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and resolved in our considerations of the proposed limited nuclear test ban treaty.

As it stands, of course, the treaty contains no provision for inspection. We are told that it does not need such a provision, that we can check on the performance of the signatory nations by the use of our detection devices. That is not true. There is one entire area of the treaty proposal which cannot be checked by black boxes, or satellites, or ionization counters or any technical means.

That area is section 2 of article I. Let me read it:

Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

The wording seems clear to me. A nation that signs this treaty will not cause a nuclear explosion, or test, anywhere in any of the banned environments. A nation that signs this treaty would pledge not to encourage any such test. A nation that signs this treaty would not participate in any such test.

Let us now get down to cases. That clause says that we will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to any tests that, for instance, the French might carry out. That clause says that the Soviets will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to any tests that Red China might carry out, to cite just one of the nations that could be involved on their side.

How in the world can any such clause be meaningful if there is no way to inspect it for possible violations?

—And how in the world can it be inspected for possible violation through existing technical means? The answer seems clear. It punches a major hole in the validity of the treaty.

Cannot the Soviets immediately claim that we are violating that clause by sharing nuclear information with France? Cannot we immediately ask what protection there is in the treaty against Soviet participation in tests inside the vastness of China? Talk of splits between the Chinese and the Soviets are no more meaningful in this respect than talk of splits between ourselves and the French. We still know whose friend is whose, and what the possibilities for violation actually are.

Secretary Rusk has commented on this by saying that we will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to French nuclear testing. He can be believed, I am sure. Whether the Russians will share that belief, I cannot say. But Secretary Rusk, in commenting on the other possibility—of the Soviet working the Red Chinese—simply says that he does not believe they will. That is scarcely the sort of assurance on which a treaty can be based.

Inspection of the shipment of fissionable material would be just one of the sorts of inspection that this particular clause of the treaty seems to raise. Transfer of technicians and even of information seems another area. In short,

it cries and begs for rigorous inspection and yet provides for absolutely none.

In that way it is symbolic of the entire treaty. It seems only half thought through in its implications. I urge that the Senate try to supply some of the thinking so obviously lacking, lest the mistakes of a few negotiators become the peril of an entire nation, of an entire way of life.

I have spoken of one part of the treaty which demands actual, physical inspection and which will make the treaty meaningless without it. I do not want to gloss over, by that single point, the general impact that this treaty has upon the principle of inspection to which we have hewed until this very proposal.

We have, through countless negotiations with the Soviet, placed the heaviest emphasis upon the need for international inspection of arms agreements. That principle now is dropped in the proposed test ban treaty.

How, having finally renounced our demands for inspection, could we expect to press those demands in future arms control agreements with which we may be faced?

Our position in the United Nations also has reflected part of this problem. We have long been firmly opposed to declaratory treaties, those treaties which simply declare a goal but provide no realistic machinery for inspection, maintenance, or effectiveness. The proposed partial nuclear test ban treaty is surely just such a declaratory treaty. Does it establish a broader precedent than even the arms control precedent? Will it, indeed, establish an entire new avenue of American diplomacy and relationship to international agreements of all sorts? Surely we must not beg this question in studying the proposed treaty.

The people of the United States have, and their representatives have, surely arrived at consensus on the need to inspect, and carefully provide for inspection of any treaty signed with the Soviet Union. Our experience in Cuba alone shows how easily we may be burned. Even with supposedly good air inspection, how long did it take before this Nation was permitted to awaken to the presence of Soviet missiles there? It took almost too long. We risked our lives then. How much more would we be risking our lives now in signing a treaty dealing with the mightiest weapons of all but with no inspection beyond sniffing the air, feeling the ground, or scanning the skies?

No, the question of inspection is not one that is apart from this treaty. Inspection is deeply involved. It must be involved. I call on my colleagues to give this matter their most serious and urgent consideration.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am sure the Senator knows that the test ban treaty which is now the subject of hearings provides a very effective means by which this country can protect its security interests, that is, by prompt withdrawal in case there is any violation. We can do this on

our own volition, by serving notice on a 90-day basis; or, if we presume that there has been a violation, we can withdraw immediately.

