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EXPOSE
OF
SOVIET ESPIONAGE
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
J. EDGAR HOOVER, Director

TRANSMITTED BY DIRECTION OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR USE OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION



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**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
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S. Res. 345

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

July 2, 1960.

Resolved, That there be printed as a Senate document a summary of known Soviet espionage cases in the United States over the past fifteen years, published by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and heretofore printed as a committee print under the title "Exposé of Soviet Espionage".

SEC. 2. There shall be printed an additional thirteen thousand copies of such document for use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

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SOVIET-BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION:

Recent Soviet propaganda has denounced the United States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception which President Eisenhower might expect on his visit to Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on May 11, 1960, as wondering what would have been the reaction of the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the United States on the eve of his visit to this country.

The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, two Soviet espionage agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield, Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A. Kirilyuk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting to induce this American to furnish information regarding United States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a vital United States Government agency where he could obtain classified information for the Russians. While this meeting was taking place Kirilyuk and the American were under observation by Leonid A. Kovalev, another Soviet employee of the United Nations who was conducting a countersurveillance. Unknown to the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians.

Not only did these Russians stoop to spying, but they callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy in the most reprehensible manner -- the subversion of an American on American soil.

Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photographed the Russians, no publicity was given to this incident in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace.

And this is not an isolated incident - nor has the target always been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against this country, and through the years have procured a volume of information which would stagger the imagination. This information includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major U. S. cities and vital areas which have given the Russians the product of aerial reconnaissance just as surely as if Soviet planes had been sent over this country.

2. ACQUISITION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

In a free country such things as aerial photographs are available to the public and can be purchased commercially. The Soviets have been fully aware of this and throughout the years have taken full advantage of this free information, collecting aerial photographs of many areas of the United States.

For example, during October, 1953, two Soviets who had visited Minneapolis where they purchased fifteen aerial photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In October and November, 1953, two Soviets traveled in Missouri and Texas and obtained aerial maps of Dallas, Tulsa, Fort Worth and the surrounding areas covering a Naval air station, an Army airfield, and an Air Force base. In April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased aerial photographs of five Long Island communities. Also, in April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased three aerial photographs of Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas. In May, 1954, three Soviets traveled to California where they ordered from a Los Angeles photography shop \$80 worth of aerial photographs covering the Los Angeles area.

However, they have not been content with acquisition of publicly available data. For example, on May 3, 1954, Leonid E. Pivnev, an assistant Soviet air attache stationed in Washington, who had previously traveled extensively throughout the United States and had obtained commercially available aerial photographs of various areas of this country, requested a Washington, D. C., photographer to rent an airplane to take photographs of New York City which were not commercially available. He specified the scale to be used and the altitude from which the photographs were to be taken. He offered \$700 for this activity. Obviously the photographs which he requested would depict vital port areas, industrial facilities, and military installations in the New York area.

For this brazen abuse of his diplomatic privileges Pivnev was declared persona non grata on May 29, 1954, and departed from this country on June 6, 1954.

But this did not stop the Soviets. They continued their systematic program of collecting aerial photographs of major cities and vital areas of the United States. On January 19, 1955, the State Department sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador placing restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of data by Soviet citizens in the United States. These restrictions were comparable to restrictions on American citizens in Russia and in part prohibited Soviet citizens from obtaining aerial photographs except where they "appear in or are appendices to newspapers, periodicals, technical journals, atlases and books commercially available to the general public."

Soviet reaction to the restrictions was typical of their philosophy. They began circumventing the restrictions by subverting Americans to purchase aerial photographs for them. One month after the restrictions became effective, Nikolai I. Trofimov, a Soviet official in Mexico, began negotiations for a resident of the west coast of the United States to obtain aerial photographs of 45 major United States cities. Nineteen of these cities are located near Strategic Air Command bases. The remaining 26 are all strategic cities in or near which are located air bases, naval bases, research or training stations, atomic energy installations or important industrial facilities.

During April, 1958, Vladimir D. Loginov, a Soviet employee of the United Nations used the same technique to obtain an aerial map of New York City. At 10 p.m. on April 26, 1958, Loginov secretly met an individual in a darkened parking lot at the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York, where this map was delivered to Loginov. Months later on November 15, 1958, this same parking lot was again utilized by the Soviets to obtain aerial photographs of Chicago, Illinois. On this occasion, the photographs were turned over to Kirill S. Doronkin, another Soviet employee of the United Nations. In this same operation, the Soviets attempted to obtain aerial photographs of Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and San Diego and San Francisco, California.

Circumvention of the restrictions also took the form of trickery and deceit. For example, on July 17, 1959, Viktor V. Fomin, assistant Soviet military attache and Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the Soviet Military Attache in Washington, D. C. obtained an aerial photograph of the Glasgow Air Force Base in Montana from the local Chamber of Commerce by posing as tourists without identifying themselves as Soviet officials. On July 24, 1959, they obtained an aerial photograph of Thermopolis, Wyoming, by bullying the clerk at the Chamber of Commerce in an arrogant and insistent manner, again posing as tourists. They were given the photograph in spite of the fact that such a photograph is not normally given to tourists.

It is apparent from the examples cited that the Soviet Union reaps the benefits of aerial reconnaissance of the United States just as surely as if planes were sent over this country.

3. RECRUITMENT OF AMERICANS:

The acquisition of aerial photographs is only one phase of Soviet-bloc intelligence activity in the United States, but the manner in which it has been done illustrates two basic Soviet intelligence concepts; namely, to exploit the weaknesses of Americans whenever possible and to take full advantage of all the freedoms of our democratic society.

Following these concepts, the Soviets through the use of such devices as entrapment, blackmail, threats, and promises have exploited human frailty. The record is replete with examples of such exploitation of Americans throughout the years following the Russian Revolution in 1917. For example, Nicholas Dozenberg, a naturalized American, first became associated with the communist movement about 1920. In 1928 he was recruited into Soviet espionage activities with the approval of the Communist Party. He was recruited by one Alfred Tilton, who was an illegal agent of Soviet Military Intelligence, posing as a Canadian citizen and in possession of a Canadian passport. One of the early assignments given to Dozenberg was the sounding out of other Americans for later recruitment by Tilton. Dozenberg, after pleading guilty to violations of the passport laws, served a term in prison in 1940 and thereafter prior to his death cooperated with United States Government agencies.

Simon Rosenberg, another naturalized American of Polish background, during 1931 was sent to Russia by his employer. While there, he met representatives of a Soviet intelligence agency and under threats of reprisals to be taken against his sister who was then living in Russia, he agreed to work in behalf of the Russians upon his return to the United States. His principal assignment in this country was to obtain technical and industrial information. Rosenberg, who is now deceased, also cooperated with agencies of the Government, prior to his death, as have many other Americans who have been involved in Soviet intelligence activity.

Another example is the case of Hafis Salich, a naturalized American employed by the Office of Naval Intelligence in California who met Mikhail N. Gorin through a mutual acquaintance in 1937. Gorin was then the Pacific Coast manager of Intourist. By advancing Salich money, Gorin ultimately persuaded him to furnish Office of Naval Intelligence reports for which Gorin paid \$1700. Gorin and Salich were found guilty of espionage in 1939 and Salich was sentenced to four years imprisonment, which he served. Gorin appealed his conviction and sentence of six years to the Supreme Court of the United States which unanimously upheld the conviction in 1941; however, the trial judge suspended execution of the sentence and placed him on probation provided he would pay a \$10,000 fine and leave the United States, never to return.

The decade of 1950 - 1960 has been no exception. It began with the trial and conviction of Valentin Gubitchev, a Soviet employee of the United Nations who had obtained information from Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice. This conviction was soon followed by convictions of several Soviet agents in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg network in 1951; by the sentencing of Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger in 1953 after they pleaded guilty to espionage; by the guilty pleas of espionage by Jack and Myra Sobel and Jacob Albin in 1957 and later in the same year the conviction of Colonel Rudolf Abel, a Soviet illegal agent in this country.

These prosecutions, although they clearly establish the nature of Soviet espionage activities against this country, involve only a part of the Soviet-bloc espionage attack which has included numerous Soviet attempts to penetrate United States Government agencies. For example, the prosecution of Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice in early 1950 was followed in October, 1950, by a Soviet assignment to Boris Morros, an American motion picture producer who was cooperating with the FBI, to revive his acquaintance with a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; to obtain compromising information concerning this individual; and to carefully explore the possibility of placing a secretary in his office who could furnish information to the Russians. Morros previously in 1948 had been given the assignment to attempt to obtain information which could be used by the Russians in an effort to compromise United States General Clay in Germany.

Another example occurred during 1954 when Soviet intelligence officers in Germany approached an American Army officer stationed in Germany who was soon to be retired. They propositioned him to work for the Soviets after his return to the United States and set up a schedule for meetings in New York City. Pursuant to the arrangements, Maksim G. Martynov, counselor of the Soviet Representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, carried out a series of clandestine meetings in New York with a person whom he believed to be the Army officer. As a result of his abuse of his status, Martynov was declared persona non grata on February 21, 1955.

Another example is that of Eugeny A. Zaostroutsev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy who was declared persona non grata on May 13, 1959, for attempting to subvert a State Department employee to obtain information from State Department files.

A more recent example has been previously cited involving the attempt by Vadim Kirilyuk, an employee of the United Nations, to penetrate a vital Government agency by instructing an American to obtain employment in that agency.

Soviet attempts to recruit Americans during this period have not been confined to attempts to infiltrate Government agencies. For example, in February, 1954, Igor A. Amosov, assistant Soviet naval attache, was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain information concerning radar and United States naval vessels from a businessman who had commercial dealings with the Russians and who was in a position to obtain such data.

In June, 1956, Ivan A. Bubohikov, an assistant Soviet military attache was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain data regarding radar, guided missiles, jet fuels and atomic submarines from an American businessman who during World War II had extensive contacts with the Russians on both private and United States Government business. The Soviets attempted to exploit his World War II friendliness.

In August, 1956, Viktor I. Petrov, a Soviet translator at the United Nations, was released from his employment for recruiting an employee of an American aviation company to obtain classified data regarding United States aircraft.

4. THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE OF THE SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIALS

Only a few of the many examples of abuse of their diplomatic privileges by Soviet-bloc officials in the United States have been mentioned. In the more flagrant cases, the United States Government has asked the offending officials to leave this country. During the decade, 1950 - 1960, 19 Soviet officials have been asked to leave. Many more have been engaged in intelligence activities throughout the years.

The Soviet Union has maintained a large staff of officials in this country since its first recognition in 1933. These officials have been assigned to Soviet embassies, consulates, trade delegations, news media, the United Nations, and the Amtorg Trading Corporation. It is from these installations that the primary intelligence activities are directed against the United States. A former Soviet intelligence officer who defected from the Soviets has estimated that from 70% to 80% of the Soviet officials in the United States have some type of intelligence assignment. Other defectors have confirmed that a high per cent of the officials are intelligence agents. As of May 1, 1960, there were 328 Soviet officials stationed in this country. They were accompanied by 455 dependents, many of whom are also potential intelligence agents.

Nor is this the full strength of Soviet-bloc intelligence. As of May 1, 1960, there were 272 satellite officials stationed in the United States accompanied by 435 dependents. This almost doubles the potential of Soviet intelligence services. The satellite intelligence services have been developed according to the Soviet pattern, their personnel selected or approved by the Soviets and they are trained and guided by Soviet policies and procedures. Recent defectors from satellite intelligence services have advised that the Soviets have access to all data obtained by the satellites and, in fact, maintain an advisor system at headquarters level to make certain that the satellites operate consistent with Soviet interests.

This coordination is not limited to headquarters' levels. Beginning in November, 1958, the Soviet and satellite military, naval and air attaches stationed in the United States began a series of monthly meetings under the guidance of the Soviet military attache. During this initial meeting the satellite representatives were given specific target assignments for the collection of information desired by the Soviets and arrangements were made for the over-all correlation of their activities.

