

THEODOR HANS

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In my capacity as a counterintelligence agent, and having been in charge of counter-espionage operations (until approximately 1951) in West Berlin, I had firsthand knowledge of the type of Soviet activities under discussion, such as abductions and interrogations under duress of psychological pressure or physical intimidation.

For the unit to which I was assigned in Berlin, I had to safeguard the security and mission of the United States Forces stationed in Berlin and Europe. I was also responsible for aiding or assisting and advising the German authorities and Allied agencies in their investigations of abductions or as the German authorities call them, the violations of the personal security of the civilian population of Berlin. During the same period as well as afterwards, I also had the responsibility of protecting operations and personnel utilized in the collecting of counterintelligence or positive intelligence information for the United States Forces. A large number of the victims of abductions and interrogations under duress were active for the Western Allies and German agencies (also private organizations in West Berlin) in gathering data and information intelligence from East Germany. For this reason, many sources and investigators for the United States Forces and United States Information Agency (USIA) were directly endangered by these Soviet practices. Therefore, any cases of abductions and interrogations under duress were of direct interest to me and the unit which I served (Region VIII of CIC and USAREUR Liaison Groups).

Our basic aim was to collect the data on the facts in each case and to learn more about the modus operandi of the Soviet, East German, and Satellite intelligence and security organizations perpetrating such crimes.

During the entire period that I was engaged in these investigations, I collected applicable newspaper clippings and publications concerning these cases and generally containing accurate information without violating the existing security regulations of the Counter-Intelligence Corps. The material that was published had been

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released in the foreign press. Not having ^{this} would have been impossible for me to recollect the large number of details and names of persons involved, especially since I was consistently required to cover or report on a multitude of persons and events of interest to the United States Forces.

From January 1 to October 31, 1951, there occurred 14 cases of abduction in which persons and circumstances became known to the West Berlin police, and the MFS (or SFS) was directly implicated. During the same period, the police was notified 209 times regarding abductions, in which the suspects or offenders could not be identified.

As mentioned in the KGU (Fighting Group Against Inhumanity) pamphlet, "The Red Gestapo" by Bernhard Sagolla, concerning the MFS, KURT MUELLER, Communist representative at Federal German Congress (Lower House), was lured to West Berlin (again no actual abduction) and was reportedly later beaten (about 1951) by the interrogator LOTZE to admit having betrayed the party (according to testimony of a fellow inmate who was released and fled to West Berlin). The East German refugee, RUDOLF J., Landhausstrasse, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, was assaulted by four men and beaten with a copper cable on the night of July 28, 1951. Pedestrians came to the victim's aid when he called for help. One WERNER HOPPE, East Berlin, was then caught. An accomplice, 27 year old ERWIN ZILZ, and an MFS officer, 39 year old ALBERT SALMINKEIT, managed to flee. HOPPE had a falsified West Berlin identification document under the name of MEWES, given him by the MFS. HOPPE was a burglar who had been offered leniency for a burglary if he cooperated and was also well paid to carry out the operation and rent a car.

The following are cases described in various German newspaper clippings and of which I also have personal knowledge:

1. DR. ALEXANDER TRICHNOVICH, 60 years old at the time, head of the Berlin Committee of Anti-Soviet Organization "NTS" and a leader of Russian emigrants and resistance groups. On April 13, 1954, after a brutal beating, he was apparently placed in a car and taken to East Berlin. The suspect was HEINZ GLAESKE, 40 years of age, married, resident of

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Berlin-Halensee (British Sector), Heilbronner Strasse 11, was visited in the evening by the victim. GLAESKE was an active member of a German private organization, so-called, "Late Returnees and Expellees from Prisoner of War Camps and lost Eastern German Territories." The abduction occurred about 8:00 -- 8:45 pm. The accomplices were most likely a male driver and up to two more men and one woman. GLAESKE was an architect and good acquaintance of the victim, who probably trusted him well. Also, GLAESKE was most probably an active double-agent between Soviet intelligence (and/or MFS) and the West German United States supported Gehlen organization (now the BND). Blood was found in the apartment afterwards. A rug had been carried downstairs by GLAESKE. Later, a subsequently defected East Berlin policeman claimed that a black OPEL KAPITAEN was used to take TRUCHNOVICH and GLAESKE to East Berlin. The confusing, yet interesting, element in this case is the lack of Western knowledge on whether either TRUCHNOVICH or GLAESKE were abducted and who really abducted whom. Whatever the true circumstances were, it is evident that both TRUCHNOVICH and GLAESKE were moved to the East and placed under Soviet control; there was a bloody struggle, and definitely an abduction of one or both individuals took place at Soviet or MFS direction.

One KUEHNE, of the SPD--Ostbuero and its newly appointed head of covert and resistance activities in East Germany, was abducted February 1949 from West Berlin to the East. KUEHNE had been in contact with one EHLERS, who had a leading position in the "DWK" (German Economic Commission) of the Soviet Occupation Zone. At that time, EHLERS resided in West Berlin (French Sector, not far from the Soviet Sector) and KUEHNE had been visiting him at home repeatedly. KUEHNE was then staying temporarily in West Berlin to take over and organize the many East German operational contacts and planned to return to Hanover, West Germany. The Soviets (MGB) had arranged for two accomplices to aid EHLERS in drugging KUEHNE and then moving KUEHNE to East Berlin. One girl, posing as a maid, prepared the drinks with a drug. The male accomplice was to put handcuffs on the victim. When KUEHNE was not easily doped, the man left the adjoining room, turned the radio on full volume, and tried to subdue KUEHNE in order to give him an injection (the syringe was later found). The attempt failed and the criminal had to hit KUEHNE on the head with the handcuffs. KUEHNE obviously put up a terrific fight leaving blood

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traces and overturned furniture.

RAINER HILDEBRANDT, onetime head of the KGU, was the target of several Soviet and MFS abduction attempts. One of these was organized by the HEDERICH Group (MFS directed and paid) in February 1950, in the British Sector at Berlin-Grünwald. Two cars were to block the street. A third car was to approach from a side street. As HILDEBRANDT's car would stop, a man from the approaching vehicle would subdue HILDEBRANDT with an ether sponge and a pistol butt, so that HILDEBRANDT could be taken by one of the cars to East Berlin. The plan failed when HILDEBRANDT simply drove around the obstruction without realizing the true significance of the situation. Two culprits were later caught in West Berlin and sentenced. One RUTH PENSA, closely associated with HEDERICH and a member of HEDERICH's gang, voluntarily came to West Berlin to escape further political pressure and the constant surveillances by informants and collaborators of the Communists and Soviets. She had also been ordered to abduct one KARL HEINZ HAGEN, a member of the "UFJ" (Investigating Committee of Free Jurists).

WOLFGANG HOEHER, a LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) Representative in West Berlin and a member of LDP "Hilfsdienst Ost" (Aid Service East), was caused to become intoxicated and probably also drugged in order to be abducted to East Berlin. This was in February 1953. In early 1950, HOEHER had become acquainted with one KIRVES, a director of a Soviet Corporation in East Germany and an alleged member of a resistance group. One evening they met, as usual, in a restaurant having dimly illuminated separate booths. At one of these, KIRVES was holding a seat for HOEHER and probably drugged the wine he had ordered for HOEHER. The drug that was used apparently paralyzed the will and mental processes of the victim while not impairing bodily action and mobility. This accounts for HOEHER having left the meeting place without objection and joining KIRVES in a waiting taxi, that had been sent there by the MFS. HOEHER appeared slightly inebriated, but in no unusual condition to arouse suspicion when departing from the restaurant. The taxi then proceeded to East Berlin without interruption.

Chemistry student, KAISER, who was subsequently

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sentenced to death in an East German show trial, was employed by the KGU in a laboratory doing experimental chemistry work connected with propaganda and resistance operations directed against the Soviets and the East German Regime. His onetime fellow student and friend, BRAMBACHER, from East Berlin's Humboldt University maintained close contact with KAISER for years. One day, BRAMBACHER told KAISER that he had been accosted on the street in the Soviet Sector by MFS officials while shopping. After an arrest and a short but intensive interrogation, BRAMBACHER was recruited as an MFS informant. BRAMBACHER openly told KAISER about the difficult position in which he found himself when given the mission by the MFS to aid in or arrange KAISER's abduction. Through his frank disclosure, BRAMBACHER fully gained KAISER's confidence. Several days later, the two were together with their fiancées and had a few drinks. Then BRAMBACHER and KAISER decided to go to another local tavern to have more drinks. From there both then boarded a taxi and left for East Berlin. KAISER was apparently unconcerned, although intoxicated, and very likely also drugged without realizing it.

The MGB (or KGB directed Soviet Intelligence and Security Service) used particularly the element of deception and trapped victims into placing themselves into Soviet hands without causing the abducted persons to realize with whom they actually dealt until it was too late. A favorite ruse was to request the wanted person to accompany the civilian officials of an alleged Western occupation power to the next Headquarters Office (Kommandatura) for a routine interview or supposedly harmless identity check. Local residents were generally aware that Western Allied authorities did not "violate personal freedoms" (as abductions, arrests without warrants, holding suspects without defense or outside contact, and interrogations under duress are called in Germany). Therefore, they willingly accompanied the civilians claiming to represent the Western Allies. Once in the vehicle, the victims were subdued immediately upon any sign of alarm or mistrust. An estimated 600 West Berlin residents at least, became victims of abductions by the Soviets or their German organizations or helpers between the end of World War II and 1954. Most of these were abductions through ruses but quite a number of victims were also overpowered through physical violence or the use of alcohol and drugs.

