

rally in Moscow, I am genuinely worried. For Khrushchev's proposals, which include a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement and the reduction of military forces on both sides of the line running through the heart of Germany, could, if adopted, weaken the West's position in central Europe and lead to the neutralization of West Germany and the dissolution of the western alliance, which is the primary objective of the Soviets in Europe. Developments since the initialing of the test ban treaty have calmed my fears somewhat, but I feel that we must be most cautious and prudent in considering the next steps proposed by the Soviets.

We have an idea of Khrushchev's conception of the next steps. But what about President Kennedy's conception? I have seen little evidence of an American initiative in this area. In fact, we appear to be following Khrushchev's lead, as evidenced by our interest in the nonaggression pact suggestion.

Can we not suggest that the next steps toward peace and reason and away from war be taken in Laos, in Cuba, and in Berlin? It was President Kennedy's initiative, in proposing the Moscow conference, that paved the way for the treaty now before us. Now it is Khrushchev's turn.

At his meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna 2 years ago, Khrushchev solemnly pledged to uphold the independence and neutrality of Laos. This pledge has been termed a litmus-paper test of Soviet intentions by Kennedy administration officials. He has not kept it. Now he can.

Khrushchev pledged last fall to withdraw Soviet forces from Cuba in due course. Although President Kennedy has reported some reduction in their numerical strength, it is clear that this pledge has not been fulfilled. Now Khrushchev can fulfill that pledge.

It was exactly this point that I was driving at upon the floor of the Senate yesterday in a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER]. I suggested then that the time for such bargains was before the signing of the treaty; that we have now passed the psychological moment when we can demand a quid pro quo; and that the psychological moment passed when the treaty was signed. It will be much more difficult to get such a quid pro quo from the Communists at a time like this.

I have no doubt that any withdrawal from Cuba pursuant to any inspection will be a long one and reluctant one, something that will not occur unless it is precipitated either by the Cubans themselves or by the Cubans with the support of the United States.

Two years ago, the Communists erected the odious "wall of shame" in Berlin. If they truly desire to take steps toward peace and reason and away from war, they can signify their good intentions by dismantling the wall.

Mr. President, I have discussed some of the factors that I am weighing as I consider the test ban treaty. I am struck by the apparent haste in which it was concluded. I am deeply troubled by the possible gaps in our knowledge concern-

ing the effects of high-altitude super-megaton explosions upon the posture of our retaliatory strategic missile forces. I am concerned about the direction in which this treaty, as a vaguely defined "first step," could lead us. Unfortunately, the factors that must be weighed in our consideration of this treaty are not cut and dried. For this reason, reaching a decision is difficult.

The history of the relations between the United States and Soviet Russia, since our first recognition of that country, is not such as to inspire confidence in either the Russian motivation or the reliability of any agreement made with Russians. In fact, based upon the number of broken treaties and agreements which the Russians have made, we have more reason to be suspect of their intentions of keeping this treaty than we have to believe that they will respect it. In the field of international relations between countries, we cannot place ourselves upon a plane of high idealism and refuse to look at the motivations of other countries. To do so would be to shirk the fundamental duty of the Senate in the coming week, when it must either approve or refuse to approve the treaty.

What is this motivation? Heretofore, I have suggested some of the things which may be the motivation, yet today, that motivation is not clear to me. I am sure there is a motivation for the Russians are nothing if they are not realists. Is fear of nuclear war what causes them to sign such a treaty? I doubt it, because they know that the President and the Defense Department and the American people are completely saturated with the concept of defense only, which has prevailed over the years. It is illogical to assume that a country which never has pursued an aggressive or acquisitive policy is going to change that policy overnight and commence such a war, particularly when it knows that it can do so only at the price of a nuclear holocaust? Has the Red Chinese rift caused Russia to do this? No man with commonsense can believe that is true. It is true that the Chinese have the largest population on earth; but in this modern day and age, war can be waged only by a country with a great industrial potential. In this respect, Red China is industrially coming up out of the miocene ooze, compared with Russia's present industrial potential. China cannot and could not wage a major war, and is not likely to be able to do so in the next 10 or 20 years.

