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**INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
AND
THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 1962**

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September 1962

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"Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion--which is usually too late."

From the Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling in Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohlstetter, Stanford, 1962.

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A. SCOPE

1. The production of national intelligence estimates as a coordinated effort of the United States intelligence community has been under way since the establishment of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in the Fall of 1950. The structure, formats and the principal procedures in estimating have shown substantial continuity down to the present time. At its present stage of evolution the estimating process constitutes a remarkably small evaluative effort at the apex of the broad collection and analytical efforts of the intelligence community. A guiding doctrine in the shaping of the system to date has been the separation of estimating from policy in order to assure the presentation by the intelligence community of unbiased comprehensive judgments to the policy makers. In this climate few participants in the estimating system will hazard a guess as to the influence of estimates on policy decisions.

2. The critical nature of the estimating function has made the system the object of relatively frequent top-level Government review and evaluation. The Hoover Commission Report of 28 December 1948 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee Report of 1 January 1949 examined the subject in detail and laid much of the groundwork for the establishment of the Office of National Estimates. The

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Inspector General conducted a "Survey of the Office of National Estimates" in April of 1954. A Task Force on Intelligence Activities under General Mark Clark issued a report in May 1955 dealing at length with estimating. Background material in the Clark Committee files dealt with most of the key issues brought to our attention during the current inspection.

3. Another medium for more general discussions of the purposes and problems of national estimating has been the quarterly Studies in Intelligence now in its sixth year. Many members of ONE, of the Board of National Estimates, and of other components of the intelligence community have contributed firsthand accounts and judgments on important aspects of the subject.

4. Finally, in the past 12 months the Joint Study Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and the present Director's Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Matters both chaired by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick have completed studies with implications for the estimating process. These were explored orally by the inspectors with Mr. Kirkpatrick.

5. A three-man team from the Inspector General's staff spent the months of July and August 1962 reviewing primarily the organizational and management aspects of the national estimating process. The

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bulk of the survey was concerned with the Office of National Estimates which provides most of the apparatus and the day-to-day coordination of the community's effort in national estimating. Discussions were held with all members of ONE and the Board of National Estimates, with many other senior officials of CIA and with selected contributors and users of estimates in the Government.

6. An Agency inspection of this intelligence community system necessarily stopped short of a detailed examination and comparison among the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) member organizations of their levels of effort, quality of performance, and standards of management. Such review would be essential to a coordinated USIB effort to appraise and improve the estimating process. The USIB community approach to estimating was frequently characterized to us by its participants as a loose federated system of very uneven quality and performance. The USIB does not maintain a formal management group to analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems, for example, in estimating. In the past the excellence of the example set by the ONE estimators appears to have been the principal stimulus to improved community performance.

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7. This review of the estimating process would not be complete without mention of the continued presence at the helm of the Office of National Estimates of Sherman Kent, who has probably made the largest individual contribution to the present highly respected stature of his office. We encountered a wide range of warm personal tributes to Mr. Kent.


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d. OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

- (1) MISSION. The Assistant Director for National Estimates is charged with the production of national intelligence estimates.
- (2) FUNCTIONS. The Assistant Director for National Estimates shall:
 - (a) Direct the production of national intelligence estimates. This includes the setting of priorities and the assignment of production responsibilities among the components of the Central Intelligence Agency, and among the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government.
 - (b) Prepare national intelligence estimates for issuance by the Director of Central Intelligence.
 - (c) Sit as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates.
 - (d) Provide CIA representation and intelligence support at the Staff Assistants level of the National Security Council Staff.
 - (e) 25X1C8A

 - (f) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence research agencies.
 - (g) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence collection agencies.

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B. THE ESTIMATING SYSTEM

8. Authority pertaining to the production of national intelligence estimates is provided in National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) Numbers 1 and 3 and in Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) Number 1/1. DCID's 3/3, 3/4, and 3/5 which establish under the United States Intelligence Board the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), and the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC) incorporate a standard paragraph providing for the participation of these Committees in national estimating. The inspectors encountered no concrete proposals for the modification of these directives.

