



CUBA VS THE C.I.A.

by Robert E. Light, Carl Marzani

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versus
CIA

by ROBERT E. LIGHT
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INTRODUCTION

THE NEW YORK *Times*, May 10, 1961, addressed an editorial to the U.S. government called, "The Right Not to Be Lied To," which was precipitated by the wilful falsehoods spread by Administration officials on the Cuban invasion fiasco. Despite the well-warranted rebuke of the *Times*, and many public figures, official lying on the nature of U.S. involvement in the unhappy affair has persisted.

It has been our purpose, to the extent of our information and experience, to put together the full story of the purpose, execution and failure of the invasion carried out under the aegis of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, with the approval of two U.S. Presidents. To explain the mentality of the invasion's midwife—the CIA—we have examined the agency, traced the career of its director Allen W. Dulles and publish herewith—for the first time in the U.S., we believe—a Hitler SS document covering Dulles' meeting with a Nazi representative in 1943. A concluding section of our joint effort deals with the dilemmas of U.S. foreign policy and suggests ways to peaceful readjustment to a changing world.

It has not been our purpose to evaluate Premier Castro's government; neither to list its shortcomings nor to trumpet its achievements. But, we frankly profess our belief that the revolutionary government holds far more promise for Cuba than any regime the invaders might have established.

We are indebted to Robert Edwards, British Member of Parliament, and to his collaborator, Kenneth Dunne, for many of the facts on Allen Dulles, which they printed in a booklet, *A Study of a Master Spy*, published by Housmans, London.

The extensive files and library of *National Guardian* newsweekly provided much of the material on the Cuban invasion. The impetus for this published work grew out of a series published in the *Guardian*.



We are in deepest obligation to John T. McManus for wise counsel and deft editing.

ROBERT E. LIGHT
CARL MARZANI

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THE OPPOSING STRATEGISTS

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
United States of America



FIDEL CASTRO RUZ
Commander-in-Chief,
Cuban armed forces,
Republic of Cuba

DULLES AND THE CIA

PERHAPS AS A HEROIC GESTURE in behalf of subordinates, President Kennedy has assumed responsibility for the invasion of Cuba April 17 which ended 66 hours later in total defeat for the invaders.

It was correct for the President to assume the blame for the resulting fiasco, but the responsibility must be apportioned among the agencies and men who planned and carried out the action.

Operation Pluto, the code name for the Cuban invasion (Pluto was King of the Underworld in Greek mythology), was conceived under the Eisenhower Administration and willed to its successor. President Kennedy accepted the inheritance and committed his Administration to carrying out the plan.

Between conception and birth, the operation involved the Joint Chiefs of Staff, top officials in the State and Defense Departments, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and the CIA. Whatever reservations some may have had, only Fulbright went on record against the adventure—which cost some \$45 million of U.S. taxpayers' money, to which \$15-\$20 million may be added by public contribution to indemnify Cuba for the damage done, via the tractors for prisoners project initiated by the President a month after the invasion.

While all concerned must bear an appropriate share of the responsibility, the CIA was the agency most directly implicated. It trained the invaders, procured the arms, drew up the invasion plan and presented the intelligence estimates on the basis of which the other agencies concurred and participated. Washington made its decisions on what the CIA reported.

In a basic sense, CIA made foreign policy and this (says the *New Republic*, for example) "was the natural end-result of a broad usurpation of power which took place, almost unnoticed, during those anomalous years *when one Dulles ran the State Department and another the agency [emphasis added]*. . . . Since the death of Foster Dulles this usurpation has grown increasingly visible, and Cuba turned a searing

spotlight on the phenomenon of a government which has come to have, in effect, two State Departments." Perhaps the most important consequence of the failure of the Cuban invasion is that for the first time the American people have had a glimpse of the sinister influence of the CIA in foreign policy.

But this usurpation of power was not only due to the fact that the Dulles brothers ran two vital U.S. agencies; it was also due to the fact that in the CIA, as Marquis Childs reports, "military influence has long been important" and the Pentagon has supported, abetted and protected the CIA in its political adventurism. The power of the Pentagon in foreign policy is little known to the American people but is beyond dispute. As long ago as 1950, Walter Lippmann wrote that there was developing in the Pentagon "a very good and rather serious imitation of what in any other country would be militarism—namely the military control of foreign policy." (*N.Y. Herald Tribune*, June 20, 1950.) Not only Lippmann, but John Foster Dulles himself in 1950 attacked the Democratic Administration for the fact that "the State Department is in many respects subordinated to the National Security Council in the field of foreign affairs. The National Security Council has been predominantly military in character." (*War or Peace*, p. 235.) In the intervening decade the power of the military has greatly increased; indeed President Eisenhower warned of this trend in his farewell address in January, 1961. Yet when the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave written approval to the Cuban invasion, they were approving a plan in which the Pentagon had participated. The debacle is a comment on the military mind, and this military mind functions also inside the CIA, which Marquis Childs says "falls into the error of counting guns and tanks as though a census of the number of divisions in being were proof of the stability of a country."

But we must look deeper into the structure of the CIA. Leaving aside the morality of invading a sovereign nation in times of peace, the sheer massive misrepresentation of intelligence as well as the bumbling inefficiency of execution staggers the imagination. Here is an agency that has tens of thousands of employees and spends hundreds of millions of dollars a year (the exact amount being unknown as the CIA has no Congressional supervision) and yet can fail so dramatically to present a true picture of conditions within a small nation 90 miles from our shores—which until Jan. 3, all U.S. citizens might freely visit. Where were all those secret agents and spies which the CIA is supposed to have all over the world? Did they mislead Washington?

The answer lies in the nature of an intelligence agency. Contrary to popular belief the heart of intelligence work is not the information of the super-duper spy, but the systematic gathering of facts which are 90 per cent obtained from open and legal sources from the country in

question: their magazines, newspapers, academic journals and so on, as well as the reports of our embassies with their various attaches, commercial, military, naval and the rest. Some 200,000 pieces of such "open" literature go into the CIA every month and are processed into permanent records as an infinity of facts on IBM cards.

But these millions and millions of disparate facts are quite useless unless a *mind* is applied to them, unless somebody *thinks* with them, uses them to develop and check judgments and evaluations. This takes a body of experts; and by historical development of intelligence in this country, the CIA is not only weak in general on evaluation, but in the case of Latin America it happens to be staffed by men trained to be cops and not political analysts. The *New Republic* for May 8, 1961, lays bare this hitherto little known aspect of the CIA:

"When the wartime intelligence groups were disbanded, some 1,600 scholars and area experts who had been enlisted by the Office of Strategic Services became the nucleus of the State Department intelligence organization, while only a handful of OSS veterans found their way into the newly formed CIA. The CIA had to start from scratch to develop its personnel, or to draw on the military and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the case of Latin America, the FBI men who had been given wartime responsibility for intelligence and counter-espionage work in the Western Hemisphere served as the core of the CIA regional staff. The Special Intelligence Service set up by the FBI for overseas work had performed effectively for seven years. But it was one thing to arrest enemy espionage agents and quite another to fathom the inner social and political workings of Latin American societies. . . . The FBI hemisphere organization was in the end incorporated into the CIA more or less intact."

The reason military men and FBI agents do not make good intelligence experts in the political field is that their training is too rigid and narrow. Furthermore, they are usually politically naive and tend to see everything in black and white—or should one say, red and white.

But the decisive factor is not so much their past training as the indoctrination they receive in the CIA itself: the atmosphere of the agency, which, as in every organization, is a reflection of the director. There is an old joke that the key part of an automobile is the nut that holds the steering wheel; and this comment holds for an intelligence agency. The personality and predilections of Allen Dulles are basic to the steering of the CIA and to molding its collective personality.

What kind of a man is Allen Dulles?

In a long article on the CIA, *Newsweek* (May 8, 1961), waxes ecstatic over Allen Dulles the master-mind:

“For more than eight years, Dulles has dedicated himself to his job, giving it ten or twelve hours a day, expanding and improving his staff, developing new facilities and techniques, doing his best to make CIA the best intelligence agency in the world. And there is no question but that his devotion has paid off. French and British security officers privately express great admiration for CIA. American intelligence officials—especially the old timers from OSS days—say what Dulles has really given the CIA is professionalism.”

With such admiration for Dulles, two further paragraphs in the article are unexpectedly devastating:

“The CIA was in the news this week because of two defeats. . . . One setback was in Laos, where the CIA decided to support the power of General Phoumi Nosavan, mainly on the grounds that he was strongly anti-Communist. He was—but the CIA entirely overlooked the fact that he was also politically unpopular, and his army was almost entirely worthless.

“The other humiliation was in Cuba, where the CIA clearly failed to grasp the political realities of the situation. The CIA believed the information it received from one group of Cuban refugees, that the Cuban people were ripe for revolution; it discounted the information that said this simply was not so.”

Newsweek calls this “astonishing ineptitude” and goes on to analyze why:

“The basic reason is that the CIA tendency to support the most militant anti-Communist is built into the system. . . . When a CIA man goes abroad, the emphasis is on getting intelligence, especially about what the Communists are doing, and the best way to find out about the Reds is to establish contact with the national secret police. . . . ‘The result is that the system tends to make the U.S. clandestine allies of reaction,’ says a former CIA man who now holds elective office.”

Militant anti-Communism is *Newsweek's* reason for the CIA ineptitude, a blind, self-defeating anti-Communism. But this political position is not the result of co-operating with reactionary secret police throughout the world. Such co-operation is the result and not the cause of CIA's blindness. A more accurate reason is given by Marquis Childs in the *Washington Post* (April 26, 1961) in what he calls the CIA's “exile mentality.” He writes:

“Ever since the Russian revolution of 1917 and increasingly in the past two decades exiles have influenced American policy and the American appraisal of critical situations. . . . But by the very terms of exile they are more likely than not to be wrong in their estimates of what is happening in their former homelands.”

But in a sense this reason begs the question: Why should U.S. policy makers be influenced by exiles? It is, after all, well known that exiles are rarely objective about conditions in their former countries: Chiang Kai-shek is not the best expert on China, and reactionary governments are out of touch with their own people—that’s what makes them reactionary.

Naturally such people will give biased and misleading information. Commander Lederer, one of the authors of *The Ugly American*, has shown in his recent book, *A Nation of Sheep*, how U.S. intelligence and diplomats are systematically gulled by the reactionaries’ regimes throughout Southeast Asia. Lederer gives specific instances where these regimes prevent U.S. agents from going into the field, a not too difficult job of persuasion since U.S. agents generally do not know the language and are reluctant to leave the easy life of the big cities.

Above all, however, these agents also know that the home office looks with suspicion on reports that seem “soft” on communism. In the struggle between the Chinese Red Army and the Kuomintang, American officials in China were afraid to report the objective situation. *Time-Life* correspondent Jack Belden in *China Shakes the World* gives many instances of this fear. *Newsweek* unwittingly confirms this phenomenon quoting the former CIA man as saying: “When it comes to recommendations about politics, the safe project is to support the element which is most anti-Communist.”

In other words, the political bias of the top CIA officials, their blind anti-Communism, is the basic reason for CIA ineptitude. The intellectual climate of the agency is shaped by these officials and primarily by the director himself. Dulles himself has said, “You have to look to the man who is directing the organization and the result he achieved. If you haven’t got someone who can be trusted, or who doesn’t get results, you’d better throw him out and get some one else.”

This is sound advice and will probably be prophetic. It is doubtful that Allen Dulles will last through 1961 as director of the CIA. But when he is gone it may be hoped that he will not be forgotten, for his life and mentality are typical of many top policy makers in our government, particularly the ease with which such men shuttle from lucrative corporate positions to high government posts and back again. Much of Allen Dulles’ background is unknown to the American people. A quick

look at his personal history will illuminate both the CIA and U.S. foreign policy in the last decade.

Allen Dulles was born on April 7, 1893. As a future diplomat and intelligence official he had picked his relatives carefully. His maternal grandfather, General John Watson Foster, was Secretary of State in the Harrison administration [1890-94], and busied himself to annex the Hawaiian Islands. His uncle, Robert Lansing, became Wilson's Secretary of State in August, 1915. Thanks to his abilities and his family connections, Allen Dulles became a second secretary in Vienna in 1916 at the age of 23. From Vienna he went to Switzerland and later to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. His admirers say he showed great talents in those years. *Time* magazine in September, 1959, wrote that in Switzerland in 1918 "Dulles hatched the first of the grandiose plots which were to become his trademark." Grandiose seems to be the *mot juste*: Dulles' plot aimed at saving the Hapsburg empire by turning it into a kind of United States of Austria. Events didn't quite turn out that way—and as a matter of history, the hallmark of futility has remained with Allen Dulles right through to the Cuban enterprise.

A year later, at the Paris Peace Conference, we find Dulles terribly impressed by anti-Bolshevik emigres. He wrote a memorandum entitled "Lithuania and Poland, the Last Barrier Between Germany and the Bolsheviks." The memorandum is strongly in favor of Polish-Lithuanian intervention and "The Allies should not be deterred from a military expedition because of their fear that it would require hundreds of thousands of men." Allen Dulles was only twenty-five and a half years old, but already he was thinking big.

Allen Dulles' superior at this time was a Mr. Ellis Dressel who was the leading U.S. expert on German affairs. When Dressel went to Berlin in 1919 as U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Dulles was with him as first secretary. Dressel had many contacts with the generals and financiers who were dreaming of a future push to the East. One of the Dressel reports makes interesting reading. He talked to a leading financier who told him that the nations destined to bring order to Russia were undoubtedly Germany and America. America could not cope with this task alone because she did not understand conditions in Russia whereas Germany had the necessary experience. Dulles' top level German contacts date from this time.

After Berlin, Dulles spent two years in Constantinople and then returned to Washington where he became head of the Division for Near East affairs until he left in 1926. Near East means oil and during this period the battle between American and British oil companies took place with Rockefeller finally getting 25 per cent of the shares of Iraq Petroleum Co., Mellon's group of the Gulf Oil Corporation getting priority rights on the Bahrein Islands.

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In 1926 Dulles resigned from the State Department for a post in the powerful legal firm of Sullivan and Cromwell which had ties and dealings with Rockefeller and Morgan among other American corporations. Dulles' knowledge of oil stood him in good stead as evidenced quickly by the affair of the so-called "Barco Concession" in the oil fields of Colombia.

In 1917 a certain General Barco had sold a group of American firms (including Morgan and Mellon) a concession on the rich oilfields in the province Norte de Santander, but in 1926 the Colombian President, Dr. Miguel Abadia Mendez, denounced the concession. The Morgan-Mellon group chose two experts on the art of putting pressure, both former State Department officials—Allen Dulles and Francis Loomis. Other advisers were Gerrard Winston, former assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Herbert Stadler, former head of the Latin American Division of the State Department.

By 1928 Secretary of State Kellogg had sent an ultimatum and the Mellons threatened an economic boycott. But President Mendez remained firm. However by 1950, with a little financial push from the U.S. oil companies, a new president was elected in Colombia who forced a new oil bill through the Colombia Congress. The operation was a success.

Among the major customers of Sullivan and Cromwell were three German firms, Vereinigte Stahlwerke (the famous steel trust), I. G. Farben and Bosch. Bosch had an American subsidiary which at the beginning of World War II was turned over to the Swedish bankers, Wallenberg Brothers, to be returned at the end of the war. The Dulles brothers handled the transaction in the United States. By this time Allen Dulles had become a director of the German-international J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation in the United States. The head of the German parent outfit, Schroeder Bankhaus, was a genuine German baron, Kurt von Schroeder, whose house in Cologne was the rendezvous for the famous meeting of Hitler and Franz von Papen in January, 1933. The Baron later became an SS *Gruppenfuhrer* and chairman of a group that collected funds to finance Himmler.

