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lowed walls. Therefore it is a great privilege to present our guests:

The Honorable Jacobo Schaulsohn, President of the Chamber of Deputies from Santiago, Radical Party. First elected to the Chamber in 1949. [Applause. Senators rising.]

The Honorable Humberto Aguirre-Doolan, Senator from Concepcion, Radical Party. First elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1949 and to the Senate in 1953. [Applause.]

The Honorable Humberto Del Rio, Member of the Chamber of Deputies from Cauquenes, Liberal Party. President of the Agricultural Committee. First elected to the Chamber in 1949. [Applause.]

The Honorable Renan Fuentealba, Member of the Chamber of Deputies from Coquimbo, Christian Democratic Party. First elected to the Chamber in 1957. President of the Christian Democratic Party. [Applause.]

The Honorable Victor Gonzalez-Maertens, Member of the Chamber of Deputies from Temuco, National Democratic Party (Padena). First elected to the Chamber in 1957. [Applause.]

The Honorable Julio Subercaseaux, Member of the Chamber of Deputies for the First District of Santiago, United Conservative Party. First elected to the Chamber in 1961. [Applause.]

Mr. President, to our Chilean friends I wish to say the Senate of the United States extends a very warm and cordial welcome, and we hope that they will have a very profitable and pleasant and enlightened trip as they go from point to point in this Republic. Thank you for coming. [Applause.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is happy to join in expressing to our distinguished visitors the official welcome of the Senate. The Chair appreciates the privilege of doing so.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 222) providing for the designation of the period October 1962 through October 1963 as "National Safety Council 50th Anniversary Year."

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 8038) to amend section 491 of title 18, United States Code, prohibiting certain acts involving the use of tokens, slugs, disks, devices, papers, or other things which are similar in size and shape to the lawful coins or other currency of the United States.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10) to encourage the establishment of voluntary pension plans by self-employed individuals; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS, Mr. KING of California, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. KEOGH, Mr. MASON, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BAKER

were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10650) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a credit for investment in certain depreciable property, to eliminate certain defects and inequities, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS, Mr. KING of California, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. KEOGH, Mr. MASON, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BAKER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12870) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SHEPARD, Mr. SIKES, Mr. CANNON, Mr. JONES, and Mr. TABER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolutions, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 167. An act to authorize the Attorney General to compel the production of documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and for other purposes;

H.R. 75. An act to amend section 2103 of title 28, United States Code, relating to appeals improvidently taken;

H.R. 857. An act to improve due process in the consideration and final adjudication of disputed claims for veterans' benefits by providing that the claimant shall be furnished a brief statement of the facts and law applicable to the case appealed and afforded an opportunity to reply thereto;

H.R. 860. An act to repeal certain obsolete provisions of title 38, United States Code, relating to unemployment compensation for Korean conflict veterans;

H.R. 1322. An act for the relief of Georges Khoury;

H.R. 1450. An act for the relief of Maria Odella Campos;

H.R. 1463. An act for the relief of Judy Josephine Alcantara;

H.R. 1678. An act for the relief of Jacques Tawil;

H.R. 2611. An act for the relief of Charles F. Ward, Jr., and Billy W. Crane, Sr.;

H.R. 4628. An act for the relief of Fotios Sakelaropoulos Kaplan;

H.R. 5234. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for the restoration of certain widows and children to the rolls upon annulment of their marriages or remarriages, and for other purposes;

H.R. 5317. An act for the relief of Mrs. Sun Yee (also known as Mrs. Tom Goodyou) and her children, Nale Har Yee, Shee Bell Yee, and Male Jean Yee;

H.R. 7328. An act for the relief of the estate of Louis J. Simpson, deceased;

H.R. 7437. An act for the relief of Stella Rosa Pagano;

H.R. 7900. An act for the relief of Lt. (Jg.) James B. Stewart;

H.R. 9775. An act for the relief of Nihat Ali Ucuuncu;

H.R. 9834. An act for the relief of Estelle L. Heard;

H.R. 10195. An act to validate payments of certain special station per diem allowances and certain basic allowances for quarters made in good faith to commissioned officers of the Public Health Service;

H.R. 10493. An act to amend title 18, United States Code, section 4163, relating to discharge of prisoners;

H.R. 11017. An act to amend section 4281, title 18, of the United States Code to increase from \$30 to \$100 the amount of gratuity which may be furnished by the Attorney General to prisoners discharged from imprisonment or released on parole;

H.R. 11031. An act for the relief of George Wm. Rueff, Inc.;

H.R. 11122. An act for the relief of Edward J. McManus;

H.R. 11863. An act for the relief of Vernon J. Wiersma;

H.R. 11996. An act to amend the act of January 30, 1913, to provide that the American Hospital of Paris shall have perpetual succession;

H.R. 12157. An act to amend the Bankruptcy Act in respect to the salaries of retired referees;

H.J. Res. 627. Joint resolution extending the duration of copyright protection in certain cases; and

H.J. Res. 783. Joint resolution granting consent of Congress to the State of Delaware and the State of New Jersey to enter into a compact to establish the Delaware River and Bay Authority for the development of the area in both States bordering the Delaware River and Bay.

THE FUTURE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET QUISLING REGIME IN CUBA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, over the past several weeks, some of our most distinguished Senators have made statements on the subject of Cuba, expressing diverse opinions. This is as it should be, if the Senate is truly to fulfill its advisory function in the critical realm of foreign affairs.

For my own part, I have hesitated to speak before today for several reasons. In the first place, I do not regard the Cuban situation as one which lends itself to a simple one-word or one-action solution.

I do not believe that the way to deal with it is to send in the marines tomorrow.

In the second place, I know how great the cares of the President are, and how many different factors must be taken into consideration in establishing our policy toward Cuba and toward Latin America as a whole. I do not wish to add to the great burden he is carrying. I want to help our President, and that is why I speak today.

But, in the course of the current debate on Cuba, there are certain things that have not yet been said; there are certain aspects of the situation that have not been given due consideration.

I speak today in the hope that I can contribute, at least in small measure, to the discussion which is essential to the clarification of our collective thinking on Cuba.

Mr. President, we live in a time when historic retribution is quick to follow upon each political folly or lapse of judgment.

Three and a half years ago, Fidel Castro and a band of several thousand guerrilla followers were made masters of Cuba when the dictatorial regime of Fulgencio Batista crumbled.

In retrospect, the innocence and gullibility of our policymakers at that time with regard to Castro seem almost incredible. There is strong evidence to show that, if the Eisenhower administration misjudged the Cuban situation so gravely, they did so because vital information was suppressed at desk position and because spurious estimates by publicly unknown subordinates became the basis for policy decisions of the gravest import for the Western Hemisphere.

Because of these totally misleading estimates, for more than another year, despite Castro's daily abuse of America, the official policy was to keep our minds open, to give Fidel Castro a chance, to avoid doing anything that would, so we were warned, drive him into the arms of Moscow.

But today, Castro's Cuba is as completely communized as the Soviet Union or Red China. The Iron Curtain has been rung down 90 miles from our shores.

The Cuban peasants are being forced into state farms. The workers are exploited and oppressed more brutally than chattel slaves. An omnipresent secret police keeps every Cuban under daily surveillance. The land does not produce, and the shop shelves are bare. The one thing of which there is a surplus is Communist literature, designed to help brainwash Cubans of all ages.

The economy of Cuba has become completely slave to the Soviet economy. And, in recent weeks, there has been ominous news concerning the arrival in Cuba of massive shipments of Soviet military equipment and of thousands of Soviet military personnel. What this adds up to is that Cuba has today become a full-fledged military and political satellite of the Soviet Union.

On many points, the recent reports have been publicly confirmed by the President or else privately confirmed to the press by the Department of State.

About the following points, I believe there is no dispute:

First. During the last week of July, 11 Soviet cargo ships and 5 Soviet passenger vessels arrived in Cuba.

Second. The passenger ships carried approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel, whom the Cuban press described as agricultural and industrial experts who had come to Cuba for the humanitarian purpose of assisting the Cuban people. President Kennedy, himself, has confirmed that approximately 3,000 of the Soviet experts who have already arrived in Cuba, or are on their way, are, in fact, military experts.

Third. The material unloaded included tanks, planes, antiaircraft missiles, missile-equipped torpedo boats, and other military hardware of various kinds, communications equipment and heavy trucks.

Fourth. All of the ships arrived at night and were unloaded at night, ac-

ording to eye witnesses, by Soviet personnel.

Fifth. At least 15 additional ships bringing cargoes from the Communist bloc countries are at present on their way to Cuba. Some of these ships fly flags of NATO countries.

I can understand the State Department's desire to avoid statements which might unnecessarily aggravate the situation or alarm the American public. On the other hand, I believe that in a situation such as this the American public has a right to the unvarnished facts. From this standpoint I find it difficult to understand the assurances that were initially given to the American public that the Communist bloc personnel who entered Cuba aboard the ships which recently docked there were technicians in the nonmilitary sense. President Kennedy did the right thing in his statement of last Tuesday, when he set the record straight on this point and spelled out some of the details about the recent shipments.

But I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from reliable sources, that the situation in Cuba is even more grave than has yet been indicated to the American public.

What is more, the recent shipments of Soviet arms to Cuba are by no means the first. It can be stated as a matter of fact, that the Soviet bloc, prior to July of this year, had already delivered to Cuba 500 tanks of various sizes, 500 to 1,000 artillery pieces, between 50 and 75 Mig jet fighters, some 200,000 small arms, and mortars, antiaircraft guns and other military hardware in substantial quantity. With these earlier shipments, it goes without saying, had come Soviet bloc specialists and instructors to train the Cuban Red army in its use.

IS THE BUILDUP DEFENSIVE?

The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles and advisory personnel that has gone on in Cuba over the past year cannot be dismissed as purely defensive.

As the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] pointed out last Wednesday, weapons per se cannot be divided into clearly defined defensive and offensive categories. Most weapons can be used for either purpose. It all depends on who wields the weapons and on the intent of the wielder.

No quantity of Soviet arms could give Castro the capability to invade the United States. But accepting this fact, I still say that the massive buildup of Soviet arms in Cuba constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere, and that this buildup must be regarded as an act of aggression and as a prelude to further aggression.

It is an act of Soviet aggression against the people of Cuba, in the sense that it endows the quisling tyranny with greater military power to keep them in subjection.

It is a prelude to further aggression in the sense that the large shipments of Soviet arms which have already been unloaded in Cuba are now being transhipped, through clandestine routes, to Castroite movements in other Latin

American countries, some of which are already openly fielding guerrilla forces.

It poses a distinct threat to the security of the United States in the sense that it gives Castro the military power to overthrow, or repeat his attempt to overthrow, the Government of Panama, thus placing the Panama Canal under the direct control of Moscow. In doing so, Khrushchev and Castro would not stage a frontal attack on Panama; they would attack by proxy, using an indigenous extremist movement as a front, and pretending to the world that the entire action had been initiated by the Panamanian people.

The Soviet arms buildup in Cuba poses a threat to the security of the United States in the sense that it places the Soviet Union in control of territories and of physical facilities which could prove of the greatest strategic importance in the event of a military showdown with the Soviets.

There is a growing feeling in our country, a feeling that cuts across party lines and political labels, that the time has come to face up frankly to these facts. There is a feeling that we cannot afford to delay much longer, because the longer we delay, the more difficult it will be to cope with the problem.

The existence of this popular conviction has been demonstrated by the many editorials and columns in the American press. The temper of the American people on this matter is further demonstrated by the very heavy mail which Congress is now receiving on the subject of Cuba, urging a stronger policy toward the Castro regime. My own office alone has received literally hundreds of such letters and telegrams. One of the chief reasons why I am speaking today is that I consider it my duty to let my constituents know where I stand on this issue.

HOW OUR POLICY WENT ASTRAY IN CUBA

Three and a half years ago, as I pointed out in my opening remarks, the Castro movement consisted of a mere handful of guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. At that time we might have prevented the establishment of a Communist beachhead on our very shores if we had listened to the warnings of our Ambassadors in Latin American countries and of our intelligence agencies. They warned us that, while there might not be conclusive proof that Castro, personally, was a Communist, there was proof that a number of his chief lieutenants were Moscow-trained Communists and that the movement, as a whole, was to a dangerous degree under Communist influence. There were also many things in Castro's personal career, including the leading role he had played in the Bogotá riots of 1948, which at least strongly suggested that Castro himself had ties with the Communist apparatus.

Had we listened to these warnings, we would have striven to bring about an orderly transition from the Batista regime to a democratic and constitutional regime, directed against Castro as well as the extreme right. But, unfortunately, there were those in the State Department at the time who were prone

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to accept as gospel the evaluation of the Castro movement which found its way into the staid columns of the New York Times through the pen of Mr. Herbert Matthews.

Mr. Matthews assured the American public that Castro was not a Communist and that the Castro movement was not Communist-dominated; and Matthews built up a hero image of Castro in which all the virtues of Robin Hood and Thomas Jefferson, of George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln, were combined in a single man.

The American people were fed more of the same hokum over the CBS network in a documentary film prepared by their Cuban correspondent, Mr. Robert Taber. Mr. Taber, who was dismissed by CBS when he was called before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, later blossomed forth as director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a Castro-subsidized front organization which for some time enjoyed a considerable vogue in this country. It also developed that Mr. Taber had a long criminal record, which included convictions for robbery and kidnaping.

Because we were thus misled as to the true nature of the Castro movement, because the reports of our Ambassadors and of our intelligence services were minimized or ignored, because some of the experts in our Latin American division assured their superiors, in almost vehement terms, that there was no proof that Castro was a Communist or that his movement was Communist dominated—because of these things we did nothing to prevent Castro from coming to power in Cuba. Indeed, to the extent that our diplomacy did intervene in Cuba, it intervened in a manner that was mathematically guaranteed to assure the installation of a Castro regime.

The Batista regime crumbled primarily because it was venal and inept and cruel and had lost popular support. But it was American policy that was responsible for the timing of Batista's downfall and for the fact that when he fell, the only man that could fill the vacuum that was thus created was Fidel Castro.

No effort had been made to encourage the formation of a middle-of-the-road alternative to both Batista and Castro.

No effort was made to explore the possibility of an election under OAS auspices, which our Ambassador to Cuba had advocated and believed possible.

As another variant, we might have explored the possibility of democratic reform under a non-Castro regime by stabilizing the situation until President Rivero Aguero, who had been elected as Batista's successor in November 1958, could be formally installed in an inaugural ceremony that was scheduled for February 24, 1959.

But apparently no alternative to a Castro takeover was given serious consideration. Our position was that Batista had to go and go immediately; and if Castro was the only man on the scene able to take over at that time, then the prudent thing to do was to be nice to Castro and to give him a chance to prove that he was basically a "decent fellow."

Because this was our attitude, no effort was made to warn the Cuban people, the overwhelming majority of whom were anti-Communist, of the dangerous degree of control which Moscow-trained Communists exercised in the Castro movement.

When the Castro regime publicly revealed its true colors, a decision was made, during the last months of the Eisenhower administration, to give active assistance to the Cuban opposition in an effort to overthrow the Castro dictatorship. This effort could have succeeded, indeed, I am certain it would have succeeded, had we determined in advance to support the Cuban freedom fighters on their beachhead with American air cover, to assure the success of their undertaking. But in this case, a policy which had been rightly and soundly conceived was, I have reason to believe, undermined by divisions within the ranks of the President's principal advisers.

There was, in particular, great concern that active American involvement in the Cuban invasion would alienate many of the Latin American and Afro-Asian nations and further complicate our position within the United Nations.

With some advisers pulling one way, and some advisers pulling the other way, the Cuban freedom fighters and the cause of Cuban freedom became the inevitable casualties.

The freedom fighters did not receive the air support which had been considered essential to the success of the invasion; and the result was the Bay of Pigs disaster.

THE HIGH COST OF NOT TAKING DECISIVE MEASURES

To overthrow the Castro regime today—I have no illusions on this score—will require a far greater effort than it would have required 1 year ago.

But the cost of overthrowing it today would be infinitely smaller than the price we will have to pay 2 or 3 years hence, when we may very well be confronted not with a single Castro regime, but with some half-dozen Castro regimes scattered through Latin America.

Each year that we fail to face up to the danger of Castroism, the cost of confronting it goes up in geometric proportion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks an article on Cuba written by the distinguished columnist Roscoe Drummond, which appeared in the August 29 issue of the Washington Post. I consider it an article of such significance that I hope all Senators will find the time to read it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DODD. The basic argument of Mr. Drummond's column is that we cannot expect the Castro dictatorship to die on the vine; that while there is hunger, undernourishment and monumental mismanagement under the Castro regime, Castro, despite all this—I quote—"is steadily tightening his grip on the Cuban state and on the Cuban people—with so much Soviet help that he is both ally and captive."

Perhaps the most cogent argument against the "let Castro die on the vine" thesis was made by the internationally famous liberal historian, Salvador de Madariaga, one of Europe's most revered elder statesmen, who for many years played a distinguished role in the League of Nations. Professor de Madariaga makes this statement in his recent book "Between the Bear and the Eagle":

The argument that Castro had better be left alone and given enough rope to hang himself is worthless. the experience of other nations fallen into the unscrupulous hands of the Communist Party allows of no such optimism. Time could only make of Cuba an impregnable base for communism to spread all over Latin America. The Latin American governments who shilly-shally over it are only preparing the rope with which they will be hanged. Castro must go soon.

