

RESTRICTED

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REPORT

OF

THE GENERAL BOARD

UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS-PROCUREMENT, TRAINING
SUPPLY, ADMINISTRATION, AND
UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL**

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

G-2 SECTION

STUDY NUMBER 12

RESTRICTED

No date, 1945-46(?)

REPORT

OF

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

The Military Intelligence Service in the

European Theater of Operations

Study Number 12

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

MISSION: Prepare report and recommendation on the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations--the procurement, training, supply, administration and utilization of intelligence personnel.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

File: R 013/1

Study Number 12

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 1THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1. Definition of Military Intelligence Service. The term "Military Intelligence Service," as employed in the European Theater of Operations, may be defined as an over-all grouping of intelligence agencies which had operational, as distinct from staff, functions. It comprised most of the field agencies which operated under the ultimate direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. It was conceived as a means of relieving the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, from the necessity of exercising administrative control over a multitude of units and individuals operating in the field, while at the same time giving the field agencies the advantages of a reasonable degree of autonomy.

2. Establishment of the First Operational Intelligence Agencies. The first operational intelligence agency to be established, in point of time, for operation overseas, and which later operated extensively in the European Theater of Operations, was the Counter Intelligence Corps.¹ This body, however, was never closely integrated with the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations.

a. MIS-X (Military Intelligence Section-X). The history of the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations began, for practical purposes, with the organization in Washington, District of Columbia, in November, 1942, of a highly specialized intelligence unit which was given the arbitrary designation of MIS-X.² The symbolic designation of this unit was intended at the time to mask its real functions, and, as a matter of fact, it carried on its activities behind a carefully drawn veil of secrecy. MIS-X was concerned with the problems presented by the capture of our personnel by the enemy. It trained selected military personnel, particularly Air Forces personnel, in what their conduct should be in case of capture by the enemy or of imminent danger of such capture; how they should conduct themselves in an enemy prison camp; under what circumstances they should attempt escape and the means of effecting escape; and how they might contact and utilize agents of the escape routes established in occupied countries. An important feature of the work of MIS-X was to collect positive intelligence concerning the enemy. To this end, it taught an elaborate code by means of which Americans confined as prisoners-of-war might send out intelligence in their letters, and it interrogated Americans who succeeded in escaping from enemy territory. A part of MIS-X was transferred to the United Kingdom, where it began operating in February, 1943.

b. MIS-Y (Military Intelligence Section-Y). Another intelligence agency, designated as MIS-Y,³ was set up in the European Theater of Operations in February, 1943. This was the parent of the many agencies concerned with the collection of intelligence by means of the

1. See "Organization and Operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations," Study No 13, of the General Board, USFET, December, 1945.

2. See draft of "History of the Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations," compiled by the Historical Section, Military Intelligence Service, no date, Chap 1, Par 1. This work, still in the course of preparation in November, 1945, will be referred to hereinafter as "History of MIS."

3. See "History of MIS," Chap 1, Par 2.

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also in close co-operation with the British, in the preparation of topographical materials as aids in strategical planning.

f. Censorship Service. Several branches of censorship were established and functioning in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1943. These included a half-dozen Base Censor Offices; the Press, Radio, and Cable Censor Office; and the Prisoner-of-War Postal Censorship Office--the latter being engaged in the censorship of the mail of enemy prisoners-of-war who were confined in the United Kingdom. All of these agencies of censorship were engaged in work which was deemed to be of importance in military intelligence. For this reason they had all been placed under the nominal supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations.

