American Police Force, and Inter-American Court of Justice. No action was taken by the committee to which referred.

On the 31st of May 1959, after Fidel Castro and his Communist cohorts had, through executions and the use of raw power, subdued all resistance in Cuba, he again turned his eyes toward new conquests and launched an invasion of the country of Nicaragua.

That invasion was successfully turned back and incontrovertible evidence was obtained by the defenders of Nicaragua, proving beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the invasion had been financed, organized, and launched by Castro from the Island of Cuba. So far as I have been able to ascertain there was no protest or outcry about the invasion of Nicaragua by the State Department or anyone else in position of authority.

I again emphasize that there were very few people in that particular time, the summer of 1959, who were interested in clipping the wings of Fidel Castro.

He still had the bulk of the American people's support. He still had many newsmen lyrically writing about him as a

great revolutionary, despite the fact that his drumhead courts-martial had executed close to 600 of his fellow countrymen—including some who had fought alongside him in the hills against Batista—and despite the fact that he had completely flaunted the rights of U.S. citizens and property owners and had launched invasions of Panama and Nicaragua.

On June 14 and June 20, 1959, invasion forces organized in Cuba were directed against Santo Domingo. These were stopped and, from the sketchy reports, it appeared that every member of that expeditionary force from Cuba was exterminated. Once again, sufficient evidence was recovered from the bodies of the invaders to establish that these forces were sent on their mission by Fidel Castro and the Communists.

On October 13, 1959, the little country of Haiti was invaded, again by forces from the Island of Cuba, and again under the direction of Castro's Communists. This invasion was again defeated by Haitians who had been trained in military tactics by a detachment of 50 U.S. Marines.

On October 26 Castro, becoming ever more arrogant and contemptible in his conduct toward the United States and his neighbors in this hemisphere, and feeling ever more secure in his relationship with the Communists, accused the United States of aggression.

He reestablished his drumhead military courts and began to summarily execute political prisoners without recognition of any of the elementary personal rights whatsoever. As of this date it was estimated the Castro regime had executed over 500 people. Later the total was to reach well over 1,000.

In January 1960 and through the early part of February I made another trip to the Central and South American countries and upon my return I outlined in a Senate speech on February 24 an eight-point program calculated to limit the activities of Castro's Communists in Central and South America.

Among other things, I asked that we turn over to the OAS all the information which the FBI, CIA, and our other intelligence agencies had in their files on communism in Cuba and Castro's connection with it.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover had at this time—and long before—a dozzier on Castro and his Communist connections that should have convinced the most ardent fan of Castro's in the State Department, of his allegiance to communism, but I doubt if they ever asked for this information or saw it.

In that speech, I urged the United States to urge the OAS to act. I said the United States should not act unilaterally. I suggested that the OAS should examine the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Cuba. I also said that "Castro has now identified himself for what he is—a man who, if not himself a Communist, is certainly doing the work of the Communists with the direct help of the Communists."

On March 5, 1960, Castro accused the United States of complicity in the explosion of a munitions ship in the Havana

Harbor which killed hundreds of people.

On March 25 in a TV interview I said "I deeply regret the administration's return of Ambassador Bonsal to Cuba" from where he had been withdrawn on January 21, and I pointed out that this move would be mistaken by the people of Latin America.

I had visited in my office with Ambassador Bonsal prior to his return. I suggested to him that he not return, arguing that it would appear in the minds of many of our friends in Latin America that, in fact, we wanted to see the government of Fidel Castro succeed and that his action would be interpreted as endorsement of Castro's actions. Bonsal said the decision was not his to make.

Again I took the matter up with the State Department and other officials without any success, for Ambassador Bonsal was returned.

It was because of this action that I said in the television interview mentioned above, that "even though we claim in our press and elsewhere about our desire to get rid of dictators, it would appear that we are standing behind this dictator."

At this particular time I recall distinctly having a visit with Secretary Christian Herter, for whom I personally have great affection and respect, and asking him to withdraw Mr. Bonsal for the second time as Ambassador to Cuba.

I pointed out that "Che" Guevara, who was at that time the head of the National Bank of Cuba, in a recent speech in Havana had five times said that the Soviet Union was the best friend Cuba ever had.

None of my warnings seemed to convince anyone. Shortly thereafter in a TV program I said:

For many, many years this administration has talked about the appeasement they thought had gone on in the Far East and other areas of the globe—they made a great to-do about the statement that they would under no conditions appease—that they would stand strong in the face of the Communist movement. But in this particular instance I think we have some sickening appeasement.

On April 7, 1960, I made another general speech on the floor of the Senate in which I recommended a six-point program to strengthen ties between the United States and Latin America.

On May 23, 1960, Castro seized U.S. oil refineries and said they would be required in order to process Russian crude oil.

On May 27, 1960, the U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. economic aid program to Cuba, which had been running between \$150,000 and \$200,000 a year, would be terminated on December 1, 1960.

It was further announced that the U.S. military aid which was at that time consisting of training Cuban air cadets in Texas would be terminated in June of 1960.

I praised President Eisenhower on this action and I said:

I am glad that the President has now taken a realistic and sensible position with respect to the Communist-dominated Castro

government. It has never made sense to me to have our Government giving aid and comfort to another government which is openly vilifying us and our way of life.

I went on to say that—

I hope that those who have up to now sought a continuation of a very partial and preferential sugar legislation as it pertains to Cuba will be willing to reevaluate their position to revise the legislation in a realistic and up-to-date manner.

Shortly thereafter on May 28, 1960, I introduced a bill revoking Cuba's preferential sugar quota and distributing it to five friendly Latin-American countries which never up to that time shared in the U.S. sugar market.

I said:

We are permitting Cuba to sell into the United States over 3 million tons of sugar on which we are giving her a premium price of over 8 cents per pound—3 cents over the world price. This means Cuba gets \$300 million a year from the U.S. housewife. That money, I presume, would be used to further entrench the pro-Communist government and propagandize the Cuban people against the United States and for the Soviet Union.

On June 11, 1960, Castro seized U.S. owned Havana Hotel and Nacional Hotel.

On June 30, 1960, on the floor of the Senate, I urged the establishment again of the hemisphere police force to preserve the peace and security of this hemisphere against the menace of communism and also expressed support of the administration's protest to the OAS of Castro's campaign of lies and slander against the United States.

On July 13, 1960, I again urged the recall of our Ambassador Bonsal and reaffirmation of our treaty rights to Guantanamo Bay, and the placing of the case of Cuba and its control by the Communists before the OAS.

On August 10, 1960, in a public statement, I urged U.S. agencies, particularly the border patrol—Immigration and Naturalization Service—to cease harassing Cuban exiles operating from Florida in their efforts to open lines of communication with democratic forces inside Cuba.

On August 12, 1960, I wrote a letter to President Eisenhower in which I proposed that consideration be given to withdrawing preferential tariff treatment to the Cuban Government in connection with all imports, particularly with respect to sugar, fruit, and vegetables.

I also suggested that the United States impound payments for any commodities received from Cuba and hold until such times as concessions were made with respect to U.S. interests, since Castro had seen fit to prevent American dollars paid for U.S. commodities sold in Cuba from getting out of the country.

On August 31, 1960, after the close of the conference of the OAS in San Jose, Costa Rica, I issued a statement in which I criticized strongly the State Department's support of the watered-down, milk-toast, slap-on-the-wrist type of condemnation of international Communists.

It will be remembered that even with Secretary Herter as our representative at that meeting, the conference did not

have the forthrightness to mention the name of Fidel Castro or the Communist government of Cuba. I called it then, "a diplomatic defeat of the first magnitude."

On the floor of the Senate I noted that the San Jose Conference called for the overthrow of the government of Trujillo but refused even to mention the government of Fidel Castro. I went on to say that the Dominican government "is a government we surely do not approve of; its leadership is undemocratic and dictatorial"; but I asked, "Is there any doubt concerning the real threat to our freedom today?" "It, of course, is communism, and where is the fountainhead of international communism in Latin America today? Not in the Dominican Republic, but in the Communist government of Fidel Castro, and every informed person knows it, and most will admit it."

I asked in that speech:

Who is it in the State Department or in the administration who believes that the 30-year-old government of the Dominican Republic is a greater threat to the freedom of the Western Hemisphere than the Communist government of Cuba?

Who is it that really believes that the government of the Dominican Republic needed to be ostracized and expelled, but that the government of Cuba should go along threatening freedom without even so much as a verbal spanking?

In that speech I said that—

The administration has failed in its leadership because it was unable to cause our friends in the hemisphere to see the difference between an ancient, static, expiring, nonexportable dictatorship and a new, inflammatory, virulent, belligerent, expanding military dictatorship of the Communist variety that is working hand in glove with Khrushchev and Red China.

I asked, "Can fairminded men call this result a great victory?" "I warn my friends in Latin America that Castro's communism aims to destroy them."

I closed the speech by saying:

We must stop deluding our friends in Latin America and stop deceiving ourselves into a sense of false security by adopting pious declarations, which dismay the Communists not at all. We stand on the thin edge of disaster. This is no place for the timorous. This is no time for listening to those who do not realize or refuse to admit we are now in the throes of a tremendous struggle between the free world and the Communist world.

We must stop penalizing those nations who have befriended us. We must take our position as firmly and defiantly as the Communists have taken theirs—and we must encourage every nation and all peoples everywhere to take their stand with us and make their choice for freedom now—or the world will have no choice at all.

On September 21, 1960, I again called on the Government to bring Ambassador Bonsal home; I asked it to ban shipments to Cuba of U.S. machinery or equipment or replacement parts, and to start increasing our long-range broadcasts from the United States to Cuba.

On November 15, 1960, I urged Secretary Herter to call for a plenary session of the OAS to investigate the threat of Castro's communism to this hemisphere and for the United States to as-

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

4139

sume the leadership for the formation of an Inter-American Police Force.

On January 7, 1961, I wrote a letter to outgoing Secretary Herter and incoming Secretary of State Dean Rusk urging the banning of all Cuban imports to the United States in order to put an economic squeeze on Castro's government and try to bring it down. There was criticism of this by some Florida industries who depended upon Cuban products, but I felt the situation called for such action.

On February 15, 1961, after the change of administration, in another speech on the Senate floor, I said:

The time has come for action in the Cuban situation. We should adopt an economic embargo calculated to bring Castro to his knees and the Cuban people to freedom.

BAY OF PIGS

On April 17, 1961, we remember, less than 4 months after this administration had come into office, an attack was launched by a group of 1,500 Cubans who had been trained in the far reaches of Guatemala under the supervision of military experts recruited in the United States.

This plan for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs had not been some new development of the new administration because we know that, as a matter of fact, these men were gathered together and sent to Guatemala for training in 1960, before the change of administration.

From my own personal knowledge I know that these men had been held and trained for so long a time in Guatemala and other Central American countries that most of them had become discouraged, and some had left the ranks in their belief that the U.S. Government would never permit them to try to win back freedom for their own country.

Here in the United States there was great concern as to what determination should be made with respect to these Cuban invasion forces. This occurred prior to the beginning of the invasion. Should they be returned to the United States and dispersed, or should they be permitted to make the effort to free their own homeland?

While I was not consulted officially about this matter, my opinion was asked for by some people in lower echelons of the Government, and it was my judgment that the men should be permitted to make the effort to free their country, for they would never be happy until they had made this noble effort; but, of course, it should be made only after sound military judgment had been obtained that the endeavor had some chance of success.

Everyone now knows of the enormous miscalculations and mistakes that were made.

I think the President, whose final decision it was, did the right thing when he assumed the full responsibility for the fiasco. This was the manful and courageous thing to do. But the fact remains that there was considerable misjudgment on the part of many agencies and persons who had a part in the decision. No one man—be he even the President of the United States—can make correct judgments when he is proceeding from inadequate information.

The Bay of Pigs is now sad history. Had it succeeded, Cuba would have been free and our problems would have been lessened to a great extent, although, of course, not totally eliminated.

Some, it is now revealed, counseled against the invasion before it occurred. I thought, and still think, the "Go" signal was the correct one, based on the facts then available.

I never did subscribe to, nor do I now, the theory that the Latins would be appalled by our impetuosity or by our show of strength. Latins like leadership and strength; they always have, and they always will.

They have a history of 400 years of respecting, admiring, and looking up to strong leadership. That is why they still continue to admire strong leadership.

Everyone has 20-20 rear vision.

That judgment on the Bay of Pigs can be debated a long time. But surely the man who gave the word "Go; rescue your homeland; defeat and overthrow the Communists" cannot now in fairness have it even suggested that he is timorous or afraid of action. Couple this with the acts of October 1962, his quarantine, his confrontation with Khrushchev, and no man can fairly say that this President is not always prepared to act.

But to continue with the chronology, before discussing broader concepts, on June 21, 1961, shortly after Castro's May 1 declaration of Cuba as a Socialist, or Communist state, and some 2 months after the catastrophe at the Bay of Pigs, I again warned that "to hope Castro communism will wither away and die on the vine is both woolheaded and dangerous. Western Hemisphere nations must act now to expel Castro before he wins his race with time."

On July 20, 1961, in a speech on the Senate floor I urged U.S. recognition of the Cuban Government-in-exile and the creation of an Inter-American Military Force again.

I continued to urge on this administration the placing of an import embargo on trade with Castro, and I was highly gratified when on February 3, 1962, this administration took such action. Thereafter, the many millions of dollars which they had been receiving in trade were denied to them, and conditions were obviously made worse for Fidel Castro.

In a Florida speech on May 3, 1962, I stated that "Castro continued to work full throttle against the hemisphere's free nations," pointing out that Cuba has set up subversive schools, indoctrination centers, and propaganda classrooms to instruct teachers, students, intellectuals, political leaders, and revolutionaries from all over Latin America. I said:

The plan is to send these Communist-indoctrinated people back to their homelands and set them to work subverting their countries with the hoped-for Communist takeovers scheduled 1, 5 or even 10 years from now.

On June 18, 1962, I called for the establishment of a four-point program designed to make the policy of the United States toward Latin America, as I said, "one of realism and not romanticism."

I recommended the welding of our

economic program in Latin America with our political goals; the establishment of an Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs reporting directly to the President; and again called for recognition of a Cuban Government-in-exile, stating, "We are going to have to meet this Red challenge with determination, and I am confident we will do so."

On September 5, 1962, I made this statement:

The presence in Cuba of 5,000 so-called technicians from the Soviet bloc makes even more compelling the need for an Inter-American Police Force to back up inter-hemispheric treaties based on the Monroe Doctrine which pledges to keep communism out of this hemisphere.

In addition, I urged, as I have time and again in the past, that the United States recognize and support a democratic Cuban Government-in-exile, whose first purpose is the liberation of the Cuban people from Communist tyranny. I said:

Such a free Cuban regime could openly receive support from the United States towards the accomplishment of this goal and the eventual restoration of their liberties to oppressed Cuban citizens.

On September 18, 1962, I introduced in the Senate two resolutions. One called for recognition of the Cuban Government-in-exile and the other supporting establishment of an inter-American military alliance.

Mr. President, some people may wonder why I have gone to such lengths to recite the record in such detail.

My answer is that I am trying to point out, among other things, why this problem of Cuba is not now and never has been the problem of a single political party, but instead, is the problem of both parties and all Americans. It is the problem of the Nation as a whole.

It goes without saying that so far as removing Castro and the Communists from Cuba is concerned, it would have been considerably easier to have done it in 1959 or 1960 than it would have been in 1961 or 1962, or than it will be in 1963 or 1964.

For the Island has been continuously fortified and militarized, and more and more modern and sophisticated weapons have been employed.

But no programs were developed in 1959 or 1960; and in January 1961, at the change of administrations, the outgoing one merely passed along the growing problem of Cuba to the incoming Administration, as one passes a very hot potato from his own hand to that of his unsuspecting dinner partner.

I have recited some—and only some—of the instances when I spoke in the Senate and elsewhere in 1961 and 1962, calling the attention of this administration to the need for developing a program having for its ultimate goal the freedom of Cuba. While I have yet to learn of a long-range program, this administration did put into effect, in 1961, the economic embargo which had as its result the denial to Castro of the use of many millions of dollars which he had previously realized each year from trade with this country.

The administration also diligently exercised pressure in an effort to get

other allies to stop trading with Castro's Cuba. In this endeavor, the administration was moderately successful.

The administration did, in 1961, initiate a meeting of all the members of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este, in Chile, and did succeed in getting three-fourths of the nations of the hemisphere—for the first time—to strongly condemn Fidel Castro and his brand of communism in Cuba.

That was the first time that such a specific resolution had ever been gotten from the Organization of American States. Since that time, several other minor measures have been adopted, looking toward making life more difficult for the Communists in Cuba; but the problem of communism in Cuba remains and constantly grows.

Mr. President, Cuba is a serious problem equaling in importance, in my judgment, any that we have in Europe or in southeast Asia or anywhere else in the world. It cannot be swept under the rug, ignored, or minimized; and I do not believe that anyone, or any government, is today trying to do that, because all recognize now the total seriousness of the problem of Cuba.

It is a problem that, if not handled correctly, could quickly lead to nuclear war. It is a problem that may lead to the involvement of the United States and its allies in a bloody conventional war. It is fraught with peril of most every kind; and certainly, therefore, it should not be discussed or debated in partisan terms.

Our Nation's future and the future of the free world are too important to become topics of partisan discussion. At the same time, they are important enough to deserve and bear discussion by troubled and conscientious men and women who are sincerely seeking solutions.