Mr. President, our concern is that possibly Russia has achieved a scientific breakthrough which, if known to the President, has not been told to the American people or to Congress itself. If this is true, then—to paraphrase Shakespeare—the treaty might well be the "sleep of death" which must give us pause. Against this eventuality, we have been given assurances by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and many others high in authority. If this be just one more attempt at "gimmick" government, government by press agency, adulation of the Kennedy personality cult, an election elixir, then this will indeed be the sorriest day

for America. But we have no right to assume that these men do not act in good faith, or that they have withheld material facts from the people or the Congress. In fact, they have given us every assurance that they have not done so.

Despite the solemn warnings of the President and all others involved in drafting this treaty, the immediate reaction, as exhibited by my own mail and by the mail of most of the Members of Congress, is that the treaty will result in a nuclear utopia, that the specter of nuclear war is gone, and that world disarmament is around the corner. The reaction shown by most of the nations in the world, particularly those in southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has been substantially the same. Last year, as a congressional delegate for the United States to the United Nations, I learned of the great concern which the representatives of these countries had about the nuclear race. In some cases, the concern was almost hysterical. As a result, Mr. President, today we find that even before the treaty was reported by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 86 nations had scampereed like wildlife before a forest fire to place their names on the treaty.

I must pay tribute particularly to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], who so promptly held full committee hearings upon this matter.

Not to approve the treaty, therefore, would be to douse all the hopes of those nations—illogical though their hopes may be, in light of the treaty itself—and to say to them—figuratively, not literally—that we are not interested in the cessation of nuclear tests or in stopping the saturation of the earth's atmosphere with radioactive fallout. It seems to me this is a price we can ill afford to pay, if we are to retain the confidence of the world in our moral leadership. No one should ever have written a treaty which permitted such a stampede, before the United States had an opportunity to consider, on the merits of the treaty itself, rather than on the merits of international press agency, the treaty as an effective basis for the control of nuclear tests.

But we are called upon to make a decision, Mr. President; and decision means choice. While I feel, to a degree at least, that this Nation has been blackjacked into approval of this treaty, failure to approve it could destroy our already fast-diminishing claim to the moral leadership of the world. The Berlin wall, the two Cuban escapades, Laos, and now South Vietnam, have tarnished our claim to that leadership; and I believe we cannot now do otherwise than approve this treaty. If, based upon a preponderance of evidence which would sway intelligent and reasonable minds, there were a clear-cut reason why we should not approve it, then—even though we would thus dash the hopes of every other nation on earth—I would not vote to approve the treaty. But in the absence of such a preponderance of evidence, I shall reluctantly vote in favor of approval of the treaty, unless facts which may appear subsequently supply a weight of evidence

which clearly shows the treaty to be contrary to our national safety.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MORSE obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield, provided it is understood that in doing so, he will not lose his right to the floor?

Mr. MORSE. Certainly.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business, to consider Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st session.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to the consideration of Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st session, the nuclear test ban treaty, which had been reported favorably by Mr. FULBRIGHT from the Committee on Foreign Relations, and which was read the second time, as follows:

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDERWATER

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

ARTICLE III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and of accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of the United States of America:

DEAN RUSK

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

HOME

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. GROMYKO

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the treaty will be the pending business when the Senate convenes on Monday.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it adjourn until noon on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oregon for his courtesy in yielding.

Mr. MORSE. I have been glad to yield.

INTERIM REPORT ON MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield briefly to me?

Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as the Senate knows, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which I am privileged to be chairman, has been conducting extensive and exhaustive hearings on nuclear test ban matters since September 1962. During recent weeks the hearings have focused upon the military and technical implications of the pending treaty which would bar nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater. An earnest, determined, and conscientious effort has been made to develop all of the facts from qualified military and scientific people, and to arrive at solid answers to the many complex, troublesome, and difficult questions which are involved.

During the past week, I have received numerous inquiries as to the status of our hearings, with particular emphasis upon the question of whether the subcommittee proposes to issue a report and, if so, when. Another subject of inquiry has been the matter of the printing and public release of the transcripts of the hearings. I believe it is proper and fitting for me to advise the Senate and the public of the status of these matters.

The subcommittee plans to issue an interim report dealing specifically with the military and technical implications of the partial test ban and the impact which the treaty, if approved, would have upon our present and future military striking power. This report is now in the process of preparation, and it is hoped that it will be available for release early next week.