I concur wholeheartedly in this opinion. If we permit the Castro regime to remain on the Latin American vine, in the hope that it will perish, the chances are that, instead of perishing of its own weakness, it will spread its disease to the rest of the vine.

We have committed ourselves to a massive program, the Alliance for Progress, in an effort to rehabilitate and modernize the economies of the Latin American countries. But this entire program is vitiated from the outset by the mere existence of the Castro dictatorship.

The fact is that we are losing the cold war in Latin America and we shall continue to lose it so long as we use foreign aid, unsupported by vigorous political action, as the chief instrument of American policy.

I have heard from many sources that, in most of the Latin American countries, the Alliance for Progress program is virtually unknown to the man on the streets. True, the intellectuals do know about it; but as things are today in Latin America, the majority of the intellectuals are prone to condemn the Alliance as a device for the enslavement of Latin America by "American imperialism."

We put up money to build schools and combat illiteracy and encourage higher education. But all too often the teachers in these schools and the professors in the universities are members of Communist-dominated unions, who use their American-supported educational facilities to teach their wards to hate America and despise capitalism, and to admire everything that bears the Soviet brand-mark.

A recent survey in Venezuela showed that the percentage of Communist teachers in grade schools ranged from a high of 86 percent in some schools to a low of 33 percent in other schools. It also showed that there were 800 card-carrying students in the engineering school of the University of Venezuela.

In Brazil, according to the newspapers, the Communists also completely dominate the student movement. I quote from a New York Times dispatch from Rio de Janeiro, dated July 23:

The leftist-dominated National Students Union has elected an unopposed list of officers on a platform including opposition to

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the United States sponsored Alliance for Progress.

In Mexico, according to a detailed report I have recently received, the Communists exercise over the teachers' union a degree of control which is nothing short of terrifying.

I want to say a few words about the situation in Brazil, because the dangerous turmoil that today exists in that country is characteristic of much of Latin America—and will, I am afraid, remain characteristic so long as the Kremlin is permitted to maintain an advance base for political and military subversion on the shores of the Western Hemisphere.

President Goulart's government, according to all reports, is weak and divided, and the Communists are gaining influence on many fronts—in the trade union movement, among the unemployed, among the impoverished peasants of northeast Brazil, among the students and intellectuals, in the ranks of government workers, and even in the top echelon of the Brazilian Government.

Although President Goulart during his visit to the United States sought to disassociate himself from his pro-Communist brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, Governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola still remains in office, and his popular influence has, if anything, increased. He has repeatedly called for the expropriation of all U.S. property in Brazil; and on February 16 of this year he set an example for other Brazilians by arbitrarily confiscating all of the properties of the International Telephone & Telegraph Co., located within his state frontiers, offering only token compensation.

It is also significant that the new Prime Minister of Brazil, Dr. Francisco Brochado da Rocha, was Secretary of Justice and the Interior in the government of Brizola at the time when the International Telephone & Telegraph property was expropriated, and he is credited by many persons with having been the actual brain behind the expropriation.

The temper of the statements that the Brazilian people are listening to from their political leaders offers small reason for encouragement. For example, on May 22 of this year, Governor Brizola addressed a group of law students, at a meeting which was generously attended by government dignitaries and members of Soviet bloc embassies. In this nationally televised diatribe, that would have done credit to Fidel Castro, the Governor told his audience that Brazil was being occupied and sacked by the "imperialistic capitalists of the United States."

He said that Brazilians should have the courage to take over U.S. firms in Brazil, to tell Americans to get out, unless they bring their families and children to Brazil and become Brazilians and learn Portuguese.

He also said that one more chance should be given democracy in Brazil. And he served notice on the present government that it must make all the reforms demanded: Change the constitution. Kick the U.S. interests out of

Brazil. Stop the Alliance for Progress—and do it now—or else the revolutionary forces would do it in their own way. And he added that he would gladly accept leadership of the revolution.

There are some who say that we cannot deal with the problem of Castroism in Latin America unless we first deal with the problems of poverty and social backwardness and military dictatorship. I say that the converse is true: That we cannot properly deal with the problems of poverty and political instability unless we first deal with the problem of Castroism. In the interim period, we have no alternative but to endeavor to deal with both problems simultaneously.

It is not true that communism breeds only on poverty and political tyranny. I would point out to my colleagues that the government of Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela is commonly acknowledged to be one of the most democratic and socially progressive in Latin America, that the people of Venezuela enjoy a higher standard of living than any of their Latin American neighbors. But despite all these things—or is it precisely because of them?—the Communists have made the Government of Venezuela their No. one target in Latin America. Under Castroite instigation, Venezuela over the past 2 years has been the scene of riot after riot and uprising after uprising.

Let there be no mistake about it: The mere existence of Castroism makes political stability impossible in Latin America, and makes turmoil an epidemic condition. Fidel Castro, under Moscow's direction, has become both the principal organizer and charismatic symbol of the political and social chaos that today racks the lands of Latin America.

More than one Latin American political leader has faced up to the fact that so long as this turmoil is permitted to exist, there can be no way out but total chaos and ultimate communism. Speaking on August 16, for example, the Argentine Minister of Economics, Alvaro Alsogaray, stated the following:

If there is no political stability, if every day we are threatened by coups d'etat, if at every moment we are fearful that blood is to be shed among Argentines * * * if we look more like an anarchical state than an organized country, then this system of modern free economy with a social distribution of wealth falls at its base, and cannot work. We cannot attract capital under the permanent threat of revolution.

If the economies of Latin American countries are to be developed at a tempo adequate for our times, it will require all the private capital, both domestic and foreign, that can be mobilized and brought to bear on the problem, through political encouragement and economic inducement. But the fact is that, since Castro took power in Cuba, there has been a serious flight of capital from virtually all the Latin American countries, a process of disinvestment rather than of investment. The inroads that Castroism has made in Latin America, the apparent stabilization of the Castro dictatorship, our failure thus far to take any active measures to terminate the problem, have all helped to produce a

great outpouring of "frightened capital," seeking investment in safer areas.

I say that no foreign aid program, no matter how generously conceived, can act as a substitute for private capital. Foreign aid can render support to a program of private investment in the development of backward countries. But one of the prime functions of our foreign aid program, as I see it, is to create a climate that is hospitable to private investment. No sovereign government can be denied the right to expropriate property, in return for proper compensation, if it considers such action to be in the national interest. On the other hand, we must endeavor to set forth the facts about expropriation and the role of private capital to our Latin American friends. We must endeavor to explain to them that expropriation, historically, has weakened the economies of those nations who have practiced it; that it has resulted in an immediate deterioration in the management of the expropriated industries; that it has, at a later date, retarded their modernization and made it more difficult for them to compete in the world's markets; that it has, in effect, killed the goose that lays the golden egg by discouraging further capital investment in these countries.

I am convinced that we can get this across to the Latin American peoples because reasonable nationalists and true progressives have long since come to realize that expropriation is self-defeating. They have come to realize that the welfare of their people depends on their ability to foster a spirit of partnership between their governments and foreign investors, perhaps based on the profit-sharing formula which has now become so widespread.

Expropriation of foreign enterprises today remains the policy of only two groups: the lunatic nationalists like Mossadegh and the Communists. The Communist agitation for expropriation runs parallel to their vicious encouragement of antiwhite terrorism in the countries of Africa. The latter policy is designed to drive the white people physically out of Africa in order to create a political and social vacuum. The policy of expropriation, similarly, is designed to frighten out foreign capital already in the country and to keep away foreign capital that might have come in, for the purpose of creating an investment vacuum and further aggravating the economic hardship and social chaos on which communism batters.

I come back to the point that there can be no serious program of economic rehabilitation in Latin America so long as the Castro tyranny, which is the prime source of the expropriation sickness and of political turmoil in Latin America, is permitted to exist.

I say that the Alliance for Progress and the continued existence of the Castro regime are mutually incompatible—that one or the other will have to go.

THE NEED FOR A LIBERATION POLICY

I believe that the security of the hemisphere demands decisive action to put an end to the tyranny that today oppresses the Cuban people.

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I cannot, however, agree with those who are today urging that we invade and occupy Cuba with American forces.

The call for an American military occupation of Cuba is false in its emphasis and lays us open to unnecessary attack by the Communist and Castroite propaganda apparatus. Because of this, an American military occupation of Cuba, even if carried out with dispatch and efficiency, might very well produce a worsening of the political situation throughout Latin America.

The Cuban people must be liberated from Soviet slavery. The right of self-determination must be restored to them. But the task of liberation must be carried out, in the first instance, by the Cuban people themselves. The role of the United States and of the other American nations must be limited to supporting the forces of Cuban freedom.

There is too great a tendency to accept Communist revolutions as irreversible and Communist regimes as permanent.

Indeed, this assumption somehow seems to have become an essential ingredient of our foreign policy.

It is an ingredient which seems to have had a paralyzing effect on our understanding and on our will.

It is not too much to say that unless we can succeed in shaking off this paralysis, the triumph of the Communist world over the free world is inevitable.

Even those who urge conciliation with communism will not dispute the statement that the Communists seek to subject the remaining free governments of the world by every means at their disposal—by propaganda, by political agitation, by infiltration, by guerrilla action, and, in certain cases, by direct military aggression. Nor would they question the statement that, employing these means, the Communists since World War II have annexed or succeeded in taking over the following roster of countries and territories: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany, North Korea, mainland China, North Vietnam, Tibet, northern Laos, and Cuba.

Rosters of names, I know, make dreary reading. But I do not think it would hurt us to repeat this roster to ourselves at regular intervals.

True, we did succeed in preventing the Communists from taking over in Greece, in Guatemala and in South Korea. But the final outcome of the struggle is a matter of simple arithmetic if the Communists continue to annex new territories while we limit ourselves, at each juncture, to defending sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, what remains of the free world.

I believe that if Communist counter-revolutions are possible, revolutions for freedom are also possible. I believe that if Communist regimes can be imposed on peoples, there are also ways in which these regimes can be deposed. I believe that the entire record of the postwar period, indeed, underscores the vulnerability of Communist regimes and the feasibility of overthrowing them.

The Communist regimes are different from the orthodox tyrannies of the past in the sense that they are totalitarian, that under communism, not merely is opposition political activity proscribed, but every phase of human activity is brought under the control of the all-powerful state.

Wherever they have taken power, these regimes have shown themselves to be monumentally inefficient. That this is so should not be surprising, because the concept on which they are based runs completely counter to the grain of human nature. Whether it is in the Soviet Union or in Czechoslovakia or in China or in Cuba, these regimes have demonstrated an infallible genius for undermining agricultural production by destroying the will to produce of the peasant classes. In the name of creating an ultimate utopia, they have invariably subjected their newly acquired peoples to far crueler economic hardship than they had ever before experienced.

This combination of ineptness and cynicism, of economic hardship and religious persecution and total political tyranny, has, in turn, produced in the countries subjected by communism a hatred more violent and more universal in nature than anything heretofore recorded by history. The phenomenon of total dictatorship has, in fact, produced the phenomenon of the "total revolution," in which entire peoples, including the military forces under supposedly Communist direction, have revolted against their Communist masters.

The French Revolution was opposed not merely by the aristocracy, but by substantial sections of the middle class and, in certain parts of France, even by the peasants.

The American Revolution, in terms of popular support, was at best a majority proposition, with substantial portions of the population remaining loyal to the British Crown, while other portions remained uncommitted.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Communist revolutions that have taken place since that time, were distinctly minority affairs, in which disciplined conspiratorial parties, numbering only a tiny fraction of the total population, succeeded in imposing their will on their peoples by force and by subterfuge.

But there was no such national division at the time of the East German uprising in 1953, of the Polish uprising of 1956, of the Hungarian revolution of October 1956, of the Tibetan uprising of March 1959. These national uprisings against Communist tyranny have been marked by their universal nature, by the fact that in each case the armed forces sided with the people against the tyrants. The report of the United Nations Committee on Hungary, for example, made the point that, when the Red army invaded Hungary to put down the revolution, there was not a single recorded instance of Hungarian fighting against Hungarian. It was the Hungarian people as a whole fighting against the tanks of the Red army.

That the phenomenon of "total revolution" is not a freak or historical accident is further demonstrated by the fact that we have had four such uprisings over the past 9 years. This is all the more remarkable, because in each case these uprisings took place without foreign support of any kind, without internal organization, in the very teeth of the Soviet Army or the Red Chinese army, and without any hope of intervention or military assistance by the free world.

The Polish revolution was frozen halfway because of the massive presence of the Soviet Red Army within Poland and on its frontiers. The East German uprising, and the Hungarian revolution were defeated only by the open intervention of the Red army against the peoples of East Germany and of Hungary. The Tibetan uprising, similarly, was not put down by any Tibetan quisling apparatus; it had to be put down by the overwhelmingly superior military forces of Communist China.

If such a total revolution against communism were to take place in Cuba, however, its immediate success would be assured for the simple reason that the Soviet Union and Communist China would be in no position to intervene in Cuba as they did in Hungary and East Germany and Tibet.

Against this background, Mr. President, I do not think it unrealistic to suggest that we should strive to assist the Cuban freedom movement to build up its forces and to foster the conditions for a total anti-Communist revolution, uniting the Cuban people and the Cuban armed forces against the quisling tyrants who oppress them.

We should not wait for this revolution to take place accidentally or spontaneously. On the contrary, short of open military intervention by American military forces, we should do everything in our power to encourage and to assist the forces of Cuban liberation.

I believe that the proposal of Professor de Madariaga for collective action by the Organization of American States in support of Cuban freedom is the ideal for which we should strive. But if such action cannot be organized, if our Latin American friends continue to shilly-shally, then, as President Kennedy suggested in his historic speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors after the Bay of Pigs disaster, we must be prepared to act alone in support of the Cuban people.

Our patience is not inexhaustible—

Said the President:

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of the Nation.

Like all of my colleagues, I have given much thought to the situation in Cuba. I should like to submit for their consideration a six-point plan of action for the liberation of Cuba.

I submit this plan with no sense of finality.

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I recognize that other and more effective measures may conceivably be devised for coping with the problem.

I recognize, too, the infinite complexities that the administration must take into consideration in determining its course of action.

I believe, however, that in this critical situation, a moral obligation devolves upon the Senate and especially upon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to give this matter their most earnest consideration and to set forth their opinions and their suggestions in the hope that they can thus be of some assistance to the few men upon whom rests the ultimate responsibility of decision.

I believe the first measure we must take is to commit ourselves to a "declaration of independence and freedom for the Cuban people," so that the whole world will know that the decision has been made to completely eradicate the malignancy of Castroism.

Second, I believe that we should inform the Cuban exiles in this country that we are prepared to support the establishment of, and grant recognition to, a broadly representative, provisional Cuban government in exile. If the Cuban political leaders cannot achieve the minimum agreement essential to the establishment of such a provisional government, then I believe that the faculty of the University of Havana, most of which is now in this country, or alternatively, the several hundred members of the Havana Bar Association who have sought refuge here, should be constituted as a provisional government, committed to the holding of free elections within 1 year of the liberation of Cuba.

As a third and immediate measure—in anticipation of action by the Organization of American States—I believe we should invoke the Monroe Doctrine to proclaim a total embargo on shipments of Communist military materials and military personnel to Cuba.

The words of President Monroe never had clearer application than they have today in Cuba.

In his message to Congress December 2, 1823, President Monroe asserted:

As a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by an European power.

We owe it therefore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those [European] powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their systems to any portions of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety—

Monroe said. I ask my colleagues to note carefully the wording of this statement, to note that President Monroe spoke of extending—

their systems to any portion of this hemisphere.

I would also ask them to note with care the words of President Monroe when he said further in his statement that the United States would view as an—

unfriendly act any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them—the Latin American

republics—or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power.

I believe that this wording applies clearly to the situation that exists in Cuba today. I cannot understand, indeed, how my good friend, the distinguished Senator from California, could take the stand that the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to Cuba because the Soviet armaments and Soviet personnel now in that country were there by virtue of an official request from the Government of Cuba. He stated:

The Monroe Doctrine applies to a situation in which a foreign power by force overthrows an established regime in this hemisphere.

As I read the Monroe Doctrine, it applies to "any interposition" for the purpose of oppressing the Latin American peoples or controlling their destiny "in any other manner."

Nor can I understand the legitimacy which he accords the Castro government in his statement. The Castro government was not elected by the people of Cuba and does not represent them. It is not an indigenous government, but a quisling Soviet regime which has been imposed on the Cuban people by deception and by fraud and by terror, and which now maintains itself in power only thanks to the massive presence of Soviet arms.

At the time President Monroe made his historic declaration, the United States was only a minor power compared with the great nations of Europe, and its navy was by no means the first in the world. Today we are indisputably the world's greatest power, while our navy dwarfs the navies of all the Communist nations combined. If the Monroe Doctrine cannot be enforced today to deal with a situation that more clearly violates its intent than has any other situation since its proclamation, then I say that the candid thing to do would be to strike the doctrine from our books.

