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demands" for residual oil—the encouragement of consumers to invest in new equipment and plants to accommodate residual oil only on the assumption that future quotas of imports would be raised steadily to take care of "new demands." In spite of the Government's present import control program even the Government itself has continued to build new installations equipped to burn residual oil only. This is paradoxical.

The proposed legislation does not attempt to impose unrealistic limits on imports which would penalize any section of the country or any friendly foreign nation.

An essential need is to remove present uncertainties inherent in the residual oil import control program under which quotas must be set periodically on the basis of human judgment of anticipated "demand," and with such judgments subject to being swayed by pressures from several sides.

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to establish a formula by which the level of imports might be held at a fair rate while also mitigating against the consequences of pressures which are inevitable under the present control system.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2185) to impose quota limitations on imports of foreign residual fuel oil, introduced by Mr. RANDOLPH (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

PRINTING OF TAX BILL WITH TABLE OF CONTENTS

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the bill, H.R. 8363, the tax reduction bill, is referred to the Committee on Finance, it be printed with the table of contents following the text of the bill and the signature of the Clerk of the House.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM—ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF RESOLUTION

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on September 12 I submitted a resolution, Senate Resolution 196, to cut off aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem government made needed reforms. Since the introduction of the resolution, the junior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] and the senior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] have asked that their names be added to the list of cosponsors of this resolution. The addition of these two Senators brings to 32 the number of Senators cosponsoring the resolution. I ask unanimous consent that both names be added to the list of cosponsors of Senate Resolution 196 at the next printing of the resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. DIRKSEN:

Booklet entitled, "You And Your Ballot—A History of Freedom," published by Citizens Honest Elections Foundation, Chicago, Ill.

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

Article entitled "U.S. Government 'Isn't an Enemy'," published in the Arkansas Gazette on August 11, 1963.

By Mrs. NEUBERGER:

Article on William O. Hall, new Assistant AID Administrator, published in the September 9, 1963, issue of Front Lines.

By Mr. DOUGLAS:

News release of Veterans of Foreign Wars, dated September 24, 1963, opposing sale of U.S. wheat to Soviet Union.

By Mr. RANDOLPH:

Article in September-October 1963, issue of Development, discussing cleanup campaign now in progress in West Virginia.

Article from September 23, 1963, issue of Charleston (W. Va.) Daily Mail, "State Economy Set New Mark in 1962," and Harry Hoffmann's Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette column, "Rockefeller Showed Vast Misinformation," also September 23, 1963.

SOUTH VIETNAM—THE EDGE OF CHAOS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the American press does the best job of foreign news reporting in the world. The job that American newsmen have been doing in South Vietnam has been excellent, especially considering the restrictions imposed on them by the Diem regime. I wish to call special attention to an article by Stanley Karnow which appears in the September 28, 1963, issue of the Saturday Evening Post headed: "The Edge of Chaos: Vietnam's 'Royal Family,' Long Aided by U.S. Troops and Money, Has Persecuted Religious Leaders, Embittered the People and Bungled a Critical Struggle Against Communism." Mr. Karnow's article is a study in depth of the problems which face us in Vietnam.

Mr. Karnow's concluding paragraph is especially chilling:

> South Vietnam lies on the edge of chaos. And in retrospect, the strongest Communist allies in the country have been the Diem family. They have sown suspicion and hatred, and their show of apparent power has been a sham to conceal their weakness. Back in 1933, when he was a young civil servant, Ngo Dinh Diem made a prophecy that may yet come true. "The Communists will not take our country by virtue of their strength," he said, "but by virtue of our weakness. They'll win by default."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this informative article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE EDGE OF CHAOS: VIETNAM'S ROYAL FAMILY, LONG AIDED BY U.S. TROOPS AND MONEY, HAS PERSECUTED RELIGIOUS LEADERS, EMBITTERED THE PEOPLE AND BUNGLED A CRITICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM

(By Stanley Karnow)

It was just after midnight when the battle of the temple began. Truckloads of helmeted South Vietnamese police, armed with shotguns, submachineguns, carbines, and tear gas grenades, rumbled through the streets to attack Xa Loi, the main Buddhist temple in Saigon. Inside, the monks shouted and banged pots, pans, drums, and gongs as the cops smashed down the temple's iron gate. Some 400 monks and nuns cowered before the onslaught. There were screams, shots, and explosions as the police attacked. Some monks were thrown off balconies onto the concrete courtyard, which was hung with banners reading: "Thou Shalt Not Kill." Within less than 2 hours all but two of the Buddhists—who escaped over a wall into an adjacent U.S. Government building—had been hauled off to jail. Among those arrested was 80-year-old Thich Tinh Khiet, the country's venerable Buddhist patriarch.

Four hundred miles to the north, in the psovincial capital of Hué, the Government raid was even more fierce. There, while Buddhists fortified themselves inside the Dieu De temple and fought off paratroopers for 8 hours, some 1,500 people rioted through the streets. They ripped down barbed-wire barricades with their bare hands while soldiers beat them down with rifle butts. They picked up tear gas bombs thrown by the troops and tossed them back.

By midmorning, when the battle was over, a Western correspondent counted 10 truckloads of students being driven off to prison. They waved their bloody hands at him as they passed.

Many Americans may feel there is something remote about this strange conflict between South Vietnam's Catholic President Ngo Dinh Diem and the leaders of Vietnam's dominant religion. But the United States is inextricably involved. President Kennedy, convinced that a Communist takeover of South Vietnam might mean the fall of southeast Asia, has repeatedly promised to defeat the guerrillas that dominate much of the country. He has backed up his words with a 16,000-man U.S. force in Vietnam—more than 100 have lost their lives—and with $1.5 million a day spent on the war. But the spectacle of American-trained troops using American weapons to raid Buddhist temples made clear one fact that U.S. officials have long tried to evade: No matter how much the United States supports the unpopular regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, this regime's chances of victory over the Communists are just about nil.

