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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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And on page 8, line 20, strike out "8" and insert "9."

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate disagree to the amendments of the House and ask for a conference with the House thereon, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JACKSON, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. KUCHEL, and Mr. ALLOTT conferees on the part of the Senate.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY: THE NEED FOR POLITICAL PRIMACY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I support the treaty before the Senate banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

I commend the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT] for his scholarly, comprehensive presentation of yesterday in support of the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. I consider the statement of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas to be most conclusive, definitive, and comprehensive on foreign policy as it relates to the nuclear age and our relationships with the Soviet Union that I have heard or read to date. I particularly commend the Senator from Arkansas on the latter portions of his magnificent address, in which he discussed some of the broad diplomatic and political factors involved in the discussion of the treaty and its ratification or rejection. We need a more mature and thorough understanding of all facets of our foreign policy and the interdependence and interrelationship of the many factors that go to make up foreign policy. The Senator from Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has made a powerful and distinct contribution to a better understanding.

I support the treaty because, to my mind, it inhibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It reduces the chance of war. It minimizes the spread of radioactive fallout. It weakens the unity of the Communist bloc. It enhances the prospects for an era of peaceful coexistence.

The treaty strengthens our posture as a proponent of peace without weakening our security.

It is my view that the treaty is in our national interest, serves the objectives of our foreign policy, and contributes to the security and peace of the world in which we live. It advances us one step along a new course which, as Secretary Rusk has well said, might make it possible that "frail and fearful mankind may find another step, and another, un-

til confidence replaces terror, and hope takes over from despair."

Throughout the preliminary discussions on the Senate floor and in the extensive hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I have on several occasions identified myself as a strong advocate of the treaty. I have said that the world does not lack for doubters, but that there appears to be a definite shortage of advocates. While one unquestionably runs certain political risks in publicly assuming this posture, nevertheless I proudly stand here today and once again proclaim: "This treaty is clearly in the interest of the United States. Let us cast an overwhelming vote in support of its ratification."

Why this position of advocacy on a matter which all reasonable men agree carries a certain degree of military and political risk for the United States? Is not this either personal irresponsibility or political foolishness, or perhaps a combination of the two? Does this not reflect, as much of my mail has suggested, mere emotionalism, a blind grasping for a panacea to eliminate the tension and insecurity of the cold war? Do not these factors really lie behind my role as an outspoken advocate?

The senior Senator from Minnesota believes he has a responsibility to his conscience, to his constituents, and to his colleagues, to attempt to answer these questions.

First, the burden of the testimony in the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the other two committees concerned the question of the impact of the treaty on the military security of the United States.

This is a vital matter, and is one to which we must give the utmost consideration. Every witness—those who supported and those who opposed the treaty—admitted that certain military risks were assumed in our halting atmospheric nuclear testing. Not one witness—even those most enthusiastically in support of ratification—could positively guarantee the absence of all military risks. In light of this, how does one justify, then, a position of advocacy in behalf of this treaty?

I stand here as a Senator who would never knowingly accept a military risk which would gravely impair the security of the United States. Every Senator has sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. Surely no Senator would knowingly violate his solemn oath.

Therefore, in our debate on the solemn question of approving this vital treaty, we do not question each other's motives. We may have disagreements about matters of judgment or fact; but insofar as the motives and motivation of Senators are concerned, there can be no argument.

However, while none of the witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee could positively guarantee an absence of all military risk, they could state the following—and I summarize, now, certain portions of the testimony:

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said:

The risks under the treaty are either small or under control, and the values of the treaty are substantial even if we consider only the military area. The scales are clearly tipped in favor of the treaty, Mr. Chairman. It has my unequivocal support.

The Secretary of Defense is one of the President's principal officials. He has the awesome burden and responsibility of advising and counseling the President of the United States on the adequacy of our military strength. I am convinced that no Secretary of Defense in any administration would ever knowingly advise the President to sign a treaty which would in any way limit or reduce the national security of the United States. I have great faith in Secretary McNamara. I believe his testimony was both persuasive and well documented by fact and by experience.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached the determination that while there are military disadvantages to the treaty, they are not so serious as to render it unacceptable * * * It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if adequate safeguards are established, the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences.

Throughout this debate, much will be said about the position and role of our military officials. It should be manifestly clear, however, that—with one or two exceptions—those responsible for the military strategy of this Nation and for the preparation and training of our military forces and their deployment have spoken in support of the treaty. Indeed, they have told us of their doubts and their apprehensions. But as mature, responsible men who have the duty to make decisions, they have decided in favor of the treaty.

