

under the Defense Production Act. I believe the information contained in this report is of considerable interest at this time, and will request that an extension of my remarks on this subject be printed in the RECORD.

The Joint Committee on Defense Production has the responsibility of reviewing the execution and administration of Defense Production Act programs. The Banking and Currency Committees have legislative jurisdiction over this act.

The Joint Committee on Defense Production is frankly proud that it was able to save the taxpayers of the Nation a substantial sum through reductions in materials purchases. Upon the recommendation and at the urging of this committee, in the past 5 years there have been reductions of \$351.3 million in the contracts which provided for the delivery of materials to the Defense Production Act inventory.

It has been more than 5 years since this committee called in procurement officials to see what the Government could do to reduce future deliveries of surplus materials that were expected to replace earlier shortages and also live up to its contractual obligations. As a result of the actions which followed, the deliveries to the Defense Production Act inventory have been substantially less than the contracts provided. The reduction of \$90 million in aluminum purchases was brought about when the committee insisted that consideration be given to the imports of Canadian aluminum by Alcoa and Kaiser.

In addition, the Joint Committee on Defense Production took a close look at new proposals calling for the expenditure of DPA funds. In a hearing on May 28, 1957, this committee questioned the necessity of buying \$47 million worth of cobalt, inquired as to whether the agreement for the purchase of nickel from the Freeport Sulphur Co. was in the best interest of the Government, and received assurances that the U.S. Government was not obligated to buy additional quantities of nickel from the International Nickel Co., as had been previously indicated.

As to nickel, it is pertinent to remember that when the planning for a 5-year emergency was changed in 1958 to that of a 3-year emergency, the stockpile objective for nickel was reduced from 675 million pounds to 323 million pounds. This reduction of 352 million pounds compares with 142,077,157 pounds of nickel that was reported to be in surplus supply as of June 30, 1962.

It was the Joint Committee on Defense Production that called for the rejection of a proposal to use \$5½ million of DPA funds to bail out a railroad that had not made a profit in years.

This committee repeatedly opposed the use of DPA funds to solve economic dislocations as being contrary to the purposes of the Defense Production Act, and millions of dollars could have been saved by eliminating a high percentage of the \$78 million expended for materials under Public Law 206 and the administrative actions which followed. This law came into being through a convenient bypass of the committees having legislative jurisdiction over the Defense Production Act, authorized the use of DPA borrowing authority funds intended for defense and defense supporting purposes, increased the deliveries of unneeded materials to the DPA inventory over an extended period of time, and thereby brought about additional losses for non-defense purposes.

If there have been any new contracts signed in recent years to increase surpluses, these contracts have not involved the use of Defense Production Act funds. The General Services Administration advises the committee that there has not been one contract signed to buy materials for the De-

fense Production Act inventory in more than 3 years. Mica was the only material involving new contractual obligations under the Defense Production Act during the fiscal years of 1958 and 1959.

There have been deliveries of materials to the DPA inventory in recent years, but it must be remembered that many of the DPA contracts provided for deliveries over a period of years. The primary purpose for purchasing materials under the Defense Production Act was to expand the productive capacity of the United States to overcome critical shortages in supply, and this objective was accomplished. The accumulation of a DPA inventory of materials was a by-product of this endeavor.

The Congress recognized that there would be losses under these expansion programs when the Defense Production Act was approved in September 1950, and provided for reports to the Congress covering losses incurred and anticipated losses. I am not aware of any newly discovered losses on materials purchased under the Defense Production Act not previously reported by this committee and the agencies concerned.

The probable ultimate net loss and expense on Defense Production Act programs administered by GSA, which includes materials, was estimated to be over \$1 billion more than 8 years ago. Estimated losses were published quarterly prior to the year 1960 and semiannually thereafter. Information on these losses and the quantities of materials held in the DPA inventory was not classified.

The committee report indicates that total gross transactions contracted under the Defense Production Act to June 30, 1962, by the General Services Administration amounted to \$7,508,712,000 and that the losses and expenses on these transactions are expected to amount to \$1,260,844,000 by the end of the fiscal year 1965. There were additional gross transactions by other departments and agencies in the amount of \$539,218,000 on which anticipated losses and expenses will amount to about \$108,320,000 by the end of the fiscal year 1965.

The Joint Committee on Defense Production has conducted a continuing review of disposal plans and receives advance notice when sales are to be made from the Defense Production Act inventory. Sales have been made from the DPA inventory in the amount of \$69.3 million through disposal plans.

No solution has yet been offered for the problem that we have been stressing for the past 5 years, namely: How can the Government dispose of surplus materials without undue loss to the taxpayers on the one hand and without unduly depressing the market on the other?

Surplus materials may be sold from the Defense Production Act inventory without congressional approval at not less than the current domestic market price. However, until recently the policies and procedures being followed in the administration of the disposal program permitted any one interested agency to veto a disposal plan except when materials were sold to other agencies. When it appeared that disposal plans were being held up or vetoed without adequate justification, the committee staff questioned some of the actions that were taken. The committee then reported to the Congress in the 11th annual report that a proposed disposal could be upheld by the dissent of a single department or agency and that disposals could be delayed for indefinite periods if a department or agency elected to keep a proposed plan under consideration.

In 1955 this committee objected when the Office of Defense Mobilization authorized the General Services Administration to cancel shipments of copper which permitted three producers to make a windfall of about \$231,000. This practice, which was discontinued

thereafter, was reported in the fifth annual report of this committee.

Surplus materials have resulted largely because of reductions in the stockpile objectives. On June 13, 1958, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization announced that strategic and critical materials would be stockpiled for a 3-year emergency period and he stated that since July 1957 new commitments were limited generally to meeting the needs of a 3-year emergency. Prior to that time materials were being acquired for a 5-year emergency.

When the planning for a 5-year emergency was changed in 1958 to that of a 3-year emergency the overall stockpile objectives were reduced from \$8.5 billion to \$4.4 billion, a reduction of \$4.1 billion. Although Government inventories on hand and on order were about \$1.1 billion short of meeting objectives for a 5-year emergency at that time, this decision created a surplus in excess of \$3 billion in specification grade materials plus the additional quantities of lower grade materials.

It is obvious that any decision to change the planning concept from a 5-year emergency to that of a 3-year emergency would have been considered at a high level, and that this was not a decision which would be left to an office having responsibility for pulling together total materials requirements or to a procurement agency.

The Office of Emergency Planning and predecessor agencies have had their problems in obtaining current materials requirements from the Department of Defense. This committee has repeatedly questioned the adequacy of the procedures followed by the Department of Defense with respect to maintaining and reporting military requirements for materials. The OEP and predecessor agencies have found it necessary to wait for extended periods of time to obtain these military requirements for materials.

In past reports the Joint Committee on Defense Production has criticized the poor judgment which was exercised in the execution and administration of some purchase agreements which did not offer a legal basis for the recovery of funds. In the current report the committee points out that the recommendations contained in its progress report No. 29 of 1957 continue to apply, and calls for a review of the auditing procedures of the General Services Administration. The committee report states that the payment of funds under circumstances which permit the expensing of costly items, thereby increasing the cost of nickel, raises a question as to the adequacy of the auditing procedures being followed by the General Services Administration.

The committee report is critical of the Interstate Commerce Commission for its insistence on a so-called system of "random sample" audits of its records by the General Accounting Office. Under this system the GAO was denied access to records considered pertinent for an audit of the guaranteed loans extended to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad. The committee report states:

"In the letter to the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission dated August 2, 1962, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Defense Production stated that even though this railroad had lost more than \$50 million since it had made an annual profit, the Interstate Commerce Commission acted favorably on a \$7.5 million loan guarantee as late as December 8, 1961, bringing the total amount owed on ICC guarantees to \$34,790,440 in addition to defaulted DPA loan guarantees of \$11,797,198. Yet, the ICC was required to make a finding under the law that there was reasonable assurance that this railroad would repay the loan. About 3 months earlier the ICC had asked for direct Federal grants for this railroad, stating that

It is highly improbable that the New Haven can emerge from reorganization and continue to render essential transportation services in the absence of direct Federal grants. It was later reported in the press on October 29, 1962, that this railroad sustained a deficit of \$9,938,401 for the first 9 months of 1962.

"It is the belief of this committee that the 'random sample' formula of the Interstate Commerce Commission provides inadequate protection for safeguarding the expenditure of public funds. Although this committee has taken action to stop the use of Defense Production Act funds for the purpose of paying the operating deficits of this railroad, additional Government funds were made available through the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission. If the General Accounting Office is to serve as an effective arm of the Congress, the Comptroller General must be permitted to exercise some discretion as to the records he requires for an audit. The General Accounting Office should be permitted to continue with its investigation and audit of all Government loans or guaranteed loans extended to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad."

The Joint Committee on Defense Production has conducted its review of Defense Production Act programs within the framework of an act that did not provide for profit controls. On August 11, 1950, in debate in the Senate on the Defense Production Act, I stated that a comprehensive renegotiation act was a necessary and integral part of a successful defense production program. This matter was also discussed when the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 were considered. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee stated in its report at that time that if the Congress sees fit to control profits, it will do so through tax legislation.

As I have indicated previously, the Joint Committee on Defense Production is proud that substantial sums have been saved as a result of continuing reviews and the actions taken by the committee.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

Bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. ELLENDER:

S. 405. A bill to amend the copyright laws with respect to certain rights of copyright holders in musical compositions; and

S. 406. A bill for relief of Rickert & Laan, Inc.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LONG of Missouri:

S. 407. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow income tax deductions for certain payments to assist in providing higher education; to the Committee on Finance.