4. Establishment of the Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations.

a. The direction of so many and such highly specialized field services presented problems of serious proportions to the G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations. As the massing of troops and materials in the United Kingdom progressed, with the attendant increase in military intelligence personnel and functions, the G-2 Section was becoming top-heavy with administrative personnel and duties, and was in danger of finding its proper functions of policy-forming and planning on the staff level obscured behind a mass of detail. At the same time, the field agencies tended to lose contact with the G-2 Section, and thus did not have the broad supervision and direction which was needed to co-ordinate their activities with the policies of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. During the summer of 1943, these problems received serious consideration, and a staff study resulted in recommendations designed to reduce the G-2 Section to reasonable proportions and to safeguard it in its proper functions. It was decided to relieve the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the necessity of providing for the detailed supervision and administration of field agencies, and to set up a new agency to achieve these ends, while preserving to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the broad power to direct the operations of the field agencies.

b. The Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations, was activated by an order dated 17 August 1943, effective as of 1 August 1943.⁶ This order had the effect of consolidating most of the existing field agencies into a single service for the major purposes of administration, procurement and training of personnel, and the day-by-day direction of operations. The order contained a Table of Organization which gave an allotment of grades and ratings for the Headquarters of the Military Intelligence Service and for all of the operational intelligence agencies that have been mentioned above, except the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. Subsequent orders, dated 6 September 1943, and 1 October 1943,⁷ assigned the above-mentioned agencies to the newly created Military Intelligence Service, including the Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams that had already arrived in the United Kingdom and Base Censor Offices Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, but omitting the Counter Intelligence Corps. Other Base Censor Offices and Censorship Services were soon after added to the Military Intelligence Service.⁸ For all practical purposes, these early additions may be considered as going to

6. Hq Special Troops, ETOUSA, General Order No 3, 17 Aug 1943, file 383.6, G-2, ETOUSA.

7. Hq Special Troops, ETOUSA, General Order No 4, 6 Sep 1943; No 8, 1 Oct 1943.

8. Base Censor Offices Nos 5 and 6, and the Press, Radio, and Cable Censor Office; see Hq Special Troops, ETOUSA, General Order No 9,

make up the original composition of the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations. Thus, the plan of uniting all the field intelligence agencies into a single Military Intelligence Service was realized in its entirety, with the important exception of the Counter Intelligence Corps. Originally, only the Headquarters of the Counter Intelligence Corps was assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, and the latter had jurisdiction over the former only in the publication and distribution of orders relating to the assignment of personnel. Even later on, beginning in July, 1944, when detachments of the Counter Intelligence Corps were attached to the Military Intelligence Service, the relationship was limited to certain administrative matters.

5. An Outline of the Subsequent History of the Military Intelligence Service.

a. Composition as of 17 December 1943. A study made by the G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, as of 17 December 1943, showed that the composition of the Military Intelligence Service had not changed in any important respect, except that it included at that date Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in all four categories, namely:

- (1) Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War.
- (2) Military Intelligence Interpreter.
- (3) Photo Interpreter.
- (4) Order of Battle.

b. Composition as of 19 April 1944. A study prepared for the G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, detailing the composition of the Military Intelligence Service as of 19 April 1944, showed that it had not by that date undergone any change as to its component agencies, but that some of them had been rechristened with more descriptive titles, as follows:

- (1) Home Forces Intelligence Detachment had by this date acquired the new designation of Photo Intelligence Indoctrination Center. (Later, it was known simply as the Photo Intelligence Center.)
- (2) Inter-Service Topographical Detachment had by this date acquired the new designation of United States Army Topographical Research Department.

c. Later Changes in Composition. Most of the agencies comprising the Military Intelligence Service underwent an expansion in personnel and an internal diversification in structure commensurate with the increase in their responsibilities. Headquarters soon expanded into a Headquarters Company, and was later sub-divided into four standard staff sections with a Headquarters Command. Headquarters also included, by mid-summer of 1944, Liaison Sections for action with Army Groups and Armies. The Field Interrogation Detachment expanded to include Documents Sections and Mobile Field Interrogation Units. The first major

Footnote 8 (Contd).

6 Oct 1943. The Prisoner-of-War Postal Censorship Detachment was assigned to the Military Intelligence Service on 12 Feb 1944. See Ltr, AG 322 OpGC, 12 Feb 1944.

addition to the Military Intelligence Service occurred on 25 October 1944 in the creation and assignment to it of the 6857 Order of Battle Center.⁹ At the end of October, 1944, two new units were assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, namely the 6823 Headquarters Company and the 6824 Detailed Interrogation Center.¹⁰ On 21 February 1945, the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, was consolidated with the Military Intelligence Service.¹¹ The Mobile Intelligence Training Unit was assigned on 21 March 1945.¹²

d. Strength of the Military Intelligence Service. The strength of the Military Intelligence Service, as of selected dates for which figures are available, is shown in Table I.

