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PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

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
INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
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The United States entered World War II with:

- a. No intelligence on enemy air or ground order of battle.
- b. No detailed reference material on enemy armed forces such as weapons, insignia, fortifications, and documents.
- c. No detailed topographic intelligence for landing operations.
- d. Insufficient facts -- but plenty of opinion -- on which to base strategic estimates.
- e. No trained personnel for either strategic or combat intelligence.

Fortunately, our allies were able to provide us with some already prepared intelligence on which we initially had to depend for our current intelligence requirements. Even so, it was not until late 1944 that a reasonably effective intelligence machine had been developed.

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There are three requisites which logically must be accepted as the basis for a required peacetime intelligence organization:

a. It should produce strategic estimates which figuratively speaking, are "better than 90 percent correct."

b. In our smaller world, global coverage is essential.

c. The intelligence service must be on an M-day basis.

The size of an army has no effect on the problems of peacetime intelligence production. In peacetime, the scope of intelligence is wider because we do not know who will be our future enemies, and we must amass the factual information on areas which we cannot enter during hostilities. Also peacetime diplomatic considerations frequently present barriers to the collection of information. This brings us to the point where we must outline:

a. What should be the minimum products of a global intelligence service for the army.

b. The present status of production.

c. Improvements required.

d. The number and quality of personnel needed.

The minimum products of a global intelligence service should consist of the following:

a. Complete and up-to-date compilations of pertinent factual information on all countries, provided by:

- (1) A compilation of factual intelligence on all factors in the war potential of a given country -- in the shop this is referred to as Strategic Intelligence Digests. They are maintained in loose-leaf form at research desk levels, and form the primary basis for the production of all intelligence. Plan-

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ning for the digests is completed; implementation is in its initial stages.

- (2) Detailed descriptions of all military organizations, weapons, tactics, etc., of the major powers, referred to as Military Handbooks. Only the U.S.S.R. Handbook is in production and is nearing completion.
- (3) Special Studies on national, regional, and global subjects of strategic importance, such as weapons, transportation, key materials, and armament industries. An initial program of 40 studies has been established by the War Department Intelligence Plan, of which 2 have been produced.
- (4) Analytical topographic surveys of critical areas of the world -- referred to as JANIS (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study). They present all the necessary detailed topographic intelligence upon which may be based a plan for military operations in the subject area. Only 24 of a possible 200 have been produced.
- (5) The compilations of factual intelligence pertinent to strategic targets throughout the world are referred to as Bombing Encyclopedias. The Intelligence Division must procure the information for Army Air Forces to produce the encyclopedias. Plans are now being formulated for the production of this vital intelligence. The Intelligence Division has available in usable form less than five percent of the information required for a bombing encyclopedia on the U. S. S. R.

b. The final step in the production of intelligence is a Strategic Intelligence Estimate. It is the most authoritative interpretation of the capabilities of a given foreign nation to prosecute war. Strategic Estimates at the present time are inadequate in that they are not based upon a comprehensive compilation of authoritative factual intelligence. This will be made available only after Strategic Intelligence Digests are produced.

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An intelligence production machine to a large measure is helpless without an information collecting service. The efforts of such an agency must be directed by a War Department Intelligence Plan and must utilize all sources of information -- official, published, private, and secret.

Official sources of information are military attaches, missions, observers, and other government agencies.

Specific measures required to exploit official sources of information are:

- a. A prescribed course of research training in the Intelligence Division for all outgoing field personnel.
- b. Assignment of civilian research analysts to tours of duty at field stations.
- c. Close and constant guidance of field effort through the War Department Intelligence Plan and other directives.
- d. Extension of Military Attache functions to include analysis of world opinion and attitudes.
- e. Improved coordination of collection effort with other government agencies through the Central Intelligence Group.
- f. Cooperative effort with other government agencies in Washington in the production of intelligence.

The exploitation of published sources of information requires fuller collection, faster transmission, and specialized language personnel for analysis.

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Private sources of information are one of the richest and relatively unexplored sources. They include:

- a. Universities and research foundations.
- b. Expert consultants in specialized fields such as petroleum, metals ethnology, nuclear physics, and transportation systems.
- c. Domestic firms with overseas agencies.
- d. Private individuals traveling abroad, particularly experts in scientific and other fields.
- e. Domestic newspaper morgues.