U.S. officials publicly "deplored" Diem's "repressive actions" against the Buddhists, and there were private predictions that "Diem must go." But the prophets have been less certain on the questions of who could oust Diem and who could replace him. As for listening to any advice, Diem cut short one top general recently by declaring, "Only God commands me." If he lacks support from the people, Diem always his his "royal family," one of the oddest political conglomerations in the world—brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of the secret police; sister-in-law Madame Nhu, the beautiful and arrogant first lady of Vietnam; brother Ngo Dinh Thuc, the archbishop of Hué; brother Ngo Dinh Can, the warlord of central Vietnam.

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Other relatives have served as envoys to Washington, London, and the United Nations.

The Ngo Dinhs resemble a cross between the Borgias and the Bourbons. Narrow, devious, obstinate, and imperious, they have functioned in an atmosphere of neurotic and sanctimonious egotism. They have plotted against their rivals, and played their own subordinates off against one another. They have preached puritanism but tolerated corruption, extolled democracy yet rigged elections, and jailed at least 30,000 political prisoners in "reeducation" camps.

Devoutly Catholic by religion and archaically Confucian by philosophy, President Diem is a combination of monk and mandarin, a kind of ascetic authoritarian who might have flourished in the Middle Ages. A small, rotund man who talks incessantly, he is persuaded that he possesses the "mandate of Heaven," and the people must obey. "His Republic of Vietnam is not government for the people by the people," says a Western-educated Vietnamese, "but government for the people by Ngo Dinh Diem."

Certain that he knows best, Diem is almost immune to outside information. When a prominent Vietnamese officer returned to Saigon from a tour of the countryside, Diem asked him for a frank assessment of rural morale. The officer had hardly begun to enumerate complaints against the Government when Diem interrupted him angrily, shouting, "Nothing but lies—you're a victim of Communist propaganda."

While Diem is the President, last month's clashes made it obvious that many of his powers were being exercised by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, a voluble, shifty-eyed man in his early fifty's. Nhu proclaims himself an intellectual revolutionary and spins out his abstruse theories with the intensity of a precocious college sophomore. Not long ago, as I sat with him in his soundproof office adorned with books and stuffed animal heads, Nhu chain-smoked and shrilly denied the many charges of corruption and venality against him and his wife. "But even if people wrongly think you're corrupt," I asked, "isn't that still an important political reality?" He shrugged. "Maybe, but I don't care what people think."

Nhu never opposed the influx of U.S. money, but he has often questioned the value of American advisers. "I don't think they can advise us on subversive warfare," he said. "Americans are very advanced on matters like space, but for small problems of the earth I'm afraid they don't know as much as we do."

Alongside Nhu stands his extraordinary wife, who has long wielded a peculiar power over President Diem. Madame Nhu won great status as one of the few members of the family to have children. (There are two daughters, Le Thuy, 17, and Le Quyen, 4, and two sons, Trac, 15, and Quyhn, 10.) At the same time, she frightens Diem. Beyond a passing glance at a girl in his youth, he has led a life of celibacy, not only fearing women in general but particularly fearing female tantrums, at which Madame Nhu is expert. And so, without being married, President Diem has been naggingly henpecked by a first lady not his own. In addition, Madame Nhu has convinced Diem that without his family he stands alone. "His followers were all killed by the Communists, and our followers saved him," she explained. "The women follow me, my husband has his youth movement, the Catholics take orders from Archbishop Thuc * * *. If there is nepotism, it is the President who profits."

Twice in the past 3 years non-Communist military rebels made abortive attempts to overthrow Diem's government. A few months ago, however, a new and different kind of passive protest emerged in South Vietnam. Though it became political, its origins were religious. In 1954, when French colonial rule ended and Vietnam was divided, nearly a million refugees fled from the Communist-controlled north to settle in the southern sector. Most of them were Catholics, and President Diem assumed they would favor his government. Diem could not openly discriminate against the Buddhist majority, but Catholics won many key jobs as province chiefs and military officers. "Catholics are more trustworthy anti-Communists," a Vietnamese official told me, "and they're likely to be more loyal to the regime."

Feeling especially privileged, Catholic functionaries out in the countryside often took it upon themselves to harass Buddhists. Under a statute passed in French colonial times, Buddhism was a private association which required authorization for its activities. Despite Diem's promise to change it, this rule stood. Under cover of the law, Catholic officials often broke up illicit Buddhist religious meetings.

No single individual in Vietnam did more to aggravate this religious friction than Diem's shrewd older brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, 66, archbishop of the Ngo Dinh family hometown of Hué. "He has the idea that catholicism is the state religion," says a Catholic Vietnamese, "and that he can wield his authority over all Catholics in the Government."

As the family's oldest living brother, Thuc is hugely respected by Diem, who regards him as a great human benefactor, another Dr. Schweitzer. Many Vietnamese, Catholics among them consider Thuc more of a businessman than a clergyman. Thuc has plunged into all sorts of operations, buying apartment houses, stores, rubber estates, and timber concessions; and when he eyes a prospective purchase, other bidders somehow drop out. Thuc enjoys an exclusive license to import schoolbooks—which also makes him official educational censor—and he has requisitioned army trucks and labor to construct his church buildings. As a Presidential relative, says a Saigon merchant, his requests for donations read like tax notices.

Madame Nhu, who adores him, thinks he should be a cardinal, and Diem lobbied strenuously to have Thuc made archbishop of Saigon. But the Vatican, aware that Thuc's activities have hurt the Catholic image, refused. The Ngo Dinh family's reaction was characteristic. When a new archbishop was appointed, invitations to his investiture were strangely misplaced at the post office, and only a handful of guests showed up.

Buddhist resentment against the Ngo Dinh family's narrow catholicism simmered until last spring. Then, on a hot humid May morning in the charming old city of Hué, thousands of Buddhists assembled to celebrate the 2527th anniversary of the birth of their Lord Gautama Buddha. It was to be an occasion of prayers, sermons, and processions.