I am sure the Senator knows that it is the intention of this Government, from all the reports that have been given to us in the hearings, to maintain at peak performance our laboratories and scientific teams in the field of nuclear science and in the field of nuclear weaponry. We intend to maintain testing equipment for atmospheric, underwear and outer space tests at a ready alert, and to engage in an extensive series of underground tests, which are costly and time consuming—an area of testing the Soviet Union has not perfected but one in which we have expert knowledge.

Finally, I point out to the Senator from Arizona that when raising these doubts—which surely is a legitimate activity on the part of any interested citizens or Senator—it is also important to cite what we do to overcome the doubts. For example, we have the most extensive system of inspection and detection of nuclear explosions of any nation on the face of the earth. We have acoustical, electronic, and seismic detection and identification systems. Those systems are tied in with those of other countries.

The particular treaty under discussion would not cover underground tests for the purpose of inspection. Our international inspection system was primarily directed toward the underground tests. In this environment we needed on-site inspections within the Soviet Union to be able to ascertain whether there had been a violation by underground testing. The problem here is one of differentiating between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. This requires an extensive system of seismic stations surrounding the Soviet Union and within the Soviet Union, and a freedom to move within the Soviet Union for on-site inspection.

The limited nuclear test ban treaty relies upon the national systems of surveillance; seismic, electronic and acoustical systems, plus the regular intelligence services of our Government and of friendly countries.

Furthermore, the treaty will be signed by many scores of nations, all of whom have a stake in seeing the treaty enforced and observed.

I rise to protest the strawmen that are set up day after day for someone to come in later and knock down and say, "I have proved my point."

The basic structure of this treaty was submitted by the previous administration; it has been recommended by Members of Congress, by resolutions. The treaty before us is the most simple and direct treaty we could sign in our national interest. The testimony reveals that it is in our national interest. I do not feel that we ought to be frightening the American people as to what is in this treaty or what it means to our security.

The treaty provides every safeguard that could possibly be provided. The treaty provides more safeguards than there were in the so-called uninspected

moratorium, which was approved by the previous administration, and which included underground tests.

The treaty requires careful consideration. The hearings have been productive. Nothing has been said in the hearings to date which was not known before or which would in any way frighten the American people into a position of doubt as to the reliability of the instrument we have signed.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have been listening very carefully. I have been trying to ascertain the point the Senator is trying to make.

I agree with what the Senator has said, but I think the point he is trying to get across is that Senators have no right to stand up and ask questions about the treaty.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Not at all.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator will read my remarks carefully, he will find there is an area of doubt, but not in the same area. The Senator from Minnesota has raised some very intelligent questions. I know about seismic detection. I know we cannot distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. I am not arguing that point at all. I am arguing whether there is some doubt as to whether we would have to give up our help with the French, or what the Soviet attitude is toward Red China, or any other country. Once Cuba is recognized as a signatory of this treaty, there is nothing to prevent any other country from giving her atomic information.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Oh, yes; there is.

Mr. GOLDWATER. This is what occurs to me at the time. This is the point I am trying to make. The Senator from Minnesota is making a long recital of things he knows I know, and he knows I agree with him. I am merely trying to raise questions which are in my mind, and I intend to continue raising them.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is entitled to do so.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am glad to hear that.

Mr. HUMPHREY. He would be remiss in his duty if he did not.

All I am saying is that the Senator has indicated certain things. He has indicated that the treaty would not be subject to inspection—which is not true. It is subject to inspection—it is subject to our national inspection system.