9. Within CIA the Office of National Estimates is designated as a component of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence, and specifies that the Deputy Director (Intelligence) (DD/I) is "responsible for directing and coordinating the activities of the Office of...National Estimates...." The relationship between DD/I and Assistant Director for National Estimates (AD/NE) has varied with the incumbents depending in large part on the relation desired by the Director of Central Intelligence with his AD/NE. There is an evident need for keeping the DD/I fully and promptly informed on the programming of

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ONE assignments. Further, the DD/I clearly will need to oversee the exchange of views between his staff in ONE and in other DD/I offices to insure maximum reconciliation or full identification of differences of position between himself and the Board of National Estimates on national security problems.

Components

10. The Board of National Estimates consists at the present time of 12 members selected by the Director of Central Intelligence on indefinite tenure to give both substantive and procedural guidance to the national estimating process. Present members have been selected for their civilian or military experience in academic, military or intelligence pursuits. The Board is thoroughly integrated into the ONE structure but its members are freed of all administrative duties. The AD/NE is Board Chairman, there is a deputy chairman, and the Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates (DAD/NE), who is responsible for the administration of the Office, is also a member of the Board.

11. The Board's existence rests on the authority of the DCI. There is no cognizance of its existence and functions in the directives of the National Security Council. DCID 1/1 spells out

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Board functions in scheduling and assigning work on estimates, in setting terms of reference and in coordinating estimates for final presentation to the USIB.

12. The Board was an integral part of the original conception of the national estimating process. In the early years its composition and purpose were visualized, however, as an assemblage of independent authorities of the highest national reputation, acting in a corporate capacity, to develop the substantive product of the estimating effort. This concept has been substantially modified through time with the growing professionalism of the Estimates Staff. The Board enjoys the services of many gifted individuals, but the demands of coordination have restricted their contributions in the strictly creative sense of conceiving estimates and highlighted their skills in criticism and negotiation.

13. A second feature of the evolution of Board functions has been the sharp reduction in the functioning of the Board as a corporate body in coordinating estimates. The given estimating project is today steered through the system by a panel of two or three Board members, one of whom is designated chairman with wide latitude to impress his personal views of coordinating procedure on the community effort. Efficiency in coordination has risen through the years and the panel approach with the use of strong

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chairmen has enabled the Board to handle a larger volume of business without community complaint concerning the objectivity and fairness of the process. Questions concerning the selection, career management, and alternative uses of Board talents are discussed in detail in Section C of the survey.

14. The Estimates Staff is a group of intelligence officers maintained in ONE to perform the final drafting of national estimates. These men are responsible first of all for keeping themselves comprehensively informed on the areas or subjects for which they have assigned responsibility. Their effectiveness at drafting derives from personal command of a subject field and from utilization of the estimative contributions from the intelligence community. Their product may in turn undergo substantial modification at the hands of members of the Board of National Estimates and during the interagency coordination of the draft prior to its submission to the USIB. The growing competence of the ONE staff has been a notable feature of the evolution of ONE to date and has contributed to a relatively autonomous status for the staff vis a vis the Board in ONE.

15. The measure of a staff man is his ability to weigh events and trends in the given area or subject field, to make perceptive judgments of their significance for intelligence and

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policy planning purposes, and to communicate these ideas effectively orally or in writing to the varied ranks of Government officials. Objectivity of analysis is of the essence both in the preparation of a draft estimate, a commissioned memorandum or a self-initiated appreciation of a foreign situation, and in its defense before the Board of National Estimates, and subsequently in the market place of the intelligence and policy community. The characteristic influence of such experience on the individual cannot yet be fully appraised, but there is an evident premium on initiative and forcefulness. There is a distinct pull on the most aptly suited individuals to move from this arena of evaluation into positions of command both in CIA and elsewhere in the Government.

16. The Support Staff provides for the administrative needs of both the Board of National Estimates and the Estimates Staff. These activities include maintenance of an Information Control unit, reading and reference rooms, a Publications and Reproduction unit, and research, secretarial and clerical services. There is a substantial volume of publishing and dissemination of revised drafts of estimates, much of it occurring outside regular working hours. The skills and dedication of the staff were widely commended by ONE's professional members.

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Estimating Procedures

17. The estimative product may take any one of many forms, depending on the nature and urgency of the problem being dealt with by the policy makers of the Government. The majority of estimative papers are commissioned by the DCI, the White House staff, the policy planning mechanism of the Department of State, policy task forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military operations authorities. There is a substantial demand for estimative memoranda by the DCI and the USIB and, finally, a lesser volume of self-initiated ONE staff and Board memoranda. Channels for requesting estimates are informal and vary from direct contacts between outside requesters and members of ONE to command assignments delivered either directly from the DCI or via the DD/I.