With respect to the printing of the transcripts, let me point out that the sensitive matters involved in our hearings made it mandatory that the testimony be received in executive session. We have made every effort to abide by all applicable security requirements and regulations. Therefore, before the testi-

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mony can be printed, it is necessary that the typewritten transcripts be gone over thoroughly in order to delete therefrom all sensitive information which, if made public, might be of value to a potential enemy. Subject only to this, we will make the testimony public to the greatest extent possible.

We are today releasing the testimony of General Power, which has been cleared for security.

Although the subcommittee staff has been working diligently to get the transcripts ready for printing, the magnitude of the problem now makes it clear it will be impossible to print them prior to the conclusion of the debate upon the test ban treaty. However, copies of the transcripts, in their classified form, are available in the office of the subcommittee and can be there examined by any Senator upon request.

Mr. President, a great deal of effort has been made to get those records cleared for security in time to be printed, but it is quite a long process, even after we get the transcript back with the deletions, to put it in shape to go to the printer.

I would now like to make a few remarks about the proposed nuclear test ban as an individual Senator. I preface these remarks with the statement that on these points I speak only for myself.

On May 28, 1963, I took the floor of the Senate and addressed myself to Senate Resolution 148 which had then just been introduced by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DONN] and others. As will be recalled, this resolution proposed that the Senate go on record as supporting a renewed offer by the United States to the Soviet Union of an agreement banning all tests that contaminate the atmosphere or the ocean and, in the event of the rejection of such offer, that we commit ourselves unilaterally to a moratorium on such testing.

I then pointed out that the question of banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere involves serious security considerations and was intimately related to the problem of national survival.

Some of the questions which I then said must be asked and answered before the necessary assurance could be acquired were:

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to provide our Nation with an effective defense against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles?

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to provide our Nation with a certain capability of penetrating a Soviet missile defense employing nuclear warheads?

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to assure the survival of our offensive missile systems after a surprise enemy nuclear attack?

Since my floor statement of May 28, 1963, these and other questions have been explored in depth and detail by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. We have had before us many of the most knowledgeable people in the country upon the military and technical aspects of the problem. The information which we have obtained has not

been reassuring to me. On the contrary, the evidence before the subcommittee has given me, as an individual Senator, cause for great concern and alarm about the security implications of the proposed treaty.

In short, based upon a long and serious study and assessment of the testimony which has been presented to us—and I did not make any conclusion on that point until all of the testimony was in just a few days ago—I have come to the conclusion that the net military disadvantages to the United States which are inherent in the proposed treaty are so serious and formidable as to raise very serious questions as to the effect of the treaty upon our national security, safety and survival. Considering the treaty comprehensively I have found nothing in it which counterbalances this factor to the extent that I can say that the military risks which are inherent in the treaty are, on balance, acceptable. In fact, the contrary is true.

My concern in this matter is to do all that I can to insure that our vital interests are protected and that our capacity to defend ourselves against an aggressor are not degraded. Since I have reached the conclusion that unacceptable military and security risks are involved in the proposed treaty and that it is not in the national self-interest, I shall have no alternative but to cast my vote against its ratification. At a later date I shall discuss in detail the reasons and facts which have impelled me to take this stand.

I thank the Senator from Oregon again for his courtesy.

Mr. MORSE. It is my pleasure to cooperate with the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. President, with the understanding that I do not lose my right to the floor, I yield to the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON].

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of the distinguished Senator from Oregon.

THE STOCKPILE INQUIRY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I have before me an article which appeared in the press with respect to some remarks apparently written by the senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE]. I have not seen what he said, but I have the article in my hand. Based upon that newspaper article, I desire to make a statement this afternoon with respect to the subject the Senator from New Jersey brought up.

A newspaper story today states that the Senator from New Jersey said in connection with the pending report on the stockpile that I had refused "to let the men accused in the report submit their defense with the release of the findings."

The Senator from New Jersey did request that the proposed report of the subcommittee be first submitted to those witnesses to whom he wanted to show it; but I found, to the best of my knowledge, that any such action would be without precedent; and I also felt that it would be improper to submit a subcommittee report of this character to any of the

witnesses before it had been submitted to the full Armed Services Committee.

The Senator from New Jersey states that the report was "more the work of Timothy J. May, assistant counsel."