(See the remarks of Mr. Long of Missouri when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. METCALF (for himself and Mr. MANSFIELD):

S. 408. A bill to set aside certain lands in Montana for the Indians of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Mont.; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. CURTIS:

S. 409. A bill for the relief of Yeng Eurdick; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota:

S. 410. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to receive from the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe of the Fort Totten Reservation, N. Dak., a deed conveying certain property on such reservation to the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 411. A bill to provide for allowance of credit under the Civil Service Retirement Act for service as a member of a county committee established under section 8(b) of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. YARBOROUGH:

S. 412. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide for waiver of indebtedness to the United States in certain cases arising out of default on loans guaranteed or made by the Veterans' Administration; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. YARBOROUGH when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. HAYDEN:

S. 413. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and provide certain services to the Boy Scouts of America for use in the 1964 national jamboree, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

(See the remarks of Mr. HAYDEN when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MUNDT (for himself, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. CASE, Mr. DODD, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. PROXMIER, Mr. FONG, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. MILLER, Mr. KEATING, Mr. LAUSCHE, and Mr. SCOTT):

S. 414. A bill to create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy; to conduct research to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, economic, technological, and organizational areas to increase the non-military capabilities of the United States in the global struggle between freedom and communism; to educate and train Government personnel and private citizens to understand and implement this body of knowledge; and also to provide education and training for foreign students in these areas of knowledge under appropriate conditions; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(See the remarks of Mr. MUNDT when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MOSS:

S. 415. A bill to amend Public Laws 815 and 874, Eighty-first Congress, in order to extend for 1 year certain expiring provisions thereof, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. Moss when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. BARTLETT:

S. 416. A bill for the relief of Patrick E. Eagan;

S. 417. A bill for the relief of Raghavalyengar Parthasarathy and his wife, Sarada Parthasarathy;

S. 418. A bill for the relief of Syun-Ichi Akasofu and his wife, Emiko Akasofu; and

S. 419. A bill for the relief of Joseph T. Flakne; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACKSON:

S. 420. A bill for the relief of Frederick Ho Wolf; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FONG:

S. 421. A bill for the relief of Ho Koon Chew; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HARTKE:

S. 422. A bill for the relief of Jasenko Rokov; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MUNDT:

S. 423. A bill to amend title V of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 in order to provide for guidance, counseling, and testing programs in elementary schools, and to provide for training for individuals engaged in counseling and guidance in elementary schools; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. LAUSCHE:

S. 424. A bill for the relief of Venson Chu, Miao-Chuen Liu Chu, Jeannie Ju-Yue Chu, Turney Hou-Nan Chu, Paul Tsze-Yuen Chu, and Barbara Chuen-Yue Chu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

S. 425. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act so as to remove the limitation upon the amount of outside income which an individual may earn while receiving benefits under such title; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. DOUGLAS:

S. 426. A bill for the relief of Remo Angelo Santilli;

S. 427. A bill for the relief of Regidor Nava Guirre (also known as Felipe Capulong);

S. 428. A bill for the relief of Joseph Lovrich (also known as Josip Lovric);

S. 429. A bill for the relief of Rachel Ann Proctor; and

S. 430. A bill for the relief of Kam Ng; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BEALL:

S. 431. A bill to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and enter judgment upon the claims of certain Army and Air Corps officers for back pay authorized by the act of September 14, 1922 (42 Stat. 840, ch. 307); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEATING:

S.J. Res. 19. Joint resolution designating the fourth Sunday in September of each year as "Interfaith Day";

S.J. Res. 20. Joint resolution designating the third week in June of each year as National Amateur Radio Week;

S.J. Res. 21. Joint resolution designating February of each year as American History Month; and

S.J. Res. 22. Joint resolution designating November 19, the anniversary of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, as Dedication Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS

CEREMONIES IN ROTUNDA IN CONNECTION WITH STATUE OF THE LATE JOSEPH WARD OF SOUTH DAKOTA

Mr. MUNDT submitted the following concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 9); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the South Dakota State Historical Society of South Dakota is hereby authorized to place temporarily in the rotunda of the Capitol a statue of the late Joseph Ward, of South Dakota, and to hold ceremonies in the rotunda on said occasion; and the Architect of the Capitol is hereby authorized to make the necessary arrangements therefor.

THANKS OF CONGRESS TO SOUTH DAKOTA FOR STATUE OF THE LATE JOSEPH WARD

Mr. MUNDT submitted the following concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 10); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the statue of Joseph Ward, presented by the State of South Dakota, to be placed in the Statuary Hall collection, is accepted in the name of the United States, and that the thanks of the Congress be tendered said State for the contribution of the statue of one of its most eminent citizens, illustrious for his leadership as author of the State's motto, framer of the Territorial school law, founder of the first college, and outstanding churchman in

1963

707

the founding of Christian churches among whites and Indians; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions, suitably engrossed and duly authenticated, be transmitted to the Governor of South Dakota.

**TO PRINT AS A SENATE DOCUMENT
THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE AC-
CEPTANCE OF THE STATUE OF
THE LATE JOSEPH WARD**

Mr. MUNDT submitted the following concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 11); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the proceedings at the presentation, dedication, and acceptance of the statue of Joseph Ward, to be presented by the State of South Dakota in the rotunda of the Capitol, together with appropriate illustrations and other pertinent matter, shall be printed as a Senate document. The copy for such Senate document shall be prepared under the supervision of the Joint Committee on Printing.

Sec. 2. There shall be printed three thousand additional copies of such Senate document, which shall be bound in such style as the Joint Committee on Printing shall direct, and of which one hundred copies shall be for the use of the Senate and one thousand two hundred copies shall be for the use of the Members of the Senate from the State of South Dakota, and five hundred copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives and one thousand two hundred copies shall be for the use of the Members of the House of Representatives from the State of South Dakota.

RESOLUTIONS

**ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AF-
FAIRS**

Mr. PEARSON submitted a resolution (S. Res. 51) creating a standing committee on Veterans' Affairs, which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

(See the above resolution printed in full when submitted by Mr. PEARSON, which appears under a separate heading.)

**STUDY OF MATTERS PERTAINING
TO VETERANS' AFFAIRS**

Mr. YARBOROUGH submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 52) to authorize a study of matters pertaining to veterans' affairs, which was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

Resolved, That the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof is authorized under sections 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and in accordance with its jurisdictions specified by rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to examine, investigate, and make a complete study of any and all matters pertaining to veterans' affairs including, but not limited to, such problems as (a) vocational rehabilitation and education of veterans, (b) veterans' hospitals, medical care, and treatment of veterans, (c) soldiers' and sailors' civil relief, and (d) readjustment of servicemen to civil life.

Sec. 2. For the purposes of this resolution the committee, from February 1, 1963, to

January 31, 1964, inclusive, is authorized (1) to make such expenditures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ upon a temporary basis, technical, clerical, and other assistants and consultants: *Provided*, That the minority is authorized to select one person for appointment, and the person so selected shall be appointed and his compensation shall be so fixed that his gross rate shall not be less by more than \$1,600 than the highest gross rate paid to any other employee; and (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to utilize the reimbursable services, information, facilities, and personnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Government.

Sec. 3. The committee shall report its findings, together with its recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than January 31, 1964.

Sec. 4. Expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$75,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

**APPEARANCE OF SENATOR EAST-
LAND AS A WITNESS IN THE CASE
OF UNITED STATES AGAINST
ROBERT SHELTON**

Mr. EASTLAND submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 53); which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

Resolved, That whereas the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. EASTLAND, has been subpoenaed to appear and testify in the case of *U.S. v. Robert Shelton*, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Resolved, That the permission of this body for the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. EASTLAND, to appear and testify in response to the aforesaid subpoena is hereby granted.

**INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR
CERTAIN COSTS OF HIGHER EDU-
CATION**

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, for a number of years Congress has been struggling over proposals to promote education. To the best of my knowledge, every Member of Congress agrees that education and its development is vital to our Nation's future. However, agreement stops here. From this point on, attitudes and views run the full range from no Federal action to a comprehensive program of Federal assistance at every level and to all schools. Since entering the Senate, I have supported legislation to provide grants to the States to be used for school construction and teachers' salaries. Also, my support has been given to legislation to assist in the construction of academic facilities at institutions of higher education. I have supported a Federal scholarship program for higher education and proposals to strengthen the National Defense Education Act. All of these measures, in my opinion, are necessary if our young people are to have the opportunity to obtain the best possible education. It is my firm conviction that we have a responsibility to see that the youth of our country have this opportunity.

In the days ahead, we will discuss and debate these issues at length. It is my hope that a sound program will receive final congressional approval. Certainly, I will exert every effort in this direction. In the meantime, however, quick action should be taken on a measure for which there is widespread support. That is tax relief for costs of higher education. During the past few days, numerous proposals have been introduced in both Houses for this purpose. Some propose an additional \$600 exemption for a full-time student. Some propose a tax credit. Some propose a tax deduction. Some contain limits while others cover all expenses. But they all share a common purpose to stimulate higher education through a tax incentive. Last year, the Congress approved an investment credit provision to stimulate economic growth. Certainly we can afford a similar incentive to stimulate that which is of even greater importance—human growth. An outstanding feature of this approach to aid higher education is that it nurtures diversification. It provides equal help to the student of math, the student of medicine, the student of art, the student of political science, the student of physics, the student of engineering, the student of music. All of these, as well as all other areas of learning, are essential to our society.

Mr. President, I now introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow income tax deductions for certain payments to assist in providing higher education.

This bill would allow a taxpayer to deduct certain costs of higher education for himself, his spouse, and his dependents. It would include expenses for tuition, fees, books, and board and room. To insure that all taxpayers will enjoy the benefits of this proposal, the deduction would be allowed on page 1 of the tax form in computing adjusted gross income. While I believe this approach the best, I hope the Congress can move quickly to resolve the differences in the various proposals and approve one. The administration has opposed the tax approach in the past, but I am hopeful it will reassess its position. A tax incentive measure would, in my opinion, fit well into a comprehensive aid to education program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 407) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow income tax deductions for certain payments to assist in providing higher education, introduced by Mr. Long of Missouri, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

**WAIVER OF INDEBTEDNESS TO THE
UNITED STATES ON DEFAULT OF
GUARANTEED VA LOANS**

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for waiver of indebtedness to the United States in certain cases

File
in
January 22

arising out of default on loans guaranteed or made by the Veterans' Administration.

This bill would authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to waive, under certain circumstances, the recovery from veterans or their spouses of any indebtedness owed the United States resulting from default on guaranteed or direct loans.

Specifically, the bill would permit waiver of recovery of such indebtedness if the Administrator determines that the default arose out of compelling reasons without fault on the part of a veteran, or that collection of the indebtedness would otherwise work a severe hardship upon a veteran. The bill does not authorize the VA to grant a complete waiver of a veteran's liability where his financial situation is such that he could arrange to pay all or a substantial portion of the indebtedness without severe hardship upon himself or his family.