It is, however, my confident expectation that, with or without the support of our Latin American neighbors, the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine in its specific application to Cuba will be recognized, and the necessary action will be taken to implement it.

In invoking the Monroe Doctrine to prevent the shipment of Communist military materials and military personnel to Cuba we could, I am certain, make it abundantly clear that our action was directed not against the Cuban people but against the Soviet quisling regime. We might even give consideration to substituting a food ship, loaded with American surplus food, for every shipment of Communist arms of military contraband that was turned back.

Fourth, I believe that we should greatly intensify our entire propaganda effort with the frankly declared purpose of assisting the Cuban people to liberate themselves. We must direct this propaganda not merely to the people of Cuba, but to all the peoples of the Americas, documenting the facts about Castro's communism, about the treachery by which he imposed his Communist tyranny on the Cuban people, about the abandoned promises for free

elections, about the catastrophic economic mismanagement that characterizes his regime, about the thousands of Soviet and Chinese experts who are now flooding the country, about the abject economic and political tutelage to the Soviet Union into which Castro has led Cuba.

As a fifth step, I believe we should be prepared, preferably in concert with the OAS nations, to impose a total blockade on all shipments to Cuba, other than shipments of food and consumer goods.

Sixth, I believe we should be prepared to give open and increasing assistance to Cuba's heroic freedom fighters, who are daily defying Castro's execution squads.

I note that there have been some editorials in our country which have explored the action of the group of Cuban refugee students who recently bombarded Havana from makeshift craft that they had sailed from Miami.

According to these editorials, the U.S. Government should now take the most stringent action to prevent any such future expeditions by Cuban patriots operating from our shores. I would point out to these editors that none of them, to my knowledge, made similar protests when the Castro movement was seeking to overthrow the Batista regime, and when agents for the Castro movement were active in this country, raising funds for its support and purchasing arms and ammunition which they sent by plane and by ship to the Castro guerrillas from Florida ports. Indeed, it is amazing, in retrospect, to realize that there was no public protest over the virtually total suspension of American law enforcement when it was a matter of "arms for Castro."

I suggest that it is our moral duty to give the Cuban freedom fighters of today at least the same leeway that we gave the agents of Castro only several years ago. Indeed, I would urge that we not only support the resistance movement in Cuba, but that we openly support the creation of a "Cuban Freedom Legion" in exile, whose ranks would be open to all Latin American nationals.

To be realistic, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of military assistance to the Cuban freedom fighters. But I believe that this is a decision that can only be made at a later date and against the background of a plan of action similar to the one I have here outlined.

Let us not be deterred from a policy of liberation by the fact that the Communist nations and certain of the Afro-Asian nations will scream at the top of their lungs that American imperialism is engaging in military aggression.

It is the Soviet Union which stands convicted of political and military aggression in Cuba, and which, from its Cuban beachhead, is daily practicing political aggression against the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, the Soviets and the Afro-Asian extremists have long ago forfeited all right to protest against unilateral military action.

A free Hungary threatened no one; but, in open defiance of the United Na-

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tions, the Soviet Union sent in an army of 5,000 tanks to crush the Hungarian Revolution in blood and to impose an inglorious quisling regime which could not have mustered a hundred votes in the whole of Hungary.

Goa threatened no one; but, in violation of the U.N. Charter, India invaded and annexed the territory of Goa.

West New Guinea, as a colony of the Netherlands, threatened no one, and the Netherlands Government had already committed itself to a policy of self-determination for the Papuan people. But Indonesia has now succeeded in forcing the peaceful surrender of West New Guinea to Sukarno's imperialist ambitions, flagrantly violating the two cardinal tenets on which the United Nations is founded—the right of self-determination of peoples and the repudiation of force as an instrument for the settlement of disputes.

Let us not be deterred from our commitment to a free and independent Cuba by the hysterical protests of tyrants or opportunists who usurp the name of the Cuban people or hypocritically invoke the United Nations Charter. For I believe that the justice of this policy of liberation will be vindicated by the Cuban people themselves in free elections, under OAS auspices, on the morrow after their liberation.

THE NEED FOR A FREEDOM ACADEMY

In concluding my remarks, I wish to urge that instead of endeavoring to cope with disasters when they have grown full bloom, we must in the future find some way of anticipating disasters and preventing their emergence.

The situation in Cuba today and the ominous rumblings in so many Latin American countries, again points up the dismal fact that the Communists know how to wage political warfare and we do not—that we have been losing the cold war because, in effect, we have been amateurs fighting against professionals.

It was precisely to cope with this deficiency that the Senate, in the closing days of the 1960 session, passed a bill calling for the creation of a Freedom Academy—where research into the entire spectrum of Communist strategy and tactics could be carried out under the direction of the most competent men available from government and from private life; where measures could be devised to meet and contain the Communist offensive and to restore the initiative in the cold war to the free world; and where Americans called upon to represent their countries abroad, either in the service of their Government or in the service of private business, could be schooled in the interlocking complexities of political warfare.

The Senate Judiciary Committee, in reporting this measure favorably, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever introduced in the Congress." But unfortunately, after being passed by the Senate, the bill died in the House because of honest but, I believe, misguided fears that the Freedom Academy, if it were ever established, would be taken over by those who are

soft on communism, or, even worse, by infiltrates.

When the bill was reintroduced in the Senate in February 1961, it was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration at the specific request of the committee chairman and by unanimous consent. I regret to report that, over the intervening year and a half, no hearings have been held on this bill, and chances are that it will not be brought to the floor for public debate before the close of the session.

The establishment of such a training academy has been strongly advocated by nationally recognized authorities in the field of the cold war. For example, the Strausz-Hupe group in their book "A Forward Strategy for America," pointed out that while the United States has established academies to train men for war and a Foreign Service Institute to train diplomats, no comparable establishment trains Americans in the art of psychological warfare.

It is in the field of revolutionary conflict techniques—

Said Dr. Strausz-Hupe and his colleagues—

that the Communists hold a decisive margin of superiority over the Western Powers.

The need for a cold war training institution was also recognized by the so-called Sprague committee, which reported to President Eisenhower just before the close of his term. The committee strongly recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of a National Security Institute which "would provide concentrated exposure to and study of Communist ideology, techniques, and operations, worldwide, as well as our total governmental informational resources, and the best ways to orchestrate and use them."

The need for such an institute has also been recognized and endorsed by the editors of our greatest national periodicals, Life magazine, Saturday Evening Post, and Reader's Digest; by the American Federation of Labor, with its extensive experience in combating communism both in this country and abroad; and by organizations like the Cold War Council, which was founded by members of the ADA, and the American Security Council, whose membership is primarily conservative and big business.

But above all, the need for a Freedom Academy has been underscored by the events that have taken place, at dizzying pace and in so many different parts of the world, since the Freedom Academy bill was first introduced.

There are those who have accused this administration of adhering to a "no win" policy, that is, of not wanting to win the cold war. I believe that this charge is as mischievous as it is false. I am convinced, in fact, that there is no one in this administration who does not want to win the cold war.

The trouble is—and this is a trouble that has been true of every American administration since the close of World War II—that we do not know how to go about winning the cold war.

The trouble is that, while the Communists wage total political warfare, our own conduct is governed by conventional concepts of war and peace; when there is no war in the military sense of the word, we consider ourselves to be at peace and we conduct ourselves accordingly.

The trouble is that, while the Communist training schools every year turn out thousands of professional revolutionaries, some of them specialists in certain areas, others trained as conflict managers, who know how to orchestrate all the instruments of political warfare, the free world continues to believe that traditional diplomacy and a conventional foreign service is all that is necessary to deal with the menace of communism.

The trouble is, in short, that, on the one side in the cold war, there are free world amateurs who look upon the struggle with communism as a phenomenon that can be resolved if we avoid provocation and conduct ourselves according to the Queensbury rules of 19th century diplomacy; while on the other side there is an international conspiracy disposing of tens of thousands of ruthless professionals dedicated to the total destruction of the free world, and nothing less than this.

I plan to speak at a later date on the theme that our chief trouble is that we do not know how to win.

Meanwhile, I would again point to the many ominous signs in the world situation as a reminder that the time has come for an end to amateurishness and an end to innocence.

We cannot afford any more Cuban disasters, or the luxury of performing postmortems for the purpose of discovering how and why these disasters occurred. The politics of hindsight must give way to the politics of foresight.

We must accept the fact of fourth-dimensional warfare, or psychological warfare, and we must equip ourselves with the knowledge and the means and the trained personnel required to meet the Communist onslaught in this dimension.

But above all, we must accept the underlying fact that we are locked in a life-and-death struggle with an enemy of infinite cunning and infinite ruthlessness.

Because the acceptance of this basic fact is the beginning of all political wisdom in the world in which we live today.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from New York.

Mr. KEATING. I am sorry that every Member of the Senate was not present to hear the analysis of the situation in Cuba delivered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut.

The Senator from Connecticut has advanced a program which does not involve armed action against Cuba at this time, action which I think most of us would agree would be a mistake; but he does set forth a six-point program,

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clearly after considerable study. There are two points about the Senator's address to which I should like to add a word.

One has to do with the analysis which the Senator from Connecticut has made of the nature of the weapons which are now located in the advanced Soviet base which is Cuba, weapons which cannot in any sense be considered purely defensive. Whether a weapon is defensive of offensive depends entirely upon the triggerman or the operator of the particular weapon and the person or the nation against which the weapon is turned. True, Mig fighters, tanks, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and torpedo boats are defensive weapons; but they are also offensive if the desire is to use them offensively.

The other point relates to the analysis of the Monroe Doctrine. As the Senator has said, it was contended by the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] and has also been contended by others—and I venture to say that the Senator from California was enunciating the present policy of this administration—that the Monroe Doctrine is not here involved because Soviet Russia was invited to Cuba by the existing Government of Cuba.

Think what that reasoning leads to. It means that in any Latin American country, all that needs to happen is a coup d'etat, following which the government which takes over by force may call in Soviet Russia or Communist China, or some other Communist country; and thereby the Monroe Doctrine will not apply. At present the situation is the Monroe Doctrine minus one country; and the next country which has a coup d'etat will make the situation the Monroe Doctrine minus two. Pretty soon, all that will be left will be the Monroe Doctrine applying to the United States of America.

President Monroe made it abundantly clear that if the Monroe Doctrine is to remain in force—and I do not believe it is the policy of the United States to have it junked—it should cover cases in which our southern brethren—meaning the Latin American Republics—had imposed upon them by force from the outside the ideologies and the principles of a foreign power, which they would not of their own accord adopt. That is exactly what has happened in Cuba. Today Cuba is a Communist state; and communism was imposed upon Cuba by the world Communist movement, of which it is now apparent that Fidel Castro is a part, and admittedly so. Castro and Khrushchev have had the effrontery not only to admit but also to boast that they are making a military base of Cuba and are increasing military supplies and military personnel there.

I believe, as does the Senator from Connecticut, that we in Congress who feel strongly about this situation have a duty to speak out on this question and to be certain that the American people are fully informed about it.

Ours is a government of the people. The American people, if they know all the facts in relation to this situation, will, in my judgment, be able, through their congressional representatives and

in conjunction with the executive branch, to support a conclusion and a solution which will protect the security of our country. I feel that the Senator from Connecticut has today made a significant contribution to that end.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am deeply grateful to the distinguished Senator from New York. As usual, he is very generous.

As I have said openly, my intent was to make a small contribution to the current discussion of this subject. I think the Senator from New York has himself made a most significant contribution to it. All we are trying to do is to think things out and set forth our views.

I am aware that this is a difficult problem. There is no easy solution of it. It is satisfying to know that in this wonderful body we can speak our minds, and perhaps, in that way, help those who have the principal responsibility to make the right decision.

As I have said on many other occasions, I am glad to have the warm and comforting words of the great statesman from New York [Mr. KEATING].

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 29, 1962]

CASTRO NOT DYING ON VINE—FIDEL'S FALL SEEN POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF HE IS PUSHED

(By Roscoe Drummond)

PORT-OF-SPAIN, TRINIDAD.—Nowhere in Latin America have I encountered any support for the wishful thinking in Washington that Castro is going to die on the vine or that the Cuban dictatorship will soon fall from its inner weaknesses.

The prevailing view in the Latin American capitals I have visited is that while conditions in Cuba are getting steadily worse, the Castro regime itself is becoming steadily more entrenched.

One South American newspaper correspondent, who had spent considerable time in Cuba and left only recently, put it this way: "Fidel Castro is proving himself totally incompetent to manage the affairs of his nation, but extraordinarily skillful in managing the apparatus of a police state."

This raises a question of acute importance to policymakers in Washington who are rather counting on waking up some morning and finding that Castro has disappeared in the dust.

QUESTION IS POSED

The question is whether any Communist police state, holding all the weapons of terror and repression in its own hands, can ever be overthrown by a popular uprising armed with little more than sticks and stones.

There is no doubt that conditions are deteriorating inside Cuba. There is clearly developing an angry, resentful, frustrated and humiliated people who, while still passionately supporting the "Castro revolution," are heartsick over what Castro has done to the revolution.

The evidence is mounting that there is hunger and undernourishment. Cuba used to produce food for export and now cannot supply the needs of its own population. Private farmers have no incentive to increase their crops, and the peasants on the state collective farms are wondering when they are going to receive "their land" as promised by Castro. They still can't quite realize that Castro's Communist state has taken over both the land and the peasants to work it.

The situation is so out of hand that you have the upside-down condition of farmers

appealing to the cities to send them food.

Economic aid from the Soviet Union and Red China is failing to live up to promises—even as Fidel has failed to live up to his promises. Castro is finding that Communist bloc assistance—except arms—is not only doled out very carefully, but is also costly. Cuba's slim reserves of foreign currency are steadily being drained away, largely because Cuba no longer has the exports it can sell to the hard-currency countries.

But Latin American sources on the continent are convinced that Castro is steadily tightening his grip on the Cuban state and on the Cuban people—with so much Soviet help that he is both ally and captive.

Castro's armed forces seem to be all that he needs—and more—to prevail over any opposition that might develop. The Soviet Union is stepping up its shipments of arms and thousands of "technicians." Castro has recruited the forces in ample volume. There is every reason to assume that the army is loyal to Castro's bidding. While the regime has been unable to feed his people properly, it has taken care to see that its troops are a favored class. This means that the Castro army is massively armed, well fed, and heavily disciplined for its duty—to keep the dictatorship in control at all costs.

A LIBERAL'S VIEW

A distinguished European liberal who has recently visited Latin America contends that Cuba ought to be liberated by the Organization of American States. These are the words of Salvador de Madariaga:

"The argument that Castro had better be left alone and given enough rope to hang himself is worthless. The experience of other nations fallen into the unscrupulous hands of the Communist Party allows of no such optimism. Time could only make of Cuba an impregnable base for communism to spread all over Latin America. The Latin American governments who shilly-shally over it are only preparing the rope with which they will be hanged. Castro must go soon."

But wishful hoping will not free the Cuban people. Castro will fall—only if he is pushed.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD several articles relating to the Cuban situation.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1962]
RED DECISION TO BOOST AID TO CASTRO IS SEEN

(By Donald May)

The Soviet Union appears to have made a major policy decision to prop up the Castro regime in Cuba and draw it closer to the Communist camp, U.S. observers said yesterday.

Administration officials, who a week ago reported a big increase in Soviet military aid to Castro, gave this updated account of the situation:

Military supplies believed to include transportation, electronics, and construction equipment which had been reported being unloaded at Cuban ports late July and early August, apparently are being transported to sites around the island.

Officials feel it is a pretty safe prediction that the supplies will turn out to include Soviet anti-aircraft missiles similar to the U.S. Nike. The prediction is based on other equipment which has been identified and the fact that Russia has given such missiles to Iraq and Indonesia.

A number of small patrol craft arrived as deck cargo aboard Soviet ships. It is not clear whether they were torpedo boats, as

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reported Friday by Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, Republican, of New York.

ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

There is no evidence yet that Moscow has sent equipment to monitor U.S. rocket launchings at Cape Canaveral, Fla. The electronic equipment which appears designed to bolster coastal and air defenses.

It is "theoretically possible" that such equipment could be used to interfere with ground signals that control the Canaveral rockets. But officials doubt that Russia or Cuba would try this. The United States could retaliate. The result would be a very expensive "rocket-jamming war."

It is considered very improbable that stations located in Cuba could send out signals to alter the course of U.S. rockets. This would mean obtaining the exact secret codes by which the rockets are controlled.

The "most probable" estimate of the number of Soviet-bloc technicians to arrive in Cuba recently is 3,000. It could be 5,000. There is no good estimate of what percentage are military technicians, but probably more than half are.

Though there are still many rumors that the military technicians are "troops" organized into combat units, all U.S. information from "trained observers" indicates the contrary. They are not in uniform and appear to be limited to installing the new military equipment and training Cubans in its use.

Senator HOMER E. CAPHART, Republican, of Indiana, has called for a U.S. invasion of Cuba and KEATING has accused President Kennedy of withholding information about "Soviet troops" from the American public.

Much of the U.S. policy thinking on Cuba recently has centered on the broader trend of Russia's deepening involvement in Castro's affairs.

The Cuban economy is not thought to be on the brink of collapse but it has been going steadily downhill.