That is not correct. Mr. May did work on the report, as did many others, but every word of said report was first approved by the chief counsel of the subcommittee, Mr. R. C. Coburn, prior to its submission to me and my subsequent submission to the subcommittee.

The Senator from New Jersey is quoted as asserting Mr. May was formerly a member of the White House staff.

Mr. President, I do not see why that is particularly pertinent especially if Mr. May possessed information or experience which would help the chief counsel and the subcommittee get the facts; but in any case it is also an incorrect statement.

Mr. May was not a member of the White House staff at the time he was employed by the counsel of the subcommittee, and had never been a member of the White House staff. He had been a consultant to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. Since that office supervised stockpile policy, it was logical for Mr. Coburn to want his services.

When the report was originally submitted some members thought it was too long.

Investigating these contracts was a very complicated accounting effort. It was understandable that after a year's hearings, a long report could be in order; but in any case, in an effort to accommodate those on the subcommittee who felt it was too long, it is now being reworked by counsel in the hope it will be satisfactory to the subcommittee.

The Senator from New Jersey is reported as stating that the inquiry was "limited to a partial examination of the handling of a few metals during the period of the previous administration."

That also is not correct.

Many contracts investigated were signed in both previous administrations, and also in the current administration, in many cases either after critical published reports or investigation by the General Accounting Office; and every contract was investigated that was requested by any member of the subcommittee or Member of the Senate.

The Senator is reported as saying that he is "not interested in covering up or accusing anyone." I am glad to know that.

Perhaps the reason for much of the above is the fact that the Senator from New Jersey was not appointed to the subcommittee until March 26, 1963, many weeks after the hearings were completed; and therefore the Senator from New Jersey did not participate, at any time, in any of the hearings.

The report is based on the record of the hearings. The Senate and the people are entitled to a summary of the findings. That is the duty of the subcommittee and I intend to see that that duty is carried out.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my able friend from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. There is one thing about the statement made by the Senator from Missouri this afternoon which disturbs the senior Senator from Oregon, if it is correctly understood. The Senator said, I believe, that the committee is now at work cutting down the length of the report. I hope this does not mean that the Senate will be denied any information it should have in regard to this investigation, because in my judgment the Senate is entitled to all the information.

I have not participated in any way in the discussion of this investigation over the many months during which it has been going on.

The Senator from Missouri knows that there is an operation in the State of Oregon involving a nickel mine and plant which, in newspaper stories, at least, has been involved in the investigation to various degrees. I have received many inquiries about it. My answer has been uniform. I propose to wait until all the record is in and the committee has completed its hearings and made its full report.

I sincerely hope the chairman of the committee is not in a position in which, for any reason whatsoever, he has to delete from the report information which, in his original judgment, the Senate is entitled to receive.

As one Senator who has the kind of interest in the matter I have outlined, I wish to be sure that I have all the information, so that when I reach my evaluation of the report and reply to my constituents I shall know I have a full record.

I am also aware—and I have a little sense of humor about this—that there is always a desire in the Senate to be brief, but I have observed after 19 years here that sometimes the desire to be brief is motivated by the desire to cover up. I would much prefer to speak at length and to write at length, satisfied that by so doing I was making a complete record.

I hope that we shall not get such a brevity-stricken report that we shall not be able to present to our constituents all the information we should be able to present in our final evaluation of the Senator's work.

I wish to say something about the Senator's work, based upon my great respect for and unlimited confidence in him. As the Senator knows, although I have not in any way participated in the conferences in regard to this investigation, from the very beginning I have had complete confidence in the integrity and the dedicated public service purpose of the Senator from Missouri in conducting the investigation. So far as I am concerned, as is true of all such matters, the issue is nonpartisan when we are dealing with the public interest. It makes no difference to me, when alleged irregularities arise in an administration of this Government, whether it be under a Democratic or Republican administration. The senior Senator from Oregon has always insisted, and will continue to insist, that there be the most thorough investigation in the public interest.

I have been confident that the Senator from Missouri has been conduct-

ing such an investigation. I wished to make this statement before I asked the Senator for a reply with respect to two questions.

First, can the Senator give me assurance that he is not so cutting down the report that I, along with other Senators, will thereby be denied information to which all Senators are entitled?