18. The USIB or the DCI on its behalf must approve the scheduling of a national estimate. The USIB approves each quarter a program of national intelligence estimates for the succeeding six months which is prepared by the Board of National Estimates. The next step is the preparation of terms of reference for the estimate which define the subject to be covered, and pose the questions to be answered. The terms of reference are drafted in ONE and submitted to the USIB agencies for review. Representatives designated by the USIB agencies to coordinate the

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production of the estimate then meet with a panel from the Board of National Estimates to confirm the terms of reference, and to assign responsibility and deadlines for the production of departmental contributions. The contributions from all sources are delivered to the Estimates Staff of ONE and a designated estimates team proceeds to draft the estimate for Board consideration.

19. The drafting of estimates is by and large the prerogative of ONE and is the source of some contention on the part of contributors to estimates in other agencies. The problem is to produce a cohesive estimate written in an effective style. Such integration must come in the last analysis as the performance of one individual. It derives from the individual drafter's command of pertinent information, his ability to focus and make perceptive judgments on the essential problems, and his skill in presenting them lucidly and convincingly. The authors of contributions from the other agencies inevitably tend to challenge the style, if not the judgments, in the final draft and to question the discard of their own conscientious and sometimes excellent efforts.

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C. OPERATING TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

General

20. ONE and the estimating process have been operating in a climate of organizational stability for some years. There is a general lack of sentiment among the participants for radical change in the basic features of the system. There are a number of factors that help to account for this stability. One of the most important is that ONE has been able to attract high caliber staff and to satisfy them with the working atmosphere. ONE is a market place for ideas and it offers both the freedom and the pressures conducive to strong performance by perceptive individuals. Any tendency in the individual participant to relax in comfortable established procedures is likely, we judged, to prove a relatively short-lived condition.

21. A second factor making for stability is the reputation that the system and the product have established for themselves in the U.S. Government. There is a wide readership for estimates, tending to be more comprehensive the higher placed the individual official. Our discussions outside the Agency indicated that the estimates are read at the operating level by the authorities responsible for the areas and subject fields with which they deal. The construction and style of estimates are regarded as professional

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in quality. A good job is done in handling facts and background data. The timing of estimates was regarded as generally satisfactory. Every observer also had views on the inherent limitations in estimating and these are dealt with in more detail below. But the reservations were prefaced with expressions of respect and appreciation such as are noted here.

22. A third factor keeping the system on its present course is its record of substantive accomplishment. Particular satisfaction was expressed with the demonstrated capability of ONE and the DD/I area in general to help formulate as well as coordinate the estimative judgments on military subjects, sometimes involving issues that the military had failed to analyze or coordinate effectively among themselves. Independent civilian analysis of military/strategic problems was considered by at least one observer as perhaps the most significant current contribution of the estimating system to the national security. Many individuals expressed the opinion, always an intangible one as to concrete evidence, that the policy commitments of the other USIB organizations influence their estimative judgments. The absence of such commitments enhances the objectivity and usefulness of the estimative contributions produced by CIA.

23. There was also a consensus among participants and observers of the estimating process that various features and procedures in

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the system are defective but lacking obvious remedy. The broadest of these criticisms was that the estimates tend to be too general in scope and their judgments are too heavily hedged to be useful to policy makers. Since estimates deal with problems in which essential information is frequently lacking and even the policy makers of target countries are unable to foresee and control developments with precision, it would seem that this criticism is more in the nature of a description of one of the basic features of the game.

24. A close corollary to the preceding point, however, was the observation from many estimators that they have very limited contact with policy makers. They are never fully satisfied, therefore, that they appreciate the context and the precise issues in the mind of the requester of an estimate. SNIE's were judged by some participants and users to be less open to this criticism than the more formal scheduled NIE's. One highly placed user considered a recent SNIE (58-5/1-62) "Communist Reaction to Additional U.S. Courses of Action in Laos and North Vietnam" to be a model of estimative treatment of a strategic problem.

25. The relation of estimators to policy makers has long been a subject of debate, and ONE broadly speaking has been operating under a doctrine perhaps best expressed by AD/NE himself

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as follows:

"The only institutional safeguard (for impartial and objective analysis) is to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which investigates. The two should be parallel but quite distinct bodies of men, recruited differently, paid if possible from separate funds, responsible to different heads, intrinsically uninterested in each other's personal success.