5. INDUSTRIAL SPYING AND CIRCUMVENTION OF REGULATIONS:

This large group of Soviet-bloc officials stationed in the United States has systematically over the years developed a most important part of the modern intelligence machine which was referred to by one Soviet official as the best industrial spying system in the world. Volumes could be written as to the techniques used and the ways and means developed by the Soviet bloc to obtain information regarding the industrial potential of the United States often with the use of subterfuge and deceit as well as deliberate circumvention of Customs regulations.

The following examples illustrate this activity:

In 1924 the Amtorg Trading Corporation was organized in New York for the purpose of acting as an importer and exporter on the North American continent for official trusts of the Soviet Union. Amtorg continued to operate during World War II, although in 1942 the Soviet

Government created the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., to purchase war material. This Purchasing Commission was dissolved after the end of World War II, and its activities absorbed by Amtorg. Since its organization, Amtorg Trading Corporation has been staffed primarily by representatives of the Soviet Government who have official status. Former employees of Amtorg have advised that it was standard practice for Soviets attached to Amtorg to request permission for Soviet officials to visit industrial facilities throughout the country on the promise of orders to be forthcoming if the products were found satisfactory. In many instances the officials of the companies would later be advised by Amtorg that Moscow would have to approve the order. In instances where a contract was given to a particular company, Amtorg consistently demanded blueprints of the particular product and other data to which it was not entitled by normal business practices. Amtorg officials also consistently insisted on a clause in the contract which would give Soviet inspectors the privilege of inspecting all of the merchandise before it was shipped to Russia.

Another device utilized by Amtorg officials was to gain the confidence of some employee in a plant which had a contract with the Russian Government and, through this employee, obtain blueprints which were copied in the Amtorg office and the copies forwarded to Russia. Amtorg officials would also advertise for employees who, when they appeared for an interview at the Amtorg office, would be instructed to bring proof of their ability in the form of blueprints of former projects. When the applicants for employment later showed up with the blueprints, the blueprints would be photographed and the photographs forwarded to Russia.

Amtorg has also followed a practice of preparing detailed catalogues concerning American industry. Congressman Mundt on January 29, 1947, described one of these catalogues as "a manual for bombing America." It was pointed out that the book contained detailed information including many photographs and maps of vital areas of the United States. In this connection Amtorg Trading Corporation during the 1940's prepared a monthly magazine called "American Engineering and Industry" and an annual guide called "Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry." This latter publication in 1946 was described as a three-volume, 5,000-page document.

In August, 1956, Milos Prochazka, a Czechoslovakian official assigned to the Commercial Office at the Czech Embassy, furnished to an American the specifications for the components of 2 steel mills to be purchased in the United States for the Czechs. He outlined a plan whereby the American would act as an exclusive agent to purchase these mills ostensibly for a private concern in a Western country. He would obtain estimates and if the estimates were approved, the Czechs would furnish the name of the purchasing company, a power of attorney and the necessary bank credit. Thereafter, the mills would be shipped to the Czech agent in the Western country and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia.

6. EXPLOITATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION:

It is no secret that one of the results of the freedom of our democratic society is the availability of voluminous information to members of the public merely for the asking. Some of the cases previously cited clearly indicate that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are

aware of this fact and have taken full advantage of this democratic freedom; however, it remains for former Soviet-bloc intelligence officers to testify as to its real significance and importance to the Soviet-bloc intelligence services. One defector has stated that the ease with which information is obtained in this country has resulted in a reduction of the hazardous and time-consuming clandestine operations which would otherwise be necessary. Another has estimated that the Soviet Military Attache's office in the United States is able to legally obtain 95% of the material useful for its intelligence objectives. He stated that, in fact, 90% of an intelligence agent's time in any other country in the world would normally be consumed clandestinely obtaining information which is readily available in the United States through Government agencies or commercial publishing houses. He pointed out that Polish military intelligence obtains more technical data in the United States than from all the other countries in the world combined.

Although such information is collected in a number of ways, the following techniques in addition to those previously mentioned have been most productive.

One of the most useful techniques is attendance at conventions of American organizations by Soviet-bloc officials. During the year preceding Khrushchev's visit to this country, Soviet officials alone attended approximately 30 conventions covering various fields of endeavor including aeronautics, electronics, plastics development, education and others. Typical were the activities of 2 Soviets who attended the Western Electric convention held in Los Angeles during August, 1959. As usual, at the inception, they began to collect voluminous literature. When the volume became unwieldy one Soviet left the material at a check stand and resumed his collection activities. It was estimated that the literature picked up by these Soviets at this one convention weighed approximately 250 pounds.

Another technique utilized is correspondence with chambers of commerce and industrial facilities throughout the United States through which voluminous information regarding transportation systems, major industries, etc., is obtained. In many instances useful maps of the areas are also secured.

Still another technique is the subscription to American publications and collection and review of United States Government documents. For example, during June, 1959, it was ascertained that the personnel of the Soviet Military, Naval and Air Attache Offices subscribed to 44 newspapers and 58 magazines of a technical, scientific, military and general news nature. It is apparent that the Soviets have a definite program of subscribing to newspapers published at or in the vicinity of vital United States military bases.

Purchases from the United States Government have long been a productive source for Soviet-bloc intelligence. For example, on December 28, 1944, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., ordered copies of 5,810 patents. On the same date the New York office of this Commission purchased two copies of 18,000 patents. On January 1, 1945, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington again ordered copies of 5,342 different patents. On January 12, 1945, copies of 41,812 patents were ordered. The next order was for 41,810. The acquisition of copies of patents has been continued throughout the years as illustrated by the fact that in early 1959 Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the

to instruct him in the use of the "Search Room" of the United States Patent Office so that he could locate patents in which he was interested.

The Soviets have, of course, not restricted themselves to the acquisition of patents. For example, on March 10, 1954, an Assistant Soviet Air Attache purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for the East and West Coasts of the United States from the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Department of Commerce. On March 12, 1954, a chauffeur of the Soviet Air Attache purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for Canada and Alaska. Six days later an Assistant Soviet Attache ordered "The Pilot's Handbook" for the Far East and Europe. These handbooks contained diagrams of all of the principal airfields and the approaches used in landing planes.

In April, 1954, Soviet officials stationed in Washington obtained from the Map Information Office of the U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, topographic maps covering North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Kentucky, and an area within a 50-mile radius of Washington, D. C.

This collection activity has continued unabated up to the present time. Literally thousands of similar documents are obtained in this country every year by Soviet-bloc officials assigned in this country and through registered agents such as the Four Continent Book Corporation and the Tass News Agency.

A statement of a satellite defector illustrates the value to the Soviet-bloc of United States Government publications. He stated that on one occasion, Polish military intelligence obtained an 18-volume edition prepared by the United States Army Engineers regarding United States port facilities. It was purchased from the Government Printing Office at nominal cost, but its estimated value to the Polish military intelligence was placed at \$50,000.

Not content with the large volume of publicly available material, Soviet-bloc officials have resorted to deceit. For example, on November 5, 1958, Ion Dubesteanu, an assistant military attache of the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C., was declared persona non grata for activity beyond the scope of his official duties. Using a false name and identity, Dubesteanu had corresponded with U. S. military installations soliciting material and had rented post office boxes at North Beach, Maryland, under assumed names to which such material was to be sent.

Reconnaissance trips by Soviet-bloc officials have been a most productive source of intelligence. The officials have been observed to carefully prepare for such trips by reviewing publications collected in this country, doing research at the Library of Congress, et cetera. Exclusive of trips from Washington, D. C., to New York City, officials of the Soviet Military Office alone took 16 trips to various areas of the country in 1958 and 1959. They visited 26 states in 1958 and 37 in 1959. They covered most of the strategic areas of the country and covered some areas as many as four times. During these trips they followed a definite pattern of visiting chambers of commerce, driving around the perimeter of industrial facilities and wherever possible circled military, naval and air installations in the areas visited. They collected all available literature and maps relating to industrial facilities, transportation systems, power plants, dams, chemical factories, et cetera, and wherever possible took photographs in addition to making extensive notes.

7. PROPAGANDA AND PERSONAL APPEARANCES

Exploitation of our freedoms has also taken the form of propaganda. Not content with the distribution of over 20,000 copies of the illustrated monthly magazine, "USSR," which is in reciprocity for distribution of a similar American magazine in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy has a carefully planned program of distributing press releases. As of February, 1960, the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy was distributing press releases to almost 7,000 individuals and institutions in the United States, including newspaper editors, business leaders, radio stations, public libraries, television stations, teachers, labor leaders, scientists, and leaders in trade and commerce.

In addition, since January 1, 1959, 30 different officials attached to the Soviet Embassy have made, or were scheduled to make, 74 public appearances (not including 7 additional invitations for appearances by the Soviet Ambassador) before various groups in this country. Nineteen other Soviets attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, employed by the United Nations Secretariat or assigned to Intourist, made, or were scheduled to make, 39 public appearances during the same period.

These public appearances normally involved speeches or participation in forums on the part of the Soviet officials and were made before various types of groups, including high school, college, and university groups, parent-teacher associations, advertisement and civic clubs, fraternities, professional associations or clubs, religious and cultural groups, travel clubs and community centers. Some of these were television appearances. It is apparent that the Soviets are taking every opportunity to spread the gospel of communism by exploitation of the intense desire of Americans to learn more about the Soviet Union.

8. USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Attention is called to the fact that many of the incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated to the concept of fully exploiting the freedoms of the countries they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they would not prostitute the United Nations.

9. "ILLEGAL" OPERATIONS

Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in addition, operated a parallel clandestine espionage system known as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920's. Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making full use of secret communications channels and other clandestine techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic relations.

It is apparent that during the decade 1950-1960 the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that a special directorate was created in

1947 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told, while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that as early as June, 1952, an order was sent to intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal" organizations which could function without interruption under any conditions.

That this policy was followed with respect to the United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 1956, a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from Canada at Detroit using an authentic copy of a birth certificate previously issued to an American. Detected by the United States border screening process, she was refused entry. Less than a year later, Rudolf I. Abel, a colonel in the Soviet Committee of State Security, was arrested in New York City where he was posing as an American photographer under the name Emil R. Goldfus. Abel had entered the United States in 1948 using a passport issued to a naturalized American in 1947 to visit relatives behind the Iron Curtain and who never returned to this country. Abel was subsequently convicted of espionage and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, which sentence he is now serving.

It is interesting to note that in October, 1952, the Soviets sent Reino Hayhanen to the United States to act as Abel's assistant. Hayhanen, prior to leaving Russia, had been given instructions by Mikhail N. Svirin, a Soviet intelligence officer. After his arrival in this country, Svirin, who had become First Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, met with Hayhanen and subsequently, during the period 1952-1953, Hayhanen operated under his supervision. It was not until 1954 that Svirin gave instructions for Hayhanen to contact Abel and to act as Abel's assistant.

The case involving Abel and Hayhanen is a striking example of Soviet use of "illegal" agents against the United States. In dispatching such agents to this country, we can be certain that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services will, as they have with their representatives who are dispatched to this country as diplomats, take full advantage of the freedoms of this country which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

10. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE

The United States has not been the only target of the Soviet-bloc intelligence organizations. Many other countries of the world have felt the barbs of the Soviet espionage attack. The disclosures of the Royal Commission in Canada which followed the 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet code clerk, revealed a Soviet espionage apparatus which on a broad scale had recruited and subverted Canadian citizens while seeking to infiltrate the Canadian Government and drain off its secrets. The admissions of Klaus Fuchs in 1950 that he betrayed the free world when, as a member of the British Atomic Energy Team, he passed atomic secrets to the Russians clearly indicate the Soviet designs on information in possession of the British Government. The flight of the British scientist Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in 1950 and the British diplomat Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean in 1951 behind the Iron Curtain adds additional proof. The report of the Royal Commission of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1955 following the defection of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Soviet espionage agents assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Australia, disclosed an extensive Soviet espionage apparatus directed against Australia. Many similar examples could be cited to illustrate that Soviet espionage is international in character and the expulsion of two Soviet officials from Switzerland during the past month clearly indicates that Soviet espionage is currently international in character.