Action has been initiated to form a committee representative of learned societies and research foundations to exploit civilian research facilities.

A major criticism of G-2 has been a failure to disseminate its intelligence. This was reflected in combat units where the flow of information upward was better generally than downward. Media for dissemination of intelligence include:

- a. Oral presentation to higher authority.
- b. Responses to requests by staff divisions and other government agencies.
- c. Special Studies and Handbooks.
- d. Periodic publications:
 - Military Summaries (monthly)
 - Scientific Intelligence Review (monthly)
 - Intelligence Review (weekly)
 - Soviet Military Roundup (weekly)
 - Intelligence Bulletin (monthly)
- e. Special dissemination.


The preparation of information for dissemination is one of the most important "jelling" processes in the production of intelligence. It forces research analysts and specialists to marshal the facts and to arrive at generally logical conclusions.

Human beings are, as a whole, mentally lazy. In most instances, they can only be forced into the process of turning out information in files into intelligence through objective production assignments.

With minor additions, the staff of the Intelligence Group of the Intelligence Division as authorized by the 1 January 1946 T/O is adequate, once personnel is trained, to meet the intelligence needs outlined.

However, it will be 1 September 1947 before this machine is operating to a reasonably satisfactory degree; and 5 years will be required to reach the desired standard.

INTELLIGENCE GROUP



	<u>OFF.</u>	<u>E. M.</u>	<u>CIV.</u>
Currently Authorized	224	0	539
Proposed Increase:			
Domestic Branch	8	0	15
Analysis of Foreign Public Opinion	1	0	5
Guidance of Research in Civilian Instructions	1	0	4

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The Intelligence Group is the intelligence producing agency in the Intelligence Division. The T/O of 1 January 1946 for the Intelligence Group (shown on opposite page) authorized 224 officers and 539 civilians. In addition, there are now in the Military District of Washington 147 people formerly stationed at Camp Ritchie, Md., employed in the exploitation of captured German and Japanese documents. It is estimated the latter will be required only until 1 July 1947.

The minor additional staff requirements referred to are designed to meet recently increased responsibilities -- 34 for duty in Washington and 125 for duty outside the United States. The latter are to be assigned to the collection group. Of the former, 23 are needed to operate the newly activated Domestic Branch and its supporting desks within the Functional Branches - Military Branch, Who's Who Branch, Political and Economic Branch; 6 for Analysis of Foreign Public Opinion; and 5 for Guiding Research in Civilian Institutions. Of those for duty outside the United States 124 are for Research Analysis with Field Offices overseas and 1 for duty with Canadian Intelligence.

During the war the peak staff of 1,115 in the Intelligence Group worked a total of approximately 55,000 man-hours per week. The Intelligence Group was also directly assisted by the efforts of auxiliary groups numbering almost 500 persons involved in captured document exploitation and other activities. The intelligence effort during hostilities was directed almost entirely against the 2 major enemies and their satellites.

At present the staff of approximately 700 works about 29,000 man-hours per week. Reduce the staff by 50 percent and apply the law of geometrical progression to account for overhead and processing, and the actual intelligence production hours would be reduced to approximately 7,000 per week to cover the entire world -- this as compared with the 55,000 hours when we were working almost exclusively on only 2 nations and their satellites.

Reduction in personnel may be effected intelligently only by elimination of functions. Production of intelligence on the U. S. S. R. and "satellite countries" must continue. If a 50 percent cut were ordered, the following measures would have to be taken:

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a. Cessation of production of intelligence and maintenance of an information library on the following areas:

- (1) The United States
- (2) The British Empire
- (3) Western Europe
- (4) The Far East
- (5) South America.

b. Cessation of publication of the following:

- (1) Special Studies
- (2) Intelligence Bulletin
- (3) Scientific Review
- (4) Military Handbooks.

The effect of reduction of personnel on the basic research desks is shown by the following example:

The French Desk of Polec Branch is allotted a total of 7 personnel (2 military, 5 civilian). It therefore produces 280 man-hours of work a week.

During an average week the French Desk receives 100 cables, 151 documents, and 118 publications, requiring the various processes of reading, analysis, evaluation, Biding, making extracts, clipping, indexing, filing, etc. The time required to process fully this incoming material averages 80 percent of the average working week, a total of 224 man-hours.