But Archbishop Thuc, planning to commemorate his silver jubilee as a bishop, did not fancy the sight of Buddhist banners adorning his see. Through his influence, the Government forbade the flying of religious flags, and local troops tried to prevent the Buddhists from unfurling their multicolored banners. Armored cars bristling with machineguns wheeled into the streets to disperse the crowd. When this failed, an obscure officer ordered his men to shoot. Nine women and children were killed.

In the days that followed, Buddhist protest demonstrations gradually spread. Led by monks and nuns, absurdly frail-looking in their saffron robes and shaved heads, they gathered silently in front of public buildings and staged hunger strikes in their temples. Diem set his police and soldiers against them. Finally realizing that continued collisions would lead nowhere, Diem finally formed a committee to study the situation, and a temporary truce was declared.

By now, however, the demonstrations had changed from a religious protest into an increasingly organized expression of accumulated political grievances. At Saigon's ornate Xa Loi temple, young Buddhist monks installed telephones and mimeograph machines to duplicate press releases, and their spokesman stated firmly that "we must continue the fight against those who try to destroy Buddhism." Nor did Diem really mean to come to terms. "As the situation relaxed," one of his aides confided to me, "he began to feel he had the upper hand and he was thinking of some new drastic action."

The tenuous truce was shattered by the fiery Madame Nhu. In private she berated Diem for compromising with "illiterate, crypto-Communist" Buddhists; at one point, according to family intimates, she pounded the dinner table so fiercely that she upset a bowl of chicken soup. For public consumption she ordered the English-language Times of Vietnam—a Saigon daily run by an American protege—to publish a proclamation by her rubber-stamp Women's Solidarity Committee. Among other things the statement charged the Buddhists with everything from sedition and neutralism to insulting the flag and being foreign agitators "undermining the nation." And the angry, confused battle against the Buddhists was on again.

It came to a climax a few days later, on the morning of June 11. Diem had gone to the Saigon Cathedral to celebrate a mass in memory of Pope John XXIII. Not far away, at a street intersection, an aged Buddhist monk called Thich Quang Duc seated himself cross-legged on the warm asphalt. He fingered a rosary of holy beads and softly chanted a prayer as another monk splashed his robes with gasoline. Without the slightest tremor crossing his serene face, he touched a match to himself, instantly bursting into a horror of flame and billowing smoke.

The impact of that—and the other suicides to follow—shook the world. Buddhists in Ceylon, Japan, Thailand, and elsewhere raised a chorus of complaint, and American clergymen of all denominations petitioned President Kennedy to intercede. With typical understatement, Pope Paul urged South Vietnam to find "the secret of unity."

In one of the stiffest gestures it has ever taken toward him, Washington privately warned Diem to meet the Buddhist grievances. Or else, American Chargé d'Affaires William Truehart told Diem, the United States would "disassociate" itself from his policies and publicly condemn him. Praised and coddled for years by the United States—Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON called him the "Winston Churchill of Asia"—Diem was taken aback by the criticisms. He agreed that Buddhists could fly their flag, he promised to abrogate the old French law discriminating against Buddhists, and he ordered the release of most of the Buddhists arrested in antigovernment demonstrations.

Mild as they were, these concessions were too much for the Nhus. In part, they confirmed the Nhus' deep-seated hostility toward interference by the United States, a power they have variously referred to as "capitalist imperialist," "neocolonialist" and "Communist-infiltrated." American efforts to make Diem meet the Buddhist terms, cried Madame Nhu, were "blackmail."

More astutely, her husband sensed that the Buddhist dispute was only the superficial symptom of a far deeper resentment against the regime. He realized that his family-run police state could not suddenly compromise without falling apart. Instead, he mobilized his blue-uniformed Republican Youth Movement—of which he is "supreme leader"—and urged them to oppose Diem's half-hearted attempts at conciliation. On

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Nhu's instructions, wounded war veterans were rounded up to stage demonstrations against Buddhist temples.

Nhu made no secret of his feeling that Diem was too soft. On one occasion he called a group of army generals into his office and provocatively told them to count him in if they were planning to overthrow the government. Another time, he implied to a reporter that he might lead a coup d'etat that would be "anti-Buddhist, anti-American and against the weaknesses of the government." Echoing a similar sentiment, his wife said, "The president worries too easily. He's not the type to take the initiative in a crisis. His government is weak, and because of that weakness, I'm here. I'm for the underdog. In this country, the upperdogs are the Communists and the Americans."

In her own inimitable fashion, Madame Nhu advocated beating the Buddhists "10 times more." She even told a TV interviewer, "All the Buddhists have done for this country is to barbecue a monk." Diem himself, in a rare moment of candor, told an aide, "What can I do? I can't control her."

The relations between President Diem and his first lady are unique. She thinks nothing of pushing him around, even in front of strangers. In the presidential palace, which she and her family share with Diem, Madame Nhu was preparing to be interviewed on TV one day last month but decided the setting was inappropriate. Without hesitation she burst into a chamber where Diem was seeing visitors and asked them to leave. At the prospect of moving all their equipment, the TV crew dissuaded her from changing places. "Oh, all right," she agreed, and turning to an aide, she said, "Go tell the President never mind."

Presented with the case of Madame Nhu, an amateur psychiatrist would be tempted to look into her childhood, and she frankly confesses that her youth was miserable. Her father was a wealthy lawyer and landowner, her mother, a member of Vietnamese royalty, and young Le Xuan, or "Beautiful Spring," had her own liveried coolie to pull her to school in a rickshaw. But she was a middle child, between an older sister she had to respect, and a younger brother who received more attention. "It's too bad my parents never loved me," she still moons.

At the age of 20, she escaped from home into marriage with Ngo Dinh Nhu, then the chief librarian in Hanoi and 13 years his bride's senior. She also converted from Buddhism to Catholicism.