TABLE I
STRENGTH OF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Date	Hq & Detachments			Censorship			MIS ¹ Teams			Grand Total
	O's	EM	Total	O's	EM	Total	O's	EM	Total	
17 Aug 43 ²	94 ³	156 ³	250 ³	357	175	532	24 ⁴	48 ⁴	72 ⁴	854
19 Apr 44 ⁵	121	202	323	390	185	575	776	812	1588	2486
Oct 44 ⁵	135	301	436	305	165	470	659	1379	2038	2944
25 Feb 45 ⁵	210	593	803	290	185	475	945	2389	3334	4612
31 Mar 45 ⁵	209	584	793	295	184	479	1031	2470	3501	4773

References for Table I:

1. Military Intelligence Specialist.
2. Authorized; figures of actual strength not available.
3. Counter Intelligence Corps not included, because it was at no time integrated with the Military Intelligence Service.
4. Estimate.
5. Actually present.

The following observations may be made upon the basis of the figures just presented:

- (1) The Censorship Service, in terms of personnel, comprised a large proportion of the Military Intelligence Service. The personnel of Censorship decreased steadily, and due to the increase of personnel in other branches of the Military Intelligence Service, the relative importance of Censorship decreased to a marked degree.

9. Hq MIS, General Order No 25, 25 Oct 1944.
10. Hq Command, ETOUSA, General Order No 80, 31 Oct 1944.
11. Hq MIS, General Order No 12, 21 Feb 1945.
12. Hq ETOUSA, Troop Assignment Order No 53, 21 Mar 1945.

- (2) The over-all strength of the Military Intelligence Service increased during the period under consideration. The personnel of the Headquarters and the Detachments increased moderately, but the increase in over-all strength was due primarily to the great expansion in the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.

6. Scope of this Study. From this point, this study will be limited to the consideration of the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. Some of the reasons for so limiting the scope of this study are as follows:

a. Numerically, the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were the largest element in the Military Intelligence Service.

b. The Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were a field agency, going everywhere and coming into contact with many other elements of the military forces. Consequently, it is possible to obtain more, and relatively impartial, judgments of their work.

c. Due to their numerical preponderance and the wide range of their operations, the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams attracted more attention than any other part of the Military Intelligence Service, and to many people they represented the work of the larger organization. To a large extent, the record of the Military Intelligence Service must be judged in terms of the work of the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.

CHAPTER 2PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL FOR
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST TEAMSSECTION 1PROCUREMENT

7. Statistics of Personnel of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The classification of the personnel of the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in the European Theater of Operations, at dates for which figures are available, is indicated in Table II.

TABLE II
STRENGTH OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
SPECIALIST TEAMS

Date		Category	Officers	EM	Total
28 Mar 1944	Allotted grades and ratings	IPW	368	720	1088
		MII	178	356	534
		PI	274	564	838
		OB	67	134	201
		Total	887	1774	2661
Apr 1944	Actual Strength	Total	776	812	1558
Oct 1944	Actual Strength	IPW	225	486	711
		MII	117	240	357
		PI	258	536	794
		OB	59	117	176
		Total	659	1379	2038
28 Dec 1944 25 Feb 1945 31 Mar 1945	Allotted grades and ratings	IPW	436	872	1308
		MII	198	396	594
		PI	302	604	906
		OB	77	154	231
		Total	1013	2026	3039
25 Feb 1945	Actual Strength	IPW	373	1044	1417
		MII	192	568	760
		PI	302	619	921
		OB	78	158	236
		Total	945	2389	3334
31 Mar 1945	Actual Strength	IPW	416	1042	1458
		MII	210	629	839
		PI	317	633	950
		OB	88	166	254
		Total	1031	2470	4501