The problem of Cuba, therefore, deserves the best nonpartisan attention of all of our minds in the best and highest tradition of Americans who are earnestly concerned about the future of our country.

RUSSIAN TROOP BUILDUP

Mr. President, in September 1962, while many of us were campaigning, we began to see in the press and to hear over the radio reports about the now-famed buildup of Russian offensive missiles and bombers.

I must say that prior to that time, on many visits in and out of Miami, where the refugee colony makes its headquarters, I had been advised by Cuban refugee friends that they thought missiles were being erected in Cuba. Some gave me handmade maps depicting the location of the alleged missiles; others wrote letters describing them; others merely poured into my ears their suspicions and fears.

I turned over every scrap of this information to the Central Intelligence Agency, where I thought it should go for proper examination and evaluation.

However, Mr. President, it is eminently clear that prior to October 14, the day when the "picture" was finally obtained of missiles actually on site, there was really no hard, provable evidence on

hand, not the kind of certain and demonstrable evidence on which a great and responsible nation could act.

There were circumstances and there was considerable talk on the part of refugees regarding a missile buildup; and to me it was apparent that this word was getting to the CIA and to our intelligence outfits for the U-2 flights, which all through the summer had been occurring on a basis of two every month, and which were stepped up to four a month in September.

In September, there were flights on September 5, 17, 26, and 29; in October there were flights on the 5th and the 7th, and, of course, on the 14th. None produced any evidence of the missiles, although the reports continued to come in, and many people began to believe the missiles were there, even though no photograph had shown them. Then, I think, some adjustments began to be made even prior to October 14, although I have no exact knowledge of this. In any event, the overflight of October 14 showed the missiles.

Thereafter, the President of the United States called off his speaking trip, returned to Washington, met with the heads of the CIA, the Defense and the State Departments, and others, and, after great soul searching, evolved a program as to what would be done.

All of us know now that the congressional leadership on both sides was called back to Washington, prior to the President's speech on October 22.

The President announced to those of us gathered at the White House what had developed in Cuba; and, after discussion, he stated what he intended to do. There was comment with respect to additional steps which some of those present thought should be taken. However, the President fully and satisfactorily explained why he felt it was more correct to pursue the course upon which he had determined.

Everyone there, publicly or privately, I am sure, pledged his support to the President and the course of action which the President outlined for the Nation to follow.

I am sure that everyone of us was greatly moved and deeply concerned as the President delivered his magnificent message, in which he clearly pointed out that there would be no toleration of Communist offensive missiles or bombers in Cuba; that the offensive missiles had to be removed; that if any of them was launched at the United States or at our neighbors, the United States would fire back—not at Cuba, but at the source of the problem, the Soviet Union.

I am sure that all of us recall vividly with what great apprehension and concern we lived in the next few hours and the next few days. And as the build-up of our manpower and might in south Florida and the Caribbean speeded up, I am sure we all recall with what final consummate relief we heard the announcement that Mr. Khrushchev had, in effect, backed down; that he had agreed to the withdrawal of the offensive weapons.

We truly, as the Bible says, "walked through the valley of the shadow" and emerged unscathed.

Mr. Khrushchev did not wish, at this time at least, to start a war over Cuba, for he agreed to back his missiles and bombers out of Cuba, which must have been humiliating and awkward for him. While we did not get the on-site inspection asked for, because of Castro's intransigence, nevertheless the Communists permitted our planes to fly at low altitudes over the missile sites, without gunfire being directed at them, and permitted inspection by our airplanes and our surface ships of the missiles and bombers being returned to the Soviet Union.

It is also worthy of note that today our planes are daily flying low and high over Cuba, for inspection purposes; and none of the very effective anti-aircraft weapons—the SAM, the SA-2, and others which have great efficiency—have been fired at our planes. Mr. Khrushchev realized that the President was and is ready to go to any extremity to get those offensive weapons—a threat to U.S. security—removed from Cuba, and, furthermore, that he had to be satisfied that they were removed. That is why the Communists have permitted the flights every day over Cuba, to observe what is happening with respect to missiles, troop concentrations, and removals. No shot has been fired at our photographic planes, and none will be fired, because the President has made it crystal clear he will not permit it without instant retaliation.

Mr. Khrushchev, having also agreed to withdraw some of the 17,000 troops remaining in Cuba after the missiles and bombers left, is now in process of doing that. How many have left, I do not know. But State Department sources indicate that some 2,500 have left, and also even some of the units of the four armored groups that were there.

I was pleased to note in the March 9 issue of the Washington Star, however, that Mr. Antoly Dobrynin, Soviet Foreign Minister, stated that a substantial pullout would be completed by mid-March, as Mr. Khrushchev had promised. I am certain that President Kennedy is exerting all the influence he can to see to it that all the Russian forces are withdrawn from the island.

It is interesting to see what some people—now that the critical danger has receded—have chosen to criticize. When the President, in late October, held our national and individual destinies in his hands, few voices were heard; almost everyone was breathless while the President spoke clearly and firmly. I, for one, did not have much to say, and I do not recall that anyone did.

Now, however, there are loud cries and criticisms of an intelligence gap between September and October, of inter-agency confusion, over concessions made or imagined, and so forth. But the important thing to remember is that the President when confronted with the actual direct threat to the security of the United States acted with consummate courage and skill to protect our national interest. He acted in accord with the highest traditions of American statesmanship and successfully eliminated a threat of monstrous proportions to our national existence.

Because the Constitution of the United States puts into the hands of the executive branch of the Government—or the President of the United States—the final authority and responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, I think he should be permitted without personal harassment or political attack to proceed along this logical line of getting Soviet troops removed from Cuba, for I would challenge anyone to suggest that there is a more useful course of action looking toward the total solution of the problem of Cuba than that of removing the troops and technicians of the Soviet Union from Cuba.

But, Mr. President, what of the future? What are our long-range goals?

Certainly, they are to see Cuba freed. But do we have a program or a plan of action? If the President has, of course he does not have to tell it to anyone. I have not heard of any plan, and I think if we are to free Cuba and keep the respect of our Latin neighbors we have to have a plan or a program which we can logically follow to a final and happy solution of a free Cuba.

Now I would like to offer a program, or plan of action, but before doing so I want to make it clear I speak only for myself. I speak only for the junior Senator from Florida. I have not cleared this speech with anyone. This voice is speaking only for me.

In the past I have recommended all sorts of programs of action. I have talked about a combination of measures, embargoes, quarantines, economic measures, political measures, propaganda measures, diplomatic measures, and others. But at no time have I recommended that the United States declare war on Cuba or act unilaterally with our own military force.

Since the buildup of weapons and men in Cuba last fall by the Soviets, the situation has changed. We now have a new dimension to consider, the possibility of direct confrontation of Soviet troops and United States troops.

Furthermore, in the light of the enormous amount of military equipment put into Cuba, we have a much more difficult situation to deal with than we did in 1960 or 1961.

When we talk about strong measures today, particularly when we imply force even though we may not say it, we are in reality talking about a direct confrontation of the military forces of the United States with the military forces of the Soviet Union, unless we first are successful in getting these forces out of Cuba. Such a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States forces we have not had thus far in our history.

During the Korean war, while we fought the Red Chinese and undoubtedly many Soviets, nevertheless they operated clandestinely under color of the North Koreans and/or Red Chinese. However, so long as the Soviet military troops remain in Cuba, the prospects of escalating action in Cuba into total war are infinitely greater because any unilateral action against Cuba, or even action led by U.S. forces puts, for the first time,

U.S. military forces in direct confrontation with those of the Soviet Union.

As stated, I think this adds a new dimension of danger to our already difficult problem.

I do not go so far as to say that we should never act, or that we should not proceed, even if some of the military of the Soviet Union stay there. I would emphasize, however, that the solution to the problem of Cuba, which means the elimination of communism from Cuba, is infinitely easier without the Soviet forces there. I say that their removal will diminish greatly the prospects of whatever action is finally taken in Cuba escalating into a total world and nuclear war. It has been the consideration of this problem, the gravity of it, the enormity of it, the complexity of it, which has made me feel that the President is on the right track in first getting removed from Cuba the offensive missiles and bombers and, thereafter, insisting upon the removal of the Soviet personnel.

Furthermore, we must keep in mind that today, when we suggest further action, either in the form of a blockade or a raid, this involves the use of force. And force, of course, means war. It might be limited and small—or it might be unlimited and staggering in its consequences. When we embark on a blockade of an island like Cuba, for it to be effective the blockader must make up his mind he may have to go to the length of shooting and sinking a surface ship as one starts into Cuba with supplies and personnel, or of shooting down an aircraft which is loaded with supplies and personnel.

In any event, the act of shooting a plane or a ship is an act of war and, as the President said in his last news conference, any such action on our part will probably call up an immediate response.

Furthermore, let us be sure when we talk of force and war we know what we are talking about. This use of force, this war we are talking about, is not a cold war waged in the daily press and over the conference tables. It is not a war of words in which our Secretary of Defense corrects the blusterings of the Soviet Defense Minister on the number of operative U.S. missiles or the size of our thermonuclear bombs. Not even a guerrilla war in which railroad bridges are destroyed and crops burned or sugar mills sabotaged.

We are talking about a war in which troops storm a beachhead, where platoons are sent to knock out a bunker, a war in which villages are destroyed by artillery fire, a war in which lives would be lost and men maimed and crippled for life, a war which could well leave fatherless thousands of children.

There may be some who think that now is the time for war. Some who advocate, rather glibly, that American forces turned quickly on Castro's Cuba—and get the job over with. It may come to that, but everyone should know exactly what they are talking about. I hope they have given thought to not just the phrases but the consequences as well.

How many American troops, for example, would be required to die in order to land a large effective fighting force on an island which has 150 coastal defense missiles and operational sites for most of them? These missiles can reach troop ships 40 miles out. How many troops, landing craft, and even transports could be sent to the bottom of the Caribbean by a dozen operative missile launching torpedo boats, whose launch range is 15 miles, which the Cubans now have?

How many aircraft would be lost in attaining air superiority over a small island with 500 surface to antiaircraft missiles and defended by 100 Migs, over 40 of them capable of matching our F-104 Starfighter in performance and all piloted, we must presume, by skilled aviators and directed by 200 modern radars?

How many soldiers would be lost in subduing a force of some 75,000 regular and, we must presume, fanatically indoctrinated troops, fighting on their home ground, and backed by at least 100,000 militiamen and 100,000 home guard troops?

They are fully equipped with tanks, field artillery pieces, antitank guns and other modern weapons. They are a formidable force and would be operating defensively, taking a tremendous toll of any liberating force.

Once a beachhead for the liberating force was established how long would the battle for the island take?

How many casualties, American casualties, would it cost to subdue Cuba?

I have no access to contingency plans but we hear figures such as a month and 100,000 casualties. I gather that our military planners see no quick, glorious charge up San Juan Hill now. Rather they envision a long, grueling, and bloody war waged in the most exhausting and savage tradition of the 20th century world wars.

And would the war for the liberation of Cuba remain limited?

I challenge anyone to say he knows. We can carry on some logical speculation. It might be a war confined to the island of Cuba and the waters surrounding it.

Or it might be a war which precipitates a Soviet move into Berlin with all that implies. Or action in Cuba might precipitate full-scale conflict in southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam or Laos.

Or how do we know that the war to liberate Cuba will not really touch off the total thermonuclear conflict which each of us prays daily will not occur. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky says it will. Can we assume he does not mean it?

Our Defense Secretary has said we will defend Berlin—with nuclear bombs if necessary—and I am sure every man in this Chamber approves this stand and knows that Mr. McNamara spoke for the President when he said it. We know the United States means it, that we will defend West Berlin and if necessary with nuclear weapons.

Malinovsky has said essentially the same thing about Cuba. Can we be certain he does not mean what he said?

Can we be as certain that he does not mean it as we are certain that Secretary McNamara does?

I do not know. To take action which could imperil the national existence on the basis of a pleasant and encouraging assumption would be one of the greatest gambles in history. I believe that it is within the context of real and violent warfare that the calls for a blockade or an all-out assault on Cuba must be evaluated. Well, if war is the final answer, if any Member of this Chamber feels it is worth it at this point in order to clear Russian troops from Cuba, he is in the right place to call for it.

As we all know, Congress has the right to declare war on Russia, on Cuba, and the first step is for one of the Members of the body to submit a resolution declaring the existence of a state of war. This has not yet been done, and I do not think it will be done any time soon.

However, while the consequences of any meaningful action are extremely grave, we must nevertheless not be frightened out of doing our duty or living up to our traditions of fighting for freedom.

As we look at the present situation and talk about it with some appreciation of what we are talking about, let us not fail to offer solutions, if we think we have them, but let us make whatever suggestions we have in the realization that the problem is a bipartisan matter and that if we become totally involved, bullets do not merely pick out Democrats or Republicans. Neither red-blooded Americans nor bullets know partisanship.

In this context of understanding, without political motivations and only in an effort to be helpful to the President of the United States, who, of course, has to make the final decision for all in this Nation on matters of this character, I would like for the next few minutes to discuss the situation as it exists today, and what I think we may have to do in the future, and why.

I think we must first settle in our minds whether or not this Nation can long abide Fidel Castro and communism in Cuba.

I know that there is a small body of opinion that would say because Cuba is now too dangerous for us to fool with, therefore, we should do nothing about it except ignore it and hope it goes away.

I am not one of those who subscribe to that theory of hoping it will go away. For hope has yet to remove a Communist dictatorship anywhere in the world.

Tightly controlled police states do not wither on the vine. I do not believe the Communists will surrender merely because we hope they will.

There are others who subscribe to the containment theory as the policy to follow under present circumstances—the easiest policy to follow. Containment is the recognition of the status quo within a country, while at the same time restricting its overt actions outside its borders. However, the danger from Cuba today does not lie solely in the fact

that it may attack over the border a neighbor country. We are pledged to and we can easily stop that.

The danger in a continuing Communist government in Cuba, even though contained within Cuba's physical boundaries, lies in that Cuba will continue as it is now, the fountainhead of subversion, propaganda and training. We can stop the exportation of its troops to other lands, but we cannot stop the exportation of its ideas, its propaganda, its training of subversives.

Millions of tons of literature depart Cuba for other Central and South American countries every month. Propaganda broadcasts to Central and South America have been increased in the last 18 months from 80 hours a week to over 150 hours.

John McCone, Director of the CIA, admitted recently, and it was made public, that some 1,500 revolutionaries from other Central and South American countries trained in Cuba last year. This type of activity is almost impossible to stop, short of extirpating the Communist government itself.

However, the greatest danger of a "contained" but "continuing" Cuba under communism is that it negates and renders ineffective our long-range program of helping our Latin American neighbors through the Alliance for Progress.

As we all know, Alianza Para el Progreso is a program calculated to build up the economy, the standards of living, and the literacy of the people, through economic and technical aid from the United States, while simultaneously effecting tax, land and social reform from within.

It envisions the expenditure of U.S. funds in the neighborhood of close to \$1 billion each year for 10 years. For this noble purpose, however, Mr. President, Latin America needs 90 percent more funds than this. It was reasoned that these additional large sums would be supplied from two sources: First, the country itself; and second, private capital. However, neither of these two sources is available if communism remains in Cuba.

As the Alliance was planned, 80 percent of the contribution was to be made by the Latins themselves, both through their governments and through private investment. However, with local governments, such as Venezuela, expending their time and energies in building up their armed forces, staying busy putting down Cuban instigated riots, spending their money and energies on day-to-day existence, the deep economic and social problems will never get either the attention or the money which their solution require.

And private investment, either of Latin American or United States origin, is obviously going to look for more stable and secure markets, even if the interest rate is not as high as it currently is in Latin America. A corporate executive is not going to put his stockholders' money into an area where it might be confiscated without any reimbursement, as was done in Cuba, nor is a private individual going to invest his savings in a land which

may fall under a Communist influence at any given moment.

As an example, the flow of new U.S. private investment in South America has plummeted in recent years. In 1957 U.S. citizens and businesses put \$1,164 million in direct investment into the area. By 1961 direct new investment had dropped to only \$141 million, a drop of more than 70 percent. This figure comes from the Bureau of International Commerce of the Department of Commerce.

Government sources estimate that when the 1962 totals are finally calculated they will show a flow back to the United States of more than \$10 million. In other words, more U.S. private capital was pulled out than was put into Latin America in 1962.

In the case of needed private investment from Latin sources themselves, the situation appears equally critical.

Because of the threat of a Communist-type dictatorship in most every country of South America, local capital is fleeing in enormous amounts out of Latin America into banks and investment in Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, and even Hong Kong.

The Alliance for Progress is the most realistic, long-term attempt we have ever made to help the Latin American nations out of the cycle of poverty, ignorance, and illness, in which for centuries they have been caught. It must not fail if we are to keep the countries to the south of us in the column of the free world. Yet there can be no doubt that the continued existence of Castro's Cuba insures its eventual failure. Because the Alliance, operating by itself does not have the money to do the job, because the U.S. Treasury cannot fill the vacuum caused by the fear of investment on the part of outside private capital and the flight of local capital.

This means, Mr. President, that Fidel Castro and communism must go before we can get moving on the big job of realizing the aims and ambitions of the Alliance for Progress.

How then can we get Castro and communism out of Cuba? I see only two alternatives.

First, we can, through various sources, attempt to foster an internal defection and uprising against Castro—in effect, turn Castro's own weapons back on him. This has some appeal primarily because it looks easy, but the lessons learned from East Germany and Hungary cause some pessimism. A rebellion against a tightly controlled police state is not likely to succeed.