Second, is it not true that all of the witnesses who may be involved in any charges or criticism in the report—which I have not seen—testified or had the opportunity to make whatever statements they wished to make in their own defense?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon for his considerate remarks with respect to efforts made in this regard. The Senator from Oregon is not only a great Senator, but also an articulate former dean of a law school. Therefore, when he emphasizes the importance of making a complete record he does it from a background equaled by few if any Members of this body.

The hearings were quite long. Because the records prior to these hearings had always been classified so the information was kept from the American people, and because there was so much money involved—specifically some \$9 billion—the work could not have been done without extensive accounting research. I am glad to report to the able Senator from Oregon, and to the Senate that we had the fullest cooperation from the Comptroller General of the United States, an Eisenhower appointee, and his staff. Because of the tremendous amount of detail involved, the hearings would not have been possible without such cooperation.

The record of the hearings goes to some 4,000 pages. Any report, along with suggested legislation can only be of value when it truly portrays the various conditions and facts with regard to the various contracts in question; therefore, the report was relatively long.

I have not had the type and character of experience which the able Senator from Oregon has had, so I left it up to the subcommittee's chief counsel, one of the most able and prominent lawyers in this country, saying to him, "See if you can reduce the size of the report without affecting the record of the presentation to the Senate." He said, "I will do my best to that end," and that is what is going on at the present time.

In reply to the second question of the Senator from Oregon, there was no witness before the subcommittee who did not have an opportunity to testify completely with respect to a contract in question. All the witnesses testified under oath. Because there were discrepancies in the sworn testimony of members of the General Accounting Office team, the General Services Administration representatives before the committee from the Office of Emergency Planning and representatives of certain companies, it was necessary that further work be done in an effort to get the facts.

I again thank my colleague from Oregon for his kind remarks about my approach to this problem, and I would re-

ciprocate with respect to any problem he presented to the Senate. I assure him that I have taken on this obligation as a Senator from Missouri, to give to the Senate the facts based on the record we have compiled.

Mr. MORSE. I want to say to the Senator from Missouri that his replies to my questions satisfy me, and if after reading the record I feel it is desirable for me to check the records of the committee, it is my understanding that any Member of the Senate has access to those records, subject to the same rules of restriction that are imposed upon members of the subcommittee.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from Oregon is correct. The hearings themselves are now printed and a matter of record. We are working on legislation, because we want to have a constructive report, and I am sure there is not a member of the subcommittee but who agrees there should be some improvements in the legislation. We hope to present both a report and legislation to the Senate at an early time.

APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC MEMBERS OF RAILROAD ARBITRATION BOARD

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, before I turn to the two subject matters I rise to speak about, I want to extend to the President of the United States my enthusiastic compliments and sincere congratulations for the appointment of very able public members of the arbitration board to arbitrate the two main issues in the pending railroad dispute that were referred to the board by congressional legislation.

The chairman of the board is Mr. Ralph T. Seward, a very able lawyer and an arbitrator of great distinction in the field of labor arbitration in the United States.

When I was a member of the War Labor Board, he was one of our top counsel. We assigned him many times to the arbitration of cases during the war, and in each case he performed outstanding service. After I left the Board to run for the Senate, he for a time, as I recall, was a member of the Board.

Another member of the board, Prof. James J. Healy, of Harvard University, was one of my associates on the special commission appointed by President Kennedy earlier this year to try to settle the dock strike, which had the east coast and the gulf coast tied up tighter than a drum. Professor Healy is undoubtedly one of the two or three top authorities in this country on the economic problems involved in labor relation contracts, particularly in respect to welfare funds, pensions, health benefit funds, and job security problems.

I had an opportunity to work day and night with Professor Healy during the time we sought to settle the dock strike. As I said earlier this year, about him and the other member of that the special panel, Ted Kheel, of New York, I could not have had assigned to me two more able colleagues. I am delighted to know President Kennedy has appointed Pro-

older than Sir Francis Bacon in the 16th century, who is credited with being its father and which was developed haltingly through the great pioneers in science such as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and in the last century by such immortals as Darwin and Pasteur. But it is really only in our own time that the fields of science have broadened both extensively and intensively, indeed exploded and brought forth such a plethora of new-found leads, insights, trails, and discoveries that today the greatest of all frontiers—research in science—beckons invitingly to the continued exploration and penetration of the mysteries of the cosmos. The forest laboratories are a part of this great surge to turn new light onto man's age-old natural inheritance.