SUGAR CROP FAILURE

Cuba's 1962 sugar crop appears to be a failure. The harvest produced 4.8 million tons against an announced goal of 5.4 million tons, compared with a yearly average of 6 million tons over the previous 5 years.

The coffee harvest now underway in Oriente Province may also be in trouble. Because of labor problems, there apparently is a large-scale mobilization of students being carried out by the Government to harvest the crop.

Cuba's Labor Ministry announced last week a freeze on wages and curbs on absenteeism and vacation time. Cuban labor unions have made voluntary sacrifices in the past but this was the first time the order came directly from the Government.

FOOD RATIONS CONTINUE

Food rationing has been in effect since March. The economy also is plagued by lack of consumer goods, inflationary prices, and low production. Foreign exchange is at a new low.

Russia announced last Tuesday that Soviet shipments of economic aid goods to Cuba in 1962 would be twice that of last year. And since much of Cuba's economic troubles come from administrative bungling, some officials believe Russian advisers may now take an increased role in Government management.

In past years Russia has made Cuba pay with sugar for goods delivered. Now, it appears, the Kremlin is beginning to give aid on a pay later basis.

Recent U.S. policy has been aimed at cutting off Cuba economically. The question being analyzed now is whether Russia's substantially increased economic aid can counter the isolation policy by keeping the Cuban economy on its feet.

Many officials still doubt that Russia is willing to launch an all-out aid program in Cuba.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 3, 1962]

SOVIET CUBA TODAY—INSIDE STORY
(By Keith Morfett)

Thousands of strapping young Russians are moving quietly into tented military encampments close to the outskirts of Havana in a vast Soviet buildup that is causing deep concern among diplomats in the Cuban capital.

From 5,000 to 8,000 Russians have arrived so far.

A Western ambassador in Havana told me categorically:

"I have reported to my government, despite all denials, that many of these men are Soviet troops, that they are arriving in increasing numbers, and that this is all part of a carefully planned military operation to underwrite the Castro regime."

Many of the Russians are in their early twenties. All have reached Cuba aboard three Soviet passenger liners.

At the same time, a continuous armada of cargo ships is now stretched out between Russia's Black Sea ports and Cuba, carrying trucks, jeeps, machinery, food, guns—and ground-to-air missiles for Fidel Castro's armed forces.

This much is certain from what I have just seen in Cuba:

No large-scale attempt to overthrow the Castro regime could now be launched by the United States or Cuban exiles without Russian blood being spilled in the process.

I watched the Russians in two separate encampments—after being told they were a "ghost army" existing only in the imagination of Americans.

They looked pretty healthy ghosts to me. Hefty, athletic, and looking a lot better fed than their Cuban hosts, they crowded up to a barbed-wire fence at the first camp I found near the village of El Cano.

They appeared to be members of the kind of unit usually moved in advance of regular fighting troops to set up camps, establish communications networks and accomplish other related chores.

In the tropical heat they looked unhappy and homesick. They had cloth caps and denim trousers and clustered together for comfort like sheep on the range in a rain-storm.

The contrast between the El Cano crowd and the next lot I looked at was so great that it became clear Cuba's Russians fall into two distinct categories.

The El Cano Russians were recruited into "labor battalions" rather like the British Army's Pioneer Corps. They will dig trenches, lay cables, and do all the donkey work.

A few miles away, down a rutted side road the whole countryside was suddenly swarming with Soviets. This time they were obviously on different business. Hundreds of them moved around among military vehicles parked under trees, in fields, alongside hedges, and between row upon row of khaki-colored tents.

Nearby, antiaircraft guns in freshly dug pits were manned by Cuban militiamen. Machineguns were mounted at all approach roads into the camp. By the tasks they were doing, checking their equipment on radio trucks, command vehicles and signal equipment, these Russians appeared to be military technicians such as signal, staff, and electronic engineers.

Out in open spaces around the camp, dozens of them were dressed in identical physical training outfits of the kind troops would wear. They were doing gymnastics

under the direction of instructors. Others were playing volley ball—dressed in the same dark blue trunks and running shoes. Still others were out on an improvised running track.

In every field for a couple of miles around were military vehicles, including some armed cars. Groups of heavily armed Cuban militia patrolled the camp's perimeter.

Many of the Russians at this encampment were billeted in what was the former boys reformatory at Torrens, about 14 miles from Havana. But they had quickly spilled over into tents.

Still more tents were being erected by the Russians as I drove past. Trucks filled with more Russians were rolling in through the bright red dust from the port town of Mariel, where a high wall—called "Little Berlin" by the locals—is being built to screen off the dock area. Three miles from the Torrens encampment in the direction of Havana is a big Soviet vehicle park.

More Russian vehicles are packed in neat rows near Havana's seafont Malecon Drive, behind the American memorial commemorating the sinking of the battleship *Maine* during the war against the Spanish. These vehicles are all painted blue and stamped with the name "Zil."

Down in Havana's dockyards, trucks were leaving the Soviet vessels from early morning until late at night piled high with huge, unmarked wooden crates.

All dock entrances are heavily guarded. Hundreds more military trucks, jeeps, and command vehicles were lined up five deep for quarter of a mile along the street called San Pedro on the Havana waterfront. These vehicles are all marked in Russian "Gorkovskiy Avtozavod" and are being moved quickly to all parts of the island.

The Soviet liner *Gruziya*, yellow hammer and sickle painted on its scarlet funnel, was unloading while I was in the dock area.

In addition to its Russian passengers, the *Gruziya* brought back to Havana hundreds of young Cubans who had been on special courses in Moscow and Leningrad. All carried cheap Russian travel bags which matched their blue uniforms. They were met at the docks by their families. The next day about 2,000 young Cubans boarded the *Gruziya* for the return journey to Russia.

The Cuban Government insists that the young Russians now pouring into Cuba—yet to be seen on the streets of Havana—are all civilians.

The tightest censorship ever imposed since Castro came to power is now operating in the Cuban capital. Extent and scope of the Soviet buildup is being deleted from cable dispatches by military censors.

Twenty Soviet ships have reached Havana Harbor in the last 3 weeks. In addition to the Soviet vessels, a fleet of chartered ships including some flying the British flag are under commission for the Cuban buildup.

Ten more Soviet vessels are at this moment Havana-bound on the high seas. They include the *Ustuzhna*, the *Ivan Polzunov*, the *Usoliet*, and the *Ojotsk*. From Soviet ports also now Havana-bound are the East German *Westfalen*, the Norwegian *Tive Lillian*, the Greek cargo ship *Parnaw*, the Italian *Airone*, the West German *Atlas*, and half a dozen ships flying the Liberian flag.

A number of British vessels are on the way to Russian ports to begin the long haul to the Caribbean.

What is behind it all? It began following the recent visit to Moscow by Fidel Castro's brother Raul Castro, who heads the Cuban armed forces, and Economic Chief Ernesto (Che) Guevarra.

I understand the Cuban Government urged Soviet Premier Khrushchev to provide the revolution's leaders with some sort of

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guarantee that the now openly Communist Cuban regime would not be allowed to collapse in the face of mounting economic chaos and shortages.

The Cubans sought similar guarantees against the possibility of direct American intervention to topple Castro's regime. They suggested Cuba might join the Warsaw Pact.

Instead of a pact, Mr. Khrushchev gave them a promise—and a better guarantee than they had bargained for. "I'll send you Russians," he reportedly said. "What better guarantee could you ask than that?"

While the Russians continue to arrive, Castro is anxious to keep his part of the bargain. This is that no incident of any kind involving the Americans should be allowed to arise while the Russians are still settling in.

This, it is believed in Havana, is why no fire was returned when an exile group steamed into Havana Bay 10 days ago and pumped cannon shells into a seafloor hotel housing Communist technicians. It is also why Fidel Castro not only denied that his ships fired on an American plane last Friday, but also why he was reported enraged at the trigger-happy gunners who allowed it to happen. The Russians want no trouble, not at the moment anyway.

An air of anxiety now pervades Havana. It's as though every one knows something big is about to happen—but no one knows quite what it will turn out to be. The presence of the Russians has given many Cubans a sense of quiet despair. They are convinced that "the Yanks won't come now—it's too late and they know it."

The city itself is almost totally Sovietized. The only hint of efficiency anywhere is in the big bright posters everywhere extolling the glories of the revolution, the workers, and solidarity with the Soviets. The posters are superbly painted and lend the only color to the city of drabness and despair.

During the last few hours before I left Havana, six more Cubans went to the firing wall. Four hundred Cubans were rounded up amid rumors of a plot to topple Castro. Communist newsmen in the city—whose sources are usually good—say they expect a Castro speech soon giving details of how the plot was smashed.

The militia has been mobilized for a week. The food shortage is worsening daily. More Cubans are guardedly critical of Castro than at any time in the past 2 years. They must be careful. The "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution" has its ears on every street and block.

Notices I had not seen before in the bare-shelved shops say "No dogs here—but we have teeth to bite those who talk against the revolution."

All security has been tightened. Every Cuban must now get not only police permission but also clearance from his local vigilante committee before he can even apply for an exit permit to leave the island.

The once elegant splendor of the big hotels is no more. Havana Hilton, where I stayed, is dirty, and everything is breaking down including the bathroom taps. Instead of a menu in the hotel restaurant, two plates of cold food are carted around on a trolley, and guests have to point to the plate they prefer.

At Havana Airport I watched a pitiful sight. Clothes of all kinds taken from departing Cubans as well as other cheap belongings were piled into a big heap. I was taken by militiamen to a small room and searched in case I was taking out anything for Cubans. Rings, watches, family heirlooms, all these must be left behind.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 4, 1962]

UNCENSORED, EYEWITNESS REPORT No. 2.—
LIFE IN CASTRO'S SOVIETIZED CUBA

(By Keith Morfett)

Forty-three months after the sweep of his bearded heroes into Havana from the mists of the Sierra Maestra, Fidel Castro has turned Cuba into a tropical 1984.

The swelling concentration of Russians in camps beyond the capital has coincided, over the last 10 days, with a final, unsecretive, spurt toward total sovietization and the creation of a closed society of 6 million people barely 50 minutes by air from the Florida coast.

All pretense is now tossed aside. Cubans are at last learning the meaning of the Migs in their skies and the "big brother" images of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung that look down from walls, billboards and banners across the islands, towns, and cities.

Before a crowd of Campesinos the other day Fidel Castro, speaking with the simplicity of a schoolmaster addressing children, said: "Put up your hands all those who think they knew what a revolution was 3 years ago?" Not a single hand went up.

Castro said: "Put up your hands, all those who think they know what a revolution is now." Suddenly you couldn't see the heads for the waving hands.

Castro was unquestionably correct as Cubans are just discovering, the revolution was not the mountain battles against the troops of Batista; it was not the heady sense of victory at the seizure of Havana, nor the long, bitter wrangle over taking from America what Cubans considered their own.

The revolution is now. Even the slight degree of cautious gradualism of former days has gone out the window. The Soviets have arrived, and today the curtain is falling on Cuba with a finality that is startling even to many of those once proud of the name, "Fidelista."

From this week on, Cuban citizens increasingly will be prisoners in their own homeland. Exit permits will be hard to get. Every obstacle against leaving is set up.

All emphasis on the country's future direction will be unashamedly Communist. Minister of Industry Ernesto (Che) Guevarra was in Moscow to set the final seal on the massive movement into the Caribbean of Russian personnel, armaments, food and oil that will now form the island's lifeline.

In Sloppy Joe's Bar just off the Prado, where Alec Guinness shot scenes for "Our Man in Havana," I looked across the world's longest bar at the barman with the world's longest face.

"No, senor. No hay beer. No senor. No hay whiskey. No senor. No hay gin. No senor. No hay orange juice."

His face brightened—but saddened just as suddenly with an awareness of the bitter irony of what he was saying.

"Senor, solo Cuba Libre." We both laughed. And he made me up the rum drink that is known nowadays as "Free Cuba."

The bare-shelved shops of Havana are no better. I cannot buy an egg—but I can buy a newly arrived booklet by Mao Tse-tung on "Correcting Contradictions in the Minds of the People."

I cannot buy a beef sandwich or a tin of milk or a pair of shoes—but I can buy a badge with Lenin's head on it or a dozen records of Russian folk songs.

I can make a telephone call, but I must not mind if a vibrant recorded voice comes on before the number goes through, chant-

ing: "You are in the glorious free territory of Cuba. Venceremos [We will win]."

This is the lot of Cubans in Havana and throughout the island.

Cut this Soviet lifeline and Cubans must starve. Attack this island and Russians must die. It is now as simple as that.

I found Havana a strange city. Its streets are almost as free of traffic as a country town on a Sunday afternoon. Its restaurants are dismal, deserted places that you telephone first to see if they have food to serve at all.

Even the fish that abound off Cuba's coasts and the big Morro crabs from Havana Bay are seldom on sale in the city. The fishing fleets are tied up most of the time for "security reasons." And the chances are that if Ernest Hemingway's "Old Man" put out after marlin at the Gulf Stream's edge, he would be blasted out of the water by a Cuban gunboat.

But if Cubans are going short of things to eat, there's plenty of "new thought" to fill their minds. While I was in Havana a new batch of school textbooks, fresh from the printers, was going into the schools. There is a "new" geography book for 7-year-olds. Its author is Castro Cabinet member, Nunez Jimenez. Its title "This Is My Country."

It is superbly printed and illustrated, but all the maps of Cuba and its countryside are inset with little pictures of the revolution's leaders. Its first five pages consist of extracts from Castro speeches and under an early chapter heading, you read:

"Imperialism and the exploitation of the people."

The first grade learns that "in our schools before the triumph of the revolution, Yankee imperialists taught our children the theory that our country, 180 kilometers from United States, would never be able to free itself from the tentacles that imprisoned Cuba. Today, the struggle of the people destroys the lies of the false geography."

After this and other glimpses into the "new" geography in the same vein, it is no longer surprising to come across columns of slogan chanting schoolboys, marching like a miniature militia through Havana's streets.

The Castro revolution is creating its own art, its own music, its own poetry. A new volume of poetry has also gone into the schools. I have it beside me at this moment. Here is a poem written in tribute to Castro troops that fought in last year's disastrous invasion attempt by the Florida-based exiles.

The poem's title: "Bay of Pigs."

"With my useless hands,
That know nothing else but how to write,
I wish to gather your heads,
My brothers, compatriots.
The heads of those who died under a different sun,
The heads that flew to undo the abuses.
And in my being will be your blood,
And the need for avenging your deaths.
Now I do not fear the words:
'Justice'; 'liberty'; 'bread'."

Or this one—the lines of which will soon be known by heart by a million schoolchildren:

"I believe in the life that is to come for all,
I believe in the life that was born out of
the fires of hatred,
I believe in the Communist Party,
I believe in the revolution,
I believe in the budding roses,
And in the peasants of my country."

With this "Orwellian" world, comic contrasts sit strangely in the sadness of its streets.

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Like the stickers on all the buses saying: "Consume the produce of your country"—when Cubans would quite happily consume anything from anywhere to supplement beans and dry bread.

Like the single island of elegance atop Havana's highest skyscraper where diplomats (and an occasional Cuban Cabinet minister) eat duckling while Cubans far below go empty bellied to their beds.

Said one Cuban: "It's way up there in the sky so no one can see what's on their plates."

Like the new tourist literature, superbly done, that claims in bold letters across the front of gay brochures: "Cuba has a flavor all its own."

Like the harmen in the world-famous "Floridita," who have removed the solid gold brooches, shaped into their names, from the lapels of their white jackets.

They stand now before the large lettering along the bar, "Da Cuna del Daiqueri" [the cradle of the Daiqueri] and explain a little sadly: "It seemed all wrong to keep wearing the gold brooches—with customers coming in with open-neck shirts."

Like the taximan who jerks his thumb toward the building that housed the U.S. Embassy and says reassuringly: "I tell you frankly, senior, the Yanquis will be back in there 12 months from now."

But when you hope it will be nice for him he adds, apologetically: "Ah senior, I am leaving soon with my family for Florida."

Through all of this the Cubans have retained their infinite capacity for courtesy and friendliness.

In many visits to Cuba I have never once been treated with discourtesy—despite being taken much of the time for an American. The same applied on this occasion, even though I tried to buy American magazines. The shelves were stacked high with Mao and Lenin, and a flood of Communist-bloc literature.

From the harbor wall where boys still cast for snapper, I looked back before leaving on a city that has worn itself out.

Russians move in by the thousands; but the heady fervor of rebellion has spent its force.

For Havana, 3 years and 7 months later, the "Barbudos" [bearded ones] are but a memory of what might have been.

Nothing is left now but the soldiers * * * and the slogans * * * and everywhere the guns.

[From the U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 3, 1962]

GROWING TURMOIL IN LATIN AMERICA—ARE REDS WINNING?

(Reported from Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, and Lima)

The Minister of Economics of Argentina, Alvaro Alsogaray, gave this gloomy picture of the outlook for his country on August 16:

"If there is no political stability, if every day we are threatened by coups d'état, if at every moment we are fearful that blood is to be shed among Argentines * * * if we look more like an anarchical state than an organized country, then this system of modern free economy with a social distribution of wealth falls at its base, and cannot work.

"We cannot attract capital under the permanent threat of revolutions."