Practically every one of the cases cited above, although based in other countries, had ramifications in the United States. For example, information furnished to the Russians by Dr. Allan Nunn May, who was uncovered by Gouzenko, had been obtained when May visited a laboratory in Chicago in 1944. Klaus Fuchs worked on atomic energy in the United States from early 1944 through September, 1945, and supplied information to the Russians while in this country. The British diplomats Burgess and MacLean had been stationed in the United States prior to their disappearance behind the Iron Curtain. In spite of the use of third countries by the Soviet Union to commit espionage against the United States, Premier Khrushchev has made strong threats of reprisal against his neighboring countries which he assumes have been used as bases for United States aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.

11. AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The world-wide espionage networks of the Soviet Union are an essential and integral part of the over-all communist plan to completely dominate the world. However, to understand the significance of the intelligence activity, it is necessary to examine the basic aims and principles of communism.

The highly authoritative "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" summarized the teachings of Marx and Engels on the question of force and violence. It stressed that Marx and Engels taught the impossibility of establishing a communist state by peaceful means, emphasizing that this could be achieved only through a proletarian revolution through which a dictatorship could be established and all resistance crushed. V. I. Lenin gave practical application to the teachings of Marx and Engels. Through the application of such principles the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917 and under Lenin's guidance, established a dictatorship through which all resistance was systematically crushed. The success of the movement led Lenin to reiterate in later years that "The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution."

Joseph Stalin followed the Marxist-Leninist principles. The Communist Party in the United States, since it was organized in September, 1919, and throughout the years of Stalin's rule in Russia, was unalterably bound to Moscow. In the earlier years, Party leaders openly, boastfully and defiantly proclaimed their allegiance to and support of Soviet objectives. The nature of the Communist Party, USA, was exposed in 1949 and its leaders convicted in a court of law where the evidence laid out before the jury constituted irrefutable proof that the Communist Party, USA, advocated the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence. The policies and activities of the Communist Party, USA, have not changed to date. The current leaders of the Communist Party, like their predecessors, unwaveringly follow the lead of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Time and again, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has claimed that the Soviet Union does not and will not interfere in the affairs of other nations. Yet, in practically every country in the world to date the Soviet Union has established fifth columns in the form of Communist Parties which are under the complete domination and control of the Soviets and are sworn to uphold and aid the Soviet dream for world conquest. Through the directives it furnishes to these subversive forces, the Soviet Union clearly interferes with the political, social, and economic affairs of other nations on a continuing basis in the relentless drive toward world domination.

"peaceful coexistence." However, on May 5, 1960, Premier Khrushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paid tribute to V. I. Lenin and stated "The Soviet people are proud to know that the cause of our great leader and teacher lives and triumphs and that Lenin's dreams are being translated into reality by hundreds and millions of people--builders of socialism and communism--and that Lenin's cause is winning all upright men on earth." Referring to the triumph of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Khrushchev went on to reaffirm "Marxist-Leninist ideas" as the guide to the ultimate triumph of world communism.

Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, demanding the use of force and violence, represent the guides for communism to achieve world conquest. The extensive espionage activities directed against the United States which, in the past, have utilized communists and communist sympathizers in this country as well as other individuals who could be subverted, can be better understood when regarded as essential tools in the relentless and fanatical drive of international communism to conquer the world.

I. CASES INVOLVING COURT ACTIONS DURING THE PAST DECADE

There are set forth hereinafter cases which have been presented to Federal Courts in the United States during the past ten years and which unquestionably reveal Soviet efforts to steal American secrets affecting the national security of this country. All these cases have withstood the exacting test of being tried under the democratic system of the American courts and the convictions obtained are ample proof of the charges made.

A. Soviet Infiltration of the United States Government

a. Testimony of Elizabeth T. Bentley

In November, 1945, Elizabeth T. Bentley disclosed operations of two extensive Soviet intelligence networks in United States Government agencies during World War II. She stated the networks were under the control of officials of Soviet establishments in the United States and involved a number of employees of the United States Government. She added one of the networks was headed by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, a United States Government employee in Washington, D. C., and the second network was under the direction of Victor Perlo, also a United States Government employee.

Elizabeth Bentley had been engaged in communist activities during the 1930s, and in 1938 became acquainted with Jacob Golos whose true name was Jacob Raisin. Golos was head of World Tourist, Incorporated, and utilized that organization to arrange travel for communists and Soviet agents. Upon instructions from Golos, a cover agency for Soviet intelligence operations was established under the name of the United States Service and Shipping, Incorporated, and Elizabeth T. Bentley became an official of that company. Under the direction of Golos, Bentley, in 1941, began collecting information for Soviet intelligence from sources in Washington, D. C., and her role became more important due to the ill health of Golos as time went on. After the death of Golos in November, 1943, Bentley continued her operations in Soviet espionage, first consulting with Earl Browder, then head of the American Communist Party, whom she had previously met through Golos. The activities of Bentley consisted of collecting information from various individuals who were employed by United States Government agencies and the information covered a variety of subjects including aircraft production data, data concerning financial activities particularly as they related to foreign commitments of the United States, information from the Foreign Economic Administration, the War Production Board, the Justice Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and numerous other sources.

During the course of her intelligence operations for the Soviets, Elizabeth T. Bentley, met Anatoli B. Gromov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and upon instructions from Gromov, one of Bentley's

Soviet intelligence superiora, Bentley ceased regular courier operations in December, 1944. In the Fall of 1945, Bentley had two meetings with Anatoli B. Gromov and on the occasion of one of these meetings he paid her \$2,000 for past services. Much of the information furnished by Elizabeth T. Bentley has been corroborated and shows that the Soviet intelligence service was receiving a volume of information from persons named by Bentley from the files of United States Government agencies in Washington, D. C. The individuals named by Bentley, for the most part, have sought refuge behind the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when questioned by Government investigative committees and official Government sources concerning their activities.

1. The Case of Edward Joseph Fitzgerald

In November, 1945, Elizabeth T. Bentley advised that early in 1944, through arrangements with Earl Browder, then head of the American Communist Party, she met a group of individuals in New York City including one Edward Joseph Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald was born in 1911 in New York City and was employed by the United States Government from 1936 to 1947 in several Government agencies.

Elizabeth T. Bentley stated that these individuals talked freely in her presence, that there was discussion as to the payment of Communist Party dues to Elizabeth T. Bentley and a general discussion as to the type of information each person could furnish. Fitzgerald, who was at that time associated with the War Production Board, an agency of the United States Government, indicated he could supply Bentley with miscellaneous statistics that came to his attention. She later met Fitzgerald on four or five occasions in New York City and on these occasions Fitzgerald was acting as a representative of the Victor Perlo group in bringing information to Bentley.

Subsequent investigation of Fitzgerald showed him to have been in contact with numerous individuals mentioned by Bentley and also disclosed that he was associated with other individuals who were reported to be communists or pro-Soviet sympathizers.

In August, 1954, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice gave consideration to action that could be taken against individuals named by Elizabeth T. Bentley under Public Law 600, 83rd Congress, which is commonly known as the Immunity Act.

On September 1, 1954, Edward Joseph Fitzgerald appeared before a Federal Grand Jury in Camden, New Jersey, and invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to questions relating to the allegations of Elizabeth T. Bentley. He again claimed the Fifth Amendment before a Federal Grand Jury in New York City on July 20, 1955. On July 29, 1955, he was offered immunity and again claimed privilege under the Fifth Amendment. On August 18, 1955, Fitzgerald was found guilty of contempt in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for having refused to testify after having been granted immunity under the procedures set forth by the Immunity Act. He was given a sentence of six months and remanded to custody in October, 1956, to serve the sentence after refusing to purge himself of the contempt citation.

2. The Case of William Ludwig Ullmann

Elizabeth T. Bentley, in November, 1945, identified William Ludwig Ullmann, a resident at the home of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, as one of the individuals who was furnishing information for Soviet intelligence. Ullmann was born in 1908 at Springfield, Missouri, and entered the service of the United States Government in 1935. He continued service in a civilian capacity with the United States Government until 1942 when he was inducted into the armed forces. In 1945 he was released from active duty with the rank of major and returned to civilian service with the United States Government until he resigned in early 1947.

According to Elizabeth T. Bentley, Ullmann brought Government documents containing data which, in his opinion, would be of interest to the Soviets to the Silvermaster home for transmittal to Bentley. He provided himself with a camera and became proficient in document photography. Bentley advised that Ullmann, while in the armed forces of the United States, furnished data on aircraft production, aircraft allocation and deployment and pertinent developments regarding the construction, planning and completion of a strategic-type of American aircraft.

The investigation of Ullmann disclosed that his contacts included many of the individuals named by Elizabeth T. Bentley as being involved in Soviet espionage.

In August, 1954, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice gave consideration to action against Ullmann under Public Law 600, Eighty-Third Congress, which is commonly referred to as the Immunity Act. On November 3, 1954, William Ludwig Ullmann appeared before a Federal Grand Jury and invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to questions relating to the allegations of Elizabeth T. Bentley. On February 9, 1955, an order was granted directing Ullmann to answer questions propounded to him before the Federal Grand Jury. After dismissal of an appeal by Ullmann, he again appeared before a Federal Grand Jury on March 8, 1955, and refused to answer questions directed to him after being granted immunity under the Immunity Act. Contempt proceedings were instituted and he was sentenced on March 8, 1955, to a term of six months in prison. The conviction of Ullmann was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 26, 1956.

3. The Case of William Walter Remington

Elizabeth T. Bentley also identified William Walter Remington, an employee of the United States Government, as one of the sources of information in the Government service through which she obtained information for the Soviets. Remington was born October 25, 1917, in New York City and entered the Government service in 1936. He was employed intermittently by the Government from that date until 1950.

Remington, according to Elizabeth T. Bentley, was introduced to her by Jacob Golos, a Soviet espionage agent who was one of Bentley's Soviet espionage superiors in the early part of 1942. During the following two years she met

Remington by prearrangements on approximately fifteen occasions, at which times she obtained from him information from the files of the War Production Board. Bentley collected Communist Party dues during this period from both Remington and his wife. Remington's relationship with Bentley ceased in 1944 when Remington joined the United States Navy. The activities of Remington as they involved his association with Bentley were verified by Remington's former wife.

On January 27, 1953, William Walter Remington was convicted of perjury on two counts and was sentenced to a term in Lewisburg Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, after the Supreme Court of the United States refused to review his conviction. Remington died on November 24, 1954, at Lewisburg Penitentiary.

b. The Testimony of Whittaker Chambers

Earlier Soviet-directed espionage which successfully obtained unauthorized and vital information from our Government departments, as early as the 1930's, was revealed by Whittaker Chambers, a confessed Soviet agent.

Joining the Communist Party in 1924, Chambers later became active in the Party underground in New York City. In 1935 his Soviet superior, J. Peters, sent him to Washington, D. C., to look into the background and activities of another underground organization, or apparatus, located there, headed by Harold Ware, and made up of Government employees. Peters told Chambers to find out which members of this group could keep the Party well informed on current activities within their respective Government departments or agencies. For a while Chambers acted as a morale officer and liaison man between this group and J. Peters in New York. In late 1936 this apparatus was taken over by a Colonel Bykov, another Soviet agent, in New York.

Its operations were focused in Washington, Baltimore and New York. From 1936 to early 1938 Chambers received from certain members of this apparatus important Government documents for transmittal to his Russian superiors. Among those who contributed were Alger Hiss, a State Department employee, and Franklin Reno who was employed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland. Documents would be extracted from Government files, photographed or typed and then returned without delay. Apartments were made available in Washington and Baltimore for photographic purposes and Party members schooled in photography did the work. Chambers was the courier and sometimes photographed the documents himself. The Soviets were constantly supplied with current information of value to our Government.