It is fair to say that they could simply have stated that they were in favor of the treaty, without expressing doubts or concern. But these men, who wear the uniform of the armed services of the United States, are honorable. They spoke frankly to the members of Senate committees, as they did to the President. They expressed doubts; but then, when they came to the moment for decision, they spoke in support of the treaty.

Every general will admit that he has doubts about a particular strategy or tactic to be followed on the field of battle; but he must make a decision. Indeed, General Eisenhower had doubts about the Normandy invasion. Other great generals who have served this country have had doubts about the effectiveness of their plans; but they made decisions. They acted.

Today I state that although one can quote the doubts and the apprehensions, the important part of the testimony to be analyzed, studied, and evaluated is the portion in which the decision was rendered. The duty of responsible officials is to decide, not merely to discuss or to doubt.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I assume that the Senator from Minnesota is about to proceed to another point.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to express my appreciation of the Senator's kind words of approval of my comments.

In regard to the military matter, which has caused considerable concern, I should like to emphasize again—as the Senator from Minnesota has done—that those in the highest positions of authority and with the ultimate power of decision in military matters—and, of course, they include the Commander in Chief, and also the Joint Chiefs of Staff—seven of the nine unified field commanders who were asked for their opinion, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and not by the committee, reported that they approve the treaty. One of the nine said he did not feel he was sufficiently informed to be able to take a position. Only two opposed it—General Power, of the Strategic Air Command, and General Schriever, another active commander, who is important in the field of missile development. In response to a request by the committee, the great General Eisenhower directly expressed his approval of the treaty.

According to my calculation, 14 of the most prominent members of the military, including General Eisenhower, endorse the treaty, two who still have such responsibilities oppose it.

Mr. President, I submit that on all controversial questions of any significance in any body in a democracy there will be at least that much dissent. It is not human nature for everyone to agree on an important matter of this kind.

Does not the Senator from Minnesota agree with that statement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I surely do. I would expect that men with different experiences and different roles to play in the Military Establishment of our country might well have differences in their points of view. Those differences have been expressed. I think the most important point for us to note is that in testimony in both public sessions and executive sessions, the military officers testified that they had not been under any pressure to support the treaty. There had been no arm twisting. They had made their decisions on the basis of their own observations, experiences, and reflection. It seems to me that this point in itself well merits some attention.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator from Minnesota yield further?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. With regard to the question of pressure, it is inconceivable to me that men who have reached the stature of the Joint Chiefs—all of them among the most eminent in this country, if not in the world—would yield to any such attempt. It would be highly insulting to them to suggest that their solemn declaration—under oath—to the committee and to the Nation that they support this treaty was the result of some sort of pressure. I believe such a statement would be a reflection upon

them. I do not for a moment believe that General Shoup or General LeMay, or General Wheeler, or Admiral McDonald were so afraid of losing their positions that under those circumstances they would distort their opinions on the effect of the treaty on this country. If they did, it would be a great disservice. I do not for a moment believe that any such thing happened.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I fully concur in the remarks of the Senator from Arkansas. I remind Senators that the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when he had an honest disagreement over military policy, resigned from the armed services and stated his views as a matter of personal integrity and professional honesty.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. First, yesterday I was detained in Rhode Island and did not have an opportunity to hear the very excellent presentation made by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. He had already concluded when I arrived in the Chamber. But I took it upon myself to take his speech home, and I read it before I came to the Capitol this morning. I compliment the Senator for a very brilliant presentation.

On the point that has been raised, with the kind permission and indulgence of the Senator from Minnesota, I wish to make one observation.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to have the Senator do so.

Mr. PASTORE. The question as to whether pressure had been exerted on the Military Establishment of our country by the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who asked the question categorically of the Joint Chiefs. He asked them whether or not anyone at any time had tried to exert any influence upon their judgment. As I recall, General LeMay said, in substance, "I would resent it if any such attempts were made." That such was the case was categorically denied. I hope that for once and for all that doubt has been banished from the mind of everyone.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Rhode Island has made it explicitly clear as to what transpired both in the executive and in the public hearings relating to this particular point in the many discussions that have taken place on the treaty.

The argument has been raised that the treaty was drafted without full consultation or cooperation of the military officials. On that point, General Taylor testified that he was in constant consultation; that he had advised and consulted with the President regularly; that he was in consultation on the treaty prior to Mr. Harriman's going to Moscow and during Mr. Harriman's mission in Moscow; that he was a part of the group of officials who worked out the instructions for Mr. Harriman's mission to Moscow; and that he also contributed to the rewording and redrafting of the treaty provisions while Mr. Harriman was in Moscow.