Key to abbreviations used in Table II:

EM Enlisted Men
IPW Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War
MII Military Intelligence Interpreter
PI Photo Interpreter
OB Order of Battle

The following observations may be made upon the basis of the figures presented in Table II:

a. During the period of approximately a year covered by these figures, the total personnel of the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams actually present in the European Theater of Operations increased by 188 per cent.

b. The rate of increase in total personnel present in the European Theater of Operations of the four different kinds of teams was:

(1) Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War	105.0%
(2) Military Intelligence Interpreter	135.0%
(3) Photo Interpreter	19.6%
(4) Order of Battle	44.3%

c. The Photo Interpreter Teams, which held first rank in point of total personnel present in the European Theater of Operations, at the beginning of the period under consideration, soon gave place to the Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams. The Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams held third place throughout, and the Order of Battle Teams fourth place.

d. The proportion of officer personnel in the total decreased in the period covered by the figures in Table II from 49.8 to 22.9 per cent.

e. The proportion of officer personnel in the total present in the European Theater of Operations for the four different kinds of teams was as follows, for the earliest and latest dates for which figures are available:

	Oct 44	Mar 45
(1) Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War	31.6%	28.5%
(2) Military Intelligence Interpreter	32.7%	25.0%
(3) Photo Interpreter	32.5%	33.3%
(4) Order of Battle	33.5%	34.6%

Thus, it is clear that the Photo Interpreter and the Order of Battle Teams received the most favorable treatment in this respect, having the constant proportion of one third of their personnel of commissioned grade, while the proportion of officers in the other two kinds of teams showed a marked decline.

f. It may further be observed that, while at first the allotted grades and ratings were not filled up by personnel arriving from the United States, there soon developed a lag, and grades and ratings were not made available in sufficient numbers to take care of those arriving from the United States. The deficiency, was not made up in the period covered by the figures in Table II.

8. Procurement of Military Intelligence Specialist Personnel in the Zone of the Interior. Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was responsible for the original procurement of personnel for specialist teams, as well as

the assignment of individuals to a specialty.¹ Personnel was ordered to Camp Ritchie from all Army installations--in many instances directly from the Induction Centers.² The authorities of Camp Ritchie were further responsible for seeing to it that the names of all members of specialist teams were submitted for security check by Counter Intelligence and clearance by the War Department before transfer overseas.³

c. Supply of Personnel for Specialist Teams in European Theater of Operations. There was some difference of opinion as to whether the supply of personnel for Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in the European Theater of Operations was adequate to meet the demand. On the one hand, officers who were closely associated with Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, state that the demand always exceeded the supply.⁴ On the other hand, the great majority of G-2 officers consulted in the preparation of this study state that operations in the field never suffered in any serious way from the lack of personnel for the specialist teams. The following matters have a bearing upon this subject:

a. The schools which were established in the European Theater of Operations to indoctrinate newly arrived specialists, had limited capacities. When tactical units began arriving at a greatly accelerated tempo, difficulties were encountered in imparting the training believed by those in charge to have been necessary.

b. Replacements of personnel coming from the United States were based on an estimate of 5 per cent loss. To some observers, this appeared to be an insufficient allowance. While casualties from enemy action were light, there was some loss of personnel because some individuals were found to be unsuited to the work. Intelligence specialists confined to hospitals for wounds or illness tended to get lost from their teams, and it has been estimated that the loss from this cause alone amounted to 5 per cent.

c. As the armies advanced towards Germany, there were delays in obtaining replacements in forward areas. Unit commanders who requested replacements found that much time was lost in transmitting their communications to Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, and that from 14 to 18 days were required to deliver reinforcements. These delays have been attributed largely to the failure of the Military Intelligence Service to move forward with combat advances.⁵

d. Some temporary breakdowns in the schedule of arrival of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams led to temporary shortages of personnel in the European Theater of Operations. Teams were made up at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and transferred to the European Theater of Operations according to a policy which provided for their arrival at least 30 days before the combat units with which they were to work. In a few instances the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, failed to notify Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, sufficiently in advance of the arrival of certain units, and consequently

1. Ltr, Brig Gen G Bryan Conrad, Acting AC of S, G-2 Hq Com Z, USFET, to Maj Gen Clayton L Bissell, AC of S, G-2, WD, 29 Jun 1945.