1. The Case of Alger Hiss

Chambers' chief unauthorized source of information was Alger Hiss, who for many years advanced himself within the State Department until he finally became Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs responsible for United Nations matters. He was one of the late President Roosevelt's advisors at the Yalta Conference, and was Secretary-General of the San Francisco Conference which organized the United Nations Organization in 1945.

According to Whittaker Chambers, materials received by him from apparatus members, except Alger Hiss, were original Government documents. At first, Hiss furnished Chambers original documents, but later gave him typewritten excerpts and summaries of State Department documents to help speed up operations.

Although Hiss has continually denied his implication in Soviet espionage, he was tried and convicted in 1949-1950 on perjury charges growing out of Chambers' allegations of espionage and was sentenced to a five-year term in a Federal penitentiary.

In perjuring himself before a Federal Grand Jury in 1948 he denied that he had ever furnished Chambers any documents or copies of documents from the State Department. He also denied he had ever seen Chambers within the period that Chambers alleged he performed these espionage activities.

2. The Case of Franklin Victor Reno

In 1937 Reno was employed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland, and in the same year was introduced to Whittaker Chambers through a mutual Communist Party underground worker. He immediately fulfilled espionage assignments given him by turning over to Chambers on various occasions such vital information as the textbook of the Ordnance School which dealt with ballistics, and mathematical data about firing tables of certain guns, among other things.

Reno not only committed espionage but his failure to tell the truth finally found him serving a three-year term in a Federal penitentiary for falsifying information concerning his former Communist Party membership. This he concealed when filling out a personnel history questionnaire at Aberdeen in 1948.

A Federal Grand Jury indictment in 1951 charged him with making false statements to the Army on a personnel history statement and in 1952 he was sentenced as previously indicated.

B. Judith Coplon - Valentine A. Gubitchev Case

Judith Coplon, born in Brooklyn in 1921, obtained employment in 1943 in the Department of Justice, New York City. In 1945, at her request, she was transferred to Washington, D. C., where she was employed in the Foreign Agents Registration Section of the Department of Justice.

Coplon was observed clandestinely meeting with Valentine A. Gubitchev, a Soviet citizen employed as an engineer by the United Nations Secretariat in New York City. After a clandestine meeting on March 4, 1949, in New York, both were arrested by the FBI. In her purse at the time of her arrest Coplon carried summaries of confidential FBI reports to which she had access in her employment.

Coplon was tried in Washington, D. C., for espionage and on July 1, 1949, was sentenced to ten years in prison.

for conspiring to commit espionage and were convicted. On March 9, 1950, she was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. On the same date, Gubitchev was also sentenced to fifteen years in prison; however, his sentence was suspended with the provision that he depart from the United States and not return.

Although Coplon's conviction in New York was reversed and she was held entitled to a new trial in Washington, D. C., based on technical grounds in both instances, it is interesting to note that Judge Learned Hand, Second Circuit, Court of Appeals, made a statement that even though the case was being reversed, the guilt of Coplon was plain.

C. Fuchs - Gold - Rosenberg -- Atomic Espionage Conspiracy

1. Harry Gold

The Klaus Fuchs - Harry Gold treachery has become inseparable from the history of the atomic age. Fuchs, a German-born physicist, was forced to flee Germany in 1933. He went to England where he became a naturalized citizen and was trusted with the most vital secrets of that country. In May, 1941, Fuchs was placed on research work on atomic energy and almost immediately he rewarded his benefactors by seeking out Soviet agents to whom he could and did give important information in his possession. In December, 1943, he came to the United States as a member of the select British mission to carry on further atomic research in coordination with the Americans. Before leaving England, Fuchs had already perfected arrangements to continue his espionage activities in the United States. These arrangements resulted in placing Fuchs in touch with Harry Gold, who in turn was in contact with Anatoli Antonovich Yakovlev, an official of the Soviet Consulate in New York City. From early 1944 through September, 1945, Fuchs worked with the Manhattan Engineer District in New York and in Los Alamos and furnished his information to Gold who relayed it to Yakovlev. Fuchs returned to England in June, 1946, when plans had already been made for his future activity in England which lasted until 1949.

On January 27, 1950, after the FBI had informed the British that Fuchs was a Soviet spy, Fuchs confessed his activities on behalf of Soviet Russia. Concerning his American contact, all Fuchs was able to furnish was a meager physical description and the belief that this man was not a nuclear physicist but a person with some knowledge of chemistry and engineering. Within four months this contact was identified as Harry Gold.

The search for Harry Gold ended on May 22, 1950, when he was confronted with his possession of a travel folder and map concerning Santa Fe, New Mexico, after having previously claimed that he had never been west of the Mississippi River. Gold, born in Switzerland in 1910, had been brought to the United States by his Russian-born parents in 1914 and he became a citizen through the naturalization of his father. Gold admitted espionage activity on behalf of Russia since 1935 and made available valuable information concerning his activities and those involved with him.

entering a plea of guilty, was sentenced to thirty years in prison and he is presently confined in the Federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.

2. David Greenglass

In May, 1945, Harry Gold was given an assignment by Yakovlev to go to Santa Fe, New Mexico, to accept a delivery of vital atomic energy information from Fuchs. In connection with this trip, Yakovlev gave Gold another task; namely, to contact an American soldier in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to obtain from him information on the atomic bomb. On a Sunday morning in early June, 1945, Gold did contact the American soldier at the soldier's home in Albuquerque and delivered to him an envelope containing \$500. In turn, the soldier delivered to Gold written information regarding experiments being conducted in relation to the atomic bomb. The two men never saw each other again and Gold could not recall the identity of the soldier. Based upon Gold's facts, an FBI investigation led to the identification of David Greenglass as the American soldier involved. The investigation of Greenglass led to the uncovering of the Soviet espionage network headed by Julius Rosenberg.

The most interesting development in connection with the above lies in the fact that the Soviets disregarded one of their cardinal rules prohibiting contacts between members of separate espionage networks in using Gold to contact Greenglass. This error cost them an espionage network and their error was realized by them prior to the arrest of Greenglass as Rosenberg, the head of the network, when he learned of the arrest of Gold, gave Greenglass and his wife \$5,000 and instructions to go to Mexico where arrangements would be made for false passports with which they could travel to Czechoslovakia.

Greenglass, born in New York City in 1922, was a machinist who served in the United States Army from 1943 to 1946. He was stationed at Los Alamos from August, 1944, to February, 1946.

Greenglass did not leave the country as instructed by Rosenberg and was arrested in June, 1950, in New York City. He confessed his espionage activities and was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to commit espionage. He entered a plea of guilty and after testifying as a Government witness against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for fifteen years.

3. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg

The questioning of David Greenglass and his wife, Ruth, resulted in their admissions of espionage activity carried on at the instigation and under the direction of Julius Rosenberg, husband of David's sister, Ethel, for the purpose of aiding the Soviet Union. Julius Rosenberg, assisted by his wife, was able to persuade Ruth Greenglass to induce her husband in Los Alamos in 1944 to make available secret data concerning atomic energy research which was available to him in his position. Subsequently, Greenglass furnished valuable and secret information both to Harry Gold and to Rosenberg concerning the developments at Los Alamos.

Rosenberg had other espionage objectives. Max Elitcher, an employee of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, from 1938 to 1948, stated Rosenberg, on approximately nine occasions, attempted to persuade him to turn over material and drawings handled by Elitcher in his work. Greenglass told of Rosenberg's boast to him that he once took the entire proximity fuse out of a New York City plant where he was stationed as a Government inspector. Rosenberg also told Greenglass he had learned of a "sky platform" on which the United States Government was working. He said the idea was to create a platform at a point in space where gravity ceased to exist, perhaps 5,000 miles above the earth.

Julius Rosenberg was arrested July 17, 1950, and his wife was arrested August 11, 1950, and both were charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. The trial of the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell was held in March, 1951, at which time they were found guilty. The Rosenbergs were sentenced to death in April, 1951, and were executed on June 19, 1953.

Between the time of the sentence and the execution the Rosenberg case, in one form or another, was before the United States District Court on sixteen occasions, before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals on nine occasions, before the United States Supreme Court on nine occasions and there were two applications for executive clemency.

4. Morton Sobell

The espionage activities of Morton Sobell rose as a result of disclosures made by Max Elitcher concerning the Rosenberg network. He advised that when he was approached by Rosenberg, a former college classmate, and requested to obtain information for transmittal to Russia, Rosenberg told him that Sobell was either working or cooperating with him in his activities. Later, Elitcher repeated this statement to Sobell which caused Sobell to become quite angry and to remark that Rosenberg should not have mentioned his name. Further, after Sobell moved to New York City in 1946 or 1947, he was instrumental in arranging further meetings between Rosenberg and Elitcher and, in doing so, indicated his knowledge of the fact that Rosenberg wanted to discuss with Elitcher the matter of his furnishing information to the Russians. Also, in July, 1948, Elitcher accompanied Sobell in his car on a trip to the lower east side of New York in the vicinity of the Rosenberg apartment. Sobell left Elitcher in the car for approximately fifteen minutes and on his return indicated he had delivered a "can" to Rosenberg, and Sobell described its contents as "good material."

An investigation was instituted and showed that Morton Sobell had failed to return to his place of employment after June 16, 1950, the day of the arrest of David Greenglass. It was determined Sobell and his family left New York City by airplane on June 23, 1950, and proceeded to Mexico City. While in Mexico, the Sobell family lived under assumed names and corresponded with their relatives in the United States through a mail drop. Sobell was arrested in Mexico City by Mexican security police and was turned over to the FBI at Laredo, Texas. He was indicted and tried with the Rosenbergs. On April 5, 1951, he was sentenced to a term of thirty years. He participated in the Rosenbergs' appeals and since their execution appealed his case to the Supreme Court twice with negative results.

5. William Perl

William Perl, born in New York City in 1918, was a classmate of both Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell at college. He worked for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics at Langley Field, Virginia, and Cleveland, Ohio, after his graduation. It was learned that Sobell maintained close touch with Perl through correspondence after their graduation from college.

Perl admitted that in July, 1950, a girl he recognized to be a former girl friend of a close friend of his visited him in Cleveland. He said that she explained in writing that a stranger instructed her to proceed from New York City to Cleveland to deliver a message to an aeronautical engineer. She wrote out the instructions for him to leave the United States and flee to Mexico. She mentioned the name "Rosenberg." This girl was located and on interview verified the above information and stated that Perl refused to accept the sum of \$2,000 which she offered to him.

Perl was called to testify before a Federal Grand Jury and denied that he had been acquainted and associated with Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell. He was found guilty on two counts of perjury concerning his denial of knowledge of Rosenberg and Sobell. On June 5, 1953, he was sentenced to serve five years on each count to run concurrently.

6. Alfred Dean Slack

Harry Gold was thoroughly interviewed for information about his espionage associates and contacts. He told of his first meeting Alfred Dean Slack on the instructions of his then Russian superior in September, 1940. In meetings occurring between 1940 and 1942, Slack furnished information from the files of Eastman Kodak and concerning the making of nylon. Fate came to the assistance of Gold and his Soviet network when in September, 1942, Slack was transferred to the Holston Ordnance Works, Kingsport, Tennessee. In about April, 1944, Slack turned over to Harry Gold the formula for and a sample of RDX, a secret and powerful explosive being manufactured at the Holston Works.

Slack was born in Syracuse, New York, August 6, 1905, of American-born parents. When interviewed in June, 1950, he related his original recruitment by his brother-in-law, Richard Briggs, a research chemist, and his furnishing information to the Soviets through Briggs shortly after 1936. At first he believed the information was used by Briggs for business purposes; however, later Briggs told Slack that he was passing the information on to the Russians, specifically one "George." Slack later met George and on the death of Briggs in 1939, he continued supplying information to George, who was identified by Slack as Gaik Ovakimian, a Russian arrested in New York City in May, 1941, for violation of the Registration Act. Ovakimian was allowed to leave the United States in July, 1941. Slack admitted his contacts with Gold and the handing over to Gold of the formula and sample of RDX, a military explosive.