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In addition, many more persons were apprehended in Soviet controlled territory after having been lured or watched closely and entering such area. In a strictly technical interpretation, cases of apprehension without proper legal grounds (a method typical of Soviet security actions) cannot be considered as abductions unless the victim was moved to Soviet control against his will. In one such case, in which the victim was trapped into entering Soviet ruled territory, a well-known and highly popular ballerina of the State opera house in the Soviet Sector was apparently used to entice the victim, a German of Russian origin, to go to East Berlin. A close female acquaintance of this dancer was sent by the Soviets to the victim, after arranging a meeting for the victim with the ballerina, NATASHA TRCFIMOVA, to take place following a performance. In this case, no physical violence or drugs had to be employed, and the person who was to be met in the East was possibly not even aware of the true purpose of the meeting.

According to material collected and carefully checked by the UFJ and covering the period of the fall of 1949 until early 1956, there occurred at least 98 abductions to East Germany through the use of deception and baits besides an additional 26 abductions in which the victims were overpowered. As the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, stated on February 22, 1956, in the British Parliament, 103 persons were abducted or illegally arrested between 1945 and that date by the Soviets or their German collaborators from the British Sector of Berlin alone. In only seven of these cases was it possible for British authorities to cause the Soviets to release the victims.

HELMUT NICKEL, 43 years old, a high school teacher, was assaulted May 1st, 1950, in the French Sector of Berlin in the late evening by two unknown persons, pulled into a waiting car and abducted.

ALFRED WILAND, 44 years old, a journalist, was overpowered near a deserted house in ruins in the vicinity of a British Sector post office (Berlin West 30) on November 11, 1950, and carried into a waiting car by two unknown assailants who abducted him to the Soviet Sector. WILAND always visited the post office regularly in the late morning hours to pick

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his mail up at his own special delivery box.

STANISLAW PIETR, 54-year old laborer, was spoken to on August 11, 1951, by a group of three unknown men. Not expecting any trouble at all, PIETR approached the group, was beaten unconscious, dragged into a waiting passenger car, and abducted. This took place relatively early in the evening, about 6:00 pm, near the elevated train station Sonnenallee in Berlin-Nankölln (American Sector).

GUNTHER MICHEL, another West Berlin resident, was asked by a stranger on February 24, 1950, to board a waiting automobile to be taken by the driver to a hospital into which a short while before MICHEL's injured girl friend had allegedly been delivered from an accident. In actuality, she had not been placed in any hospital or involved in any accident. The ruse succeeded, however, in causing MICHEL to be abducted to East Berlin, where the responsible authorities then found out that MICHEL was not the person by that name they really wanted.

GUNTHER VALDIX, 26 years old, he participated in a small family celebration of acquaintances on the night of July 6th to 7th, 1951 in West Berlin. During the early morning hours, VALDIX was taken to the Soviet operated elevated train in West Berlin to Berlin-Wannsee, where he resided. Upon arrival there and before leaving the station premises, he was assaulted by three strangers, who had been waiting for him there, pulled into the train again, and abducted in it to Potsdam in East Germany, the train's final destination. He was subsequently tried by an East German court for political offenses and sentenced.

Preparations for abductions require careful planning and thorough knowledge regarding the victims and their daily routine activities especially when drugs and/or large groups of assailants are utilized. Usually, such information is collected through systematic surveillances. Frequently, and if feasible, informants with personal contact with the target personalities, are also used and specifically directed to provide the needed knowledge. For this reason, it is extremely difficult to determine accurately at which stage the collection of information (through surveillances,

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informants, double-agents, or by other means) ends and at which precise moment the actual abduction operation begins. The one activity always carries over into the other and both must be fully coordinated. Almost all abductions, except those solely aimed at eliminating political opponents, generally lead to the interrogation and intelligence exploitation of the victim and the possible infiltration of the organization which the victim had served, so that one of the major purposes of abductions is again the gathering and following up of valuable intelligence data and leads not as easily or quickly available by other methods. Therefore, the victims of abductions generally are persons engaged in anti-Soviet or anti-Communist efforts, oftentimes on behalf of or in cooperation with agencies or groups operated or supported by the United States or other Western Allies. In order to achieve their aims in this respect, the Soviets, their Satellites, and Communist agents do not hesitate to use poison and terror through extreme physical violence and brutal psychological pressure. This is true for the manner in which persons are kidnapped or arrested illegally as well as for the way in which suspects or pre-trial prisoners are interrogated and confessions obtained. The most typical examples of Soviet (or MFS) brutality and disregard for humane conduct in intelligence, as well as counterintelligence, operations are the following:

On July 8, 1952, the member of the UFJ and a West Berlin lawyer, DR. WALTER LINSE, was brutally assaulted in the American Sector of Berlin and abducted to East Germany. Because of the complexity of the large-scale operation conducted to kidnap DR. LINSE, who was actively engaged in propagandizing the evils of the Soviet system, it was possible in a relatively short time to gain detailed knowledge of the individuals, organization, and actions connected with the LINSE abduction. The overpowering and moving of the victim from West Berlin was carried out by notorious criminals under the personal direction of MFS officers, who did not, however, leave East Berlin. A West Berlin taxi was taken by the criminals at 5:00 am of the same date from West Berlin to the Soviet Sector. The driver, WILHELM WOITZISKE, was paid the fare in advance to convince him of the honesty of the passengers and to make him less suspicious about entering the East Sector. Just before crossing the Sector border, one passenger gave WOITZISKE a carton of cigarettes as further

incentive for the trip. The border guards stopped the vehicle, asked WOITZISKE to step out, and upon finding the cigarettes on him, arrested him at once on a smuggling charge. He was placed in pre-trial detention. His taxi was taken directly to a safe location in the Soviet Sector, where the license plates were removed and placed on a previously selected and prepared MFS passenger car (4-door Opel sedan). The gang members assigned to the automobile left immediately with this car for the pre-arranged West Berlin meeting place while the other accomplices proceeded to the site by different routes. Not all participants in this crime were at the scene to assist in overpowering DR. LINSE. Some were to watch for police interference, several had to observe the victim, and others had the task of checking the operation for any signs of trouble or possible failures. After all accomplices had placed themselves at their assigned locations, DR. LINSE left his home at 7:30 am. Two of the criminals then walked directly to DR. LINSE and apparently asked him for a light for a cigarette. DR. LINSE obliged, put his hand in his pocket, and at the same moment was hit in the face with a small hard bag filled with sand. He was pulled into the car, which then drove off at excessive speed. A driver of a delivery truck, which was in the same street, immediately gave chase but could not catch the car, which was noted by other witnesses as it approached and crossed the border between West Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone.

Other witnesses in East Germany subsequently described how the Opel sedan was stopping at an apparently pre-designated site in the Soviet Zone where an escort of East German police in a second car and a motorcycle patrolman joined the abductors and left for the next destination of the victim. According to initial and official Soviet statements, this abduction never occurred and the presence of DR. LINSE in the Soviet occupied or controlled territory was unknown, in spite of an alleged Soviet investigation in this case as requested by the Western authorities. Yet, the Soviets recently disclosed that DR. LINSE had died in late 1953, in a Soviet prison camp of unknown causes. The West Berlin police investigation and interviews of witnesses revealed beyond doubt that the MFS Main Department VIII (Investigations and Arrests), headed by MORGENTHAU, had planned and directed this entire operation, and that the so-called

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WEINMEISTER Group (one of Dept. VIII's sub-units) had carried it out. MFS officers who directly supervised this abduction were one "PAUL" (covername) from Berlin-Pankow, Soviet Sector, the group leader, and his deputy, FRITZ VAHLE alias, PAUL SCHMILT. One SIEGFRIED BENTER, 27 years old, later caught in West Berlin, was an accomplice in the abduction of DR. LINSE.

On May 17, 1955, the 29 year old MFS informant and collaborator, GERHARD BECK, from Teltow, East Germany, was tried by a West Berlin court for attempted abduction and poisoning of the employee LISA STEIN of the USIA operated West Berlin broadcasting station RIAS (Radio in the American Sector). BECK had been active as a Communist in various Leftist East German political and mass organizations from 1946 on. In the fall of 1953, BECK established contact with RIAS and offered to provide information for broadcasts on agricultural and East German farmer's situations in the Soviet Zone. According to BECK's testimony at the trial, he had been arrested unexpectedly November 1954 by the MFS. Although he allegedly denied initially having any connection with RIAS, BECK claimed he was finally forced to confess to having furnished reports to RIAS. BECK asserted that the MFS interrogators threatened to take adverse and punitive action against his wife and five children. Instead of prosecuting and trying BECK, the MFS utilized him to continue his contact with RIAS and, while acting as double agent, to report in detail on all individuals, offices, and information requests or interests of RIAS.