2. Memorandum, Col C A Harper, Hq MIS, USFET, to Col Hamer F Ford, Commanding Officer, MIS, 13 Oct 1945.

3. Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 22 Oct 1945.

4. See "History of MIS."

5. Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 23 Oct 1945.

no preparation had been made to provide them with specialist teams.⁶ Furthermore, in August and September, 1944, the speeding up in the shipment of combat units and a current shortage in shipping space resulted in a number of specialist teams arriving behind schedule in the European Theater of Operations.⁷

10. Procurement of Military Intelligence Specialist Personnel in the European Theater of Operations. When the Military Intelligence Service requested authority to screen personnel from reinforcement depots and to train them within the European Theater of Operations, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, European Theater of Operations, pointed out that all personnel with the necessary qualifications were already assigned to other branches of the service, and none were available for the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations. The personnel of specialist teams were required to be screened by both the Counter Intelligence Corps and the War Department, and this was difficult to arrange in the case of personnel already overseas. These difficulties contributed to the fact that only 204 specialists were recruited and trained in the European Theater of Operations. Among these were 10 Photo Interpreter Teams, requiring 20 officers and 40 enlisted men, recruited with good results within the European Theater of Operations in October and November, 1944.⁸

11. Qualifications Sought in Recruiting Personnel for Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.

a. The qualifications ordinarily given weight in recruiting personnel for the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were:

- (1) Candidates should have a good working knowledge of at least one foreign language, except for members of Photo Interpreter Teams.
- (2) They should be familiar with the customs and modes of living in foreign countries.
- (3) They should have a special aptitude for intelligence work, such as previous experience in professional, commercial, or political endeavors in foreign countries.
- (4) They should have a high score in the Army General Classification Test. It has been claimed that the average score of candidates for specialist teams at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was never below 130, but it is obvious that this is an exaggeration.
- (5) They should meet high standards of integrity and patriotism in order to be acceptable from the point of view of military security.

6. This is said to have been the case with 6 Army Group, Seventh Army, 1 Armored Division, and the 45 Infantry Division. See notes of interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 22 Oct. 1945.

7. Memorandum, Col C A Harper, Hq MIS, USFET, to Col Hamer F. Ford, Commanding Officer, MIS, 13 Oct. 45.

8. Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq, MIS, 23 Oct 1945.

b. Military Intelligence specialists arriving in the European Theater of Operations usually did not meet these standards. Some specialists were linguists of insufficient caliber to perform their duties. Some reasons for the failure to meet these standards are as follows:

- (1) The pressing need for Intelligence Specialist Teams overseas and the resultant rush in filling personnel vacancies made the careful selection of recruits difficult.
- (2) Many commanders were reluctant to give up their highest type German-speaking personnel to the Military Intelligence Service.

SECTION 2

TRAINING

12. Training of Personnel in the Zone of the Interior.

a. All members of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were required to take a course of training of eight weeks' duration in the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland. As no basic military training was included, it was a matter of chance whether or not a specialist received such training before going into combat. Most specialists joined their units too late to be given any basic training. There were two outstanding results:

- (1) Military Intelligence Specialists were regarded as poor soldiers by the units to which they were assigned.⁹
- (2) A lack of appreciation of military fundamentals and lack of military discipline among Military Intelligence Specialists resulted in friction with their respective G-2 officers and troubles within the teams themselves.

b. The G-2 officers, whose opinions were sought in the preparation of this study, agreed that the training course of the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was well-planned, but inadequate to prepare intelligence specialists to enter upon their work in the European Theater of Operations. Not a single dissent from this view was registered. The opinion was thus unanimous that the training received in the Zone of the Interior had to be supplemented by additional training and indoctrination in the European Theater of Operations. A defect in training stressed by many officers was the failure to insure that all Military Intelligence Specialists should have the basic qualifications of a soldier, and thus be able to care for themselves in the field, as well as to be willing to accept the responsibilities of working in a military hierarchy.