After pleading guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit espionage, Slack was sentenced in September, 1950, to serve fifteen years in a Federal penitentiary.

7. Abraham Brothman

8. Miriam Moskowitz

Abraham Brothman first came to the attention of the FBI when, as a result of the disclosures of Elizabeth Bentley, it was learned that in 1940 she had been introduced to

on about ten occasions receiving from him various blueprints and documents for delivery to Golos. She last contacted him in late 1940 and gave him specific instructions on meeting his new Soviet contact whose identity she did not know.

Harry Gold, after his arrest, admitted that under the instructions of Semen Semenov, his Soviet superior, he contacted Brothman in New York City in September, 1941. He stated thereafter he obtained blueprints, documents and other information of a commercial, industrial nature for transmission to the Soviets.

On interview in May, 1947, Brothman furnished to the FBI fabricated information to the effect that he met Gold through Jacob Golos, then deceased. Immediately following the interview, he furnished Gold the substance of the statements he made and requested Gold to use a similar story. Brothman testified along the same line before a Federal Grand Jury in July, 1947, and when Gold later received a subpoena to testify before the same Grand Jury, Brothman spent two hours reviewing with Gold the details of his testimony to assure that their stories would coincide. Brothman and his business partner, Miriam Moskowitz, were indicted on a charge of conspiracy to obstruct and impede the administration of justice. Both were convicted. Brothman was sentenced to two years imprisonment and \$10,000 fine on one count and five years and \$5,000 on the second count. Moskowitz received a sentence of two years and \$10,000 fine. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Brothman's conviction on the count carrying the five year sentence on the grounds that venue did not lie in the Southern District of New York. The conviction of Moskowitz was upheld.

9. Anatoli Antonovich Yakovlev

Yakovlev entered the United States in February, 1941, and assumed his duties as a clerk at the Soviet Consulate in New York City. From the first part of 1944 through late 1945 he directed the activities of Harry Gold and received from him all the atomic energy information turned over by Fuchs in the United States. It is interesting to note that in July, 1946, upon his return from a two-month trip to Moscow, he was made vice consul of the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He left the United States in December, 1946. He was named as a coconspirator and codefendant in the Rosenberg-Sobell indictment; however, he has not returned to the United States and has not been tried.

10. Semen Markovich Semenov

Semenov was the espionage superior of Harry Gold during the period from 1940 through 1943. He first entered the United States in 1938 and attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he obtained a masters degree in science in 1940. In July, 1941, he was designated as an official of Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York City. He left the United States in September, 1944.

D. Otto Verber - Kurt Ponger Case

Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger, his brother-in-law, were naturalized American citizens and were members of the United States Armed Forces during World War II. Upon their discharge from the Army after World War II they remained in Germany and accepted civilian employment in connection with the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. They were recruited by the Soviets to act in an espionage capacity against the United States Army establishment in Vienna, Austria, and were instructed to secure information concerning United States installations and

personnel files. They recruited an American employee of the United States Air Force in Vienna who was operated as a double agent against the Soviets by the United States Army.

The double agent returned to the United States and as a result of instructions from Ponger and Verber he was placed in contact with Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Novikov met with the double agent on ten different occasions in Washington, D. C., or the immediate vicinity. The last meeting took place on April 22, 1952. At some of these meetings Novikov accepted information from the double agent, some of which was of a classified nature. Novikov showed a definite and particular interest in the sources of information utilized by the intelligence agencies of the United States Military establishment. He also indicated a desire for data concerning the operations of the United States Armed Forces in Europe and data possessed by the Air Force relative to vital installations such as railroad, air fields, heavy industry, etc., in the Soviet Union. He also expressed interest in information concerning the intelligence set-up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On January 14, 1953, the United States State Department declared Yuri Novikov persona non grata for his activities in this case and Novikov departed for the Soviet Union on January 19, 1953.

Verber and Ponger, the original principals in this operation, were brought back to the United States and pleaded guilty to espionage charges. On June 8, 1953, Verber was sentenced to a term of not less than three years, four months or more than ten years and Ponger was sentenced to a term of not less than five years or more than fifteen years.

E. Clarence Howard Vetterli Case

Igor Gouzenko, Code Clerk for the Soviet Military Attache, Ottawa, Canada, from the summer of 1943 until his defection to Canadian authorities in September, 1945, revealed that in August, 1945, Moscow had instructed the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa to obtain a Canadian passport for a Soviet agent then residing in Los Angeles, California, under the name Ignacy Samuel Witczak. Gouzenko stated that Witczak's function in this country was to operate a network of Soviet agents in the event Soviet diplomatic establishments were no longer available due to a break in United States - Soviet diplomatic relations.

The true identity of Soviet agent Witczak has never been established. He used the passport and assumed the identity of a naturalized Canadian of the same name who had been born in Poland. The real Witczak had served with the Loyalists in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. He alleged that his Canadian passport had been taken from him upon his arrival in Spain and that it was subsequently reported to have been destroyed.

The Soviet agent Witczak entered the United States in 1938 and studied at the University of Southern California. In 1945 he was Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at that University. On November 21, 1945, he disappeared.

Investigation established that Soviet agent Witczak's most intimate associate in the United States was Clarence Howard Vetterli who appeared to be cognizant of Witczak's activities. Vetterli was used by Witczak for the purpose of contacting various individuals. On May 25, 1949, Vetterli was brought before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, and denied any

denials he was indicted and convicted on two counts of perjury and sentenced to six years imprisonment on July 25, 1951. His conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals.

On November 10, 1952, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the United States District Court for resentencing of Vetterli. He was resentenced on February 2, 1953, to a total of six years to be reduced by the time already served in custody of the Attorney General.

F. Jack Soble Case

In the early 1940's the FBI was conducting an intensive investigation into the activities of Vassili Zubilin (true name, Vassili Mikhailovich Zarubin), Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Zubilin had entered the United States on December 25, 1941, with his wife, Elizabeth, and son, Peter. The investigation disclosed that Zubilin had been an important Soviet intelligence agent for many years. During 1934-1937 he was in the United States on several occasions utilizing an American passport fraudulently obtained under the name of Edward Joseph Herbert.

The first break in the FBI investigation came when in the Spring of 1943, Zubilin, while under physical surveillance by the FBI, was observed to contact Boris Michael Morros, a motion-picture producer in Hollywood. After extensive investigation into the activities of Morros, he was interviewed by the FBI in July, 1947, and admitted he was recruited by Zubilin for Soviet intelligence activities. Morros, thereafter, agreed to operate as a double agent against the Soviets under the direction of the FBI. Thus began an operation of intrigue which led to the expose of a Soviet espionage ring in New York City culminated by the arrest on January 25, 1957, by FBI Agents of Jack Soble, Myra Soble and Jacob Albam on charges of conspiring to commit espionage. In addition, the FBI investigation resulted in identifying as Soviet intelligence agents, Jane and George Zlatovski, who were indicted on July 8, 1957, charged with espionage conspiracy; Alfred and Martha Stern, who were indicted on September 9, 1957, on two counts charging espionage conspiracy; Ilya Wolston, who was charged with contempt for failing to appear before a grand jury and on August 7, 1958, pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York; Mark Zborowski, who was indicted for perjury on April 18, 1958, as a result of his denial before the Federal Grand Jury that he knew Jack Soble; and Vassili Molev, an official attached to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., who was declared persona non grata, January 25, 1957.

1. Jack and Myra Soble

Jack Soble entered the United States in 1941 as a Lithuanian refugee and in 1947 became a United States citizen by naturalization. As early as 1944 Soble participated with other Soviet agents in the operation of a business concern organized to serve as a "cover" for Soviet agents. This was the Boris Morros Music Company with offices in New York and Los Angeles. In December, 1943, Vassili Zubilin introduced Morros to Alfred K. Stern and his wife, Martha Dodd Stern, at which time it was agreed Stern would invest \$130,000 in Morros' business, becoming an officer, and learn the business. This arrangement was consummated in early 1944. Shortly after the agreement was made between the Sterns and Morros, Zubilin advised Morros that he was leaving the United States and introduced Morros to Jack Soble, a resident of New York City. Zubilin instructed that Soble was thereafter to act as Morros' and Stern's superior.

Soble supervised activities of Soviet agents both in the United States and Europe; assigned them to recruit U. S. Government employees stationed abroad, to obtain information concerning military equipment and supplies; and has claimed to have obtained information concerning the number of atomic bombs stockpiled in the United States and the rate of atomic bomb production as well as photographs of atomic "bunkers" in which bombs were stored.

His wife, Myra Soble, also a Lithuanian refugee, assisted him in his espionage operations.

Jack and Myra Soble were arrested by FBI Agents on January 25, 1957, and were indicted on February 4, 1957, on five counts charging espionage, conspiracy and violation of the Registration Acts. On April 10, 1957, they pleaded guilty to count two of the indictment which charged violation of Section 793, Title 18, U. S. Code (commonly referred to as the peace-time espionage statute) which carries a maximum prison sentence of ten years. On August 9, 1957, Myra Soble was sentenced to five and one-half years in Federal prison and the other counts of the indictment were dismissed as to her. On October 8, 1957, Jack Soble was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. At that time Myra Soble's sentence was reduced to four years. The other counts of the indictment were dismissed.

2. Jacob Albam

Jacob Albam, associated with the Sobles in the espionage conspiracy, is also a native of Lithuania. His application for U. S. citizenship in 1951 has not been granted. Jacob Albam first came to the United States in 1947 on a visitor's visa from France. Soble had an assignment from the Soviets to obtain an American woman for Albam to marry and to set Albam up in business in the United States. Albam was married to an American woman in the Spring of 1948 and returned to France, later re-entering the United States as an immigrant husband of an American citizen and subsequently applying for American citizenship. He purchased an interest in a business in New York which later went bankrupt and subsequently he was employed by his brother who operates a business in New York City.

Albam has been described as a specialist in handwriting, "copying" and photography. When contacted in 1955 by Boris Morros, Albam acknowledged the code name assigned by his Soviet supervisors, admitted receipt of money to establish himself in this country and agreed to take further Soviet instructions.

Albam was also arrested on January 25, 1957, and indicted on the same charges and on the same date as the Sobles. He pleaded guilty to count two of the indictment on February 26, 1957. On August 9, 1957, he was sentenced to five and one-half years. The other counts of the indictment against Albam were dismissed. On October 8, 1957, Albam's sentence was reduced to five years.

3. Jane and George Zlatovski

Jane and George Zlatovski, American citizens currently residing in France, served under Jack Soble's supervision from 1945 to 1951. In a report intercepted by Boris Morros, Jane Zlatovski claimed that while employed by the U. S. Army in Austria in 1947 - 1948, she obtained through her Army employment names, photographs

and biographies of agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Central Intelligence Agency, similar information concerning their "native agents" and "practically every scheme they hatched." Only disruption of contact with her superiors prevented successful delivery of such information to the Soviet Intelligence Service.

Jane and George Zlatovaki were indicted on July 8, 1957. The indictment contained two counts charging both with espionage conspiracy similar to the Soble indictment. The Zlatovakis were not arrested inasmuch as they reside in France and efforts to effect their return from France to date have been unsuccessful.

4. Alfred and Martha Stern

The Sterns are both American-born citizens. They were originally identified as Soviet agents by Boris Morros in July, 1947, when he reported that they had participated with him and Vassili Zubilin in the establishment of a business concern (the Boris Morros Music Company) which was to be used as a "cover" for Soviet intelligence agents. It was agreed that Stern would invest \$130,000 in Morros' business, become an official and learn the business. Since Jack Soble pleaded guilty, he has confirmed that the Sterns were Soviet agents.