What Alsogaray said of Argentina is basically the case of virtually every one of the South American nations.

In country after country in South America, you find the people grumbling about their governments and demanding a change.

Communists, cashing in on this dissatisfaction in many countries, are making gains, more active than ever. Old-style military men and new-style soldier moderates are pressing for power, seizing it in some cases.

Turmoil is rising fast on this continent. And President Kennedy's plans to modernize

this half of the hemisphere are getting much of the blame—or credit.

Leaders of some democratic governments, on the defensive, are blaming Mr. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress for many of their troubles. They say that the Alliance has raised false hopes of quick solutions to problems rooted deep in centuries of backwardness.

Actually, the seeds of change were taking root in Latin America long before the Kennedy program began, long before Fidel Castro's Communists took over Cuba and reached out toward South America.

Whatever the cause, there is no doubt that the 10 countries of this continent are up against political turmoil generated deep down at the grass roots.

A crisis of authority is paralyzing governments. They are fighting resistance to change by entrenched cliques of wealthy landowners and bankers. They are also fighting off Communists and their allies who are demanding extreme solutions.

It is now a year since the Alliance for Progress went into operation. In that year only 3 of 10 South American countries—Bolivia, Chile and Colombia—have produced long-range development plans as agreed. And there is little sign of the reforms in education, taxes and land distribution which are considered essential to the Alliance.

The shape and extent of the challenge rising from angry people becomes clear in a survey of what is happening inside each country.

Argentine paralysis: Argentina is almost at a standstill. The most advanced country on this continent, Argentina is almost paralyzed by a running battle among its military leaders over what to do about a threatened comeback by the followers of Juan D. Perón, the dictator ousted in 1955.

The new Argentine President José María Guido, has barely survived a military crisis that brought his country to the brink of civil war. It was the second such crisis in his 5 months of office. More trouble lies ahead.

Military men took over last March when President Arturo Frondizi lifted a ban on the Peronists, who promptly staged a startling comeback in state and congressional elections. Guido, then Senate President, succeeded Frondizi. But the real power lies in the hands of the military men, and they are divided.

The military promise elections next year, but Perón's men, they say, will be barred from running candidates. Whoever wins will thus be caught in the same tug of war between the armed forces and Peronists, who dominate labor unions.

In the meantime, things are going from bad to worse in Argentina. Exports are crippled by a meat packers' strike. Living costs are shooting up. The peso is sinking in value. Communists are making common cause with Perón's followers.

Brazil, Reds gaining: The giant among South America nations, Brazil, is up against roaring inflation. Communists are making such gains that many ordinary people in Brazil are beginning to echo the Reds' anti-United States line.

President João Goulart presides over a weak and divided Government. He wants to do away with the present parliamentary system which weakens presidential powers by sharing them with a prime minister. But the political issues are blurred, executive talent is limited, discontent is rising and Communists are gaining positions of power within labor unions and in the depressed areas of northeast Brazil.

Peru, military moderates: A military junta that seized power in Peru in July has gained considerable acceptance by taking a moderate position.

The soldier rulers promise new elections within a year to substitute for recent elec-

tions which the military refused to accept on charges of fraud at the polls.

Peru's economy, compared to that of other South American countries, is in fair shape. Yet more than 6 million of its 11 million people live in poverty, illiteracy, and squalor. Little has been done to help these people, and the Communists are busy among them.

Venezuela, Reds' No. 1 target: As a democratic country which leads all on this continent in terms of social gains made in recent years, Venezuela's democratic Government has become a prime target for Communists.

Under President Rómulo Betancourt, schools are going up, land is being parceled out to those who farm it, low-cost housing is rising in city and town. But lingering recession in some industries keeps the number of unemployed at about 300,000—or 12 percent of the work force.

Venezuelan Communists are trying their best to justify the prediction of Castro of Cuba that Betancourt would be "gone" by the year's end. Reds spearhead the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, control young gangsters at the University of Caracas, stir up revolts in the armed forces, stage bank and store robberies. Jittery Venezuelan businessmen have been exporting their capital.

Chile, a squeeze: President Jorge Alessandri of Chile is caught in a squeeze between wealthy landowners who block reform bills in congress and a five-party Popular Front grouping which includes the Communists and which expects to win the presidency in 1964.

One result of the squeeze has been failure of the government efforts to get more returns from income taxes. But taxes on the U.S.-owned copper companies are rising higher and higher.

Wealthy Chileans are sending their capital abroad in such quantities that reserves of foreign currencies have dropped sharply, and the value of the Chilean escudo has fallen too.

All over South America, troubles of a political and economic nature appear to be rising faster than ever in recent years.

Bolivia, the nearly bankrupt welfare state of the Andes, has been kept going by doses of U.S. aid doled out as direct gifts. Now powerful labor unions are resisting changes in the fantastic featherbedding practices of the nationalized tin mines.

In Ecuador, where the conservatives won a victory in last spring's elections sitdown strikes took over all the private banks in Guayaquil, the country's main port city. Political rioters had to be dispersed with tear gas by police. The chances of getting much-needed measures for land reform seemed slim.

Missing, dynamism: Through most of the countries of South America there is a shortage of dynamism in the democratic systems of government.

Experts of the Kennedy government who surveyed South America's leadership apparently counted on parties of the "democratic left" in various countries to supply the drive to push through reform programs vital to the Alliance for Progress.

Now, it appears, these parties just are not strong enough to do the job. In the recent Peruvian elections, where U.S. officials appeared to hope for a victory by the APRA Party, much of the "reform" fervor appeared to have gone out of that group. Landowners had become APRA supporters, and the relatively moderate APRA program drew less than 33 percent of the votes.

Military men rising throughout South America also are turning out to be a varied lot, no longer predictable. In Argentina the military leaders have so far shied away from taking the Presidential post and left it to a civilian. In Peru, where the military did

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take power, the soldier leaders show a willingness to break with the wealthy defenders of things as they are, display an interest in moderate reform.

Showdowns coming: All over South America there are signs that showdowns are taking shape in many countries. On one side are the Communist-led or Communist-influenced supporters of Castro-type dictatorship. On the other extreme are those who want to turn the clock back. Often the extremists work together to try to upset governments.

Big question in most of the countries of South America appears to be whether dynamic moderates can be found between these two extremes to provide a vehicle for carrying out the reforms which have been promised by the Alliance for Progress.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 1962]

ARGENTINE SPEAKS OUT—TAKES STRONG ANTI-COMMUNIST STAND
(By Jessie Ash Arndt)

WASHINGTON.—Elsie Kasting de Rivero (Mrs. Rivero Haedo) of Buenos Aires is a dramatist, three of whose plays were running there at the same time this season, a novelist—under the pen name of Virginia Carreño—a lecturer on the history of politics and of the theater, but above all, she is a militant anti-Communist.

This tall, handsome Argentine woman—as articulate in English as in Spanish—is convinced that unless the free world makes its influence far more potently felt than it has so far, Latin America will be lost to communism in less than 2 years. She expressed this view at the time she attended the convention of the General Federation of Women's Clubs here in June, en route home from a trip to Asia.

She knows the methods of the Communists (her mother is a native of Latvia) and she sees them being used in her own country. "We talk of the possibility of world War III; this is it," she says. "It is being waged by psychological warfare."

Mrs. Haedo sees evidence of infiltration and propaganda all through the cultural life of Argentina, and in the schools, from the elementary grades to the universities.

In the universities, many of the authorities are avowed left wingers, she says, "and add to this the infiltration in the arts."

DOMINATE THEATER

She stated that the Communists dominate the little theater—and there are 90 or more little theaters in Buenos Aires. In the cinema, the Soviet Union is supplying films free to exhibitors who show these as regular commercial fare to their patrons. The U.S. producers, of course, cannot do this and, unfortunately for the cause of the free world, Mrs. Haedo pointed out, the films they send to South America and other countries usually present the worst phases of American life and give a distorted idea of the United States. With Spanish the language of all the Latin American Republics except Brazil and Haiti, the distribution of subversive materials is relatively simple for the Communists.

In politics, she explained, the Communist aim is to stay in the background but to have many candidates, all of whom respond to the same Communist idea running under different party labels. This keeps the citizens battling against each other for issues that look different but really are merely a smokescreen for the dangerous national trend to the left.

This makes it difficult for good people to go into politics. They are not going to let themselves be destroyed by political campaigns, declared Mrs. Haedo. "We must reassess democracy, not from the legal aspect but from that of the spirit. We used to have in ancient times the 'infallibility' of

soothsayers; then the 'infallibility' of kings; now it is 'infallibility' of numbers.

"Politics seems to have become an extension of the theater arts. We can't choose candidates who haven't the ability to speak or who have the wrong shape of nose."

CHOOSE CANDIDATES

—She pointed out that in small groups it was different. There it was easy to choose good candidates for office. They were known. People knew them and their families, their experience and their abilities, and voted accordingly.

"Also, a free leader must have a free press and other media of communication," Mrs. Haedo said, adding, "there are many Communist papers in Argentina."

Because of her outspoken anti-Communist stand, Mrs. Haedo is labeled in Argentina "a reactionary," she told me, but this does not alter her convictions.

Many Bolivians are now living in exile in other Latin American countries, she said, because Bolivia has already gone so far to the left, but they cannot work effectively against communism while in exile. In Argentina, for instance, they are not allowed to be vocal.

Women have a tremendous opportunity to make the counterinfluence felt, she believes, because of the fact that culture at present is the main field of Communist activity in Latin America.

AGREE ON QUEMOY

Mrs. Haedo was accompanied on her trip to Asia by Irene Silva de Santolalla, who has just completed a 6-year term in the Peruvian senate. "We agreed," she said, "that Quemoy is the frontline of defense for South America. If that were to fall to the Communists, Taiwan were to go, there would be only water between us and Red China.

Despite Communist influence in Argentina, there is an extraordinary project in preservation of Baltic culture going on there, said Mrs. Haedo. Books are being published there in the Estonian language. Manuscripts are sent to Sweden for editing, they are illustrated by an Argentine artist, and the whole put together and published in Argentina.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 1962]

PRESIDENT STATES POLICY—UNITED STATES DRAWS LINE FOR CUBA

(By Bertram B. Johansson)

President Kennedy has, in effect, restated Monroe Doctrine policy in contemporary clothing.

Without referring to the doctrine as such, but touching on matters involving U.S. and hemisphere security, he issued a special White House statement Tuesday evening setting unmistakable limits on possible Cuban aggression in the hemisphere.

The statement was restrained. It was firm. It was explanatory in nature, specifying the nature of Soviet weaponry in Cuba, especially the nature of anti-aircraft missiles, and had several obvious functions.

It was meant to keep the public informed, allay congressional clamor for an invasion of Cuba, warn the Castro regime, and possibly to temper the type of national hysteria that flash-fired in the era of the Spanish-American War at the turn of the century.

CONFERENCE HELD

The statement was issued by Press Secretary (Perre Salinger after the President had conferred for an hour with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, and a bipartisan delegation of Members of Congress.

Though concerned with Soviet arming of Cuba, the operative sections of the Kennedy statement focused, not on the Soviet Union, but on Cuba's intentions.

In effect, the Kennedy statement attempts to pull the Cuban question one step back from the cold-war arena, and place responsibility on Cuba for any aggression in the hemisphere.

RHETORIC COUNTERED

This tact is evidently a counter to Soviet rhetoric and oratory, which in effect constitutes a Soviet "Monroe Doctrine" implying that any "aggressive" move against Cuba would be considered a move against all of the Communist brotherhood of comrades and nations.

"It continues to be the policy of the United States," the President said, "that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or by threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere."

President Kennedy's statement, which will not satisfy those who believe Communist aggression and infiltration in the hemisphere must be stopped now, appealed for consideration of the Cuban question "as part of worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace."

"It must be dealt with," he said, "as part of the larger issue as well as the context of special relationships which have characterized the inter-American system."

The President acknowledged the Soviet Union had provided Cuba with some 3,500 technicians, torpedo boats, and "a number of anti-aircraft defense missiles with slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike."

He said also there was "no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo (the U.S. naval base in Cuba); of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other significant capability in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."

[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1962]

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The year was 1823. Imperialist Russia, filled with ambitions to extend its domain, was pushing its power along the northwest coast of North America. In an alliance with Austria and Prussia, whose territories included parts of what is now East Germany, the Russians were threatening to intervene in revolutions in Central and South America.

In that situation the U.S. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, proposed and the President of the United States, Mr. Monroe, issued a statement addressed to the European powers.

"We owe it therefore to candor," said the President of the United States, "and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portions of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety."

The United States, in those days, was a weak country. It comprised less than half its present continental expanse; it numbered barely 9 million people; it had only a small Navy and less Army. It was certainly no such power in the world as Austria, Prussia, France, or Imperial Russia. And as a matter of fact, in most of the chancelleries of the world there was contemptuous amusement at President Monroe's bold pretensions.

For they were bold. It took considerable courage for the President to act alone instead of waiting for Great Britain, which had suggested a joint statement but somehow never got around to acting on it. Neither Mr. Adams nor Mr. Monroe were quite sure how they would implement their policy if it were challenged by the great powers.

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But believing the step necessary to this country's peace and safety, they did not let uncertainty paralyze their decision.

Those quiet words, shorn of all bombast, served their purpose for 140 years, through many tests, because the world came to believe we meant what we said. The Monroe Doctrine did not keep the United States out of wars. It did assure that no foreign power would come to threaten us upon our own doorstep.

Or at least, the Monroe Doctrine did so until our own day.

It can hardly be a secret to anyone that a new imperialist Russia is extending its system to this hemisphere. The system of the present Government of Cuba is the Communist system. And this week the Castro regime signed a military pact with the Soviet Union in which it is frankly and publicly acknowledged that the Soviet Union will help train and provide arms to the Cuban army.

But a difference between the centuries is that today Secretaries of State and Presidents of the United States have reacted differently. Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have asserted that the Monroe Doctrine is not dead. But up to yesterday neither had chosen to implement it; both have relied instead upon the so-called machinery of the inter-American security system.

That is, the U.S. Government has put its trust in the hope that others will act rather than in acting itself. Where once a weak nation was bold enough to put its shield over the other nations of the hemisphere, a strong nation has hoped that its weak neighbors will somehow rise and shield it from a danger on its own doorstep.

So matters stood until yesterday. Now President Kennedy has issued a statement saying that the Castro government of Cuba will not be permitted to extend its influence further in the Western Hemisphere and strongly implied that the United States will stand by its doctrine of 140 years ago.

Just 2 years—in July 1960—Mr. Khrushchev said the Monroe Doctrine was dead. The President of the United States says it is still alive. Now the problem today, as it was in the days of Imperial Russia, is for the United States to convince the world that it means exactly what it says.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 1962]

CUBA AND MONROE DOCTRINE

(By William H. Stringer)

WASHINGTON.—At his last news conference President Kennedy was asked point-blank what the Monroe Doctrine meant to him in the light of world conditions and Cuba. He replied that it meant the same as it has since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it.

Yet there have been changes. Originally the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral warning by the United States that European powers must not "extend their system" to any portion of the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine told czarist Russia to stop encroaching in the Pacific Northwest. It advised France to quit Mexico in 1865.

Since the good-neighbor policy, the United States has sought more and more to enlist all of the hemisphere's states in the defense of hemispheric integrity. The Rio Treaty of 1947 refined encroachments to include "an aggression which is not an armed attack." At 1962's Punta del Este conference the Organization of American States aimed the broadened doctrine, albeit mildly, at Castro's Cuba, declaring his regime to be "incompatible" with the American system.

The United States has sought to set in motion events that will eventually topple Fidel Castro—embargoing Cuban trade, talking up the Castro menace throughout

Latin America, strengthening hemispheric sinew through the Alliance for Progress (a painfully slow process). Now Moscow has countered the United States threat to the Castro regime with what looks to be massive intervention.

The Soviet Union doesn't care about the Monroe Doctrine. Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev is being bold at Havana as he is at Berlin.

This isn't the first flouting of the doctrine. Napoleon III had a whole army operating in Maximilian's Mexico. But the flouting always ceased, in former decades.

What happens this time, after Moscow has dispatched an armada of ships bearing technicians and service troops, Communist-bloc artillery, and communications equipment, plus supplies for a floundering economy?

The Kremlinologists constantly remind us that Moscow seldom acts from a single motive. We have two explanations for the Soviet move. One is that Moscow cannot afford, in terms of world prestige, to see its Cuban ally collapse in economic chaos. This would be no advertisement for communism.

Ergo, Moscow must sail to the rescue, and with sufficient military equipment to make Senor Castro invulnerable to internal revolt or small-scale amphibious attack.

The other explanation is that Moscow sees a way to make big trouble, close to home, for the United States; sees a chance to fortify a base for revolution that can reach out to all of Latin America; sees an opportunity to build a technological redoubt which can even track U.S. space experiments from Cape Canaveral.

Actually, the weighty probability is that both explanations will prove true. Having moved in to save the Cuban economy, Premier Khrushchev will exploit his leasehold to the full.

The question facing President Kennedy is what Moscow's boosted intervention will do to the "peace and safety" of the United States, which the original Monroe Doctrine was summoned up to protect.