No doubt there are in Cuba huge numbers of people among the military, the campesinos, the laborers, and, in fact, among all groups and classes, who are praying for the demise of Castro and the Communists. But in a land under communism, overridden with informers, and disciplined by brutal secret police, the organization and execution of a revolt or mass defection is an infinitely difficult thing. Perhaps it could be successful in Cuba, but being realistic rather than romantic, we should not count on it.

It seems to me in searching for a plan of attack, we must face up to the fact that there is no easy or inexpensive short-run solution to the problem of Castro and communism. There was in 1959. It might have still been easy in 1960, but no longer.

Realizing the problem of Castro and communism will not be solved overnight, I suggest putting into action a long-range plan which envisions only ultimately, and, in the final analysis, if need be, the use of force in order to get rid of Fidel Castro.

However, if it comes to force, the program envisions Latins and Cubans, who believe in freedom, leading that force against the Latin Communists of Fidel Castro. In other words, the program envisions Latins-for-freedom versus Latins-for-dictatorship.

After all, the problems posed by Castro are greatest with respect to the Latin American nations, and as such it is the Latin nations which should begin to bear an increasing responsibility for bringing about a solution.

More specifically, communism has established its hemispheric fortress in Cuba and, in the final analysis, it should be, and can be the Cubans who assume the leadership in what will have to be of necessity a joint undertaking.

The value of turning to the Latins to provide the leadership and most of the manpower required to do the job, returns the problem to its proper place as a Western Hemisphere problem, to be handled within the framework of already existing treaties and agreements entered into by all the Western Hemisphere countries.

Furthermore, there is no sense in purposely bringing about a situation in which Mr. Khrushchev, already ignominiously removing his missiles from Cuba, is required once again to either back down or fight, because of direct confrontation with our troops, or a specific challenge from us.

I do not know, and I do not believe anyone does, just how far Mr. Khrushchev believes he can back up before he destroys his own position, with his ally the belligerent Chinese Reds, or with his own military leaders within the Soviet Union.

I see no point in plotting a course at this time that does not afford Mr. Khrushchev a door through which he can move to avoid confrontation with us, if he wants to. This program which I shall suggest, in which the action taken is called for and lead by Cubans and Latins, in some measure avoids the confrontation and thereby lessens the possibility that, if and when force comes into use, the encounter will escalate into total war or nuclear war.

If the Cubans and other freedom-loving Latins are to take charge of the Castro problem, there must be a rallying point for them, a central body which can focus and direct their efforts. I see no group which can do this, which can speak in the name of all the Cuban people, except a fully constituted Government-in-exile which is recognized by us and other hemispheric nations. We should acknowledge its power to make

treaties, conduct foreign relations, borrow money, establish armed forces, and enter into all activities of a regularly constituted government. As I understand it, from international lawyers dealing regularly with such matters, our recognition of an exile government would be preceded by withdrawal of recognition of the present regime.

The only argument I have heard against such a government-in-exile is, How will it be formed when all the exiles are divided as to who or what group will lead it?

First, I am certain that any government selected by the Government of the United States and announced as the exile Government of Cuba will, in fact, be the Government-in-exile. However, there is a more democratic method of procedure if our officials want to follow it.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Refugee Committee have the names and addresses of every refugee in the United States and Puerto Rico. Why not send each one a ballot, asking him or her to write their first, second, or third choices down—sort of like an absentee ballot here in all our States of the United States.

It would be relatively simple to carry out a poll by mail and under the supervision of a group of prominent exiled Cuban jurists, in which each exiled Cuban adult is asked for a free expression of who should head an exile Government. No doubt, there would be some errors and duplication—this is inevitable—but it would provide a consensus and would give support to the man or men who finally act as the Government-in-exile.

Once it was established who the Cuban people had selected to lead the fight to free their homeland, U.S. recognition should be immediate.

This would emphasize to the other hemispheric nations that the efforts of free Cubans to expunge communism from Cuba have our full support and lead to recognition of the exile Government by other hemispheric nations.

Moreover, there are nations in Latin America which would act as host to the Government-in-exile. I will not bring about their subjection to pressure and harassment by mentioning their names here. But they have made it clear that they would allow a Cuban Government-in-exile to operate from their soil.

I am not suggesting that the Government-in-exile be the government which takes over the power of Cuba once the freedom of the Cuban homeland has been regained. On the contrary, it should be understood that the Cuban Government in exile maintains our recognition only so long as it takes to free Cuba and, thereafter, hold a democratic election on Cuban soil with all the people of Cuba participating.

Once formed and established, the Cuban Government, under the Rio Treaty of 1947, the Caracas Agreement of 1954, the Punte del Este agreements of 1961, and, in fact, the basic provisions of the Organization of American States, could call upon all the nations of the Western Hemisphere for military

and financial assistance. And under those provisions we and the other nations are legally and/or normally obliged to help. With this military equipment, they could begin to tighten the noose on Fidel Castro.

The Cuban Government-in-exile would itself be able to, with the use of PT boats and other craft acquired from throughout the hemisphere, place a selective type blockade on the Island of Cuba, cutting off the supply of oil and other essential supplies needed for Castro's armed forces.

Simultaneously, it could foster defection within Cuba by providing arms and munitions to those who would turn against Castro. This, I submit, is the only realistic course to follow for those who rely on the defection from within alternative. Help from outside Cuba is needed, and Cubans could supply it all.

Propaganda barrages could be established with Cubans talking to Cubans. The Government-in-exile could ask and insist, under the treaties, that all Latin American nations which had not already done so, close their shores to Castro's embassies. This would stop most of the subversive propaganda now flowing out of Cuba. The Cuban Government, acting in the name of freedom, could ask that all trade with Castro be stopped. They can ask this cooperation from all members of the OAS, whereas the United States which is, technically, not directly involved, could not.

Cubans could easily smuggle goods to the underground in Cuba without having to run the gauntlet of the U.S. Immigration and Border Patrol officials, who now stop them and defeat their major efforts.

There is a good chance that such an exile Government, supported and supplied by all the nations of the Western Hemisphere, could nourish sufficient defection within Cuba to topple Castro, and, of course, that is to be desired.

But, if in the final analysis it were needed, that exile Government could undertake the liberation of its home by the force of arms. As a member of the OAS, and under the provision of the treaties of Rio and Caracas this Government could call on other member nations for whatever assistance would be required—including arms—to bring about a successful conclusion to their efforts. Under the commitments imposed on the United States and the other hemispheric nations by longstanding treaties, we would be legally bound and acting within the dictates of our international obligations in answering the Cuban exile Government's request for help.

Surely, we and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere would respond, just as we responded to the call of the English and French in World Wars I and II. We would respond because we believe in freedom and the right of self-determination, and it is just as precious and dead in this hemisphere as in the Continent of Europe or the far away reaches of southeast Asia.

The proposal is not a roadmap to utopia. Liberation of Cuba by forces directed by a government-in-exile is a long-range prospect. There would have to be a time-consuming buildup of

4144

governmental organizations, operating funds, and troops. The problems would be large.

But similar problems have been faced before and overcome. There is more to bind together the various groups of Cuban exiles than there is to divide them. And the promise of realistic help in returning to a free homeland would be a powerful lever in bringing about pressure in the direction of unity.

Properly organized and motivated, I feel that it could take effective action. I believe that people by the hundreds of thousands on the Latin American continent—from the humblest campesinos to chiefs of state would realize that this Government was acting for all of them and would make common cause with it. Tens of thousands of young men from all over the continent would, I believe, join the ranks of its fighting forces. This exile-Government could provide a living illustration that the battle cry of freedom still rings clearest in the human heart.

A Cuba Government-in-exile is the force which, acting on behalf of and in the name of the Cuban people, can bring about the liberation of their island. This is the group which can properly take any and all action necessary to successfully wage a war of liberation.

Once communism and Castrolism are eliminated in Cuba the United States must continue its interest in Latin America. We must continue our program of long-range assistance to enable the Latin governments to bring about a better life for their people. We must reform our thinking and remember that we exist side by side, interdependent, whether communism threatens or not.

Mr. President, I said early in my remarks that I believe one day Cubans will again enjoy the blessings of liberty, freedom, and self-government. No member of this body wants more than I to see that day come and to hasten its approach.

I have today presented a plan which I think can free Cuba. I feel it is a sensible and logical course of action and commend it to those who are searching for ways to free Cuba and drive communism from the hemisphere. In the final analysis the President of the United States makes the final judgment—the ultimate decision, as to what will be this Nation's course of operation. I am sure he is prayerfully considering all proposals suggested as to what course to follow. Whatever his decision I intend to support the President in whatever action he takes. I know that all citizens and patriots will do likewise.

SENATE SHOULD INVESTIGATE THREATENED CHANGES IN IRS FIELD STRUCTURE

Mr. BRUSKA. Mr. President, since the Secretary of the Treasury announced the proposed changes in the field structure of the Internal Revenue Service on March 5, a number of Senators have voiced deep concern. Let me say that I fully share this concern. The cogent reasons supporting such protests merit

the careful attention of those responsible in the administration for the proposals.

Apart from the political implications involved in the proposed changes, they would have a drastic effect on a substantial number of Nebraskans, most of whom have served the Internal Revenue Service faithfully for many years. Certainly the same would be true in the other affected areas.

In order to give Commissioner Caplin an opportunity to justify his proposals, I requested specific information about the claimed savings.

I had thought that my letter did not impose unusual demands on the Commissioner, because the high level ad hoc Committee on Resources Utilization which he appointed early in 1962 to study revisions was to have its recommendations available by December 1962. However, apparently I raised some questions that this "high level" committee had not considered because, as of this time, the Commissioner has not replied.

Thus, I think it is appropriate to discuss the matter here.

The Commissioner's claim that he can accomplish a \$5 million annual savings without reducing the service to the taxpayer is attractive. However, there is serious doubt that it can be accomplished.

Further doubt has been cast on the proposals by the Secretary of the Treasury who, upon encountering opposition, announced to the press that action would be deferred until he has had more time to review the plans.

However welcome this decision is, it will not settle the question. The time for review has passed.

According to a letter sent to all Internal Revenue Service employees, the recommendations of the Committee on Resources Utilization were in the hands of the Treasury Department officials prior to February 7 of this year. Hence, the Secretary has had a whole month to review the program.

If a further review is to occur, I strongly recommend that the Secretary get together with his Commissioner, because the Commissioner continues to act as if he does not intend to change his plans.

It is important that there be a complete investigation of the proposals by the Senate Finance Committee. Otherwise, the plan may be fully implemented while we are still awaiting a report from the Secretary. Such an investigation would, among other things, scrutinize the inconsistencies that manifest themselves in the Commissioner's proposals.

Consider first the case of Omaha, with which I am most familiar. By January 1, 1964, the Commissioner intends to reduce the present Omaha staff of 297 to 83. He has indicated that he will try to reduce the adverse impact on these people as much as possible. He has reaffirmed this position in a recent statement to the press, and a member of his staff advised my office that those who wished to remain in the Service will be retained for at least 2 years at the same GS rating whether their position is downgraded or not.

Mr. President, I do not know how the Department can incur the expense of moving employees and their families, maintain them at the same salary until after the 1964 presidential election, and still accomplish a net savings.

Furthermore, the Commissioner indicated that most of the officials and employees whose positions will be eliminated have risen to their present positions by doing their work well and have experience and skill that the Internal Revenue Service does not want to lose. Nevertheless, he indicated that he expects to lose some of their positions.

While Commissioner Caplin is in the process of eliminating skillful and experienced personnel the President is proposing to increase the number of Internal Revenue Service employees from an estimated 60,300 in fiscal year 1963 to 64,086 by the end of fiscal 1964. Obviously, if the President sees a need for increasing the present personnel level in the Internal Revenue Service by approximately 3,700, then certainly he must also feel the need to replace the employees that will be lost through the proposed changes. The replacement of long time skillful and experienced personnel with new and inexperienced personnel does not seem to me to be consistent with the President's goal of obtaining a lean, fit, and efficient establishment.

When the Internal Revenue Service was reorganized in 1952, two primary objectives were to decentralize service to taxpayers and restore integrity and public confidence where it was lacking.

The proposed plan is hardly consistent with the sound objective of decentralizing service to the taxpayers. On the contrary, Omaha, which is the most nearly central location that could be obtained for all the various States in the present region, is being eliminated in favor of Chicago. Chicago, on the other hand, is at the extreme eastern edge of the proposed region. It is difficult to visualize how the Commissioner expects to accomplish a savings by this move when he is obviously increasing the cost of employee travel within the region?

Furthermore, in an attempt to justify the move from New York to Boston, the argument has been advanced that it will place the regional office closer to the Automatic Data Processing Center at Lawrence, Mass. If this is the reason for the New York move, then how can the Omaha move be justified? Under the present regional structure, the ADP service center is scheduled for Kansas City, Mo., just 175 miles from Omaha. If the regional office is moved to Chicago, the ADP center will be 500 miles away.

In his fiscal 1962 report, Commissioner Caplin referred to the "blue ribbon" program which was launched by the Service in 1956 for the purpose of increasing the caliber and productivity of its work force. The Commissioner noted that—

Since that time the Service has been conducting vigorous college recruitment campaigns to attract top-quality applicants to enter revenue employment, and, at the same time, has provided training to enhance employees' ability to perform at the full-working level.

complishment, properly understood and properly sustained, can be a major reinforcement to our whole society—as a demonstration of effective action for high purposes. It is time for us to speak and work a whole lot harder to this end, so that the winds may blow, the windmills work—and all of us be proud.

PROBLEMS OF URBAN GROWTH

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, we are all pretty much aware of the tremendous population growth and changes that are taking place in the major metropolitan areas of the country, but we have badly ignored the problems that have arisen and neglected ways of coping with them, so that we might achieve the best possible living environment for the vast majority of the American people who are urban and suburban dwellers.

A most interesting article on this subject recently appeared in the Jersey Journal, February 4, written by Dr. Stanley Worton, of Jersey City State College.

After describing the implications of downtown deterioration, suburban sprawl, and traffic congestion, Dr. Worton suggests that our metropolitan areas consider reviving "the old natural corridor-type development that came with the railroads in the last century" as a way of shaping a more satisfying environment for all.

While obviously no one solution will meet the almost infinite variety of needs and desires of our urban areas across the country, this pattern of development certainly warrants very careful study.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A BROADER REGIONAL APPROACH WILL HELP SOLVE URBAN BLIGHT—JCSC PROFESSOR CONSIDERS "SPREAD CITY" PROBLEM

(By Dr. Stanley N. Worton)

The bulldozers are busy. The countryside is being subdivided into larger and larger plots for ranch-style, split-level, and colonial homes. Shopping centers are springing up like mushrooms. Industry is spreading out in all directions along the highways or on scattered sites.

Meanwhile, urban blight continues to spread. The problems of congestion, dirt, noise, air pollution, and lack of parking and play space are on the increase. There is an exodus from the older cities of families with children.

Does this mean that the great metropolis of which we are a part is on the way out, slated to extinction like the dinosaur or the dodo bird?

Will the entire region soon become a crawling mass of continuous residential and industrial development without 1 inch of open space?

Will our central cities be left to the old people, the single people, the wealthy, the very poor, and to minority groups who are not welcome elsewhere?

The answer to all these questions must be emphatic "No."

The New York metropolitan area is the fastest region in the Nation, if not in the entire world. It is unsurpassed as a center of industry, commerce and finance, of entertainment and culture, of education, and, yes, living as well.

More than 16 million persons—1 out of every 11 Americans—live here. They inhabit 22 counties in 3 States; 9 of the counties—our own Hudson is 1 of them—are in New Jersey.

How can this region change the direction of its development and avoid its fate? It can do so only when we the people who live and work in it recognize what will be happening to us and then decide to do something about it.

But first we must see how we got to be the way we are.

Basic to any human settlement are the opportunities for jobs present in the area. The New York metropolitan region got its start as a port of entry for people and for goods. It continued to grow, not only because it developed into a great port, but because of the forms of economic activity that developed out of its role in commerce.

In addition to light and heavy industry and all forms of transport, there are concentrated here the financial community, the printing trades, advertising, public relations, and management experts, designers, wholesale and retail centers, nonprofit corporations and foundations, health and welfare leadership, cultural and entertainment facilities, and a host of specialized services.

Such an economic mix requires a tremendous reservoir of manpower, skills, and talent. The residents of this region provide these quantities to a degree unmatched anywhere in the world.

So concentrated are the enterprises involved that one-third of the more than 6½ million jobs are in lower Manhattan. Another one-third are in the harbor band—the rest of the core area—in cities like Jersey City, Bayonne, Kearny, Hoboken, Weehawken, Union City, West New York, and North Bergen. One-fifth are in the inner ring of suburbs, and the remainder in the outer ring, or hinterland.

However, in recent years there has been an outward movement of jobs. The trend has been to go suburban. Industry has found that the time factor is more important than the distance factor and it has been locating along the highways or in industrial parks. Here they establish themselves on large tracts of land in sprawling, one-story plants with plenty of parking space. Acreage is cheap and taxes are low—at first.

The movement to the suburbs got its start at the end of World War II because of the pent-up demand for housing and the fact that it was cheaper to buy a house in the suburbs under a veterans' or PHA mortgage than to rent an apartment in the city.

But it was more than just a matter of economics. Suburbia became a form of status and a choice of a way of life—open space, grass and trees, a big backyard, community life, small local government, good schools, and low taxes.

