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903

Communist pressure is being aided by the global growth of nationalism and neutralism and by technological developments. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Polaris missile-firing submarines and the art of refueling bombers in the air has reduced materially U.S. dependence upon overseas bases.

Today, the United States can deliver a devastating nuclear attack on the Soviet Union without utilizing overseas bases. By the end of 1962, the United States will have approximately 200 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in position.

NINE POLARIS SUBMARINES

There are nine nuclear-powered Polaris submarines with a total of 144 missiles in commission. The Navy maintains 16 attack carriers with more than 400 attack bombers, each capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Strategic Air Command operates more than 700 B-52 and B-58 bombers with ample range to reach the Soviet Union—without air refueling from the United States. There are also 700 or 800 B-47's with shorter ranges. These are gradually being replaced by missiles. With air refuelings they can reach Soviet targets and return to bases in this country.

The smallest strategic warhead or bomb utilized by these planes and missiles has an explosive force of about half a megaton (the equivalent of about 500,000 pounds of TNT). The largest U.S. bombs are rated at 20 to 30 megatons.

This is held to be the major reason that the first chapter of the Cuban crisis was terminated in favor of Washington. The immensely superior nuclear delivery forces of the United States give it the capability to devastate the Soviet Union no matter what it did first; Moscow could hurt, but not destroy us.

The Soviet Union probably has considerably fewer than 100 ICBM's in position and its long-range bomber fleet and missile-firing submarines are inferior in numbers, quality and general technology. The Soviet Union has no aircraft carriers.

MOSCOW'S MISSILES

But Moscow has long had a large number of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles of sufficient range to reach the territory of U.S. allies and most of the U.S. bases overseas from Soviet soil. These missiles are incapable of reaching the United States.

Thus the Soviet missile bases in Cuba, though primarily of political and psychological importance, compensated to some extent militarily for the Soviet Union's intercontinental inferiority. If Moscow had been allowed to turn much of Cuba into a vast missile-launching site, the U.S. greatest military advantage would have been not eliminated but seriously reduced.

Moreover, the Cuban missile sites were so close to U.S. shores that little warning of missile firings would have been possible. In any case, the United States has no ballistic missile early warning system along its southern coast comparable to that in Alaska, Greenland, and England.

These facts would seem to indicate that Moscow, from a technological point of view, would benefit more from overseas bases than the United States.

There are other and more dominating reasons, however, for overseas bases, which would make any exchange of Cuba for Turkey (or similar bases) highly dangerous, in the opinion of both military men and political observers.

NEED FOR BASES SEEN

The U.S. intercontinental advantage has not eliminated the strategic need for overseas bases. Oversea airfields are still highly useful for these purposes: dispersion of

strategic forces, bases for refueling aerial tankers, post-attack recovery bases for planes that have completed their attack missions, transport and air-supply staging bases, sites for tactical aircraft (fighter-bombers and light bombers) capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Overseas bases and facilities are far more important as a political part of the general United States deterrent to Soviet expansionism, and as a military deterrent to limited aggression than as part of the strategic nuclear deterrent. Use of such bases would be essential, as the Turkish airfields were during the Lebanon crisis, to contain any threatened conflagration. In this context, they are virtually indispensable.

Withdrawal from facilities abroad could lead to the end of the U.S. system of international alliances upon which the entire postwar security system has been based. This is all the more true since some allies have expressed open suspicion that U.S. acquisition of an intercontinental delivery system might tend toward an isolationist "Fortress America" policy and that Washington would be unlikely, once it withdrew, to come to the aid of a threatened ally, particularly when it knew such aid might risk a nuclear attack upon the United States.

Washington has described the IL-28, a light bomber, as an "offensive" weapon when based in Cuba and has asked for its withdrawal along with the missiles. If the same reasoning were applied to Turkey, the Turkish airfields would probably become unavailable to any U.S. military aircraft, since fighter-bombers, as well as light bombers, can carry nuclear weapons and have range enough from Turkey for deep penetrations into the Soviet Union.

Such an interpretation, if applied, would, military men believe, effectively neutralize Turkey and perhaps detach her from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The real measure of the overseas base, therefore, is its purpose. The U.S. contention, shared by its allies, has always been that its overseas bases were established solely in answer to Communist aggressive expansionism at the request of the countries concerned.

The United States maintains or has access to more than 300 bases, facilities, posts or stations overseas, ranging from small radar outposts to great air-land complexes, such as some facilities in Germany, or sea-air installations, such as the Navy's base at Rota, Spain.

There are about 60 Thor 1,500-mile missiles in Britain, which are now considered as obsolete and are scheduled to be dismantled in the next 12 months. There are 30 Jupiters near Bari in Italy, and 15 Jupiter 1,500-mile missiles in Turkey. There are protected underground sites for winged Mace missiles in West Germany and in Okinawa, as well as some unprotected sites for older Matador winged missiles elsewhere in Germany.