Cuba as a creaking semi-Communist state was no great menace. Cuba as a Soviet-bloc state so heavily armed as to shift the military power balances in Latin America is a much bigger menace.

But if Cuba ever came to mean, to Premier Khrushchev or anyone else, that the United States, for fear of nuclear consequences, would hesitate to act when its "peace and safety" was threatened, then this would be the biggest peril of all.

This latter prospect was directly implicit in the reporter's question about the Monroe Doctrine.

[From the Seafarers Log, August 1962]

NATO GOES CUBAN, MOVES RED CARGO

The current mass shipment of food, arms, and technical equipment from the Soviet bloc to Cuba has been accomplished with the aid of some of the closest allies of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Shipowners in Britain, Norway, and Greece, among other countries, supplied most of the tonnage running to Havana and other Cuban ports. The "emergency" shipments were made necessary by Cuba's failure to provide enough of the necessities of life for her people, under the present Communist system. President Kennedy disclosed that the United States had discussed the Cuban shipping excursions by NATO country shipowners and said he would make every effort to have them curtailed.

The move by our allies to ship Communist supplies to Cuba is considered a direct contradiction of NATO policy, which is to stand firm against the Communist menace. Any weakening of this structure could have severe repercussions to the Western World.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the continuing issue in Cuba, as Marguerite

Higgins has so succinctly put it in her latest column "is not whether the Soviet-supplied missiles are offensive or defensive or whether Soviet officers are in Bermuda shorts rather than battle gear," but whether or not our policy of hesitation and restraint is not encouraging the Soviets to press harder.

The same sentiments, in effect, were expressed by Robert Frost on his return from the Soviet Union, when he said:

Khrushchev said he feared for U.S. modern liberals. He said we were too liberal to fight. I suppose he thought we'd stand there the next hundred years saying, "On the one hand; but on the other hand."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record the perceptive article by Marguerite Higgins.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RUFFIANSHIP VERSUS RESTRAINT

(By Marguerite Higgins)

WASHINGTON.—The key issue in Cuba is not whether the Soviet-supplied missiles are offensive or defensive or whether Soviet officers are in Bermuda shorts rather than battle gear. The issue is whether American policies of so-called restraint tempt the Russians into putting on more pressure everywhere or whether U.S. restraint will be rewarded by Soviet restraint.

So far, President Kennedy, with, of course, the most honorable of motives, has most often taken the advice of those officials who counseled caution even at the price of letting the Russians get away with a slice here and a slice there of the U.S. world position in areas ranging from the Far East to central Europe to the Caribbean.

The President himself at a press conference stated part of the rationale for this attitude by indicating that America had to be cautious in Cuba because action against the Communist incursions there might result in Soviet counteractions in places like Berlin.

But what a tragedy if, for example, the initial slowness of American reaction should prove one day to be the factor that decided Khrushchev to authorize a new era of brinkmanship in Berlin by threatening to use the missiles newly emplaced along the Western air corridors to the city.

And with a new crisis boiling up, it seems important to bring to the surface what has been known for several months to insiders in Washington. This is that Americans of great stature, both in and out of Government, Democrats as well as Republicans, are now asking whether President Kennedy will preside over the decline of America as a great power.

Perhaps this seems unduly alarmist at a time when America is so psychologically attuned that headlines give greater attention to a "satisfactory conversation" between the American Secretary of the Interior and the Premier of the Soviet Union than to dispatches from Berlin saying that Russians have riddled an American military car with 40 machinegun bullets.

But nonetheless the question is being asked and soon, it can be predicted, will be put on the public record because the men involved know that the issues are too crucial to go undebated.

Indeed, some of President Kennedy's advisers most closely connected with the Berlin situation feel that in the coming months the United States is risking the most serious—and needless—confrontation with the Russians in Berlin because this country—not just in Europe but also in Cuba and elsewhere—has not faced up to the possi-

bility that inaction vis-a-vis the Russians often runs greater risk than action.

As President Kennedy himself once remarked, atmospherics have their uses, and the time to send sharp diplomatic protests to Moscow, to summon the Soviet Ambassador for stern confrontations, was at the beginning: That is, at the moment that the first Soviet ship of the recent armada (which everybody knew was on the way) headed toward Cuba in July. The long silence on this score plus official attempts to play down the importance of it all was an invitation, the argument goes, for Moscow to believe that America was looking for a way to evade the challenge.

Moscow's reaction, of course, was very ungentlemanly. For instead of playing Washington's game, Moscow threw its challenge contemptuously in America's teeth by openly announcing to the world that it was sending military personnel and supplies to Cuba. There is a conviction in many responsible quarters that a straight and tough stand from the beginning would have greatly inhibited the Soviets—and still might. Nonetheless, it is a great mistake to rule out publicly whatever means might be necessary to curb Soviet intrusion, including a blockade and all that flows from that. How can promises of any sort of immunity help but embolden such an opponent?

For Robert Frost spoke true and well in Moscow when he described Premier Khrushchev as both a ruffian and a great man. Ruffianism has never been inconsistent with greatness, and the gentlemanly approach to international politics has never impressed the Bolsheviks.

Indeed, just 18 months ago, Premier Khrushchev created a stir in diplomatic circles by this remark on Cuba: "How am I to believe that Kennedy is serious about Berlin when he permitted the failure of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs? After all, Cuba is at America's own back door." This was, of course, a conversational probe and Khrushchev later indicated he did not subscribe entirely to his own thesis.

But here in Washington, advocates of a firm line earnestly warn that nothing less than the future of this country is at stake unless President Kennedy becomes convinced of this proposition: That the risk of counterpressure to Soviet thrusts is less than the risk of doing nothing because the greatest danger is that the next time Khrushchev says America is afraid he might really believe it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the middle of the front page of the Baltimore Sun of today, Monday, September 10, 1962, is an article entitled "Russian 'Horse Trade' Hinted—KEATING SAYS United States May Be Eyeing Cuba-Berlin Deal."

I should like to read excerpts from the article, as follows:

Senator KEATING said today "a horse trade" with Russia in Cuba and Berlin may be in the wind and branded it as a betrayal.

Further:

KEATING said reports circulating here "suggest that the Soviet Union may want to put Cuba and Berlin up on the auction block together for a diplomatic deal that would make some of our most hard-boiled negotiators blush."

And, again:

"In brass-tacks language," he said, "it would mean that Premier Khrushchev has told President Kennedy, 'you lay off on Berlin, we'll lay off on Cuba. But if you press us in Berlin, then we will put the screws on you in Cuba.'"

KEATING said, "the United States may well be toying with some Soviet deal to link the two," adding:

"In some of his most recent utterances, the President has spoken of the two crises in the same breath and has in effect urged a 'wait and see' attitude."

KEATING said the United States must make clear to the people of Cuba and the people of Berlin and to people everywhere, "that no such deal is in the cards."

The article was sent out by the Associated Press, and I assume it was published in other newspapers throughout the country.

Mr. President, these references in the morning's press to statements, purportedly made by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], to which I have referred, and which use such words as "deal" or "a horse trade" between the United States and Russia over Berlin and Cuba must, I think, be discussed on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, the Senator from New York is a most responsible Member of this body whose understanding of foreign policy problems is deep and far reaching. He knows, for example, the difference between a fact and a rumor in the international situation. He knows that a sense of discernment between fact and rumor is essential if Senate discussion of foreign policy is to help to minimize rather than complicate the enormous burdens which the President bears in these matters. He knows, further, that President Kennedy did not create either the present Berlin situation or the present Cuban situation; that both were in existence long before he took office. He knows, too, I am sure, that the President is doing the best he can to deal with both issues in a way which safeguards the Nation and the interests of all of us. He knows, finally, that the President, as we all are, is most concerned that American lives not be expended unnecessarily through rashness or error in Cuba or Berlin.

Knowing how deep is the sense of responsibility of the Senator from New York, and his utter lack of partisanship where matters of great national concern are involved, I am somewhat at a loss to understand the news reports in this morning's press about a deal with Russia over Cuba and Berlin.

I am not quite sure what kind of a deal could be involved; but the Senator must know, since he speaks of it. It appears to be a most serious deal. And since the Senator from New York has referred to it, and the Senator is a most responsible man, I presume that the report has a serious foundation. It is always possible, of course, that the Senator was merely speculating on possible developments in a grave situation. The press may have misinterpreted his speculation. What was the Senator's fancy may have become fact by the peculiar chemistry in which the press sometimes indulges.

But I would most certainly like to know from the Senator from New York himself whether such was the case. If he was speculating, that would be an end to the matter.

But if the Senator from New York was doing more than speculating, if he knows of a deal involving a "horse trade" on Cuba and Berlin, that is a completely different matter. I am sure that the Senator from New York would agree that this is critical information of the greatest importance to the Nation. I am sure, too, that the Senator from New York would agree further that the President should also have access to this critical information and its source, since the President, beyond talking or speculating, has the responsibility for decisions involving the very lives of Americans with respect both to Berlin and Cuba, as well as elsewhere. So I would ask the Senator from New York, whether or not he has specific information that a deal is being worked out, or is even being seriously contemplated, involving some kind of trade as between the situations in Berlin and Cuba; and, if so, can he give the Senate the details and his source of information?

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Montana, our majority leader, whom we all deeply respect.

The news account to which he has referred, referred to a television program in Buffalo, in which I was very careful to say that the linking of Cuba and Berlin as a deal was a rumor which was prevalent in Washington; and I am sure the distinguished majority leader has not in these remarks for the first time heard the rumor that such a deal might be made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I must admit in all honesty that I have never heard of a "deal" being made relative to a combination of matters affecting Cuba and Berlin. Of course I have heard the President and Members on this floor, the present Speaker included, in discussing the Cuban situation, mention the fact that the responsibilities of the President were worldwide in nature; in addition to having to keep an eye on Cuba, he also had to watch conditions in Berlin, in southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and in the Far East, in the region of Formosa, as well. There are other points which could be mentioned.

But I must admit—and I say this most sincerely—that I have never heard of any kind of "deal" which would affect the interrelationship of Berlin and Cuba, insofar as the policy of our President is concerned.

Mr. KEATING. Of course, Mr. President, I accept as a fact the statement of the majority leader.

If the word "deal" were not used, perhaps the majority leader has previously heard the rumor that these were all part and parcel of one proposal.

Perhaps it would clarify the situation to include following my remarks excerpts from such respected publications as U.S. News & World Report and the Northern Virginia Sun which include just such

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reports. I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the two articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From U.S. News & World Report]

War over Cuba, involving the United States with Russia, is moving closer, now that the Soviets have an advanced military base just off the coast of Florida.

President Kennedy, on September 7, asked Congress for authority to call up to 150,000 reservists. Main reason: The Russians' move into Cuba.

Soviet submarines, based on Cuba, are expected soon to lie athwart strategic lifelines of the United States to the Panama Canal, to the oil and raw materials of South America, ready to help Castro's Reds move to the mainland.

Missile-carrying Soviet submarines, based on Cuba, would threaten U.S. cities. Cuba, military leaders say, is an ideal base for high-accuracy missiles that can cover the heart of the United States.

In late 1959, long before the armed power of the Soviet Union moved into Cuba, Samuel Flagg Bemis, professor of diplomatic history and inter-American relations at Yale University, wrote an article for U.S. News & World Report. Professor Bemis, an outstanding authority in his field, warned that Communist power established in the Caribbean could "tip the balance of power fatally against the United States in the present deadly crisis of power and politics which we call the 'cold war.'"

With Cuba as a Soviet base, the United States suddenly finds itself engaged with threats from the four points of the compass—from Cuba on the south and along the Atlantic seaboard, from Russia against Berlin and Western Europe on the east, from Russia over the North Pole, from Russia and Red China to the west. Mr. Bemis warned in 1959 that "we simply cannot allow that to happen."

Now that it has happened and that the Soviets are involving the United States on a fourth front, the whole problem of Cuba is taking on a new dimension—one that admittedly is far more dangerous to the security of the United States than at any time in the past.

A POLICY THAT FAILED

Soviet power, now firmly planted in the Caribbean, marks the collapse of a U.S. policy followed since Cuban exiles were allowed to invade Castro's Cuba without air cover or support in 1961.

American policy, up to this month, had been "to allow Cuba to wither on the vine." U.S. officials talked until recent days of isolating Cuba.

The idea at the highest level of the Kennedy administration has been to base this country's Cuban policy on the premise that the dictator of Cuba, in the end, would fall as the result of an economic breakdown.

Soviet boss Nikita Khrushchev, by throwing in economic aid to bolster Cuba's economy and military aid to stiffen its defenses and give the Reds striking power, has countered that U.S. policy. Castro, in effect, is covered by a Soviet guarantee against failure.

If a military base for communism located within 90 miles of Florida is to be removed, as officials talking privately see it now, the removal will have to be accomplished by military means.

Here again, however, President Kennedy finds himself boxed in by Khrushchev, now that Soviet power has been taken to Cuba.

The box: Let the United States make a move against Castro in Cuba, and Khrushchev will heat up the Berlin crisis, move into Laos, strike at Iran or into the Middle

East. Chinese Communist will move against Formosa or prod North Koreans to move into South Korea.

With Khrushchev of Russia and Mao of Red China working together during a Cuban showdown, the United States could find itself swinging in all directions.

Cuba under Soviet domination is described by military men as throwing the United States off balance.

SOVIET BUILDUP

Armed forces within Cuba are gaining substantial strength.

President Kennedy himself, on September 4, reported that the Russians without doubt have put ground-to-air missiles similar to the early U.S. Nike-Ajax into Cuba. Mr. Kennedy also confirmed that there are now Soviet-made torpedo boats with ship-to-ship guided missiles in Cuba.

In addition, Castro has at least 60 operational Mig fighters, Soviet-made tanks and Russian 122-millimeter artillery plus other guns in quantity, modern antiaircraft guns, considerable numbers of Soviet jeeps and trucks, quantities of radar and other electronic equipment. Small arms, including the latest machineguns from Communist Czechoslovakia and ammunition for such arms, have been supplied in quantity.

Main factor in Soviet aid, as confirmed by the President's statement, is a minimum of 3,500 Russians, described by British newsmen in Cuba who saw them as "brawny young men * * * tanned * * * fit and constantly in training." An eyewitness report by one of the British observers set the number of these Russians at "from 5,000 to 8,000."

Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, Republican, of New York, said that there were 5,000 Russian troops—not technicians—already in Cuba.

Such doubly confirmed reports, differing only as to the number which admittedly is growing day by day as Soviet freighters and personnel carriers arrive in Cuba, appear to be in line with earlier reports of Khrushchev's personal pledge to Raúl Castro, brother of Fidel. It supposedly was made to Raúl on his visit to Russia some months ago.

The Cuban, Defense Minister in his brother's dictatorship, asked Khrushchev to take Cuba into protection of the Warsaw Pact grouping. Khrushchev is said to have replied: "I will do better than that. I will send Russians to Cuba."

There are no reliable reports as yet that nuclear warheads or long-range missiles capable of delivering them on U.S. cities have been placed in Cuba. Chances are, experts say, that Khrushchev would insist on keeping such weapons aboard Russia's nuclear submarines, which, however, could use Cuban bases.

Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, summoned the Ambassadors of the Latin American countries to the State Department on September 5 to give them information gathered by the United States on the flow of Soviet military personnel and materiel to Cuba.

President Kennedy, in his statement of September 4, declared that if there were aggression from Cuba against any other part of the Western Hemisphere, then the United States would act. Threat from Cuba, as the President interpreted it, should be dealt with "as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace."

Present policy of the United States, as it appears to the world, is to accept the buildup of Cuba as a Soviet base without using military force to prevent that buildup. Policy now is to avoid shooting.

With the Russians thus established on an island base within the Western Hemisphere, however, there are real chances of serious incidents. The U.S. base at Guantanamo is

in more danger. Trouble for Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, and other countries on the Latin American mainland is more likely than ever.

WHAT IT WILL TAKE

Congressional leaders, by September 7, were agreed it might take U.S. military action in Cuba to remove the threat to U.S. security. Republican leaders urged legislation giving Mr. Kennedy authority to make what military move he deemed necessary. It was then that the President asked authority to call 150,000 reservists.

If it comes to a fight to oust Castro's dictatorship, the conflict may be bloody. U.S. soldiers in Cuba would find themselves up against not just Cuban Reds, but Russians too.

War over Cuba, discounted by administration leaders until recent weeks, has been brought closer by Khrushchev's act of moving Soviet arms and military men into an island of the Americas.

[From the Northern Virginia Sun]

ALL TRAFFIC HARASSING EXPECTED; 1961 NOTE WARNED UNITED STATES ON CUBA

(By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott)

The East Germans are expected to soon begin harassing the allies' Berlin air traffic with newly installed electronic counter equipment.

These electronic devices, similar to those being installed in Cuba, are showing up along the three air corridors linking West Berlin to West Germany.

U.S. Intelligence estimates warn that the ECE stations are being readied to blockade the corridors by jamming the guidance control systems of allied aircraft flying into the big Tempelhof Airfield in West Berlin.

By really intensive use of these and other methods, the East Germans, if backed by the Soviets, can effectively block the corridors according to U.S. military experts. Planes flying these airways because of bad weather in the fall and winter months must depend about 80 percent of the time on radio guidance from ground control stations.