When she married Nhu, Madame Nhu really married the Ngo Dinh family. They were a distinguished family of Catholic mandarins who had resisted French colonial domination but also refused to ally themselves with the Communist-led Viet Minh nationalists. The eldest of the Ngo Dinh brothers and his son were shot by the Communists; Madame Nhu, her daughter, and mother-in-law were imprisoned by them for 4 months, then released.

During the years the French fought to keep Indochina, Diem played virtually no political role. He traveled around the world with his brother, Archbishop Thuc, and settled for some time in a New Jersey seminary. After the French defeat in 1954, the United States, searching for a prominent nationalist free of French or Communist ties, decided on Diem to run the southern half of the partitioned country. He was an unknown without political support.

The problems he faced were staggering. Refugees were pouring out of the north; and in the south Diem was confronted by dissident sects, pirates and a mutinous army. He decided to fight rather than compromise, and the United States helped him significantly. His most rebellious general agreed to retire to France after the American Ambassador let it be known that the Vietnamese Army could expect no U.S. air unless it gave Diem "complete and implicit obedience." The pirates were tracked down and seized. Against all odds and despite the most dire predictions of his downfall, he held on.

But those months of fighting and intrigue left him distrustful of all but his immediate family. He concentrated all authority unto himself and, afraid of disloyalty, depended for his power on two of his brothers. Nhu installed himself in the Saigon palace; Ngo Dinh Can, a stout, sharp-eyed man who drinks heavily, took over central Vietnam and ruled from Hué, where he also cared for the brothers' aging mother. (Past 80, she is bedridden and silently lies in state, like a wax mummy, occasionally visited by dutiful officials.)

To give the young government an ideology, the intellectual brother Nhu invented "personalism," which he evolved out of Catholic existentialism and Confucianism. Beyond a small circle of fellow highbrows, nobody has yet fathomed its meaning. Nhu also created the Can-Lao Nhan-Vi Cach-Mang Dang, or Revolutionary Labor Personalism Party, a clandestine organization of some 70,000 agents who spy on citizens and transmit Nhu's orders to branches of the army and administration. More recently he formed his paramilitary Republican Youth.

THE RISE OF MADAME NHU

As the family clan grew tighter and more powerful, Madame Nhu's role loomed more prominent. She became a member of the National Assembly, and she introduced to Vietnam's public affairs a feminine penchant for generalizing from the particular. For example, when her sister's wealthy husband tried to get a divorce, Madame Nhu bulldozed through a law banning divorce except by presidential decree. This family law, as it is called, also prohibits "too-free relations" between the sexes. While she was at it, Madame Nhu went on to abolish beauty contests, boxing, fighting, fish, sorcerers, prostitution, birth control, smoking and drinking by minors, and all dancing. In addition, she outlawed over 200 sad and sentimental songs which allegedly "lowered national morale." Despite some publicized banning of U.S. Embassy square dances, this effort to legalize morality has been less than a success. Saigon is still full of roisterous bars and flocks of streetwalkers.

In more serious fields, President Diem has also been less than a success. He has made some timid attempts at land reform and economic development. But serious economic projects were hampered by his claim to inner revelation on almost every subject and his inability or unwillingness to delegate authority to experts. He would instruct foresters on how to plant trees and tell contractors where to build roads.

His inefficiency in military matters has been even more crippling. Ever fearful of betrayal, he distrusts his top officers, and of his 20 generals, only 4 or 5 actually command troops. He also delights in shunting his armies around whimsically, changing priorities and ignoring advice.

Last year, over the howling protests of U.S. advisers, every M-113 armored personnel carrier in the critical Mekong River delta was withdrawn to Saigon—for the Republic Day parade. On the basis of some inspiration a few months ago, Diem ordered Operation Waves of Love, dispatching marine and naval forces into the marshes of the Camau Peninsula, at the southern end of the country. The men bogged around for a month and, achieving nothing, withdrew.

More significantly, Diem has never really grasped the concept of counterinsurgency. To fight guerrillas, an army must be broken into small, fast, mobile units that can pursue offensive operations quickly and flexibly. But Diem thinks in terms of artillery "because you can strike the enemy from a distance," and his commanders love to rely on aerial attacks, which usually kill more innocent peasants than Communists. "They just have it all wrong," explains a seasoned American officer. "This is not an artillery war or an air war but a rifleman's war."

Military conditions have improved in central Vietnam. But Diem's reluctance to launch a major offensive during the recent dry season, from autumn through spring, has seriously impaired his position in the important southern delta. It spared the Communists, who have emerged again in the rainy months when the Government's tanks, artillery and aircraft cannot easily operate.

Though U.S. brass and Saigon statisticians claim progress, the Communists have increased their hard-core regulars from 18,000 to more than 25,000 in the past year. The ratio of weapons captured and lost is said to be improving, but these figures are illusory. The Government loses Browning automatics and recoilless rifles, and captures homemade lead-pipe pistols from the Communists. Casualty tabulations are similarly deceptive. All dead bodies are listed as Communists.

At the same time, the massive "strategic hamlet" program, designed to put the population into fortified settlements, is not working well in the rich, ricegrowing region south of Saigon, where over half the country's people live. Again, Diem's concept of the plan is at odds with what U.S. military advisers have in mind. "We must control territory and defend everything under the sun," he told me. "We must suffocate the Communists. This job can't be done drop by drop."

Brother Nhu has set a lively rhythm for building hamlets. He not only has ordered them erected deep in Communist areas, where they are highly vulnerable, but he has posted strict achievement targets. In too many places local officials have thrown up bamboo fences and barbed wire, forced people to move in, and announced that their hamlets are ready. Of the 4,000 settlements officially claimed to exist in the strategic Mekong Delta, only about 1,000 are regarded as "viable" by U.S. experts. "There's a basic difference between ourselves and Vietnamese officialdom," says an American who works in the field. "We see security in terms of people; they see it in terms of territory. I don't think they've yet grasped the political aspects of this war."