The Mace sites still have technological usefulness; the rest of our land-based overseas missile sites could gradually be eliminated, if the countries concerned agreed, without significant impairment of our nuclear deterrent capability.

But the other functions of our overseas bases and positions are still of high importance. These indispensable functions include the protection of our sea-air lines of communications with our allies and overseas sources of raw materials; outpost warning positions; intelligence gathering functions; stabilizing points in areas of unrest (as in the Middle East), and as backup points and bases for the support of limited war operations.

Even more important, U.S. bases overseas have tremendous political and psycholog-

ical—and in some cases, economic—importance.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1963]
UNITED STATES TO TAKE MISSILES OUT OF
TURKEY

(By Murrey Marder)

A new element in the shifting pattern of East-West relations was underscored yesterday in an official announcement by Turkey that the United States will dismantle its Jupiter missile bases there.

While the announcement was foreshadowed by reports to this effect in Washington last week, it drew added attention to the manner in which Soviet-American postures have changed since the Cuban crisis, for a combination of reasons.

The Soviet Union long has charged that one of the greatest obstacles to reduction of East-West tension is its "encirclement" by American bases overseas. This has been a main theme of Soviet propaganda.

U.S. officials vigorously denied yesterday, as they had last week, that plans to remove 30 Jupiter missiles from Italy and 15 from Turkey have any connection with the correspondence between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev during the Cuban crisis last October. At one point in that crisis Khrushchev demanded withdrawal of the American nuclear weapons from Turkey to offset his removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Removal of the 1500-mile Jupiters from NATO bases in Italy and Turkey was contemplated long before the Cuban crisis, along with the earlier withdrawal of Thor missiles from Britain, as part of the process of "weapons modernization," American officials stressed.

Moreover, they noted, the targets in Soviet bloc territory at which these missiles are aimed will now be assigned to more effective, submarine-launched Polaris missiles. The result is more defensive power for the West, not less, American officials said.

Removal of the Jupiter bases from Italy and Turkey will end a situation in which these nuclear bases have been a "lightning rod" for Soviet propaganda that threatens to wipe them out first in event of nuclear war, American officials agree.

As a result, these officials acknowledge, the thrust of Soviet psychological warfare probably will have to be altered to meet this shift of deployment of weapons by the Allies.

But, it is insisted, no political significance whatever can be read into this change. There is absolutely no foundation, they assert, to speculation that this decision may be the result of a secret deal between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

Many independent diplomatic observers, however, dispute the interpretation that there is no political import to the present action.

Even if only by implicitly reacting to circumstances that have developed since the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war in October, each side independently has taken actions that have tended to ease the tensions between them.

The Soviet Union has backed considerably from any showdown by force in Berlin.

Both nations have joined in a new round of nuclear test ban talks now going on in Washington as the result of direct communication between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

The Soviet Union may, of course, and presumably will, shift its target of attack from the land-based missiles to the sea-based missiles, but the psychological barb of confronting nuclear strategic missiles at its borders will be gone.

Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin made the announcement of the plans

to dismantle two American Jupiter missiles. State Department spokesman Lincoln White said, "We are discussing the modernization of weapons systems with a number of countries, including Turkey." White said he is "not prepared to say more at this point."

I believe the people of this country have a right to know what is behind the withdrawals to which the administration has apparently agreed.

AIR SUPPORT AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION

(Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Speaker, national confidence in our ability to cope with the Cuban situation is at a low ebb.

After 2 years of being permitted to believe that air support was pledged, but withdrawn, in the Bay of Pigs invasion, we suddenly are advised by the Attorney General that air cover was never offered or intended.

Thousands of words have appeared in the press in the last 22 months quoting military and civilian leaders and Cuban invasion participants as flatly affirming the promise of U.S. air support in April 1961.

This tremendously important controversy transcends political parties and partisan motivations. At this late date, an honest, accurate report of events leading up to and including the invasion would not breach security. It would, instead, indicate the manner in which we have been, and are, dealing with the deadly menace of communism just 90 miles from our shore.

If our leadership in military strategy is shaky, sophomoric or incompetent, we must know it. If the facts are as the Attorney General has presented them, we are entitled to have our minds put at ease.

Cuba's present threat to our national existence will not disappear through wishful thinking. Cuba is even more of a threat today than it was last October. Reports that the Russians even now are constructing highly sophisticated ground and air bases in Cuba makes a complete review of our system of military policy-making absolutely urgent. It is a Communist base for propaganda, infiltration and subversion.

Therefore, I am introducing a concurrent resolution, identical in many respects to one introduced yesterday by Senator GOLDWATER. My resolution, however, would create a Special Joint Committee, composed on a bipartisan basis of Members of both House and Senate.