The Senator has questioned whether or not the treaty would be abided by. I think the point he is trying to make to the American people is a disservice, namely that the treaty is an open invitation to avoidance or evasion. The Senator says the treaty is not subject to inspection. I say it is subject to our inspection. The Senator's questions tend to obscure rather than illuminate the Senate's consideration of this treaty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not subject to the type of inspection that we have been insisting on year after year.

Mr. HUMPHREY. For underground tests?

Mr. GOLDWATER. For all tests. We held, in ventures in the past in trying to reach agreements, that we needed onsite inspections.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is talking about onsite inspections for the comprehensive, overall nuclear test ban proposals, which included underground tests. I am not going to let the Senator from Arizona befog or becloud the record or to obscure the central issue. The tests being banned under the treaty are the very areas which the previous administration recommended for the kind of treaty we now have, and the previous comprehensive test ban proposals were not approved. It was in the area of onsite inspection and international control where we had differences. The Senator from Minnesota represents that this treaty is subject to inspection—our inspection—and we can withdraw at any time that we find it is in our national interest to do so.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator will take the trouble in the morning to read the remarks I have made, he will see that I am outlining an area in which I feel that a different type of inspection is needed. I may be mistaken, but the Senator is not talking to the point, so we are not solving it. The point I make is that after reading the draft of the treaty I have a question in my mind as to whether or not we need a better inspection system in that area. I admit that the situation may never develop, but the fact that it could develop worries me. I know we can withdraw. That is the most palatable part of the treaty. I would not want to join in one that was irrevocable.

I further suggest that, in the whole area of underground testing, we can test as much as they and they can test as much as we can. In this we are not stopping a proliferation of weapons. I think we are adding to the proliferation of weapons. But this is neither for nor against the treaty. I have merely raised a question, as have other Members of the Senate. I asked Dean Rusk for a complete briefing—I have not received it yet, but I know I will—as to why, by East Germany's signing the treaty, we would not be in effect recognizing her. I take his word for it. I believe him. But I want to have some legal proof before I say "Yes." I am merely raising questions. I merely wanted to clarify the issue and debate it. I hope the Senator from Minnesota does not suggest that a Senator ought not to have the right or duty to stand up and raise a question. When I have other questions I intend to raise them.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The practice of continually raising questions is a good way to indicate a deep interest in the subject; and the Senator from Arizona has a deep interest in it. But these questions have already been raised. The point with respect to recognition of East Germany has been answered. A pamphlet has been published by the Foreign Relations Committee on the legal question involved. Furthermore, the State Department has a memorandum on this particular legal issue. I point out that the West German Republic has many

agreements with East Germany, but it does not recognize the East German regime. East Germany has signed certain protocols and agreements relating to prisoners of war to which we are signatories. That does not mean that the East German regime has been recognized.

First the Senator from Arizona announced that he was opposed to the treaty—

Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator is mistaken.

Mr. HUMPHREY. At one time.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I said I was opposed to the draft that Dean Rusk showed us 2 or 3 days before.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It was the same treaty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. No; it was not.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I respectfully differ.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I respectfully differ. I heard it. I was present.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to learn that the Senator is not opposed to the treaty. This is encouraging to me, because I felt that eventually he would not be opposed to it. He is sensible, wise, and intelligent.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Flattery will get the Senator everything.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to know that the Senator will be on the side of those supporting the treaty. West Germany did not have any difficulty with it, because it signed the treaty. West Germany is not as worried about its relationships with East Germany as we are. The Associated Press indicated a few moments ago that the Republic of West Germany signed the treaty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator is interested in my becoming enlightened in this field, if he will allow me to ask questions, I may be contented, and he may find me going arm in arm with him—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Wonderful.

Mr. GOLDWATER. But not having all the intelligence that the Senator from Minnesota has—

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is going too far.

Mr. GOLDWATER. He is going to hinder me and place hurdles in my road. I merely want to be as well informed on this subject as those who have already made up their minds. I hope the Senator will not undertake to restrain me from asking questions in the future that I regard as important questions to me. I hope the Senator will not deny me that right.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I will join the Senator in that exercise of interrogation. I read with considerable interest the Senator's speech during the past weekend. I listened to his remarks today. Both speeches indicate to me that a number of questions are being asked.