13. State of Morale of Personnel Upon Arrival in the European

9. See "A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch) in the 12 Army Group, for the period from 1 Aug 1944 to 9 May 1945," Sec 30. This work was prepared by G-2 Intelligence Branch, Hq 12 Army Group, and was transmitted to the AC of S, G-2, 12 Army Group, 1 Jul 1945. This work will hereinafter be referred to as "A Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Army Group."

Theater of Operations. Morale in specialist teams upon arrival in the European Theater of Operations was high because of such factors as the following:

a. The supervision of the activities of the specialist teams was usually not close, which resulted in their personnel enjoying more freedom and independence than others.

b. Military Intelligence Specialists were constantly aware that they were selected, highly-trained specialists. A certain feeling of superiority seems to have been one of the results of the training received at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

c. The intensive course offered at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, gave most of the graduates a great measure of inspiration and enthusiasm for their work.

14. Basic Problems in Establishing a Training Program in The European Theater of Operations.

a. In the spring of 1943, when the training of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams was begun in the European Theater of Operations, the following problems were encountered:

- (1) The lack of contact with enemy forces on the Continent made it impossible to provide an operational training for intelligence specialists.
- (2) The lack of enemy prisoners-of-war caused difficulty in the training of interrogators and interpreters.
- (3) The lack of captured enemy documents meant a deficiency in the raw material for developing information concerning the enemy forces.

b. This situation was partially remedied when the German Afrika Korps was defeated in Tunisia in the summer of 1943, and thousands of German prisoners-of-war and many enemy documents started to pour into the British Isles. Intelligence specialist teams were then able to begin operational training. The exploitation of captured enemy documents affected many intelligence agencies, among them being the Military Intelligence Research Section ¹⁰ and the Photo Intelligence Center. In these agencies, the new information was collated, evaluated, and processed so that the newly gained intelligence could be disseminated promptly and efficiently. These documents disclosed many changes in the organization of the German Army, as well as the equipment, tactics, personalities, and reinforcement system. This information was incorporated immediately into the existing training programs, and new orientation courses were set up for supplemental training.

15. Agencies in Charge of Training in the European Theater of Operations. General direction of the training of Military Intelligence Specialists was in the hands of the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations.

10. See below, Chap 2, Par 19 b.

a. Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams. The problem of training intelligence specialists in the European Theater of Operations first arose in the spring of 1943, when a few Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams arrived from the United States. These teams were found to have a good theoretical training, but with no experience in contact with prisoners-of-war and with a lack of grounding in the basic training of the soldier. A training program was improvised to correct these defects, consisting of experience at a Prisoner-of-War Enclosure and field training with a combat unit then on maneuvers.¹¹ Later, a training program was developed under the direction of the Field Interrogation Detachment.

b. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams. The field Interrogation Detachment was also in charge of the training of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams.

c. Photo Interpreter Teams. The agency in charge of the training of Photo Interpreter Teams was until May, 1944, the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment, and after that date, the Photo Intelligence Center.

d. Order of Battle Teams. The agency in charge of the training of Order of Battle Teams from January to October, 1944, was the Order of Battle School, a subsidiary of the Military Intelligence Research Section, and after October, 1944, the Order of Battle Center.

e. General. Another agency of importance in the training program was the Military Intelligence School, operated as part of the American School Center. In addition, other agencies of both the American and the British Armies were brought into the training program at one time or another, by the device of attaching trainees for a brief period of observation and apprenticeship. In 1943, the training program for intelligence specialists operated in a fairly leisurely manner, two or three months often being available for the training of an individual. Later, the training period was shorter. Since the bulk of the specialist personnel arrived in the European Theater of Operations after D-day, the training facilities of the Military Intelligence Service continued to operate after D-day and were moved to the Continent. All the principal training agencies, except for the Photo Intelligence Center, were still functioning in October, 1945.¹²

16. Training of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams. The training of interrogators was a combination of basic military training, courses of study in which the organization of the German Army was emphasized, and practical experience in the art of interrogating prisoners-of-war.

a. As much time as possible was devoted in the training program to the physical hardening of the students, the use of weapons, the driving of vehicles, and the maintenance of motor equipment. Concurrently, the students took courses of study related to their specialty. German language classes were provided for students not

11. Ltr, Brig Gen G Bryan Conrad, Acting Deputy AC of S, G-2, Hq Com Z, USFET, to Maj Gen Clayton L Bissell, AC of S, G-2, WD, 29 Jun 45.