For all too long, Washington also failed to grasp the political aspect of this war. On the assumption that there was no alternative leadership in Vietnam, the United States treated Diem as indispensable. In 1961 President Kennedy's new military adviser, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, flew out to Saigon and recommended massive American military aid. He also suggested that Diem reform his government by, among other things, appointing a genuine cabinet, releasing thousands of political prisoners, inviting his political opponents to join the regime, and streamlining his cumbersome chain of command.

Ambassador Frederick Nolting, Jr., was left to negotiate these reforms. For 3 weeks, while the controlled Saigon press virulently attacked "U.S. interference," Nolting tried to persuade Diem to change. The evening the talks finished, Ngo Dinh Nhu appeared at a party. "Mr. Nolting is the most intelligent American Ambassador we've ever had in Saigon," he announced. Everyone present knew immediately that the United States had backed down. As a Washington official explained it, "We just couldn't make Diem budge, so we decided to fight the war first and worry about reforms later."

Thus the U.S. Establishment, still scarred by the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, declared a moratorium on public criticism of Diem and his family. The American Embassy in Saigon began to sound like a branch of Diem's own Public Information Department, and probing reporters were treated like disloyal citizens. When a correspondent asked

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a sharp question at a briefing some months ago, visiting Adm. Harry D. Felt snappped back, "OK, boy, get on the team."

But the U.S. policy of "sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem," as the New York Times Correspondent Homer Bigart coined it, was basically doomed. For one thing, Diem in his infinite egotism did not cooperate. Not long ago Ambassador Nolting pointed out to Diem all the moral credit that the United States had built up in Vietnam and asked him to revoke a minor decision. Diem reportedly replied, "You have no credit with me." For another, the U.S. idea of postponing political reforms ignored the fact that Vietnam was immersed in political warfare. Diem's brother Nhu was perfectly aware of the fact. And in the Buddhist crisis he and wife seized the opportunity to become overt powers in South Vietnam.

During the long crisis, Nhu began to abandon his pose as an intellectual recluse. He made public speeches and talked to newsmen, and the Government printed up thousands of posters with his photograph in the uniform of the Republican Youth. He also quietly strengthened his loyal military elements around Saigon. Four companies of armored troop carriers, each equipped with .50-caliber machineguns, were brought in from central Vietnam. The U.S. Advisory Command was told that these vehicles were en route to the Mekong Delta, but they remained in the capital. At the same time, Nhu reinforced the Vietnamese special forces battalions in Saigon, bringing their strength up to about 1,200 men. Commanded by the faithful Col. Le Quang Tung, a former counterespionage chief, these units included two groups dressed in civilian clothes and armed with knives, pistols, and grenades for street fighting.

All together, more than 7,000 troops were stationed in or near the capital. On the surface it looked as though Diem was being protected against a potential attack from the countryside, possibly by his own mutinous men. In reality, these troops in Saigon were themselves preparing for an assault. Last month, on Nhu's orders and with Diem's apparent blessing, they struck against the Buddhists. As soon as the raids were finished, Diem moved one of his most faithful generals into Saigon as military governor, and then took to the radio to declare martial law throughout the country. He called the Buddhist leaders "political speculators who have taken advantage of religion * * * to carry out repeated illegal actions." Ngo Dinh Nhu was more specific. He claimed that the Buddhists had hidden weapons in their temples and were plotting "to sabotage national security * * * and organize a coup d'etat." To observers it looked as though Nhu's supposedly preventive action might really be Nhu's own creeping coup d'etat.

Nhu had obviously staged his move to precede the arrival of the new U.S. Ambassador, blunt, outspoken Henry Cabot Lodge. But he and Diem had gone even further than that in their deviousness.

The very night that their troops and police sacked the Buddhist temples, the Ngo Dinh brothers ordered a group of Vietnamese generals to their palace. With the palace surrounded by loyal units, Diem and Nhu commanded the generals to sign a predated document. This false document was framed as a request by the generals asking the Government to declare martial law and crack down on the Buddhists. The fake request was aimed at Ambassador Lodge—designed to give him the impression that the sweeping repressions reflected demands from a powerful group in the military high command. Virtually prisoners in the presidential palace, the generals had no choice but to sign. And Washington, which at first attributed the raids to the Vietnamese Army, soon found it had been duped. It issued a statement blaming Nhu, exonerating the army and implying that a drastic overhauling of the Saigon regime would not be unwelcome.

DIEM'S MINISTER QUITS

Overnight, the Diem regime's tottering reputation all but collapsed. South Vietnam's Buddhist Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau resigned, shaved his head, and announced that he intended to make a religious pilgrimage to India. (He was later arrested.) Diem's Ambassador to Washington, Madame Nhu's father, Tran Van Chuong, also resigned from "a government * * * of which I disapprove." Under the Diem regime, he said, "there's not one chance in a hundred for victory." His wife, observer to the U.N., also quit.

Washington's distress over the crisis had no immediate effect in Saigon. After smashing the Buddhists, the Ngo Dinhs went on to crack down on teachers and students, a previously placid and apolitical group. Professors and university leaders came out with banners denouncing Diem and Nhu, and the police went into action. As the students arrived at Saigon's university, troops, and cops neatly knocked them off their bicycles and hauled them off to jail by the truckload. (They also detained three American correspondents, including the Post's Burt Glinn.) Elsewhere in Saigon, where students were planning noisier demonstrations, the Government was harsher. Hundreds were beaten, and one girl, allegedly trying to "escape," was shot.

The rise to power of the feared and detested Ngo Dinh Nhu helped to cyrstalize the many military elements that have long plotted against the Government. Until now they have hesitated to act, because they lacked cohesion, because they were uncertain of getting U.S. benediction and because they feared the Communists would profit from a coup. There are several generals among these potential insurgents, and they even include men close to Diem's family. "But you've known Diem and the Nhus for years," I asked one of them. "How could you kill them in cold blood?" My friend shrugged sadly. "We must choose between a few people and a nation."