Because of his German contacts, Allen Dulles became head of the Berne office of the OSS during the Second World War. His work is still shrouded in secrecy but here and there a glimpse is available. A British Member of Parliament, Mr. Robert Edwards, has obtained and published documents from the files of the SS Reich Security Office of conversations held between Dulles and a high SS official in February, 1943. The cover name for Dulles was Mr. Bull. The SS official's cover name was Pauls. Here are excerpts from the SS reports published by the Hon. Mr. Edwards:

"He (Dulles) received Herr Pauls very cordially, and the

two established that they had already met in 1916 in Vienna and between 1923 and — in New York. Mr. Bull (Dulles) said he was very glad to see Mr. Pauls again after all this time and exchange ideas with him, as he had a clear head for European problems; he (Dulles) was fed up with listening all the time to outdated politicians, emigres and prejudiced Jews. In his (Dulles) view, a peace had to be made in Europe in the preservation of which all concerned would have a real interest. There must not again be a division into victors and vanquished, that is, contented and discontented; never again must nations like Germany be driven by want and injustice to desperate experiments and heroism. The German state must continue to exist, as a factor of order and progress; there could be no question of its partition or the separation of Austria. . . . To the Czech question Mr. Bull (Dulles) seemed to attach little importance; at the same time he felt it necessary to support the formation of a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism and pan-Slavism through the eastward enlargement of Poland and the preservation of Rumania and of a strong Hungary.”

“Then Mr. Bull (Dulles) turned to the subject of National Socialism and the person of Adolph Hitler and declared that with all respect to the historical importance of Adolph Hitler and his work it was hardly conceivable that the Anglo-Saxons’ worked-up public opinion could accept Hitler as unchallenged master of Greater Germany. People had no confidence in the durability and dependability of agreements with him. And re-establishment of mutual confidence was the most essential thing after the war. Nevertheless, Herr Pauls did not get the impression that it was to be viewed as a dogma of American prejudice. Mr. Bull (Dulles) described the Atlantic Charter as an important basis; but its excessively wide compass needed to be revised.”

The hint of anti-Semitism contained in the first excerpt was more sharply enunciated in two other passages which follow.

“Herr Pauls now made a very sharp thrust on the Jewish question and declared that any Central European would find it unbearable to think the Jews might ever come back again; people would simply not accept a return of the Jews and a re-establishment of their position of power. Herr Pauls intimated that he sometimes actually felt the Americans were only going on with the war so as to be able to get rid of the Jews and send them back again. To this Mr. Bull (Dulles) who in the course of the conversation had clearly evinced anti-Semitic tendencies, replied that in America things had not quite got to that point

yet and that it was in general a question of whether the Jews wanted to go back.”

* * *

“Mr. Bull (Dulles) is in close touch with the Vatican. He himself called Herr Pauls’ attention to the importance of this connection, for the American Catholics also have a decisive word to say, and before the conversation ended he again repeated how greatly Germany’s position in America would be strengthened if German bishops were to plead Germany’s cause there. Even the Jews’ hatred could not outweigh that. It had to be remembered, after all, that it had been the American Catholics who had forced the Jewish-American papers to stop their baiting of Franco Spain.”

We cannot assume that Dulles is as virulently anti-Semitic as his Nazi counterpart, Herr Pauls—after all he was trying to be pleasant to a Nazi—but even for this purpose he seems unnecessarily enthusiastic. More important, however, is that at a time when the Casablanca Conference had set a Big Three allied agreement of “unconditional surrender” Dulles is suggesting that Austria not be liberated and that a strong Germany be part of a new cordon sanitaire against the USSR.

Moreover this conversation in February, 1943, must be seen in the context of the times. The German defeat at Stalingrad in January, 1943, was seen by all military strategists as the turning point of the war. Henceforth the USSR could not be defeated and therefore a German defeat was inevitable unless the Allies could be split. The more far-sighted Nazis recognized this and from the memoirs of such Nazi intelligence agents as Gisevius and Hottl we know that Himmler at about this time was looking for contacts with the West for a deal to remove Hitler, cede the occupied territory in the West and continue the war in the East.

Dulles supplied this contact and was actually being used by Himmler perhaps without his knowing it. (Incidentally the Nazi agents have revealed that the Hungarian deciphering office had broken the code that Dulles used to communicate with Washington.)

There was no alternative to the agreed policy of “unconditional surrender” except on the political premise of anti-Sovietism. This was clearly understood by all concerned including the Vatican, which was to have its finger in the generals’ plot against Hitler the following year. That Dulles favored this plan is shown by the fact that two years later, in February, 1945, he was involved in secret negotiations for the surrender of Nazi troops in Italy, excluding the Russians who had a right to participate and thus precipitating one of the few angry exchanges between Stalin and FDR.

The full story of what Dulles’ contacts with the Nazis actually achieved is still shrouded in secrecy, but if they were as praiseworthy

as has been hinted it is a reasonable supposition that more details would be available—for Dulles is not unaware of public relations methods. From what little has been garnered here these contacts seem to show the typical Dulles' hallmark of grandiose (and futile) schemes of which the Cuban invasion has become the most notorious.

Despite Dulles' protestations to the contrary, the CIA under his direction has consistently edged into foreign policy and has acted again and again as if it were a government super-imposed on a government. It has been published and never denied that the CIA has subverted government after government, not stopping at the use of military force. The CIA role in overthrowing the Mossadegh government in Iran and the Arbenz government in Guatemala has been underlined in innumerable publications. A *Saturday Evening Post* article over four years ago declared that CIA agents had worked with Naguib and Nasser in the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952 and the responsible British *New Statesman* (May 12, 1961) flatly asserted that the CIA "disposed of Patrice Lumumba." There are persistent reports in France that CIA agents were involved in the generals' abortive revolt in Algeria. There are strong grounds for believing the CIA supported Chiang Kai-shek's defeated troops which retreated to Burma and set up bases there for hit-and-run raids on China. This led to serious friction between the U.S. and Burma. Says the *New York Times* (May 23, 1961):

"The Chinese Nationalist operations which were unsuccessful against Communist China ended in an exacerbation of relations between Burma and the United States. In 1953, 7,000 Chinese Nationalists were taken out by air to Taiwan (by the U.S.) and it appeared that the episode was over."

But the tenacity of the CIA, and their flouting of official U.S. policy, is shown in the same *Times* article by the fact that at Geneva in May, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk had to assure the Burmese that the U.S. was not responsible for "the recent renewal of Chinese Nationalist activity in Burma and that the Central Intelligence Agency had not been involved in it. The history of Chinese Nationalist operations in Burma, however, have kept Burmese suspicions alive."

The *Times* proceeds to give some details of why the Burmese are not satisfied:

"Burmese Army patrols last October [1960] discovered an airstrip in Shan State maintained by Chinese Nationalists. Airdrops were being made by unmarked transport planes. [This is a favorite CIA device.] One of the transports was engaged by a Burmese fighter plane. The fighter plane was shot down by the transport and the pilot killed."

All this has come out because at the Geneva conference on Laos, the Communist delegate charged that Chiang's troops were being used in Laos and the Burmese Foreign Minister, though friendly to the U.S., felt compelled to tell the conference:

"Past experience warns us that these marauders, unless withdrawn from Laos, are likely to infiltrate into Burmese territory again while we are engaged in mopping up the small numbers still remaining on our soil."

With masterly understatement the *Times* dispatch says:

"The Burmese Foreign Minister indicated that his neutral country was not entirely satisfied with assurances he received privately from Secretary of State Dean Rusk . . . that Chinese Nationalists would not be allowed to infiltrate back into Burma from Laos."

It is a commentary on the influence of CIA on foreign policy that a U.S. Secretary of State is not believed by the Foreign Minister of a friendly neutral country. How disastrous to U.S. prestige irresponsible CIA actions can be was, of course, dramatically shown by the U-2 flight before the summit conference of May, 1960. President Eisenhower took full responsibility for that disaster, just as Kennedy did for Cuba, although as *Newsweek* stated on May 8, 1961, "most of official Washington still believes that Mr. Eisenhower didn't know beforehand about the last, tragic U-2 mission."

The CIA sees as "Communism" the slightest attempt at social reform by any government and proceeds to subvert such government. If unsuccessful, the intervention pushes those governments further left, as in the case of Iraq and Cuba; where successful, as in the case of Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala, it ultimately strengthens the pressures for revolutionary solutions.

Enough details have come out on the Cuban fiasco so that citizens can see for themselves what the CIA has been doing and how far its actions square with existing laws or accepted morals in our country. We can also see to what extent CIA policy is the result of a blind adherence to the status quo which puts U.S. foreign policy at variance with a world in change. There is an inescapable symbolism between Allen Dulles, chief instigator of the invasion and Fidel Castro who led the defending forces. Dulles is 68, Castro half his age. Dulles won his first spurs trying to save the Hapsburg Empire—in a world that had no Soviet Union, no atom bombs, no African liberation struggles; a world where China was a geographical expression, the United States a rising


power protected by ocean distances, and world politics settled in a handful of capitals in tiny Europe.

Castro grew up in a world of cataclysmic change, a teen ager when World War II was going on, a student when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

For Dulles the Russian Revolution was a traumatic experience, the terrifying eruption of the lower depths as seen through the eyes of bitter emigres. The Soviet Union was a patchwork of a state that couldn't possibly last, Marxism the Devil's own dogma and Lenin a conspiratorial agent probably paid by the Germans to take Russia out of the war.

Castro saw correctly that a new social structure built on wholesale agrarian reform was the only hope for politico-economic independence for his country—and indeed for the whole of Latin America. When the U.S. reacted imperialistically to his aims, he turned toward the Soviet Union, which he respected as the leading world power in a victorious alliance against Fascism. He saw in Marxism a stimulating philosophy in vigorous competition with other philosophies, and regarded Lenin as a great historical figure.

In the last decade while the sedentary Dulles in his sixties shuffled papers on his desk and spun schemes to stem the rising tide of social change the free-wheeling Fidel in his twenties was fighting gun in hand to free his country from the oppression of the U.S.-supported Batista. As the aging Dulles sat at his desk waiting to hear reports from the long-feared invasion, the vigorous Castro, in the prime of his life, was shooting from a tank and sinking an ammunition ship chartered by the CIA. Two worlds stood face to face, two epochs, and the answer was in doubt only for Dulles.



from Vie Nuove, Rome

"I'll bet he's a CIA man."



from Revolucion, Habana

We want Peace — and to be left in peace.

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MADE IN U.S.A.: the counter-revolutionaries' arsenal.

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INTERVENTION – YANKEE STYLE

IN THE EARLY HOURS of April 17, a fleet of cargo ships, converted fishing boats and onetime sub chasers dropped anchor off *Bahia de Cochinos* (Bay of Pigs), on the south shore of Cuba 90 miles southeast of Havana. At 3 a.m. the first of some 1,500 to 1,700 Cubans scrambled ashore from self-exile to try to overthrow the Revolution won Jan. 1, 1959.

The invaders wore U.S.-made camouflage uniforms with cap devices reading, "God, Fatherland and Liberty." They were armed with some 2,500 tons of supplies, including five tanks, ten armored cars, 18 anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, 70 bazookas, rocket and flame throwers, 30 mortars, sub-machine guns, heavy machine guns, rifles and knives.

They landed at Playa Larga (Long Beach) at the bottom of the bay and at Giron Beach at its mouth. Some 175 paratroopers dropped inland. The bay is in the Cienaga de Zapata, a vast thicketed swamp-land, which lies between the mainland of Cuba and a small strip of solid land along the coast. Two newly-built roads lead inland.

From the Caribbean, Radio Swan Island broadcast in the name of Jose Miro Cardona, president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council:

"Before dawn, Cuban patriots in the cities and in the hills began the battle to liberate our homeland from the despotic rule of Fidel Castro."

The "liberators" on the beaches did their best. They moved 20 miles inland, overrunning handfuls of local militia, many of whom were teenagers from the cities teaching peasants to read and write.

But even as the invaders were landing, a call from five militiamen guarding Playa Larga, "they're here," alerted Cuban defense forces. By dawn the six planes that constituted the Cuban air force—two British-made Sea Furies, two U.S.-made jet trainers and two U.S.-made B-26s—attacked the supply ships and landing craft. Five vessels were sunk, including the *Rio Escondido* which carried about 30,000 gallons of aviation gas as well as tank shells and anti-tank mines, and the *Houston* with tons of communications equipment and one battalion of troops.

Infantry battalions from Cienfuegos, Matanzas and Cavadonga, as well as a militia battalion from Matanzas, moved against the invaders. Artillery and tank units followed. From Havana, Premier Castro came to take command.

The Cuban planes hammered at the supply ships around the clock. The counter-revolutionaries' propeller-driven B-26s were no match for the Cuban jets. They conceded the skies over the sea and beach and concentrated on strafing the Cuban defenders. On the ground, Castro directed his tanks and artillery against the flanks; infantry moved against the center. The defenders fought efficiently and with fury.

By April 19 the invaders were in full rout. Many fled into the swamps. Others ran back to the beaches looking for evacuation boats, but for most there was no escape.

Manuel Penabaz, one who escaped, described the scene at the beach: "Glancing back we saw the entire battalion fleeing in panic—running wildly toward the sea and then, when the shells rained down on the beach, back toward the road, and then back toward the sea."

On April 19, "Communique No. 4" was issued from the battlefield, signed by Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief." It said:

"The invading mercenary army which occupied Cuban territory for less than 72 hours has been completely crushed.

"The Revolution has emerged victorious though paying a high toll in courageous lives of fighters who faced the invaders.

"A part of the mercenaries sought to leave the country by sea in a number of boats which were sunk by the revolutionary air forces.

"The remainder of the mercenary forces suffered heavy casualties, dispersing in a swamp area from which no escape is possible.

"A large quantity of arms of American manufacture was captured, including several Sherman tanks."

Cedric Belgrave reported in *National Guardian* on visiting the battlefield April 20:

"All the way down the road to Playa Giron, tired, dirty, triumphant militiamen greeted us. . . . In the ditches lay the debris of a two and one-half-day war. Militiamen who'd come from Havana spoke of their disappointment at arriving too late to fight. Nothing remained to do except bring in the groups of invaders who kept emerging from the thickets of the swamp, burning with thirst, clothes and bodies torn, desperate to surrender. . . .

"It was clear that a similar defense could have and would have been mounted anywhere in Cuba, using mostly the forces in the locality. There was never even time to bring into play

the major forces. When word of the landing reached Jaguey, its people stormed the armory for weapons. An old man wept because none were left for him."

A final count of captured counter-revolutionaries ran to 1,214. Many were sons of landlords and other property holders who lost their assets under the revolution. Some were former army and police officers in Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship. A few were "idealists," adventurers and opportunists.

Under questioning they told like tales. They did not expect to meet resistance. They were told that Cubans were suffering under Castro, who had allowed Russians to overrun the country. Cuban soldiers and militiamen, they were led to believe, would throw down their arms and join the counter-revolution. In the cities there were to be mass uprisings and a general strike.

The invaders also expected that a 15,000-man inter-American army would reinforce them on the beachhead. U.S. planes were to protect them overhead.

For some of the invaders counter-revolution was a patriotic duty. To others it was to be a lark. As the prisoners mused over their fate, they also wondered what went wrong.

The story of how and why the invaders got to Cuba and how and why they were manipulated and deceived is both sordid and alarming. The plan was written in Washington and the plot developed in Florida, Louisiana and Texas and in Guatemala, Panama, Puerto Rico and Nicaragua. The authors are U.S. political and military leaders, in both parties. Their purpose was imperialist; their technique in character. The casualties of their folly were fortunately light. But the sortie came dangerously close to setting off a world-wide holocaust.