For these reasons, what is unquestionably gained in guidance may well be lost in the integrity and objectivity of the operation. The absorption of intelligence producers by the intelligence consumers may prove to be too heroic a cure for both disease and patient.

The only way out of the dilemma seems to me to lie in the very compromise that is usually attempted: guarantee intelligence its administrative and substantive integrity by keeping it separate from its consumers; keep trying every known device to make the users familiar with the producers' organization, and the producers with the users' organization."

Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, 1951, pp. 200-201.

Our review of the ONE Quarterly Report of Staff Activities tended to support the conclusion that ONE personnel at present have very limited contact with senior policy-making personnel in the Government. The record is by no means black or white and such contacts have perhaps been on the increase of late. The change in emphasis by the present national administration from regular use of the formal National Security Council policy-making apparatus to increased use of task forces and estimative memoranda were viewed favorably by many ONE personnel. The

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change has tended to enliven the work and to increase the sense of usefulness of the estimating effort.

26. Another area of estimating under frequent criticism is the quality of performance of the other USIB organizations. The level and priority of effort and the quality of the contributions are generally regarded as uneven. Some contributions are excellent. Many are regarded by ONE as clearly deficient. The contributions occasionally fall behind schedule. Coordination is frequently characterized as cumbersome because it tends to become editing by committee rather than a lively exchange of informed views. Some participants are regarded as professional meeting-goers who make little useful contribution to the substantive questions at issue.

27. The USIB agencies make uneven investments in the research essential to estimating in their assigned areas of responsibility. Economic research on some areas of the free world, geo-political questions in Africa, interrelationships among military weapons systems were cited as examples of subjects on which community research efforts are considered deficient by ONE. Recommendations on these matters are provided in paragraph 84 of this survey.

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Staffing Policy

28. We interviewed all professional and clerical personnel on the ONE staffs. The staffs currently have [] professional personnel on board out of a T/O of []. Without exception, we were favorably impressed with the dedication, intelligence, and intellectual curiosity of each of the [] professional officers we interviewed. It is significant to note that each of these officers admires and respects all of his staff colleagues, both professionally and personally. Morale, except for the overcrowded working conditions, is excellent throughout the staffs.

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29. Each member of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) rates staff personnel as high-quality and outstanding. The reputation of the staffs is also high with other CIA components as well as with outside departments and agencies.

30. The backgrounds, experience, and interests of staff personnel are, to a large extent, remarkably similar. Almost every one did undergraduate and/or graduate work in a social science at one of the better known universities. Many have had teaching experience, and there seems to be a continuing desire to write for academic journals. Interest in an academic career has never completely waned, and current job satisfaction is attributable in no small measure to the academic and intellectual atmosphere pervading ONE. A large number of staff personnel

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served in OCI and/or ORR and a few in the Deputy Director (Plans), (DD/P) before coming to ONE. The other staff personnel were recruited directly from the universities. All employees interviewed felt that the blending of Agency and university people is an ideal arrangement for ONE.

31. Despite the fact that the staffs are only three under professional strength, ONE has had considerable difficulty in its recruitment efforts. At the universities, ONE has encountered stiff competition from the academic community, business world, and other Government agencies. Since ONE has had only limited success in university recruitment, it would seem that most of its people in the future will again have to be recruited from other CIA components. Many able employees in other CIA components aspire to work in ONE, but their supervisors are naturally reluctant to lose these good people, particularly since they too have serious recruitment problems. To avoid animosity and friction with these components, ONE should begin to develop a program wherein the careers of its employees should include rotational tours in attractive positions in other parts of the DD/I as well as in the DD/P. At the same time other components should seriously consider and plan for the assignment of promising talent to ONE for a tour of duty. These components would be more willing to release people to ONE if

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they were assured of getting ONE people on occasion for a specific tour of duty. (See Recommendation No. 1)

32. ONE staff personnel today express little interest in working elsewhere in the DD/I area. This attitude is at least symptomatic of a condition of overcompartmentation in the DD/I Offices. These ONE personnel now view the other DD/I Offices as offering only routine assignments and limited headroom for advancement. Sharper delineation of a DD/I career service with assurances of opportunity to move with more freedom through more areas of DD/I operations should tend to remove the present somewhat parochial attitude. At stake for the DD/I is the cultivation of a corps of officers who appreciate estimating in relation to other DD/I programming problems, who bring versatility to their assignments, and who regard the entire DD/I as an exciting place in which to work.