During the 87th Congress the Veterans' Administration officially requested enactment of this legislation in order to clarify the law relating to waiver of loan indebtedness. The law now provides that the Administrator may pay, compromise, waive, or release claims arising in connection with the guaranteed and direct loan programs of the VA. Despite this broad grant of authority, the VA believes that administrative action granting total forgiveness of indebtedness on the basis of hardship would be very questionable in the absence of specific authorization.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 412) to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide for waiver of indebtedness to the United States in certain cases arising out of default on loans guaranteed or made by the Veterans' Administration, introduced by Mr. YARBOROUGH, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

LOAN OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT TO BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill which will authorize the Secretary of Defense to loan, at no Government expense, certain equipment and services for the use of the Boy Scouts of America and Scout officials attending the Sixth National Jamboree to be held during July and August 1964, at Valley Forge State Park, Pa.

The bill permits the Secretary of Defense to loan tents, cots, blankets, commissary equipment, flags, refrigerators, vehicles, and other equipment and services as may be necessary or useful to the extent that the items are in stock and available and their issue will not jeopardize the national defense program.

In view of the outstanding accomplishments of this fine movement in the past, in aiding the youth of America, I urge my colleagues to take favorable action on this measure.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 413) to authorize the Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and provide certain services to the Boy Scouts of America for use in the 1964 national jamboree, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. HAYDEN, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

FREEDOM COMMISSION ACT

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in behalf of myself and Senators DOUGLAS, CASE, DODD, SMATHERS, GOLDWATER, PROXMIRE, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, MILLER, KEATING, LAUSCHE, and SCOTT, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a legislative proposal now widely known as the Freedom Academy bill.

This bill proposes the establishment within the structure of the National Government of an autonomous institution for broad-scale training and research in the nonmilitary areas and disciplines of our total national security operations. This marks the third successive Congress in which this legislation has been introduced.

In the 86th Congress Senator DOUGLAS and Senator CASE joined with me in sponsoring the Freedom Academy bill in the Senate. That bill was unanimously approved by the Senate late in the second session, following a highly favorable report from the Senate Judiciary Committee which stated in part:

The committee considers this bill to be one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress. This is the first measure to recognize that a concentrated development and training program must precede a significant improvement in our cold war capabilities. The various agencies and bureaus can be shuffled and reshuffled. Advisory committees, interdepartmental committees, and coordinating agencies can be created and recreated, but until they are staffed by highly motivated personnel who have been systematically and intensively trained in the vast and complex field of total political warfare, we can expect little improvement in our situation.

Failing to obtain favorable action in the House at the late hour in the session, Senators DOUGLAS and CASE and I, along with nine other Senators representing a broad spectrum of partisan attitudes, reintroduced the Freedom Academy bill in the 87th Congress.

On that occasion, in response to special request, the bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where unfortunately it remained without any action being taken for the entire term of the 87th Congress. In large part our inability to gain the favorable action of both Houses of Congress on the Freedom Academy bill has stemmed from the adamant opposition of the Department of State, opposition which has persisted over the past several years. I might observe that the position rigidly held by the Department of State is meeting growing and strong opposition from many highly influential sectors.

In 1960 the Sprague committee, com-

posed of several distinguished Americans all highly qualified in the field of foreign affairs, presented a report to the President of the United States concerning the effectiveness of our foreign information program, in which cognizance was taken of the present inadequacy of our overall training activities in the nonmilitary sector of our national security operations. The Freedom Academy bill has been endorsed by the AFL-CIO and was the subject of a favorable resolution adopted last year by the junior chambers of commerce in national convention. The Freedom Academy bill has received many plaudits from leading national journals and newspapers, such as Life magazine, the Readers Digest, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the New York Daily News, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Tampa Tribune, and the Miami Herald.

Just recently, a special study panel appointed by President Kennedy, of which Mr. James A. Perkins is the chairman, has issued a report which emphasizes our urgent needs for vast upgrading of our governmental training and research activities in the field of foreign operations. Their report recommends the creation of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs and, to quote the members of this distinguished panel, makes that recommendation "based on our strong belief that existing public programs of training, education, and research in U.S. foreign affairs fall dangerously below the requirements of a country whose officials must receive the best the country can provide."

The Perkins panel study corroborates the thinking and public utterances of the Freedom Academy sponsors and supporters. We feel that this report gives added impetus to our efforts to fill the research and training gap which presently exists in the national security area of our governmental structure.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill may be printed in the RECORD following my remarks, and also a statement taken from a monograph prepared for the President of the United States by Alan G. Grant, of Orlando, Fla. I ask that that part which appears on pages 32 to 56, inclusive, appear as a part of my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the request of the Senator from South Dakota is agreed to.

The bill (S. 414) to create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy; to conduct research to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, economic, technological, and organizational areas to increase the nonmilitary capabilities of the United States in the global struggle between freedom and communism; to educate and train Government personnel and private citizens to understand and implement this body of knowledge; and also to provide education and training for foreign students in these areas of knowledge under appropriate conditions, introduced by Mr. MUNDT (for himself and other Senators), was received, read

1963

twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Freedom Commission Act".

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) The Congress of the United States makes the following findings and statement of policy:

(1) The United States in preparing to defend its national interests in coming years faces grave and complex problems in the nonmilitary as well as military areas.

(2) First and foremost are the problems raised by the unremitting drives by the Soviet Union and Communist China seeking world domination and the destruction of all non-Communist societies. The Communist bloc and the various Communist parties have systematically prepared themselves to wage a thousand-pronged aggression in the nonmilitary area. Drawing on their elaborate studies and extensive pragmatic tests, Communist leaders have developed their conspiratorial version of nonmilitary conflict into an advanced, operational art in which they employ and orchestrate an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments in the political, psychological, ideological, economic, technological, organizational and paramilitary areas enabling them to approach their immediate and long-range objectives along many paths. This creates unique and unprecedented problems for the United States in a conflict that is being waged in student organizations, peasant villages, labor unions, mass communication systems, in city and jungle, and institutions and organizations of every description, as well as in the world's chancelleries. Recognizing that nonmilitary conflict makes extraordinary demands upon its practitioners, the Communists, for several decades, have intensively trained their leadership groups and cadres in an extensive network of basic, intermediate, and advanced schools. The Sino-Soviet conflict capacity has been immeasurably increased by the mobilization of research, science, industry, technology, and education to serve the power-seeking ambitions of Communist leaders rather than the needs of their people.

(3) Second, the problems of the United States are complicated by the emergence of many new nations, the unstable or deteriorating political, social and economic conditions in many parts of the world, the revolutionary forces released by the rising expectations of the world's people, and other factors, all of which increase the difficulties of achieving our national objectives of preventing Communist penetration while seeking to build viable, free, and independent nations.

(4) The nature of the Sino-Soviet power drive, the revolutionary and fluid world situation, the emergence of the United States as the major leader of the free world and the need to deal with the people of nations as well as governments, has compelled the United States to employ many new instruments under the headings of traditional diplomacy, intelligence, technical assistance, aid programs, trade development, educational exchange, cultural exchange, and counterinsurgency (as well as in the area of related military programs). To interrelate and program these present instruments over long periods already requires a high degree of professional competence in many specialties, as well as great managerial skill.

(5) However, the United States has fallen short in developing and utilizing its full capacity to achieve its objectives in the

world struggle. Not only do we need to improve the existing instruments, but a wide range of additional methods and means in both the Government and private sectors must be worked out and integrated with the existing instruments of our policy. Otherwise, the United States will lack the means to defeat many forms of Communist aggression and to extend the area of freedom, national independence, and self-government, as well as to attain other national objectives. However, this will require an intensive and comprehensive research and training effort first to think through these additional methods and means, and, second, to educate and train not only specialists, but also leaders at several levels who can visualize and organize these many instruments in an integrated strategy, enabling the United States to approach its national objectives along every path in accord with our ethic.

(6) There has been a tendency to look upon strategy as a series of discrete problems with planning often restricted by jurisdictional walls and parochial attitudes and too much piecemeal planning to handle emergencies at the expense of systematic, long-range development and programing of the many instruments potentially available to us. While there has been marked improvement in such things as language training at agency schools, and while university centers have made significant progress in area studies, nowhere has the United States established a training program to develop rounded strategists in the nonmilitary area or even certain vital categories of professional specialists, particularly in the area of political, ideological, psychological, and organizational operations and in certain areas of development work. Nor has the United States organized a research program which can be expected to think through the important additional range of methods and means that could be available to us in the Government and private sectors.

(7) In implementing this legislation the following requirements for developing our national capacity for global operations in the nonmilitary area should receive special attention:

I. At the upper levels of Government, the United States must have rounded strategists with intensive interdepartmental training and experience who understand the range of instruments potentially available to us and who can organize and program these instruments over long periods in an integrated, forward strategy that systematically develops and utilizes our full national capacity for the global struggle.

II. Below them, Government personnel must be trained to understand and implement this integrated strategy in all of its dimensions. Through intensive training, as well as experience, we must seek the highest professional competence in those areas of specialized knowledge required by our global operations. Government personnel should have an underlying level of understanding as to the nature of the global conflict, the goals of the United States, and the various possible instruments in achieving these goals to facilitate team operations. We should seek to instill a high degree of elan and dedication.

III. Foreign affairs personnel at all levels must understand communism with special emphasis on Communist nonmilitary conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts available for consultation. This is basic knowledge which must be widely disseminated, if planning and implementation are to be geared to the conflict we are in. (The present two weeks seminar offered at the Foreign Service Institute is entirely too brief for even lower ranking personnel.)

IV. The private sector must understand how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge res-

ervoir of talent, ingenuity, and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping to solve many of our global problems. We have hardly begun to explore the range of possibilities.

V. The public must have a deeper understanding of communism, especially Communist nonmilitary conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle, including the goals of the United States.

(8) The hereinafter created Freedom Academy must be a prestige institution and every effort should be made to demonstrate this is a major effort by the United States in a vital area.