WHO MADE THE DECISION?

When Fidel Castro visited the U.S. in April, 1959—three months after the success of the 26th of July Revolution—Washington had not yet set an official attitude toward Cuba. Some saw threats to U.S. investments in the Revolution's promises of agrarian reform, an end to unemployment, redistribution of income and affirmation of the sovereignty of the nation. They wanted open expression of U.S. displeasure of the Revolution, or, at most, icy acceptance.

Others in Washington argued that Castro's promises were standard pap to lull the Cuban populace. They recalled that Batista and other Latin American dictators also came to power on promises of reform.

When the furor died down, they said, Castro would be like the rest. U.S. business interests would be protected.

Eisenhower played it safe. He found it expedient to be out of town when Castro arrived. The State Department did not officially receive the Cuban Premier on the grounds that his was not an official visit. But Vice President Nixon spent three hours with him, listening to his plans (then still unimplemented) for Cuba.

Nixon prepared a three-page memorandum for Eisenhower and other leaders in which he argued that Castro was a captive of communists and perhaps even more dangerous than orthodox Marxists. He urged that a force of Cuban exiles should be trained to overthrow Castro.

The Eisenhower Administration mulled over the issue for some months. By the end of the year—after the agrarian reform and other measures were instituted in Cuba—Nixon's view prevailed. The National Security Council directed the CIA to prepare a "Guatemala Solution" for Cuba. The CIA was instructed to promote disaffections, organize exiles, train a military force and plan an invasion.

The operation was in full swing by the spring of 1960; the invasion targetted for November. After the Democratic convention in July, Dulles flew to Hyannis Port, Mass., to brief candidate Kennedy. (Interestingly, during the election campaign Kennedy called for full U.S. support to Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro. Nixon, instigator of the plan, was forced to argue against the dangers of unilateral action.)

After the election, Eisenhower thought it proper to check with President-elect Kennedy before instituting the invasion. Kennedy "seemed taken aback," Drew Pearson reported. But, Pearson added, "he did not say anything against going ahead." Whatever misgivings Kennedy had, Eisenhower thought them sufficient to delay the invasion for execution by the new administration.

President Kennedy's first announcement, the day after election, was the reappointment of Dulles as CIA director. He assigned his own "task force" to reexamine and reevaluate the Cuba invasion plans. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the military aspects.

Chalmer M. Roberts reported in the *Washington Post* (May 14): "Months ago some additional Pentagon officers were assigned to work on the project. When the plans were worked out, they were subject to review by a military committee of the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the top ranking military group under the Joint Chiefs.

"When the plans were presented to the President after he came into office it was no cursory affair. The meeting room was surrounded with maps showing the beaches and landing places, diagrams to show the methods of landing and the logistic preparations.

"Finally . . . the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke,

gave the President a written, signed opinion that the operation made sense militarily."

Late in January, Kennedy began meeting weekly with top CIA, State and Defense Department officials and key aides. Opinions were also sought from Administration figures, including UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The invasion plan was greeted with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The CIA and the Pentagon promoted it as their own offspring. But others were concerned with world reaction.

James Reston reported in the *New York Times* (April 11): "The State Department is worried about the political and military consequences in the hemisphere and elsewhere of providing military force to achieve political ends." He pointed out that Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States "specifically forbids such action."

The Article reads: "No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements."

Only Fulbright argued that invasion plans were wrong morally. He wrote a long memorandum to President Kennedy in March, arguing that Castro is "a thorn in our flesh, but he is not a dagger in our hearts."

Some argued that other Latin Americans might interpret the invasion as a U.S. move to restore a dictatorship and end economic reforms. Consequently, President Kennedy ordered the State Department to publish a white paper on U.S. policy drafted principally by special assistant Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

It appealed to Castro to "return to the original purposes which brought so many gallant men together in the Sierra Maestra and to restore the integrity of the Cuban revolution."

The White Paper accused the Castro government of "betraying their own revolution," but it also denounced Batista. It admitted past U.S. "omissions and errors" in relations with Batista and acknowledged the progress of the Revolution in building schools, houses and medical clinics as well as "the early projects of land reform." It added, "no future Cuban government can expect to turn its back on such objectives."

As a further step to show Washington's concern for a "democratic" new Cuba, President Kennedy ordered the exiles' military training camps purged of former Batista men.

In March the CIA pushed hard for a go-ahead signal. It argued that Castro was growing steadily stronger militarily. About 100 Cubans, CIA officials said, were in Czechoslovakia learning to fly Soviet-made

MIG jets; they would return soon with planes. (This has never been confirmed by Cuba, Czechoslovakia or neutral sources.)

CIA officials also pointed out that the Cuban underground was fast being discovered and suppressed. Jules Dubois reported in the *Chicago Tribune* (April 25) that "the underground inside Cuba suffered its worst setback on March 17 when most of its top leaders were arrested . . . while holding a meeting in Havana." Among those arrested and later executed were Maj. Humberto Sorin and Rogelio Gonzalez Corzo, whom Dubois described as "Mr. Underground."

Counterrevolutionaries were at the peak of training, the CIA argued, and they were getting restless.

But the CIA's most telling argument was that Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes had asked that the exiles be removed from training camps in his country by June 1. Ydigoras was under considerable pressure at home because of the camps. He had continually denied in public that the bases existed, but by now they were an open secret. He could not fight the pressure much longer.

President Kennedy's time for decision came the first week in April. *Newsweek* (May 1) described the scene in the Cabinet Room of the White House thus:

"Assembled around the octagonal table were President Kennedy, CIA director Allen W. Dulles; his deputy Gen. C. P. Cabell; the CIA deputy director for plans, Richard Bissell; Defense Secretary Robert McNamara; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer; the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann; the chief of the Administration's special Latin America task force, Adolph Berle; and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy.

"It was the tenth time in ten weeks that these same officials--in effect, the National Security Council augmented--had met to consider the Cuban plan. Now, in this last dramatic meeting, the President asked each man, in turn, the critical question. Not one voiced opposition."

President Kennedy signalled the green light. But he set some restrictions on the invasion plan. He insisted that no U.S. nationals could be directly involved in the landings and that the invaders could not jump off from U.S. soil.

The original plan had called for air cover from U.S. Navy planes, but the President vetoed this. A revised plan, according to *Newsweek*, provided for an air strike by U.S. planes before the invasion boats went in. The President also canceled this, at the last moment.

On advice from Rusk, Stevenson and Bowles, President Kennedy ruled out proposals for pre-invasion radio appeals to Cuba calling for an insurrection and for showering the country with leaflets.

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The first phase of the invasion began April 15. Four days later, while the invaders' commander Capt. San Roman was running about the beach shouting, "Every man for himself," the Washington planners held their heads in anxiety over what went wrong.

At first, the U.S. officials reacted as if San Roman's words were aimed at them. Each struggled to evacuate himself from the disaster. The Joint Chiefs of Staff leaked a story that they had not drawn up the military plan. But Defense Secretary McNamara went out of his way at a news conference to confirm the Pentagon's role.

James Reston reported in the New York *Times* that Rusk and Bowles had advised against the plan. According to *Newsweek*, President Kennedy "called Rusk and blisteringly reminded him that he had not offered such advice at the time."

Newsweek further said that "Bowles was handled by Brother Bobby [Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy], who in a personal confrontation jabbed his finger at the Under Secretary's chest and said: 'I understand you advised against this operation. Well, let me tell you something as of right now. You did not. You were for it.'" (Drew Pearson reported that Bowles had drawn up a memo advising against the invasion, but, Pearson said, there was no evidence that he had sent it.)

At a briefing for newsmen, the CIA said flatly that its intelligence estimates had been correct. Scapegoats would have to be sought elsewhere.

With all the cover-up, only Stevenson remained exposed, unable to hide the naive tales he had told at the UN. Although his part in the planning was small, he had had to tell the world that the U.S. was not involved. He was cast as the used-car salesman, left to face an irate customer whose car collapsed as he drove off the lot.



VICTORY PARADE: their slogan is "Homeland or Death."

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CIA ÜBER ALLES

WHEN THE CIA got the green light from Washington early in 1960 to organize an invasion of Cuba, it found Florida teeming with exile groups. There were about 100 organizations—an accurate count is not possible because they formed and folded almost daily—each with at least one leader who aspired to the premiership of the next Cuban government.

The exile chiefs ranged politically from wealthy industrialists who flourished under Batista and longed for a return to the good old days, to Manuel Ray's People's Revolutionary Movement, dedicated to a brand of middle-class liberalism. In between were businessmen, professionals and politicians who had lost their holdings under the Castro revolution, as well as opportunists and adventurers.

Some of the groups just talked, but others trained private armies. In addition, Drew Pearson reported that training in the Florida Everglades were "dissident groups financed by American corporations whose property was seized by Castro." Richard H. Rovere reported in the *New Yorker*: "It has been said on excellent authority that part of the money that supported the exiles during their months of preparation for the invasion came from private interests—sugar, oil, shipping and telephones."

The groups had only this in common: Each wanted to overturn the revolution and none had a mass following in Cuba or among the exiles.

The CIA came on the scene with an open pocketbook and a closed mind. It took to its bosom and purse the Revolutionary Recovery Movement. The R.R.M. was small, reactionary and activist. It kept a dozen men in military training in a former mansion in Miami.

Manuel Artime, its leader, was a former Catholic student leader who had been with Castro briefly after the Revolution and who had close ties with the Spanish Jesuit community in Cuba. William Shannon said in the *New York Post*: "The CIA discovered Manuel Artime . . . and has groomed him to play the role which the late Castillo Armas played in the Guatemala takeover."

But the R.R.M. had little standing with other exiles. Cuban businessmen looked on it as an adventurist group with no clear economic

program. To establish a firmer base, the CIA fostered a united front of five groups, including the R.R.M.

The new combination was called the Democratic Revolutionary Front. Its political line was conservative, but it could not be tied to Batista. Its leader, Manuel Antonio Varona, was respectable and safe. He was Prime Minister in the Prio government in 1947. He advocated the return of land expropriated by the revolution to the original owners, except for "about 15 per cent" that is not productive. "The need for agrarian reform in Cuba," Varona said, "is a myth."

The CIA showered money on the Front. *Time* reported (April 28): "Estimates of how much money was pumped into the Front for recruiting centers and other political expenses vary from \$130,000 monthly to a high of \$520,000 last December."

Miami proved a bonanza for the CIA's recruiting drive. There were 40,000 Cubans in the city, 27,000 of them recent emigres. Many were broke and did not speak English. At first they were a source of cheap labor for the hotels, but when the recession hit, they lost their jobs. While the Immigration Service admitted all freely, it did not permit the exiles to leave Florida.

The CIA designated the Front's office in Miami as general staff headquarters and established training bases in Florida in the Everglades and in Homestead, as well as camps near New Orleans and Houston. Other bases were set up in Panama and on Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico.

But the expanding army needed more room. *Time* reported: "As the plans for a frontal invasion took shape, CIA men went to Guatemala and arranged with rancher-businessman Roberto Alejos (brother of Guatemala's Ambassador to the U.S.) to use three of his properties—coffee plantations named Helvetia and La Suiza near the town of Retalhuleu, and a cotton farm called San Jose Buenavista, 35 miles from the Pacific port of San Jose—as camps to train an army of invasion. ('No charge,' said Alejos. 'Just remember me in Havana.')

"Through Alejos, the CIA also arranged a \$1,000,000 hurry-up surfacing of a 5,000-ft. airstrip at Retalhuleu. . . . Later, Alejos helped establish two more camps, one at San Juan Acul, close to the Mexican border, the other at Dos Lagunas in the jungles of northern Guatemala." Camps were also set up in Trax, Champerico and Sayaxche.

While the camps were an open secret in Miami, Washington denied their existence. *Time* said: "Alejos last winter allowed nosey journalists to visit the Helvetia plantation. Before they arrived, the Cubans were transferred to nearby La Suiza; they were brought back as soon as the visitors left."

CIA instructors at the camps were counterrevolutionary experts, recruited from around the world. A Filipino, who gained his experience in



BEFORE: in Miami, the invasion looked like a lark.

the campaign against the Huks, was in charge of guerilla training at the Panama camp. Other instructors were described by recruits as Germans, Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians. They spoke to the trainees through interpreters. Many of the U.S.-born CIA men also did not speak Spanish. All were known by code names.

Strict discipline was maintained at the camps. All but a few officers were prohibited from going into town. *Time* reported: "Exiles also say that they were subjected to lie-detector tests before going to camps (sample question: Have you had homosexual relations?) and were threatened with deportation or detention camps at McAllen, Texas, if they got out of line."

But the recruits did get out of line. Fist fights and even gun battles were reported. Politics was the major source of friction. Although Batista supporters were supposed to have been screened out, they appeared at all camps in top ranks.

The *New York Times* (April 26) reported that after President Kennedy ordered the camps purged of Batista men, "on many occasions agents of the Central Intelligence Agency in charge of the camps refused to expel Batista men on the ground that these soldiers and officers had military experience and that was more important than their political background."

Time reported: "When one Frente (Front) man mentioned the Batista recruits to a U.S. colonel, the colonel dismissed the matter with 'they're anti-communists, aren't they?'"

Manuel Penabaz, one of the invaders who managed to get back to

the U.S., reported that the chief of the general staff in Miami was Col. Martin Elena, a former officer in Batista's army.

On Jan. 31 about 300 men at the camp in Trax were assembled and told by "Frank," the CIA agent in charge, that two of the leaders had been sent away "for playing politics" and that Capt. Jose Perez San Roman, a former Batista officer, was now in command. Because of the change, 230 asked to resign.


After a week the recruits went on strike. But on assurances and threats from "Frank," all but 20 went back to training. On Feb. 11, eight of the strikers were taken under guard to La Suiza, where they were held prisoner with six others who had argued with San Roman.

One of the prisoners, Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa, a lawyer, said that they were questioned separately by "Pat," whom Nodal described as "six feet, four inches tall and about 230 pounds and stupid." Later they were given lie-detector tests and interrogated about possible communist connections.

Eventually the group was taken to a camp in the Peten jungle and "guarded by Americans with automatic weapons." They were told they would be turned over to San Roman "in handcuffs" after the invasion. But on April 28, 11 days after the unsuccessful invasion, they were returned to Miami and released.

The CIA handled the refugee political leaders with equal disregard. It openly adopted Artime, although other exiles referred to him as a "Franco Falangist." One CIA man said of Artime: "He's my golden boy."

While the CIA bestowed money and honors on Artime and the Front leaders, it withheld support from Ray's liberal M.R.P. In protest against the CIA's tactics, one of the Front leaders, right-wing but independent Aureliano Sanchez Arango, took his group out of the combination. In a memo to Front leaders, in October, 1960, he wrote:



AFTER: on the beach, it turned out to be a cruel hoax.

"The brief history of the relations between the Front and the organism assigned to deal with Cuban questions is the history of an incessant series of pressures and impositions."

By the middle of last February, the CIA moved to pull the groups together in a quasi government-in-exile. Stuart Novins said in *The Reporter* (May 11) that "the CIA brought the leaders of the opposing factions [including Ray] together and told them to work out a *modus vivendi* or else." Or else meant an end to money and arms.

Deputy CIA director Richard Bissell Jr., who was in charge of the operation, assigned agent Frank Bender to work with the exile groups. Bender was described by Shannon in the *Post* as a middle-aged German who had fought in the French underground and joined U.S. intelligence after the war. Shannon called him a "vain, domineering man who refers to himself in the third person: 'Bender will have another cup of coffee.'"