In March 1955, BECK received the MFS mission to prepare and carry out the abduction of FRAU STEIN, who was known to the MFS as being quite effective in interviewing refugees and confidential sources or visitors from East Germany at RIAS and apparently well-informed regarding East German and Soviet conditions, leading personalities, and specific organizations in the Soviet Zone and Sector, including the MFS itself. Several high MFS officers, believed to have included even FRMSI WOLLWEBER (who was then in charge of the MFS), initially discussed with BECK the best plans for abducting FRAU STEIN. These meetings took place in a covert East Berlin MFS apartment. Finally, BECK was given a box of brandy filled candy of a Soviet Zone firm and told that poisoned candy pieces had been arranged in the box in a

certain order to permit BECK to share the candy with the victim without any danger to BECK. He was warned by his MFS superiors or handlers to offer the candy sometime toward the end of the meeting with FRAU STEIN, which had been scheduled by BECK and STEIN in advance to take place in a West Berlin cafe. Upon leaving the cafe and on her walk to her nearby residence, FRAU STEIN was expected to become unconscious and was to be picked up by a waiting car which would appear to be passing by chance. All preparations for the kidnapping had been made well in advance, when BECK followed his MFS instructions precisely. FRAU STEIN did not become ill, however, until she was in front of her apartment, where neighbors came to her aid and she was immediately moved to a hospital. After 48 hours of severe illness, during which FRAU STEIN's revival was uncertain, the attending physicians managed to find an antidote and she recovered. The court medical expert found that it was most probably the highly dangerous poison "SKOPOLAMIN."

It was only through coincidence and BECK's lack of fear, based on his firm belief that his complicity in this abduction attempt could not be proven, that BECK was apprehended in West Berlin shortly after the incident. Since the death penalty is not applicable in West German (and also West Berlin) jurisdiction, BECK was sentenced to twelve years in the penitentiary. This was considered a stiff sentence and given specifically as a preventive measure regarding possible future offenses of this type. In any court in Soviet controlled territory, the same crime would have definitely resulted in a death penalty for the defendant, providing that he would still be in such physical condition after pre-trial interrogation and detention that he could face a court.

On July 25, 1955, the former MFS officer, SYLVESTER MURAU, who had defected to West Berlin some time earlier, was kidnapped from the West German town of Heubeck near Darmstadt, where MURAU had taken up residence as a refugee without official West German aid. MURAU's daughter, GITTA CULLMANN, 21 years old, was used by the MFS to dispel MURAU's suspicion against the actual abductors, who posed as good acquaintances of GITTA. One of the accomplices, 24 year old JOACHIM TIETZ, was later caught in West German territory and sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.

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In this abduction, MURAU was first induced to become intoxicated and then drugged to become unconscious. He was taken by car from the aforementioned community to East Germany across the Soviet Zone border, which is located quite a distance away. Both abductors received a bonus of 5,000 Deutsche Mark West (close to \$1,200) each in addition of reimbursement of all expenses and other payments for succeeding in this case. A short time later, while TIEFZE was attempting to take a stolen West Berlin automobile to the Soviet Sector, he and his accomplice in the kidnapping, one HOMELIS, were apprehended by Western authorities.

On February 4, 1956, the former East German People's Police Lieutenant Colonel (Inspekteur), ROBERT BIALEK, was abducted from West Berlin by direction of the MFS. In this case, too, careful preparation and timing had been used to succeed. Several months before, the onetime East German police official, PAUL DRZEWICKI, also residing at that time as a refugee in West Berlin, had been recruited as an informant by the MFS. Having lived for years in West Berlin as former defected police officer, DRZEWICKI managed to establish contact with BIALEK and gain his confidence. On the date of the abduction, DRZEWICKI had invited BIALEK to a party subsequently celebrating DRZEWICKI's birthday. The celebration took place in a furnished room, DRZEWICKI had rented on February 1st. An alleged niece of DRZEWICKI and an East Berlin acquaintance of DRZEWICKI, later introduced to BIALEK as also opposed to the Soviet regime, happened to be present at the party. In reality, the girl and the East Berlin resident were the abductors sent along by the MFS to carry out the operation with DRZEWICKI's help. The man was actually a Soviet Sector police official.

After several drinks, BIALEK was drugged and became ill. The main tenant of the apartment in which the furnished room was located, even assisted the abductors in carrying the victim out of the building without realizing the true circumstances. Once on the street, a passing car was flagged down for the purpose of moving the sick man to a hospital. In reality, the car had been waiting for this moment and BIALEK was abducted to East Berlin.

In this case, BIALEK had also been engaged after his defection in assisting Western authorities and

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intelligence agencies to gain valuable information regarding East German and Soviet targets and had further been used in attempts to cause the defection of other East Germans and People's Police members to West Berlin. It was well-known to Western counterintelligence and intelligence organizations that the Soviets and their Communist collaborators were extremely interested in having MURAU, BIALEK, and other East German defectors from police and government or party organizations returned to Soviet control in order to prevent the increasing and alarming refugee flow to the West and the gradually greater number of defections from East Germany. It also became known that many of these abduction victims, especially those formerly serving in the MFS, were sentenced to death for desertion.

One of those executed, in my memory is correct, was a onetime MFS official named PAUL REBENSTOCK, who had been arrested near the Soviet Sector border in East Berlin after extensive surveillance and being lured to the border by an alleged prospective informant or defector.

According to an article in the "Die Weltwoche," Zuerich, Switzerland, of November 28, 1955, and written by one H. COOKRIDGE, the West Berlin police president, DR. JOHANNES STUMM, informed the writer during an interview in Berlin of 1954, that according to official police files, approximately 400 persons were abducted from West Berlin by Soviet paid and directed agents and their German collaborators or criminal accomplices. Bonus payments of 500 and 1000 Deutsche Mark West for one abduction successfully carried out were oftentimes given to the abductors by the Soviets or MFS.

The close relationship between the use of abductions and the intelligence or infiltration efforts by Soviet and East German (as well as other Satellite) organizations is well demonstrated by the following selected examples, representing only a very few of the large number of cases which became known:

On April 27, 1954, GERHARD KARPAHNKE moved from the British Sector of Berlin to the Soviet Sector. According to a release by the Soviet Zone news agency, ADN, KARPAHNKE made a full confession to East German security authorities regarding his past association with the GEHLEN intelligence

organization in Western Germany. KARPAHNKE claimed in his confession that he had been deputy chief of the "Filiale K" (branch office or agency K) and had received orders directly from the chief of the "Generalvertretung G" (Main Branch or Division G), the former German General KOERNING. According to KARPAHNKE, the GEHLEN-Organization was receiving an annual subsidy of 25 million Deutsche Mark West. Although at first glance, KARPAHNKE appears to have no importance regarding abduction operations, a closer check into his background and personal contacts reveals at once the missing links between the usual intelligence activities of the Soviets (or MFS) and the abduction of DR. ALEXANDER TRUCHNOVICH, which occurred exactly two weeks before KARPAHNKE moved to the East.

HEINZ GLAESKE and KARPAHNKE were friends and had worked together in the same private German organization for German returnees and expellees. As claimed by the Soviets after the TRUCHNOVITCH incident, GLAESKE had made a full confession that he had worked for the GEHLEN-Organization. As the Soviets, and an alleged voluntary statement by TRUCHNOVICH in the Soviet Zone, also claimed, TRUCHNOVICH had left West Berlin voluntarily because he considered further opposition to the Soviet Government senseless. GLAESKE had allegedly also worked for or with the British Intelligence Service. KARPAHNKE's voluntary move to the East, his alleged confession, and his strange background strongly suggest that he had been a double agent between the East and West.

In July 1951, KARPAHNKE had moved with his entire family and all furniture from East Berlin to the West Sector. For this move, he had full permission from the Soviet Sector authorities. At any time, such moves with all belongings from East to West were hardly ever authorized by the East German administration unless severe personal hardship was involved and to grant them would be of political advantage. For this reason, KARPAHNKE was never a refugee. He never claimed to have been forced to leave East Berlin. Shortly after settling in the British Sector, KARPAHNKE obtained the job of janitor at the West Berlin "Haus der Zukunft" (House of Future), an anti-Communist youth hostel and cultural institution where different Western lecturers gave talks on the Soviets and Communist dangers to students and refugees. Shortly after World War II, KARPAHNKE had

joined the East Berlin police and served until 1946 in its Criminal Investigation Department. It became well known in recent years that the Soviets recruited many of the covert investigators and informants in German administration offices in the police force and left them in their regular positions to provide better cover for activities which in reality were carried out for the Soviets. KARPAHNKE had to leave the police when the East Berlin authorities found out that he had falsified his questionnaire. After a short Soviet detention in a Kommandatura prison, KARPAHNKE was transferred to the Sachsenhausen Soviet concentration camp, and if he had not been recruited earlier by the Soviets, it is very likely that he was coerced to become a collaborator at that time. Already in September 1951, the West Berlin police department V (Investigation of Political Crimes) received a complaint against KARPAHNKE according to which he had denounced (or reported) a refugee from East Berlin to the MFS. The material did not provide sufficient evidence at that time, however, to justify action against KARPAHNKE. If KARPAHNKE were a spy and double agent for the MFS or Soviets, he must have reported to them continuously on GLAESKE and, on the basis of GLAESKE's information and personal contact, regarding TRUCHNOVICH.

The aforementioned KGU was of serious concern to the Soviet regime because it maintained constant coverage and gathered as well as published voluminous information regarding all Soviet inhumane conduct and brutalities committed against the Germans. Also, the KGU was highly popular with the majority of the East German population. Through the KGU files and efforts on locating missing persons, as well as by charity work, many East Germans opposed to the Soviets and Communism voluntarily cooperated with the KGU and furnished valuable information. The security and success of the Communist endeavors in East Germany were therefore continuously hampered by KGU publications and resistance work. For this reason, prior to his resignation from the KGU, its founder and initial head, the aforementioned HILDEBRANDT, was the target of several unsuccessful abduction attempts. Later, other members of the KGU, such as HERR ROLLER, HERR GERD BAITZ, and ERNST TILLICH, the successor of HILDEBRANDT, were also involved in different attempts by the MFS to abduct them. For the same reason, the onetime alleged KGU contact or

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employee, BAYER, who had moved to East Berlin and became an MFS collaborator, threatened another former KGU employer, SCHARLAU, with whom he had been acquainted, to cooperate with the MFS or SCHARLAU would be exposed with regard to former moral failings and other violations. When SCHARLAU refused to accept the offer of BAYER to work with the MFS, BAYER used SCHARLAU's aged mother from Grimmen, East Germany, to be a messenger to SCHARLAU with more threatening letters.