(b) It is the intent and purpose of the Congress that the authority and powers granted in this Act be fully utilized by the Commission established by section 4 of this Act to achieve the objectives set forth in subsection (a) (7) of this section. It is the further intent and purpose of the Congress that the authority, powers, and functions of the Commission and the Academy as set forth in this Act are to be broadly construed.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 3. As used in this Act—

(1) The term "Commission" means the Freedom Commission established by section 4 of this Act; and

(2) The term "Academy" means the Freedom Academy established by section 6 of this Act.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM COMMISSION

SEC. 4. There is established in the executive branch of the Government an independent agency to be known as the Freedom Commission which shall be composed of six members and a chairman, each of whom shall be a citizen of the United States. The Chairman may from time to time designate any other member of the Commission as Acting Chairman to act in the place and stead of the Chairman during his absence. The Chairman (or the Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman) shall preside at all meetings of the Commission, and a quorum for the transaction of business shall consist of at least four members present. Each member of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions and actions of the Commission, shall have full access to all information relating to the performance of his duties or responsibilities, and shall have one vote. Action of the Commission shall be determined by a majority vote of the members present. The Chairman (or Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman) shall be the official spokesman of the Commission in its relations with the Congress, Government agencies, persons, or the public, and, on behalf of the Commission, shall see to the faithful execution of the policies and decisions of the Commission, and shall report thereon to the Commission from time to time or as the Commission may direct. The Commission shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 5. (a) Members of the Commission and the Chairman shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than four members, including the Chairman, may be members of any one political party. In submitting any nomination to the Senate, the President shall set forth the experience and qualifications of the nominee. The term of each member of the Commission, other than the Chairman, shall be six years, except that (1) the terms of office of the members first taking office shall expire as designated by the President at the time of the appointment, two at the end of two years, two at the end of four years, and two at the end of six years; and (2) any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder

of such term. The Chairman shall serve as such during the pleasure of the President, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$20,500 per annum. Each other member of the Commission shall receive compensation at the rate of \$20,000 per annum. Any member of the Commission may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.

(b) No member of the Commission shall engage in any business, vocation, or employment other than that of serving as a member of the Commission.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM ACADEMY; PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION AND ACADEMY

SEC. 6. The Commission shall establish under its supervision and control an advanced research, development, and training center to be known as the Freedom Academy. The Academy shall be located at such place or places within the United States as the Commission shall determine. The principal functions of the Commission and Academy shall be:

(1) To conduct research designed to improve the methods and means by which the United States seeks its national objectives in the nonmilitary part of the global struggle. This should include improvement of the present methods and means and exploration of the full range of additional methods and means that may be available to us in both the Government and private sectors. Special attention shall be given to problems of an interdepartmental nature and to problems involved in organizing and programing the full spectrum of methods and means potentially available in the Government and private sectors in an integrated, forward strategy that will systematically develop and utilize the full capacity of the United States to seek its national objectives in the global struggle, including the defeat of all forms of Communist aggression and the building of free, independent, and viable nations.

(2) To educate and train Government personnel and private citizens so as to meet the requirements set forth in section 2(a)(7) of this Act. The Academy shall be the principal Government interdepartmental, educational, and training center in the nonmilitary area of the United States global operations. Authority is also granted to educate and train foreign students, when this is in the national interest and is approved by the Secretary of State.

(3) To provide leadership in encouraging and assisting universities and other institutions to increase and improve research, educational, and training programs attuned to the global operational needs of the United States.

(4) To provide leadership, guidance, and assistance to the training staffs of Government agencies handling United States global operations, including training programs conducted at overseas posts.

(5) To provide a center where officers and employees of Government agencies, as well as private citizens, can meet to discuss and explore common and special elements of their problems in improving United States capabilities in the global struggle.

STUDENT SELECTION; GRANTS; ADMISSION OF FOREIGN STUDENTS

SEC. 7. (a) Academy students, other than Government personnel, shall be selected, insofar as is practicable and in the public interest, from those areas, organizations, and institutions where trained leadership and informed public opinion are most needed to achieve the objectives set forth in section 2(a)(7) IV and V. Persons in Government service coming within the provisions of the Government Employees Training Act may be trained at the Academy pursuant to the provisions of said Act. All agencies and de-

partments of Government are authorized to assign officers and employees to the Academy for designated training.

(b) The Commission is authorized to make grants to students and to pay expenses incident to training and study under this Act. This authorization shall include authority to pay actual and necessary travel expenses to and from the Academy or other authorized place of training under this Act. The Commission is authorized to grant financial assistance to the dependents of students who hold no office or employment under the Federal Government during the time they are undergoing training authorized under this Act. Grants and other financial assistance under this Act shall be in such amounts and subject to such regulations as the Commission may deem appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.

(c) Foreign students selected for training under this Act shall be admitted as non-immigrants under section 101(a)(15)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)) for such time and under such conditions as may be prescribed by regulations promulgated by the Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. A person admitted under this section who fails to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or who fails to depart from the United States at the expiration of the time for which he was admitted, or who engages in activities of a political nature detrimental to the interest of the United States, or in activities in conflict with the security of the United States, shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and promptly deported pursuant to sections 241, 242, and 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251, 1252, and 1253). Deportation proceedings under this section shall be summary and findings of the Attorney General as to matters of fact shall be conclusive. Such persons shall not be eligible for suspension of deportation under section 244 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1254).

INFORMATION CENTER

SEC. 8. The Commission is authorized to establish an information center at such place or places within the United States as the Commission may determine. The principal function of the information center shall be to disseminate, with or without charge, information and materials which will assist people and organizations to increase their understanding of the true nature of the international Communist conspiracy and of the dimensions and nature of the global struggle between freedom and communism, and of ways they can participate effectively toward winning that struggle and building free, independent, and viable nations. In carrying out this function, the Commission is authorized to prepare, make, and publish textbooks and other materials, including training films, suitable for high school, college, and community level instruction, and also to publish such research materials as may be in the public interest. The Commission is authorized to disseminate such information and materials to such persons and organizations as may be in the public interest on such terms and conditions as the Commission shall determine.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

SEC. 9. Nothing in this Act shall authorize the disclosure of any information or knowledge in any case in which such disclosure (1) is prohibited by any other law of the United States, or (2) is inconsistent with the security of the United States.

SECURITY CHECK OF PERSONNEL

SEC. 10. (a) Except as authorized by the Commission upon a determination by the Commission that such action is clearly consistent with the national interest, no indi-

vidual shall be employed by the Commission, nor shall the Commission permit any individual to have access to information which is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution until the Civil Service Commission shall have made an investigation and report to the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual, and the Commission shall have determined that employing such individual or permitting him to have access to such information will not endanger the common defense and security.

(b) In the event an investigation made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section develops any data reflecting that the individual who is the subject of the investigation is of questionable loyalty or is a questionable security risk, the Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Civil Service Commission for its information and appropriate action.

(c) If the Commission deems it to be in the national interest, the Commission may request the Civil Service Commission to make an investigation and report to the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of any individual under consideration for training at the Academy, and if the Commission shall then determine that the training of such individual will not be in the best interest of the United States, he shall receive no training under this Act.

(d) In the event an investigation made pursuant to subsection (c) of this section develops any data reflecting that the individual who is the subject of the investigation is of questionable loyalty or is a questionable security risk, the Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Civil Service Commission for its information and appropriate action.

(e) If the President or the Commission shall deem it to be in the national interest, he or the Commission may from time to time cause investigation of any individual which is required or authorized by subsections (a) and (c) of this section to be made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation instead of by the Civil Service Commission.

GENERAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 11. (a) In addition to the authority already granted, the Commission is authorized and empowered—

(1) to establish such temporary or permanent boards and committees as the Commission may from time to time deem necessary for the purposes of this Act;

(2) subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Commission;

(3) to conduct such research, studies, and surveys as the Commission may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

(4) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

(5) to make such expenditures as may be necessary for administering and carrying out the provisions of this Act;

(6) to utilize, with the approval of the President, the services, facilities, and personnel of other Government agencies and pay for such services, facilities, and personnel out of funds available to the Commission under this Act, either in advance, by reimbursement, or by direct transfer;

(7) to utilize or employ on a full-time or part-time basis, with the consent of the organization or governmental body concerned,

the services of personnel or any State or local government or private organization to perform such functions on its behalf as may appear desirable to carry out the purposes of this Act, without requiring such personnel to sever their connection with the furnishing organization or governmental body; and to utilize personnel of a foreign government in the same manner and under the same circumstances with the approval of the Secretary of State;

(8) to acquire by purchase, lease, loan, or gift, and to hold and dispose of by sale, lease, or loan, real and personal property of all kinds necessary for, or resulting from, the exercise of authority granted by this Act;

(9) to receive and use funds donated by others, if such funds are donated without restrictions other than that they be used in furtherance of one or more of the purposes of this Act;

(10) to accept and utilize the services of voluntary and uncompensated personnel and to provide transportation and subsistence as authorized by section 5 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. 73b-2) for persons serving without compensation;

(11) to utilize the services of persons on a temporary basis and to pay their actual and necessary travel expenses and subsistence and, in addition, compensation at a rate not to exceed \$50 per day for each day spent in the work of the Commission.

(b) The personnel referred to in subsection (a) (2) of this section shall be appointed in accordance with the civil service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, except that, to the extent the Commission deems such action necessary to the discharge of its responsibilities, personnel may be employed and their compensation fixed without regard to such laws. No such personnel (except such personnel whose compensation is fixed by law, and specially qualified professional personnel up to a limit of \$19,000) whose position would be subject to the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, if such Act were applicable to such position, shall be paid a salary at a rate in excess of the rate payable under such Act for positions of equivalent difficulty or responsibility. The Commission shall make adequate provision for administrative review of any determination to dismiss any employee.

GENERAL MANAGER OF THE COMMISSION

Sec. 12. The Commission is authorized to establish within the Commission a general manager, who shall discharge such of the administrative and executive functions of the Commission as the Commission may direct. The general manager shall be appointed by the Commission, shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission, shall be removable by the Commission, and shall receive compensation at a rate determined by the Commission, but not in excess of \$18,000 per annum.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Sec. 13 (a) To assure effective cooperation between the Freedom Academy and various Government agencies concerned with its objectives, there is established an advisory committee to the Freedom Academy (referred to hereinafter as the "Committee"). The Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the following agencies designated by the head of each such agency from officers and employees thereof. The Department of State; the Department of Defense; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Agency for International Development; and the United States Information Agency.

(b) Members of the Committee shall elect a member to serve as Chairman of the Committee. The Chairman shall serve for such a term of one year. The chairmanship shall

rotate among the representatives of the agencies who comprise the membership of the Committee.

(c) No member of the Committee shall receive compensation for his services as such other than that received by him as an officer or employee of the agency represented by him. Each member of the Committee shall be reimbursed for expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in the performance of duties of the Committee. Such reimbursements shall be made from funds appropriated to the Freedom Commission upon vouchers approved by the Chairman of the Committee.