Most officers hoped, however, to avoid bloodshed. Under the martial law, army elements moved into administrative control. These military units could conceivably usurp the power of the Diem regime. But if they stay faithful to Diem, they may be opposed by other, less loyal elements, which could touch off a confused, triangular civil war—South Vietnam's Army fighting within itself, with the Communists idly watching and winning.

South Vietnam lies on the edge of chaos. And in retrospect, the strongest Communist allies in the country have been the Diem family. They have sown suspicion and hatred, and their show of apparent power has been a sham to conceal their weakness. Back in 1933, when he was a young civil servant, Ngo Dinh Diem made a prophecy that may yet come true. "The Communists will not take our country by virtue of their strength," he said, "but by virtue of our weakness. They'll win by default."

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on Friday, September 20, the distinguished majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD] made a short but important speech outlining some of our problems in the Vietnamese crisis. All Members of the Senate would do well to review his latest statement on this problem. On Sunday, September 22, the New York Times published an editorial calling attention to the majority leader's remarks on Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Sept. 20, 1963]

CONFUSION ON VIETNAM

Senator MANSFIELD, a penetrating student of Far Eastern affairs, has called the Nation's attention to a major bedevilment in our efforts to help South Vietnam win the war against Communist guerrillas. This complicating element is the deep split inside the administration on just what policy to pursue—a split aggravated by the bitter hostilities and contradictory courses among the various American agencies in Saigon. The result is all-around confusion so intense it could mean disaster.

The situation the United States faces in Vietnam is difficult and delicate enough without such complications. The repressive policies of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu are alienating the country's people; the military campaign is impaired by divided command; the impending debate on Vietnam in the United Nations General Assembly will add new embarrassments.

As President Kennedy has stated, the stakes in southeast Asia are too high for us to see the war lost. But the war will not be won by what he himself characterized as "ambivalence" in our effort. The obvious remedy would seem to be the one Senator MANSFIELD suggests; namely, to put all activities under the overall direction of Ambassador Lodge and to institute such changes in personnel as may be needed to insure some consistency in our Vietnamese policy. Any policy is better than no policy at all or a dozen policies operating at cross-purposes.

Ending the present mixup over who is in charge should be a major goal of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their trip to Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Max Freedman is one of the most distinguished analysts of American politics. Mr. Freedman was formerly the Washington correspondent for the Guardian, a leading English newspaper. While serving in this capacity, Mr. Freedman was judged the best reporter for the foreign press who was then reporting from this country in a study of the subject printed in Time magazine. All Americans who had occasion to be in England at the time Freedman was writing for the Guardian were grateful for the penetrating and fair-minded quality of Freedman's writing on American affairs. Freedman has continued to display these qualities in the syndicated column that he now writes for several American newspapers, including the Washington Evening Star. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a recent column by Mr. Freedman on South Vietnam which appeared in the September 23 issue of the Star be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Evening Star, Washington, Sept. 23, 1963]

CIA'S BLUNDERS IN VIETNAM: DEVELOPMENTS SHOW FOLLY OF LETTING INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ESTABLISH POLICIES

(By Max Freedman)

As the war in Vietnam has continued, the struggle in Washington between rival groups

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inside the administration has grown in bitterness and intensity. There have been angry mutterings of resignation—not carried out in practice—and high words about drift and danger. Part of the tension has been caused by clashes in temperament but the central problem arises from differences over public policy.

By the middle of April, or even a few days earlier, it seemed clear to a few discerning officials in the State Department that the military struggle had begun to turn slowly yet decisively against the Communist forces.

This basic military fact has been obscured by the later political storms but the available evidence confirms this trend. Only about 10 percent of the Communist forces, which number somewhat less than 25,000 men, comes from outside Vietnam.

This background deserves considerable emphasis for it shows that the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency are entitled to praise for this limited achievement. As the weeks dragged on, however, it became painfully evident that both of them were guilty of shambling inaccuracies in reading the political situation in Vietnam.

When the debate behind the scenes is made public years from now, no one will be able to deny that the State Department, on the basis of papers and recommendations written at the time and not with the wisdom of hindsight, had a far greater insight into the true situation in Vietnam than any other agency in the American Government. Yet the State Department has faced a desperate and wearing struggle to get its view embodied in American policy.

If the final result in Vietnam should be a defeat for the cause supported by American arms and American money, there will be a rush in this country to place the blame on the most vulnerable scapegoats. What is an easier target than the State Department?

It will be said that the State Department lost South Vietnam just as it once lost China. That charge is wrong about China, and it certainly never can be true about Vietnam.

The record will show that the State Department from the very beginning saw the tragic significance of the Diem government's attack on the students. It understood the moral decay and political cruelty that prompted the campaign against the Buddhists. It regretted the timid, blundering, and inconsistent appeal made to the army in Vietnam to assert its independence.

It argues now that if it is hard to find an alternative to the Diem group, the blame rests in no small part on the unfortunate alliance between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department, with its disastrous impact in recent weeks on American policy.

In this distribution of blame, the heaviest burden falls on the CIA. The officials making these criticisms are not vindictive nor do they have any desire to stir up a row inside the administration.

With the evidence in their hands of the incredible and garish blunders committed in a sickening sequence by the CIA, these men in the State Department would be false to their trust if they remained silent while omens of disaster steadily accumulated.

The wretched muddle in Vietnam shows the folly and the danger of allowing the CIA to be a primary force in the development of American policy. The CIA should be an instrument for carrying out an agreed policy; it should never be the architect of policy.

Two further points should be made:

First, Ambassador Lodge, by consent of those best able to judge, is doing a first-rate job in very hard conditions.

Secondly, the action of Senator CHURCH and some 30 other Senators in threatening to cut off aid is designed to strengthen President Kennedy in his dealings with the Diem government. It arms President Kennedy with a lever against that government if it resists necessary reforms in Vietnam or if it flirts with a danger of neutrality.