I believe that in executive session there was even more detailed documentation as to the close cooperation and collaboration between the Secretary of State, the President of the United States, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. So that argument should be set to rest at once. There was all possible cooperation and coordination in the drafting of the treaty and in its final approval prior to the signing of the treaty by the Secretary of State.

Mr. President, I should like to quote a statement of Dr. Harold Brown, who is Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense:

Having satisfied myself as completely as is humanly possible that the proposed treaty cannot substantially impair our strategic superiority if we take the steps which we can to continue our nuclear developments and remain prepared, and that indeed it could enhance our strategic superiority compared with unlimited testing, I find the arguments for it on broader grounds persuasive, and I fully support its ratification.

Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said:

I think there are some risks but they are minor and that in the balance the advantage is in the favor of improving the security of our country if we enter into this treaty.

Dr. N. E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, said:

I personally am of the opinion and belief that the proposed treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space, and underwater may be ratified by the Senate with only mild risks to our national defense posture but with the possibility of taking the first real, even if small, step in the direction of the prevention of a nuclear war.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. The RECORD should show clearly at this point that Dr. Bradbury is at the head of Los Alamos, which produces most of our nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and that he has been connected with nuclear and thermonuclear weapon development from the very beginning.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator who speaks to us is in a position to know more about that subject than almost any other Member of the Congress or any citizen of our country. He serves as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

I found Dr. Bradbury's testimony to be very compelling and persuasive.

Dr. Herbert F. York, former Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense under both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy said:

It is my view that the problem posed to both sides by this dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security has no technical solution. * * * I am optimistic that there is a solution to this dilemma; I am pessimistic only insofar as I believe there is absolutely no solution to be found within the areas of science and technology. The partial nuclear test ban is, I hope and believe, a first small step toward finding a solution in an area where a solution may exist.

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Dr. York gave us some very simple testimony as to the impact of science and technology on national security. Every Member of this body should read that testimony. Dr. York came to us as a very competent witness, both in the field of weapons and in the field of basic science.

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, former Special Assistant for Science and Technology to President Eisenhower said:

Confronted with the opportunity to choose between, on the one hand, some rather small specific technical risks in ratifying the treaty, and on the other, some perhaps comparable or greater technical risks in continued unrestricted testing plus the general risks of a continued arms race which, at least, might be somewhat slowed by ratification, I hope the Senate would opt for what I regard as by far the smaller total risk and will ratify the treaty.

Finally, Mr. John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose testimony could not be printed in the hearings also advocated ratification of the treaty, without qualification.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I think the RECORD should indicate an additional fact in this connection. If Senators do not already know it, Mr. John McCone was appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission during the administration of President Eisenhower. To indicate what a cautious, deliberate, judicious man he is, Mr. John McCone, for 6 months after he was appointed, never uttered one word of testimony before our committee. He cautioned our committee that he would not open his mouth on any subject until he had had an opportunity to learn, through intense homework, what were his responsibilities. He turned out to be one of the most efficient and best Chairmen ever of that Commission. He served under the Republican President. Later, when President Eisenhower retired from public life, Mr. McCone retired from the Atomic Energy Commission. Since that time he has been appointed by the President of the United States to be the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is in a better position than any other individual in this country to know central intelligence which affects the treaty.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator has properly and helpfully pointed out that Mr. McCone, who has had long experience as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and is now the experienced director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is in a position to relate intelligence information to nuclear information better than most men could. He is knowledgeable in the field of atomic energy as well as the field of nuclear weaponry and, as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, obtains considerable information as to what other countries—and particularly the Soviet Union—are doing in this very important area of weapons.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. MILLER. I noted that the Senator quoted Dr. York as saying that under this treaty the arms race might be slowed down. As I recall, no witness testified that the race would be slowed down. I believe there was some testimony to the effect that the treaty might well cause the race to be stepped up; because, while nuclear testing in the atmosphere would stop, the more expensive underground testing would continue, and probably be stepped up in degree.

As I understand the situation, one of the reservations or conditions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that we would actually have a stepped up underground nuclear testing program. I believe the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department have indicated that they would abide by that condition.

I make this point because, as the Senator knows, I have not indicated how I shall vote. I have not made up my mind as to how I shall vote in regard to the treaty. If I vote for ratification it will definitely not be because I am persuaded that the arms race will be slowed down by the treaty. I would vote for it probably with the feeling that the arms race might be stepped up as a result of the treaty. I think it is well to point that out.