Many of those who rushed into suburban life soon found that although each had more space in his backyard, he also had space to cover to reach his destination—the job, stores, and other facilities. Hence the two-car family and the need to chauffeur the children around from activity to activity. As more people moved to the suburbs, the countryside was pushed farther and farther away. In addition, the price tags on homes rose rapidly.

With the need for more schools, sidewalks, sewers, and new services, taxes shot sky-high. Taking care of home and lawn became almost a second job. Direct personal contacts proved to be no more effective in influencing local government than the energetic civic organization with know-how in the city.

If this is the way things are now, what does the future hold for us? What will the metropolitan region be like 25 years from now?

The Regional Plan Association, a non-

profit civic organization engaged in research on the development of the metropolitan area, has made a number of projections on the region's growth. It is estimated that by 1985 the population of the 22-county area will increase from 16 million to 22 million, an addition equal to the present populations of Chicago and Philadelphia combined. The increase will be the largest of any 25-year period in our history, even including the years of heavy immigration early in the century.

As for the kind of residential development that is taking place outside our cities and will continue to develop if present trends continue, Regional Plan Association has coined a phrase to describe it: "spread-city."

It is a sparsely settled, homogenized Los Angeles. It is not a true city because it lacks centers. It is not a suburb because it is not attached to a central city. Nor is it truly rural, for it is loosely covered with houses and urban facilities.

There will be no "downtown" where shops, restaurants, movies, and specialized services are concentrated. The pulse and excitement, the variety, the culture that has attracted man to the city throughout history will be gone.

The effects of spread-city will not be felt only by those who live in it, but by all the inhabitants of the metropolitan region. Traffic congestion and travel time will continue to mount. Although factories may move farther out in the hinterland, their workers will not follow because they won't be able to afford the new one-family houses on large lots. It will be the executive-professional classes who will move out, but their jobs will continue to be in the core areas. This will result in a form of reverse commuting.

As Mason Gross, president of Rutgers University, has so aptly put it: "The greatest evil that we face is not the slum or even the inextricable traffic jam, but rather an emptiness or meaninglessness of our day-to-day existence. A tremendous amount of time which could be lived through and enjoyed has been thrown carelessly away on utterly meaningless experiences—most of them behind the wheel of the automobile. I suggest to you further that meaninglessness is a malignant disease. If we allow it to feed on 2 hours of our day, it will soon begin to spread to the rest."

What is bringing about the development of spread-city? Do the people of the metropolitan region prefer this mode of living? If we can find a cause, perhaps a solution will follow.

The answers to these questions can be found in the fact that the vacant land now being subdivided for housing is zoned at an average of two-thirds of an acre for a one-family house. This land is found in about 200 towns in the metropolitan area with an average population of 10,000 each.

The main reason for this policy is local taxes. Bigger lots mean fewer houses, fewer houses mean less families and fewer children, fewer children means fewer schools, fewer schools mean less taxes. Apartment building and industry would help, but they cause a loss of prestige.

What is at the heart of the problem, then, is the best use of land—new land to be developed and the reuse of old land.

A workable solution to the problems of the region already exists. What needs to be done is to revive the old natural corridor-type of development that came with the railroads in the last century. As the railroads fanned out in different directions from the major cities into the countryside, towns sprang up along the way spaced like beads on a chain. If this pattern were repeated again, we would have commercial centers and industrial clusters springing up around train stations and highway interchanges. Here, too, would be most of the apartment houses. Spread-

ing out from these centers probably would be garden apartments and attached houses; further but would be one-family houses on small lots; still further one-family houses on large lots.

The alternative to building the region around exclusive automobile travel would be investment in a much faster and cheaper commuter rail service. The railroads are losing money on their commuter lines and seem most willing to abandon them. A public agency could supervise the region's rail network as a whole and fit it to total needs. It could set standards and fares and provide higher speed, up-to-date equipment, frequent service, and more convenient stops and transfers.

A loop system or network of rapid transit facilities connecting cities and inner suburbs and in turn linked to the outer towns by express buses or existing rail lines would provide a logical pattern for the industrial and residential development of the future. A start has been made with the port authority's takeover of the Hudson and Manhattan lines. But this is just a beginning.

All these programs would have a direct effect upon improving the core cities. But specific action must also be taken along the following lines to make urban life more attractive:

1. Dramatically increase State aid for low- and middle-income housing and for improved schools.
2. Revamp taxation so that high-rise apartment houses (the potential slums of tomorrow) are not the sole form of urban renewal. Congestion is bad for family life.
3. Encourage individual home improvement; do not discourage it by penalizing the owner with a higher assessment when he makes improvements.
4. Spread public housing into the suburbs, rather than raise the density of the core cities.
5. Recognize that a city is more than just a mass of buildings. Families, especially new arrivals, need training and education in group living and civic responsibility.
6. Allow minority groups, whose purchasing power has risen meteorically in recent years, to make their contribution to urban living.
7. No metropolitan area in the world can offer more than this one. Whether we allow it to get out of joint or make use of the technology and planning at our disposal to improve conditions depends on how many people care and how much they care.

THE CUBAN SITUATION

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, were it not for the fact that it comes 10 years too late, I would be most gratified by the unprecedented interest expressed in this body in the conduct of our foreign relations with Latin America—particularly Cuba—and our newly developed attention to the political and economic conditions existing on that continent.

PRESENT INTEREST IN CUBA

There used to be whole weeks, indeed months, when no word concerning the aspirations and needs of our Latin neighbors was spoken in the Congress. Sometimes years would go by without any tangible action being taken by this body to alleviate the problems in Latin America, or to enable those people to better solve their own problems. Latin America was not in vogue then. Headlines proclaiming what a prominent American statesman or ordinary Member of Congress said about South America did not

come easily in those days. Now it seems the whole Nation, including those—or perhaps I should say especially those—who were most quiet then talk of little but the southern continent. There has been a change in interest and focus. What brought about the change? It was the admission of Communist adherence by a man, named Fidel Castro, who followed the typical pattern of shouting for liberty and democracy, while totally crushing the Cuban people and burying their once bright aspirations for a better life in an improved democracy.

I hope that after the present danger exemplified by Castro's Cuba has ceased to exist—and one day it will, for I fully believe the Cubans will again one day be free—our interest in the welfare of our Latin neighbors will continue.

I hope that we will not quickly forget these dangerous and unhappy days, but will forever be mindful that our own Nation's security and well-being are inextricably bound up with that of Cuba and our Latin neighbors to the south.

One of my deepest convictions is that in today's world, where jet-powered airplanes, missiles, and rocketry pull us ever closer physically, our dependence on and need for each other grow proportionately. The two continents of this Western Hemisphere are indissolubly bound together. Like the legendary Siamese twins, one cannot maintain a viable existence without the other. Recognition of this fact by the Congress is a necessary step in insuring that our own Nation's future remains economically and politically secure.

SMATHERS' LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA

It was with this in mind that, over the past 12 years, I spoke more than 170 times in the Senate—sometimes briefly, often at length—trying to call attention to the progressive deterioration in our relations with Latin America from that time in World War II, when we collaborated closely with them in joint efforts to stop the Nazis.

I recall, shortly after reaching the Senate in 1951, warning, I believe in my first speech on this Senate floor of our indifference to our Latin neighbors, and urging our Government to increase its economic assistance to the countries of Central and South America. When the Foreign Relations Committee in August of that year proposed to reduce even the small amount of technical assistance proposed by the administration for Latin America, I told the Senate:

It seems to me that we must not lose sight of our own security, which means of course the well-being and welfare of the entire Western Hemisphere. Above all, we should remember who our friends are. One of the great errors for us to make would be to forget these people who not only are in our own neighborhood, but with whom we have had friendly and beneficial relations for many years.

In July 1954, in another effort to direct our thinking southward, I warned of the Communist threat in that area by saying: "We must assist the anti-Communist forces in Latin America to eliminate the conditions of poverty and

illiteracy in which the seeds of communism blossom and flourish. The time for action is now."

With administration and congressional apathy continuing, I declared in June 1956, that "today the Soviet Union is moving into Latin America in an attempt to fill the vacuum we have left there."

Our national leaders in those days were apparently acting on the premise that the good neighbor policy, enunciated and started in the mid-1930's, would somehow work in the 1950's, even though we as a nation did no more about it than, from time to time, make a speech calculated to assuage their feelings, but nothing more.

And so, while the United States with generosity and good will unparalleled in world history granted or loaned over \$85 billion to foreign countries around the globe during the years 1947-60, the 21 nations of Latin America—our neighbors, our friends, with 180 million people and with the fastest growing population on the face of the globe—received on the average less than one-fourth of 1 percent of this \$85 billion total.

FIDEL CASTRO COMES TO POWER

Fidel Castro's coming to power in January 1959 was the beginning of the change in attitude.

We all remember that in the early months of 1959 Castro was the most heroic figure in all the hemisphere in the eyes of the general public. He was the modern Robin Hood, or, more appropriately, a Cuban "Zapata," the legendary hill fighter who fought always against tyranny.

Here was that type of man, it was said, who could revitalize the Latin American nations, who could and would throw off the shackles of inequity and oppression, who would give the people dignity and self-respect, who could operate a government like our own—one of, by, and for the people.

However, Mr. President, there were some of us who never believed this propaganda.

On January 17, 1959, 2 weeks after he came into power, I stated on a television program:

I reserve judgment on the quality of his (Castro's) ambition, his capacity to administer the affairs of Cuba, his understanding of democracy and his judgment and tolerance.

I questioned if "the people of Cuba have improved their position by merely the change of governments."

These were unhappy and unpleasant days for me—unhappy because I saw communism taking a foothold in the Caribbean with the unwitting assistance and unstinting applause of many here in our own country; unpleasant because my opposition to Castro won for me the disapproval of not only a large portion of my constituents, but virtually all of the press.

During the first week in January 1959, following Batista's flight but before Castro had completed his triumphal march from the Sierra Maestra, I was so concerned about this youthful Caesar,

NOTE: CIA REFERENCE - P. 4140

DCI " - P. 4142

and the danger he constituted to his own people and to the hemisphere, that I made special calls to Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom. I urged him, and subsequently Secretary of State Herter, not to recognize any government set up by Castro until that government had held at least one free election.

I shall never forget being advised by Mr. Rubottom that the American public demanded recognition of Castro's regime, and this recognition was blithely given on January 7. My records reflect that 2 days later, on January 9, Mr. Rubottom and I had further discussion about Castro in my office, and on January 11 I met with a State Department delegation in still further discussion of the subject of Castro, communism, and Cuba. However, the act had been done and frankly met with overwhelming approval.

I took a trip around Central and South America from January 19 until February 10, 1959, and wherever I went in my talks with labor leaders, clergymen, government officials, and others, there was quiet but nonetheless great apprehension as to the quality of Castro's intentions.

I remember well my personal dismay when Castro was invited to address the American Society of Newspaper Editors here in Washington in April 1959. I recall that he subsequently was invited and did appear before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

The chairman was kind enough to invite me to listen in, and I particularly remember the general warmth with which Fidel Castro was received. I endeavored to ask him a few questions, but had little success as he realized I had some doubts about him. When I kept asking him when he was going to have an election, I recall he responded that "the people of Cuba don't want an election." When I pressed him further on the question of elections, he said, "I might have one in 3 or 4 years."

Despite his ominous statements, support for him was so overwhelming that I began to have doubt in my own judgment about this man.

According to my files, that very day after his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, I stated in a written press release that—

Serious trouble is brewing in the Caribbean area. The source of danger is centered in Cuba, a country which historically has always been our friend. Cuba could easily become a prisoner of the Reds. Fidel Castro, during a meeting today with several Senators, told me that elections in Cuba were 3 or 4 years away. That is not very heartening news. I asked him about his anti-American statements and he denied having made them.

I went on to say:

It is clear that he has not yet learned you can't play ball with the Communists for he has them peppered throughout his government.

In early April 1959, even more disturbing news began to come. Because I had expressed doubt about Castro, others who had doubt began to call me about their concern. I received two cablegrams from the President of Haiti ex-

pressing fear over an anticipated invasion from Cuba. I came to the Senate floor and stated:

The President of Haiti appealed to me for help by cablegram to help forestall an invasion of his country. I sent today, April 17, 1959, a telegram to Dr. Jose Mora, Secretary-General of the OAS, urging that he take immediate action to set up a voluntary police force to keep the peace in Latin America. I suggested this police patrol be made up of the 21 member states of the OAS including the United States. We have to relieve tension in the Caribbean and put a halt to Communist troublemaking. An inter-American police force could do the job but we don't have much time to act.

It was shortly after this warning of April 17, specifically on April 24, that Castro sent against the Republic of Panama an invasion force that he had permitted to be organized and trained in Cuba. Even after this act of aggression, I don't recall any concern having been expressed by any of the Senators or news commentators who are so loudly and persistently talking today. I do recall the late Senator from New Hampshire, Styles Bridges, talking about the danger of Fidel Castro to Central and South America, and all he got for his trouble was criticism.

However, there began to be some ripple of criticism of Castro in May of 1959 when he confiscated the property and assets of 117 companies, the bulk of which were American-owned. I recall at that time making a statement to the press and on television that we should not sit idly by—that the confiscation of American property should not be ignored and that immediate and effective steps should be taken to stop it.

A month later, in June 1959, the State Department began for the first time to express some concern about Castro's acts and specifically about the need of having adequate compensation paid to those Americans who had lost their property.

On May 26, 1959, I offered, on the floor of the Senate, amendments to the Mutual Security Act which were designed to create an Inter-American Police Force, and Inter-American Court of Justice. No action was taken by the committee to which referred.

On the 31st of May 1959, after Fidel Castro and his Communist cohorts had, through executions and the use of raw power, subdued all resistance in Cuba, he again turned his eyes toward new conquests and launched an invasion of the country of Nicaragua.

That invasion was successfully turned back and incontrovertible evidence was obtained by the defenders of Nicaragua, proving beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the invasion had been financed, organized, and launched by Castro from the Island of Cuba. So far as I have been able to ascertain there was no protest or outcry about the invasion of Nicaragua by the State Department or anyone else in position of authority.

I again emphasize that there were very few people in that particular time, the summer of 1959, who were interested in clipping the wings of Fidel Castro.

He still had the bulk of the American people's support. He still had many newsmen lyrically writing about him as a

great revolutionary, despite the fact that his drumhead courts-martial had executed close to 600 of his fellow countrymen—including some who had fought alongside him in the hills against Batista—and despite the fact that he had completely flaunted the rights of U.S. citizens and property owners and had launched invasions of Panama and Nicaragua.

On June 14 and June 20, 1959, invasion forces organized in Cuba were directed against Santo Domingo. These were stopped and, from the sketchy reports, it appeared that every member of that expeditionary force from Cuba was exterminated. Once again, sufficient evidence was recovered from the bodies of the invaders to establish that these forces were sent on their mission by Fidel Castro and the Communists.

On October 13, 1959, the little country of Haiti was invaded, again by forces from the Island of Cuba, and again under the direction of Castro's Communists. This invasion was again defeated by Haitians who had been trained in military tactics by a detachment of 50 U.S. Marines.

On October 26 Castro, becoming ever more arrogant and contemptible in his conduct toward the United States and his neighbors in this hemisphere, and feeling ever more secure in his relationship with the Communists, accused the United States of aggression.

He reestablished his drumhead military courts and began to summarily execute political prisoners without recognition of any of the elementary personal rights whatsoever. As of this date it was estimated the Castro regime had executed over 500 people. Later the total was to reach well over 1,000.

In January 1960 and through the early part of February I made another trip to the Central and South American countries and upon my return I outlined in a Senate speech on February 24 an eight-point program calculated to limit the activities of Castro's Communists in Central and South America.

Among other things, I asked that we turn over to the OAS all the information which the FBI, CIA, and our other intelligence agencies had in their files on communism in Cuba and Castro's connection with it.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover had at this time—and long before—a dozzier on Castro and his Communist connections that should have convinced the most ardent fan of Castro's in the State Department, of his allegiance to communism, but I doubt if they ever asked for this information or saw it.

In that speech, I urged the United States to urge the OAS to act. I said the United States should not act unilaterally. I suggested that the OAS should examine the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Cuba. I also said that "Castro has now identified himself for what he is—a man who, if not himself a Communist, is certainly doing the work of the Communists with the direct help of the Communists."

On March 5, 1960, Castro accused the United States of complicity in the explosion of a munitions ship in the Havana

Harbor which killed hundreds of people.

On March 25 in a TV interview I said "I deeply regret the administration's return of Ambassador Bonsal to Cuba" from where he had been withdrawn on January 21, and I pointed out that this move would be mistaken by the people of Latin America.

I had visited in my office with Ambassador Bonsal prior to his return. I suggested to him that he not return, arguing that it would appear in the minds of many of our friends in Latin America that, in fact, we wanted to see the government of Fidel Castro succeed and that his action would be interpreted as endorsement of Castro's actions. Bonsal said the decision was not his to make.

Again I took the matter up with the State Department and other officials without any success, for Ambassador Bonsal was returned.

It was because of this action that I said in the television interview mentioned above, that "even though we claim in our press and elsewhere about our desire to get rid of dictators, it would appear that we are standing behind this dictator."

At this particular time I recall distinctly having a visit with Secretary Christian Herter, for whom I personally have great affection and respect, and asking him to withdraw Mr. Bonsal for the second time as Ambassador to Cuba.

I pointed out that "Che" Guevara, who was at that time the head of the National Bank of Cuba, in a recent speech in Havana had five times said that the Soviet Union was the best friend Cuba ever had.