(d) The Committee shall—

(1) serve as a medium for liaison between the Freedom Commission and the Government agencies represented in the Committee;

(2) review from time to time the plans, programs, and activities of the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, and transmit to the Commission such recommendations as it may determine to be necessary or desirable for the improvement of those plans, programs, and activities;

(3) meet with the Freedom Commission periodically, but not less often than semi-annually, to consult with it with regard to the plans, programs, and activities of the Freedom Commission and the Federal Academy; and

(4) transmit to the President and to the Congress in January of each year a report containing (A) a comprehensive description of the plans, programs, and activities of the Commission and the Academy during the preceding calendar year, and (B) its recommendations for the improvement of those plans, programs, and activities.

(e) The Committee shall promulgate such rules and regulations as it shall determine to be necessary for the performance of its duties.

(f) The Commission shall furnish to the Committee without reimbursement such office space, personal services, supplies and equipment, information, and facilities as the Committee may require for the performance of its functions.

APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 14. There is authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

The statement presented by Mr. MUNDT is as follows:

PART II: THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE U.S. RESEARCH AND TRAINING PROGRAM IN NON-MILITARY CONFLICT—THE FIVE REQUIREMENTS AND OUR FAILURE TO MEET THEM

The very great capabilities of the Communist enterprise in political warfare makes our problems of defense and offense extremely difficult. The more or less conventional methods of diplomacy, economic and military aid, student and cultural exchange, the limited informational activities of USIA, together with certain covert intelligence operations and limited efforts by private organizations, are proving inadequate, as presently formulated and implemented, to contain, much less defeat, Soviet indirect aggression. Undoubtedly some of the things we are doing are causing the Soviets more difficulty than is generally realized, but overall the existing methods and means, as they have been employed since the end of World War II, have only succeeded in slowing the Soviet push.

Again and again our methods have proven inadequate, because the enemy has mastered all arms and is employing an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments which enables him to outflank, envelop, or smother the more limited and hesitatingly applied in-

struments of our policy. Thus an aid program, even when well conceived, may achieve nothing toward improving the economic or political conditions in the recipient nation, if it is more than offset by Communist economic sabotage and superior agitation and propaganda capabilities. A USIA library in India is simply overwhelmed by a Soviet translation and publication effort which distributes millions of books and periodicals each year in many tongues and dialects, the large scale buying up of publishing houses and intimidation of bookstores, the massive penetration and manipulation of the mass communications system—and it hardly competes at all with trained Communist organizers operating in universities, unions, peasant villages, classrooms, and various fronts.

The rapidly expanding Soviet capacity in nonmilitary conflict and the dangerous developments beginning in 1956, now confirmed by the new draft program, make it imperative for the United States and its allies to develop, and rapidly, a far greater capacity in the area of nonmilitary conflict.

The question is, What are the conditions, the requirements, which must be met before this Nation can realize its full capacity to engage in the type of global struggle which has been forced upon us? It is rather remarkable that with all that has been written and said about the cold war, so little thought has been devoted to thinking through these requirements and how best we can meet them.

Only by understanding these requirements and the wide margin by which we have failed to realize them, can the present legislation be understood. Most of our failures to date can be traced to our central failure to take the necessary organizational measures to meet these needs systematically.

It is submitted the principal requirements are as follows:

Requirement No. 1: At the upper levels of government we must have conflict managers on our side who understand the full range of methods and means by which this Nation and its allies can meet the entire Communist attack and work toward our global objectives systematically. This means they will have to master a broad range of nonmilitary measures which have yet to be thought through and systematized. It means they must be able to organize and orchestrate these measures in an integrated strategy in which our national objectives are approached from many directions, using every promising means in accord with our ethic.

Requirement No. 2: Below these conflict managers, agency personnel must be trained to understand and implement this integrated strategy in all of its dimensions. Unless these people share a substantial common fund of knowledge about the nature of the enemy, the global conflict, and the vast array of positive and negative measures potentially available to us, there cannot be the close teamwork necessary to carry out a complex strategy with vigor and élan against a skilled and dedicated enemy.

Requirement No. 3 (implicit in above, but listed separately to facilitate subsequent analysis: Policymakers and cold war personnel at many levels must understand communism, with special emphasis on Communist conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts available for consultation. This is basic battle knowledge which must be widely disseminated in the agencies, if planning and implementation are to be geared to the conflict we are in.

Requirement No. 4: The public must have greater understanding of communism, especially Communist conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle. This is necessary to maintain the will to victory and to overcome apathy in a long and tedious struggle. It is necessary if the public is to

support wholeheartedly the difficult and often distasteful things we must do in the coming years. In a free society, policy, to be effective, must have support. A widening fissure between public knowledge and policy can spell disaster. For defensive purposes alone this knowledge is essential, if public opinion is not to be confused and manipulated by the deceptions and blandishments of skilled propagandists who understand us and our desire to be left alone too well.

Requirement No. 5: The private sector must know how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity, and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping solve our cold war problems. A wide range of interrelated programs can be implemented, if certain pre-conditions are met. Whether these things are done or not done can be the difference between victory and defeat in a close contest in which the enemy has mobilized his entire society to win the cold war, as well as to prepare for hot war.¹

It is submitted these requirements cannot be met without a large-scale research and training program directed by exceptional men who have a clear understanding of these needs.

Unfortunately, it is still being argued that existing research and training is adequate for our cold-war needs, or can be made adequate with a little beefing up. It is true that many things are being worked on within the Government that the general public is not aware of, and that institutions like the War Colleges and the Foreign Service Institute have adjusted their curriculums to some degree to meet new situations created by the Communist enterprise and the revolutionary forces at work in Afro-Asia and Latin America. It is also true that various Russian research centers and centers for international and area studies have been established at a number of universities since the end of World War II, and that the Government has available to it certain research organizations like Rand.

Yet it is equally true that the existing programs have failed to achieve to a substantial degree any one of the above requirements. Further, I can find no evidence that anyone in Government has thought out the overall research and training program which would be necessary to fill systematically and adequately these five fundamental requirements, or if anyone has done so, that he was able to make any impression on his superiors. Rather, the research and training problem has been considered in bits and pieces, and the programs instituted met bits and pieces of the problem. This should be self-evident, but there is a built-in ability within the agencies to resist these facts and the conclusions to be drawn.

It seems it will be necessary to summarize the existing programs in relation to these requirements before proceeding to an examination of the Freedom Academy bill. This will help define the nature of the gaps to be filled.

For a starting point, take requirement No. 3, the need for wide understanding of communism and especially Communist conflict technique in the agencies. This is the most obvious and fundamental requirement and should have been recognized and systematically approached at least 15 years ago. Yet, even today there is little evidence of a comprehensive, organized effort to fill this need.

Before reviewing the present programs in relation to this requirement, two points

should be emphasized. First, communism, especially Communist conflict technique, is not a quick and easy subject to learn.² It requires a considerable amount of systematized study. Training courses lasting a few days or weeks simply cannot give the student more than a superficial introduction, regardless of how well they are run.

Secondly, there is the distinction between area studies of the Communist bloc dealing with such things as agriculture, the transportation system, the new managerial class, internal indoctrination, the arts and sciences and Kremlinology, on the one hand, and studying Communist strategy and tactics for external political warfare. To a remarkable degree our university centers have concentrated on the former and ignored the latter.³ Both subjects are important, but our cold-war strategists and operational personnel will need months of intensive schooling, in addition to a range of operator experience, before they can begin to master Soviet political warfare.

With this in mind the inadequacy of the present programs becomes apparent.

The War Colleges⁴ may devote 2 weeks to a month to coverage of the Soviet bloc. Within that period the specific treatment of communism and Communist conflict techniques rarely exceeds 2 or 3 days. It is true, of course, that the rest of the instruction is related to the Communist threat. But this is an indirect tie which in many cases presupposes a more complete understanding of Communist operations than the student actually possesses.

The Foreign Service Institute⁵ has a 2-week seminar on "Communism and the Soviet Union." This is a broad survey course which can give only light treatment to communism and Communist conflict techniques. By trying to cover everything in 10 days of actual training, the course is necessarily superficial. For example, it provides 1½ hours of lecture discussions each on communism in the Far East, South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the United States. There is one lecture discussion on such involved, encyclopedic subjects as "Subversion" and "Coordination of Forces to Stop the Communist Advance." Considering the very few points even a first-class teacher can get across in 1 hour, the superficiality of the course is self-evident. This is no criticism of the teachers—they just don't have enough time.

The "Basic Foreign Service Officer's Course" (9 weeks) required of all junior officers on appointment and the "Mid-Career Course in Foreign Affairs" (13 weeks), which are the mainstay of FSI training (outside language training), offer almost nothing. The basic

¹ A minimum curriculum would have to include the historical development of communism; the principal theoretical works of Marxism-Leninism, including Mao; the Communist bloc from 1917 to the present. This would be background. The most important part of the curriculum would be a study of Soviet external political warfare which is an encyclopedic subject requiring the reading of many books, the study of numerous operational case histories, and a well organized course of study. I am appalled that some still seem to believe this is an easy subject to grasp or can be covered in a few days or weeks of training. They are displaying gross ignorance of the subject matter.

² This can be seen by glancing through their journals.

³ Army War College, Naval War College, Air University, National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

⁴ Established in 1947 under the State Department to provide in-service training to the Foreign Service and other agency personnel.

course has 6 hours of lectures by CIA experts covering the Soviet Union, the international Communist movement, the organization and strategy of communism, Soviet global propaganda, and how to answer criticisms abroad originating from Communists. (In Orlando we considered 17 hours on the same subjects too skimpy for high school seniors.) The "Mid-Career Course" includes only a 2-hour lecture on Communist doctrine and practice, 2 hours on the role of behavioral sciences in Soviet strategy, and 2 hours on Soviet political organizations. There is time, however, for 5 hours on "Philosophy of Administration" and 4 hours on "Origin and Diffusion of Myths and Rites."⁶

In 1958 FSI inaugurated the "Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy," a 9-month course, for about 20 senior officers at a time which appears to be the FSI counterpart to the War Colleges. This devotes 5 days to "Communist Strategy," and a good part of this time is spent in discussion groups or attending optional films. Actually there are just five lectures by four guest lecturers, who are, however, top men, and several short training films. Thirty-one books are recommended to the students, together with certain classified material, but this lengthy list must have been drawn up with tongue in cheek for a 5-day course. Again, much of the remainder of the course relates to the Communist threat, but as in the case of the War Colleges, this is an indirect tie which presupposes more knowledge about communism than the student usually possesses.