There is also a local time factor that is pertinent. When Rampart Canyon Dam is authorized in the near future it will be necessary within the next decade or two to assess and start utilizing the considerable timber stands in the 11,000-square-mile area that will be flooded by the reservoir back of the dam. Here an almost immediate high priority assignment awaits the foresters particularly charged with the responsibility for Alaska's arctic and subarctic. There will be need of the practical application on a microscopic scale of much that will have been learned here in the laboratory. The funds expended on research will be returned manifold into our State's and Nation's economy. (I would speak of the happy coincidence of the laboratory's establishment on the campus of the University of Alaska with the prospect of their close association in fields of common enterprise and concern. Research and teaching are closely related and I am hopeful that the interplay of these endeavors will become even more meaningful and more fruitful.)

A university—especially here where it is the State university—can and should embody and exalt the spirit of the State. It can and should supply much of its larger community's inspiration, guidance, and leadership.

The University of Alaska is destined to become not only a great center of research for all matters pertaining to the Arctic and subarctic but the only American institution of higher learning qualified by its location in the subarctic and on the edge of the arctic to carry out successfully that tremendous assignment—an assignment which is important to the Nation and indeed to the whole world. For as the world's population increases it is inevitable that the hitherto sparsely inhabited regions of the earth will be invaded by man and settled. Research into the environment and ecology of this hitherto little studied region will facilitate that settlement and adaptation to this environment.

There is still another time factor that is pertinent. Alaska has just recently become a State—a scant 4½ years ago. It has inherited needs and problems from its 92-year colonial status. Here at the university with the heartening visible evidences of its dynamic growth is a concomitant of statehood. It has provided a great thrill for those of us who sensed the importance and need of this State university and saw it suffer under the financial difficulties against which Dr. Bunnell struggled so gallantly—Dr. Bunnell, the first president and its president for 25 years, without whose dedicated and determined persistence the university would perhaps not exist today. The changed attitude toward the University of Alaska shown by the Alaska State Legislature—the really important agency since it is the source of most of the university's funds—is a gratifying by-product of statehood.

I regret to recall that in territorial days

after the first great legislature in 1913, the absentee interests took over; their purpose and policy was to take out of Alaska as much as possible and to leave as little as they could. Indeed for the 92 years before statehood much was taken out and little put back by the political and economic forces that ruled Alaska from afar through their locally installed henchmen.

The Congress, where Alaska was for 53 years before statehood represented by only a voteless delegate in the House of Representatives was likewise wholly indifferent toward Alaska, when it was not downright discriminatory. It withheld from the University of Alaska funds that were its due as a land-grant college. It arbitrarily deprived the national forests of Alaska of some \$7 million to which they were entitled—not as an economy measure—but distributed these funds among other States having national forests, and votes, and while Alaska's national forests, the Tongass and the Chugach, were established here long before statehood owing to the pioneering vision of Gifford Pinchot, appropriations for their needs were kept at niggardly minimums. In fact I make so bold as to say that this facility we are dedicating today would not have come as long as Alaska remained a territory.

So you, who will participate in the work, the research, the functioning of this Forestry Sciences Laboratory are enlisted in a great adventure, an adventure to which time and place beckon. I congratulate you. You will be working in congenial company; in an environment of scholarship and high purpose. I wish you and the Laboratory which will be your workshop a creative, successful and happy future. You will be helping to build your national Forest Service, our university, our State and our Nation and contributing to the knowledge that mankind needs for its steady advance.

THE PRESIDENT'S SOUND VIETNAM POLICY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yesterday morning Assistant Secretary of State Hilsman briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with respect to the growing problems incident to current operations in South Vietnam.

Last Wednesday an editorial in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat commended the policies of this administration with respect to that country, and because I believe in most if not all of the conclusions of this editorial, entitled "Mr. Kennedy's Sound Vietnam Policy," I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MR. KENNEDY'S SOUND VIETNAM POLICY

The President has tackled the tough, abrasive problem in South Vietnam with good judgment and candor.

Unless there is an end to the autocratic influence some members of the Nhu family exert at Saigon, the guerrilla war against the China-backed Red Vietcong can never be won. Unless bayoneted violence against Buddhists stops, Vietnam will be lost.