Bender gave the exile leaders a list of 26 names, from which he asked them to pick 10 to participate in the selection of a provisional president. But Cubans refused because they did not recognize six names on the list. The exiles finally agreed on March 20 and named a Cuban Revolutionary Council, headed by Jose Miro Cardona.

The council was assigned the public relations role of issuing statements and building morale. The CIA, and later the Pentagon, took charge of the invasion. In the final stages a U.S. colonel ran the show.

On April 16, the day before the invasion, the council—except Artime, who was with the invaders as commander-in-chief—was taken from a meeting at New York's Hotel Lexington to Philadelphia and from there it was flown to an abandoned house near Miami. Armed guards surrounded the house and kept the exiles from leaving.

From a radio the council learned of the invasion and heard reports of statements issued in its name. On April 18, a U.S. colonel briefed the exile leaders on the military situation. White House aides Adolph Berle Jr. and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. came at dawn on April 19 from Washington to reassure the Cubans.

The council members returned with Berle and Schlesinger to Washington and held three meetings with President Kennedy. From Washington the council issued a statement, which all knew to be made up of lies. It said the invasion "was in fact a landing mainly of supplies and support for our patriots who have been fighting in Cuba for months. . . . Regretfully we admit tragic losses among a small holding force. the force fought Soviet tanks and artillery, while being attacked by Russian MIG aircraft."

The *New Yorker* magazine summed up the invasion: "It used to be said that you would never need an enemy if you had a Hungarian for a friend, and Senor Castro has probably by now concluded that you will never need a friend if you have the CIA for an enemy."

FIZZLE MOST STREPITANT

BY THE END OF MARCH the Cuban community in Miami was swept by a sense of anticipation. Something big seemed in the wind. On March 28 the Revolution Council issued a mobilization order. Volunteers were signed up in Miami and shipped off to training camps as fast as they could be processed. Manuel Panabaz recalled in his diary from a Guatemala training camp: "April 8—We've also heard they have eliminated the general staff in Miami, and that means the brakes are off on shipment of any Cuban who wants to train for battle, despite his political background. Any Cuban who wants to fight communism now has the right to carry a rifle, and they're arriving in droves."


Tad Szule reported from Miami in the *New York Times* April 8: "Families and friends gathered to bid farewell to the soldiers who assemble at night at certain Miami buildings. The men are given khaki uniforms, then put aboard trucks to be driven to abandoned Florida airfields where unmarked aircraft are waiting to fly them to Central America."

Five days later Szule wrote: "Not a night goes by without the departure from here of khaki-uniformed volunteers for the revolutionary camps. . . . Cuban physicians and nurses in the Miami area are being mobilized for the six medical units being assembled at undisclosed spots."

Other invasion preparations were also under way. From Laughlin Air Force base in Texas, according to *Newsweek*, a U-2 photo reconnaissance plane of the type that flew over the USSR flew over Cuba. "The mission," *Newsweek* said, "gave the CIA a set of near-perfect pictures of Cuban airfields (and the planes on them) and military bases."

At dawn on April 15, B-26 bombers flown by counterrevolutionaries attacked Cuban airfields. Their purpose was to destroy Cuba's air force. On returning to their Caribbean bases, they reported total success and produced aerial photographs to prove it.

At the UN, in answer to Cuban charges of aggression, Stevenson



THE FAMED CZECH QUADRUPLE-BARRELED WEAPON:
Cubans called it the "Cuatro Boca" and used it against the invaders' B-26 bombers.

stuck to a CIA "cover story" that the bombings had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban air force, from Cuban airfields. Two of the planes landed in Florida, Stevenson said, and the pilots identified themselves as defectors. But their names were withheld.

The artifice was quickly exposed. *Time* reported that a few bullets had been fired into an old Cuban B-26 in U.S. hands and "a pilot took off in the crate and landed it at Miami with an engine needlessly feathered and a cock-and-bull story that he had attacked the airfields. A reporter noted that dust and undisturbed grease covered bomb-bay fittings, electrical connections to rocket mounts were corroded, guns were uncocked and unfired." When the pilot's picture was published, he was promptly identified in Cuba and by exiles in Miami as Lieutenant Zuniga, a flyer from the Guatemala training base in Retalhuleu.

Two other air strikes were planned for April 17, just before the

landings. But they were vetoed on the advice of Rusk, Stevenson and Bowles. Joseph Newman reported in the N. Y. *Herald Tribune*: "The three foreign policy advisers argued that additional attacks would make it impossible for them to uphold the official United States contention that this country was not a direct participant in the Cuban attack and to answer charges that the U.S. was committing acts of aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter and provisions of the Organization of American States."

Prior to this, the exiles had broken camp in Guatemala during the first week of April and moved to a staging area in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. They were loaded on ships April 10 and 11 at Great Corn and Little Corn islands, just off the Nicaraguan coast. The islands belong to Nicaragua but have been on a 99-year lease to the U.S. since 1916.

According to *Time*, the ships had been "painted black and equipped with guns and radar in New Orleans." They set sail April 11. U.S. destroyers and an aircraft carrier (Castro said there were also submarines) provided escort until the armada was five miles from the Cuban shore. Possibly to cover the deployment of U.S. ships off Cuba, Washington had announced early in the month that part of the Second Fleet would hold maneuvers in the Caribbean April 22-23. It also said that President Kennedy would witness the maneuvers. (After the invasion fizzled, the maneuvers were canceled.)

The CIA had organized the invasion fleet months before and recruited Cuban exiles as seamen. It bought old LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) and old fishing boats and it rented three cargo ships from Garcia Lines



BULLSEYE: Quatro Bocas brought down a B-26, while U.S. newspapers credited Soviet-made MIGs.

—*Rio Escondido*, *Huston* and *Atlantic*. It bought two of the LCIs through Miami yacht broker Charles A. Mills for \$240,000, including reconditioning. Drew Pearson reported that those who know ships “estimate that the vessels were worth around \$30,000 each.” The Garcia Lines ships were rented for two months at \$7,000 a month, in addition to a guarantee of \$100,000 for each ship in case of damage.

Pearson reported (May 6): “The CIA did not seem to trust Cubans with the liberation of their own homeland and hired American merchant officers to command this private navy of ancient ships. Many of these American mercenaries turned out to be drunks and derelicts. Some even refused to associate with the Cubans they were supposed to lead. One skipper, G. C. Julian, insisted upon naming his Cuban freedom vessel the ‘Barbara J,’ after his wife.”

Eduardo Garcia, head of Garcia Lines, considered himself in command and designated the *Rio Escondido* as the flagship. Cuban exiles named the LCI *Blagard* as flagship, under an American merchant officer who understood no Spanish. Pearson said that in the middle of the invasion, the American “forgot the battle plan.” A Cuban on board who had memorized the plan “prompted him on what orders to issue.”

“Thus the invasion started off with two flagships in command, each giving orders,” Pearson added. “In addition, several crew members would take orders from only Jesus Blanco, a former Cuban naval officer, who had recruited them.”

All the invaders’ aviation gas, tank shells and anti-tank mines were placed on the *Rio Escondido*. Early in the fighting it was hit by a bomb from a Sea Fury and went down in flames with its cargo. The ship carrying most of the communications equipment also was sunk.

Capt. Nino Diaz and a force of 168 commandos trained in Louisiana were supposed to make a diversionary landing elsewhere on the Cuban coast. The commandos sailed on the *Santa Ana* on schedule. They were certain they were headed for Oriente province where Diaz had fought with Castro and where he knew the terrain intimately. But when Diaz opened his orders, he learned that he was to land in Camaguey. In disgust, Diaz refused to make the landing and ordered the ship back to port.

On the beach, the other counterrevolutionaries also got surprises. The Cuban air force, which was supposed to have been destroyed, was in the air around the clock. The militia, which was supposed to defect in droves, fought with fury. A captured invader recounted: “When we met the first bunch of militiamen we told them they must surrender. They shouted ‘*Patria o Muerte*’ and started shooting”

The invaders were told, according to *Newsweek*, that Castro would be vacationing at his fishing cabin two hours’ march from the beach. The unsuspecting Premier was to be an easy prize. They found Castro,



THE OLD DAYS ARE GONE: invaders today are met not with machetes, but with modern field artillery.

but he was on a tank, firing its gun.

In the cities, the "secret" underground agents, who were supposed to set off uprisings, were arrested before they could make a move.

The whole show was over in less than three days.

In the late hours of April 18, invader Capt. San Roman appealed for U.S. air support, speaking from a walkie-talkie to a U.S. ship off shore. The appeal was relayed to CIA operations chief Bissell. At 2 A.M. on April 19 a group met with President Kennedy to decide whether to send U.S. planes. Some urged the President to send Navy aircraft. Some reports say that President Kennedy said it was too late to intervene; others say he refused flatly. The *Herald-Tribune* reported that a snag in naval communications made it impossible to send an order before the battle was over.

But Drew Pearson wrote (May 9): "Kennedy finally ordered American planes into action in a last-minute effort to save the rebels from collapse. But when Navy planes finally got off their nearby carrier, their only contribution to freedom was to help Castro. They shot down a rebel B-26."

In any event, it was too late for planes alone to succor the rebels. By April 19 most of those who were still alive had surrendered or fled into the swamps, to be captured later. Some managed to get away in small boats and were later picked up by U.S. ships. Chalmers M. Roberts said in the *Washington Post* April 25: "When the battle was

ending on the beach some of the wounded were taken off by American naval vessels." The survivors were taken to Camp Garcia, a U.S. Marine base on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. They were interrogated by CIA men and on May 2 they were released. Some are known to have returned to Miami; the others are still not accounted for.

On the Sunday following the invasion Castro spoke on television and radio all afternoon, analyzing in full detail what had occurred. After the April 15th air raids, he reported, "we said to ourselves: this is the aggression. What we still don't know is why they didn't land the same day, but gave us two days in which to mobilize. They committed a grave error. We [speaking of himself and his aides] had adopted the habit of sleeping in the afternoons and not at night; but on Sunday night we had gone to bed following the funeral of the air attack victims, and were wakened with news of fighting at the two Playas in the Cienaga de Zapata."

After Castro's speech, captured counterrevolutionaries were put on TV and allowed to explain themselves. For three evenings the invaders were questioned by Cuban editors and Castro himself. Most of the captives were contrite. They blamed the CIA for deceiving them. They had been told that the people were dissatisfied with Castro; that he had turned over the country to the Russians; that there were Soviet missile bases on the island; and that they would be greeted as liberators by the militia.

But some of the prisoners held to their views. They debated with Castro and the editors. Cedric Belfrage reported the TV discussions in *National Guardian* May 8, thus:

In discussion with one of the few Negro "liberators" about "what could have brought you here," Fidel turned to the son of a wealthy Cuban family (who had just said he came to fight for "his ideals") and asked if he belonged to any club in Havana. The wealthy white liberator replied: "Yes, the Yacht Club." "Did they allow Negroes in there?" "No." Fidel turned back to the Negro and said:

"So you can join this man to fight our revolution, but you can't bathe on the same beach with him—and he never worried about that but accepted it—as though your color would come off in the seawater." All discrimination, he added, had been wiped out by the revolution.

Prisoners mentioned several claims of the revolution which they had been told in the U.S. were false, such as the turning of barracks into schools, the guarantees to small property-owners under Urban Reform. Fidel asked: "Would I be making such

claims before the whole Cuban people if they were not true?" Landowners were allowed up to \$600 a month from their property, and he asked a prisoner: "Did you ever make that much?" "Never in my life." "Think you could live on it, with your own house and car?" "I'll say I could!"

As an example of Cuba's type of democracy, Fidel described the present setup in rural areas where the *campesinos* run their own affairs including public order. In former days, starving under the extortions and terror of the police, the *campesinos* sold their votes and senators and representatives whom they "elected" became millionaires from graft. None of the "idealist" prisoners who needled Fidel about elections, who "idolatrize Yanqui democracy," could deny this.

"Do you," asked Fidel, "know a single member of the revolutionary government who is a millionaire?" Nobody did, but one prisoner said: "They say that you yourself have many millions of dollars in Switzerland." Fidel took this in stride, saying that U.S. papers could publish such nonsense but "absolutely no one here has the slightest doubt about the honesty of this government. Supposing the U.S. spent \$10 million on this expedition, wouldn't they gladly have spent \$15 million to buy us? Why didn't they try? Because the know we are not for sale." [Actually the invasion cost \$45 million.-Ed.]

In the days of electoral "democracy" there were a half million kids without schools, a half million workers without jobs, a million and a half illiterates, millions of acres owned by a handful of companies, fantastic rents, discrimination, and the common folk couldn't even use the beaches. In the Cienaga de Zapata where the "liberators" landed they had seen the changes wrought in two years by the revolution.

The roundup of invaders from the swamps continued for some two weeks. A final count of captives totaled 1,214. Eight hundred of these came from families who owned a total of 27,556 caballerias of land (a caballeria is about 33 acres), 9,666 houses, 70 industries, ten sugar centrals, two banks and five mines. One hundred and thirty-five were former Batista soldiers and police. The rest were adventurers and "idealists."

On May 17, Castro offered to return the prisoners—except for those wanted for murder under Batista—if the U.S. would indemnify Cuba for the invasion damage with 500 tractors. If the deal was not approved, he said, the prisoners would be put to work digging defenses against another invasion.

LIES BY THE DOZEN

THE FULL STORY of the invasion came to light bit by bit. It poured from the mouths of exiles eager to document their deception by Washington. It oozed from the wounded egos of American officials who wanted to absolve themselves. It was leaked by others looking to minimize their responsibility.

But none of the debates answered a basic question of why U.S. involvement in the invasion came as a surprise to Americans. That it should have been a shock to the reading public is a black mark against American newspapers. Few stories have been more grossly mishandled and the public rarely has been lied to more wilfully. The story was there for all to see but the editors chose to wear blinders.

While the CIA operation was an open secret in Florida and throughout Latin America, U.S. publications pretended that the invasion preparations and the training camps were being handled by exiles. They also reported every extravagant claim of the exiles as gospel, while they scoffed at or ignored contradictory reports from Cuba. The story was so wide open one observer said that the code names and phone numbers of CIA agents in Miami were known in every beer joint. A New York businessman visiting Tampa a few days before the invasion was told casually by an associate that landings would take place within a week.

As long ago as October, 1960, *La Hora* in Guatemala reported on invasion preparations and CIA-run camps. Cuban papers and radio stations heard here told of the build-up regularly. But the first report in a U.S. publication directly implicating the CIA was not published until Nov. 19, when the *Nation* reported that Dr. Ronald Hilton, director of the Institute of Hispanic-American Studies at Stanford U., had disclosed that the CIA had acquired a tract of land in Guatemala for \$1,000,000 for training troops. But it was months before other publications, except *National Guardian*, followed up the story.

In hindsight, Reston commented in the *Times* April 26:

"Cuban radio was broadcasting all about these camps and the U.S.



NO PLEASURE TRIP: when Fidel had time to fish, he used to like to go to Cienaga de Zapata. This time he had another mission.

Government's part in them weeks before they were discussed in the American press. The official line in Washington was that this was a 'secret' operation, but it was about as secret as opening day at Yankee Stadium.

"In fact the only people who knew very little about what was happening back in the early planning stages of the exercise were the American people who were unknowingly picking up the tab . . ."

Reston might have included his own paper in the spanking. A few days before his article, *WCBS-TV Views the News* took the *Times* to task for coming very late to the story. With a full bureau in Havana and reporters in Miami, the *Times* editors surely had the story. But with the rest, they reported Castro's warning of imminent invasion by CIA-trained troops as hysterical rantings.