THE USES OF DIVERSITY—ADDRESS BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on September 9, approximately 1 week before the opening of the 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Harlan Cleveland, delivered an address to the 18th assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations. Accenting the fact that the U.N., like the United States, thrives on diversity, Mr. Cleveland told the delegates:

You are meeting today in the very citadel of diversity, the seat of an organization with the misleading name United Nations. United we certainly are not. We are gloriously, irretrievably diverse—diverse in social organization, in economic theories, in political ideas, diverse in attitudes and alliances, in wealth and power; diverse, too, in the stages of development.

He continued:

Because we are diverse, our United Nations is an intensely practical organization. For what makes diversity work, as we have found here at home, is not men's ability to agree on philosophy or broad principles, but the fact that they can agree on what to do next, while continuing to disagree about why they are doing it.

In my judgment, Mr. Cleveland's speech before the World Federation of United Nations Associations deserves the widest attention, and I recommend its careful reading to all. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Assistant Secretary's excellent and meaningful remarks be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE USES OF DIVERSITY

(Address by the Honorable Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs at the First Plenary Session of the World Federation of United Nations Association, September 9, 1963)

I

The Secretary General, who honors us by his presence here this morning, will welcome you to the United Nations. My pleasure is to welcome you to the State of New York, and to the United States of America.

You are meeting, as well you know, in the world's most antique democracy. I think you will find it also one of the world's liveliest.

Ever since our forefathers got carried away with some heady ideas about human dignity and personal freedom and equal rights for all men we have been having a lively time trying to make good on their promises. Right now we are busy trying to correct the worst and the oldest gap between promise and performance. You will have to pardon us if we sometimes seem to be too busy arguing among ourselves to argue with our visitors.

Perhaps, Mr. Secretary General, you will recall some words spoken several years ago about the nature of this democracy of ours. You might recall them because they were spoken in this city by a former Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, with whom you were associated before you left your national launching pad, as Dag Hammarskjold used to say, and went into orbit as servant to the international community.

U Nu had spent several days in a hospital on the East River, and he spoke at a luncheon in his honor of the amazing sights and the overpowering size of this metropolis. Then he said:

"One night I sat up on the terrace roof well past my bedtime and gazed out on the city. I was away from the noise and distraction. Here I seemed to sense the great pulse that beats under the surface of your city. And I thought that the power of New York lies not in any of these massive physical characteristics. It seemed to me that the greatest thing of all was the living lesson that New York offers the world: that peoples from many lands, many races, many cultures, many religions can live together and work together; not only can they coexist, but all of them seem to draw at least some little something from each other that makes them more complete and that adds vigor and endurance to their lives.

"Perhaps out of this kind of ferment, out of this kind of contact between peoples of such varied backgrounds, out of this kind of diversity can come the new ideas and the new way of looking at things that are so badly needed in our world."

Those words were well received here, because we glory in the description of our society as the great melting-pot. It is, of course, nothing of the sort.

The racial and ethnic and national groups that came here, and read a sign in the harbor saying "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost, to me * * *," didn't fly apart after they became Americans. They clove to each other, they huddled together for protection against the other groups that had already come, and against those further waves of strangers that kept rolling in past the Statue of Liberty and populating a continent with a nation of foreigners.

No, the relevant cliche is not the melting-pot, but U Nu's word: diversity. The newer Americans and the older Americans learned in time to tolerate each other. They rubbed up against each other, and they discovered not that all men are brothers—that is an early, easier lesson—but that all brothers are different, which is a later, harder lesson because it means learning about the value of difference.

You who visit us for a few weeks may find us in consequence a little confusing. Some of you come from societies which can describe their goals and define their "system" with well-honed words from ancient texts or modern manifestoes. Don't ask us for our manifesto—all you will get will be a blank stare.

For we don't have a "system." We have, if anything, a protected plurality of systems. The Englishman, Edmund Burke, in his famous speech about how to get along with those wild men across the Atlantic, said in despair that our religion is the dissidence of dissent. Americans, he thought, were a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. What makes it so hard for our own historians to capture and record the American way of life is precisely that our way of life is a living denial of the dogma that any one man's view of society,

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or any one group's view of society, is the correct, approved version.

II

You are meeting today in the very citadel of diversity, the seat of an organization with the misleading name United Nations. United we certainly are not. We are gloriously, irretrievably diverse—diverse in social organization, in economic theories in political ideas; diverse in attitudes and alliances, in wealth and power; diverse, too, in the stages of development.

Because we are diverse, our United Nations is an intensely practical organization. For what makes diversity work, as we have found here at home, is not men's ability to agree on philosophy or broad principles, but the fact that they can agree on what to do next, while continuing to disagree about why they are doing it.

Some may agree to take the next step because they see their interests served thereby; others may see a mandate for the same next step in some religious text or economics textbook; still others may go along because they don't want to offend those who are proposing the step be taken. The reasons for common action can be mutually inconsistent—in any large organization I think they often are, and in the United Nations almost always so.

If we had to wait around until two-thirds of the delegates who meet in this place could agree as to why they were agreeing, no resolution would ever be passed and the United Nations would not today be spending more than half a billion dollars a year for peacekeeping and nation building.

What unites this diversity, then, is not so much a paper agreement on philosophy as a practical consensus on procedure, a pragmatic agreement on how decisions will be made and who will carry them into action. It is no accident that the Charter of the United Nations contains 4 pages of philosophy followed by 40 pages of procedure.

A marvelous practical system it is; if we sat down in this place to write the charter again, it is highly improbable that we would do as well.

As the U.N. has grown in maturity, in strength, and in revelance to the major issues of the day, it has collected enemies in every nation as well as friends. Your United Nations associations in every land bear the brunt of defending the organization against political attack, so there is no need to remind you of the gloomy forecasts that have regularly been made about it.

The onset of the cold war, the crisis in Korea, the chronic warring in the Middle East, the chaotic ordeal in the Congo, the growing gap between the rich countries and the poor countries—each test of international cooperation has produced its crop of doomsayers.