The continued effort by the MFS to infiltrate and/or discredit the KGU in the eyes of the general public, especially the East German population, met with unusual success when a key member of the KGU and its anti-Soviet resistance activities defected to East Berlin and decided to cooperate fully with the MFS and Soviet Zone Communist regime. This move by the onetime KGU functionary, HANFRIED HIECKE, born June 25, 1929, at Dresden, was almost certainly the result of continued pressure on the part of the MFS to approach and recruit as an informant HIECKE and other KGU members. This pressure was not only applied in the form of serious threats to the person being approached and his relatives, but also consisted of generous offers, ranging from complete immunity from further Soviet prosecution for past hostile actions to promises of large scale remuneration and other economic benefits in the Soviet Zone.

HIECKE, who used the cover name of FRED WALTER while working for the KGU, later furnished all information known to him about the KGU, its operations, sources, contacts, and most of its leading members. Even though some of his information was distorted and adapted to Soviet propaganda interests, the pamphlet published containing his disclosures and entitled, "DECKNAME WALTER" did not fail in its aim of seriously hurting the further effectiveness of the KGU and preparing for its eventual breakup.

When the KGU, and with it a major sustained and usually very valuable effort against Soviet aggression and acts of terror, was finally discontinued in the face of increasing pressure and mounting public criticism, the Communists had won a hard and long battle leaving them the

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desired freedom of political action in East Germany. It may also be of Western interest to realize the tragic toll NIECKE's full disclosures had among numerous resistance contacts and sources of the KGU in the Soviet Zone whom he caused to be arrested and sentenced severely.

In 1949, the East Berlin Communist publishing house, DIETE, brought out a Soviet licensed (and probably prepared) pamphlet, entitled "KURIERE, SPITZEL, SPIONE" ("Couriers, Denunciators, Spies), written by HEINZ KUEHNE, who claimed he voluntarily defected to the Soviet Sector February 8, 1949, because he wanted to discontinue his association with the SPD in West Germany. KUEHNE is identical with the aforementioned abducted KUEHNE, who had then just taken over the SPD 'Ost-Buero' (SPD operated information and resistance organization) before being kidnapped. In his foreword, dated June 27, 1949, KUEHNE explains that he wrote the booklet because he realized the mistakes of the SPD leaders and their policies. It does not require much imagination to reason why KUEHNE cooperated with the Soviets in preparing this pamphlet.

The SPD 'Ost-Buero' was one of the most popular and efficient private and political intelligence and resistance organizations until the time KUEHNE was abducted and during a post-war period when neither the KGU nor the UFG had become really effective and known. The disclosures of KUEHNE, the loss of many good sources and contacts through him, and the drop in prestige were so damaging to the SPD 'Ost-Buero' that for many years the organization did not regain its former significance. This is particularly important when one considers the fact that the great majority of the Soviet dominated SED (Social Union Party of Germany) was taken over from the SPD by a Soviet forced merger of the SPD and KPD (Communist Party of Germany) to make it the leading party in the Soviet Zone. Again, this abduction and quick turning of a onetime political foe by the Soviets had a definite political importance in the Communist strategy and tactics regarding Germany.

Another example of how abduction, defection, counterintelligence, and anti-Western propaganda are utilized in conjunction with interrogation and exploitation of all available sources by the Soviets is the handling of the aforementioned LDP representative WOLFGANG HOEHER. (The LDP

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subsequently changed its party designation to FDP to distinguish it from the Communist controlled LDP in East Germany, and for this reason HOEHER is mentioned as FDP member in later press releases.) In late January 1954, approximately one year after HOEHER was believed to have been abducted to East Berlin, the FDP representatives and WILLI KRESSMANN, SPD representative and mayor of the Berlin city district of Kreuzberg in the American Sector, had several heated arguments in a debate in the Berlin city council regarding KRESSMANN's contention that HOEHER must have been an informant of the Soviets and double agent against the FDP (LDP) and the GEHLEN-Organization, in which he had responsible positions in West Berlin. KRESSMANN based his statements on a pamphlet, entitled "Agent 2996 Reveals," published by the Soviet Sector Kongress Publishing House in late 1953 or January 1954. In this booklet, the author is identified as "WOLFGANG HOEHER, 40 years old, jurist by profession, former military officer, and since 1950 a leading member of the counterintelligence agency of the GEHLEN-Organization in West Berlin."

Although the Berlin FDP Party Chairman, CARL-HUBERT SCHWENNICKE, declared on January 27, 1954, that the matter had not been cleared up completely and that it had not been proven yet that HOEHER had spied for the East, here again, the Soviet interest in HOEHER and other FDP members with Western intelligence missions and contacts is quite obvious. Next to the SPD (West German Socialist Democratic Party) and the SPD 'Ost-Buero,' the FDP, which had a large following in East Germany, had the largest 'Ost-Buero' and most active information and resistance organization. For this reason, many members of the FDP 'Ost-Buero' were in close touch with the GEHLEN-Organization and Western intelligence agencies.

Another FDP 'Ost-Buero' agent, HANS FUELDNER, covername LUDWIG, who had defected to the East or had been arrested by the MFS, furnished identifying data to the MFS on 27 FDP sources and contacts in East Germany. In spite of his cooperation and betrayal, FUELDNER and other double agents or informants of the MFS were subsequently tried in East Berlin for espionage and other crimes against the East German state. It is of further interest to note that other defendants tried together with FUELDNER had apparently also

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cooperated with the MFS without, however, having received immunity against prosecution, as apparently given HANFRIED HIECKE, HEINZ KUFHNE, and others.

One co-defendant of FUELDNER was a former leading member of the West Berlin League for Human Rights, one SILGRADT, also accused of espionage. SILGRADT was the principal accused.

Another co-defendant was the former East German People's Police Lieutenant, WERNER MANGELSDORF, who had taken an active part in the uprising of June 17, 1953, against the East German regime when he organized the liberation of the Gommern jail near Magdeburg. MANGELSDORF later fled to West Berlin and helped establish and operate the "Committee of the 17th of June," founded by onetime participants in the uprising who had been forced to flee from Soviet prosecution. The private organization was organized with the help of the aforementioned RAINER HILDEBRANDT to develop clandestine contacts with disaffected East Germans to prepare for another uprising against the Communist regime in the hope of gaining success in another attempt by enlisting Western support and better coordination and planning of the revolutionary effort.

After MANGELSDORF had become active in this organization, the MFS arrested his brother, HANS MANGELSDORF, and forced the fiancée of HANS, one EDELTRAUT FEHSE, to contact WERNER MANGELSDORF in West Berlin and to offer him on behalf of the MFS that HANS would be released if WERNER agreed to contact the MFS and work for it as an informant and infiltration agent in the Committee of the 17th of June. Also, the MFS offered to drop the East German death sentence against WERNER, which had been pronounced by a Soviet Zone court against WERNER MANGELSDORF, when he was tried in absence.

WERNER then allegedly accepted this offer and went to the MFS in East Berlin to cooperate. On December 23, 1953 (the year is uncertain), WERNER MANGELSDORF signed the obligation to become an MFS informant. When the MFS promise to release HANS by January 1, 1954, was not kept, WERNER failed to maintain contact with the MFS and tried to discontinue his informant mission. EDELTRAUT FEHSE was sent again to WERNER on January 16 and pleaded with him to report to the MFS again, which he allegedly refused to do.

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On the same day, WERNER MANGELSDORF did not return to his West Berlin residence from an errand to a local post office. It is very possible that FEHSE was closely observed by accomplices of FEHSE or agents of the MFS shadowing her, and that an alternate plan of the MFS was to abduct WERNER afterwards in the event that he refused to reestablish contact with the MFS. Whether he was sentenced to death and executed I do not recollect, but WERNER MANGELSDORF was definitely given at least a very long sentence. WERNER is said to have reported his MFS contact to the 17th June Committee and the West Berlin police prior to his disappearance. The subsequent fate of his brother, HANS, and EDELTRAUT FEHSE is unknown.

During the above mentioned show trial of FUELDNER and MANGELSDORF, it became evident that the principal defendant, SILGRADT, who may also have been abducted or coerced by the MFS into cooperating with the MFS, had voluminous records and address files in his possession concerning East German information sources and resistance contacts of the League for Human Rights and the 17th June Committee. All of the material and information collected in West Berlin by WERNER MANGELSDORF had also been in SILGRADT's possession and had been secured by the MFS. Evidently, the show trial was not only intended to propagandize Western intelligence and resistance activities against the East German regime, but also to hide the true roles played by the different defendants prior to the trial with regard to their MFS association and missions. It is highly doubtful that all defendants cooperated fully with the MFS in all respects, as in such event their continued intelligence utilization may have been preferred by the MFS.

Again, in May of 1954 (the year is uncertain), another member of the 17th June Committee was arrested by the West Berlin police on charges of having worked as informant with the MFS against that organization. One EGON KIAN was accused by the police of having prepared the MFS abduction of another West Berlin resident. At approximately the same time, the political refugee from East Germany, HARRY SCHLESING, was reported missing by the police. SCHLESING also had contact with the 17th June Committee and was suspected by the police of having returned to the East because of possible MFS or Eastern contacts. In view of the serious and continued

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infiltration by the MFS and Communists of the 17th June Committee, that organization finally decided to turn over for security reasons all of its files and carded data to the appropriate West Berlin police department. For the same reason, the 17th June Committee finally ceased to exist.