The public record, as well as the executive record, has answered these questions. But the constant repetition of them does not reassure the people of

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the United States. What is needed is reassurance from those who have listened to the testimony. All the questions that have been asked are being answered responsively and effectively. The testimony of Secretary Rusk, the testimony of General Taylor, and the testimony of Mr. McCone, as well as the testimony of other witnesses who have appeared before the committee, has been candid, to the point, and responsive to the questions which have been asked by thoughtful Senators, including the distinguished Senator from Arizona. But let us now acknowledge that these questions have been answered.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not believe I have missed one session of the committee hearings on this treaty. I have heard Dean Rusk, and I have heard General Taylor. The fact that there is still some question in my mind indicates that there are areas in the treaty to be questioned. I do not believe a treaty should be brought before the Senate and voted on merely because it seems to be the politically proper or appropriate thing to do or because the President wants it or does not want it. I believe these issues should be considered carefully. I am not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. My knowledge in this field is entirely military and technical. I must proceed with some caution in a field in which the Senator from Minnesota is so brilliant; namely, foreign policy and international problems. I hope the Senator will therefore help me in my ignorance. I shall be grateful if he will extend my knowledge in this field.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator's expression of humility does him well. His knowledge in this field is far beyond his present testimony, and I am more than happy to be his witness.

The Record will indicate that the Senator from Arizona attempted to tell the American people that we were trying to establish a new pattern and a new policy by signing an agreement without a provision for inspection; and that apparently we were growing a little weak in terms of our relationships with the Soviet Union because the treaty on these subjects is wide open to violation. All that the Senator from Minnesota says is that such statements plant doubts which should be resolved by testimony, and which have been resolved by testimony.

The inspection that is provided is adequate for the type of treaty we are discussing. On-site, international control inspection was required in connection with a comprehensive treaty that included underground tests. I am sure that my remarks at this point will prove to be very pertinent to this Record. I may have more to say later.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I should like to keep the Record straight. I believe that I commented upon the fact that historically we have not been in the habit of making a declaratory type of treaty. That is what I mentioned as being a step in a direction that we have not taken before. I believe that if the Senator

from Minnesota will read my speech he will find that to be the case. I am not raising the issue of inspection, because I do not believe that there can be an effective inspection system other than an on-site inspection system. In other words, as it is, if they are going to cheat, they will cheat, and we shall have a hard time catching them.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not consider the treaty a declaratory statement. It is a first step in the attempt to bring nuclear weaponry under control. It is a primary, preliminary step. However, I believe it is a very important step in our effort to prevent further proliferation of these weapons. It is not the answer to all problems. It does not represent a major step toward disarmament. It does not reduce our military power. There are many things that it does not do.

As the President says in his message to the Senate:

This treaty is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race.

Then he goes on to say:

This treaty is the whole agreement. U.S. negotiators in Moscow were instructed not to make this agreement conditioned upon any other understanding; and they made none.

This treaty advances, though it does not assure, world peace; and it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms race.

This is not merely a declaratory statement.

I thank the Senator for his indulgence. I will examine the Senator's speech in more detail. The Senator says, "Having finally renounced our demands for inspection, could we expect to press those demands in future arms control agreements with which we may be faced?" I say that that kind of question is misleading.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is it a fair question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is not a fair question.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No. It is not fair because we have not renounced our demands for inspection. Our demands for inspection were in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test treaty. The Senator from Minnesota has said on the floor dozens of times that he has been in favor of this proposal, and encourages it. Furthermore, I have not heard his entire speech. I have heard only a part of it. However, in his speech the Senator asks: "And how in the world can any such clause be meaningful if there is no way to inspect it for possible violations?"

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is that a fair question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; but the answer is as obvious as the presence of the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Why?