Already the Soviet puppet East German regime is preparing to justify this warlike takeover by listing the corridors as East German Republic airways in documents circulated to all countries recognizing the Communist government.

Copies of these explosive documents, obtained by U.S. intelligence agents are being carefully examined for their full significance by State Department experts on East German-Soviet affairs.

One opinion of these experts is that Soviet Premier Khrushchev is planning to use the East Germans to touch off a brandnew war of nerves over West Berlin to determine if the United States will stand firm.

Also that Khrushchev will link the East German blockade of the corridors closely with the use of ECE measures against U.S. planes flying over and around Cuba.

THE SECRET NOTE

Although the communication was never made public, Khrushchev sent a blunt note to President Kennedy in April 1961 threatening West Berlin if the United States used troops against Cuba. This alarming note was delivered to the White House on the weekend before the ill-fated Cuban invasion.

A congressional source, who knows the whole story about the note, says that it scared McGeorge Bundy, the chief foreign policy adviser in the White House, into prevailing on the President to call off U.S. air strikes planned to help the Cuban rebels bomb out Castro's air force on the invasion eve.

This could explain why such a note was not made public—because it would make

Americans begin to think what quid pro quo guides our foreign policy.

It might also shed new light on why Khrushchev is so boldly sending "an estimated" 20,000 military "technicians" and "advisers" to Cuba without fear of U.S. counter military action.

These new Soviet threats are one of the reasons behind Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON's trip to Turkey, Greece, and Italy. He is obtaining assurances from Western leaders of these NATO allies that they will support U.S. military action if necessary, to break any Communist air blockade.

Before leaving on this trip, Vice President JOHNSON told a small gathering at his home that both President Kennedy and he expected Khrushchev to move against West Berlin last year.

He said this estimate was the reason why President Kennedy called up Reserve units to buildup U.S. forces in Western Europe.

NEW CRISIS BREWING

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now believe that 1962 is the year that Khrushchev may try to force the West out of West Berlin. This military evaluation is supported by a Swedish intelligence report that Khrushchev is planning to create an incident and use it as an excuse to send Soviet troops into West Berlin.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from New York will yield at this point, I would say he is correct in that respect. I have heard mention of Cuba, Berlin, southeast Asia, the Middle East, and whatnot, all together. So mention of them has been made, but never, to the best of my knowledge, with the connotation of a deal attached.

Mr. KEATING. The distinguished Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE]—who replied, one day last week, to an address which I had previously made about Cuba, and whose address has been challenged today by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DOBB] on important, vital particulars—stated, as a part of his address, that when President Kennedy was asked about a statement made by the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], calling for a U.S. invasion of Cuba, to stop the flow of Soviet men and supplies, the President said:

The United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, which are very sensitive, and, therefore, I think that in considering what appropriate action we should take, we have to consider the totality of our obligations and also the responsibilities which we bear in so many different parts of the world—

Adding:

In response to your specific question, we do not have information that troops have come into Cuba.

That was on August 30.

In the text of the statement which the President made on Cuba, this statement was made:

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of the larger issue as well as the context of the special relationships which have characterized the inter-American system.

The fact that the majority leader, who so ably and so loyally represents the administration on this floor, has made the statement which he has—namely, that there is no relationship between the

two—is exactly what was asked for by me in the same television address, as the first and foremost point:

First and foremost, we must make clear to the people of Cuba and the people of Berlin and equally clear to all the peoples of Latin America and the peoples of Germany and Europe that no such deal is in the cards.

The objective of these remarks and others which the Senator from New York has made has been to stiffen our position with regard to Cuba and to say to the President and the administration that there is backing in the Congress for a more vigorous position, a harder position, with regard to the Cuban situation, and, indeed, as regards Berlin.

Both Houses of the Congress, in my judgment, will respond to keeping Cuba and Berlin entirely separate and distinct, and in not making a concession on one in order to get a concession on the other, and in standing absolutely firm on Berlin, and at the same time in taking more vigorous steps than any which have been taken to date to prevent further shipping of military equipment and military personnel into Cuba.

The Senator from New York is well aware of the problems which the President faces, and it is not his desire to add to those problems.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. In just a moment.

The responsibility of the President is to make the final decisions; and it is an awesome responsibility in the face of world events as they exist today.

I thank my friend and colleague from Montana for his reference to the fact that I have tried to be responsible.

I have been critical, but I have tried to be responsible in such criticism. I shall continue to be, but I shall not hesitate to speak out at any time when I feel that additional facts should be brought out.

I again express my gratitude to the Senator from Montana for the manner in which he has raised this question, and the reassurance—which is the important thing—which I consider implicit in his remark to the effect that no deal or arrangement has been made, or, indeed, will be made, to trade off anything to do with Berlin against anything to do with Cuba.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly at that point?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am indebted to the Senator from New York for his clarification of the news story. There is no deal affecting the interrelationship of these two areas, Cuba and Berlin. I express the hope that, if anyone ever suggested such a possibility, he would immediately contact the President of the United States, who is, of course, in charge of our foreign policy, and who, I think, would be most happy to set the record straight on any occasion when such a situation was placed before him.

Mr. KEATING. When I received a call from the Secretary of State this morning, that is exactly what I said to him—that a statement by the President or the Secretary of State to the effect that these

are not part and parcel of one transaction, to be traded off against each other, would be the very best way to set the record straight. I still think it would be. But the fact that the distinguished majority leader has made this statement on the floor gives me great confidence that that is the situation.

Let me further say that I recollect when I approached the State Department in mid-August asking for a report on the Soviet landings, I received, after 2 weeks, a reply that was so uninformative as to be virtually useless.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am pleased that the Senator from New York has had this colloquy with the majority leader growing out of the telecast program that he has already explained to the Senate; but I would like to make these comments, if he would permit me to do so, apropos his observations.

I assure the Senator from New York that President Kennedy does not barter freedom. Freedom is not for barter, and it would be unthinkable that President Kennedy for a moment would relate Berlin and Cuba for negotiating purposes in any negotiations with Russia.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, I want to say that the President of the United States has no intention whatsoever of linking the two in any negotiation, because the two could not be linked without just such ugly rumors as the Senator said he heard arising in Washington—namely, that the President of the United States is bartering freedom.

I would have us all remember that in the very critical situation involving Cuba there must be complete unity among us in supporting the right arm of the President of the United States. In the very delicate and difficult crises that exist around the world, it is very easy, I think, in the field of semantics, to link Cuba and Berlin; but they are unlinkable in that each crisis involves its own set of facts.

I say to the Senator from New York and the American people that they can rest assured that the President of the United States does not trade off freedom in any negotiation in any field of foreign policy.

My subcommittee is maintaining very close contact with this administration. For example, Monday afternoon at 4:30, we are to have a conference with the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Ambassador Morrison. Tomorrow, we will meet with other State Department officials on the same subject. As chairman of the subcommittee, I have taken the position from the very beginning of this crisis that we must be kept informed with regard to what is going on. I think we are. The Senator from New York and the American people can rest assured that these crises are being considered in their separable, individual natures, and they are not being considered in any negotiating package. Let me assure the Senator from New York of that fact.

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The Senator will share my point of view that the time has come when we must ascertain the position of our associates in the Western Hemisphere, members of the Organization of American States, as to what the course of action should be, if there is to be joint action, in regard to the threat of the establishment of a Russian-Communist beachhead in Cuba. I think there is grave danger that such a beachhead might very well be established.

One of the most delicate problems we have—it is very risky even to comment on it publicly, but it should be commented on—is the problem involving the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is not dead, but I do not think the Monroe Doctrine is the doctrine it was when it was first established by the United States, or when we enforced it 50 or 75 years ago. In part—and note my language—it was established in order to guarantee to our neighbors to the south of us that we would protect them, as well as ourselves, from any possible over-running of them, or any one of them, by a foreign power.

We carried that out, although, as we know, the historians have written that in the early decades we carried it out through the British fleet. After all, our great ally, Great Britain, enforced the Monroe Doctrine for a good many years, in that other foreign nations knew if they sought to exercise any extraterritorial ambitions over Latin America we would stand firm on the Monroe Doctrine but the Monroe Doctrine would, in those days, be enforced by the British fleet.

A great many changes have occurred since the initiation of the Monroe Doctrine. For example, the section which declares that we will not become involved in European affairs is a completely dead letter. Insofar as it relates to this hemisphere, it is a two-pronged doctrine; and let us never forget it. It is a doctrine in which we made clear that from the standpoint of our own national security we did not propose to have foreign powers establish extraterritorial rights in the Western Hemisphere. But we also said we were opposed to that because we were going to protect our neighbors to the south who, in that time of history, were exceedingly weak nations and could have been easily overrun if they could not rely upon their great neighbor to the north to come to their defense and assistance if necessary.

In our conferences in Latin America for some time past we have found that the attitude of our Latin American friends today in some instances is not the attitude they adopted at the time the Monroe Doctrine was first initiated. This is a delicate subject, but some of them have taken the position—and it is well recognized—that any carrying out of any policy of the Monroe Doctrine as originally contemplated by the United States, so far as Latin American countries are concerned, would have to be done with their complete consent, cooperation, and association. In other words, the Latin Americans question the right of the United States to take the position that it can say to any foreign power, "Your relationships with country

X, Y, or Z in Latin America are going to be determined by the United States."

So we enter into areas of conflict, which require the exercise of very delicate diplomacy.

During World War II, we negotiated a series of treaties and declarations by Western Hemisphere nations which sought to make incursions by Axis Powers into the hemisphere the subject of combined opposition and resistance by the signatories.

We sought, in other words, to enforce the Monroe Doctrine not unilaterally, but through hemispheric action.

That is how we changed the concept of the Monroe Doctrine during World War II relative to the German-Italian-Japanese axis.

Since then, we have done much the same thing relative to communism. We have held a series of conferences in an effort to keep communism out of this hemisphere not simply as U.S. policy and by U.S. action but as a policy and action of the OAS.

I do not know of any country which signed the act of Punta del Este which would not want to cooperate with us in stemming the establishment of communism in Latin America by way either of a beachhead in Cuba or of a Communist taking over of X, Y, or Z country in Latin America, for there is a recognition that if that should happen in Latin America to one country, or to two or three, it could very well extend through the hemisphere.

There have been in the press some rather excited editorials whose writers have not taken into account that the Monroe Doctrine today is not the Monroe Doctrine established by President Monroe, because of these changes in the attitude of some of our Latin American friends in regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to certain types of facts now. I only mention it in passing in this discussion, because it ought to be noted in the Record.

So the senior Senator from Oregon believes our subcommittee ought to know what is going on within the Organization of American States and within the council of the Organization of American States. To that end I asked Ambassador Morrison this morning if he would make himself available to give us a very informal executive briefing in regard to the Organization of American States, as we have a right to ask. He has the privilege of giving it or of not giving it. I am sure he will give it.

We have asked officials of the State Department—either the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs—to give us a briefing tomorrow in regard to this whole issue vis-a-vis Cuba and other Latin American states.

I appreciate the generosity of the Senator from New York in letting me make these comments at this length. I am about through. I felt that in the midst of this colloquy with the majority leader I owed it to my administration to make the statements I made.

I close by saying that I want the American people to know that they have every reason to place complete faith in the President of the United States, ir-

respective of their partisanship relative to this Cuban crisis, for the President of the United States has not placed Cuba and Berlin on the barter market.

The President is seeking to defend freedom both in Cuba and in Berlin on the basis of the facts involved in each crisis, and they are different in some respects. The common objective is not different; it is our policy in both places that freemen are not to be overridden by communism without American support of freemen. We intend to support freedom where freemen are willing to stand up and fight for freedom.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, it is very heartening to have this additional assurance from the distinguished Senator from Oregon, who acts as the chairman of the important subcommittee dealing with Latin American affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and to hear from his lips the assertion that no effort will be made to relate Berlin to Cuba in connection with any negotiations.

I hope that when the President is asked again about the situation he will make that very clear. If he is going to say that the United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, and if he is going to say that the Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace, then the very delineation which has been made by the Senator from Oregon might be added, in order that it might be made perfectly clear to the American people—because I am sure that is what they want—that there is no negotiation as between these two situations, and there will be no concessions made on the one issue in order to get concessions on the other.

I also wish to make it clear, knowing the President of the United States, having served with him, that there is not one doubt in my mind for a moment as to his intentions, his patriotism, or his desire to do the right thing under the circumstances. If these colloquies serve no other purpose, I hope they will serve the purpose of making it clear to the President's advisers that the Congress is behind the President in any decision which he may make which is a firm one, a solid one, one in which interests are not pitted off one against the other.

I commend the Senator from Oregon for his action in trying to get from the members of the Organization of American States some information as to what their attitude will be. That is very important. We should make every effort to proceed in concert with our friends of the Latin American Republics. When I made four suggestions the other day, the second suggestion was that we try to do that very thing. The Senator from Oregon is on the right track on that point.

I must add one word about the Monroe Doctrine. It is now undergoing a reinterpretation. Before the Senator from Oregon came to the Chamber, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] was speaking on that subject. I think perhaps the Senator from Oregon did not hear him. The Senator from Connecticut said that if we say that the Monroe Doctrine does not apply, per-

haps in all candor we should say that it no longer exists. In a colloquy with reference to the Monroe Doctrine I said that I think it applies in Cuba. I do not think it is an answer to say that the Cuban Government invited in the Soviets, and therefore the Monroe Doctrine does not apply in a case in which a country invites in a foreign power. If we are going to accept the Monroe Doctrine as President Monroe enunciated it, I point out that he expressly covered such a situation as that. He said that some foreign power might try to impose upon one of our southern brethren—meaning one of the Latin American Republics—a form of government they did not want.

That is exactly what has happened in Cuba. If we say that Cuba is out, and we now have a Monroe Doctrine minus one, then if there is a coup d'etat in some other country and that country calls in Soviet Russia, the Communist Chinese, or some other power, then we will have a Monroe Doctrine minus two. Are we going to keep the Monroe Doctrine alive? Certainly the American people look upon it as a very important part of our policy. If we are going to scrap it, ignore it or completely reinterpret it, I think we must make clear what we are doing. I do not think we can interpret it in such a way as to keep it viable, and say that it does not apply if a country invites in a foreign European power or an outside power no matter what the government is that is established there, whether it is the will of the people or not.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am glad the Senator from New York has raised those points, because I would be completely misunderstood, or I would have completely failed to present my view if I read in the RECORD any statement that would be subject to the possible interpretation that the Senator from New York may be making of what I have previously said here this afternoon.

Certainly Cuba cannot determine whether or not there is a Monroe Doctrine. Certainly country X, that may invite in Russia, cannot determine whether there is a Monroe Doctrine. I am talking about free nations in Latin America. I only wish to point out that we have to be very careful that we do not make an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine applicable to them on a unilateral basis, for they are very sensitive now about the Monroe Doctrine, as to whether or not we are going to speak for countries X, Y, and Z, which are free countries, and not Communist countries. That is why I have urged that if there is an application of the Monroe Doctrine, we ought to do it in concert through the OAS with our free neighbors to the south of us.

I should like to make the point as clear as I know how to use the English language, that, Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine, we have a duty to protect our own security. If the establishment of a Russian beachhead in Latin America for offensive purposes threatens the security of the United States, then no matter how many nations in Latin America or who in Latin America feels that we should not protect our own security, they

must be ignored. But that has nothing to do with the Monroe Doctrine, I respectfully point out. That has to do with the responsibility of our Government to keep America secure from the danger of a Communist beachhead so close to our shores that our own security may become endangered.

I made that comment in effect the other day on the floor of the Senate when I was discussing that problem much more briefly with the colleague of the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVIRS]. I say nothing here today that I did not intend to make clear the other day, except I did not go into that detail.

If the Senator would permit me, I should like to ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, after the Senator's comments, that part of a lecture that I gave at the University of Arizona at Tucson some months ago, in which I discussed some of the problems involving the Monroe Doctrine.

Taking what I have said here this afternoon plus the lecture which I gave at the University of Arizona at Tucson, there could not be any possibility of anyone misunderstanding the position of the senior Senator from Oregon on this very delicate subject, unless one merely wishes to misunderstand it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following the speech of the Senator from New York my lecture at the University of Arizona at Tucson some months ago dealing with the Monroe Doctrine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit I.)

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his contribution. I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT I

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA
(Remarks of Senator WAYNE MORSE at the 1962 International Forum, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., Feb. 22, 1962)

In a despatch to the American Ambassador in London dated July 25, 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney set forth a classic of extreme interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. "Today," he said, "the United States is partially sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

The basic fact of our relations today with Latin America is that we are abandoning the "Olney doctrine," and returning to a much more literal and genuine interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, at least to that part of it which related to the Western Hemisphere.

What, after all, did the Monroe Doctrine really say? Certainly it scarcely resembled what the Secretary of State enunciated as our hemispheric policy in 1895. It actually had two parts, one covering our relations toward Europe, and the second covering our relations with other nations in the Western Hemisphere. Too many Americans have rather conveniently forgotten that one part of the Monroe Doctrine declared, and I quote: "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations

by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none."

And again: "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."