When the Sobles and Albam were arrested on January 25, 1957, the Sterns were residing in Mexico City. They were subsequently served with subpoenas calling for their appearance in New York City before the grand jury hearing the Soble case. They refused to honor the subpoenas and on May 1, 1957, they were fined \$25,000 each for contempt. On the following date warrants were issued for their arrest as material witnesses. They were indicted on September 9, 1957, on two counts charging espionage conspiracy and one count charging general conspiracy. The Sterns were not arrested inasmuch as they fled from Mexico to Czechoslovakia clandestinely in July, 1957.

5. Ilya Wolston

Wolston was born in Russia. He entered the United States on April 30, 1939. He was naturalized a United States citizen on May 18, 1943. In 1942 - 1946 he served in the U. S. Army, in 1943 attending the U. S. Army Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie.

On several occasions beginning May 7, 1950, Jack Soble furnished Boris Morros with information concerning an individual he described as a U.S. Army Colonel in Germany who furnished him information under the code name "Slava," which was very valuable to the Soviets. It is noted that from October, 1949, until July, 1951, Wolston was employed by the U.S. High Commissioner of Germany in Berlin. In January, 1955, Soble identified his nephew, Ilya Wolston as "Slava." In addition, Jack Soble, pleading guilty in April, 1957, furnished information identifying Wolston as a Soviet agent who provided him information for the Soviets on several occasions beginning when Wolston was in a military camp, about 1943. Soble said Wolston gave him information concerning his assignments and names of four persons at the camp whom he believed could be approached by the Soviets.

Information concerning the probable identification of Wolston as a Soviet agent was furnished to the

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Department of State in 1951, together with data developed concerning his black market activities in Germany. The Department of State, on the basis of these data, dismissed Wolston from his employment in Berlin.

On August 13, 1958, Wolston was sentenced to one year's imprisonment for contempt for failure to appear before a Federal Grand Jury in July, 1958. The sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years' probation conditioned on his being available to process of the court within the three-year period.

6. Mark Zborowski

Zborowski was born in Russia and became a naturalized U. S. citizen in New York City in June, 1947. Zborowski was employed as a language consultant in 1943-1944 by the War Department in New York City. Jack Soble advised that Zborowski acted as a Soviet agent under his supervision during the approximate period 1943-1945, furnishing information concerning Trotskyites and other anti-Stalin elements. Zborowski denied knowing Soble before a Grand Jury in February and March, 1957, and in an interview August 11, 1957. However, when confronted by Soble on August 7, 1957, he admitted Soble had been one of his espionage superiors.

Zborowski was indicted for perjury April 18, 1958, was found guilty after trial on November 20, 1958, and on December 8, 1958, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On November 10, 1959, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

7. Vassili Molev

Vassili Molev, while attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, New York City, in 1953 (handling maintenance, purchase of supplies and similar matters) met Boris Morros on a date and at a time and place previously designated by Morros' Soviet intelligence superiors in Austria. Molev accepted from Morros a report prepared in New York by Jack Soble and given by Soble to Morros in accordance with instructions from their Soviet superiors. Photographs, both still shots and motion pictures, of this meeting were taken by FBI personnel.

Immediately following the arrest of Jack Soble on espionage charges on January 25, 1957, the U. S. Department of State declared Molev persona non grata. Molev at that time was employed (in a similar capacity) by the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. He left the United States on January 28, 1957, en route to Russia.

8. Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin

Mikhail Svirin, a Soviet assigned to the Soviet United Nations Delegation, New York City, from August, 1952, to April, 1954, was identified by Yuri A. Rastvorov, a former Soviet intelligence officer, as a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a very experienced intelligence officer.

On two occasions in January and February, 1953, Svirin was observed in the area where Boris Morros was scheduled to meet with his Soviet superior. Morros subsequently met Vassili Molev on March 3, 1953, at the scheduled meeting place.

Reino Hayhanen, former illegal Soviet intelligence agent, advised he first met Svirin in Moscow when Hayhanen returned from Finland in 1952, just prior to being dispatched to the United States as an illegal agent. After his arrival in this country he met Svirin on two occasions during the period 1952-1954 and ultimately Svirin arranged for him to meet Rudolf Abel, another Soviet illegal agent.

Svirin also served as an employee of the United Nations Secretariat from September, 1954, until October 24, 1957, when he last departed from the United States.

G. The Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel Case

1. Reino Hayhanen

On May 6, 1957, Reino Hayhanen, a Soviet citizen, walked into the American Embassy in Paris, France, and advised that he was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet State Security Service and had been involved in Soviet espionage in the United States for the past five years. He had in his possession an American passport issued in the name of Eugene Nicolai Maki, born May 30, 1919, Shaville, Idaho. He advised he had been assigned in the United States (1) to locate possible recruits for Soviet espionage, (2) to obtain information about new military installations in the United States, and (3) to check up on certain individuals who were of interest to Soviet Intelligence. He had been unsuccessful and then was ordered to return to Moscow. At the time of his appearance in Paris, he was on his way to the Soviet Union but was afraid to return because of possible measures the Soviets might take against him for his failure. On May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned to the United States by plane at his own request.

Hayhanen revealed he had been drafted into the NKVD in 1939. Following initial training and experience along the Finnish border, he was ordered to Moscow in 1948 for assignment with the "illegal" or "deep cover" section of the Soviet State Security Service. There he was given the name of Eugene Maki (American-born of Estonian parents who had been returned as a child to Estonia) and briefed for assignment in the United States. To perfect his "legend" (false background) he went to Estonia and then to Finland under his assumed name and identity. Having learned the English language and American customs and been trained in surveillance, secret writing, coding and the preparation of microfilm, he arrived in the United States October 21, 1952.

2. Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel

During Hayhanen's assignment in the United States, he had two Soviet principals. The identity of his first principal (1952-1953) was established as Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin, First Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations in 1952-1953 and later Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1954-1956. Hayhanen knew Svirin only as "Mikhail Ivanovich." His other superior in the United States (1954-1957) was a colonel in the Soviet State Security Service he knew only as "Mark." Investigation subsequently identified "Mark" as Emil R. Goldfus, who maintained a photographic studio in Brooklyn, New York.

Based on information furnished by the FBI, Goldfus was apprehended June 21, 1957, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at a hotel in New York City where he was residing under the name of "Martin Collins," and charged with illegal

entry into the United States. He claimed his true name to be Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Soviet citizen. On August 7, 1957, he was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in New York on two counts of espionage conspiracy and one count charging him to be an agent of a foreign principal without notification to the Secretary of State. On October 25, 1957, Abel was found guilty on all counts and on November 15, 1957, was sentenced to a period of 30 years on the first count, 10 years and a \$2,000 fine on the second count, and a \$1,000 fine on the third count, sentences to run concurrently as to confinement and consecutively as to fines. Abel's conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals on July 11, 1958. His conviction was also affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on March 28, 1960.

Methods used by Hayhanen and Abel in their contacts were ingenious. In order to contact his superiors, Hayhanen would place chalk marks at various predesignated points. To minimize personal contacts and subsequent danger of compromise by surveillances, a system of widely separated "dead drops" or "banks" was established throughout the metropolitan area of New York. These drops were located in such places as Prospect Park, Riverside Drive, Fort Tryon Park, and Central Park. Use was made of hollowed-out coins, bolts, jewelry, magnetic containers, and other objects in which would be inserted film containing code or plain text messages and other material for transmittal.

3. Roy Adair Rhodes

One of Hayhanen's assignments in the United States was to locate an American Army Sergeant by the name of "Quebec" who had been recruited by the Soviets while assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in 1952. Investigation identified "Quebec" as Master Sergeant Roy Adair Rhodes. The latter has admitted his recruitment stating he had been compromised through a Russian girl in Moscow with whom he had an affair. He stated he was in contact with the Soviets in Moscow for approximately two years but had furnished no information of value to them. Upon his return to the United States in 1953 he severed contacts with the Soviets. Rhodes was tried by a United States Army Court Martial on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage and signing a false loyalty oath. He was found guilty and on February 21, 1958, was sentenced to five years and a dishonorable discharge. He appealed his conviction to the Board of Review, United States Army, which approved the sentence imposed on Rhodes.

II. SOVIET NATIONALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA
OR OTHERWISE REMOVED FROM THEIR OFFICIAL
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
JANUARY 1, 1950, THROUGH MAY 1, 1960

The Soviet Union speaks of "peaceful coexistence." Its leaders refer to Americans as "capitalist warmongers," to our Government as "imperialistic," our actions as a threat to world peace. Khrushchev has made much of our attempts to determine the existence and location of Soviet intercontinental missile bases, offensive weapons of war concealed behind the Iron Curtain of Soviet secrecy. With irresponsible exaggerations he has attempted to portray the United States as an aggressor nation.

In contrast to such irresponsible statements has been the carefully considered action of the United States in those instances in which Soviet officials in this country, under cover of diplomatic immunity or official status, have engaged in aggravated acts of espionage.

Among the numerous incidents of Soviet espionage during the past decade the United States has been forced to officially request the withdrawal of 19 Soviet officials because of their participation in espionage operations or other action completely incompatible with their continued presence in this country.

Though such action has been essential to national dignity and the security of the United States, it has been frequently unpublicized, unaccompanied by frenzied charges and irresponsible threats which might create issues prejudicial to world peace.

A. Yuri Vasilyevich Novikov

Novikov entered the United States April 24, 1948, as an attache of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. He subsequently held the position of second secretary and from 1950 through July, 1952, acted as editor of the official publication of the Soviet Embassy, the "Information Bulletin."

On April 12, 1951, Novikov, by meeting a source in Washington, D. C., was identified as the new Soviet principal in an espionage operation which had its origin in Austria in 1949. Novikov, on April 12, 1951, appeared at the designated place on the proper date, at the designated time and gave the password previously agreed upon between the source and his Soviet espionage superiors in Austria.

The original principals in this operation in Austria were two naturalized citizens, Otto Verber and Kurt L. Ponger, who were brought back to the United States and upon entering guilty pleas, were, on June 8, 1953, sentenced for violation of the espionage statute.

Novikov operated the controlled source in the United States until April 22, 1952, and on ten occasions sought classified material.

On January 14, 1953, Novikov was declared persona non grata by the Department of State in connection with his espionage activity. He departed the United States on January 19, 1953.

B. Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov

Amosov entered the United States February 17, 1952, as Assistant Soviet Naval Attache.

Amosov was the third Soviet principal in an intelligence operation directed by the Soviets from their naval attache's office. He served in this capacity from June 7, 1952, until his departure in February, 1954. Targets assigned by Amosov to the controlled source included radar developments, details of the latest cargo ships, manuals reflecting details of the latest electronic developments and bombsight data. He paid the source a total of \$2,000 for his services.

While the operation functioned under Amosov's control, he did not accept any material directly from the source. Amosov furnished instructions to the source in Washington, D. C., and the material was passed in the New York City area with the source following a set procedure of obtaining acknowledgement signals and, thereafter, delivering the material to a designated drop area. Amosov was declared persona non grata by the State Department on February 3, 1954, as a result of his activities in this case and he left the United States on February 7, 1954.

C. Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev

Kovalev arrived in the United States October 8, 1950, as a second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations.

For approximately two years as Assistant Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, D. C., he had been operating a controlled source, obtaining from him material of intelligence significance. On April 19, 1952, the Assistant Soviet Naval Attache told the source that in the future, material obtained was to be microfilmed and the undeveloped film was to be delivered to the Soviets by means of a dead drop located in the New York area rather than through direct delivery to the Assistant Naval Attache. The source was told to park his car in a designated area in New York City at a designated time and to place a package wrapped in red paper therein so that it could be seen through the rear window in the event material was to be passed. An additional signal by way of marking a telephone directory in a New York restaurant was perfected to indicate to the source that the material delivered to the dead drop was picked up.