Mr. HUMPHREY. There are means of inspection; and the Senator knows it. He ought to be telling the American people that there is a means of inspection; namely, the inspection system of the United States, which is managed by the U.S. Air Force, of which the Senator is a renowned and respected member.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I wish the Sena-

tor would read the entire statement at his leisure. If he does so, he will see that I am not referring to the area of inspection that we discussed previously. I am talking about the question that arose as a result of the signing of the treaty with other countries; namely, that it might allow other countries to develop a nuclear power which they now have no opportunity to develop. I wish the Senator would read the entire statement, and not take portions of it out of context. I believe I have raised a fair, legitimate question. If the Senator can answer it, I shall be grateful to him.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall try to do so. With respect to inspection, we have not renounced our requirement for inspection in a comprehensive treaty. I believe that the Senator's speech presents a constant attitude of doubt and suspicion. I do not believe it makes a constructive contribution to a thoughtful discussion of the all-important treaty that is before us.

There is a doubt on some points. There is some doubt as to what will be the reaction of the Soviet Union if we were to give nuclear weaponry and nuclear information to France.

The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSEL] has asked for specific information on that point from the State Department, and he will get it. There is doubt as to what we could expect if China were to explode a nuclear device. All these questions have been referred to in testimony, and they have been discussed at length. All that the Senator from Minnesota is saying is that a continuation of the recital of the doubts, the setting up of strawmen, and the occasional knocking down of those strawmen by the one who initially sets them up, does not contribute to what I believe to be a thoughtful consideration of the treaty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Perhaps I am in error, but when I am engaged in dealing with the Soviet Union, the Communists, I believe I have some ground for being a bit distrustful, and I shall continue to be.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Every man is distrustful. It is "old hat" to say that we ought to be distrustful of the Communists.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is it wrong to say it?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeed not; let the Senator say it repeatedly. However, it does not fortify the Senator's argument. No treaty with the Soviet Union will be worth the paper it is written on unless it contains some mutual advantages. Furthermore, as Admiral Radford once said, We develop our system of international inspection as an alternative to trust."

Mr. President, we have poured millions of dollars into the system of international inspection.

We have farflung inspection facilities, and every Member of this body is fully aware of it. I believe the American people ought to be told that the treaty is not merely a declaratory statement, but that it involves a system of inspection. They

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should be told that we are paying for it, and that we will rely upon our inspection system to make sure that the treaty is observed and that there is no violation of it. If there is a violation, we will be ready to take whatever action is appropriate under the existing circumstances.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Once again, the Senator gets away from the point. I admit all the things the Senator is talking about.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is so helpful about admitting all these wonderful things.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator will allow me to direct his attention to the basic question that arises by the language of the treaty, I have no doubt about our inspection. I think I know as much about it as does the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Perhaps more.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have great faith in it. I am aware of its weaknesses, but we are not discussing them today. I am discussing a question I have in my mind, that I stated on the floor of the Senate, but which, except for the last part, the Senator from Minnesota did not hear. The Senator from Minnesota took exception to it. When he studies the question I propounded, if he can enlighten me on the subject, I shall be very happy to be enlightened. He will not find the question on the last page.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Despite all the genteel protestations, when I read again what the Senator from Arizona said, it is quite obvious what the impact or import of the question is. We know that suspicion exists apart from the treaty. I call upon all Senators to give this subject their serious attention. The Senator from Minnesota will give it serious consideration. Inspection is involved. The Senator from Arizona asks:

How much more would we be risking our lives now in signing a treaty dealing with the mightiest weapons of all but with no inspection beyond sniffing the air, feeling the ground, or scanning the skies

Sniffing the air under the inspection system we have is a little more than talking about hay fever. It is a mighty process. It involves planes and manpower. It involves the highest, most intricate techniques of air inspection and filtration for atomic debris. It means scanning the skies with radar and electronic devices. That is no little picture of looking up at the milky way or the moon. It is a mighty, technical, and effective process.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. So let the Senator from Arizona put the question directly. He said the issue was inspection. That issue is well met in the treaty. It is our inspection system. We are the judge of whether the treaty is being fulfilled. If ever there was a treaty that protected the national sovereignty of the United States of America, this is it. If there were an international inspection system I can imagine the Senator saying, "Are we going to trust those foreigners?"