If there is some response which the Senator might care to give, to alleviate my concern in this regard, I should like to hear it. I have not yet seen anything which indicates to me that there will not be an acceleration in the arms race as a result of the conditions laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a result of the agreement by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out those conditions.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The statement of Dr. York is a statement by a man who is prudent and cautious, and who fully understands the implications of nuclear power and nuclear weaponry. He worked for two administrations as a trusted adviser of President Eisenhower and of President Kennedy. This man will not tell the American people that "positively this will happen—absolutely it will reduce the arms race." He is saying to us—as a prudent, wise, and experienced man—that the treaty has within it the possibilities of reducing the arms race. I think that is the way we ought to deal with the treaty. I do not believe that dogmatic assertions will enlighten the American people or do honor and justice to a thorough and thoughtful consideration of the treaty by the Senate.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] is both correct and incorrect. There is a distinction to be made between an arms race, such as we are discussing, and an increase in expenditures for armaments because it is more expensive to test underground. Everyone knows that if we should test any weapon of more than 5 kilotons, it is much easier to do so in the atmosphere

than underground. First, for underground testing, it is necessary to build tunnels. It is harder to provide the trajectories desired. It is harder to reach the information which is desired. It is harder to install the sensitive instruments which are necessary to obtain readings underground. If the test is conducted in the atmosphere, the results are much simpler of attainment, and it is much easier to accomplish what is desired.

The point we are making—and I think the Senator from Minnesota is absolutely correct in this regard—is that if this "madness" is allowed to go unchecked, if we allow nation after nation to aspire to become a member of the nuclear club—and today it is not as expensive as it used to be to make a bomb—we face the risk of a terrible nuclear war.

If Senators will talk to Dr. Brown, I feel sure that Dr. Brown will tell them that today almost any industrialized nation can make an atomic bomb, if it wishes to do so.

The purpose of the treaty is to allow all nations of the world to become partners to it. The minute those nations become partners to the treaty, and they agree not to test in the three environments, we hope to accomplish a slowdown in the proliferation of atomic weapons. That is what we are discussing when we talk about slowing down the nuclear arms race.

For the next 2 or 3 or 5 years it may be necessary for us to appropriate more money for the Atomic Energy Commission, because it will be more expensive to maintain laboratories.

It will be more expensive to maintain Johnston Island in complete readiness, in case it is necessary to use it. It will cost more money to do the testing we wish to do underground. The budget may be larger, but I think it can be safely said on the floor of the Senate that the philosophy behind the treaty is to reduce the nuclear arms race in the hope that other countries will become signatories to the treaty and will not get into the nuclear club.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. I should like to respond to the Senator's statement.

I believe that the most violent opponent of the treaty recognizes—and of course I recognize it full well—that the purpose of the treaty is exactly as the Senator from Rhode Island has stated it. There is more to the treaty than the treaty itself. We now must consider the conditions which were prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These cast a different light on the treaty, in my judgment, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said, among other things:

We are not going to believe that this treaty is compatible with our national security interests unless the United States engages in a large-scale underground testing program.

That will be a program larger, in my judgment, than the program we would otherwise have. If anything, this will lead to a stepup in the arms race so far as we are concerned.

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There is nothing in the treaty to prevent the Soviet Union—or the United States, for that matter—from assisting other nations in underground testing.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Oh, yes.

Mr. PASTORE. Not in underground testing.

Mr. HUMPHREY. No; not underground testing.

Mr. MILLER. Granted, it may be more expensive. Granted, it may retard nuclear development in other countries, because of the greater expense of going underground to test, nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent that.

If I correctly understand the test provisions, the Soviet Union can well be expected to engage in a much greater, stepped up program of underground testing, in order to catch up with the United States in the tactical nuclear game.

That is the point I am making. The purpose of the treaty is clear. The treaty, standing by itself, as two sheets of paper, is clearly in line with that policy. However, when we consider the conditions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I suggest that they pretty well undercut the objective of slowing down the arms race.

The Senator from Rhode Island mentioned proliferation. I was not talking about proliferation, although I shall have something to say on that subject later. I think the treaty will have a tendency to retard it. The treaty certainly will not prevent it, because the Red Chinese and the French have indicated they will have nothing to do with the treaty. Therefore, the treaty will not prevent proliferation, but may retard it.

I want the Senator from Minnesota to know that I am not suggesting that Dr. York, or any other witness, should have stated, "On my word of honor there is not going to be a stepup in the arms race," or "On my word of honor there will be a slowing down of the arms race."

But he very carefully couched it in terms, "It might slow it down." It is a "might," a "maybe."

I should like to clear up this question. Was Dr. York testifying about the treaty as a treaty, or was he testifying about treaty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditions? I do not believe he was. I wonder what Dr. York's testimony would be if he were asked, "What about the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditions which are going to be laid down?" Would he make the statement that we are now about to slow down the arms race?