But it must be said that when the editors took the wraps off the reporters, the *Times* did a splendid job. Ted Szulc's reports from Miami were particularly noteworthy.

Morris H. Rubin, reporting on his tour of Cuba in the June, 1961, issue of *The Progressive*, explained how the deception worked. He wrote:

"I talked with virtually all the American correspondents in Havana—and the correspondents of Canadian, British and German newspapers as well. I came away convinced that they are far more torn by doubt about Castro's Cuba than their dispatches would indicate. For example, one correspondent who has been strongly anti-Castro in his commentaries confessed he was confused, that there was much good mixed with the bad, although he emphasized the latter in his reports 'because that's what they seem to want back home.'

"Typical of press coverage of Cuba before the April invasion was this depressing incident:

"Cuba's Foreign Minister Roa sent a note to the various Latin American embassies. The note contained the usual tirades against North American imperialism, but the heart of its contents was a plea to the Latin American governments to use their good offices to explore the prospect of negotiations between Cuba and the United States.

"An American correspondent heard of the note 48 hours before it was released to the public. He cabled a story to his newspapers, emphasizing the revival of official Cuban sentiment for negotiation with the United States. But the newspaper killed the story, preferring for its Cuban coverage that day a wire service report that two Catholic nuns had been arrested and detained for six hours. The management of the newspaper cabled its Havana correspondent a sour message pointing out that it was not especially interested in interpretive stories of the kind filed on the Cuban willingness to negotiate—although it was a clear scoop on a story that was to break in all the papers in a day or two—and that it was interested only in 'hard, headline news'—stories of bombs that go off or nuns being arrested by Castro's police."

Rubin concluded bitterly:

"For what it seems to want out of Cuba, the American press would do better to staff its Havana offices with police reporters rather than foreign correspondents."

Much of the pre-invasion "analysis" that the Cubans wanted to get rid of Castro and that the exile chiefs were popular leaders back home with extensive "underground" support was fed to the papers by Lem Jones Associates, Inc. in New York and Abrams, Osborne and Associates in Miami, public relations outfits hired by the Revolutionary Council and paid indirectly by the CIA. After the invasion Jones Associates owned up to staging two "stunts" that had been reported as pure news. One was to import some 60 "Women in Black" from Miami to appear in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York while Castro was attending UN sessions in September, 1960.

During the fighting, reports of counterrevolutionary successes filled the papers. The invaders were moving inland; the militia was deserting, Castro was wounded, no, he was dead, no, he was wounded; Raul Castro was captured; Che Guevara committed suicide. On top of these

remarkable successes, the press suddenly noted that the invasion had collapsed.

How fiction can turn up in print on the news pages was explained in part by Joe Alex Morris Jr. in the New York *Herald Tribune* April 20. He reported that during the fighting, Abrams, Osborne and Associates (particularly one young red-headed associate, Mary Berrer) were doing their job "with Madison Avenue efficiency and the pitch is a hard sell stressing the significance, size and success of the Cochinos Bay landing and other guerrilla operations."

While the Revolutionary Council leaders were held prisoner in Florida by the CIA, the PR outfits turned out regular bulletins in their name on the fighting. One communique credited "MIG aircraft" with destroying "sizable amounts of medical supplies and equipment."

The story of Soviet-made MIG jets in the Cuban air force was dutifully repeated across the country. Some rear-echelon pundits turned out columns blaming the invaders' defeat on Castro's MIGs. Yet it was well known that Cuba had no MIGs. Joseph Newman reported in the *Herald Tribune* May 1 that the CIA knew that the Cuban air force has only a few U.S.- and British-made planes.

Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) finally pinned down the story on May 14, when he said that Administration witnesses at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings confirmed there was no evidence "that there was a single Russian MIG in Cuba."

Faced with the bungling, most editors refused to report or even to be embarrassed. They could justify the mishandling of news as a blow against communism. If they needed further justification, President Kennedy supplied it April 27 to a meeting of the American Newspaper Publishers Assn. He called on the press to exercise "self-restraint" in fighting the "fierce struggle" in which we are engaged. He added: "Every newspaper now asks itself, with respect to every story, 'It is news?' All I suggest is that you add the question: 'Is it in the interest of national security?'" (*Monthly Review* editor Leo Huberman, who was in Cuba during the invasion, suggested a preferable criterion, "Is it the truth?")

The implication was clear. Reporting U.S. intervention in Cuba was not in the national interest; pretending it hadn't happened was.

A few papers refused to bend. The *Times* printed an editorial called, "The Right Not to Be Lied To." It said: "The Cuban tragedy has raised a domestic issue that is likely to come up again and again. . . . Is a democratic government in an open society such as ours ever justified in deceiving its own people?" The *Times* answered itself: "Neither prudence nor ethics can justify any administration in telling the public things that are not so."

In California, the little *El Cajon Valley News* put it plaintively: "Why Do They Lie To Us About Cuba?"

WORLD-WIDE CONDEMNATION

MEASURED BY WORLD REACTION Operation Pluto turned the U.S. democratic image into a mirage and lowered John F. Kennedy's prestige to the level of Richard Nixon's. As news of the invasion spread, thousands in Latin America, Europe and Asia poured into the streets to demonstrate against "Yankee Imperialism." At home there were protests outside the UN and in more than a dozen cities.

In NATO countries many were privately pleased over Washington's embarrassment. Some recalled pious words from the U.S. against imperialism when they were being divested of former colonies. In Britain and France the invasion was called the "American Suez," referring to their joint invasion of Egypt in 1956 which the U.S. disowned.

Many of the demonstrators were students. Others were those who had long opposed U.S. foreign policy, but for a good number it was a first break with Washington. Despite the denials of U.S. participation, few doubted that the counterrevolution was a Yankee show.

In New York demonstrations against the invasion outside the UN started on April 17 and continued through the week. The first day 2,000 people picketed the U.S. mission and then marched to the UN. The slogan "Hands Off Cuba" united liberals, progressives and non-political persons with Cubans living in New York.

Counterdemonstrations by anti-Castro Cubans heckled the lines. As the invasion's failure became clear, Hungarian "freedom fighters" and other "professional pickets" joined the counterdemonstrations. They picketed the Soviet Embassy, throwing rocks and burning Russian flags.

On April 21, a Fair Play for Cuba Committee rally at Union Square drew 3,000 persons.

The same day, the Fair Play committee took a large ad in the New York *Times*, appealing to the American conscience. It said: "If our government's activities are, as we believe, illegal and immoral, then we as a nation stand condemned." The same ad was refused by the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* and all four Chicago dailies.

An ad headlined, "A Declaration of Conscience by Afro-Americans"

and signed by 27 prominent Negroes appeared in the Baltimore *Afro-American* April 22. It concluded: "Afro-Americans, don't be fooled—the enemies of the Cubans are our enemies, the jimcrow bosses of this land where we are still denied our rights."

Signers included Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois and his wife, author Shirley Graham; William Worthy, Dr. Lonnie Cross, Daniel H. Watts, Robert F. Williams, Julian Mayfield, Conrad Lynn and Richard Gibson.

An ad by the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation in the New York *Times* on April 23 also condemned U.S. intervention. Signers included Dr. William C. Davidson, Dr. Kermit Eby, Dr. Erich Fromm, Maxwell Geismar, C. Wright Mills, A. J. Muste, Clarence Pickett, I. F. Stone and Norman Thomas.

An ad hoc pacifist group, Nonviolent Committee for Cuban Independence, held a two-week vigil and fast outside CIA headquarters near Washington. On week ends rallies and picket lines were held in cooperation with the Fair Play committee. Some of the pacifists were arrested and served ten-day jail terms. They continued the fast in prison.

A group of 132 lawyers including top professors in Yale and other law schools and Arthur Larson, former U.S. Information Agency Director, protested violations of U.S. laws and international obligations committed in the undertaking and urged U.S. conformity with international law.

A group of professors, most of them from Harvard, published an ad in the *Times* deploring the invasion. Harvard history professor H. Stuart Hughes said at an American Friends Service Committee (Quaker) meeting in Cambridge, Mass., on April 23: "All the pious fraud has collapsed. Everyone from the New York *Times* down has . . . admitted the fact of American intervention in Cuba. President Kennedy hasn't admitted his fault and, until he does, we have to withhold our confidence in him."

He said "it is time for a few resounding resignations" from the administration. Of Stevenson, he found it alarming "to see this man who has been a great American reduced to the level of a shyster lawyer."

A meeting of 400 Harvard students and faculty members approved a resolution urging a reversal of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Students in San Francisco marched from a Union Square rally on April 20 to the Federal Building to protest the counterrevolution. Some 2,000 persons attended the rally. The day before 200 students at the U. of California in Berkeley and 200 students at San Francisco State College held rallies. On news of the invasion, "Bay Area Students Committee to Oppose U.S. Intervention In Cuba" was formed.

Other demonstrations were organized by students at Michigan, Wisconsin and Cornell universities and at Antioch and Oberlin colleges.

In Los Angeles, the Fair Play Committee picketed the Federal Building for three days. About 900 persons from Washington and



HANDS OFF CUBA: There were world-wide protests. This one in San Francisco drew 2,000 people.

Baltimore picketed near the White House for two hours on April 22. They were from the Fair Play committee, 26th of July Movement and the Dominican Liberation Movement. One sign read, "Cuba Is Not Guatemala." In Chicago 300 persons picketed the Federal Building in the rain. One picket wrote his own slogan: "We Don't Want to Die for the United Fruit Co."

Demonstrations were also held in Boston, Detroit, Cleveland, Seattle, New Haven, Baltimore, Minneapolis, Philadelphia and Tampa.

Anti-U.S. demonstrations swept Latin America on reports of the invasion. But as the extent of CIA involvement became clear, slogans turned on President Kennedy. Those who had hoped that his election signalled a new U.S. policy in Latin America turned out to denounce him.

There were three days of demonstrations in Mexico City, involving as many as 25,000 persons at one time. About 15,000 turned out at a march called by students at the Mexican National University. At the head of the column were members of the Pancho Villa Brigade, a group which offered to go to Cuba to defend Castro.

Students chanted: "Castro Si, Kennedy No." As the line neared the National Palace, 1,000 soldiers, police and firemen attacked the marchers.

In Venezuela students led demonstrations throughout the country. High schools in Caracas were closed for a week after students burned a

U.S. flag in a public plaza. Demonstrations of high school students in Puerto Cabello, Valencia, San Cristobal and Maracaibo were broken up by police.

One of the biggest demonstrations in recent Uruguayan history was held April 22. Some 8,000 persons marched through Montevideo chanting, "Cuba Si, Yanquis, No." A rally, which included speakers from right- and left-wing parties, denounced President Kennedy as "paranoic" and as "the worst imperialist in 50 years."

The New York *Times* reported: "Although Uruguay's government and most of the press had praised Mr. Kennedy's policy, many Uruguayans, including some who have been traditionally pro-Western and cool toward the Castro regime, joined the demonstration."

Anti-U.S. sentiment in Brazil carried into the government and newspapers. Six federal and state legislators presented a petition at the U.S. Embassy urging President Kennedy to "make every effort to see that the counterrevolutionary and mercenary invaders of the Cuban nation should not have any support from the U.S. government."

A leading Rio de Janeiro paper *Diario de Noticias* summed up: "President Kennedy must come to understand that the future of relations between the U.S. and Latin America is at stake . . . [former Vice President] Nixon was spit upon because there was a Guatemala as a repulsive symbol of a certain policy toward Latin America. What awaits Kennedy?"

In Bogota, Colombia, 500 demonstrators attempting to reach the U.S. Embassy April 17 were attacked and dispersed by police. Two days later, 8,000 persons gathered for an anti-U.S. rally in the city's main square.

The defeat of the counterrevolution spread apprehension through Guatemala. The government, which itself was installed by the CIA, seemed concerned that Cuba might retaliate against Guatemala for its help to the counterrevolution.

Despite tear gas barrages and clubbings by police, anti-U.S. demonstrations went on for a week in Guatemala City. President Kennedy was denounced as an "arch assassin" and his picture was burned at a meeting. Demonstrators broke windows in the Pan American World Airways and United Fruit Co. offices after they were prevented from marching on the U.S. Embassy by police.

There were demonstrations at U.S. embassies in East and West Europe on the first days of the invasion. Later there were few in NATO capitals to defend the U.S. Angry demonstrators denounced "U.S. imperialism" in Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest, Sofia and Belgrade. Students also demonstrated in Paris, Rome and Helsinki. In London 65 prominent persons, including 29 Labor Members of Parliament, sent telegrams to President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, UN secy.-gen. Hammarskjold and Premier Castro expressing "shock" at the invasion.

Claude Julien wrote in *Le Monde* in Paris: "The naivete of the American government is incredible." *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* in Munich, West Germany, said: "Many Americans are finally beginning to realize that you can't settle with weapons a social revolution such as took place in Cuba."

In Vienna, the *Kronenzeitung* said: "President Kennedy got a double uppercut—first a Soviet cosmonaut in the skies and now a victorious Castro at the doorstep." The executive committee of the Union of Democratic Left, main opposition party in Greece, called the invasion "an act of international piracy." Don Cook, Paris correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune*, concluded: "There is not much comfort for Washington to gain by turning to the opinions of its European allies."

There was also little comfort for Washington in Asia or Africa. In Tokyo students held a demonstration April 18 before the U.S. Embassy and four more the next day to coincide with the arrival of U.S. Ambassador Reischauer. An unidentified Frenchman summed it up best for Cook. He said: "You really haven't handled your Cubans very well."



RETURN TO THE HOMELAND: the invasion cost U.S. taxpayers \$45,000,000 and Cuban families immeasurable suffering.

WHAT THE PLAN WAS

AFTER THE FIRST GUSH of news following the invasion's collapse, which brought to light most of what had happened, Administration and Pentagon officials were ordered to "clam up" and to direct inquiring newsmen to State Department off-the-record briefings. Department officials, who were supposed to pass on to reporters "inside stuff" on the invasion, developed instead a quasi-official explanation of the affair. It was a little fuzzy and could not withstand deep questioning, but Washington relied on the press to play along. The official analysis was accepted and passed along by dozens of reporters and columnists.

In the accepted version, the collapse of Operation Pluto is credited to the CIA's failure to estimate accurately the extent of internal opposition to Castro and the strength of his government and armed forces. The counter-revolution failed, the story goes, because Cubans neglected to revolt and the militia refused to defect. Some with bellicose plans for the future embellish the tale with the estimate that the invasion would have succeeded if U.S. planes had been committed. Others further disparage the CIA by stressing the operational mishaps.

But the official story is a transparent over-simplification of what most probably was the real plan. The CIA is a handy scapegoat. To allow it to draw the fire, conveniently masks the involvement of others. Rather than a quixotic bungle, Operation Pluto might be called more accurately: The intervention that almost succeeded.

There is abundant evidence that Washington never expected the landings to do more than establish a beachhead where a "provisional government" could maintain itself long enough (say a week) to be recognized and to appeal for U.S. armed support. Little stock was put in a general uprising or in the alleged guerrillas operating in the hills. Clearly, Castro was to be overthrown by external armed might.

The plan failed because the Cubans overwhelmed the invaders with such speed that the later stages of Operation Pluto could not be effected.

To sell the story of an intelligence snafu, which limits the blame to the CIA, Gen. Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that he and

other career military men had approved a plan for an invasion (1) at a point flanked by swamps, with only two good roads leading inland; (2) with 1,500 to 1,700 soldiers against an army of 40,000 and a militia of 250,000; (3) with no fighter plane protection; and (4) with no reserves.