No; we are trusting ourselves, and are trusting the finest inspection apparatus that any country has ever known.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We are getting into a discussion without the Senator's reading my question. He is not giving attention to it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator like to tell me what the question is? I have re-read his statement the second time.

Mr. GOLDWATER. No; the Senator has not.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would be most happy to have the Senator state the question.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I hope the Senator will read the question and give me an intelligent answer, because I think I asked a legitimate question. It has nothing to do with our inspection system.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What is the Senator talking about in his speech? Would he mind delineating his remarks?

Mr. GOLDWATER. It pertains to section 2 of article 1. That language reads:

Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this article.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. This wording, as I said, seems clear:

A nation that signs this treaty will not cause a nuclear explosion, or test, anywhere in any of the banned environments.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Then: A nation that signs this treaty would pledge not to encourage any such test.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; that has been testified to in all the hearings.

Mr. GOLDWATER. And: A nation that signs this treaty would not participate in any such test.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Arizona is making a good case for the treaty. What is the question?

Mr. GOLDWATER. We will get to it. That clause provides that we will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to any test the French may make.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] placed that question before the State Department. The question will be answered. A vigorous answer will be made available to the American people.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator agrees with me, then, that there is a question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Minnesota does not agree. The Senator says that the Senator from Arizona is about a week late in catching up with the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It takes about that much time to catch up with the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Oregon is a fast man.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The same clause provides that the Soviets will not cause,

encourage, or participate in regard to any test Red China may carry out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. This is where the present inspection system, in my opinion, is not meaningful, and where I have a question. How in the world can any such clause be meaningful if there is no way to inspect for possible violations? There must be a way to inspect for possible violations. We can inspect on the basis of our ability. I think we can say, without violating secrets, that we can inspect the mainland, heartland, of Russia. I do not think we are set up to inspect any disturbances that might be seismic in nature in China.

Mr. HUMPHREY. We can do so every bit as well as we can in Russia.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We cannot discuss that subject on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Arizona and I know that. I do not say we can inspect all seismic events in Russia; but we can do it as well there as we can in China.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We cannot talk about that on the floor of the Senate. That is the question I would like to have answered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What is the other question? The question is one of inspection. The Senator from Arizona not only raises the point of inspection in that situation, but the entire force of his speech was upon the subject of inspection, planting doubts in the American mind as to whether the treaty provides for inspection.

I say unqualifiedly that the treaty provides for inspection—our inspection. Who else said so? Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCone, and General Taylor. They were witnesses before the committee. Secretary McNamara also testified.

Everyone knows that the treaty provides for inspection. Whether the inspection is as good as it ought to be is a question that can be argued. I am of the opinion that our inspection system can be improved. But let the record be perfectly clear that we do not trust the Soviets, and they do not trust us. We have our inspection system. That is the alternative to trust. To me, the treaty is an enforceable document to protect our national security. We will rely on our national inspection system. The taxpayers of the United States have put hundreds of millions of dollars into this system and have reached a number of agreements with the friendly powers of the world, with whom there is a tie-in of their inspection systems with our own. Many scores of countries will sign the treaty, all of them interested in seeing that the treaty is abided by.

The argument of the Senator from Arizona has very weak underpinnings. It is primarily an expression of doubt, to which he knows the answer. That is the kind of protest the Senator from Arizona makes. I can question whether today is Monday and tomorrow will be Tuesday. I can raise a question. But there are answers to many of the questions, and the answers have been made. The answer to the Senator's speech is in the record. It was answered by the Sec-