Cases of Soviet or MFS infiltration into Western organizations are well illustrated by the following examples, which show easily how such intelligence operations may be utilized to aid in abductions:

WILHELM STELLER, 39 year old police officer of the Police Inspection Office Berlin-Zehlendorf, American Sector, was recruited in 1952 as an informant for the MFS and reported on internal and confidential activities of the police in West Berlin for several years. Prior to his assignment to the police inspection, STELLER was the regular duty officer at the Police Precinct Nr. 161 (Polizeirevier) on Clayallee, Berlin-Zehlendorf. For his espionage service, STELLER received Soviet Sector and East German state issued purchasing slips (HO-Einkaufsgutscheine) for which he bought commodities regularly in East Berlin. The West Berlin Political Crimes Investigation Department uncovered STELLER's intelligence activities and apprehended him for subsequent prosecution. It was possible for STELLER, through his official position, to cover many interesting facets of American intelligence and security operations in the U. S. Sector because the principal U. S. offices, military and of the State Department, as well as most of the covert intelligence facilities and the majority of the American billets, are located in Berlin-Zehlendorf, and particularly in the area covered by Police Precinct 161.

While the courts of the U. S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG) were still maintained, a HICOG Court in West Berlin sentenced 24 year old WERNER-HEINZ OKONEK, a West Berlin resident to one year in jail because he was found guilty of having attempted to report to the MFS in East Berlin names of fellow agents in the U. S. Intelligence Service. OKONEK was employed by the U. S. Intelligence Service. OKONEK's wife and child resided in the Soviet Zone at the time that he was in contact with the MFS, and OKONEK had been threatened by the MFS with reprisals against his family if he did not cooperate. Although the admission of OKONEK and the evidence provided by the investigators led to OKONEK's sentence, it

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is not at all certain that either OKONEK confessed everything or that the investigation uncovered the full extent of his possible espionage.

In 1953 or 1954, the 25 year old intelligence operator and informant, TIEMANN alias REINHARD, was apparently recruited by the MFS in East Berlin in or before 1952, when he established contact with his former superior of the onetime German Abwehr (Military Intelligence Service), one VON ZERSEN, who reportedly became an MFS agent some time after 1948. When TIEMANN feared he would be arrested in West Berlin for his double agent activities between the MFS and the Western intelligence organizations, he fled to East Germany. TIEMANN had established contact with the LfV (LANDESAMT FUER VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ - Office for the Protection of the Constitution) and had recommended VON ZERSEN as a valuable and trusted informant able to furnish key information. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior to VON ZERSEN's effort to organize an independent counterintelligence group for the LfV, at which time VON ZERSEN was identified as MFS informant but managed to avoid arrest, TIEMANN and VON ZERSEN apparently gained considerable insight into the LfV organization and activities. They reportedly also succeeded in furnishing false information, most likely prepared by the MFS to mislead and confuse Western authorities, to the LfV and possibly other Western agencies.

One of the most serious threats to the security of American forces and operations in West Berlin was uncovered and discontinued when the espionage agent and informant of the Soviet Intelligence Service, the 24 year old IRMGARD SCHMIDT alias STEPHANIE, was arrested by United States counterintelligence investigators in West Berlin December 1, 1954, just before going to East Berlin to turn over intelligence information and material to her Soviet superiors. IRMGARD SCHMIDT, who was quite pretty, had succeeded in establishing firm personal contact on a social basis with two important officials of the United States Intelligence Service. One of these was a military officer, the other a civilian. With the help of one of her American friends, she even managed to obtain a position within the United States Intelligence Service, in accordance with specific

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Soviet instructions. IRGARD SCHMIDT had been a university student in Halle, East Germany, specializing in languages and studying Chinese. Her mother continued to reside there after IRGARD SCHMIDT had moved to Berlin. In February 1953, SCHMIDT was arrested by the Soviets because she had placed her home at the disposal of fellow students, suspected of being in contact with the KGU and doing resistance work in Halle. SCHMIDT was offered the chance to serve as intelligence informant for the Soviets to avoid being sentenced and deported with her mother to Siberia. The Soviets gave her ample funds to permit her to carry out her espionage missions in West Berlin and to dress well. IRGARD SCHMIDT was sentenced by an American court to five years in the penitentiary.

The apparent ease with which Soviet or Satellite (including East German) interrogators, investigators, and intelligence officers "turn" suspects or defendants into cooperating informants or espionage agents is quite plausible when the Soviet or Communist practices and procedures of arresting, interrogating, and punishing people is being considered. No other government or political regime operates as many detention facilities, labor camps, and political indoctrination or re-orientation programs as the Soviets and all of their Communist allies to achieve maximum possible control over all individuals within their territories and over all followers elsewhere.

One of the greatest Soviet assets in maintaining absolute political control is the well established practice of terror through large scale or mass arrests, complete disregard for individual liberty regarding opponents and followers alike, and severe punishment, in the form of harsh sentences and inhumane jail conditions, to all those who oppose the regime or voice even the slightest criticism. Also, in this respect, the Soviet aim, or the purpose of investigations or interrogations, is not so much the finding of truth as it is to achieve a specific political goal, even if the true circumstances do not always warrant prosecution or punishment of the accused. Thus, in frequent "spy trials," the uncovering of "capitalist agents," and the elimination of "foreign aggressors and Trotskyites," oftentimes the persons being tried and even confessing their crimes have been framed and placed under psychological, as well as physical pressure, in luding various types of torture,

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in spite of the fact that only a small number of accused may have actually attempted or committed such acts.

The same principle of the means being used justifying the end to be attained holds true for Communist propaganda and alleged factual reports in Soviet controlled press and radio. For this reason, those individuals who may not surrender to Soviet or Communist demands through terror and fear might oftentimes be duped into supporting Soviet goals because they believe Soviet propaganda and distorted reports. To any persons residing in or close to the Soviet sphere of power, Soviet and Communist ruthlessness in dealing with suspects and accused individuals is well known. Therefore, when such persons fall into Soviet hands by being abducted or apprehended, they are generally very frightened and offer usually rather slight resistance to Soviet investigators or interrogators, especially when their ordeal during pre-trial handling threatens to be prolonged indefinitely or beyond their capacity for endurance in the event of their statements being insufficient to satisfy the prosecutors. Under these circumstances, confessions can be obtained after extended periods of pre-trial investigation and suffering, even if the accused are either innocent or initially determined not to implicate themselves and others beyond that which can be proven against them in court. For this reason, too, former conscientious and capable Western agents and intelligence operators, such as HEINZ KUEHNE, agreed to cooperate with the same elements they had fought so hard and effectively before. In the case of KUEHNE, who was assumed to have strong anti-Soviet and anti-Communist convictions, the manner in which he presented his "defection" to the East in his pamphlet, mentioned above, would easily cause weaker individuals in the Western parties and organizations to begin to doubt the wisdom of continuing resistance to Communism.

The following methods and conditions in East German and Soviet prisons cause arrested persons to confess their "crimes" rather than remain in pre-trial detention for long periods:

The interrogators and investigators are continuously warned by their superiors to obtain confessions from the accused if they do not want to arouse suspicion

regarding their political loyalty, efficiency in extracting confessions, or attempted collusion with defendants.

Although beatings, physical torture in the form of forcing the accused to place themselves for prolonged periods in positions of increasing hardship to unbearable pain, and other forms of physical torment were frequently used prior to 1953 and particularly in STALIN's era to extract confessions regardless of guilt or innocence, an effort was made after STALIN's death to refrain from such practices, except when drastic situations demanded mass convictions and tight security measures as in the case of the East German uprising on June 17, 1953, the Hungarian revolution, and similar events. During the periods of tension cited above, the large number of arrested people, the demand for ruthless domination of insurgents, and speed needed to re-establish full political control made it necessary to revert to physical pressure methods to convict the dissatisfied elements.

Long periods of interrogation by one or more investigators, frequently carried out in the middle of the night or toward early morning hours, poor sleeping facilities, such as hard cots, cold cells, inadequate bedding, and brightly illuminated cells, and other means of keeping pre-trial prisoners from getting any rest from repeated violent accusations and detailed questioning are all utilized to prevent the accused from maintaining his mental alertness, morale, and will to resist or defend his rights of innocence. Blinding lights focused on the accused during interrogation further helps to intimidate and weaken the defendant and to make him wish to end the ordeal at all cost.

Ice cold solitary cells with glaring lights or in complete darkness, oftentimes of extremely small size, are used also to break resistance of obstinate defendants refusing to admit guilt or betray accomplices or fellow resistance fighters.

Frequently these or similar cells are constructed to permit the so-called water treatment, which consists either of flooding the cell gradually with cold water until the prisoner has to stretch to keep his head above the water level, or dousing the victim alternately

with ice cold and very hot water for extended periods. The Soviets very often used the rather simple but just as brutal method of forcing the accused to stand for days in knee deep water or submerged up to his hips so that he could not rest or change his position besides becoming violently ill from exposure, the highly unsanitary conditions (not being permitted to leave the confinement for days), and the further lack of proper nourishment. Persons subjected to such tortures do not require drugging or stimulation through drugs to induce confessions.