This resolve on our part to refrain from participating in the affairs of Europe is a dead letter. But what of that section of the Monroe Doctrine relating to the Western Hemisphere? It declared, and I quote: "That the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." And again: "But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

The 1962 Declaration of Punta del Este was a much better restatement of the Monroe Doctrine than the Olney dispatch of 1895.

The United States is no longer "practically sovereign" in the Western Hemisphere.

Our relations with Latin America have been radically altered by two revolutionary changes since the end of World War II. The first of these has been the emergence of the United States from the confines of the Monroe Doctrine than the Olney dispatch of 1895. The second great change has been the emergence of Latin America into the mainstream of world history, or, more precisely, the awakening of the long-quested peoples of Latin America to the great social forces—communism, democracy, and, above all, nationalism—that in our time have aroused all the people of the non-European world. Thus it may be said that while the United States has emerged from isolation to join and lead a worldwide community of wealthy and long-established democratic states, the nations of Latin America have emerged from isolation to join the new countries of Asia and Africa not in a community but in a common revolution. It is a revolution conceived in economic deprivation and political humiliation, nurtured by the force of nationalism and soaring hopes of economic advance, and dedicated to the goal of securing for themselves decent, dignified, and rewarding lives as modern nations.

Both the United States and the Latin American Republics came into their new roles with unresolved dilemmas and anomalies. The ambiguity for the United States was its failure until very recently to adjust the regionalism of the Monroe Doctrine to the new globalism of the problems that confront us.

While we spent billions to rebuild Europe, and more billions to help the new nations of Asia and Africa, we said to Latin America: "We are not going to help you, and under the Monroe Doctrine, we are not going to let anyone else help you, either."

Latin America came into the modern world afflicted with an even greater dilemma—the deep contradiction between the language of democracy and progress, and the reality of oligarchy and reaction that have conditioned the political life of Latin America since the days of Simon Bolivar.

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"Democracy," said Benito Juarez a century ago, "is the destiny of future humanity." But the history of Latin America has, with rare exceptions, belied that destiny and an angry and aroused generation of Latin Americans now demands an end to the ancient hypocrisy and immediate efforts on the part of their governments to achieve performances that match their promises.

The Mexican writer and diplomat Octavio Paz (currently in the Office of External Affairs, Mexico City), expressed the basic contradiction incisively in an essay on the character of his country. "The liberal and democratic ideology," he wrote, "far from expressing our concrete historical situation, obscured it. The political lie installed itself almost constitutionally among our countries. The moral damage has been incalculable and reaches into deep layers of our character. Lies are something we move in with ease. During more than a hundred years we have suffered regimes of brute force, which were at the service of feudal oligarchies, but utilized the language of liberty."

Such considerations as these—too briefly defined—condition the relations between the United States and Latin America in the 1960's. The problem for both the United States and Latin America is to devise a hemisphere policy in a global context. I should like now to examine some of the elements that might comprise such a policy.

The basic policy of the United States toward Latin America today is to foster both security and progress in the shortest possible time. The Alliance for Progress has belatedly been recognized as a vital modern implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, along with the establishment of the Organization of American States, and the declarations that first nazism and later communism have no rightful place in the inter-American system.

The success of the Alliance for Progress, given the explosive social forces at work in Latin America today and our woefully belated willingness to come to grips with them, is problematical. Its conception and intent, however, are wisely attuned to the realities of the 1960's, to the need for a hemisphere policy in a global context.

The Alliance for Progress represents for the United States a new form of "intervention," an intervention in depth to cope with deeply rooted social and economic ills of Latin America. Before commenting on some of its problems and prospects, I should like to reexamine briefly the traditional concepts of intervention and nonintervention in relation to the new forces at work in Latin America.

Today's problem of nonintervention, simply stated, is whether the Organization of American States can or cannot intervene in the affairs of one of its member states in order to forestall intervention from beyond the American continents that threatens the security of the entire hemisphere.

The question is a simple one but any answer to it is enormously complicated by the fact that to the Latin Americans "intervention" is not an abstract concept but an historical experience deriving principally from their relations with the United States. It is not difficult to understand that, for deeply rooted historical reasons, the Latin American reaction to Soviet intervention in the hemisphere is conditioned by the experience of American intervention.

The attitude of the Latin Americans toward intervention by the United States is by no means one of unambiguous hostility, as is widely believed. It is rather an ambivalent attitude, depending upon the cause for which intervention is undertaken. In recent years there has been a steady procession of Latins coming to Washington to petition for U.S. assistance for overthrowing Batista or Castro in Cuba, Trujillo in the

Dominican Republic, or some other Latin American ruler. To these exiles—of whom the most conspicuous at present are the large number of refugees from Communist Cuba—the doctrine of nonintervention in itself has no appeal. It is their contention that when we withhold assistance we are in effect intervening on the side of entrenched regimes. The United States is thus doubly damned, regardless of its acts or omissions, and I think that those well-meaning persons who suffer excessively from flagellations of conscience over our deviations from nonintervention would do well to face up to the fact that the United States cannot avoid playing a major, and often decisive, role in the affairs of the Latin American Republics.

"The moral here," as one perceptive student of Latin American affairs recently put it, "is that a great power such as the United States necessarily intervenes in the affairs of other countries, especially smaller ones, as much by what it does not do as by what it does. A policy of nonintervention, if that term is interpreted in the strictest, most liberal sense, becomes plainly impossible. The question, therefore, is not one of intervention or nonintervention per se, but of the ends and means of intervention."

Latin antipathy to intervention derives directly from the historical fact that most of the interventions of the past have been by the United States and for ends and by means that most Latins find objectionable. American interventions, it is widely believed—and not altogether inaccurately—have been designed to protect American business interests. Few Latin Americans are aware of the preeminently strategic considerations centering on the security of the Panama Canal that motivated the repeated interventions in Central America and the Caribbean in the first three decades of the 20th century—the only large-scale sustained interventions in which the United States has engaged.

An even more subtle ambivalence characterizes Latin American attitudes toward the problem of Communist intervention and subversion. Most Latin American governments are able at present to deal with the hard core of Moscow-trained Communists operating within their own frontiers. Soviet intervention in Cuba is another matter. While Castro has proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, many Latin Americans, persuaded that he has the support of the Cuban people, are disposed to accept his open espousal of Marxism as an alarming but nonetheless legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination. This consideration is coupled with the sensitivity and fear of many Latin American governments to widespread and volatile fidelista sentiment in their own countries. One can express satisfaction, and even surprise, that the Punta del Este Conference went so far as to deprive Cuba of participation in the Organization of American States.

The compelling question at this juncture is the degree to which the governments of Latin America are prepared to tolerate the efforts of the Castro regime to subvert the legitimate representative governments that now prevail in most of Latin America. There can be no question that some progress was made at Punta del Este when shipments of arms and other implements of war from Cuba to subversives in other countries of the OAS were embargoed. Another measure to forestall intervention from Cuba was the setting up of a five-man committee of experts on how to combat subversion.

In the past there has been a tendency to regard intervention by the United States as intolerable and Communist intervention with indifference or only mild concern. The Alliance for Progress, and the excesses of the Castro regime, are bringing about a slow but discernible change in these attitudes. In due course these trends may be expected

to generate new attitudes toward intervention, more favorable in regard to the United States, and more realistic in regard to Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The Alliance for Progress and the Cuban revolution represent two forms of revolution, which are engaged in a sustained contest for prevalence throughout Latin America. The Cuban revolution aims to impose a new form of tyranny on the peoples of the American republics, by consent if possible, by force, demagoguery, or subversion if necessary. The Alliance aims to generate the means for creating a decent social and economic life for all Latin Americans under free institutions.

It represents a new form of intervention in depth, designed to cope with ancient social and economic ills and to recast the societies of Latin America. I should like, in the remainder of these remarks, to consider some of its problems and prospects.

The basic problem of the Alliance for Progress is to carry out a social revolution with due process of law.

The social and economic problems that oppress Latin America are nothing less than staggering. It is highly unlikely that even a generation of concerted effort will overcome Latin America's grievous mismanagement and entrenched selfish interests, its political factionalism and racial, class, and national animosities. What is new in Latin America is not the existence of these ancient evils but the eruption in recent years of massive forces of popular protest and social discontent.

The social and economic grievances of the Latins can be indicated by a few facts and figures:

The feudal land system created by the Spanish conquerors has persisted with some modifications to the present day. Three-fourths of all of the arable land in the entire continent is owned in the form of vast latifundia by 2 percent of the people. The result is the desperate "land hunger" of the millions of dispossessed.

Industry and commerce, the mines, oil fields, and other monagricultural assets, when not owned by foreign capitalists, are dominated by a small oligarchy of great wealth, some of whom are also owners of latifundia. Taking all forms of wealth together, it is estimated that 50 percent of it is owned by only 2 percent of the people.

Over half of the people of Latin America are undernourished and over half are illiterate. For lack of schools and teachers, millions of children are deprived of even rudimentary formal education.

With an average per capita income of only \$289 a year, levels of material consumption are far below the minimum required for a decent life by even the lowest income groups of Western Europe or North America.

In addition, Latin American is beset by a population explosion, with the result that per capita production of wealth has not only stopped growing but appears to be declining. Latin America's population, now 200 million, is increasing at a rate of about 2½ percent a year, the highest of any major region in the world. Over 40 percent of the population is under 15 years of age, with the result that the economically productive portion of the population must support a greater inactive proportion than those supported in more advanced countries.

The Latin American oligarchies bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the grave inequities of Latin American societies, although the harshest and most violent expressions of popular wrath are directed against foreigners. The latifundia are often inefficiently run and underproductive and land reform is probably the most explosive issue in Latin America today. Few of the landed oligarchy have shown any willingness to part with any of their property. Land is a form of wealth that is virtually tax free;

by ancient custom the tax rates on land are very low and by ancient custom even these low taxes are commonly evaded. In fact, tax evasion by the rich, whatever their source of wealth, is so common as to be regarded almost as a prerogative of their station.

Another compelling economic problem—I can mention but a few—is the lack of desperately needed investment capital. Commercial interest rates range from about 12 percent to an illegal but not uncommon 35 percent. While Latins complain, often with justice, of American companies sending their profits home, a substantial amount of Latin America's own capital has been sent abroad—perhaps as much as \$10 billion—by wealthy Latins who refuse to invest in their own countries because they fear revolution and, in their fear, so act as to make revolution more likely.

Still another source of grave economic maladjustment is the heavy dependence of the Latin American economies on single commodity exports, coupled with the fact that world market prices for most of these commodities have fallen seriously in recent years. Brazil, for example, derives 53 percent of her total export earnings from coffee. Some other figures for export earnings are as follows: Venezuela, 92 percent from petroleum; Colombia, 77 percent from coffee; Bolivia, 62 percent from tin; Ecuador, 57 percent from bananas; Chile, 63 percent from copper. Latin American countries are pressing the United States to enter agreements for the stabilization of raw materials export prices, especially for coffee, and it can be readily seen that such arrangements would constitute a significant form of assistance to the Latin American economies.

Probably the most pressing long-term need of Latin America is education, and the expansion of educational facilities and opportunities is quite properly one of the central objectives of the Alliance for Progress. Fifty percent of the children of Latin America have no schools to go to and only 20 percent of the pupils who attend primary schools are able to complete the full course. Standards of education must also be raised by improving methods and teacher training and adapting curricula to the pressing needs of a continent undergoing social transformation.

Another focus of effort under the Alliance program must be housing. The majority of the population of Latin America still live in rural areas but in recent years movement to the cities has proceeded apace and there now exists a terrific disproportion of people living in urban areas. There are thousands of families in Lima, Peru, for example, some 30 percent of the total population of the city, living as squatters under the most wretched conditions, and the same is true of Bogota and of many cities of Brazil. While few of the Latin American Republics can afford to invest great sums in low-cost housing programs, more can be done than is now being attempted. There are great numbers of unemployed whose only capital is time—time which, properly utilized and directed, can be used for the construction of housing.

The most explosive question remains that of land reform, the reshaping of the vast, inefficient latifundia. It is estimated that per capita production of food in Latin America today is slightly lower than it was 25 years ago—not very much lower but it has got to be a great deal higher if living standards are to be raised to a tolerable minimum.

The solution is not necessarily in all instances the breaking up of the latifundia into tiny parcels. The great estates in Haiti, for example, were broken up into postage stamp plots and in two generations the land became barren because of poor conservation practices. Both Mexico and Puerto Rico have had considerable success in operating large farm units as cooperatives. The over-

riding needs in land reform, regardless of what form it takes, are efficient operation and democratic participation by those who for so long have been deprived and dispossessed.

The task of the Alliance for Progress in the face of these staggering problems is, in the words of President Kennedy, "to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspirations for economic progress and social justice can be achieved by free men working within a framework of free institutions."

With an objective of social revolution without violent upheaval, the Alliance exceeds in scope and design the postwar Marshall plan for Europe, whose objective was one of restoration.

The extent to which it succeeds or fails will probably also be the extent of success with our modern version of the Monroe Doctrine.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN ROBERT FROST AND KHRUSHCHEV

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the American people should be indebted to Mr. Robert Frost for the very candid observations he has made in a news conference on his return from a recent visit to the Soviet Union and an hour-long conference with Mr. Khrushchev. In a few brief comments Mr. Frost has summed up the essence of the U.S. domestic and foreign policy and has given the American people a clear understanding as to why we are losing the cold war, why we are drifting toward socialism in our domestic program, and why we are trying to force socialism on foreign countries through our foreign-aid program. He reports that Mr. Khrushchev thinks we are "too liberal" to defend ourselves.

Mr. Frost's quotes on his impressions gained from his conference with Mr. Khrushchev are quite revealing and to the point. He is quoted in a UPI dispatch from New York this morning as having said:

He [Mr. Khrushchev] said he feared for us because of our lot of liberals. * * * He thought that we're too liberal to fight. He thinks we will sit on one hand and then the other.

Mr. President, is that not exactly what we have been doing in our reactions—some too late—to Communist aggressive acts in the cold war? This is the essence of our no-win foreign policy—do nothing for fear we may cause an aggressive Soviet act to escalate into a nuclear holocaust in which we will all be incinerated. We are paralyzed by fear.

Mr. Frost's remarks point out that Mr. Khrushchev is convinced we will not fight because our "liberal" leaders are hoping for an accommodation with communism by heading our country in the direction of socialism—which Mr. Frost is frank to say he feels is best for the world. I have stated in speech after speech that the essence of our policy in the cold war is that we will move in this country toward socialism with the hope that Messrs. Khrushchev, Castro, Tito, and Mao Tse-tung will "evolve" in part toward the western position by installing a few incentives and easing restrictions on individual freedoms.

Reading on in the UPI dispatch from New York as published in the Washington Post of this morning, Mr. President,

we find that Mr. Frost seems to share the idea of the "evolution" of the two systems. Here is the rest of the article:

But Frost brought back a feeling that both Soviet and United States Governments were growing more alike each day—each moving toward a center ground.

Frost said that he could notice the humanizing of Soviet life in Russian poetry, "I said to them that you could tell from their poetry that they were humanizing a little down from the severity of their idea—easing off toward democracy. They let me get away with it," he said.

"I am not a Communist and I feel it quite hard to strain up to socialism. I go slow about it. I drag my feet. But I have about decided that socialism is the only way to handle the billions being born now." Frost said.

"I see that ahead, but I'll be dead by then. I told the Russians that they're easing down to socialism and we're straining up to it."

Describing the 10-day visit as "the time of my life," Frost confirmed that Khrushchev gave him a message for President Kennedy during their talk. He declined to say what it was. Asked when he planned to see Mr. Kennedy, he said, "I don't plan. I wait for the President."

Frost said he regretted that he referred to Khrushchev in a Moscow press conference as a ruffian.

"I should have modified that a little and said rough and ready, not ruffian," he said. "Ruffian is a pretty strong word."

Frost, who continued on by a connecting airline to his home in Cambridge, Mass., denied that he read his poem, "Mending Wall," during his visit to embarrass the Russians about the wall in Berlin.

"Everybody asks me for the poem," he explained. "If I don't do it I get blamed."

He did liken the concept of a wall to current Soviet-United States relations, however.

"All life is cellular," Frost said. "Even the Communists have cells. All cells are a matter of walls breaking down and renewing."


"That's what happens after a war—new boundaries and a danger of new wars," Frost said.

Frost who said he did not discuss Cuba with Khrushchev, was asked if he planned to return to the Soviet Union, where he went this time at Russian invitation.

"Some day," he answered. "I said I would be back when I got older and wiser."


Mr. President, our no-win foreign policy is responsible for our plight today in Cuba, where a strong Communist military arsenal is being built to establish communism firmly throughout the Western Hemisphere, and in Berlin, where we are being constantly squeezed by the Communists to get out and forfeit the Western World's greatest outpost of democracy—and possibly all of Germany.

I have stated over and over again, Mr. President, that the American people must demand a change in our foreign and domestic policies if we are to win in this struggle which the forces of world communism have forced on us. Many in this country—and many in this body—have bought the so-called sophisticated approach to foreign policy and domestic policy on the basis that we must be modern in a modern world and that we must not provoke a nuclear holocaust in the atomic age. We have found, however, Mr. President, that the "sophisticated" policies have brought us the greatest debt load any nation has

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ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
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ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
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file: Intelligence Activities - Cuba 		
FROM: O/DDCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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