Mr. PASTORE. No Senator can argue that this treaty does not limit anything. It does. It limits testing in three environments—underwater, in the atmosphere, and in outer space. It is true that we are not going to stop all tests. This treaty is not to cut down all our nuclear activity. All we are saying is that all the things we must do we propose to do by underground tests.

The treaty is intended to limit the tests. If we do not have the treaty, the entire area is limitless. The Russians could test in outer space and could give assistance to any nation in the world, if they wanted to do so. They could test in the atmosphere, and could give assistance to any country in the world in that

respect, and so could we. Under the treaty they could test only underground. It cannot be said that because the testing can take place in four environments without the treaty, and in only one environment with the treaty, the treaty accelerates anything. It does not.

Mr. MILLER. Yes, it does—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator from Iowa wish me to yield?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. Yes, one can say it, because, in the first place, we do not know whether there is to be any more atmospheric testing without the treaty. The mere fact that the treaty is ratified does not mean there will be less—

Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator repeat what he said?

Mr. MILLER. The mere fact that the treaty is not ratified does not force one into the position that we are going to have more testing in the atmosphere. One cannot be forced into that position. I can argue just as effectively that we are forced into negotiating a comprehensive treaty—

Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator admit that if we do not have this treaty and the Russians test in the atmosphere, we are going to test in the atmosphere, and after that they will test in the atmosphere, and then we will test in the atmosphere? That is the race.

The arms race is accelerated without the treaty more than with the treaty, because the treaty is restrictive. That is why so many people are against it. They think that by restricting testing it endangers the military posture of the Nation. I do not agree with that position, but that is the argument. I do not think the position can be taken that if there are four ways to test without the treaty, and only one way to test with the treaty, we would be better off without the treaty than with it. I cannot follow that non sequitur. Talk about non sequiturs—it does not even touch rationality.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would like to get into this argument—

Mr. PASTORE. This is not argument; this is debate.

Mr. MILLER. But I would like to respond.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall yield to the Senator in a moment. I believe the Senator from Rhode Island has simplified the argument, and has put his finger on what is most pertinent in the treaty, namely, that it is not a comprehensive treaty; it is a limited test ban treaty. It has limited purposes. Those purposes are to limit testing in the environments of outer space, underwater, and atmosphere. Testing is to be permitted underground. Other countries could be assisted in underground testing without this treaty—

Mr. PASTORE. Only if the debris did not go outside the territory of that country.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Without the treaty those countries could have unlimited testing. Without the treaty countries could receive information for testing in all other environments. But if the treaty is ratified and generally accepted by the nations of the world, those na-

tions cannot be helped in receiving nuclear technological information or any other help for testing above ground, underwater, or outer space. The Senator from Rhode Island has made the case that if there can be limitation of testing in three environments, and it is to be permitted in only one environment, we are better off than if four environments are wide open for unlimited testing.

The Senator from Iowa wants to be heard. I yield to him.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I realize that theoretically what the Senator from Rhode Island is saying is true, or at least is possibly true, but he forgets that we may not have any atmospheric testing, regardless of the treaty. I assume that what the President of the United States said in the commencement address at American University still stands, regardless of whether or not there is a treaty. He said this Nation would not be the first to test in the atmosphere. So I assume that intention still stands, regardless of what happens with the treaty.

The point is that if underground testing is stepped up, we may more than offset the amount of atmospheric tests which we forego. To say that we are limiting the tests to one environment, instead of four, does not mean that the number of tests is reduced. It depends on what developmental work is going on in a particular environment. There might be four times as much testing in the underground environment, and that might more than offset the testing that would have been done in the other three environments.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Senators who were most insistent upon having assurances and specific details spelled out as to the amount of testing and the conditions of laboratories and the maintenance of scientific techniques for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear science are now worried for fear that the treaty will not inhibit testing. So the Senator who has a doubt about the treaty and what it would do finds himself getting into the argument of those who also had doubts about the effects of the treaty, namely, that we must have assurances that we must not lower our guard, that we must not seriously impede scientific progress in the field of nuclear weapons. I do not think one can have it both ways.

Mr. PASTORE. If the Senator will yield, who in a responsible position in this Government ever said that we would not maintain our safeguards? Who said we were not going to maintain or expand our laboratories? We have the best laboratories in the world at Los Alamos and Livermore. They are second to none, including those of Red China and Russia. Who said we were not going to maintain our facilities at Johnston Island? If that question was asked once, it was asked a dozen times. Who said we were not going to maintain underground tests if necessary? No one said that.

Those arguing this point dramatize it by saying, "I will do this if you say thus and so." This makes the position more riveted, but, after all, the President of the United States has given that assur-