They are usually so scared and exhausted, as well as oftentimes seriously ill from the physical hardships, that they confess to anything. Such drugs as Sodim Pentathol or so-called truth serums are not even practical in many Soviet interrogations because the prisoners could not possibly confess under their effect or under hypnosis to something not actually experienced or carried out. Therefore, truth serums, drugs to weaken resistance and the will to withhold information, could even defeat the interrogator's mission of preparing the accused to play the role of scapegoat in a staged show trial.

Deceptographs or Polygraphs (lie detectors), which are used considerably by Western agencies, are hardly used by the Soviets for the same reason besides accomplishing under certain conditions much less than physical pressure and terror could achieve. It is known that a stimulant, such as strong coffee, strong tobacco or cigarettes after long periods in which their use was denied, rich and enticing food, especially also alcohol in large quantities, is used often to trap the accused or cause him to become fully dependant on the kindness of the interrogator for further benefits.

Positions into which the prisoner may be forced for extended periods include sitting for days or long hours in erect posture on a small or low bench or stool until he cannot possibly bear the resultant pains and swelling of his legs and body caused by abnormal blood circulation and muscle tension. The aim in this form of torture, and similar excruciating body positions into which the accused is forced, is to make the accused lose all command over his will because of the extreme condition of fatigue, realization of utter defeat, inability to bear further pain, and consequent loss

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of strength of character and power of mental concentration. It has been established that it is almost impossible for a normal person to bear up under such treatment without becoming the willing tool of his tormentors.

Another favorite practice to torment the accused is to threaten arrest and torture of his closest relatives and immediate family. In the case of, I believe, HORST LUDWIG, who was convicted of espionage in 1959, it became quite evident, as borne out in his own testimony and magazine publications of his background story, that his father was beaten in jail in East Germany and made to believe (or actually overheard) that another close relative was also brutally beaten in an adjoining cell from where his or her cries could be heard. The result of this treatment was that HORST LUDWIG's father and other relatives cooperated with the Soviets and the MFS in convincing him (HORST) to accept the offer to spy against the Western military establishment (Federal German navy and air force, as well as the U. S. Air Force in the United States during his training in Florida) for the Soviets. In all cases of this kind, the Soviets assure a certain degree of silence and success by using close relatives as hostages, who will be arrested and punished should the agents or informants being forced to cooperate ever turn against the Soviets or betray their missions to the Western authorities. The tremendous fear of severe reprisals and harsh treatments to relatives or the immediate family, including children at times, probably is a very strong influence on the continued loyalty and silence of Eastern agents, even if they are not fully convinced of the Communist regime's alleged advantages.

A strong element in the interrogator's power over defendants is his oft-repeated contention that resistance is useless as long as the accused is in the hands of the Soviets and that he only hurts his own chances for a relatively light sentence by refusing to "cooperate." It is well known through appropriate press and radio publicity, fully endorsed and even advertised by the Soviet security agencies (such as MFS), that those who confess or offer their statements and cooperate with the Soviet authorities early enough will be given complete immunity to very light punishment while those who insist on hiding their crimes against the state or the "people" will be sentenced severely. This practice, of course, and the consistent

publicity and show trials demonstrating the method repeatedly, has a considerable influence on any defendant and his willingness to prevent a very long sentence or even a death penalty. In this connection, the utilization of technical surveillance and recording equipment, as well as informants posing as fellow prisoners or sympathetic inmates or guards, are used to gather as much detrimental information about and from the defendant as can possibly be gained between interrogations.

Aside from clever political arguments, used by Soviet investigators in convincing prisoners of the superiority and infallibility of the Communist cause and aims, the accused will frequently be led into apparently casual political discussions when the interrogators try to make the accused believe that the questioning is being relaxed for the sake of a respite and to be more friendly and even considerate toward the defendant. Even a cautious prisoner, and being intelligent, may try to justify his attitude toward his interrogators and a so-called objective criticism of the regime's errors. In such moments, the interrogators will find the arguments for coercing the prisoner into admitting political opposition to the regime.

Finally, all prisoners in pre-trial detention are treated in such manner as to purposely lower their self-respect and feeling of human dignity. The way in which a newly admitted suspect is registered at the pre-trial prison, searched physically for weapons or possible implements of escape, caused to turn in their belongings, and placed into the cell, is well calculated to cause the prisoner to feel deprived, lost, and without possible help. The simple expedient of periods of pre-trial investigation and interrogation lasting for months or even beyond a year is highly effective in creating strong despair in the prisoner's mind. Without hope and the possibility of help from the outside, he weakens much more easily than if he were permitted to communicate with relatives and friends on the outside. This practice, of course, also affects the prisoner's relatives and contacts on the outside, especially if they are in any way guilty but not apprehended as yet. Their fears may cause these people to make errors in judgment, flee, or even contact the very persons or organizations for advice and help and thus lead the Soviets to ascertain more easily their actual Western connections and missions.

The aforementioned pamphlet by SAGOLLA (DIE ROTE GESTAPO) reflects on pages 4² through 51 the above cited interrogation methods and several examples of brutal treatments of pre-trial prisoners by the MFS. For the purpose of this testimony it is unfortunate that names of the victims and interrogators are not given in the pamphlet, although dates are cited. Exact details may be obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency, whose representatives in West Berlin maintained close contact with the KGU and may have saved some of the very valuable records and files of that organization before it was closed down.

The pamphlet, entitled, "DER STAATSSICHERHEITSDIENST" (The State Security Service - i.e., MFS), prepared by the UFJ (Free Jurists in West Berlin) prior to 1960, contains very interesting information on pages 59 through 78 regarding MFS interrogation methods and the manner in which prisoners of the Soviets and MFS are handled from the moment of their arrest to their final sentencing in typical show trials. The UFJ has backed up this information with several actual case histories and mentions precise names, dates, and places involved to present authentic reports. The two examples, illustrating well Soviet and East German interrogation methods, cited below were extracted from the UFJ booklet.

ALFRED KUNTZSCH, born October 23, 1928, resided in East Germany at Lauchhammer, where he worked in the local machine factory. On March 6, 1953, he made critical remarks about STALIN, who had just died, and mentioned his hope for a unified Germany. He made these remarks among fellow workers. Two days later, he was arrested by three MFS officers, who took him to the local MFS office. After a complete physical check of his clothes and body, he was permitted to keep only his shirt, trousers and jacket, and was then placed in a cell. After several hours, he was taken to the interrogation room and questioned by several MFS officials for four hours. His statements at the factory and other remarks he had made were repeated to him and he was accused of having criticized the regime, which he denied. Two MFS interrogators repeatedly hit him in the face with their fists, causing him to fall from his chair repeatedly and to lose consciousness. Then a confession was demanded in return for cigarettes and a promise of release from jail. After continued refusal to confess, KUNTZSCH was again beaten. He was then returned to his cell.

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In the second interrogation, the report from his fellow worker, MANFRED SCHMENZER, regarding the incident and his remarks was finally shown the accused after specific statements, KUNTZSCH had made only in the informant's presence, were mentioned to prove the accuracy of the accusation. Even then the prisoner refused to make a full confession and was again maltreated. His resistance was finally broken when he was threatened with the arrest of his wife and children.

When KUNTZSCH was moved several days after his original arrest to the pre-trial judge, he was told to sign a statement that he confessed voluntarily and without coercion. KUNTZSCH pointed to his scars and other marks of violence and refused to sign the statement. He was then placed in a dark and damp basement cell without windows of very small size and forced to stand in it up to 14 hours, when he collapsed. He was revived with water, and when again threatened with further detention in the same cell, he signed the statement.

In subsequent interrogations and while being photographed, he was placed in a blinding floodlight although he was highly sensitive to any light and almost blind. He was given a defense lawyer the day of and very shortly before the trial, at which the prosecutor demanded a sentence of seven and a half years in the penitentiary. He was given a two and a half year sentence, which was later curtailed when KUNTZSCH in view of his increasing blindness, induced because of the interrogations facing the floodlights, was unable to leave the prison hospital.

MARTIN POHL, born March 23, 1930, a journalist, worked from 1947 to 1950 as editorial trainee for the East Berlin Communist youth organization magazine, (FDJ-Zeitschrift) "JUNGE WELT." There he became acquainted with the editor LOTHAR LINK. After LINK fled to West Berlin in the spring of 1950, LINK telephoned POHL and arranged with POHL a meeting in West Berlin. This telephone call, apparently made to POHL's office, had become known to the main editorial office of the magazine, causing the responsible staff members to discuss the proposed meeting with POHL and threatening him with immediate dismissal should he keep the appointment. POHL therefore did not meet LINK as scheduled and also had no further contact with LINK at any time later.

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On February 22, 1953, POHL was unexpectedly arrested in his home in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. He was taken to the MFS pre-trial prison and accused of having committed espionage against East Germany on behalf of the Americans. POHL was completely amazed at the charges and could not understand why he would be accused of such activity. After many long interrogations for one week, the interrogators finally mentioned the name LINK. Thereupon POHL explained that he had never seen LINK again after his flight to West Berlin in 1950.

In spite of his repeated denials of guilt and contact with LINK or the U. S. Intelligence Service, POHL continued to be interrogated from six to seven hours each night for approximately three weeks. POHL was not permitted to sleep in the daytime in his cell and was unable to rest during the night when his interrogations took place. While detained in his solitary and illuminated cell, POHL would be awakened by the guard at once whenever he fell asleep on his small stool, on which he was forced to sit. At those times, the guard would loudly rap on the cell door and yell and cuss out the prisoner. Because of his extreme exhaustion, POHL finally gave up further resistance and decided to make a false confession. He then claimed to have met LINK twice in West Berlin in May 1950.