The USIA training program has no course on communism, but makes use of the 2-week FSI seminar. The FBI, I am told, has a 1-week course for its internal security people.

In summary, I do not know of a single Government-operated school which gives coverage in any real depth to communism and Communist conflict technique.⁷ Without detracting from the general value of the war colleges and agency trade schools, it cannot be seriously argued these schools provide an adequate coverage. There is indeed a coverage in broad outline, but no intensive study in depth. It can hardly be otherwise under present conditions, since there are no textbooks covering the necessary range of material between covers, and the student who wants to be knowledgeable about Communist political warfare must read dozens of books and such an undertaking is simply not in the cards within a 10-month course (length of War College courses), most of which deals with other subjects, let alone courses lasting only a few weeks. Further, literature dealing with communism shows large gaps.

The answer sometimes given by Government spokesmen is that Government operated schools were not intended to provide this coverage. Instead, agency personnel are sent to leading universities for graduate work. However, an examination of these graduate studies, insofar as they are concerned with communism, reveals that practically all of them are of the area study type devoted to the internal study of Soviet Russia or China rather than study of Communist external political warfare.⁸

Further, the various Russian research centers are not suitable for instruction, but are devoted to research, and again this is overly academic and mostly of the area study type.

⁶ Figures are based on the 1960-61 academic year.

⁷ A partial exception may be a CIA school about which I have little information.

⁸ Diligent inquiry may uncover a rare seminar giving more coverage to nonmilitary conflict problems. I understand such seminars have been held by Kissinger at Harvard and Possony at Georgetown. This does not change the general picture.

¹ There are other requirements, but the above are basic in fixing goals for our research and training program. Of course, we want our friends and allies to develop a similar capacity.

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

713

Research on specific operational problems is rarely done. This should be obvious from the literary output of these institutions.

Last fall Columbia University announced it was establishing a Research Institute on Communist Affairs. The most interesting part of this announcement was Columbia's opinion this was believed to be the first institute in any American university devoted to intensive study of relations and comparisons of Communist states and movements throughout the world.⁹ In other words, for the first time an American university was departing from internal area studies to take a serious, scholarly look at communism outside the Sino-Soviet bloc and relations between members of the bloc. Coming in the 16th year of the cold war, that is an appalling admission of the lack of interest in the academic community in some of the most fascinating and involved problems ever to face mankind and on the solution of which this Nation's security depends.

The Orlando committee congratulates Columbia, but we hope policy planners in Washington will not be misled. This is a research center, not a training center. And it is concentrating on communism, not developing our methods and means of nonmilitary conflict. To the extent it may deal with countermeasures, this will apparently be almost entirely at the diplomatic level (i.e., what diplomacy can do to increase the rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China). If this institute runs true to form, we can expect its output to be overly academic.

How many more years will slip by before an American university will announce it is establishing an institute that will take a serious interest in researching nonmilitary conflict for our side; and how many years after that will an American university announce it is offering training in this area?

Requirements 1 and 2: Speaking generally there is no existing training program or combination of programs which can produce conflict managers for our side. Even if requirement No. 3 is fully met, we will still be a long way from realizing requirements 1 and 2. Studying Communist political warfare is a necessary prerequisite to becoming an expert in nonmilitary conflict for our side, but expert knowledge about communism does not make an expert in our methods.¹⁰ We can learn a great deal from the Soviets, but we must develop our own art and science of nonmilitary conflict that meets our special needs and is in accord with our ethic.

Our training programs are a reflection of our whole limited approach to the cold war. Sixteen years ago, when the agencies realized we were entering a protracted cold war, our policy planners formulated some rather minimal ideas and programs for meeting the nonmilitary part of the challenge. As the crisis deepened and the massive nature of the Soviet assault on our civilization became evident, various research projects were instituted at our universities and within the agencies; there was an increase in language training at the Foreign Service Institute and greater emphasis was placed on the nonmilitary area at the War Colleges. But our policy planners did not seem to comprehend the new areas of knowledge, especially operationally attuned knowledge, we would have to explore and the range of subjects our policy level people and operators would have to master before they would be able to compete globally with the superbly prepared conflict managers and cadres directing and implementing the Soviet effort.

The result has been a grossly inadequate approach to the research and training problems posed by the Soviet political warfare challenge. While the Communists recognized that political warfare is at least as difficult as any of the arts and sciences and that those who lead it must be intensively and specially trained professionals, the way we prepared our people seemed to reflect a belief that a liberal education gave our policy makers and operators most of the actual schooling they needed, other than on the job experience.

This attitude is seen most clearly at the Foreign Science Institute where newly appointed Foreign Service officers, fresh from the campus, are given only 9 weeks of general orientation training before being committed to the global conflict of systems.¹¹ Only as they are entering midcareer do they qualify for 13 more weeks at the Institute, and this training is not only inadequate as regards communism, it fails to give the student even a superficial survey of the range of measures potentially available to us. Only when he becomes a senior officer is he qualified for a 9-month course, and here the training in nonmilitary conflict, as will be developed later, is still most inadequate.

This would seem to reflect an attitude that nonmilitary conflict is really not so complex and that one can pick up the essentials on the job. Or it can reflect a general resistance to going beyond the traditional instruments of foreign policy conventionally applied, which leaves the Communists unopposed on much of the political-ideological terrain.

Lacking an adequate training program, our cold-war strategists and operators have had to learn on the job, with tragic consequences. Furthermore, and this is an important point, the conceptual thinking and experience of careerists is often limited to one agency. While they may serve on various inter-agency boards and even attend one of the other agency schools, they are short on operator experience outside their agency. There are exceptions—noncareerists like Robert Lovett and Gordon Gray come to mind, who have moved around quite a bit.

As previously noted, this stands in marked contrast to the preparation of Soviet conflict managers who have often rotated through the KGB, Army, AFITPROP, and Foreign Service.

Henry Kissinger, in his useful study, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," commented on this (p. 434):

"Whatever the qualities of Soviet leadership, its training is eminently political and conceptual. Reading Lenin or Mao or Stalin, one is struck by the emphasis on the relationship between political, military, psychological, and economic factors, the insistence on finding a conceptual basis for political action and on the need for dominating a situation by flexible tactics and inflexible purpose. And the internal struggles in the Kremlin ensure that only the most iron-nerved reach the top. Against the Politburo, trained to think in general terms and freed of problems of day-to-day administration, we have pitted leaders overwhelmed with departmental duties and trained to think that the cardinal sin is to transgress on another's field of specialization. To our leaders, policy is as a series of discreet problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet system has had many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an

amateur. Even a mediocre professional will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the amateur does not know what to do, but because he cannot react with sufficient speed and consistency. Our leaders have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while doing, and this has imposed too great a handicap."

C. D. Jackson, who has been closely associated with our political warfare efforts, such as they are, for two decades as Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare at SHAEP, later president of the Free Europe Committee, and finally President Eisenhower's special assistant on cold war planning, made these pertinent observations at the 1959 Senate hearings on the Freedom Academy bill (pp. 60, 61):

"If there is a single common denominator running through these different experiences—military, civilian, governmental, and private—it is the difficulty of finding Americans who have not only an instinct or a flair for political warfare, but also the elementary knowledge and training on the nature of the conflict and how to go about our end of the conduct of this very real and continuing warfare.

"To be a Communist is to make political warfare a full-time job and a life commitment. For Americans it is at best a part-time aspect of some other job, conducted intermittently and with grossly inadequate training. There are far too few Americans who are both dedicated enough and knowledgeable enough to combat communism effectively on a full-time basis. If the Communists are scoring steady political gains—and we know they are, in all corners of the world—it is because they take their political warfare seriously and we do not. Our greatest danger, it seems to me, is that we may let the victory go by default, simply because too few of us realize the nature and understand the weapons of the struggle.

"Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may repeat and paraphrase, I am sure that there is a general impression that adequate instruction places exist where this art or this profession can be studied. Actually, sir, there is no existing place where the whole problem is pulled together and taught in concentrated form and not in bits and pieces. That is why I think this is a good idea."

During the past decade, the nearest thing we have had to a training program taking note of the new forms of struggle has been at the war colleges. Originally designed to emphasize military subjects, the colleges have reoriented their courses to give to national and international affairs something approaching a coequal role. Their primary purpose is to give the officer, often insulated from nonmilitary matters prior to World War II, a grasp of the broader aspects of national strategy. Tiny quotas are also assigned from State, USIA, CIA, ICA, Treasury, and Commerce.

Many factors which go into formulating national policy are considered. In terms of providing a broad survey of our cold and hot war machinery, an understanding of the interplay between existing programs, and a survey of current political, economic, military matters around the world, the war colleges do a reasonably good job and they enjoy considerable prestige.

However, the War Colleges, despite their excellence, fall far, far short of training rounded conflict managers. Their purpose is more modest. They were designed as finishing schools for military officers—not as training centers for conflict managers in the new forms of struggle. Such central subjects as Communist conflict doctrine are, as noted, given only the lightest coverage. The all important subject of psycho-political warfare is mentioned, but not studied in depth, and so forth. The same is true at the senior

⁹ The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 3, 1961, p. 14.

¹⁰ It is remarkable how many people assume that an expert on communism is also an expert on nonmilitary conflict for our side.

¹¹ This is not an argument for an undergraduate foreign service academy. We agree this might take students out of the main stream of American life at too early a stage in their development.

officer's seminar at FSI. They hardly begin to open the students' eyes to the whole new range of operational methods and organizational forms which we must develop and master, if we are to successfully resist Communist protracted conflict from the student organizations of Latin America to the jungle villages of Vietnam.

In the spring of 1961 the writer asked Dr. Stefan Possony¹² to list some of the important subjects not being covered in government cold war training programs. Here is part of his reply:

"If we look at specific gaps, we find that there is nowhere any instruction on political warfare. Sometimes the word is used, but the speaker usually has no solid background of information nor is documentation handy. Nowhere, to my knowledge, is the subject treated comprehensively, and even if one agency does devote some attention to this, I doubt that there is enough competence throughout the Government. Hence not only our own operators, but also those large segments of the U.S. Government who are the very target of political warfare, are left in ignorance about the matter.