That would mean the United States great stake in South Vietnam would disappear beneath quicksands of the little nation's wretched and stupid crisis.

More important, it would mean America and the West would have failed to halt the gunned encroachment of Asian Communists, driving to gobble all of southeast Asia.

In his statement Monday, Mr. Kennedy called for a change in policies, "perhaps per-

sonnel" of President Ngo Dinh Diem's regime, so the Government can regain popular support of the Vietnamese people.

Secondly, Mr. Kennedy declared it would be a "great mistake" to withdraw United States aid from the Vietnam struggle against Communist marauders from the north.

The President is right on both counts. Ngo Diem has apparently lost touch with his people since last May when Government troops and police broke up a demonstration in the city of Hue, where Buddhists wanted to fly their flag in a religious ceremony. Eight Buddhists were slain, 14 wounded.

Things have since gone from bad to worse, with charges of Buddhist persecution and discrimination, culminating in raids on Buddhist pagodas by the military.

Yet it would be folly now for America to haul out of Vietnam, with our forces of more than 14,000 and our billions in military assistance.

That would simply leave Vietnam a beckoning vacuum for the Vietcong and power-hungry Red China.

Though the President did not spell out Vietnam policy in precise language, it is known the administration believes President Diem may recoup an effective Saigon rule, if he can free himself of his powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Nhu's officious, more powerful wife, Madame Nhu.

These two characters, brilliant, despotic, and controlling the secret police, are probably at the bottom of Buddhist oppression.

President Diem, a Catholic, denies any religious discrimination. But the conduct of his brother and sister-in-law has caused a bitter division among the people. This must be halted, the ugly breach spanned by new, moderate, and equitable policies.

Mr. Kennedy obviously hopes Diem can shuck his brother and Madame Nhu from Government and form a competent, popular regime.

Diem is still highly respected in South Vietnam; his brother is feared. Buddhists form 70 percent of the population. Diem's Vice President, more than half the Cabinet ministers, the commander of the armed forces, and most of his senior generals are Buddhists.

During the 8 hectic years of his administration, President Diem established a government, a national assembly, and constitution which were really working until recently. He built roads, new schools, inaugurated land reforms, and created the Vietnam army, equipped by the United States. The economy was beginning to flourish. He had built the country from virtual chaos, absorbing 1 million immigrants from North Vietnam.

His ability and capacity, which seem ruthlessly undercut by a scheming brother and the ambitious Madame Nhu, could still be directed toward binding up the wounds of his mangled state. This apparently is what Mr. Kennedy seeks to promote. There is no other leader available.

But to function in the patriotic interests of his country and stave off the Communist aggression, Diem must be liberated from the activities of brother and sister-in-law, whose marplot designs, abetted by Communist subversion in Saigon, have all but destroyed Diem and his original programs.

For these reasons, we are convinced the CIA has not plotted—as charged yesterday in a Saigon newspaper—to overthrow the whole Diem rule.

President Kennedy and veteran Ambassador Lodge have a hard, Red row in Vietnam. The President's approach seems realistic and right. We deeply hope it succeeds.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there any further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

15588

AMENDMENT OF THE MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ACT OF 1962

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 1831) to amend the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1831) to amend the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order of yesterday, the Chair lays before the Senate the bill (S. 1831) to amend the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, with respect to which there is a limitation of debate of 30 minutes on any amendment, motion, or appeal, and 1 hour on the final passage of the bill.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum without the time necessary for the quorum call being charged to either side.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WALTERS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require, under the unanimous-consent agreement, from the time on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the first committee amendment, which will be stated for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 2, line 11, after the word "following", it is proposed to strike out

Provided, That no allowances shall be paid to any such youth who drops out of school, for a period of three months after the date of dropout.

And insert:

Provided, That no training allowance shall be paid to any individual who is under nineteen years of age and has not been graduated from high school unless the Secretary shall have satisfied himself that such individual has continuously failed to attend school classes for a period of not less than three months during the regular school session, and that all appropriate procedures (including guidance and counseling by appropriate local authorities) to induce such individual to resume school attendance have failed.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may we know what the Senate is doing?

Mr. CLARK. I have asked to incorporate the committee amendments, so

that the Senate can consider the bill as it came from the committee.

Mr. JAVITS. It is understood, Mr. President, that the amendments will be incorporated as original text?