Soon after his "confession" was written up and signed, POHL was placed in another cell, in which a certain FUCHS, the onetime press secretary of the ousted East German Foreign Minister, DERTINGER, was also detained. FUCHS strongly advised POHL to not make further incriminating and false statements but to renounce his alleged confession. POHL followed this advice during the next interrogation and the investigator finally accepted his denial, making an official record thereof. Especially at this interrogation, but also in previous ones, POHL was always yelled at, cussed out, and treated in a degrading manner to cause him to lose his self-confidence.

Until mid-June 1953, POHL was interrogated three times weekly, and thereafter again at longer intervals. A final attempt to yet obtain a confession from POHL was made when he was threatened with indefinite detention prior to trial. In another attempt by the MFS, LINK and POHL were confronted while LINK openly accused POHL of espionage. Since

POHL had actually had no contact with LINK or the Americans, and LINK must have known this also, it is evident that LINK must have been forced as well by the MFS to fabricate a confession and implicate others for the sake of terminating the ordeal of interrogation and pre-trial detention hardships. In spite of his unchanged statement of innocence, POHL was placed on trial in Chemnitz, East Germany, where he and other defendants were sentenced on November 5, 1953 to four years in the penitentiary. The prosecution had demanded a five year sentence. The principal defendant, LOTHAR LINK was sentenced in a separate proceeding of the same court to ten years in the penitentiary on July 7, 1953.

POHL found out that another defendant, also a former editor of the "JUNGF WELT," one PETER LEFOLD, had also made a false confession and had then similarly retracted his confession. As LEFOLD subsequently explained to POHL, he could not have met LINK in West Berlin on the dates claimed by LINK because he (LEFOLD) was not even in East or West Berlin during that period. In the main court session trying POHL and LEFOLD, both were sentenced to four years in prison, however. The reason why the trial took place in Chemnitz, an area in which none of the defendants had resided previously or had even worked, was unknown to POHL. POHL later fled to West Berlin after his release in East Germany and made a sworn statement to the UFJ on April 18, 1955, regarding this experience.

Before closing any final analysis of Soviet and Communist interrogation methods, the following cases should be studied closely inasmuch as they serve well as typical examples of brutality and ruthless interrogation.

One is the investigation and prosecution in Hungary of CARDINAL MINDSENTY, who is currently protected by the United States Embassy in Hungary against further persecution by the AVO (Hungarian Communist Security and Counterintelligence Organization). MINDSENTY was arrested and accused of having committed treason and subversion against the Communist Hungarian People's Republic. After very long and extremely exhausting interrogations, MINDSENTY was tried in a show trial and given a long sentence. During the trial, he appeared to be a broken man, having the appearance of a hypnotized or drugged person. As far as I know,

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the methods of degradation of the spirit, of exhaustion through lack of rest and physical as well as nervous tension, and of interminable accusations and threats finally caused the cardinal to break down in his resistance. It is unknown to me if any drugs were used but I believe, having read published articles by knowledgeable writers in which the use of strong coffee was mentioned as one practice to keep MINDSENTY awake over long periods and prevent rest for the accused, that the purpose of the use of drugs had been achieved.

Another case is the prosecution and trial of KADAR, the current head of the Hungarian Communist Party and State regime. KADAR was subjected to even worse treatments and inhumane handling by the AVO, when he was accused of anti-Stalinist actions and tendencies prior to the death of STALIN. Although KADAR's suffering may not be described to any American investigators or writers by any available witnesses, it was reported, I believe, by JAMES A. MICHENER, in his recent book, The Bridge at Andau, published by Random House, New York, in 1957. MICHENER cites in this book a large number of sadistic practices of the AVO in their handling of prisoners and suspects. Being in the United States Embassy at Budapest, CARDINAL MINDSENTY should also be available for first-hand statements. MICHENER may well remember many of the Hungarian refugees whose information he reported regarding the AVO and Soviet interrogation and detention methods and may possibly provide addresses of suitable witnesses. The United States Army General DEAN should also be able to furnish first-hand testimony regarding the degrading treatment and brainwashing techniques he was subjected to by the North Korean Communists as a Prisoner of War prior to his release.

Murder by Soviet agents to eliminate political foes, knowledgeable defectors, former Communists who left the Party to fight Communism from the West, and any other opposition considered too dangerous to be permitted to continue their activities, is known well as one method of gaining political ends at all cost. A perfect example of this ruthless course of action by the Soviets was revealed when the MVD Captain KHEKHLOV defected to the West in early 1954 instead of carrying out his Soviet mission to assassinate leading NTS official OKOLOVITCH in Frankfurt/Main, Germany.

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Another agent sent along to assist KHOKHLOV was the German HANS KUKOWITSCH, an old-time Communist from Lindau, Lake Constance, Germany. KUKOWITSCH was born 1911 in Switzerland. Another agent, who accompanied KHOKHLOV and KUKOWITSCH, was the German WTBFR. On February 25, 1954, these agents were placed in protective custody by the United States authorities in West Germany. On April 22, 1954, the Americans announced publicly and officially the Soviet attempt to murder OKOLOVITCH with the help of these agents, who had been given all necessary papers, funds, and the small hidden murder weapon. It may be significant that at about the same time, DR. ALEXANDER TRUCHNOVITCH was abducted from West Berlin, namely on April 13, 1954, only nine days before the American announcement in Bonn.

To my personal knowledge, the following other instances of Soviet or MFS assassination attempts against anti-Communist politicians occurred between 1955 and 1957 in West Berlin. One was directed at the aforementioned outspoken anti-Soviet and anti-Communist Party Chairman of the FDP, CARL-HUBERT SCHWENNICKE, to whom the MFS through anonymous persons sent a package containing a strong explosive, which wounded severely SCHWENNICKE's secretary, who opened the parcel in the ante-room to the Party leader's office in the SIEMENS CORPORATION's Administration Building, where he had an important director position. This took place in early 1955. In the East German press and radio strenuous efforts were made to place the blame and guilt on Western agents of a nationalist group.

Another attempt was made, I believe in 1956, against the aforementioned SPD functionary and mayor of Berlin-Kreuzberg, WILLI KREBSMANN. In this case, an informant of the MFS, who had first been tested by several trial missions which he apparently accomplished, although not too successful, was given a parcel of a specially prepared explosive charge to mail in a certain way and with a false return address to the intended victim. Only because the informant had also established contact with an American counterintelligence agency in West Berlin and was not willing to carry out this mission, was it possible to save KREBSMANN. The charge was exploded instead by the West Berlin police detonation and mine clearing specialists. It was found to have a very large detonating force and would easily have killed the victim. The bomb and

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parcel consisted entirely of products purchased in West Berlin and manufactured in the West. The false return address was apparently picked by the MFS to implicate another opponent of Communism in West Berlin, should West Berlin authorities have found a trace of the alleged sender.

The entire parcel and contents had been built and similar models had most likely been tested earlier by the MFS in East Berlin in a specially established research and development center and laboratory, designated "Abteilung S" (Department S), in which specialists and MFS prisoners with appropriate technical and scientific background and knowledge work developing and making all types of technical equipment, used, for instance, in abductions when cars having false license plates can be driven from the scene of the crime while changing the plates without having to stop, in audio-surveillance (secret listening devices), and in clandestine communications, as well as special photographic missions requiring spy cameras of different sizes and camouflaged in various ways.

Instances of suicide, which were in reality assassinations to make the victim appear to have killed himself, are not remembered by me. There have been several cases of suicide by Soviet and MFS agents or informants, but whether these were bona fide suicides or not is extremely difficult to determine beyond reasonable doubt. Obviously, any suicide eliminates further police investigation as soon as the possibility of murder has been found highly improbable.

In one instance, a pre-trial prisoner of the East German authorities in the Soviet Sector of Berlin prior to 1953 was accused of economic as well as political crimes and/or espionage against the East German regime. He was brutally beaten and allegedly managed to jump out of a prison window in an upper floor. It was generally believed to have been suicide by a victim of torture who could not bear further mistreatment. It could, however, easily have been a last resort by the responsible investigating agency to cover up the true condition of the victim who, because of maltreatment, could no longer be utilized in a show trial or who had steadfastly or because of his true innocence failed to confess. Although the name of the victim is not recollected by me now, I know that he was at one time the fiancee of MRS. RUTH VON VARADY, the present wife of a well known journalist, ALEXANDER VON

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VARADY-SZABO, in West Berlin. I believe that close friends, as well as his former fiancée, were convinced that the victim did not really commit suicide.

In another case, an espionage suspect or agent of the Soviets, a rather beautiful naturalized American of originally West German nationality, who had married a United States serviceman and had migrated to the United States, was found in a West Berlin apartment of her onetime boy friend, the German dentist, DR. SOMMER, at Berlin-Wilmersdorf, British Sector, where she had supposedly committed suicide over her broken love affair and a quarrel with DR. SOMMER. The victim's name I do not remember, unfortunately, but the West Berlin police and United States authorities in Berlin, including the CIA, I believe, investigated this case and found a notebook of the victim. She had opened the gas valves in the kitchen after closing all windows, while DR. SOMMER left in the evening and did not return until early morning, when he found her already dead. DR. SOMMER, himself, as well as several of his female acquaintances, and even his own wife (married after the incident), were all tied up in suspicious activities in connection with the Soviet intelligence service in East Berlin. The victim had apparently made numerous travels behind the Iron Curtain and had been in contact with the Soviets repeatedly.