I urge its adoption be expedited by both Chambers of the Congress.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE STATE OF NEW YORK IN CORN PROGRAM

(Mrs. ST. GEORGE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Mr. Speaker, I am greatly disturbed, as are many New Yorkers, at the discrimination being practiced under Secretary Freeman's order posted on January 9, 1963. This makes in order preferential freight rates on Government-owned corn shipped into the Southeastern States.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I realize that is the fashion around here to believe that the State of New York is bounded by the George Washington Bridge on the north, the Battery on the south, Brooklyn to the southwest, and Long Island City to the southeast. Mr. Speaker, this is a fallacy. The State of New York has vast farm areas. In my district the greatest single industry is dairy farming and of course we have poultry, truck farming, and so forth, in great quantity.

The Secretary's order reads:

The corn will be offered at a price delivered f.o.b. car at 25 cents per bushel over the Chicago cash market price in quantities of 5 or more jumbo freight cars or 10 or more ordinary freight cars—in quantities of 1 through 4 jumbo cars or of 2 through 9 ordinary cars, the f.o.b. price will be 27½ cents above the Chicago cash market price.

Obviously this is discrimination against the State of New York and all the Northeastern States.

When we have complained to the Department about this discrimination we have been put off with the ridiculous statement that New York has a drought program in operation. Of course this is a preposterous excuse, and will not hold up. The Secretary's order on freight rates covers an entirely different problem and is in no way compensated for by the drought program.

Mr. Speaker, I trust the Congress will go to work at once to right this grievous wrong to the farmers of the Northeast.

(Mr. MCINTIRE (at the request of Mrs. ST. GEORGE) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. MCINTIRE. Mr. Speaker, I deeply appreciate the courtesy and consideration of the Congresswoman from New York in extending me time to address some comments to the subject of her remarks.

I want to say that I wholeheartedly concur with and endorse the Congresswoman's statements, and in support thereof I submit to the RECORD the two following communications:

JANUARY 10, 1963.

HON. ORVILLE L. FREEMAN,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Although no press release was effected on the matter, I have been advised that under date of January 9, 1963, the Department of Agriculture posted notice that it was offering—on an f.o.b. delivery basis—Government-owned grain (chiefly corn) at 25 cents over the Commodity Credit Corporation bushel quotation in Chicago. The pertinent rate is applicable to bulk shipments of 500 tons, with a rate of 27½ cents per bushel applying on a single car base.

This action was, of course, taken under the Emergency Feed Grain Act of 1961 and will have application to 12 Southeastern States, Maryland, and Delaware included.

This represents to me a gross inequity, being extremely unfair to Maine poultrymen

and dairymen. Such action on your part, as Secretary of Agriculture, places Maine poultry and dairy interests in an extremely disadvantageous position in marketing their products in market areas common to producers of both the Northeast and Southeast parts of the country.

I urgently petition you to eliminate this inequity by acting to restore equitable conditions to the market for all feed grain users, with emphasis on those of Maine and the rest of the northeastern United States.

Sincerely yours,

CLIFFORD G. MCINTIRE,
Member of Congress.

JANUARY 11, 1963.

HON. ORVILLE L. FREEMAN,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have been delegated by Republican members of the New England delegation in the House of Representatives to register vigorous opposition to the order posted by you on January 9, 1963, as pertaining to preferential freight rates on Government-owned corn shipped in the Southeastern States.

As per this order: "The corn will be offered at a price delivered f.o.b. car at 25 cents per bushel over the Chicago cash market price in quantities of 5 or more jumbo freight cars or 10 or more ordinary freight cars—in quantities of 1 through 4 jumbo cars or of 2 through 9 ordinary cars, the f.o.b. price will be 27½ cents above the Chicago cash market price."

We Republicans of the New England delegation contend that this action under the Emergency Feed Grain Act of 1961 is discriminatory, having the effect of providing—through reduced freight rates—a price advantage for feed grain users in the Southeast over those in New England.

Equity dictates that the Secretary of Agriculture shall not extend preferential treatment under the law to one geographical area of the United States over another. In consonance with this consideration, we Republicans of the New England delegation in the House of Representatives strongly implore you immediately to take such action as is necessary to liquidate this obviously inequitable treatment to poultry raisers and dairymen of New England. We appeal to your good conscience to effect an equitable balance of costs for both feed grain users of both New England and the Southeast.

Your serious attention to this petition will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

CLIFFORD G. MCINTIRE,
Member of Congress.

WASHINGTON STATE DOCTORS PLAN FOR MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AGED

(Mr. STINSON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include an article from the Seattle Times.)

Mr. STINSON. Mr. Speaker, the attached article from the Seattle Times demonstrates the willingness of Washington members of the medical profession to voluntarily alleviate the medical problems of our senior citizens:

KING COUNTY MEDICS PIONEER PAST-65 PATIENTS' PLAN

(By Hill Williams)

The King County Medical Society has discovered—to its surprise—that it is pioneering in a new method intended to make sure older persons get needed medical care.

The society on July 1 put a plan into operation under which persons over 65 who