When the 224 man-hours required for processing of material are deducted from the 280 man-hours available to the Desk each week, only 56 man-hours remain free for actual production of intelligence; including the writing of flashes for the morning Conferences, weekly Intelligence Review items, special studies, and such other jobs as the critically important work on the Strategic Intelligence Digest, the briefing of out-going Military Attaches, and conferring with the returning Military Attaches.

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From this it may be seen that if one person were to leave the Desk, the loss of 40 weekly man-hours would cut intelligence production time from 56 hours to 16 hours, a reduction of 60 percent. If two persons were to leave, representing a loss of 80 weekly man-hours, no time at all would be left for intelligence production, and incoming material would not even be fully processed.

The New York Times with its expert staff, can make estimates concerning world situations which will average 90 percent in accuracy. Reduce the staff and the accuracy of estimates will be reduced generally according to the law of diminishing returns. That newspaper has achieved its eminence in the newspaper world through almost unlimited expenditure not only for current production, but also for building up its morgue and a highly trained staff. This has taken several generations.

However, a geometric progression is applicable to the Intelligence Division, for we have built up neither the vast resources of highly skilled reporters, researchers, and analysts, nor a comprehensive library of essential material.

Cut the resources of the Intelligence Group by 35 percent and its production will be comparable to that of a small-town daily newspaper, producing news coverage based largely on rewrites and editorials on local problems. Such a newspaper will be fortunate if it averages a 60 percent accuracy on world situation estimates.

Cut the resources of the Intelligence Group by 50 percent and its product will be comparable to that achieved by a small community weekly together with a morgue of an average daily newspaper.

The Intelligence Service with which we entered World War II may be compared -- in skill and experience of its staff and in world coverage of its operations -- to the news service of a local daily newspaper.

The War Department cannot be satisfied with strategic estimates of between 60 and 70 percent accuracy, nor can we predict in what remote section of the world we may be suddenly called upon a few years hence to carry out air-borne or water-borne landing operations. Who would have predicted in 1935 that within 7 years we would be landing troops on the west coast of Africa or on remote islands in the Pacific?

At least the first two years of a war are fought on a basis of intelligence produced before its outbreak.

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It is highly doubtful that in the future there will be time to create an effective intelligence organization after the outbreak of war. To meet such an eventuality we must have an intelligence machine geared to make possible immediate and effective M-day operations.

One of the senior officers of the Central Intelligence Group said, "Do you realize that the Intelligence Division has the only genuine intelligence producing organization in Washington?" And yet, although we have this unique machine, we are now, paradoxically, asking ourselves what a global intelligence service should be and how intelligence should be produced.

With proper support, a machine, staffed by adequately trained personnel and on a sound production schedule, can be operating with reasonable efficiency by 1 September 1947. Within 5 years, with vigorous support and direction, we can develop an intelligence service as pre-eminent in its field as The New York Times in the newspaper world.

A great many are paying lip service to the idea that we must have a highly efficient peacetime intelligence service. However, there is only an extremely vague general concept of what constitutes an intelligence producing machine. Few realize that the problem of developing such a machine is comparable to that of the development of a staff, the editorial machinery, and the sources of information for a great newspaper like The New York Times.

The editorial activities of The New York Times are so integrated and so interdependent that no one would toy with the idea of decentralization. Decentralization would reduce materially the effectiveness of the production machine. Similarly, decentralization of intelligence operations results only in duplication of effort and a loss of flexibility. It scatters reference material among many agencies and results in an overall increase of administrative personnel, and -- most important -- it would break up the only well-balanced intelligence organization in the United States.

It has been shown already that a reduction in personnel must result in reducing accuracy or in accepting partial world coverage, which must be based on an attempt to predict where the next war is to be fought. In either case we are gambling with the future security of the United States. This risk is unwarranted, particularly when an efficient military intelligence service is within the means of the War Department.

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The personnel required are considerably less than the strength of an infantry combat team. Its annual cost can be compared with the price of 60 B-29's.

To develop an effective intelligence machine we must supply the resources to obtain a production goal, not allot a number of personnel to an organization and wait anxiously to see what they can produce.

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