It is my firm opinion, based on extended study of the Soviet practices, that in their efforts to achieve their goals they would not hesitate to assassinate opponents in any manner considered especially suitable and would therefore take any opportunity to have such murder appear as suicide.

Another good example of Communist assassination for a political purpose is the murder by ERICH MIELKE, the current head of the MFS in East Germany, when he carried out a Party order and shot and killed the German police officers, ANLAUF and IENCE, in Berlin on August 9, 1931, at a time when the Nazis had not assumed power and a truly democratic government existed under the old German Weimar Republic's Constitution.

In view of the ruthlessness of Soviet activities

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in all fields of intelligence, espionage, subversion, and counterintelligence, particularly concerning Western Europe, the problem of taking effective United States counter measures without reverting to similar tactics or utilizing such drastic actions as to seriously endanger our democratic processes has been and may well continue to be a major reason why Soviet acts of aggression and terror are difficult to combat. I am convinced, on the basis of 15 years of practical experience in Berlin and confronting the Soviets and their Communist collaborators in continuous "front line action," that until now the overall efforts and specific activities by the responsible United States agencies were rather optimistically viewed as adequate, or even effective, and fully sufficient for the future without, however, having been carried out on a scale really needed to achieve complete Western protection against future Soviet threats.

It is impossible to place the blame on any particular individual. Such attempts of improving our efficiency and increasing our effort would, in my opinion, fail to provide a sound plan for better measures. It would only result in accusations and excuses by the agencies concerned. Also, I know that a very large number of highly dedicated and capable Americans in all branches of the government and abroad have done all they could to alert the public and obtain decisions and favorable results in fighting Communist aggression and terror. But it must be realized that no matter how much any such activities, as counterintelligence, security regulations, intelligence and espionage acts, and influencing politically foreign countries and their populations, may be distasteful to or considered an essential evil by many loyal, although poorly informed Americans (including some responsible government officials) the United States and its foreign allies will be in a far more perilous position, unless we become much more active and concerned regarding Western security and our true political strength versus Communism.

I can safely state that the personnel strength, the scope of available funds and operational means, and the degree of combined or concentrated effort in providing greater security from Soviet acts of aggression and subversion in Western Europe, and particularly regarding West Berlin (or Berlin as a whole before the Soviet Blockade), were definitely inadequate, as it pertains not only to the United States authorities there, but

also regarding the French and the British endeavors. In addition, the punishment provided in our laws and West German jurisdiction, as shown above in a few examples, is very light compared with Soviet sentences for similar and even less serious offenses. When it is possible for the Soviets to concentrate on private and official Western agencies to such an extent that infiltration and subversion cause these agencies to become ineffective and even terminate their operations, then it is apparent that our success in this field is highly questionable. (The leading West German SPD functionary and member of the House of Representatives, HERBERT WEHNER, for instance, who had been a leading Communist before World War II and broke with the Party because of Soviet domination and his recognition of errors in Communist doctrines, was the target of numerous Soviet abduction attempts in his West German home town of Hamburg. He knows Communist ruthlessness personally and serves as an excellent example of Soviet terror practices. Even though he is a recognized and well known political figure, the Communists did not hesitate to attempt to eliminate him through physical violence. Yet, except for a onetime reporting of the attempts to abduct or assassinate him, very little publicity has been given these attempts.)

One weakness in American policy and actions in Germany was the reluctance to demand full recognition of occupation rights and constant respect from all German officials and politicians, especially those in responsible positions in the Soviet Zone, when dealing with or referring to United States authorities, regardless of contrary Soviet political aims and domination. The Soviets and their German collaborators regard the unwillingness by leading United States officials to openly exercise their rights as a controlling power during conduct toward Germans and handling Communists as an obvious political weakness instead of, as sincerely intended by the Americans, an effort to be considerate and fair toward all Germans. Believing the Americans weak and well-meaning, the Soviets were encouraged to become increasingly brazen in their disregard for human values and freedom in Germany, but particularly concerning residents of Western occupied territory. They accordingly assumed that the United States Government was not sufficiently serious or sincere in their declared occupation policy and plans for a unified and independently democratic Germany to be willing and prepared to take drastic action, even military measures,

to protect German integrity, security, and pro-Western interests.

An as yet unwarranted political independence and full freedom of political action for solely the Western occupied Germany 1948 (similar to a rather premature United States disarmament right after World War II), not being based on any realistic appraisal of an as yet quite unsettled political future for the whole of Germany, including the ruthlessly suppressed Soviet Zone, allowed the Soviets to isolate themselves from the Western powers, to consolidate their domination of East Germany and Poland, and to establish a deep rift between the two parts of Germany. Western actions regarding East Germany, at an early stage relatively justified and plausible in the light of joint occupation rights, therefore became practically impossible or even dangerous.

The ridiculous situation of alleged spokesmen of an occupied people, as the Communists in East Germany claimed to be, although supported in their political activities by the Soviets, protesting violently in press and radio so-called intelligence and espionage efforts by an occupying power, such as the Americans, never apparently caused the least concern or immediate counter measures by the responsible United States occupation officials to clarify once and for all the correct status of those East Germans and the Communists in Germany. Aside from oftentimes effective actions and protests by GENERAL HOWLEY, too few such energetic steps were ever taken by the Americans to demand satisfaction and corrective actions.

Unfortunately, Soviet actions in organizing and strengthening two years after World War II East German armed forces and security organizations (such as the MFS), while West Germany was neither rearming nor established similar security agencies, were never officially publicized nor strongly protested by the United States Government, although detailed and timely reports were forwarded regarding these threats as early as 1948 by CIC from Berlin.

The fact that certain United States officials in Germany intentionally or inadvertently defeated the best American interests in Germany by playing into Soviet hands further caused the Soviets and Communists to assume that

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the United States Government would not take drastic action to insist on its announced policies being carried out in spite of Soviet objections or lack of cooperation. Such American officials, as the former head of the OMCUS (Office Mil. Gov't. U.S.) Radio Branch and his deputy, having been active Communists before, took actions shortly after the Soviet Blockade of Berlin seriously affecting the personnel and effectiveness of broadcasts by RIAS (U.S. sponsored Radio in Berlin). Through their decisions, a powerful transmitter was not used in Berlin as originally planned, ardent and popular supporters of official American policies and interests in Europe, as the excellent commentators VON VAPADY and EUGEN HARTMANN, were not only fired without notice or due cause but even prevented from regaining other employment, and radio commentators were selected who openly as well as secretly supported leftist and SPD interests strongly opposing Western military preparedness, such as NATO, and efforts to contain Soviet aggression. Other independent RIAS commentators, such as FRNST TILLICH, who also staunchly backed United States policy, were dropped as well at a later date. This lack of understanding by certain American officials abroad (in this case, Berlin), regarding the importance of fostering and constantly helping the true local friends of America, was greatly responsible for resentment, despair, and doubt in the wisdom of openly endorsing United States interests in the face of constant Communist intrigues, infiltration, and frequent acts of violence, against which many once eager friends of the United States were not even adequately protected. Although the aforementioned OMCUS officials were finally ousted in 1953 (shortly before OMCUS ceased to exist anyway), the Radio Branch chief, while still claiming to represent United States interests at the Copenhagen International Broadcasting Conference in 1947, permitted the Soviets to obtain the best possible radio frequencies for East German stations sending strong Communist propaganda throughout Germany.

Another serious drawback preventing effective protective action against abductions and similar transgressions into Western territory was the inadequate patrolling by Western police and security forces at the Soviet Zone and Sector borders. After a particularly alarming series of abductions in West Berlin, I recommended to the then responsible American Public Safety officer, MAJOR BOND, that patrols and checks of vehicles at the Sector borders

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be increased to permit closer examination of suspicious cars and persons and to record license plates for ready counterintelligence reference. He agreed that such measures would be excellent but pointed out that top level political aims and diplomatic considerations were strongly opposed to such action, as "the Soviets could capitalize on such steps to accuse the Americans of sabotaging German reunification and intensifying the separation of Germany." (The latter remarks were more or less those of leading United States officials who feared such consequences.) Freedom of interzonal movement was strongly demanded by the highest American officials and then actually established in spite of continued Soviet travel restrictions. This policy may have been sincerely considered as a way by the Americans to provide the desired freedom of movement for all Germans, but it certainly permitted the Soviets to infiltrate the West with increased ease and effort while still preventing Western powers equal and proper access to East Germany in return.

My urgent recommendations are that the United States intelligence and security agencies be built up and expanded to become more effective and constitute a true deterrent to further Soviet and Communist aggression and subversion, that operational needs in this respect are not disregarded or inadequately met within, for instance, military intelligence and security organizations for the sake of overriding administrative or budgetary policy considerations, that the intelligence and foreign area specialists of the United States Government and forces are not lost to the security effort because of strict adherence to such "fearful or cautious" regulations as any recent foreign nationality, foreign spouses, or unwillingness to grant necessary waivers for their utilization and retention under unusual circumstances. If it were possible to use to really great national advantage such onetime enemies and currently truly loyal Americans as WERNER VON BRAUN, then the utilization of valuable and capable individuals in the fields of intelligence and security at the present state of "peace" with the Soviets should be just as important, if not more essential, to winning the running battle of the cold war. Inadequate funds, antiquated measures for the sake of not taking chances on any foreign born individuals, the neglect of operational requirements for the benefit of

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increased administrative activities, and the failure to coordinate all agencies efficiently in an all-out national security and, above all, active propaganda effort, should all be prevented in future measures and plans by the United States Government regarding really adequate endeavors to combat Communist aggression and subversion.