The detractors of the forties were certain the organization would die of anemia; the latter-day detractors are more inclined to predict the organization's demise from overindulgence. But they share a common characteristic: they are wrong.

The U.N.'s capacity to act—which is its most precious asset—has grown from year to year. It has outlived a succession of threats to its existence—each time, like Ulysses, emerging stronger from the trial. As Adlai Stevenson has said, the United Nations was built for trouble and thrives on it.

III

No organization can double in membership in less than two decades without putting an enormous strain on the original machinery. The machinery devised to serve the 51-member organization of 1945 is plainly inadequate for the 111-member organization of today.

For example:

The General Assembly is cumbersome—it is, for example, the only parliamentary body in the world which still tries to do most of its work through committees of the whole.

Some of the councils and commissions are too small to include voices from all parts of the newly independent world.

The Office of the Secretary General is still handling an extraordinary range of peacemaking tasks by putting an impossible burden on a handful of overworked men.

The United Nations has now undertaken 10 peacekeeping operations but the Secretariat needs more of the military planning skills that the next emergency, and the one after that, will require.

There is no doubt that technical aid and preinvestment work—the development of projects that make sense and the training of people who can make them work—is now the main bottleneck in the whole development process. The U.N., which teaches public administration all over the world, still has administrative improvements to make in unifying the contribution to this process of all the U.N. agencies.

IV

But the biggest question about the United Nations today is not whether it will be more or less efficient. The biggest question is whether its members will stay on the course they have laid out for themselves in the charter.

In every country today, voices are raised to ask: Do we really want an international organization with a significant capacity to keep the peace?

In all of the big countries, this question is asked to justify a growing resistance to paying for international peacekeeping. A new slogan, "our way or no pay," is today the official policy of several member governments, including two of the permanent members of the Security Council.

But the rest of us can hardly claim an unsullied virtue in the matter. Our debates on U.N. financing reveal strong minority opinions to the same effect: If we are paying part of the piper, shouldn't we be calling all of the tune?

The doubts about international peacekeeping also show up among those who advocate change at any price, and those who think keeping the peace means keeping things just as they are.

In Africa today the U.N. and most of its members are in the middle—determined to bring self-determination to all peoples, but anxious—and obligated under the charter—to pursue this goal by peaceful means. In every society we have citizens who in their pursuit of laudable goals are quite prepared to take the law into their own hands, convinced in their own minds that a little bloodshed will lubricate the machinery for change. The U.N. would be endangered if any of its members came to think that way.

The magnificent record of decolonization gives hope that we can yet devise in the U.N. the methods of peaceful change which will enable all the people of the southern part of Africa to exercise the rights to which the charter and their own natural dignity entitle them. But if the United Nations is going to play a central part in this process, as most of us believe it should, all parties are going to have to be willing to talk and do something about change—while maintaining the peace.

Let me say it again: A world of diversity will only work if there are some agreed rules; and rules have to be taken most seriously at moments of maximum annoyance and frustration. If a car in front of you at the stoplight fails to move when the light turns green, it is permissible to blow your horn or even to call in the proper authorities to help induce the other driver to move. It is not permissible to express your sense of outrage by ramming his car from the rear, nor can that be done without getting hurt yourself.

A related threat to the Organization has developed from this same frustration about the persistence of colonial rule and racial discrimination in the southern third of Africa. In several conferences this summer, one group of U.N. members has tried to eject other members from the meetings. On several occasions the resulting clamor has brought important work to a standstill—and has brought disrepute to the United Nations.

There is no doubt that if a large caucus of member states is unified and determined, and is willing to ignore legal rulings and the chairman's gavel, they can succeed in making a shambles of any parliamentary body. There are plenty of instances, in the tortured history of democratic institutions, of frustrated minorities becoming so incensed that they took their frustration out on the rules of the game of democracy itself.

The claim in these instances has always been same—that the end justified the means—that if democratic procedures frustrate purposes of obvious nobility, then democratic procedures must be cast aside. The boomerang effect of such an attitude is perhaps the clearest and most obvious lesson in all the history of freedom. All of us who owe our freedom, and our national independence, to the presence in the world of democratic procedures should think long and carefully before we cast them aside as an obstacle to the early achievement of our own immediate aims.

The specific remedy for all the viruses that currently afflict the United Nations—financial delinquency, the tension between peace and change, and the temptation to set aside the democratic rules of the charter—is simple. It is for all of us to remember, and repeat with our prayers, that what keeps a world of diversity from blowing itself into eternity is a consensus on how decisions will be made—lawyers would prefer to call it law—and a willingness to talk at tedious length with people whose principles you hate.

V

The creation of the U.N. did not end the competition for power among nations. It did broaden that competition, bringing in peoples and leaders from all around the globe. It did provide a place to contain the struggle—an arena for diversity. And it may in time civilize the settlement of disputes among nations.

If we are going to have an arena, we are going to have to have rules of the game, the deadly serious game, we play there. Without them, or when they are violated at will, the civilizing game disintegrates into a free-for-all. A free-for-all is bad enough in a sports arena. In the United Nations it is a formula for nuclear-powered jungle war.

The future of these nations united in diversity does not hang on their ability to meld their differences into the dull and unstable amalgam of resolutions on general principles. It hangs on the "next steps" we can take together in this place, to make this a world as safe as it is exciting to live in.

The action we take together had better contain the peril we share—for we all have to be brothers whether we like it or not.

INDIANA DUNES AND BURNS DITCH HARBOR

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, an editorial in this morning's Washington Post correctly assesses the recommendations made by the Bureau of the Budget this week as to the fate of the beautiful Indian Dunes.

The editorial states that "not three, not two, but one cheer is in order for the administration's compromise decision." I am sure that all those who want to preserve our Nation's natural treasures for the generations to come will share this view, although I might be

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Remarks:

The attached extract from the Congressional Record of yesterday deals with Senator Church's discussion of Vietnam and insertion of various articles including the Max Freedman article in The Star of 23 September. This is the first floor reference to the Freedman article.

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