"Similarly, there is no place where ideology is being studied. Ideologies are studied in universities, of course, but only in terms of Hegel, Marx, etc. In a deeper operational sense, notably in view of offensive or defensive manipulation, ideology is not on the instructional map. I would go so far as to say that there is no instruction throughout the Government designed to protect us against hostile propaganda. It is naively taken for granted that our people understand propaganda techniques and have no trouble distinguishing propaganda from genuine communications.

"Going beyond propaganda, I am unaware of any Government effort dealing with psychological warfare including such important features as motivation, will, perseverance, conversion, anxiety neuroses, and other factors from the area of psychology and personality.

"There is unquestionably some pragmatic experience in economic warfare, but there is no agency where this problem is studied comprehensively.

"With respect to technological warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has been making some progress, but, essentially, this school continues to deal with economics in the traditional sense.

"The interrelationships between psychological and technological warfare such as they manifest themselves in the test-ban agitation are studied nowhere. The many scientists who are called upon to advise the U.S. Government on technological matters are kept in blissful ignorance about the most essential points on which their advice has a bearing.

"Academic instruction is one thing and operational training another. The operational training the U.S. Government has been providing, even in its trade schools, is quite inadequate, partly because operational records are kept highly classified and are withheld from instruction. Once a particular operation is terminated, the data and the lessons learned could be incorporated into the instructional materials, but this is not done, possibly with the occasional exception of one trade school.

¹²Dr. Possony, author of the pioneering book, "A Century of Conflict" (1953), and co-author of "A Forward Strategy for America" (1960), has devoted much of his adult life to a study of Soviet conflict methods. He is a professor at Georgetown, past faculty member at the National War College, occasional lecturer at FSI, and adviser to the Defense Department on Soviet affairs.

"There are several efforts to acquaint reserve officers and civilian leadership groups with communism and other strategic problems (strategy seminars). But these programs are intermittent, improvised, and have too broad or narrow an audience base. No effort is really made to give the facts to such key segments of the American people as the communications industry. Nor is a real effort made to acquaint public opinion with the facts of life. Add to this the unfulfilled or largely unfulfilled need to increase the knowledge on communism in Allied countries, and to give a proper instruction to exchange people and foreign students, and you have a good list of the many things we are not doing."

These gaps in political warfare and its sub-strategies of economic, psychological, technological warfare and propaganda, as well as operational communism, could hardly be more critical, for they are in the very subjects which are essential to an understanding of the conflict we are in.

Without intensive, systematic study of these subjects, how can a cold war strategist possibly hope to develop strategy attuned to the world conflict? To say that specialists are available to advise him on these matters is like saying experts on strategy and tactics are available to a field commander who has never gotten around to studying these things himself. Washington advised Braddock about those unconventional Indians and well before the ambush. Unless the policymaker has himself mastered these central subjects and can think conceptually about the nonmilitary conflict, the availability of specialists will not make a strategist out of him.

When these grave deficiencies are pointed out, the stock answer is, we know Government training programs are inadequate, but this is supplemented by sending regular quotas to the better schools of international studies at our universities. As one State Department official put it to me, "We like our people to get the Harvard viewpoint, the John Hopkins viewpoint, the MIT viewpoint."

The point is that our universities are concentrating on language and area studies and not on developing or teaching nonmilitary conflict. Whoever heard of a course in political warfare? Yet it is total political war in which we are engaged.

I do not argue against the desirability of exposing agency personnel to many viewpoints. I do say that when these training programs, in sum, skim over or bypass subjects essential to an understanding of the war we are in, they are in no sense a substitute for the Freedom Academy. Language studies and area studies are essential. But until the strategist has also studied in depth Communist conflict doctrine and political, ideological, psychological, organizational, economic conflict from our viewpoint, as well as the Soviets, he cannot relate the other knowledge to the world struggle—he cannot "reorient our forces of all kinds" in the new forms of struggle.

The urgent need is for rounded cold war strategists. Our universities are attuned to developing scholars and specialists. The urgent need is for operational-organizational know-how in the new dimensions of struggle. Our universities are attuned to language and area studies or to international law and diplomacy in a more conventional context.

There is another most important reason why our universities fall short. This has to do with motivation and the will to victory. Motivation is the most essential element we must instill in our people at all levels. We are constantly told that the Communists work harder with more dedication than their opponents. This is true because the Com-

munist training program, the whole process by which they mould their cadre, concentrates on achieving a complete personal commitment. We naively assume motivation. Our Armed Forces understand its importance. Paratroop, Marine Corps, and Special Forces cadres have it, and it has been carefully cultivated in training, because their tough combat missions require it. Yet non-military conflicts tests the human will in more subtle and deadly ways than military combat, and the will to win is crucial. The university atmosphere is simply not conducive to developing a complete personal commitment. Sometimes it will, but this is by accident rather than by design.

Many of the programs which are potentially available to us are conditioned on highly motivated as well as trained personnel to implement them. Men and women ready to accept any financial sacrifice or physical rigor, if it contributes to victory; who will not permit themselves to be affected by the apathy of their associates or the psychological pressures of the enemy.

Our training program is, of course, severely handicapped by the grossly inadequate research and development program in nonmilitary conflict. This has kept us from understanding our potential capacity and instituting a training program oriented to this capacity. It has kept our training programs confined to the comparatively narrow scope of our present knowledge.

Much work has been done at our universities on area research, especially on the Soviet Union. The Russian Research Center at Harvard and the Russian Institute at Columbia have produced a number of books going into many facets of the Soviet state. There is an increasing awareness of the need for African, Latin American, and Eastern studies, and many area studies are underway at our universities. Language training is being stepped up. Hundreds of books have been published on communism.¹³

Yet, we must keep constantly before us the distinction between studying communism and the languages, institutions, economics, and histories of foreign countries on the one hand and researching and developing the operational-organizational know-how and the conceptual framework for non-military conflict. Only the latter makes it possible to understand the conflict we are in, in all its dimensions, and to apply the full range of methods and means potentially available in an integrated, sustained, and consistent fashion.

It is this operational-organizational knowledge and a realistic conceptual framework for a global struggle between freedom and communism which is neglected at our universities. I do not mean that nothing is being done about these things at our universities. Here and there an individual professor or small group is doing useful work. This does not change the general picture. There seems to be a feeling that the operational problems of nonmilitary conflict are not a suitable subject for the campus.

The Soviets also engage in extensive area and language studies, and in African studies they are probably ahead of us. But it is not this which gives them their great advantage. Rather, it is the systematic way in which they have thought out and mastered all the organizational forms and operational techniques which are possible in a total power struggle and the way in which they apply these flexibly yet systematically and consist-

¹³In many of these books, the author in the closing chapter feels the need to suggest countermeasures. Usually they have little to offer. This is most revealing as to our low level of knowledge in the area of non-military conflict.

ently with clearly understood purpose within an all-encompassing conceptual framework. This gives them the capability of using the production of their area studies to best advantage.

The Government research effort in non-military conflict has been a bits-and-pieces affair. There has been considerable ad hoc inquiry into specific, limited operational problems as they arise. There has not been an organized, comprehensive effort to think through the full range of methods and means potentially available to us. The emphasis has been on meeting the day-to-day problems, rather than a long-range research and development effort to systematically develop our national capacity to engage in the new dimensions of struggle. Furthermore, the existing operational knowledge and research has not been assembled at one place so that we can determine what has already been done, define the gaps to be filled, and then set about in an organized way to fill these gaps.

The result of this research and training failure is that our policymakers simply do not know what our national potential is in the global struggle. A whole range of means which could be available to us do not enter into our planning, because our policymakers have not been prepared to understand these things, our operators have not been trained to implement them, and our research has not been attuned to finding out what they are.

Therefore, in seeking our national objectives we employ only a fraction of the methods and means potentially available. Again and again an objective is approached along a few well-worn avenues when a whole complex of access roads lead directly or indirectly to the same objective. Ours has been a limited approach to strategy, while the Communists employ all arms.

Our greatest weakness is that we continue to plan too much in terms of present capacity rather than in terms of systematically developing capacity in the new dimensions of conflict by instituting a research and training program organized to fill the five requirements I have listed.

Consider requirement No. 4—adequate public knowledge about communism and the global struggle. Again there is no evidence of an organized effort which can hope to fill the gap.

It should be emphasized once again that adequate generalized knowledge about communism and Communist conflict technique can only be obtained through a systematic training program or a heavy amount of organized reading. It is no answer to say that our news media give excellent coverage of world events. They present a hodge-podge of uncorrelated facts which leave the untrained individual with a blurred image of communism. Nor is it any answer to say there are many good books about communism in our libraries, when no significant number of people are reading these books, or reading them in sufficient quantity.

It should be kept in mind there is little in the experience of our people to prepare them to understand the present struggle. The type of enemy we face, the confusing array of methods and means used against us, the skillful deception, the ambiguous nature of enemy moves, the misleading vocabulary, the slow, and often concealed erosion of our position, the seemingly disconnected events in all parts of the globe, subversion raised to the level of a science, the staggering long range implications of the Soviet industrial, technological, scientific effort, are all foreign to our experience.

Our secondary schools and universities are an obvious place to make a beginning. Yet by and large they offer almost nothing. Allen Dulles, in his August 1960 speech to the VFW, commented:

"In our schools and colleges we can find many courses in ancient history, in philosophy, courses on the great movements of the past, the conquests of ancient times from Alexander the Great to Napoleon. Courses on Communist theory and practices are few and far between.

"By and large, however, in our educational institutions, except in the graduate field or in specialized schools and seminars, these subjects are not generally taught.

"There is a real urgency to build up our knowledge on the entire background of the Communist thrust against our civilization.

"The people of this country are and will continue to be basically opposed to communism in general. This opposition is based more on instincts than on knowledge. This is not enough. Our people should be sufficiently educated in all of the ramifications of communistic intrigues and its historical background, its purposes, and programs adequately to contribute toward an effective answer.

"The initiative for new knowledge comes more often from those of us who want to learn than from those who teach. But let us also call on our educators, and on those in authority who have influence over the development of our educational system to begin to expand the realistic teaching of the history and policies of communism."

Mr. Dulles was overly generous in his reference to the graduate field. One expert recently advised me, "I do not think there are more than half a dozen courses in the entire country that cover communism as such and, if so, discuss operational technique rather than political philosophy and history. If there are more such courses they would be outside regular degree curricula." A course covering political philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries in which the student reads the "Communist Manifesto" and "State and Revolution," does practically nothing to prepare him to understand the conflict we are in. Nor do a few chapters on Russia since 1917 in a modern European history course. Yet this is about all that many colleges offer.