None of my warnings seemed to convince anyone. Shortly thereafter in a TV program I said:

For many, many years this administration has talked about the appeasement they thought had gone on in the Far East and other areas of the globe—they made a great to-do about the statement that they would stand strong in the face of the Communist movement. But in this particular instance I think we have some sickening appeasement.

On April 7, 1960, I made another general speech on the floor of the Senate in which I recommended a six-point program to strengthen ties between the United States and Latin America.

On May 23, 1960, Castro seized U.S. oil refineries and said they would be required in order to process Russian crude oil.

On May 27, 1960, the U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. economic aid program to Cuba, which had been running between \$150,000 and \$260,000 a year, would be terminated on December 1, 1960.

It was further announced that the U.S. military aid which was at that time consisting of training Cuban air cadets in Texas would be terminated in June of 1960.

I praised President Eisenhower on this action and I said:

I am glad that the President has now taken a realistic and sensible position with respect to the Communist-dominated Castro

government. It has never made sense to me to have our Government giving aid and comfort to another government which is openly vilifying us and our way of life.

I went on to say that—

I hope that those who have up to now sought a continuation of a very partial and preferential sugar legislation as it pertains to Cuba will be willing to reevaluate their position to revise the legislation in a realistic and up-to-date manner.

Shortly thereafter on May 28, 1960, I introduced a bill revoking Cuba's preferential sugar quota and distributing it to five friendly Latin-American countries which never up to that time shared in the U.S. sugar market.

I said:

We are permitting Cuba to sell into the United States over 3 million tons of sugar on which we are giving her a premium price of over 6 cents per pound—3 cents over the world price. This means Cuba gets \$390 million a year from the U.S. housewife. That money, I presume, would be used to further entrench the pro-Communist government and propagandize the Cuban people against the United States and for the Soviet Union.

On June 11, 1960, Castro seized U.S. owned Havana Hotel and Nacional Hotel.

On June 30, 1960, on the floor of the Senate, I urged the establishment again of the hemisphere police force to preserve the peace and security of this hemisphere against the menace of communism and also expressed support of the administration's protest to the OAS of Castro's campaign of lies and slander against the United States.

On July 13, 1960, I again urged the recall of our Ambassador Bonsal and reaffirmation of our treaty rights to Guantanamo Bay, and the placing of the case of Cuba and its control by the Communists before the OAS.

On August 10, 1960, in a public statement, I urged U.S. agencies, particularly the border patrol—Immigration and Naturalization Service—to cease harassing Cuban exiles operating from Florida in their efforts to open lines of communication with democratic forces inside Cuba.

On August 12, 1960, I wrote a letter to President Eisenhower in which I proposed that consideration be given to withdrawing preferential tariff treatment to the Cuban Government in connection with all imports, particularly with respect to sugar, fruit, and vegetables.

I also suggested that the United States impound payments for any commodities received from Cuba and hold until such times as concessions were made with respect to U.S. interests, since Castro had seen fit to prevent American dollars paid for U.S. commodities sold in Cuba from getting out of the country.

On August 31, 1960, after the close of the conference of the OAS in San Jose, Costa Rica, I issued a statement in which I criticized strongly the State Department's support of the watered-down, milk-toast, slap-on-the- wrist type of condemnation of international Communists.

It will be remembered that even with Secretary Herter as our representative at that meeting, the conference did not

have the forthrightness to mention the name of Fidel Castro or the Communist government of Cuba. I called it then, "a diplomatic defeat of the first magnitude."

On the floor of the Senate I noted that the San Jose Conference called for the overthrow of the government of Trujillo but refused even to mention the government of Fidel Castro. I went on to say that the Dominican government "is a government we surely do not approve of; its leadership is undemocratic and dictatorial"; but I asked, "Is there any doubt concerning the real threat to our freedom today?" "It, of course, is communism, and where is the fountainhead of international communism in Latin America today? Not in the Dominican Republic, but in the Communist government to Fidel Castro, and every informed person knows it, and most will admit it."

I asked in that speech:

Who is it in the State Department or in the administration who believes that the 30-year-old government of the Dominican Republic is a greater threat to the freedom of the Western Hemisphere than the Communist government of Cuba?

Who is it that really believes that the government of the Dominican Republic needed to be ostracized and expelled, but that the government of Cuba should go along threatening freedom without even so much as a verbal spanking?

In that speech I said that—

The administration has failed in its leadership because it was unable to cause our friends in the hemisphere to see the difference between an ancient, static, expiring, nonexportable dictatorship and a new, inflammatory, virulent, belligerent, expanding military dictatorship of the Communist variety that is working hand in glove with Khrushchev and Red China.

I asked, "Can fairminded men call this result a great victory?" "I warn my friends in Latin America that Castro's communism aims to destroy them."

I closed the speech by saying:

We must stop deluding our friends in Latin America and stop deceiving ourselves into a sense of false security by adopting pious declarations, which dismay the Communists not at all. We stand on the thin edge of disaster. This is no place for the timorous. This is no time for listening to those who do not realize or refuse to admit we are now in the throes of a tremendous struggle between the free world and the Communist world.

We must stop penalizing those nations who have befriended us. We must take our position as firmly and defiantly as the Communists have taken theirs—and we must encourage every nation and all peoples everywhere to take their stand with us and make their choice for freedom now—or the world will have no choice at all.

On September 21, 1960, I again called on the Government to bring Ambassador Bonsal home; I asked it to ban shipments to Cuba of U.S. machinery or equipment or replacement parts, and to start increasing our long-range broadcasts from the United States to Cuba.

On November 15, 1960, I urged Secretary Herter to call for a plenary session of the OAS to investigate the threat of Castro's communism to this hemisphere and for the United States to as-

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

4143

It seems to me in searching for a plan of attack, we must face up to the fact that there is no easy or inexpensive short-run solution to the problem of Castro and communism. There was in 1959. It might have still been easy in 1960, but no longer.

Realizing the problem of Castro and communism will not be solved overnight, I suggest putting into action a long-range plan which envisions only ultimately, and, in the final analysis, if need be, the use of force in order to get rid of Fidel Castro.

However, if it comes to force, the program envisions Latins and Cubans, who believe in freedom, leading that force against the Latin Communists of Fidel Castro. In other words, the program envisions Latins-for-freedom versus Latins-for-dictatorship.

After all, the problems posed by Castro are greatest with respect to the Latin American nations, and as such it is the Latin nations which should begin to bear an increasing responsibility for bringing about a solution.

More specifically, communism has established its hemispheric fortress in Cuba and, in the final analysis, it should be, and can be the Cubans who assume the leadership in what will have to be of necessity a joint undertaking.

The value of turning to the Latins to provide the leadership and most of the manpower required to do the job, returns the problem to its proper place as a Western Hemisphere problem, to be handled within the framework of already existing treaties and agreements entered into by all the Western Hemisphere countries.

Furthermore, there is no sense in purposely bringing about a situation in which Mr. Khrushchev, already ignominiously removing his missiles from Cuba, is required once again to either back down or fight, because of direct confrontation with our troops, or a specific challenge from us.

I do not know, and I do not believe anyone does, just how far Mr. Khrushchev believes he can back up before he destroys his own position, with his ally the belligerent Chinese Reds, or with his own military leaders within the Soviet Union.

I see no point in plotting a course at this time that does not afford Mr. Khrushchev a door through which he can move to avoid confrontation with us, if he wants to. This program which I shall suggest, in which the action taken is called for and lead by Cubans and Latins, in some measure avoids the confrontation and thereby lessens the possibility that, if and when force comes into use, the encounter will escalate into total war or nuclear war.

If the Cubans and other freedom-loving Latins are to take charge of the Castro problem, there must be a rallying point for them, a central body which can focus and direct their efforts. I see no group which can do this, which can speak in the name of all the Cuban people, except a fully constituted Government-in-exile which is recognized by us and other hemispheric nations. We should acknowledge its power to make

treaties, conduct foreign relations, borrow money, establish armed forces, and enter into all activities of a regularly constituted government. As I understand it, from international lawyers dealing regularly with such matters, our recognition of an exile government would be preceded by withdrawal of recognition of the present regime.

The only argument I have heard against such a government-in-exile is, How will it be formed when all the exiles are divided as to who or what group will lead it?

First, I am certain that any government selected by the Government of the United States and announced as the exile Government of Cuba will, in fact, be the Government-in-exile. However, there is a more democratic method of procedure if our officials want to follow it.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Refugee Committee have the names and addresses of every refugee in the United States and Puerto Rico. Why not send each one a ballot, asking him or her to write their first, second, or third choices down—sort of like an absentee ballot here in all our States of the United States.

It would be relatively simple to carry out a poll by mail and under the supervision of a group of prominent exiled Cuban jurists, in which each exiled Cuban adult is asked for a free expression of who should head an exile Government. No doubt, there would be some errors and duplication—this is inevitable—but it would provide a consensus and would give support to the man or men who finally act as the Government-in-exile.

Once it was established who the Cuban people had selected to lead the fight to free their homeland, U.S. recognition should be immediate.

This would emphasize to the other hemispheric nations that the efforts of free Cubans to expunge communism from Cuba have our full support and lead to recognition of the exile Government by other hemispheric nations.

Moreover, there are nations in Latin America which would act as host to the Government-in-exile. I will not bring about their subjection to pressure and harassment by mentioning their names here. But they have made it clear that they would allow a Cuban Government-in-exile to operate from their soil.

I am not suggesting that the Government-in-exile be the government which takes over the power of Cuba once the freedom of the Cuban homeland has been regained. On the contrary, it should be understood that the Cuban Government in exile maintains our recognition only so long as it takes to free Cuba and, thereafter, hold a democratic election on Cuban soil with all the people of Cuba participating.

Once formed and established, the Cuban Government, under the Rio Treaty of 1947, the Caracas Agreement of 1954, the Punte del Este agreements of 1961, and, in fact, the basic provisions of the Organization of American States, could call upon all the nations of the Western Hemisphere for military

and financial assistance. And under those provisions we and the other nations are legally and/or normally obliged to help. With this military equipment, they could begin to tighten the noose on Fidel Castro.

The Cuban Government-in-exile would itself be able to, with the use of PT boats and other craft acquired from throughout the hemisphere, place a selective type blockade on the Island of Cuba, cutting off the supply of oil and other essential supplies needed for Castro's armed forces.

Simultaneously, it could foster defection within Cuba by providing arms and munitions to those who would turn against Castro. This, I submit, is the only realistic course to follow for those who rely on the defection from within alternative. Help from outside Cuba is needed, and Cubans could supply it all.

Propaganda barrages could be established with Cubans talking to Cubans. The Government-in-exile could ask and insist, under the treaties, that all Latin American nations which had not already done so, close their shores to Castro's embassies. This would stop most of the subversive propaganda now flowing out of Cuba. The Cuban Government, acting in the name of freedom, could ask that all trade with Castro be stopped. They can ask this cooperation from all members of the OAS, whereas the United States which is, technically, not directly involved, could not.

Cubans could easily smuggle goods to the underground in Cuba without having to run the gauntlet of the U.S. Immigration and Border Patrol officials, who now stop them and defeat their major efforts.

There is a good chance that such an exile Government, supported and supplied by all the nations of the Western Hemisphere, could nourish sufficient defection within Cuba to topple Castro, and, of course, that is to be desired.

But, if in the final analysis it were needed, that exile Government could undertake the liberation of its home by the force of arms. As a member of the OAS, and under the provision of the treaties of Rio and Caracas this Government could call on other member nations for whatever assistance would be required—including arms—to bring about a successful conclusion to their efforts. Under the commitments imposed on the United States and the other hemispheric nations by longstanding treaties, we would be legally bound and acting within the dictates of our international obligations in answering the Cuban exile Government's request for help.

Surely, we and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere would respond, just as we responded to the call of the English and French in World Wars I and II. We would respond because we believe in freedom and the right of self-determination, and it is just as precious and dead in this hemisphere as in the Continent of Europe or the far away reaches of southeast Asia.

The proposal is not a roadmap to utopia. Liberation of Cuba by forces directed by a government-in-exile is a long-range prospect. There would have to be a time-consuming buildup of

governmental organizations, operating funds, and troops. The problems would be large.

But similar problems have been faced before and overcome. There is more to bind together the various groups of Cuban exiles than there is to divide them. And the promise of realistic help in returning to a free homeland would be a powerful lever in bringing about pressure in the direction of unity.

Properly organized and motivated, I feel that it could take effective action. I believe that people by the hundreds of thousands on the Latin American continent—from the humblest campesinos to chiefs of state would realize that this Government was acting for all of them and would make common cause with it. Tens of thousands of young men from all over the continent would, I believe, join the ranks of its fighting forces. This exile-Government could provide a living illustration that the battle cry of freedom still rings clearest in the human heart.

A Cuba Government-in-exile is the force which, acting on behalf of and in the name of the Cuban people, can bring about the liberation of their island. This is the group which can properly take any and all action necessary to successfully wage a war of liberation.

Once communism and Castroism are eliminated in Cuba the United States must continue its interest in Latin America. We must continue our program of long-range assistance to enable the Latin governments to bring about a better life for their people. We must reform our thinking and remember that we exist side by side, interdependent, whether communism threatens or not.

Mr. President, I said early in my remarks that I believe one day Cubans will again enjoy the blessings of liberty, freedom, and self-government. No member of this body wants more than I to see that day come and to hasten its approach.

I have today presented a plan which I think can free Cuba. I feel it is a sensible and logical course of action and commend it to those who are searching for ways to free Cuba and drive communism from the hemisphere. In the final analysis the President of the United States makes the final judgment—the ultimate decision, as to what will be this Nation's course of operation. I am sure he is prayerfully considering all proposals suggested as to what course to follow. Whatever his decision I intend to support the President in whatever action he takes. I know that all citizens and patriots will do likewise.

SENATE SHOULD INVESTIGATE THREATENED CHANGES IN IRS FIELD STRUCTURE

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, since the Secretary of the Treasury announced the proposed changes in the field structure of the Internal Revenue Service on March 5, a number of Senators have voiced deep concern. Let me say that I fully share this concern. The cogent reasons supporting such protests merit

the careful attention of those responsible in the administration for the proposals.

Apart from the political implications involved in the proposed changes, they would have a drastic effect on a substantial number of Nebraskans, most of whom have served the Internal Revenue Service faithfully for many years. Certainly the same would be true in the other affected areas.

In order to give Commissioner Caplin an opportunity to justify his proposals, I requested specific information about the claimed savings.

I had thought that my letter did not impose unusual demands on the Commissioner, because the high level ad hoc Committee on Resources Utilization which he appointed early in 1962 to study revisions was to have its recommendations available by December 1962. However, apparently I raised some questions that this "high level" committee had not considered because, as of this time, the Commissioner has not replied.

Thus, I think it is appropriate to discuss the matter here.

The Commissioner's claim that he can accomplish a \$5 million annual savings without reducing the service to the taxpayer is attractive. However, there is serious doubt that it can be accomplished.

Further doubt has been cast on the proposals by the Secretary of the Treasury who, upon encountering opposition, announced to the press that action would be deferred until he has had more time to review the plans.

However welcome this decision is, it will not settle the question. The time for review has passed.

According to a letter sent to all Internal Revenue Service employees, the recommendations of the Committee on Resources Utilization were in the hands of the Treasury Department officials prior to February 7 of this year. Hence, the Secretary has had a whole month to review the program.

If a further review is to occur, I strongly recommend that the Secretary get together with his Commissioner, because the Commissioner continues to act as if he does not intend to change his plans.

It is important that there be a complete investigation of the proposals by the Senate Finance Committee. Otherwise, the plan may be fully implemented while we are still awaiting a report from the Secretary. Such an investigation would, among other things, scrutinize the inconsistencies that manifest themselves in the Commissioner's proposals.

Consider first the case of Omaha, with which I am most familiar. By January 1, 1964, the Commissioner intends to reduce the present Omaha staff of 297 to 83. He has indicated that he will try to reduce the adverse impact on these people as much as possible. He has reaffirmed this position in a recent statement to the press, and a member of his staff advised my office that those who wished to remain in the Service will be retained for at least 2 years at the same GS rating whether their position is downgraded or not.

Mr. President, I do not know how the Department can incur the expense of moving employees and their families, maintain them at the same salary until after the 1964 presidential election, and still accomplish a net savings.

Furthermore, the Commissioner indicated that most of the officials and employees whose positions will be eliminated have risen to their present positions by doing their work well and have experience and skill that the Internal Revenue Service does not want to lose. Nevertheless, he indicated that he expects to lose some of their positions.

While Commissioner Caplin is in the process of eliminating skillful and experienced personnel the President is proposing to increase the number of Internal Revenue Service employees from an estimated 60,300 in fiscal year 1963 to 64,086 by the end of fiscal 1964. Obviously, if the President sees a need for increasing the present personnel level in the Internal Revenue Service by approximately 3,700, then certainly he must also feel the need to replace the employees that will be lost through the proposed changes. The replacement of long time skillful and experienced personnel with new and inexperienced personnel does not seem to me to be consistent with the President's goal of obtaining a lean, fit, and efficient establishment.

When the Internal Revenue Service was reorganized in 1952, two primary objectives were to decentralize service to taxpayers and restore integrity and public confidence where it was lacking.

The proposed plan is hardly consistent with the sound objective of decentralizing service to the taxpayers. On the contrary, Omaha, which is the most nearly central location that could be obtained for all the various States in the present region, is being eliminated in favor of Chicago. Chicago, on the other hand, is at the extreme eastern edge of the proposed region. It is difficult to visualize how the Commissioner expects to accomplish a savings by this move when he is obviously increasing the cost of employee travel within the region?