Lemnitzer told his story to civilian legislators; he might better have told it to the marines. Perhaps public embarrassment was Lemnitzer's penance for his part in the operation, but his story couldn't hold water with anyone who got through GI basic training. Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) concluded from the testimony that "the President needs new, wiser and abler men." He added: "I find it perfectly incredible that career military officers, charged with such high responsibility, could certify as a feasible military undertaking the uncoordinated plan of a few hundred ill-equipped Cuban exiles to invade Cuba. . . . There were no reserve forces to back up the so-called 'expedition.'"

Pieced together from what slipped out before the clampdown, this is what seems to have been Washington's plan for Cuba:

Operation Pluto was a multi-stage project. At its maximum it might have meant full-scale war, with U.S. and other forces fighting the Cuban army and militia. At a minimum it would be a commando raid to probe Cuba's defenses. Along the way, there were a series of checkpoints at which Washington could decide whether to go further.

The exiles' mission was to establish and hold a beachhead. As soon as it was feasible, the Cuban Revolutionary Council was to be flown in and to proclaim itself the new government of Cuba. The U.S. and some Latin American countries were to recognize the government immediately and respond to its calls for military help. U.S. Marines and Navy were to lead an inter-American force into Cuba.

Before each phase, Washington was to decide whether to proceed or to vary the plan to meet a new circumstance. If there was a general uprising against Castro, or, if the militia threw down its arms and defected, open U.S. involvement might not be necessary. If Castro was brash enough to attack the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, Washington had an even better pretext for action.

But should the exiles fail to hold out for a week, they were to be evacuated and the operation would be chalked up as a large commando raid like the one at Dieppe, France, in advance of the Second Front invasion during World War II.

Considerable evidence and opinion favor this explanation over the official version. Clearly, Washington never counted on much help from the underground in the cities or from guerrillas previously planted in the Escambray Mountains in Las Villas province. Walter Lippmann wrote in the *Herald Tribune* May 2: "As I understand it, and contrary to the general impression, there was no serious expectation that the

landing of exiles would be followed immediately by political uprising against Castro. The object of the landing was to establish a beachhead for a civil war."

In a pre-invasion story, Joseph Newman wrote in the *Herald Tribune* April 14 that the strategy for bringing down Castro "is based on a plan to start a Hungarian-type uprising." Newman added: "Once the uprising takes place, Cuban revolutionaries will call on the United States and other American republics to help them establish a free and democratic society." Newman reported that Miro Cardona said that "as provisional president, [he] would be entitled to request diplomatic recognition and receive aid from outside."

Newman added: "Having extended diplomatic recognition to the provisional government, the United States and other American republics could supply economic and military aid without appearing to violate their international commitments."

If the CIA indeed reported mass discontent in Cuba, President Kennedy had considerable advice to the contrary. While the Administration might have leaned to its own intelligence voices, it is not likely that a plan based on a disputed judgment would have been approved.

During Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's visit to the U.S. last March, he told President Kennedy that British intelligence did not forecast an early uprising against Castro. The London *Times'* Washington correspondent later reported that "British intelligence reports suggesting that the landings in Cuba would not lead to a revolt were rejected unread by President Kennedy."

In addition, Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), a former Foreign Service officer, made an unofficial and confidential trip to Cuba last December to test the atmosphere. On his return, according to Rowland Evans Jr. in the *Herald Tribune* May 9, Pell reported to the Administration that "the people were far from ready to revolt against Fidel Castro." Pell said: "I am afraid that it is only true that they were still tasting the satisfaction of Castro's land reform, of his nationalization of United States companies and of the other much-touted reforms put into effect by Castro. The dispossessed were in jail or in exile."

If political uprising was a cornerstone of Washington's plan, then considerable advance contact with the underground was to be expected. But, *Time* reported, an exile leader complained on April 19: "We offered the complete underground system in Cuba for the purposes of coordination. We were capable of bringing about great defections in the military inside Cuba, even contacts to bring off a general strike. Why, 48 hours after the invasion started, has this not been done?"

Stuart Novins said in *The Reporter* that "Manolo Ray's underground, all prepared to hit preselected targets and ready to appeal to the Cuban people over at least 14 transmitters scattered across the country

. . . received no advance word of the landing.”

While the anti-Castro saboteurs were not alerted, other forces were. Joe Alex Morris Jr. reported from Miami in the *Herald Tribune* April 22: “The U.S. Navy was reported to have two task forces, each with a carrier, operating in the [Caribbean] area, instead of the usual one. Both were said to be engaged in routine exercises, as were 1,700 Marines in Puerto Rico. But American naval and Air Force units in the area were on a constant alert.”

Despite the official word that the Escambray guerillas were to carry out harassing attacks and perhaps link up with the beachhead, Washington knew that the mountain fighters had been eliminated weeks before the invasion. Szulc reported from Miami in the *Times* April 7: “It is now conceded here that Dr. Castro succeeded in virtually wiping out the Escambray operation in months of action by tens of thousands of his militiamen.” Belfrage had reported substantially the same story earlier in the *Guardian*.

Washington strained hard to convince the world that it did not plan to commit U.S. military forces.¹ It did not convince the exiles. Miro Cardona told Time before the invasion: “They [U.S. officials] promised me they will use the troops.” In Havana, the invaders’ captured chief Manuel Artime said: “We were promised air support.” Another captive, identified only as Pablo on Cuban TV, said that a CIA

¹ The false ring to the “official” story made it open season for speculation on the real plan. One die-hard Administration supporter insists that Operation Pluto was President Kennedy’s devious scheme to discredit Allen Dulles and pump \$45,000,000 into the economy in one move.

A more interesting thesis comes from an imaginative friend who asks to be identified as Mr. Machiavelli. He examines two troubling questions: (1) Why did President Kennedy abandon a plan for air cover?; and (2) Why did he return the British intelligence packet unopened?

His answer goes back to the OAS meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica last August, where the U.S. hoped to get a strong statement against Cuba as well as private support for the invasion plan. But, as Raul Castro warned at the time, the Latin American leaders were fearful of open identification with the U.S. against Cuba because it would set off angry protests from their own people at home. The best Secy. of State Christian Herter could get out of the conference was a weakly worded Declaration of San Jose against “intervention or threat of intervention” by an extracontinental power, which did not mention Cuba.

World opinion against a Washington-devised invasion of Cuba solidified by D-Day and forced President Kennedy to reconsider the air cover scheme. The Soviet note threatening to sink U.S. shipping apparently was the clincher.

President Kennedy, Mr. Machiavelli argues, did not open the British packet because it did not contradict what he already knew about the possibilities of a Cuban uprising. The CIA in fact did not predict a revolt. But the story of CIA predictions was circulated to prepare the agency as scapegoat in case the operation failed.

Thus the President did not want to be on record as having seen a contradictory report.

—(Ed.)

man told him that "the U.S. would intervene directly within 15 days if the invasion failed."

In Miami, Manuel Penabaz, invasion survivor, said that in the last hours, when the attackers called for U.S. planes, this reply came on the radio in English: "Don't worry. They will be there soon. Keep fighting."

Last February Adolph Berle Jr., special advisor to President Kennedy on Latin America, took a trip through the hemisphere, ostensibly to report the general situation. But on May 11, Brazilian Congressman Osmar Cunha reported that during an interview with captured counter-revolutionaries in Havana, Artime gave him another version of Berle's trip. Cunha, a member of the middle-of-the-road Social Democratic party, quoted Artime as saying: "Berle . . . visited Brazil and various other countries on the continent with the specific mission of consulting and negotiating with these governments the immediate recognition of an anti-revolutionary government in Cuba that would be set up by invading troops." Cunha added: "Artime told me that the Brazilian government was the only one consulted to reject the . . . proposal."

U.S. News (May 21) reported that some exile leaders said the CIA had promised that "once they were established on the beaches, there would be support for them by a three-nation force of 30,000 men. On rechecking with the Americans, the figure was reduced to 15,000."

A troubling question to those who accept the purpose of the landing as a major thrust inland was the choice of the site at Cienaga de Zapata. It is flanked by impassable swamps, with only two roads leading to the interior. To break out of the beachhead, invaders would have to move along roads on which defenders would be certain to concentrate heavy fire.

But as a defensive position, Cienaga de Zapata is excellent. Castro himself described it as "a very difficult position to attack, because you have to attack it from a highway across the swamp, with only three or four entry points, which would be effectively defended with tanks, anti-tank guns and heavy mortars."

Drew Pearson (May 9) confirmed that the invaders' strategy was to "hold out in the swamp and on the beach" by mining the "roads against the advance of Castro's tanks." *Newsweek* (May 1) reported that the orders for the bulk of the invading forces were to "set up a defense for the beachhead."

The invaders' mission then was to hold the beachhead long enough to fly in the six leading members of the Revolutionary Council, held under guard near Miami. *U.S. News* (May 15) reported that "on a Miami airport were a number of C-46s and C-47s, painted white without markings." One of the planes "was in readiness to transport the 'Revolutionary Council' to set up an anti-Castro government."

Had the invaders held the beachhead for a few more days, Operation

Pluto might have "succeeded." The last stages might have been effected; the new government established, recognized and reinforced by U.S. and other forces in a day or two.

The operation failed because:

- The tiny Cuban air force (six assorted planes) was never knocked out. It dominated the skies and it played havoc with the invaders on the beach.

- It underestimated the ability of Cuba's militia and the efficiency of its intelligence. Cuban forces fought well and with high morale. There are also indications that Castro knew when and where the invasion was coming.

- It overestimated the ability and passion of the counter-revolutionaries. That 1,214 of an invading force of between 1,500 and 1,700 surrendered does not speak well for it. Francis L. McCarthy, Latin American editor of United Press International, told the American Newspaper Publishers convention that the invading paratroopers "retired without orders" at the sound of Cuban artillery.

While the CIA deserves no kudos for its part in the scheme, it is a misjudgment to credit it with more than an agent's share of the blame. A member of Congress, described by David Lawrence in the *Herald Tribune* as familiar with facts, found a more just apportionment in this characterization: "A case of cumulative stupidity."



Sherlock Dulles

L'Express, Paris

A FORTUNATE FAILURE

OPERATION PLUTO'S moment of truth came at the White House meeting in the early hours of April 19 when President Kennedy had to choose between writing off the invasion or unleashing U.S. forces against Cuba. What went into the President's decision not to commit U.S. forces may never be known. Some speculate that he thought the situation was too far gone. Others conclude that he did not want to intervene unilaterally after he and Stevenson had stressed that U.S. forces were not involved in the landings. One foreign diplomat reported the scuttlebutt that Premier Khrushchev had sent a secret note threatening that Soviet submarines would retaliate against U.S. shipping, if the President sent troops or planes to Cuba. It was recalled that Soviet intimations of intervention were credited with causing the Franco-British withdrawal from Suez in 1956.

Whatever President Kennedy's reasons, the world can be thankful that he made the decision he made. "Success" for Operation Pluto at best would have meant a modern version of the Spanish Civil War, with U.S. and perhaps other American troops fighting Cubans. It might have created also an "American Algeria"—a devitalizing and endless war against guerrillas. At worst, it could have led to nuclear war, if the U.S.S.R. made good on its promise to defend Cuba with missiles.

Walter Lippmann pointed out that should the invasion have started a civil war, "no plan seems to have been made, no thought seems to have been given, to what we would do then, what the rest of Latin America would do then, what the Soviet Union would do, while the civil war was being fought."

Operation Pluto's military aspects were detailed in GI fashion, by the numbers. There were written plans covering from "D-Day minus 7" to "D plus 30." But beyond that the exiles were in such sharp disagreement that they never could present more than a vague political-economic outline for a post-Castro Cuba. Varona was concerned with the protection of private property. Ray argued for social justice. Miro Cardona stressed the importance of rule by law. Artime, the fugitive embezzler, stressed the importance of Artime.

Did the operation's planners think they could turn back the clock in Cuba? Having tasted the first fruits of agrarian reform, did anyone expect the campesinos to go back to the plantation system? Could high rents and low pay be reinstated in the cities and the anti-illiteracy campaign ended in the countryside?

The dynamics of social revolution are that progress breeds further progress. Looking back is for the exploiters; the liberated can point only forward. Cubans would have fought to protect their newly-won gains against whatever force with whatever weapons. Take away their "Quatro Bocas," they would have used pistols. Remove their sidearms, they would have fought with machetes. And they would have continued fighting in the certain knowledge that they were defending the future and the U.S. was fighting for the past.

While Washington reappraises its Cuban policy, there are ominous signs that the obvious is being overlooked in favor of the bellicose. The exiles, more split than ever—Ray took his group out of the Revolutionary Council—have dropped the pretense of overturning Castro from within and openly advocate direct U.S. intervention. Varona told a New York meeting May 7 that the invasion should "teach a lesson" to the U.S. that nonintervention is an untenable doctrine in the fight against communism. Miro Cardona earlier spoke of doing away "with the formalities of nonintervention" and he added that Cuba must be freed by "the coordinated forces of all the nations of this continent."

Many of the respected columnists have based their post-invasion analyses on the premise that Castro must be overthrown. Reston called it a requirement of "the self-interest of the nation." Shannon said "it would be in America's national interest." Sanguine Stuart Alsop put it: "Some day, one way or another, the American commitment to bring Castro down will have to be honored. The commitment can only be honored if the American government is willing, if necessary, to strike to kill, even if that risks the shedding of American blood."

To a visitor from Mars the dread fear of the richest nation in the world of a tiny island with a population less than New York City's might seem pathological. Clearly the invasion showed that all Cuba wants Castro. But, the logic says, we must overthrow him to protect our security. Our Martian might question the nature of Castro's threat. He might easily brush off the canard of Soviet missile bases off our shores by pointing out that aside from the fact that Khrushchev has disowned such designs in Cuba, a nation that has the rocket thrust to orbit a cosmonaut need not locate its bases under a potential adversary's nose.

The more logical answer lies in the statement of an unidentified diplomat to the *Wall Street Journal* April 28: "We might as well face it, Castro is no great threat to our security by himself; it's the danger of his doctrine spreading to other countries that's a threat to us."

Our Martian might attribute vulgar motives to Washington officials because of their direct and covert ties to U.S. sugar and business interests in Cuba, which were "intervened" by the Castro revolution. For example, Adolph Berle, until last February, was chairman of American Molasses Co., which got its sugar and molasses from companies formerly in Cuba. The company's stock price rose to an all-time high at the time of the invasion. Berle's wife owns, and he is trustee for, \$1,250,000 worth of American Molasses stock.

But we would divert our Martian from cynical thoughts and turn him toward the real lesson for the U.S. in Cuba. While we have been watching television, the Latin American campesino has been looking at his plight. He has decided that he is entitled to a fair share of what he produces and the Cuban revolution has shown him that he can get it and how to get it.

The campesino's emancipation is no threat to the nation; it endangers only the spoilers, who have had their way too long. The United States can live in peace with the new campesino and it can do business with him. It can sell him goods at a fair price and buy his on similar terms. But the nation must accept that the day of the spoiler in the "banana republics" is gone. The campesino may choose political forms different from ours, but we must recognize that that, too, is his right and to challenge this right is to risk global holocaust.


It is not easy for the spoiler who has fed so long high on the hog to settle for chittlings. But we must not allow his recalcitrance to put the nation out of step with history. The real threat to national security is allowing the spoiler to shape our policy.

Globally every day, we test whether great powers of unlike political and social systems can coexist. In Cuba, the question is whether a great power can survive the impertinence of a tiny neighbor's decisions to have economic self-determination. As the Soviet Union has survived reactionary regimes in Turkey and Iran on its borders, so the U.S. can survive agrarian reform in Cuba, even though it calls itself socialist.



from Nis Hammartsroem in Ny Dag, Stockholm

"The tourist posters told us Cuba is the land of surprises!"