As Dulles emphasized, this instruction should begin in our secondary schools. Here the gap is almost complete. Actually some public pressure is developing to institute courses on "Communism Versus Democracy" in our high schools. However, even if our schools wanted to do this, and some now do, they are stymied because no teachers have been trained to give such courses, or to include the subject in adequate form in social science and history courses.

Nothing demonstrates our research and training failure better than this failure to teach the teachers. Again and again civic organizations, the American Bar Association for example, have urged such instruction. And each time they run up against the same roadblock. There is little evidence our teachers colleges and State universities are doing anything to remedy the situation or that they have instructors themselves, in many instances, who are prepared to teach these things. It is unrealistic to expect our busy teachers to educate themselves in this difficult subject. Under mounting pressure, courses will begin to appear in our high schools, but their quality, in the absence of systematically trained teachers, will leave much to be desired.

There are a few bits and pieces, small scale attempts to overcome public ignorance. The War Colleges bring in a few private citizens, mostly reserve officers, for 1- or 2-week strategy seminars. These range over such a wide area they can provide only the skimpiest coverage of communism. Some private groups have initiated schools on communism, usually of 1- to 5-day duration. Sometimes

these have been well run. Sometimes they have been unnecessarily partisan. There is seldom any followup. Last fall the University of Southern California received a \$350,000 gift to establish a school on "Communist Strategy and Tactics." Presently it is offering 6 weeks of night classes. This event was so unique in the academic world, it received wide press coverage. It is a small, but hopeful beginning.

It is when we come to requirement No. 5, however—not merely understanding communism and the nature of the global struggle between systems, but knowing how the private sector can contribute to winning this struggle—that the extent of the research and training gap really becomes apparent.

The very idea of the private sector playing a large role in the cold war may seem novel. The Orlando committee, after years of considering the problem, is convinced that many of our most difficult cold-war problems are susceptible of partial solution, at least, through a wide range of method and means which can be implemented by the private sector—provided our private institutions and civic organizations have among their members some who have received at least a little systematic training about communism, the global conflict, and what the private sector can contribute. Without such trained and motivated people, what the private sector can do is limited. With them, even in comparatively small numbers, the range of activities * * * is almost unlimited. Yet, as in the case of schoolteachers, we have neglected to provide anywhere a training program which would enable any significant number of private citizens to learn about these things.

Today the private sector wants to participate. From personal experience, and this has been confirmed by others I have talked with, I can testify a marked change has occurred in the public's attitude toward the cold war. Responsible citizens who showed little concern even a year or two ago, are now crowding forward to ask "What can we do?" They are worried. They sense that the business as usual civic projects now engaging their time are a little remote in terms of the present world situation. Many display eagerness to involve themselves and their organizations in worthwhile projects that have some real bearing on winning the cold war. These are responsible civic leaders, who understand the battle must be won in Latin America and Africa as well as H-boken, and by a combination of positive as well as negative programs.

By and large, however, this increasing desire to participate has been frustrated by lack of trained leadership at the community, State, and National levels and advanced knowledge on what the private sector can do.

This is disturbing, because every day important opportunities are slipping by, some never to reappear. But our civic leaders lack the training to enable them to visualize these opportunities or the methods and means their organizations could employ to take advantage of them.

The little training that is available, like the strategy seminars, has one common failing. It gets the student all stirred up and then suggests little or nothing he can do. There is a good reason why. In this tough and complex struggle the things the private sector can do are not as obvious as some imagine. Knowing something about the enemy is not sufficient preparation for making an effective contribution. It will require a concentrated, systematic research program involving a broad cross section of experts with a maximum cross fertilization of ideas and experiences to think through the many methods and means the private sector can employ—if the private sector is

to participate on a sustained and systematic basis.

A number of private organizations are making some contribution here and overseas. Certain foundations are spending substantial sums overseas on a range of projects that sometimes have at least an indirect bearing. The AFL-CIO has done considerable work in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia attempting to build up free labor against the Communist onslaught. If you go through the whole list of private participation, at first glance it appears impressive.

In fact, it is not. Only a tiny fraction of the ingenuity, talent, and strength that could be brought to bear here and overseas is being utilized. The great majority of our civic organizations are uninvolved. Much of what is being done is mediocre in terms of what it could be, if we had trained, motivated people to carry out these programs.

To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive, organized effort going on anywhere to research and think through the full range of methods and means the private sector can properly employ. Nor does any existing center have the staff, funds, or directive to undertake this enormous and challenging job. Yet, until the problem is considered whole, until a wide range of expert knowledge is focused on the problem, we can never know what the true capacity of the private sector is.

In planning our strategy in the nonmilitary area, we tend to downgrade the role of the private sector and this is realistic, considering its present limited capacity. The point is that we can very likely develop a very large capacity to participate with the type of research and training program envisioned for the Freedom Academy. Instead of bemoaning the lethargy, indifference, and seeming incapacity of the private sector, we should recognize these are the natural and expected results of our neglect to institute an adequate research and training program.

The President's speech of April 20, 1961, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors indicates the administration may have turned a corner in its comprehension of the inadequacy of our strategy and the means of implementation in nonmilitary conflict. I was particularly struck by these words:

"It is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. The advantages of a police state, its use of mass terror and arrest to prevent the spread of free dissent, cannot be overlooked by those who expect the fall of every fanatic tyrant.

"If the self-discipline of the free cannot match the iron discipline of the mailed fist in economic, political, scientific, and all the other kinds of struggle as well as the military, then the peril to freedom will continue to rise. . . ."

"It is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments.

"We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concept, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it. . . . And we dare not fail to realize that this struggle is taking place every day without fanfare in thousands of villages and markets day and night and in classrooms all over the globe. . . ."

"Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs; on armies prepared to cross borders; on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough; that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

"We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to reexamine and reorient our forces of all kinds; our tactics and our institutions

here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war."

These are hopeful words. Whether the corner has been turned will depend in good measure on the training and research effort we now inaugurate to prepare us to understand and master the new concepts, the new tools which will enable us to reexamine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics, and our institutions.

For many years I have felt that one of the best indicators of future Soviet intentions is their immediate research and training effort. No one who noted the stepped up training of Latin Americans at Prague beginning in 1954 would have been misled by Khrushchev's protestations of peaceful coexistence.

By the same token I will remain unimpressed by talk about new methods and means until an adequate research and training program is inaugurated to provide them.

The question is this. Will the administration take the position that the existing research and training program is adequate, or can be made adequate with a little more emphasis on nonmilitary conflict? Or will the administration admit that we have not even come close to an adequate research and training effort in the new dimensions of conflict, and then set about systematically creating national capacity for the long haul in the new forms of struggle?

The President is on record that we can lose everything if we fail to master the new forms of struggle. As of today there is not a single center in or out of government where this vast subject is pulled together and taught in concentrated form.¹⁴ Yet, only when it is considered whole can we understand the nature of the challenge and generate an adequate response.

SCHOOL ASSISTANCE IN FEDERALLY AFFECTED AREAS

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, the program of Federal school assistance to local school districts under Public Laws 874 and 815 has now been operating successfully for 12 years. It has served all of our 50 States, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands under many diverse situations and conditions, and served them remarkably well.

¹⁴The Senate Judiciary Committee in its June 1960 report on the Freedom Academy bill made this finding:

"1. No concentrated, systematic effort is being made to develop an integrated operational science for our side which will meet the entire Soviet attack and work toward our long-range national objectives in a coordinated manner, utilizing every area of potential strength in the public and private sectors. We have not thought through all of the short- and long-range methods and means which freemen can properly use when faced with a Soviet-type challenge, and we have not integrated these methods into a broad strategic plan. This is especially true in the field of political and economic warfare. Bits and pieces of the problem are being worked on within the Government and at some universities, and part of this development work is of a high order, but the total effort falls far short of seeking an integrated, operational science and does not begin to develop our true potential.

"2. Nowhere today can Government personnel or private citizens receive broad spectrum training in cold war, especially in the large and highly complex field of political and economic war. Not only do we lack top level schools, we do not even have intermediate or lower level schools. There is no place where the bits and pieces are pulled together and taught in concentrated form."

During this time, the impacted-area laws have been extended many times, and have been adjusted again and again to meet new situations and to iron out inequities. Public Law 815, which provides construction funds, was extended, or its provisions modified to adjust assistance to recently modified needs, three times in the 83d Congress, three times in the 84th Congress, three times in the 85th Congress, three times in the 86th Congress, and once more in the 1st session of the 87th Congress.

Public Law 874, which provides operation and maintenance funds in federally impacted areas, was extended, or modified, with similar purposes in view, three times in the 83d Congress, five times in the 84th Congress, twice in the 85th Congress, three times in the 86th Congress and once in the 87th Congress, 1st session.

The Members of Congress who sit on the committees responsible for the impacted-area laws have shown great willingness to adjust the laws to fit newly emerging situations, and the Congress has given almost unanimous support to the recommendations of the committees.

As a result, in 1962, approximately 11 million schoolchildren, or close to one-third of all pupils attending public elementary and secondary schools, were in attendance at a school in one of the 4,065 school districts receiving aid under one or more of the impacted-area programs. Federal property forming a basis for this assistance totalled 255 million acres. There were some 5,288 different Federal properties claimed by applicants as a basis for federally connected children. I quote these figures to indicate how widespread the programs are, and the increasingly important impact this assistance is having on all public elementary and secondary education in the United States.

In my State of Utah, in 1962, 12 school districts were aided under Public Law 874, the operation and maintenance law, receiving a total of \$2,257,342. Two school districts were helped by Public Law 815, the school construction law, receiving \$1,094,329. In a relatively small State like Utah, where there is a high birthrate, a personal income average below the national average, and more children in public schools per capita than in any other State, the \$3 million in school assistance provided by these two laws was welcome, indeed, indispensable.

Some provisions of these valuable and highly regarded laws have been made permanent, but others are under temporary extension, and will expire on June 30 of this year. I hope that in this session we can give these programs early and careful consideration, so we will not be faced with pushing them through at the last moment—or even after they have expired, as was the case in the 1st session of the 87th Congress—and that we can also consider carefully some adjustments which would broaden the programs slightly to allow other schools to participate and would also clear up inequities. I am, therefore, introducing a bill today which I hope will be a basis for such action.