Furthermore, in an attempt to justify the move from New York to Boston, the argument has been advanced that it will place the regional office closer to the Automatic Data Processing Center at Lawrence, Mass. If this is the reason for the New York move, then how can the Omaha move be justified? Under the present regional structure, the ADP service center is scheduled for Kansas City, Mo., just 175 miles from Omaha. If the regional office is moved to Chicago, the ADP center will be 500 miles away.

In his fiscal 1962 report, Commissioner Caplin referred to the "blue ribbon" program which was launched by the Service in 1956 for the purpose of increasing the caliber and productivity of its work force. The Commissioner noted that—

Since that time the Service has been conducting vigorous college recruitment campaigns to attract top-quality applicants to enter revenue employment, and, at the same time, has provided training to enhance employees' ability to perform at the full-working level.

Because the Constitution of the United States puts into the hands of the executive branch of the Government—or the President of the United States—the final authority and responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, I think he should be permitted without personal harrassment or political attack to proceed along this logical line of getting Soviet troops removed from Cuba, for I would challenge anyone to suggest that there is a more useful course of action looking toward the total solution of the problem of Cuba than that of removing the troops and technicians of the Soviet Union from Cuba.

But, Mr. President, what of the future? What are our long-range goals?

Certainly, they are to see Cuba freed. But do we have a program or a plan of action? If the President has, of course he does not have to tell it to anyone. I have not heard of any plan, and I think if we are to free Cuba and keep the respect of our Latin neighbors we have to have a plan or a program which we can logically follow to a final and happy solution of a free Cuba.

Now I would like to offer a program, or plan of action, but before doing so I want to make it clear I speak only for myself. I speak only for the junior Senator from Florida. I have not cleared this speech with anyone. This voice is speaking only for me.

In the past I have recommended all sorts of programs of action. I have talked about a combination of measures, embargoes, quarantines, economic measures, political measures, propaganda measures, diplomatic measures, and others. But at no time have I recommended that the United States declare war on Cuba or act unilaterally with our own military force.

Since the buildup of weapons and men in Cuba last fall by the Soviets, the situation has changed. We now have a new dimension to consider, the possibility of direct confrontation of Soviet troops and United States troops.

Furthermore, in the light of the enormous amount of military equipment put into Cuba, we have a much more difficult situation to deal with than we did in 1960 or 1961.

When we talk about strong measures today, particularly when we imply force even though we may not say it, we are in reality talking about a direct confrontation of the military forces of the United States with the military forces of the Soviet Union, unless we first are successful in getting these forces out of Cuba. Such a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States forces we have not had thus far in our history.

During the Korean war, while we fought the Red Chinese and undoubtedly many Soviets, nevertheless they operated clandestinely under color of the North Koreans and/or Red Chinese. However, so long as the Soviet military troops remain in Cuba, the prospects of escalating action in Cuba into total war are infinitely greater because any unilateral action against Cuba, or even action led by U.S. forces puts, for the first time,

U.S. military forces in direct confrontation with those of the Soviet Union.

As stated, I think this adds a new dimension of danger to our already difficult problem.

I do not go so far as to say that we should never act, or that we should not proceed, even if some of the military of the Soviet Union stay there. I would emphasize, however, that the solution to the problem of Cuba, which means the elimination of communism from Cuba, is infinitely easier without the Soviet forces there. I say that their removal will diminish greatly the prospects of whatever action is finally taken in Cuba escalating into a total world and nuclear war. It has been the consideration of this problem, the gravity of it, the enormity of it, the complexity of it, which has made me feel that the President is on the right track in first getting removed from Cuba the offensive missiles and bombers and, thereafter, insisting upon the removal of the Soviet personnel.

Furthermore, we must keep in mind that today, when we suggest further action, either in the form of a blockade or a raid, this involves the use of force. And force, of course, means war. It might be limited and small—or it might be unlimited and staggering in its consequences. When we embark on a blockade of an island like Cuba, for it to be effective the blockader must make up his mind he may have to go to the length of shooting and sinking a surface ship as one starts into Cuba with supplies and personnel, or of shooting down an aircraft which is loaded with supplies and personnel.

In any event, the act of shooting a plane or a ship is an act of war and, as the President said in his last news conference, any such action on our part will probably call up an immediate response.

Furthermore, let us be sure when we talk of force and war we know what we are talking about. This use of force, this war we are talking about, is not a cold war waged in the daily press and over the conference tables. It is not a war of words in which our Secretary of Defense corrects the blusterings of the Soviet Defense Minister on the number of operative U.S. missiles or the size of our thermonuclear bombs. Not even a guerrilla war in which railroad bridges are destroyed and crops burned or sugar mills sabotaged.

We are talking about a war in which troops storm a beachhead, where platoons are sent to knock out a bunker, a war in which villages are destroyed by artillery fire, a war in which lives would be lost and men maimed and crippled for life, a war which could well leave fatherless thousands of children.

There may be some who think that now is the time for war. Some who advocate, rather glibly, that American forces turned quickly on Castro's Cuba—and get the job over with. It may come to that, but everyone should know exactly what they are talking about. I hope they have given thought to not just the phrases but the consequences as well.

How many American troops, for example, would be required to die in order to land a large effective fighting force on an island which has 150 coastal defense missiles and operational sites for most of them? These missiles can reach troop ships 40 miles out. How many troops, landing craft, and even transports could be sent to the bottom of the Caribbean by a dozen operative missile launching torpedo boats, whose launch range is 15 miles, which the Cubans now have?

How many aircraft would be lost in attaining air superiority over a small island with 500 surface to antiaircraft missiles and defended by 100 MiGs, over 40 of them capable of matching our F-104 Starfighter in performance and all piloted, we must presume, by skilled aviators and directed by 200 modern radars?

How many soldiers would be lost in subduing a force of some 75,000 regular and, we must presume, fanatically indoctrinated troops, fighting on their home ground, and backed by at least 100,000 militiamen and 100,000 home guard troops?

They are fully equipped with tanks, field artillery pieces, antitank guns and other modern weapons. They are a formidable force and would be operating defensively, taking a tremendous toll of any liberating force.

Once a beachhead for the liberating force was established how long would the battle for the island take?

How many casualties, American casualties, would it cost to subdue Cuba? I have no access to contingency plans but we hear figures such as a month and 100,000 casualties. I gather that our military planners see no quick, glorious charge up San Juan Hill now. Rather they envision a long, grueling, and bloody war waged in the most exhausting and savage tradition of the 20th century world wars.

And would the war for the liberation of Cuba remain limited?

I challenge anyone to say he knows. We can carry on some logical speculation. It might be a war confined to the island of Cuba and the waters surrounding it.

Or it might be a war which precipitates a Soviet move into Berlin with all that implies. Or action in Cuba might precipitate full-scale conflict in southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam or Laos.

Or how do we know that the war to liberate Cuba will not really touch off the total thermonuclear conflict which each of us prays daily will not occur. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky says it will. Can we assume he does not mean it?

Our Defense Secretary has said we will defend Berlin—with nuclear bombs if necessary—and I am sure every man in this Chamber approves this stand and knows that Mr. McNamara spoke for the President when he said it. We know the United States means it, that we will defend West Berlin and if necessary with nuclear weapons.

Malinovsky has said essentially the same thing about Cuba. Can we be certain he does not mean what he said?

Can we be as certain that he does not mean it as we are certain that Secretary McNamara does?

I do not know. To take action which could imperil the national existence on the basis of a pleasant and encouraging assumption would be one of the greatest gambles in history. I believe that it is within the context of real and violent warfare that the calls for a blockade or an all-out assault on Cuba must be evaluated. Well, if war is the final answer, if any Member of this Chamber feels it is worth it at this point in order to clear Russian troops from Cuba, he is in the right place to call for it.

As we all know, Congress has the right to declare war on Russia, on Cuba, and the first step is for one of the Members of the body to submit a resolution declaring the existence of a state of war. This has not yet been done, and I do not think it will be done any time soon.

However, while the consequences of any meaningful action are extremely grave, we must nevertheless not be frightened out of doing our duty or living up to our traditions of fighting for freedom.

As we look at the present situation and talk about it with some appreciation of what we are talking about, let us not fail to offer solutions. If we think we have them, but let us make whatever suggestions we have in the realization that the problem is a bipartisan matter and that if we become totally involved, bullets do not merely pick out Democrats or Republicans. Neither red-blooded Americans nor bullets know partisanship.

In this context of understanding, without political motivations and only in an effort to be helpful to the President of the United States, who, of course, has to make the final decision for all in this Nation on matters of this character, I would like for the next few minutes to discuss the situation as it exists today, and what I think we may have to do in the future, and why.

I think we must first settle in our minds whether or not this Nation can long abide Fidel Castro and communism in Cuba.

I know that there is a small body of opinion that would say because Cuba is now too dangerous for us to fool with, therefore, we should do nothing about it except ignore it and hope it goes away.

I am not one of those who subscribe to that theory of hoping it will go away. For hope has yet to remove a Communist dictatorship anywhere in the world.

Tightly controlled police states do not wither on the vine. I do not believe the Communists will surrender merely because we hope they will.

There are others who subscribe to the containment theory as the policy to follow under present circumstances—the easiest policy to follow. Containment is the recognition of the status quo within a country, while at the same time restricting its overt actions outside its borders. However, the danger from Cuba today does not lie solely in the fact

that it may attack over the border a neighbor country. We are pledged to and we can easily stop that.

The danger in a continuing Communist government in Cuba, even though contained within Cuba's physical boundaries, lies in that Cuba will continue as it is now, the fountainhead of subversion, propaganda and training. We can stop the exportation of its troops to other lands, but we cannot stop the exportation of its ideas, its propaganda, its training of subversives.

Millions of tons of literature depart Cuba for other Central and South American countries every month. Propaganda broadcasts to Central and South America have been increased in the last 18 months from 80 hours a week to over 150 hours.

John McCone, Director of the CIA, admitted recently, and it was made public, that some 1,500 revolutionaries from other Central and South American countries trained in Cuba last year. This type of activity is almost impossible to stop, short of extirpating the Communist government itself.

However, the greatest danger of a "contained" but "continuing" Cuba under communism is that it negates and renders ineffective our long-range program of helping our Latin American neighbors through the Alliance for Progress.

As we all know, Alianza Para el Progreso is a program calculated to build up the economy, the standards of living, and the literacy of the people, through economic and technical aid from the United States, while simultaneously effecting tax, land and social reform from within.

It envisions the expenditure of U.S. funds in the neighborhood of close to \$1 billion each year for 10 years. For this noble purpose, however, Mr. President, Latin America needs 90 percent more funds than this. It was reasoned that these additional large sums would be supplied from two sources: First, the country itself; and second, private capital. However, neither of these two sources is available if communism remains in Cuba.

As the Alliance was planned, 80 percent of the contribution was to be made by the Latins themselves, both through their governments and through private investment. However, with local governments, such as Venezuela, expending their time and energies in building up their armed forces, staying busy putting down Cuban instigated riots, spending their money and energies on day-to-day existence, the deep economic and social problems will never get either the attention or the money which their solution require.

And private investment, either of Latin American or United States origin, is obviously going to look for more stable and secure markets, even if the interest rate is not as high as it currently is in Latin America. A corporate executive is not going to put his stockholders' money into an area where it might be confiscated without any reimbursement, as was done in Cuba, nor is a private individual going to invest his savings in a land which

may fall under a Communist influence at any given moment.

As an example, the flow of new U.S. private investment in South America has plummeted in recent years. In 1957 U.S. citizens and businesses put \$1,164 million in direct investment into the area. By 1961 direct new investment had dropped to only \$141 million, a drop of more than 70 percent. This figure comes from the Bureau of International Commerce of the Department of Commerce.

Government sources estimate that when the 1962 totals are finally calculated they will show a flow back to the United States of more than \$10 million. In other words, more U.S. private capital was pulled out than was put into Latin America in 1962.

In the case of needed private investment from Latin sources themselves, the situation appears equally critical.

Because of the threat of a Communist-type dictatorship in most every country of South America, local capital is fleeing in enormous amounts out of Latin America into banks and investment in Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, and even Hong Kong.

The Alliance for Progress is the most realistic, long-term attempt we have ever made to help the Latin American nations out of the cycle of poverty, ignorance, and illness, in which for centuries they have been caught. It must not fail if we are to keep the countries to the south of us in the column of the free world. Yet there can be no doubt that the continued existence of Castro's Cuba insures its eventual failure. Because the Alliance, operating by itself does not have the money to do the job, because the U.S. Treasury cannot fill the vacuum caused by the fear of investment on the part of outside private capital and the flight of local capital.

This means, Mr. President, that Fidel Castro and communism must go before we can get moving on the big job of realizing the aims and ambitions of the Alliance for Progress.

How then can we get Castro and communism out of Cuba? I see only two alternatives.

First, we can, through various sources, attempt to foster an internal defection and uprising against Castro—in effect, turn Castro's own weapons back on him. This has some appeal primarily because it looks easy, but the lessons learned from East Germany and Hungary cause some pessimism. A rebellion against a tightly controlled police state is not likely to succeed.

No doubt there are in Cuba huge numbers of people among the military, the campesinos, the laborers, and, in fact, among all groups and classes, who are praying for the demise of Castro and the Communists. But in a land under communism, overridden with informers, and disciplined by brutal secret police, the organization and execution of a revolt or mass defection is an infinitely difficult thing. Perhaps it could be successful in Cuba, but being realistic rather than romantic, we should not count on it.

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

4139

sume the leadership for the formation of an Inter-American Police Force.

On January 7, 1961, I wrote a letter to outgoing Secretary Herter and incoming Secretary of State Dean Rusk urging the banning of all Cuban imports to the United States in order to put an economic squeeze on Castro's government and try to bring it down. There was criticism of this by some Florida industries who depended upon Cuban products, but I felt the situation called for such action.

On February 15, 1961, after the change of administration, in another speech on the Senate floor, I said:

The time has come for action in the Cuban situation. We should adopt an economic embargo calculated to bring Castro to his knees and the Cuban people to freedom.

BAY OF PIGS

On April 17, 1961, we remember, less than 4 months after this administration had come into office, an attack was launched by a group of 1,500 Cubans who had been trained in the far reaches of Guatemala under the supervision of military experts recruited in the United States.

This plan for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs had not been some new development of the new administration because we know that, as a matter of fact, these men were gathered together and sent to Guatemala for training in 1960, before the change of administration.

From my own personal knowledge I know that these men had been held and trained for so long a time in Guatemala and other Central American countries that most of them had become discouraged, and some had left the ranks in their belief that the U.S. Government would never permit them to try to win back freedom for their own country.

Here in the United States there was great concern as to what determination should be made with respect to these Cuban invasion forces. This occurred prior to the beginning of the invasion. Should they be returned to the United States and dispersed, or should they be permitted to make the effort to free their own homeland?

While I was not consulted officially about this matter, my opinion was asked for by some people in lower echelons of the Government, and it was my judgment that the men should be permitted to make the effort to free their country, for they would never be happy until they had made this noble effort; but, of course, it should be made only after sound military judgment had been obtained that the endeavor had some chance of success.

Everyone now knows of the enormous miscalculations and mistakes that were made.

I think the President, whose final decision it was, did the right thing when he assumed the full responsibility for the fiasco. This was the manful and courageous thing to do. But the fact remains that there was considerable misjudgment on the part of many agencies and persons who had a part in the decision. No one man—he even the President of the United States—can make correct judgments when he is proceeding from inadequate information.

The Bay of Pigs is now sad history. Had it succeeded, Cuba would have been free and our problems would have been lessened to a great extent, although, of course, not totally eliminated.

Some, it is now revealed, counseled against the invasion before it occurred. I thought, and still think, the "Go" signal was the correct one, based on the facts then available.

I never did subscribe to, nor do I now, the theory that the Latins would be appalled by our impetuosity or by our show of strength. Latins like leadership and strength; they always have, and they always will.

They have a history of 400 years of respecting, admiring, and looking up to strong leadership. That is why they still continue to admire strong leadership.

Everyone has 20-20 rear vision.

That judgment on the Bay of Pigs can be debated a long time. But surely the man who gave the word "Go; rescue your homeland; defeat and overthrow the Communists" cannot now in fairness have it even suggested that he is timorous or afraid of action. Couple this with the acts of October 1962, his quarantine, his confrontation with Khrushchev, and no man can fairly say that this President is not always prepared to act.

But to continue with the chronology, before discussing broader concepts, on June 21, 1961, shortly after Castro's May 1 declaration of Cuba as a Socialist, or Communist state, and some 2 months after the catastrophe at the Bay of Pigs, I again warned that "to hope Castro communism will wither away and die on the vine is both woolheaded and dangerous. Western Hemisphere nations must act now to expel Castro before he wins his race with time."

On July 20, 1961, in a speech on the Senate floor I urged U.S. recognition of the Cuban Government-in-exile and the creation of an Inter-American Military Force again.

I continued to urge on this administration the placing of an import embargo on trade with Castro, and I was highly gratified when on February 3, 1962, this administration took such action. Thereafter, the many millions of dollars which they had been receiving in trade were denied to them, and conditions were obviously made worse for Fidel Castro.

In a Florida speech on May 3, 1962, I stated that "Castro continued to work full throttle against the hemisphere's free nations," pointing out that Cuba has set up subversive schools, indoctrination centers, and propaganda classrooms to instruct teachers, students, intellectuals, political leaders, and revolutionaries from all over Latin America. I said:

The plan is to send these Communist-indoctrinated people back to their homelands and set them to work subverting their countries with the hoped-for Communist takeovers scheduled 1, 5 or even 10 years from now.