33. ONE has had a large turnover of staff personnel over the years. At the time of the 1954 IG Survey, there were officers serving on the ONE staffs. Six remain today, of whom four are serving in supervisory or specialized capacities. There is an unwritten philosophy in the office that personnel either go up or out, and we believe that this is a sound philosophy. When we consider that the national intelligence estimate is one of the most important studies produced in the United States Government,

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it is obvious that ONE must be staffed with top-flight career people. The caliber of the present ONE staff is most impressive, and when an estimator demonstrates outstanding talent and interest in this type of work, a career service would presumably take these factors into account in career planning.

34. It is generally recognized that four to five years of continuous estimating for most people should be followed by a change of scenery to permit the development of fresh approaches and new ideas and to prevent stagnation. A periodic change of scenery would be rewarding if it involved rotation to another stimulating DD/I assignment, a sabbatical at a university, or an overseas tour. An overseas tour, wherein he would acquire area background and experience, would be refreshing and invaluable to the individual as well as to the Agency. The individual would return to ONE with added knowledge and expertise, and his overseas performance may serve to eliminate some of the barriers and prejudices that exist between DD/I and DD/P personnel. We are not suggesting that the DD/P fill classical clandestine positions overseas with ONE personnel, although we believe that some of them could serve with distinction in such positions. However, we do believe that ONE personnel, as well as other DD/I personnel, could make significant and valuable contributions as substantive intelligence advisors to chiefs of station.

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The Board of National Estimates

44. The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is at the apex of CIA's estimative process and as such is responsible for the estimates produced. The Board reviews the terms of reference and the draft of an estimate before it is coordinated with the USIB agencies. A Board member is assigned to chair the meetings during the interagency coordination process. The BNE decides when an estimate is ready for USIB consideration, and the Chairman of the Board and the member charged with responsibility for the particular estimate attend the USIB meeting to defend the paper on behalf of the interagency group producing it.

45. The concept of the Board dates back to an IAC meeting in October 1950 when General Smith, then DCI, referred to "a panel of five or six individuals constituting the top brains" of the new estimates organization. The BNE was mentioned in ONE's first approved Table of Organization in January 1951. The present group is made up of 10 members plus the Assistant Director for National Estimates, who serves concurrently as Board Chairman, and the Deputy Assistant Director. Of these 12, two have been on the Board of National Estimates since its inception, four are alumni of the ONE staff, one is a senior economist from the Office of Research and Reports, and three are retired general and flag

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rank officers representing the three services. Of the remaining two members one has a legal background and came to the BNE a decade ago from ECA while his colleague, coming from the State Department, joined the group not long after. A senior station chief from the Deputy Director (Plans) will join the Board in a few weeks. With the exception of the retired military and some of the DD/I office alumni, the Board members have been in place for over half a decade.

46. The original Board was largely composed of individuals described as "outstanding scholars of national repute, experts in the fields of strategy, political science, economics, and other social sciences...." We believe the concept of having both outsiders and insiders, as it were, on the Board is a healthy one. The possibility of eventual promotion to the Board gives the senior staff member a goal. The outsiders bring to the Agency a fresh approach and help to stifle any tendency towards intellectual inbreeding.

47. It is apparently difficult to attract "name" scholars to become semi-permanent members of the Board. The inspection team believes the concept of part-time or short-term Board members from the outside is to be encouraged. For several years a member of the Princeton faculty has spent the bulk of his summer holiday

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serving as a most useful and productive Board member. We believe this infusion of fresh ideas should be encouraged and that a vigorous attempt should be made to attract other eminent academicians from different disciplines to join the Board for a number of successive summers, for a sabbatical year's leave or even a semester.

48. There is an almost unanimous opinion that the quality of the Board is uneven. In particular, we were advised that more than half of the military officers who served on the Board over the years made negligible contributions, although the contributions and performance of some military members have been outstanding. The general feeling exists that there is no longer any justifiable need or significant reason to continue to have representation from each of the three military services. We believe that there should be some military representation on the Board, but the abilities and qualifications of each individual candidate should be carefully and thoroughly assessed by the DD/I and AD/NE to eschew possible error. There should be no compulsion to recruit one officer from each of the services and to maintain three military officers on the Board at all times. If, on the other hand, one service were to nominate two outstanding officers for Board membership at the same time, we see no reason why both officers could not be appointed.