VACUNA ANTIRRABICA.

Anti-Rabies Vaccination

from Revolucion, Habana

POSTSCRIPT



from Revolucion, Habana

Another of our powerful weapons.

FOREIGN POLICY AFTER CUBA

The humiliating defeat for the U.S. of Operation Pluto by the Cuban revolutionary forces has had, and is having, significant repercussions within the ruling power elite of the United States. The defeat was the sharpest expression of the failure of American foreign policy in the past decade, and it has resulted in an enraged feeling of frustration among the rulers of America. Frustration leads to bitter arguments. At an earlier time of frustration the late John Foster Dulles threatened his Western allies with an "agonizing reappraisal" of American commitments in Europe. It was a threat uttered at the wrong time, to the wrong people, for the wrong reasons, but it was a memorable phrase. In a fateful way, the phrase accurately fits the present dilemma of the Kennedy Administration as a result of the Cuban fiasco. Says *The Reporter*:

"Cuba and Laos have done it: a debate on the ends and means of our foreign policy has started; the strategy and diplomacy of the nation are being publicly re-examined with feverish thoroughness."

Everybody is agonizing, though some agonize less than others, and two broad camps have shaped up. The less agonized camp, whose articulate and sober spokesmen are James Reston of the *N. Y. Times* and Walter Lippmann of the *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, holds that the balance of power in the world has shifted from U.S. preponderance to East-West equality and that our foreign policy must be drastically re-adjusted to this reality.

The other camp, which is led by the CIA and the Pentagon, argues that Western power is still dominant but is not used ruthlessly enough. What is needed is to reinforce Dulles' policy of force; put a little more heat under the Cold War! Most U.S. press pundits—Max Lerner, Joseph Alsop, Marguerite Higgins, David Lawrence, Roscoe Drummond and so on—are in the second camp. There is however a lot of confusion among them as is natural among agonizers.

Both camps claim President Kennedy as their own, the re-adjusters a little wistfully, the ruthless ones a little more confidently, since the President's utterances since the Cuban invasion have been quite belligerent. His first speech after the failure was an affirmation that the United States would intervene unilaterally in Latin America if he felt American national security was at stake. He has said that the East-West conflict is such that "no war has ever posed a greater threat to our security." He has declared, "every new piece of information, every fresh event, has deepened my conviction that the survival of our civilization is at stake—and the hour is late."

Furthermore the main emphasis in foreign policy is still on military force. The enormous arms budget has been further increased. The ICBM and Polaris submarine programs have been accelerated and we have also stepped up the construction of medium-range missile batteries in England, Turkey and Italy. Most important, Kennedy has decided to increase rapidly the special units of the army for so-called guerrilla warfare. The appointment of General Taylor to head the inquiry into the CIA fiasco has a built-in verdict: take away the operations functions of the CIA and give them to the Pentagon in order to strengthen and increase them.

Guerrilla warfare is the new panacea of Kennedy—just as massive retaliation was that of John Foster Dulles. It is reported that Kennedy has been reading Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara's works on the subject, and according to Hanson Baldwin of the N. Y. *Times*, Kennedy "has been impressed." The Army has three Special Forces groups. Baldwin in the *Times* describes them thus: "The Seventh (or parent) Group now at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the Tenth in Germany and the First in Okinawa. . . . A further index of the emphasis on guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities is the increase in rank from colonel to brigadier general given to the commanding officer of the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. He is Col. William P. Yarborough. . . ." Baldwin explains that the outfit is expanding because of the special interest shown by President Kennedy himself. The Kennedy budget for 1962 requests 3,000 more men for the Special Forces, enough to more than double their strength. The outfit is aware of the Presidential interest and the men are calling themselves the President's Own.

The sudden discovery of guerrilla warfare as a cure for the U.S. military problems has created a kind of euphoria which has influenced even such a sober paper as the *Wall Street Journal*. Under a headline U.S. ARMY TAKES TIP FROM REDS, STEPS UP GUERRILLA TRAINING, a special report is enthusiastic:

"Here in the pine woods around Fort Bragg, a select group of volunteer soldiers is learning how to infiltrate a Communist country, arm and train anti-Red native bands, and then help

these insurgent groups ambush convoys, disrupt communications, raid supply lines and otherwise harass the enemy . . .

“These rugged men, all volunteers for hazardous duty, train to survive and operate in swamps, jungles, deserts and mountains. . . The Army claims these men could infiltrate Communist-dominated lands by land, sea or air; working perhaps up to 2,500 miles behind the Iron Curtain, they could organize sympathetic people into guerrilla bands to harass and undermine the government. Initially the resistance movement would probably concentrate on subversion through strikes, rumors, riots; then as it picked up strength and firepower, the movement would chip away at industry, communications and supply, and government morale . . .”

“Special Forces detachments can use such diverse weapons as a bow-and-arrow, an obsolete Thompson sub-machine gun, a Cuban developed M-16, a sawed-off shotgun that fires an incendiary gasoline bottle as much as 1,200 yards. . . . Each Special Force soldier must possess a number of skills: How to perform minor surgery, bag rattlesnakes to stave off starvation, fire foreign weapons and win over natives at the grass-roots level.”

Unfortunately, there is a little problem which even the euphoric reporter could not miss: The problem of language. Our bow-and-arrow sharpshooters and rattlesnake-bagging guerrillas “face a pitfall in their limited ability in language . . . an obvious limitation in swaying native opinion and controlling guerrilla forces.” But the Army doesn’t give up easily and the officers see to it that the men learn a few hundred words of *any* language they may need. As one of them explained to the reporter, “if our men know 300 to 500 words and select phrases, they can show natives how to strip down a gun or plant a demolition bomb.”

One can only marvel at such monumental egocentricity and visualize our highly trained paratrooper knocking at the door of a Laotian peasant and drawing on his scant stock of words for the magic phrase that will open the door.

The new American reliance on guerrilla warfare will prove illusory. The Kennedy Administration may read Mao Tse-tung, but it doesn’t understand him. On June 4, 1961, under the headline “Mao’s Primer on Guerrilla Warfare” the *New York Times* published extensive excerpts from Mao’s manual (translated by the Marine Corps!) The opening sentences should make the Pentagon think:

“Without a political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assist-

ance cannot be gained. *The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character.* (Emphasis added.)

“On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses, and is supported by them.”

The Pentagon thinks it can make use of the techniques of guerilla warfare because it thinks in terms of equipment and training, of TNT and small radios, of Garand rifles and bows and arrows. But the decisive factor in guerrilla warfare, as Mao points out, is the political factor: what is the guerrilla fighting for? Always, in every case, the guerrilla is fighting for food and justice against oppressive social and economic systems, against landlords, usurers, corrupt officials and arbitrary police, in short the very things American foreign policy supports because it supports the status quo.

The Pentagon's utilization of guerrilla warfare, or as it is more formally called, paramilitary warfare will end up to be nothing more than hit and run commando raids and sabotage missions . . . plain gangsterism by the U.S. government. That this is no exaggeration is shown in a blunt article in the *Wall Street Journal* of May 16, 1961 which make this brutal statement about paramilitary warfare: “It is a doctrine which could concentrate on brutalities performed in the dark; honorable men of high rank now sit in this city (Washington) calmly discussing the possibilities of such things as the methodical assassination of Communist leaders abroad.” This is not a Steve Canyon comic strip; this is the *Wall Street Journal* reporting on high U.S. officials, and if there are any doubts it is not because of moral considerations but rather “opposition to all-out paramilitary ventures has centered within the government on purely practical considerations.” One of these considerations is a rather important one, “By any realistic assessment, it would seem that if America tries to step up undercover competition with the Soviet, it must count on a ‘paramilitary gap’ that will make the ‘missile gap’ look trivial by comparison.”

By some kind of insane logic the failure of the Cuban invasion has strengthened the proponents of paramilitary action. We read in the article, “The idea that the U.S. Army must rely on undercover paramilitary techniques of warfare as one way to stop and reverse Red advances now appears more firmly established as national policy than it was before the recent resounding failure of the paramilitary invasion of Cuba . . . which attempted to cloak as a spontaneous rebellion of exiles an attack which was in fact fully sponsored and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.” But this logic is no longer insane when the *Journal* reveals why the Pentagon likes the idea, namely, the ability to use secrecy so that there are no controls over the Pentagon

activities. "Any paramilitary program, large or small, can bypass established governmental mechanisms of review. An offensive involving vast stakes can be decided in secret by a few highly placed officials, then executed without scanning by Congressional committees. Though the CIA has had its failures, its success in blazing this trail is complete." In other words the CIA has shown the Pentagon the technique of waging undeclared war without the knowledge or consent of Congress, and the *Journal* goes on to spell this out: "The tradition of an informed public, the Constitutional right of the Senate to advise on foreign policy and of Congress to declare war . . . seem in basic conflict with paramilitarism."

This paramilitary doctrine is clearly designed not to attack Moscow or Peking, but as an undercover police action to stop popular movements. It is the military doctrine which corresponds to the political doctrine expressed by Kennedy in his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Publishers where he said that the struggle "is taking place every day, without fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets, day and night and in classrooms all over the globe. . . ."

In these thousands of villages are hundreds of thousands of people who are sick and tired of their poverty and exploitation, and prepared to fight for their emancipation when they get socialist weapons. But it isn't the weapons that make the revolutionary movements, it's the people. The Pentagon can supply arms by the millions of dollars, as it did in Laos, but it cannot find the people willing to fight to maintain the status quo. That this reality should escape the secluded, rigid Pentagon brass hats is understandable, but it is surprising that so intelligent and democratic a person as Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt does not see it. She, too, is puzzled. "As you look around the world," she writes, "where the Russians have supplied arms and materials of war, it is a strange thing to find that the peoples who have received this aid seem to fight harder than those to whom we supply arms and materials of war. There must be a reason for this . . ."

There is a reason, and it seems fairly obvious when one appraises the Algerians or the Viet Nam forces fighting the French army, the Angolese fighting the Portuguese, or the Cubans resisting American-trained invaders. The obvious can be called by name--colonialism, imperialism--but these are dirty words. "There must be a reason for this," says Mrs. Roosevelt, "and I think it would be well for us to ferret it out. Perhaps those to whom we give aid are not entirely sure they can trust us. Why those who take aid from Russia should be sure they can completely trust the Soviets is a mystery, but it is one for us to study."

The fact is that those to whom we give aid do trust us: we give to oppressors. It is their oppressed peoples who don't trust us. One has only to call the roll, Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Batista, Franco and so on. This fact is so clear that in recent months commentators

freely admit it and try to excuse it on the grounds that the alternative to reactionary regimes is Communism. For example William Shannon writing in the liberal *New York Post* on May 16, 1961 says:

“The governments we back in some countries are gray, but the alternative is black. The Spain of General Franco is in many ways a very sad country, but there is not the hopelessness of Hungary, South Vietnam has its problems and the Ngo Diem government could do better, but there is nothing like the bloodshed and ruthlessness of Ho Chi Minh’s rule in North Vietnam.

“There is an unconscious moral jingoism in the view that the U.S. should insist upon better governments in the countries we are aiding. In some countries there is no alternative to existing ruling factions. . . . When it comes to the problems of corruption and of social change, we must bear in mind how difficult such matters are in our own country. The maintenance of honesty in the governments of New York and Chicago is a constant struggle. The achievement of social change in Alabama and Mississippi almost defies the reason and imagination of men of goodwill . . .

“The question we must ask about a government is not whether it is corrupt but whether it functions effectively. . . . In foreign affairs, social reform represents the utopian solution of liberals.”

These statements reflect attitudes that are widely held in the government by men who consider themselves realists. In fact these ideas are appalling self-deceptions. The corruption in the American “client” states (as Lippmann calls them) is not the corruption of a city government. It is the corruption of a nation, a corruption that is so enormous, widespread and tenacious that it stifles trade, industry, agriculture, all possibilities of economic growth. This is what makes for explosive, revolutionary conditions. To ask whether a corrupt government functions effectively is to beg the question: such governments seem to function until overthrown. Batista looked very powerful and effective until a couple of months before he was thrown out. By then it was too late. Reform in our client states is not a moral question; it is a question of achieving stable governments supported by a majority of the population. This is difficult to achieve under the best of circumstances, but it becomes impossible if the position is taken that any reform will help Communism.

Shannon’s attitude that the choice is between reactionary governments and Communism is predominant in our government circles and it is the root of our self-defeating foreign policy. This “either/or” psychology closes the door to alternatives and was the essence of John Foster Dulles’ policy. To Dulles the neutralism of India was offensive because

all neutrality in the East-West struggle was a vote of no-confidence in the U.S. and therefore, for Dulles, a pro-Communist position. While the Kennedy Administration is more realistic about neutralism, the "either or" psychology is still powerful within it, particularly in the Pentagon. The English, who are our closest allies, look upon this attitude with dismay since it is a sure formula for diplomatic defeats. A clear statement of the British position is found in the London *Observer*, a conservative, pro-American newspaper. It said on April 30, 1961:

"It would be comforting to believe that the Cuban adventure was an isolated blunder, partly inherited from the previous Administration. But all President Kennedy's speeches and actions since then, and in the reactions of the American press, suggest that this was not so. The Cuban intervention sprang from a particular view of the world which the President fully shares, which most Americans approve, and *which at present sharply divides the United States from most of her allies and from all the neutral nations.*

"To a far greater extent that they would like to admit, *our American friends are the prisoners of an ideology* almost as narrow as that of the Communists and just as ferently believed. The American ideology equates capitalism not only with freedom but very nearly with virtue. The nationalization of an American company by a small nation seems to most Americans proof of a political sin so obvious as to require no further discussion.

"To nearly all Americans, Communism is an evil as absolute as Nazism or as murder, and any one who questions this dogma must already be infected by the contagion. They decline to notice any difference between Khrushchev's Russia and Stalin's Russia. They ignore the case of Yugoslavia, where Communists have created a society which is independent of Russia and which appears to less impassioned democrats morally no worse than the capitalist societies of Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal or Verwoerd's South Africa. *Few Americans can conceive that a Laotian peasant might genuinely prefer the Pathet Lao to Prince Boun Oum, or that there is anything except misery in the Soviet Union.*

"... *This view of the world is a dangerously over-simplified one.* Mr. Khrushchev makes no secret of his conviction that Communism will ultimately prevail and that he will do his best to help it. No one would deny that Communist techniques are dangerous and hard to counter. But Mr. Khrushchev also knows that technique is not enough; that outside the areas where the Russian and Chinese armies are dominant, *Communism can*

succeed only where the conditions favor it. The chief of these conditions are well known to be poverty, backwardness, feudalism and oppression; but there are also external factors of great importance.

"In Eastern Europe, for instance, Communism's greatest ally is fear of Germany. In the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America, it is anti-colonialism. By direct intervention in would-be neutralist parts of the world, the West presses a still painful wound. Admittedly, it takes strong nerves not to intervene when a country is threatened by Communist subversion, but it may be the right course. If Britain had intervened in Iraq after General Kassem's revolution, Iraq would now be Communist." (Emphasis added.)

No one can accuse the conservative British government of pro-Communism and Prime Minister Macmillan has a long record of anti-Soviet bias, so the tartness of British comment is not due to ideological differences but to the fact that *American policies have actually aided Communism*, a contention which is strongly and explicitly supported by Walter Lippmann who writes:

"... The reason we are on the defensive in so many places is that for some ten years we have been doing exactly what Mr. Khrushchev expects us to do. We have used money and arms in a long losing attempt to stabilize native governments which, in the name of anti-Communism, are opposed to all important social change.

"We cannot compete with Communism in Asia, Africa or Latin America if we go on doing what we have done so often and so widely—which is to place the weak countries in a dilemma where they must stand still with us and our client rulers, or start moving with the Communists."