On June 18, 1962, I called for the establishment of a four-point program designed to make the policy of the United States toward Latin America, as I said, "one of realism and not romanticism."

I recommended the welding of our

economic program in Latin America with our political goals; the establishment of an Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs reporting directly to the President; and again called for recognition of a Cuban Government-in-exile, stating, "We are going to have to meet this Red challenge with determination, and I am confident we will do so."

On September 5, 1962, I made this statement:

The presence in Cuba of 5,000 so-called technicians from the Soviet bloc makes even more compelling the need for an inter-American Police Force to back up inter-hemispheric treaties based on the Monroe Doctrine which pledges to keep communism out of this hemisphere.

In addition, I urged, as I have time and again in the past, that the United States recognize and support a democratic Cuban Government-in-exile, whose first purpose is the liberation of the Cuban people from Communist tyranny. I said:

Such a free Cuban regime could openly receive support from the United States towards the accomplishment of this goal and the eventual restoration of their liberties to oppressed Cuban citizens.

On September 18, 1962, I introduced in the Senate two resolutions. One called for recognition of the Cuban Government-in-exile and the other supporting establishment of an inter-American military alliance.

Mr. President, some people may wonder why I have gone to such lengths to recite the record in such detail.

My answer is that I am trying to point out, among other things, why this problem of Cuba is not now and never has been the problem of a single political party, but instead, is the problem of both parties and all Americans. It is the problem of the Nation as a whole.

It goes without saying that so far as removing Castro and the Communists from Cuba is concerned, it would have been considerably easier to have done it in 1959 or 1960 than it would have been in 1961 or 1962, or than it will be in 1963 or 1964.

For the Island has been continuously fortified and militarized, and more and more modern and sophisticated weapons have been emplaced.

But no programs were developed in 1959 or 1960; and in January 1961, at the change of administrations, the outgoing one merely passed along the growing problem of Cuba to the incoming Administration, as one passes a very hot potato from his own hand to that of his unsuspecting dinner partner.

I have recited some—and only some—of the instances when I spoke in the Senate and elsewhere in 1961 and 1962, calling the attention of this administration to the need for developing a program having for its ultimate goal the freedom of Cuba. While I have yet to learn of a long-range program, this administration did put into effect, in 1961, the economic embargo which had as its result the denial to Castro of the use of many millions of dollars which he had previously realized each year from trade with this country.

The administration also diligently exercised pressure in an effort to get

other allies to stop trading with Castro's Cuba. In this endeavor, the administration was moderately successful.

The administration did, in 1961, initiate a meeting of all the members of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este, in Chile, and did succeed in getting three-fourths of the nations of the hemisphere—for the first time—to strongly condemn Fidel Castro and his brand of communism in Cuba.

That was the first time that such a specific resolution had ever been gotten from the Organization of American States. Since that time, several other minor measures have been adopted, looking toward making life more difficult for the Communists in Cuba; but the problem of communism in Cuba remains and constantly grows.

Mr. President, Cuba is a serious problem equaling in importance, in my judgment, any that we have in Europe or in southeast Asia or anywhere else in the world. It cannot be swept under the rug, ignored, or minimized; and I do not believe that anyone, or any government, is today trying to do that, because all recognize now the total seriousness of the problem of Cuba.

It is a problem that, if not handled correctly, could quickly lead to nuclear war. It is a problem that may lead to the involvement of the United States and its allies in a bloody conventional war. It is fraught with peril of most every kind; and certainly, therefore, it should not be discussed or debated in partisan terms.

Our Nation's future and the future of the free world are too important to become topics of partisan discussion. At the same time, they are important enough to deserve and bear discussion by troubled and conscientious men and women who are sincerely seeking solutions.

The problem of Cuba, therefore, deserves the best nonpartisan attention of all of our minds in the best and highest tradition of Americans who are earnestly concerned about the future of our country.

RUSSIAN TROOP BUILDUP

Mr. President, in September 1962, while many of us were campaigning, we began to see in the press and to hear over the radio reports about the now-famed buildup of Russian offensive missiles and bombers.

I must say that prior to that time, on many visits in and out of Miami, where the refugee colony makes its headquarters, I had been advised by Cuban refugee friends that they thought missiles were being erected in Cuba. Some gave me handmade maps depicting the location of the alleged missiles; others wrote letters describing them; others merely poured into my ears their suspicions and fears.

I turned over every scrap of this information to the Central Intelligence Agency, where I thought it should go for proper examination and evaluation.

However, Mr. President, it is eminently clear that prior to October 14, the day when the "picture" was finally obtained of missiles actually on site, there was really no hard, provable evidence on

hand, not the kind of certain and demonstrable evidence on which a great and responsible nation could act.

There were circumstances and there was considerable talk on the part of refugees regarding a missile buildup; and to me it was apparent that this word was getting to the CIA and to our intelligence outfits for the U-2 flights, which all through the summer had been occurring on a basis of two every month, and which were stepped up to four a month in September.

In September, there were flights on September 5, 17, 26, and 29; in October there were flights on the 5th and the 7th, and, of course, on the 14th. None produced any evidence of the missiles, although the reports continued to come in, and many people began to believe the missiles were there, even though no photograph had shown them. Then, I think, some adjustments began to be made even prior to October 14, although I have no exact knowledge of this. In any event, the overflight of October 14 showed the missiles.

Thereafter, the President of the United States called off his speaking trip, returned to Washington, met with the heads of the CIA, the Defense and the State Departments, and others, and after great soul searching, evolved a program as to what would be done.

All of us know now that the congressional leadership on both sides was called back to Washington, prior to the President's speech on October 22.

The President announced to those of us gathered at the White House what had developed in Cuba; and, after discussion, he stated what he intended to do. There was comment with respect to additional steps which some of those present thought should be taken. However, the President fully and satisfactorily explained why he felt it was more correct to pursue the course upon which he had determined.

Everyone there, publicly or privately, I am sure, pledged his support to the President and the course of action which the President outlined for the Nation to follow.

I am sure that everyone of us was greatly moved and deeply concerned as the President delivered his magnificent message, in which he clearly pointed out that there would be no toleration of Communist offensive missiles or bombers in Cuba; that the offensive missiles had to be removed; that if any of them was launched at the United States or at our neighbors, the United States would fire back—not at Cuba, but at the source of the problem, the Soviet Union.

I am sure that all of us recall vividly with what great apprehension and concern we lived in the next few hours and the next few days. And as the build-up of our manpower and might in south Florida and the Caribbean speeded up, I am sure we all recall with what final consummate relief we heard the announcement that Mr. Khrushchev had, in effect, backed down; that he had agreed to the withdrawal of the offensive weapons.

We truly, as the Bible says, "walked through the valley of the shadow" and emerged unscathed.

Mr. Khrushchev did not wish, at this time at least, to start a war over Cuba, for he agreed to back his missiles and bombers out of Cuba, which must have been humiliating and awkward for him. While we did not get the on-site inspection asked for, because of Castro's intransigence, nevertheless the Communists permitted our planes to fly at low altitudes over the missile sites, without gunfire being directed at them, and permitted inspection by our airplanes and our surface ships of the missiles and bombers being returned to the Soviet Union.

It is also worthy of note that today our planes are daily flying low and high over Cuba, for inspection purposes; and none of the very effective antiaircraft weapons—the SAM, the SA-2, and others which have great efficiency—have been fired at our planes. Mr. Khrushchev realized that the President was and is ready to go to any extremity to get those offensive weapons—a threat to U.S. security—removed from Cuba, and, furthermore, that he had to be satisfied that they were removed. That is why the Communists have permitted the flights every day over Cuba, to observe what is happening with respect to missiles, troop concentrations, and removals. No shot has been fired at our photographic planes, and none will be fired, because the President has made it crystal clear he will not permit it without instant retaliation.

Mr. Khrushchev, having also agreed to withdraw some of the 17,000 troops remaining in Cuba after the missiles and bombers left, is now in process of doing that. How many have left, I do not know. But State Department sources indicate that some 2,500 have left, and also even some of the units of the four armored groups that were there.

I was pleased to note in the March 9 issue of the Washington Star, however, that Mr. Antoly Dobrynin, Soviet Foreign Minister, stated that a substantial pullout would be completed by mid-March, as Mr. Khrushchev had promised. I am certain that President Kennedy is exerting all the influence he can to see to it that all the Russian forces are withdrawn from the island.

It is interesting to see what some people—now that the critical danger has receded—have chosen to criticize. When the President, in late October, held our national and individual destinies in his hands, few voices were heard; almost everyone was breathless while the President spoke clearly and firmly. I, for one, did not have much to say, and I do not recall that anyone did.

Now, however, there are loud cries and criticisms of an intelligence gap between September and October, of inter-agency confusion, over concessions made or imagined, and so forth. But the important thing to remember is that the President when confronted with the actual direct threat to the security of the United States acted with consummate courage and skill to protect our national interest. He acted in accord with the highest traditions of American statesmanship and successfully eliminated a threat of monstrous proportions to our national existence.

1963

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, last year alone the Government spent \$602.9 million supporting the price of milk, plus \$88.5 million for the school milk program.

As I see it, the Congress must come to grips with this problem. It cannot any longer be ignored because the industry representatives cannot agree on a new program.

In the past, when laws relating to other commodities have developed weaknesses, Congress has seen fit to act. And yet in the case of milk, which is the most costly program of all, there has been no action. This is intolerable. There must be a change. For if there is not, the taxpayers of this country may well demand that the entire program be "sacked."

Now, the bill which I have introduced provides a basic framework for the development of a sound, healthy, and prosperous dairy industry, and certainly one that will be less costly to the Government.

I want it clearly understood, and I want to emphasize, that this legislation is not designed to lower the income of dairy farmers. Rather, it is designed to correct the inequities and shortcomings of the present law.

For example, it will in no way—and I repeat—positively in no way will it lower the price received by farmers for the very wholesome milk produced for use in fluid form by the consumers of this country. This milk is produced under the highest and strictest of sanitary requirements at a very high cost to farmers. Producers must receive a good price for this milk. And under my bill they will.

My bill will not in any way curtail the production of milk which is required for fulfilling the needs of the fluid markets. As a matter of fact, it will encourage farmers to gage their production to fully meet market needs. My aim is only to discourage the production of unneeded milk—milk that is produced in excess of market needs. This excess milk is giving both the farmers and the Government problems. This is the milk that is costing the Government money.

My bill is not designed to penalize those farmers who produce for the manufacturing markets. In my estimation, proper corrections in the market order areas will minimize the problems in the manufacturing milk areas. In addition, proper correction now of deficiencies in the price support program will preserve that program for the manufacturing milk producer. As a result, both parts of the milk industry will benefit and enjoy a prosperous future.

Cuba
OUR CASTRO FIXATION VERSUS THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, last Friday the distinguished majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], one of the wisest and most thoughtful Members of the Senate, warned against irresponsible discussion of American foreign policy and especially the Cuban question. The Senator from

Montana expressed the view that "much of the discussion of Cuba by Members of the Congress is not helping this Nation; it is hurting it. We have indeed had discussions of Cuba," said the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], "but a discussion steeped in politics, panic, and perversion of fact."

Recognizing that the late Republican Senator from Michigan, Arthur Vandenberg, offered the Nation a classic example of constructive bipartisanship during the critical years after World War II. The Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] quoted Senator Vandenberg's warning to the Senate:

Only in those instances in which the Senate can be sure of a complete command of all the essential information prerequisite to an intelligent decision, should it take the terrific chance of muddying the international waters by some sort of premature and ill-advised expressions of its advice to the Executive.

As a freshman Senator, Mr. President, I have been reluctant to add my voice to the current clamor over Cuba and Castro. I wholeheartedly endorse the majority leader's warning that on this and other foreign policy issues, no Senator should speak his mind until he has thought through the consequences of his words.

But keeping in mind the counsel of Senator Vandenberg and the majority leader, I am constrained to speak out against what seems to me to be a dangerous fixation on Castro that is not worthy of this great Nation. I submit that we have become so involved in charges and countercharges about our Cuban policy that we have come close to losing sight of the real interests of the Nation in the hemisphere. We have ignored the biblical warning against straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.

I have often wondered why the wily Khrushchev would invest so heavily in both capital and personnel in the kind of risky enterprise which Fidel Castro is frantically trying to establish in Cuba. If his purpose was to enhance the influence of Castro and Castroism in the hemisphere, he must be bitterly disappointed with the results, for the Castro-Khrushchev embrace has had the opposite effect. By turning his revolution over to Moscow, Castro has sacrificed much of his appeal to revolutionary leaders and followers in other Latin American states. No thoughtful observer of Latin American affairs has failed to note the decline of Castro's influence in the hemisphere since his marriage to the Kremlin.

But if Mr. Khrushchev's purpose was to create in Castro a gadfly designed to divert the attention of the United States from the real dangers and challenges of Latin America, then he must indeed feel that his investment has paid off handsomely. For each day brings some mighty blast at Castro from a highly placed American politician or commentator.

Meanwhile, the basic dangers to our security in the hemisphere—the economic, political, and social ills of Latin

America—continue to fester. The United States has atomic bombs in its security arsenal, but on the side of insecurity we have a smouldering blockbuster on our doorstep to the south which makes Mr. Castro appear like a mouse trying to bring down an elephant.

I refer to the 200 million people of Latin America who occupy a vast land, potentially rich and fruitful but actually beset by misery, sickness, injustice, illiteracy, malnutrition, and misrule. It is a continent cursed by a social system that concentrates enormous wealth in the hands of the few and consigns the many to lives of desperate poverty. But make no mistake about it, powerful social forces are stirring to the south of us. Latin America is in a state of ferment; it is, as one observer put it, "dynamite on our doorstep."

Neither Fidel Castro nor Nikita Khrushchev nor international communism is at the base of this explosive situation. They are the exploiters and the would-be beneficiaries of the tensions and illness which threaten the security of the hemisphere, but they are not the fundamental factors. They are effects rather than causes.

Castro climbed to power over the carcass of a decadent political and social system which he shrewdly exploited, but which he did not create. The appeal of Castroism and communism in other parts of the hemisphere springs from the same corruption and social injustice which paved the way for the collapse of Batista and the triumph of Castro.

The real bombshells of Latin America are fused to the following conditions:

First, 2 percent of the people of the continent own more than half of all its wealth and land while most of the remainder of the people live in hopeless poverty.

Second, 80 percent of the people dwell in miserable shacks or huts.

Third, illiteracy grips well over half the population.

Fourth, more than 50 percent of the people suffer from hunger and disease and most of them will never in their lifetimes see a doctor, nurse, dentist, or pharmacist.

Fifth, most of the peasants live under primitive feudal conditions with no hope for land ownership, reasonable credit, or escape to a better life.

Sixth, several key countries depend on one-crop economies afflicted by depressed commodity prices.

Seventh, most governments are weakened by unjust tax structures, excessive military budgets designed to keep the people under control, bad land ownership and utilization, and indifference to shocking social problems.

Eighth, a population growth rate several times faster than the production of goods and services exists in several Latin American countries.

Two years ago, at the request of the President, I led a food-for-peace mission to Latin America which took us to northeast Brazil. In this benighted section of the largest and most populous nation of Latin America our mission came face to face with the real challenge to

the hemisphere. There we saw the wretched life of Brazil's 27 million peasants who are trying to survive in the feudal, drought-stricken sections of the northeast. There we saw the miserable mud huts, the total absence of sanitation facilities, the villages devoid of doctors, teachers, and adequate water and food.

We saw, too, Fidel Castro's counterpart and alter-ego, Francisco Juliao, the flaming peasant leader, urging his wretched followers to seize the land and destroy the suppressors.

I ask the Senate to consider the real problems that confront us in this area. Is it Juliao or Castro? Or is it the unstable, frightful conditions on which they thrive?

It may very well be that in the long view of history, the Castro's and the Juliao's, for all their mischief and violence, will have indirectly performed some service in that they have forced us to give closer attention to our neighbors to the South. Likewise, they have confronted the ruling classes of Latin America with a stern choice between making long overdue reforms or seeing themselves swept aside in a series of violent Castro-type revolutions. Sometimes the hand of providence moves in strange ways. There can be no mistaking the fact that much of Castro's appeal to the oppressed rests on the knowledge that his presence has forced every government in the hemisphere to take a new and more searching look at the crying needs of the great masses of human beings.

The real issue, it seems to me, turns upon the question of whether or not the people can overturn an unjust social order through a peaceful democratic revolution, or whether they will do it by a violent Communist-led upheaval.

The Alliance for Progress is a mutual effort to raise standards of living through the painstaking, often frustrating, method of democratic reform and constructive economic development.

The Communists call for a quick upheaval that promises a new day through Marxist shortcuts Castro-style.

The Alliance for Progress will test the patience and toughness of all of us who believe in its promise. It does not appeal to the politician who wants a quick headline and a fast answer.

It is far easier to make loud speeches against an irritable, bearded dictator than to face the tough and sometimes painful tasks of making the Alliance for Progress work.

I suggest that we have had too many who are willing to shed the blood of our soldiers in an invasion of Cuba, and not enough courageous and thoughtful men giving their attention to the real problems confronting the Alianza.

We have too many self-styled experts telling the President the inside dope from their private intelligence sources and not enough expert analysis of depressed commodity prices, rural credit problems, land reform and population pressures.