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It is recommended that:

No. 9

The AD/NE request the Director of Central Intelligence to ask the State Department for the services on the Board of National Estimates of a named individual of ambassadorial rank.

50. Since the Board's inception there has been a change in the nature of its contribution and in its work habits. Originally it was thought that a Board composed of prominent men with nationwide reputations was needed in order, through their quasi-judicial procedures, to enhance the estimates by conferring on them the Board members' own prestige and authority. The NIE is now recognized as authoritative in its own right. The workload in the early years was light enough so that the final form of each estimate represented the Board's corporate view. The increase in demands on the Board's time has made the corporate deliberation impossible in most situations and almost all NIE's are now handled by a panel from the Board consisting of the paper's chairman and two panel members. The chairman lends an aura of impartiality to the interagency discussions of the paper and the staff personnel are freed to concentrate on substance. Also there are public relations overtones to placing the Board's stamp of approval on an estimate or memorandum.

51. The increasing workload appears to have curtailed quite sharply the amount of time the individual Board member can devote

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to creative thought and writing on intelligence problems. The role of Board members has become largely critical. By promoting one of the luminaries of the Estimates Staff to the Board, ONE in effect promotes him to a position where his specialized knowledge has less impact as time passes. The survey team is strongly of the opinion that greater opportunity should be provided for the younger members--Board members range in age from 41 to 64--to replenish the wellsprings of creativity. We are of the opinion that there is high caliber manpower available here that is not being sufficiently stimulated intellectually and that some revitalization of the BNE's role is necessary.

52. Board appointments are made personally by the Director of Central Intelligence. At times, earlier DCI's have sought the views of Board members on a variety of problems. It may be that the present BNE is not to be utilized in this manner. We would favor some experimentation to achieve a more stimulating role. It is possible that a closer relationship between the DD/I and the Board whereby the latter would serve as a high caliber reservoir to be tapped as needed for staff work would provide the creative opportunities now lacking. The team sees no loss in reducing the size of the Board panels to provide the DD/I with this informal staff assistance.

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It is recommended that:

No. 10

The AD/NE explore with the DD/I ways and means of enhancing the Board's role so that good men can be attracted and stimulated.

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Miscellaneous Problems

Administration, Support and Space

59. ONE has succeeded ever since its inception in keeping its administrative, support and secretarial elements to a minimum. Out of a total on board strength of 68 there are 12 secretaries or typists and a Support Staff of nine. The latter group is composed of an Information Control Branch of four who perform the normal document routing and registry functions for the office. The group also handles document logging for the DD/I's immediate office. A Publications Branch of three individuals cuts stencils on the drafts of NIE's, proofreads drafts and printer's galleys of NIE's and runs off such other documents as the Daily Status Report. The Reading Room Branch with a staff of two handles the library facilities in the special intelligence area.

60. ONE is having a difficult time in finding and keeping adequate clerical assistance. ONE's situation in this regard is not unique but is a part of the larger Agency problem of encouraging secretaries to commute to the Headquarters Building. The team does wish to record its belief that ONE requires a high priority for secretaries in view of its already spartan staffing arrangements and, if necessary, its clerical grade structure should reflect this priority.

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Post-Mortems and Validity Studies

71. The post-mortem is a study prepared after the completion of a national intelligence estimate to record and highlight the deficiencies and gaps in information pertaining to the estimate. The study is coordinated and approved by the USIB and disseminated as an official USIB document. Essentially the post-mortem represents a guide to the collector, but the extent to which the collector relies on this study per se is dubious. There is naturally considerable overlap between the deficiencies recorded in a post-mortem and the regular requirements submitted by other CIA components and the rest of the intelligence community. The usefulness and value of a post-mortem is questioned by ONE, but two examples were cited wherein specific collection action was undertaken in apparent response to a post-mortem.

72. Initially a post-mortem was prepared routinely after the completion of each estimate. Fewer post-mortems were prepared in succeeding years despite an increase in the number of estimates, since ONE often considers a post-mortem unnecessary and of dubious value. There appears to be no clear-cut policy pertaining to the preparation of post-mortems. Today a post-mortem is prepared only if the drafter or chairman of an estimate or a USIB representative determines it to be worthwhile.

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