A trial run of this arrangement occurred in New York City on April 23, 1952, on which date Kovalev was observed in the immediate vicinity of source's car, which was parked in the designated area and in which was placed a package wrapped in red paper. Thereafter, the source deposited material in the dead drop and on April 24, 1952, Kovalev was observed making the predesignated mark in the telephone directory in the New York restaurant.

Material of intelligence significance was left by the controlled source in the New York dead drop area on October 1 and December 3, 1952, which material was retrieved by the Soviets. On June 7, 1952, the source was given by his Soviet principal in Washington \$500 to purchase an electronic device for delivery to the Soviets and an additional \$500 in payment for delivery of a microfilm reproduction of portions of a manual dealing with an automatic steering device for ships. The controlled source last heard from his Soviet principal on April 1, 1953, on which date he was told that a meeting scheduled for April 3, 1953, would not be held.

Kovalev was declared persona non grata by the Department of State for his actions in this case on February 3, 1954, and he departed the United States February 10, 1954.

D. Leonid Igorovich Pivnev

Pivnev entered the United States on March 17, 1950, as Assistant Soviet Air Attache.

On November 2 and 3, 1953, while on a tour throughout the Southwest, Pivnev purchased aerial maps of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity and Dallas, Texas, and vicinity. Pivnev did not identify himself as a Soviet official when purchasing these maps.

In the Spring of 1953, through a Washington businessman, he endeavored to utilize the businessman's address as a mail drop. He explained to the businessman that he would have mail delivered to him at the businessman's address, which mail was to be addressed to a fictitious person and which, upon receipt, was to be delivered by the businessman to him.

On March 24, 1954, he inquired at a Virginia aerial photographic concern as to the possibility of purchasing aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois. He instructed the firm to seek such maps and agreed to pay approximately \$8,000 for them. On that date he purchased 33 aerial photographs of Washington, D. C., and vicinity. Pivnev, in contacting this firm, identified himself as one "George." He did not indicate his official connection with the Soviet Embassy.

On May 3, 1954, he contacted a Washington, D. C., photographer, introducing himself as a Mr. George Tinney, a representative of a private firm desirous of purchasing aerial photographs of New York City at a scale of 1:20,000 to 1:40,000 feet. Photographs of this type were not commercially available. On May 13, 1954, he agreed to pay the photographer \$700 to obtain the photographs. He advanced on that date the sum of \$400 as partial payment.

On May 20, 1954, when meeting with the photographer for the purpose of obtaining the photographs, he was accosted by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on which occasion he identified himself. On May 29, 1954, the Department of State declared Pivnev persona non grata for his action, and he departed June 6, 1954.

E. Maksim Grigorievich Martynov

Martynov last entered the United States on November 3, 1954, as a member of the Soviet Representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee.

In August, 1954, a highly placed Army officer in Germany was introduced to a Soviet under clandestine circumstances in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The Soviet, aware of the officer's plan to retire from the Army, asked him to be of assistance when the Soviet came to the United States. The officer did not discourage the Soviet's approach and meetings in New York City were arranged. A code phrase was established for recognition purposes.

On November 15, 1954, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, made up to resemble the Army officer, was contacted at the agreed time and place in New York City by Martynov. Prearranged signals were exchanged and they talked for approximately thirty minutes. Martynov indicated he was a friend of the Soviet who contacted the officer in Germany and he asked for the officer's assistance, paying him \$250. A subsequent meeting was scheduled for January 15, 1955.

On that date, Martynov kept the appointment and with State Department permission, FBI Agents accosted him. Martynov identified himself and claimed diplomatic immunity.

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On February 21, 1955, the Department of State declared Martynov persona non grata for the above activity and he departed the United States February 26, 1955.

F. Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guryanov

Guryanov entered the United States March 26, 1955, as an employee of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations.

On April 25, 1956, Guryanov was declared persona non grata by the United States Department of State as a result of his implication in the improper repatriation to the USSR of five Soviet seamen who left the United States on April 7, 1956. The seamen were members of the crew of the Soviet tanker "Tuapse" who previously defected to the United States. The Department of State informed the Soviet Government that Guryanov's activities made his presence in the United States no longer desirable and he departed May 9, 1956.

G. Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov

Bubchikov entered the United States December 1, 1954, as an Assistant Soviet Military Attache.

From July, 1955, through May, 1956, Bubchikov maintained contact with a naturalized American citizen of Russian origin who was employed as a sales engineer. In July, 1955, he appeared at the sales engineer's residence late in the evening and sought his cooperation in securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical developments. Bubchikov promised the engineer large sums of money; however, even though seemingly important information was furnished to him, he did not fulfill his promise of large payments. During the course of this operation it was featured by clandestine meetings, complex recognition signals, and a variety of "drop areas" in which the source deposited material for the Soviet.

In view of his activities in connection with the engineer, the Department of State, on June 14, 1956, declared Bubchikov persona non grata for engaging "in espionage activities incompatible with his continued presence in this country." He departed the United States June 24, 1956.

H. Boris Fedorovich Gladkov

Gladkov entered the United States December 15, 1953, as naval advisor to the Soviet Representation in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations (UN).

In January, 1955, Gladkov, at a cocktail party, met a sales engineer for a New York City marine engineering firm. He cultivated the sales engineer and held a number of clandestine meetings with him. Through the engineer, on June 14, 1955, he received two unclassified publications dealing with marine boilers. During his meetings with the sales engineer which continued on a regular basis through June, 1956, Gladkov furnished the engineer \$1,550 for services rendered.

On June 22, 1956, the Department of State declared Gladkov persona non grata for engaging in "activities which were highly improper and incompatible" with his status as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the UN. He departed July 12, 1956.

I. Rostislav E. Shapovalov

Shapovalov entered the United States September 27, 1955, as a second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations (UN).

On May 7, 14, 17 and 21, 1956, Shapovalov contacted a Russian emigre in New York City and urged him to return to Russia. The emigre, Michael Schatoff, a former officer in the Russian Army, was a classmate of Shapovalov at a New York university.

On August 20, 1956, the Department of State declared Shapovalov persona non grata for his activities in attempting to induce Schatoff to return to the Soviet Union.

Shapovalov departed the United States September 12, 1956.

J. Viktor Ivanovich Petrov

Viktor Ivanovich Petrov arrived in the United States February 17, 1953, as a translator employed at the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, New York City.

In December, 1955, he responded to an advertisement placed in a New York newspaper by an aviation draftsman for part-time work. The draftsman was an employee of one of our largest aircraft factories. At the outset, Petrov gave the draftsman insignificant drafting work, later asking him to send for various brochures on aviation. On April 5, 1956, Petrov requested the draftsman to obtain information concerning United States military aircraft. The information sought was classified and, according to the United States Air Force, would have been a good guide concerning the status of United States aircraft development.

On August 20, 1956, a representative of the Department of Justice and the United States Representative to the UN conferred with the Secretary General of the UN, who agreed to dismiss Petrov. On August 21, 1956, charges against Petrov were presented to the Deputy Soviet UN Representative and on August 23, 1956, the UN received a two-line resignation from Petrov which requested acceptance by August 27, 1956. The Secretary General of the UN agreed not to accept the resignation and to proceed with Petrov's dismissal. Petrov hurriedly departed the United States on August 23, 1956.

K. Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov

Ekimov entered the United States October 17, 1955, as second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations (UN).

Newspapermen and Immigration and Naturalization representatives in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, accused Ekimov of participating in the abduction of Tanya Chuastov, aged two, an American-born daughter of a Russian refugee. It was alleged that Ekimov participated on October 3, 1956, in dockside arrangements enabling Alexei Chuastov to leave the United States with his infant daughter. This move was against the wishes of the child's mother who remained in the United States. Ekimov was declared persona non grata by the Department of State on October 29, 1956, and he departed the United States on November 30, 1956.

L. Yuri Pavlovich Krylov

Krylov entered the United States May 4, 1955, as Assistant Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C.

In April, 1956, Krylov was introduced to the manager of a Washington electronics supply house. Through the Washingtonian, who cooperated with the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, Krylov purchased hard-to-get electronic equipment.

In August of 1955, Krylov contacted an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from him information concerning the technical aspects of nuclear power. In December, 1955, he contacted a former commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission in an effort to develop information concerning atomic energy for space heating. In February, 1956, he attempted to purchase 26 unclassified films on peace-time atomic energy.

In February, 1956, he endeavored to join the Society of American Military Engineers and to subscribe to the publication "The Military Engineer," which contained information concerning United States fortifications.

On January 14, 1957, the Department of State declared Krylov persona non grata as a result of his activities. He departed the United States January 26, 1957.

M. Vassili Mikhailovich Molev

From August, 1944, through January, 1957, Molev served several tours of duty in the United States, occupying positions of chauffeur and property custodian to the Soviet Consulate General in New York and property custodian at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.

Boris Morros, an admitted Soviet agent cooperating with the FBI, was instructed by his Soviet superiors to appear in the vicinity of 58 West 58th Street, New York City, at 3 p.m. on the first Tuesday of each month for contact by his Soviet principal. If the contact was not made, Morros was instructed by the Soviets to return the following Wednesday and Thursday. On Wednesday, January 7, 1953, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Molev in the vicinity of 58 West 58th Street, New York City.

Morros was later instructed by his Soviet principal to meet his Soviet contact on Tuesday, March 3, 1953, on the corner of Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas, New York City. On March 3, 1953, Molev was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation consummating a meeting with Morros at Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas. On this occasion Morros passed to Molev a report previously obtained from Jack Soble, Morros' immediate superior, who was subsequently convicted of espionage. Molev, on March 3, 1953, issued instructions to Morros for a subsequent meeting; however, that meeting was not effected.

On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Alham were arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy. Simultaneously, Molev was declared persona non grata because of his implication in the conspiracy. He departed the United States January 28, 1957.

N. Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha

Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha was formerly assigned as first secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations (UN).

On the night of March 5, 1957, Dhanapala Samarasekara, a Ceylonese national employed at the UN Secretariat, New York City, was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to enter the Ceylonese Delegation to the UN. At 7 p.m. on that date Samarasekara was observed on the fourth floor of that building opening what appeared to be a file cabinet and examining some papers. He was observed to have

left the delegation shortly thereafter carrying an airline-type handbag. He drove to an area where Vladimir Grusha was observed standing on a corner. Approximately one hour later Samarasekara was observed to return to the same area where Grusha was seen getting into Samarasekara's automobile. After driving a short distance, Grusha left the car and Samarasekara returned to the Ceylonese Delegation. He was at that time observed on the fourth floor of the building where he was observed opening the same file cabinet he opened earlier in the evening. He was then observed carefully placing a red book in the cabinet. He left the delegation shortly thereafter.

It was subsequently learned that the Ceylonese code book was red in color and that the code room of the Ceylonese Delegation was located on the fourth floor of the Ceylonese Delegation building.

Subsequently interviewed, Samarasekara admitted going to the Ceylonese Delegation building and later meeting with Grusha on the night of March 5, 1957. He denied passing any information to the Soviet.

Based on information developed by the FBI, the Department of State declared Grusha persona non grata on March 25, 1957, and he departed from the United States on April 10, 1957. The Department of State instructed the United States Mission to the UN to request the Secretary General of the UN to dismiss Samarasekara from the UN Secretariat. Samarasekara was advised on July 5, 1957, that he was suspended with pay. A committee was appointed by the Secretary General to investigate the allegations against him and on December 16, 1957, the Secretary General informed the United States Mission to the UN that he had terminated Samarasekara's employment.

O. Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev

Mashkantsev served as an employee of the Consulate Division of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., handling repatriation matters. He arrived in the United States October 25, 1956.

On March 12, 1957, he appeared at the home of Petr Pirogov, Russian flyer who, with Anatoli Barsov, defected to the United States in Austria in 1948. Barsov redefected to Russia in 1949 and, according to Vladimir Petrov, the former Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Australia, after lengthy interrogation was executed.