We have had too many post-mortems over the ill-conceived Bay of Pigs invasion, which might have damaged our standing in the hemisphere more if it

had succeeded through American military intervention, than it did as a miserable flop. We had no more legal right to undertake air cover or any other military aggression against Cuba than the Russians would have in invading Turkey. We have offensive nuclear weapons, not 90 miles from Russian territory, but in Turkey on the Soviet border, capable of pulverizing Russian cities in a matter of minutes.

The Cuban invasion, originally conceived in the previous administration, was a tragic mistake both in conception and execution for which President Kennedy has bravely taken the blame. Why compound the error by probing the ruins of a mistaken venture and then calling for a repeat performance?

I applaud President Kennedy's policy of wisdom and restraint since the Bay of Pigs fiasco. He has been firm and courageous in resisting the clamor of the warhawks.

Last October he rejected the counsels of those who called for a naval blockade before we knew the nature of the Russian arms shipments. The President also rejected the strong advice of those who favored an immediate air strike against Cuba. By waiting until he had positive proof of the Soviet-Cuban offensive missile threat before invoking a naval sanction, the President won unanimous support for his action from our Western allies and the countries of Latin America. He forced Khrushchev to back down, but he did it without war. He has since resisted those who have shouted for blood and battle and blockades.

Perhaps this is why for the first time the American people have indicated in a current Gallup poll that they have greater confidence in the capacity of the Democratic administration to preserve peace than they do in the opposition spokesmen. In another recent Gallup poll the American public registered its overwhelming opposition to an invasion of Cuba. The people understand better than some political figures that such an effort misses the real nature of the challenge before us.

The President put it this way:

I think the big dangers to Latin America—are the very difficult, and in some cases, desperate conditions in the countries themselves—unrelated to Cuba.

He has cited political and economic injustice, poor housing, illiteracy, and inadequate commodity prices as the big dangers to the security and well-being of the hemisphere.

As the President has said these are problems which must be faced and solved in the main by the people of Latin America. But he has also proclaimed our willingness to help.

Hence, the hopeful and inspiring promise of the Alliance for Progress.

Hence, the Peace Corps units which through the dedication and idealism of American youth are bringing new hope and pride to the villages of Latin America.

Hence, an expanded food-for-peace program which among other accomplishments is now providing a nutritious meal daily to 8½ million Latin American

schoolchildren and to 5½ million babies and pregnant mothers.

Hence, the U.S. medical teams that are developing in Central America.

Hence, the growing exchange of students and teachers between the universities of North and South America.

These are the tools of hope and life and strength with which America is fighting the truly significant battles of the hemisphere. This is our best answer to communism and Castroism.

It is not yet clear that the ruling groups of Latin America are aroused sufficiently to their responsibilities to make the Alliance succeed on a broad scale. Nor is it clear that we have grasped fully the nature and scope of the leadership demands that are upon us as a great and powerful nation.

I earnestly hope that we will not dissipate our energies in a senseless fixation on Castro. Our mission is to point the way to a better life for the hemisphere and, indeed, for all mankind.

I conclude on this additional note, Mr. President: we dare not let our preoccupation with Mr. Castro and other irritants abroad blind us to our domestic responsibilities. If America is to fulfill its promise both at home and around the globe, we must move ahead on vital domestic fronts. We have a gigantic agricultural plant to be nurtured and stabilized; we are faced with the necessity of creating new job, educational and recreational opportunities for our young people; and older citizens are confronted by rising medical and hospital costs; we need to consider seriously the relationship of our tax and fiscal policies to a sluggish national economy—these and many other mounting challenges call for clear minds and steadfast spirits.

It is no longer possible to separate America's domestic health from our position in world affairs.

Let us then move forward with a courage and prudence commensurate with our traditions and our responsibility as a great nation.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. I congratulate the Senator from South Dakota on what I believe is his maiden speech. Is it not?

Mr. McGOVERN. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. It seems to me that the Senator from South Dakota has briefly, tersely, and very ably indeed allied himself with the presidential party in the Senate. I am sure this will be a source of substantial comfort to the White House. I particularly like to commend my friend from South Dakota for his very able analysis of our Cuban policy, which I support as strongly as he does, for his able defense and his statement of hope for the future, for the Alliance for Progress, which I also support, as he does, and for his short and penetrating analysis, at the conclusion of his speech, of the major domestic issues which confront our country.

In the 7 years that I have had the privilege of serving in the Senate I do not believe that I have ever had the pleasure

of listening to such an able maiden speech as that delivered by my friend from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for his very kind and generous remarks.

Mr. McGOVERN subsequently said:

Mr. President, in relation to my remarks made a few minutes ago about the Alliance for Progress, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD two articles written by Roscoe Drummond which were published recently in the Washington Post. One article relates to the general attitude of the American people toward foreign assistance; the other details some of the advances made by the Alliance for Progress.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT IS A MYTH

When Congress comes to vote on the foreign aid program, it ought to vote on the basis of fact, not on the basis of fiction.

The greatest fiction of all, to which President Kennedy has unintentionally made his own contribution, is that most American people are against it.

The opposite is the truth.

In his year-end TV interview, the President, thinking that he was speaking with ingratiating candor, cited the foreign aid program as crucial despite the "fact" that it is a large burden not popularly supported.

This is not the fact.

The truth is that the foreign aid program is a relatively small burden, one-twentieth of the budget, and is popularly approved.

Here is the evidence:

A study of a whole sequence of findings of the Gallup polls from 1955 to 1963 shows that:

Popular support of the foreign aid program is at a high point for the entire 9-year period.

Today 58 percent of the American people record themselves as approving foreign aid, 30 percent oppose, and 12 percent are neither for nor against it.

There is no great variation between the different sections of the country: in the South 55 percent approve; East, 60 percent; Midwest, 58 percent; Far West, 59 percent.

Public backing of foreign aid is 7 percent higher than it was in 1958, 2 percent higher than in 1955.

In recent years, despite the appropriation of about \$4 billion annually, popular support has not, as widely believed, been declining; voter approval has been going up and voter opposition has been going down.

Most of those who question foreign aid think that the appropriation is much higher than it is.

This, I think, gives a far different picture of American public opinion than the widespread myth that foreign aid is unpopular, even resented, by the great majority of the people.

The nearest thing to a national referendum is this 9-year sequence of Gallup polls. It shows that Mr. Kennedy has been making a mistake by talking about the unpopularity of the program. He should be talking about its popularity.

An examination of the exhaustive backup statistics and individual responses which lie behind the public reports of the Gallup findings justify these factual conclusions:

The principle of foreign aid is more strongly supported today than in 1958, and at least as strongly as any time since 1955.

The percentage of people opposed to the principle of foreign aid has shown a drop

of 3 percentage points since 1958; the number of people with no opinion has dropped 4 percent. This suggests that the principle of foreign aid continues to draw supporters rather than opponents.

Public support for foreign aid is highest among those who know more of the facts about the program. More than 40 percent of the people polled think the foreign aid appropriations represent 10 percent of the national budget instead of 5 percent. More than 80 percent did not know the approximate amount appropriated.

The humanitarian aspects of foreign aid have the greatest appeal to the American people. More than 65 percent of the pro-foreign aid comments of those polled gave the humanitarian reason as the basis of their support.

On the other hand more than 40 percent of those who were critical of the program were not opposed in principle—just felt it was not well administered.

Congress certainly ought to take a hard look on a country-by-country basis to determine for itself how well the program is being administered, and wherein foreign aid is being well or where badly utilized. I am not defending any particular level of appropriation. I am simply reporting that in approving the continuance of foreign aid Congress would be reflecting the judgment of the great majority of the American people.

LATIN REDS ARE DISHEARTENED

Latin American Communists are becoming downright disillusioned—and disheartened—by the Alliance for Progress. It isn't failing adequately. For them it is succeeding too well.

While some of its supporters in the United States, who expected it to perform miracles overnight, are disappointed that the Alliance hasn't gotten off the ground faster, its Communist opponents are finding to their dismay that it has gotten off the ground too well for their comfort.

I am not suggesting that the first year's work of the 10-year Alliance for Progress has alone thrown the Communists on the defensive. It has helped, visibly helped. The Communists are most on the defensive where the Alliance has been most active. Here is some of the evidence:

In most of the Latin-American countries, notably in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, the Communists are abandoning nearly all effort at peaceful persuasion and turning to violence and subversion as the only means of attaining their ends. They can't win converts from people who see even modest progress in the present, hope in the future.

The Latin American Communists are continuing to lose their influence in the labor movement where they thought their prospects were best. Today the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in South America embraces 8 million workers; the Red-dominated labor organization, not over one million.

Through Alliance aid 37 U.S. universities are now working with 57 Latin institutions in 18 countries to improve education. There is already evidence of a trend away from longtime Communist control of the universities in Central America.

All the ravages of a long-outdated economic system cannot be repaired in 12 months or 12 years, but the evidence is now sufficient to report that the Alliance is making a sturdy and steady beginning—and can succeed.

Here are some of the things that are right with the Alliance for Progress and show that, after an understandably slow beginning, more can be expected:

Fourteen Latin-American countries have either passed new and tighter tax legisla-

tion or improved their tax collections; in seven of these countries the reforms are on a major scale.

The Alliance is pursuing a rational and constructive course on agrarian reform. It is not promoting a casual, ineffective program of just cutting up large estates. It is promoting a modernizing of agriculture. Venezuela has succeeded in resettling nearly 60,000 farm families. Since last spring hundreds of families in the Dominican Republic have been resettled. In Chile, Colombia, Bolivia and elsewhere, similar programs are getting under way.

The Alliance is enlisting new financing for Latin America from Western Europe and from Japan and is carrying forward a positive campaign to attract more and essential investments by U.S. private business with guarantees against the risk of expropriation, inconvertibility and war.

I am not relying merely on Government figures to justify the report that the Alliance for Progress is beginning to make itself felt, is starting to pay dividends. The latest report on "Latin-American Business" from the Chase Manhattan Bank cites economic progress in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela as improving and encouraging. No wishful thinking from that source.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Latin American Communists would breathe a sign of relief if we would give it up.

RATIFICATION OF ANTI-POLL-TAX AMENDMENT

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I am happy to announce that two additional States have ratified the anti-poll-tax amendment which is presently being considered by the legislatures of the respective States of the Union. The two new States are Washington and Vermont, bringing to 22 the total number of States which have ratified the amendment.

I was informed late yesterday by my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], that the House of the Washington Legislature on February 26, 1963, approved the amendment unanimously by a vote of 95 to 0, and that the Senate on yesterday, March 14, also approved the amendment unanimously by a vote of 44 to 0. I salute both of my friends from Washington, Senators MAGNUSON and his distinguished colleague, Senator JACKSON, each of whom not only cosponsored my resolution in the 87th Congress which proposed submission of the amendment to the States but vigorously supported its approval by the Senate and then followed through aggressively to obtain its ratification by the legislature of their State.

Mr. President, it is most interesting to note for the record that when Senator MAGNUSON was a Member of the House of Representatives in the State of Washington in 1933, just 30 years ago, he introduced and vigorously supported a memorial in the Washington Legislature aimed at removing the poll tax as a requirement for voting, in an effort to start a movement whereby those States which had the poll tax requirement would eliminate it.

I believe that at the time there were 11 States in which a poll tax or other tax was a requirement for voting in Federal elections. I warmly congratulate

Senator MAGNUSON for his long-time interest and effective leadership in this field.

The House of the Vermont Legislature only this morning ratified the amendment on final reading of the enabling resolution which it passed yesterday by a vote of 157 to 63, the Vermont Senate having previously ratified the amendment on February 6 by a unanimous voice vote.

I am greatly indebted to my good friend, the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], for this encouraging information and to both Senator AIKEN and his distinguished colleague, the junior Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY], each of whom have shown their dedicated interest in this movement toward eliminating the poll tax or any other tax as a requirement for voting in Federal elections by their support and cosponsorship in the Senate last year and by their aggressive and constructive work this year with the Vermont Legislature.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I should like to explain the Vermont situation in a little more detail. The Senate of the Vermont Legislature unanimously approved this constitutional amendment many weeks ago—I believe on February 6. It was then referred to the house. There was some opposition in the house from an organization which does not believe in this constitutional amendment. It was successful in postponing action on it.

Yesterday there was a vote in the Vermont House with the result which has just been stated by the senior Senator from Florida, 157 to 63. That vote, however, permitted the amendment to be brought before the House for a third reading today. It is my understanding that the amendment passed the Vermont house without opposition this morning; that there was no vote recorded against it, although I expect there were a few members who were still against it. Nevertheless, they were completely ineffective.

I wish to say something more. The senior Senator from Florida has referred to the work of the senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], which started more than 30 years ago. It is my understanding that 26 years ago, in 1937, when the senior Senator was a member of his State's senate, he started to work toward the same objective in the Florida Legislature. I think that now, when his objective seems fair to be accomplished, we ought really to respect the long years of effort which have been devoted by the senior Senator from Florida to making it possible for all people to vote for President, Vice President, and Federal officials without making the payment of a poll tax a condition for their voting.

The senior Senator from Florida has performed an outstanding service, even if it is taking well over 25 years to accomplish it, and his goal is now in sight. I know the satisfaction he must feel that what he foresaw years ago as a necessary change in the Constitution is now on the way to accomplishment.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the more than kind statement made by the distinguished Senator from Vermont. I am not ready, as we say in the South, to throw up my hat yet, because we still have 16 more States to go. But we are hoping for ratification by those additional 16 States at a relatively early date. We are working toward that end, just as the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] and his distinguished colleague [Mr. PROUTY] have worked so effectively in securing the action of the Vermont Legislature, which was completed just this morning.

I do not believe we would have had success with the Vermont Legislature had it not been for the determination, persistence, and continued efforts of the distinguished Senators from Vermont. I salute them upon their success.

Mr. AIKEN. My only regret is that Vermont was not the third State. It could not possibly have been the first or second, because the Vermont Legislature was not in session at that time. I regret that Vermont had to be the 21st or 22d, instead of the 3d State, which it could have been had the Vermont House not been delayed in reaching a final vote on the question. However, I am much gratified to report that the amendment passed the Vermont House on third reading this morning without opposition, as I understand.

Mr. HOLLAND. In completing my statement, I am not surprised to find that there are determined and persistent people in Vermont. We have seen evidence of the fact that Vermont produces that breed of sons. I am glad that by their continued effort the two Senators from Vermont have been able to persuade some of their fellow citizens in Vermont to a better solution and conclusion than seemed to have been possible just a few days ago.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I wish to state my concurrence in the views expressed by the able Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] about my distinguished colleague from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], who is the author of the constitutional amendment. Had it not been for his tenacity, determination, and strong belief that this was a forward and progressive step, even among the Southern States, as well as throughout the United States, toward giving the people greater voting privileges, the objective would not be so near accomplishment.

As my colleague has said, he is not yet prepared to throw up his hat. There is still some ground to be covered. However, I am satisfied that he and others who believe with him in this endeavor will see to it that it is accomplished, and that finally we shall have in Florida the proud realization that one of our most distinguished sons is the author of a constitutional amendment. There are only 22 constitutional amendments now. I do not know exactly in what States they originated. But I believe that very few States have the honor of having had represent them those who were in point of fact the authors of such a useful, beneficial constitutional amendment as I know the one which has been intro-

duced by my colleague from Florida will be.

I join with the able Senator from Vermont in his expression of commendation.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am most grateful to my colleague from Florida for his kind words.

Since he came to the Senate, which I believe was in January 1951, he has been a cosponsor and coauthor of this amendment since almost the first day, in every session of the Senate, and in every Congress since that time. If there be any credit eventually, he is entitled to a full share of it.

WASHINGTON POST SERIES DESCRIBES INDIAN PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, on Monday of this week I called the attention of the Senate to the first two installments of an excellent series of articles by Mr. Aubrey A. Graves currently appearing in the Washington Post. Mr. Graves has given us a superb account of some of the basic problems, achievements, and prospects of the Oglala Sioux Indians of South Dakota.

These articles in effect are a description of the Indian problem as a whole. I strongly urge the Members of Congress and others interested in this most important field to read Mr. Graves' articles thoughtfully.

I ask unanimous consent that the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth installments of these articles be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 12, 1963]
NEW DAY ON THE RESERVATION, III—OGLALA
SIOUX FIGHT POVERTY AND DISEASE

(By Aubrey Graves)

Now that the emphasis has shifted from resettlement to reservation improvement, are Indians still so miserably housed that they have been dying from the extreme cold of this bitter winter?

In a nation burdened with food surpluses, can it be that American Indians are starving to death, or even going hungry?

The answers to these two questions were among the objectives of my recent 4-day visit to the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in southwestern South Dakota. Here live the Oglala Sioux, one of the largest and most poverty-stricken Indian communities in the Nation.

To the first question, the answer is yes. As for the second, some Indians are going hungry at times but it is not due to lack of a food distribution program.

Because of exposure, improper diet, and unsanitary conditions, the infant mortality at Pine Ridge is shockingly high—44 deaths per 1,000 live births. This compares with a mortality rate of 26 among non-Indian babies throughout the Nation. But even this high rate is an improvement over that for 1954, when 66 out of every 1,000 Indian infants died before reaching the age of 1.

The average age of Indians at death is 42; the country's non-Indians live to an average age of 62.

The incidence of tuberculosis among Indians, though still high (285 per 100,000 population in 1961) has dropped from 600 per 100,000 in 1954. Ten years ago tuberculosis was the chief cause of Indian deaths. Today it ranks ninth.