The U.S.—Cuba relations of the last few years fit perfectly into the British and Lippmann analysis. The United States supported Batista with money and arms, opposing all social change, while major American utilities, sugar and oil companies derived huge profits. The fact of U.S. control over Batista is uncontested. One may say it has been certified by a qualified authority, Mr. Earl T. Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, who told a Senate Committee:

"Senator, let me explain to you that the United States, until the advent of Castro, was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that . . . the American Ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the President."

Batista's army was equipped with American weapons and trained

by U.S. military men, who remained in Cuba even beyond the fall of Batista. In fact, they were sent home by Castro who explained politely that their services were not needed by the Cuban guerrillas and that their competence, in view of Batista's defeat was, to say the least, questionable. Despite U.S. support of Batista, when Castro won in January, 1959, he was not at all oriented to the socialist countries. There wasn't even a trade agreement with the Soviet Union for over a year.

An intensely eclectic individual, Castro's only basic commitment was the agrarian reform which his guerrilla forces, predominantly peasants, had been promised and now expected. But there was certainly at that time no immediate intention to nationalize U.S. companies. In fact, in the spring of 1959 Castro came to the U.S. to seek loans and economic help. He was turned down, and after he carried into effect the Agrarian Reform, the Eisenhower Administration began to put active economic obstacles in the way of Cuban trade. Nevertheless it was several months before Cuba turned to the socialist countries and in February, 1960, signed a trade agreement which included the purchase of Soviet oil at prices well below those of the monopoly-dominated world market. The big refineries (Standard of New Jersey, Texaco, Shell) refused to handle the oil and the Cuban government took over the refineries. This was in June, 1960, a year and a half after the victory of the Revolution. It was this event which triggered the chain reaction that led to the nationalization of all American companies in Cuba. The monopolies thereupon cut off the flow of oil from Venezuela and Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for all its oil.

In July the U.S. government cancelled the sugar quota, a major blow of economic warfare, expected to cripple the Cuban economy. Cuba sold its sugar to the socialist countries and retaliated by nationalizing the oil refineries, the U.S.-owned sugar mills, the U.S.-owned utilities. In October Washington imposed an embargo on exports and Cuba nationalized all the U.S. companies. All told, about one billion dollars of U.S. investments were taken over. The CIA stepped up its plans to prepare an invasion which was carried through in April, 1961.

Several things must be noted. If there are Czech trucks on the Cuban highways and Soviet tankers in Habana harbor, it is because American companies have refused to sell U.S. trucks and U.S. oil to Cuba. U.S. policy of economic warfare deliberately destroyed the network of trade relations forcing Cuba to turn to the socialist countries for its machines, spare parts, technical training and so forth.

Secondly, and as a consequence, the Cuban people began to get a new viewpoint on socialism and the socialist countries. The mass of people in Cuba have been influenced not so much by Cuba's small Communist Party as by the daily arrival of Soviet tankers into Cuban harbors. The entire Cuban economy depends on oil as a source of

energy and every Cuban knows how essential oil is to any activity. The white tankers with the hammer and sickle on their funnels are the most effective propaganda that could possibly be devised.

Thirdly, while the nationalization of U.S. industries was part of the struggle against American economic warfare and was determined by American actions, yet this nationalization had an internal effect of strengthening the public sector of the Cuban economy, thus pushing Cuba further on the road to socialism. As sections of the upper middle class turned against the Castro government because of their economic and political ties with American interests, the Cuban government nationalized their holdings as well. Large sections of the upper classes defected to Miami and their defection further weakened the conservative forces inside Cuba. The ultimate result of U.S. enmity was that both the economic and the political basis of socialism was strengthened in Cuba and the opposition dispersed in the brief space of two years. The attempted invasion climaxed this development and it was after this fiasco that Castro spoke of the revolution as patriotic, democratic, and—for the first time—socialist.

The contention that American foreign policy forced the Cuban Revolution to take the socialist road has been challenged by friend and foe. Theodore Draper has argued that the break with the United States was desired by Castro and his friends and that they maneuvered skillfully so that the actions they wanted to do seemed to be reactions to American economic aggression. The least that can be said to this is that American foreign policy was terribly obtuse to give Castro the excuses he wanted. Yet Draper himself admits that Castro's ideas were the ruling ideas of the Revolution and that at the beginning Castro did not have socialist solutions in mind. Draper at no time takes up the question of what would have happened had the United States accepted the Agrarian Reform and given Cuba the loans which Castro came looking for in the spring of 1959.

The *Monthly Review* editors, Huberman and Sweezy, in their book and their articles have argued that, whether they knew it or not, the original objectives of the Cuban Revolutionists could only be achieved through socialism. Huberman has written: "Let me be clear. I am *not* saying that opposition by the U.S., of itself, forced the Revolutionary Government to move towards socialism—it served rather to speed up the process." Of course, everything revolves around that phrase "speed up." It can mean a year, a decade, or even half a century. The point simply is this: Had the United States accepted the Agrarian Reform and provided loans, the nationalization would have been limited to a few key monopolies (oil, utilities, sugar mills) which would have been compensated, but the smaller American and Cuban businesses would have been functioning, expanding, and finding the way to have a political

platform and exercise political influence. It is beyond our scope at this time to examine this problem at length, and it is only touched upon here because it deals with the question of whether the U.S. could have pursued an alternate policy *in its own class interests*, what the New York *Times* termed editorially "the engineering of a social and economic revolution by peaceful means."

Whether such an alternative is feasible or not, no one knows. It hasn't been explored and of course it hasn't been tried. What is being tried is the policy of bolstering disintegrating regimes with American arms. The result can only be a series of colonial wars which will be as disastrous for the American nation as the Indo-China and Algerian conflicts have been for the French nation. It is evident by now that the American policy of clinging to a reactionary status quo and of attempting to turn the clock back has resulted in such resounding defeats in Cuba and now in Laos as well, that some sections of the American ruling class are beginning to take stock. In an editorial on May 14, 1961, the New York *Times* stated:

"We have too often encouraged communism by treating any anti-Communist government as a friend. The fact that Fidel Castro has been able to build up an anti-United States, pro-Russia regime in Cuba is at least partly due to our tolerance of the arbitrary and corrupt Batista government which Castro overthrew. We should learn from this case and from others that we cannot successfully fight communism by subsidizing governments that rob or exploit their own people."

A few days later, May 18, Walter Lippmann in a slashing attack on the continuation of the Dulles foreign policy, which he titled "A Dying Policy," analyzed the failure of this policy in the Far East, writing:

"The revolution in Iran and the revolution in South Korea are warning signs . . . that it is not only in Laos that there is trouble for the American client states.

"In Iran the revolution is a desperate attempt at the top, with the blessings of the Shah, to reform the regime before it is overthrown from below. . . . The hour is late in Iran.

"In South Korea the revolution is the work of the Army . . . the new military government, although it is not anti-American in theory, is in fact defying and ignoring our embassy and the American army commander."

"The revolutions in South Korea and Iran, following the disorders in Laos and South Vietnam, are a warning that in Asia the policy of containment by American satellite states is breaking down. *In all four of these countries the governments have been our clients, indeed they have been our creations.* All of them

are crumbling, and in the last analysis they are all crumbling for the same reason . . . *these American client states are not only corrupt but they are intolerably reactionary.*

“ . . . our present experience on the periphery of Asia is the American equivalent of what the British and the French are experiencing during the liquidation of their colonial empires. For what we are witnessing is the dissolution of the *Dulles system of Asian protectorates.* (Emphasis added.)”

This is strong language indeed and a blunt statement of facts long hidden from the American people. That so respectable a commentator as Lippmann should talk about American satellites and the Dulles system of Asian protectorates in a context which equates American policy with British and French imperialism is a reflection of the urgency of the need for new foreign policy. The old foreign policy of Mr. Dulles, says Lippmann, has confirmed Mr. Khrushchev's belief “that a capitalist society cannot change, that in its dealings with the under-developed countries it can only dominate and exploit. It cannot emancipate and help.” A new approach must be, says Lippmann, to make it “our central and persistent and unswerving policy to offer these unhappy countries a third option, which is economic development and social improvement without the totalitarian discipline of Communism.”

In more cautious language the New York *Times* supports this position, editorializing: “. . . whether we like or not we are living in a revolutionary period. . . . What we must do is to understand that we are living in a period of irrepressible change. We will have to broaden and deepen the principles of democracy. We will have to be tough with groups in other countries who would use foreign aid to promote their own interests and power.”

Whether or not such a new foreign policy could work is a moot question. Given the structure of American society it is a difficult, unexplored question beyond the scope of this writing. Yet the necessity of making the attempt is clear to men like Lippmann and Reston, to institutions such as the New York *Times*. The immediate political problem, therefore, is to widen and deepen the debate between the re-adjusters and the standpatters, to isolate such powerful forces as Standard Oil and the Pentagon which will not budge a millimeter. Tigers do not want to eat grass.

It is a gauge of the new cleavages created by this political dilemma that certain liberal forces, blinded by anti-Sovietism, now support the most reactionary forces in America. Typical is Max Ascoli, editor of *The Reporter*, writing in the issue of May 25 a bitter editorial against Lippmann and Reston under the title “Foreign Policy After Cuba.” Ascoli sees the desperate straits of American foreign policy, saying:

"A great power enjoys a considerably broad margin for error. After Cuba, we have no margin." But his recipe is: more of the same, no readjustment, no negotiations, no disengagement. The next to last paragraph of his editorial is a blatant statement of the new Know-Nothingism.

"The great post-Cuba debate will go on for a long time and any number of Clausewitzes are likely to suggest changes in our diplomacy as a result of what they consider our new strategic position. As far as we are concerned, to the now fashionable question of which country we should disengage ourselves from, our answer is: from none. And if it is asked which country we should like to have neutralized by a coalition government with Communist participation, our answer is again: none."

The forces opposing a re-examination and change in foreign policy are powerful indeed and not to be minimized. But these contemporary King Canutes have already suffered a major defeat in the very fact that a debate has begun, and, as Ascoli agrees, this debate will go on for a long time. It is our belief that events will force this debate to go deeper and deeper and to penetrate into all layers of the American population. The voices of reason will have to speak ever more clearly, ever more bluntly. They will have to reveal much of the truth of American diplomacy and foreign policy of the past decade, bring out facts which have been systematically hidden and falsified.

Already, for example, Lippmann and Reston have boldly stated the key fact of the post-Roosevelt foreign policy, namely that the atomic diplomacy of the U.S. initiated the Cold War. In the last fifteen years any such statement would have been immediately red-baited, for only the Left took such a position.

Fifteen years ago when Churchill and Forrestal used the pliant Truman to start the Cold War, it was nearly impossible to find any politically respectable individual to state the truth of this matter. It took diligent research to get a quote like that of Summer Welles who wrote in 1946 concerning the Cold War that "the blame for the present disaster should be shared by the United States," or Elliot Roosevelt's statement in the same year that "it was the United States who first shook the mailed fist."

For 15 years such statements were tabu. To say that the Truman Administration, hypnotized by the atomic bomb, was primarily responsible for the Cold War, was to ask for trouble. But now, listen to James Reston: "Immediately after the war, when the United States had an atomic monopoly, it was in a position to enforce its will in areas close to the Communist borders. It was then that the Government decided on a policy of halting expansion of Communism everywhere." Or listen to Lippmann, "They [the American people] have not been told

that the military situation which existed when John Foster Dulles established his policy no longer exists. They have not been told that he made it work by shaking the bomb at the Communists."

To understand the origins of the Cold War is the beginning of wisdom in foreign policy. The overwhelming majority of the American people still have no idea of the struggle that went on in the Truman Cabinet over the issue of getting tough with the USSR; do not know that Stimson and Marshall as well as Henry Wallace disagreed with the policy of the Cold War. There is little knowledge in America that as early as September 1945 Stimson wrote a famous memorandum to President Truman warning against atomic diplomacy and saying prophetically:

"I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problems of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and distrust of our motives will increase."

The American people still do not know that as early as 1946, in Truman's first Administration, John Foster Dulles was busy behind the scenes in the State Department. William L. Shirer reported in June of 1946 that "Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes, green as they are in foreign affairs, have taken over so many ideas of Mr. Dulles, especially in regard to Russia." In sum, Dulles planted the seed of the Cold War at that time.

The Dulles policy of the Cold War, introduced via Truman and continued by Eisenhower, has brought the United States from its apex of world power and prestige in 1945 to the low of 1961. It has been a disastrous policy not only for the broad national interests of the American people, but also for the narrower class interests of the ruling groups themselves, and it is for this reason that in the last few years differences of opinion have been growing sharper among policy makers, erupting into the present "great debate." The wiser heads among the power elite would like to make the necessary adjustments but they are in a minority and can only achieve their aim if they can muster broad popular support within the American people.

It is in this context that the necessity arises of informing the public of the truths of the past decade. The *New York Times*, Reston, Lippmann, Kennan and others are finding it necessary to speak clearly enough so that all may understand them and to point out the obvious results of atomic diplomacy. Today this policy is in ruins and when Lippmann attacks the policy he has to say why it was made and how it failed. He writes as follows on Asia, but his words are applicable all over the world:

“The Kennedy Administration did not form the policy of setting up on the periphery of Asia a semi-circle of American military clients. But it is now confronted with the breakdown of that policy, with the disorders, the dangers, and the pains of having to pick up the pieces. This is an experience which the American people have never had before and it is one for which their leaders have not prepared them. They have not been told by anyone in authority that there has been a radical change in the military situation and what the consequences of that change are. They have not been told that the military situation which existed when John Foster Dulles established this policy no longer exists. They have not been told that he made it work by shaking the bomb at the Communists. That is why so many of them suppose that Mr. Kennedy can make it work with a few Marines and by shaking his fist.

“Our moral and intellectual unpreparedness for the reality of things is causing widespread demoralization among us. We must not let ourselves be overcome by it.”

The American people are demoralized because they have been lied to by their own government, lied to persistently and systematically. So much has this been the case that the *New York Times*, which has not been wholly blameless, published its stinging enditorial, **THE RIGHT NOT TO BE LIED TO.**

Cuba has brought out into the open a debate which has been going on among the power elite in the privacy of their offices, homes and clubs. This debate is a reflection of the struggle over a change in foreign policy, a struggle which will become sharper under pressure of international events. More and more people will be drawn into this struggle, more and more the truth will be out about the Cold War. It is our profound conviction that in the next few years great political struggles will take place in our country to take American foreign policy out of the hands of the CIA, the Pentagon, the armaments corporations and the political diehards. In such an eventuality we may look back to the Cuban fiasco as a turning point in international affairs, and the American people may finally see the Cuban Revolution as an essential step in achieving their own democratic fulfillment.

THE AUTHORS have gathered and analyzed all the material available on the attempted invasion of Cuba in April 1961, paying particular attention to the systematic misinformation and deception of the American public by government agencies and government officials of the highest rank. The deception was so blatant that the usually restrained *New York Times* published a blistering editorial entitled **THE RIGHT NOT TO BE LIED TO.**

The Cuban invasion was organized and executed by the Central Intelligence Agency under Allen Dulles. A summary view of the CIA and its director is given so that the Cuban invasion may be seen in its proper perspective as one of many similar operations—Iran, Guatemala, Burma—in which the CIA has been engaged without the knowledge of the American people.

The failure of the Cuban invasion has had, and is having, profound repercussions on American foreign policy and has precipitated a debate as to its future course. The importance of this debate cannot be minimized, and the authors have added as a postscript a chapter entitled *Foreign Policy After Cuba*, which brings to the reader some of the pros and cons of the arguments now current.



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