I have amendments to offer, and other Senators have amendments.

Mr. CLARK. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the committee amendments are agreed to en bloc; and the bill, as so amended, will be considered as original text for the purpose of amendment.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need on the bill.

S. 1831 is a companion measure to S. 1716, which was passed by the Senate on Wednesday of this week. Both bills incorporate amendments to the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, recommended by the President to the Congress. Both bills are of some assistance in the upgrading of the labor skills of minority groups.

In his message of June 19 President Kennedy made certain recommendations "designed to improve the training, skills, and economic opportunities of the economically distressed and discontented, white and Negro alike."

He further recommended amendments to the Manpower Development and Training Act "not only to increase the authorization ceiling and to postpone the effective date of State matching requirements, but also—in keeping with the recommendations of the President's Committee on Youth Employment—to lower the age for training allowances from 19 to 16, to allocate funds for literacy training, and to permit the payment of a higher proportion of the program's training allowances to out-of-school youths, with provisions to assure that no one drops out of school to take advantage of this program."

S. 1831 incorporates each of these proposals.

First, it provides for training in reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as manual training in the use of tools, for those of the unemployed who are unable to take occupational training courses because they lack these skills.

Second, it provides for expansion of the youth training program by lowering the age limit for youth training allowances from 19 to 16.

Third, it increases the percentage of funds available for the youth training program from 5 percent of the estimated total training allowances to 15 percent.

The bill authorizes additional annual appropriations of \$100 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, and a like amount for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, in order to meet the cost of the expanded program.

The need for this bill arises from the fact that there are 3 million workers in our labor force today who can neither read nor write. Eight hundred thousand, or more than one-quarter of them, are unemployed. Perhaps as many as 25 percent of unemployed illiterates are Negroes.

In the first year of the Manpower Development and Training Act program

eight applicants were rejected for every trainee accepted in the program. Many of them were rejected because they could neither read nor write, or had no knowledge of elementary mathematics, principally arithmetic.

In other words, they did not even have knowledge of the three R's, and yet, in order to be a gas station attendant today, one has to be able to handle a charge account; he has to be able to write out a bill; he has to be able to add and subtract; he also has to be able to do a little simple multiplication. A taxi driver has to be able to read road signs and his meter. He has to be able to make change. But 300,000 of our unemployed are unable to perform these elementary acts; and these are the hard core of the unemployed.

In addition to teaching the three R's under this bill, there would be training in how to use basic tools common to many occupations.

An interesting bit of testimony was that of Secretary of Labor Wirtz, who told the committee of an instance in which 500 women were interviewed recently in one public employment office before 30 were found to fill a class in practical nursing. In order to line up 20 trainees for hotel and restaurant cooks, 287 persons had to be interviewed. Many of those rejected were rejected because they could not read the simple instructions needed to carry on the occupation; others because they could not do the simple exercises in writing necessary to fulfill their job; still others because, as I have said, they could not add, subtract, or divide.


Under normal circumstances, those who will receive literacy training under the bill would have been applicants for ordinary occupational training in a manpower development and training course, but were rejected, because they could not read, write, or figure.

It is important that the intent of the literacy training program should not be confused with the normal instruction we expect of our educational system. We are speaking, by and large, of teaching older heads of households who must have some source of income while they learn the basic educational skills essential to obtain employment. We are talking for the most part about the 45-year-old unemployed coal miner and those who share his lot. The statistics on illiteracy among our unemployed reflect this: In March 1962, about only 4 out of 10 of workers 45 to 64 years of age had completed high school, compared to 6 out of 10 of those 35 to 44, and almost 7 out of 10 of those 18 to 44.

While the bill, for the sake of flexibility, permits literacy courses to run for as long as 52 weeks, Commissioner Kepel advised the subcommittee that the normal instruction period will last from 4 to 6 months. Of the \$100 million which would be authorized additionally under the bill, it is expected that \$50 million will be allocated to the functional illiteracy program provided by the bill, and that 50,000 literacy-deficient unemployed can be trained at that cost.

I turn now briefly to the parts of the bill dealing with youth. The bill would

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Mr. Elder		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
Attached are two excerpts from the Congressional Record of Friday, 6 September, which the Director might like to see.		
		
Assistant Legislative Counsel		
FROM: Preparedness File		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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