Upon visiting Pirogov, Mashkantsev delivered to him a lengthy handwritten letter purportedly from Barsov. The letter petitioned Pirogov to return to the USSR. Examination of the letter established that it was not in the handwriting of Barsov but was a carefully prepared simulation. As a result, on April 17, 1957, Mashkantsev was declared persona non grata for "improper activities directed toward inducing return to the Soviet Union of persons who have sought asylum in the United States." Mashkantsev departed April 25, 1957.

P. Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin

Kurochkin entered the United States, April 4, 1956, as a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.

In the Fall of 1956, Charles T. Beaumet, a professional writer, contacted the Soviet Embassy seeking statistics as to hosiery production in the Soviet Union. He met Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statistical data and, after a series of meetings, informed Beaumet that if he would obtain military information to be incorporated in articles

Kurochkin was writing for Russian military journals, he would share with him his proceeds from the articles. Thereafter, Beaumet, utilizing the entree he enjoyed as a reporter, obtained training and field manuals of the U. S. Army which he turned over to Kurochkin. For the various manuals delivered to Kurochkin, Beaumet was paid approximately \$450. Included among the manuals sought by Kurochkin were two which were classified. The classified manuals were not delivered to the Soviet.

On June 6, 1958, Kurochkin was declared persona non grata for engaging in highly improper activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. He departed from the United States on June 11, 1958.

Q. Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin

Doronkin arrived in the United States March 12, 1956, to serve as Film Editor, Radio and Visual Division of the Department of Public Information, United Nations (UN) Secretariat. He returned to the USSR on home leave April 17, 1958, and re-entered the United States July 29, 1958.

In October, 1958, a source recruited by the Soviets obtained aerial photographs of the Chicago area for delivery to an unknown individual whom he was instructed to meet at a prearranged spot in the parking area adjacent to the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York. On November 15, 1958, the source arrived at the designated area to keep his scheduled meeting with the unknown Soviet. Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Doronkin and his wife arrive at the parking lot at 6 p.m., November 15, 1958. At 6:55 p.m. Doronkin and his wife left their car and while Doronkin's wife strolled about the immediate area, Doronkin was seen to talk to the source. The source was observed to pass to Doronkin a paper-wrapped package which he took from the trunk of his automobile. Shortly thereafter the source, Doronkin and his wife re-entered their respective cars and left the area. The source reported that he turned over to Doronkin the requested aerial photographs of the Chicago area.

The United States Mission to the UN delivered a note to the Secretary General of the UN on January 15, 1959, requesting Doronkin's dismissal from the UN because of this activity. Doronkin's contracted term of employment terminated March 3, 1959, and he was not re-employed by the UN. He departed from the United States March 11, 1959.

R. Eugeni Alekseevich Zaostrovstev

Zaostrovstev entered the United States August 2, 1957, as a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.

On February 23, 1958, Zaostrovstev met a State Department foreign service officer in training, at a social function. There followed intensive efforts on the part of Zaostrovstev to cultivate the State Department employee for intelligence purposes. Between February, 1958, and February 6, 1959, he met with the State Department employee on 15 occasions. He obtained from the State Department employee material concerning the training program of foreign service officers and endeavored, without success, to obtain classified documents from State Department files concerning the political and economic affairs in the area of the Government employee's future foreign assignment. He paid the Government employee \$150 for information furnished to him.

As a result of his dealings with the State Department employee, the Department of State on May 13, 1959, made an informal request of the Soviet Embassy for Zaostrovitsev's recall. Zaostrovitsev departed the United States on May 15, 1959.

S. Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk

Kirilyuk arrived in the United States September 11, 1958, as a political affairs officer employed by the Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self Governing Territories, United Nations (UN) Secretariat. In April, 1959, an American citizen contacted a Soviet official in Mexico City concerning the possibility of obtaining a Soviet university scholarship. The Soviet obtained complete background information from the American, including the facts concerning his previous assignment in cryptographic machines and systems while serving in the United States Army. Following his return to the United States, the American was contacted by Kirilyuk, who identified himself as one "George."

During the period from June through September, 1959, Kirilyuk met with the American in a clandestine manner on five occasions. On these occasions he requested data concerning cryptographic machines and instructed the American to seek employment with a vital United States Government agency. Kirilyuk's meetings with the source on August 28, 1959, and on September 18, 1959, were observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Secretary General of the UN was informed of Kirilyuk's espionage activity on December 17, 1959. On January 7, 1960, the Soviet Delegation to the UN was advised of Kirilyuk's activities, whereupon Kirilyuk and his family left the United States on January 10, 1960.

III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Espionage, by its very nature, is international - the attempt by one country to obtain the secrets of another. Frequently a third country, because of its neutrality or strategic accessibility, is used as a base for such operations, its citizens, often having privileges as allies of the target country, recruited as agents. The Soviet Union, now critical of American use of overseas bases, has for many years directed espionage operations against the United States through other countries. Petr Derjabin, Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Austria in 1954, stated that in December, 1951, when Lieutenant General Sergei R. Sauchenko became Chief of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence Service), he issued orders that it would be necessary to intensify operations against the United States from beyond our borders. His instructions have been carried out.

A. Dr. Alan Nunn May

Dr. Alan Nunn May was born in Birmingham, England, in 1911. In 1943 he was sent to Canada with a group of prominent British nuclear physicists to work on the atomic bomb project for the Canadian Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.

Igor Gouzenko, Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada September 5, 1945, described May as one of the most important Soviet agents under Colonel Nikolai Zabolot, Soviet Military Attache and chief of Soviet Military Intelligence operations in Canada. Dr. May furnished Zabolot's organization with voluminous, vitally important information concerning atomic fusion, including specimens of uranium 233 and uranium 235. Gouzenko stated that May had been in the pay of the Soviet Union for many years and had been a secret member of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

Immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima in August, 1945, Zabolot wired to Moscow certain information received from May, forwarded a report by May setting forth production figures and furnished a small quantity of uranium 233. May had access to uranium 233 in connection with his work in Canada but did not have access to uranium 235 which may have been obtained when he visited the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago in September and October, 1944. May also furnished to the Russians information concerning the proximity fuse.

May returned to the United Kingdom in September, 1945, and in February, 1946, was arrested by British authorities in London and charged with violation of the Official Secrets Act. Subsequently, on a plea of guilty, May was sentenced to serve 10 years in a British penitentiary.

B. Sam Carr

From information furnished by Igor Gouzenko, together with documents which he abstracted from the Soviet Embassy in Canada, it was established that Sam Carr was one of the most important espionage agents operated by the Soviet Military Intelligence Service in Canada during 1942-1945. Sam Carr, born as Schmil Kogan July 7, 1906, at Kharkov, Russia, was naturalized as a Canadian citizen in 1931. An old communist of international reputation, he had long been active in illegal and intelligence work.

In March, 1946, following the defection of Igor Gouzenko, Carr suddenly disappeared from Canada, fleeing

behind the Iron Curtain. Having altered his appearance and assumed a new name and identity, Carr surreptitiously entered the United States in the Fall of 1948 and in January, 1949, was apprehended by the FBI in New York City. Carr was returned to Canada and on April 8, 1949, was convicted in Ottawa of conspiracy to violate Canadian law in the procurement of a fraudulent passport. He was sentenced to six years in prison.

C. Ignacy Samuel Witzak

One of the individuals for whom Sam Carr was instructed to obtain false documentation was a Soviet agent using the assumed name of Ignacy Samuel Witzak. According to Igor Gouzenko, Moscow had instructed the Soviet Military Attache of Ottawa in August, 1945, to obtain a Canadian passport for a Soviet agent then in Los Angeles, California, under the name of Witzak. Gouzenko stated that the latter's function in the United States was to operate a network of Soviet agents in the event of a break in United States-Soviet diplomatic relations. However, the FBI established that Witzak was engaged in recruiting individuals in the United States for intelligence assignments in the Orient and South America. The persons recruited were given funds, passage, and instructions for establishing contact with other Soviet agents upon reaching their destination.

The Soviet agent posing as Witzak had assumed the name and identity of a real Ignacy Samuel Witzak, a Polish-born naturalized citizen of Canada who had served with the Loyalists in Spain and had surrendered his Canadian passport upon arrival in that country in 1937. Using this passport, the false Witzak, a Soviet illegal agent, had arrived in the United States the following year.

In New York City in 1945, Witzak, the imposter, was in contact with Leonid S. Malou, clerk of the Soviet Consulate, who was clearly implicated in Soviet espionage operations and in November, 1945, was also in contact with Lieutenant Nikolai G. Redin who was brought to trial the following year on charges of espionage. In California the false Witzak was in contact with Mikhail F. Mukhachev, Assistant to the Soviet Vice-Consul in Los Angeles and a reported Soviet intelligence agent.

The Soviet agent posing as Ignacy Samuel Witzak disappeared November 21, 1945. His most intimate associate in the United States was Clarence H. Vetterli, whom Witzak had used in making contact with potential recruits. On the basis of denials, before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, of participation in Witzak's intelligence operations, Vetterli was convicted July 12, 1951, on charges of perjury and on July 25, 1951, was sentenced to a total of six years imprisonment.

D. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs

Forced to flee his native land in 1933, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, German-born nuclear physicist, sought refuge in Great Britain. In 1941, having received the greater portion of his higher education in Great Britain, Fuchs was entrusted with research work on atomic energy. Almost immediately he sought out Soviet agents to whom he could and did give secret information to which he had access.

In December, 1943, Fuchs arrived in the United States as a member of a group of British scientists selected to carry on further atomic research in coordination with that of this country. Before leaving Britain, Fuchs had perfected arrangements to continue his espionage operations. As a result of

such arrangements, relayed through Moscow, Fuchs was placed in contact with Harry Gold who was in contact with Anatoli A. Yakovlev, clerk of the Soviet Consulate in New York City. From early 1944 through September, 1945, Fuchs worked with Manhattan Engineer District in New York and at the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, during which time he repeatedly transmitted secret atomic energy information to Yakovlev through Harry Gold. Upon returning to England in June, 1946, Fuchs continued to supply his Soviet superiors with secret information concerning atomic research until 1949. Interrogated by British authorities, on January 27, 1950, Fuchs confessed to his operations on behalf of the Soviet Union.

On March 1, 1950, Fuchs entered a plea of guilty in England to charges of violating the Official Secrets Act and was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

E. Pontecorvo, Burgess and Maclean

In September, 1950, several months after the arrest of atomic spy Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, an outstanding British scientist, Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo, disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. Thirty-seven years of age at the time, Pontecorvo was a naturalized British subject of Italian birth. He had worked with Enrico Fermi in Rome, Italy, until 1936 when he went to Paris, France, to escape religious persecution under the fascist regime. In Paris, he worked with Frederic Joliot-Curie, leading French nuclear physicist and admitted communist. Pontecorvo fled from France following the invasion by Nazi forces in 1940. One of the scientists responsible for the development of the Neutron Theory, subsequently applied in the creation of the atomic bomb, he arrived in the United States in August, 1940. Here he was employed by a private concern in the location of oil deposits but later engaged in atomic energy experiments and cosmic ray research for the British Government in Canada and at the time of his disappearance was employed at the British atomic establishment located at Harwell, England. In 1955 it was reported that Pontecorvo, then in Moscow, USSR, where he was working on Soviet atomic projects, claimed that he had left the "capitalist world" because of preparations being made for the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

On May 25, 1951, two British diplomats, Guy Francis DeMoncy Burgess and Donald Duart Maclean, also disappeared. Maclean had been assigned as a member at the British Embassy, Washington, D. C., from May, 1944, until September, 1948. Burgess served in a similar capacity in the United States from August, 1950, until his recall in May, 1951. In February, 1956, they handed a prepared statement to members of the press in Moscow, USSR, in which both admitted having been communists at college and stated that Burgess arranged for their escape inasmuch as Maclean was under surveillance. Vladimir M. Petrov, Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Australia in 1954, stated that he had learned from a colleague that the flight of Burgess and Maclean, both long-term Soviet agents, had been planned from Moscow.

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