12. Memorandum, Col C A Harper, Hq MIS, USFET, to Col Hamer F Ford, Commanding Officer, Hq MIS, USFET, 13 Oct 1945.

sufficiently fluent in that language. The latest data concerning the organization of the German Army, and the identification of German military personnel, materiel, and documents were made available to all students. Courses were offered in the geography of France; signal communications; and map-reading and military signs and symbols. Some officers of the Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams also attended a six weeks' course at the British Military Intelligence School, and others received training in the interpretation of enemy documents at the Order of Battle School.

b. The most important training received by Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams in the European Theater of Operations was gained from practice in interrogating German and Italian prisoners-of-war. American personnel was admitted to practice interrogation under British supervision at three Prisoner-of-War Cages. Facilities were available for only a limited number of Americans, and the British did not admit enlisted men for such practice until 1944. In November, 1943, five Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams were attached to the Fifth United States Army in Italy for practical experience in the field. These teams served two months in combat operations and many of their members later became instructors in the school conducted by the Field Interrogation Detachment.

17. Training of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams.

a. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams received basic military training and instruction in the geography, economics, and politics of France and the organization of the French Army. Later, the emphasis in the instruction was upon the organization, tactics, weapons, and materiel of the German Army.

b. A number of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams underwent an extended course of training conducted by the Theater Intelligence Section, an organization directed by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, under the supervision of the British Home Forces Intelligence. The principal work of the Theater Intelligence Section was the interpretation and classification of information bearing on the plans for the invasion of the Continent. This information was obtained from every conceivable source and had to be collated for military use. Non-commissioned officers were assigned to the various sub-sections to study reports and documents, and as a result of their work a huge amount of material pertaining to enemy defenses, communications, Order of Battle, transportation, supply, and power and production systems was sifted and classified. This information then was localized and checked by photo interpreters, who checked every report and confirmed or supplemented it for use in future operations.

c. Training for Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams was also conducted at the Royal Patriotic School. This training agency, maintained by the MI-19 Branch of the British War Office, provided training for Military Intelligence Interpreter officers in the interrogation of civilian refugees who had escaped from France. The Field Interrogation Detachment sent two Military Intelligence Interpreter officers to the Royal Patriotic School every 10 to 14 days, throughout the winter and spring of 1943 and 1944.

d. The conversion of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French) into Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (German) did not present any major training problems for the following reasons:

- (1) Many Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French) had some personnel who could also speak German.
- (2) By the addition of two German-speaking men to a Military Intelligence Interpreter Team (French), it could operate as a Military Intelligence Interpreter Team (German), by using the others as drivers and in similar capacities.

18. Training of Photo Interpreter Teams.¹³

a. The training of American personnel in the interpretation of aerial photography, for service with the Ground Forces, was based largely upon British experience. In the summer of 1943, a small group of American officers and enlisted men were assigned to work in the British Army Photo Intelligence Section. On 6 September 1943, this group of Americans, numbering at the time 15 officers and 17 enlisted men, was activated as the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment, and charged with the training of personnel arriving from the United States.¹⁴ The first contingent of photographic interpreters, consisting of 23 officers, arrived in the United Kingdom on 27 October 1943, and their training was begun promptly. Soon after, the first group of 12 Photo Interpreter Teams, each consisting of two officers and four men, arrived in the United Kingdom. This personnel had already passed through the course in the interpretation of aerial photographs at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and they were found to be well grounded in the rudiments of the art, but lacking in practical experience.

b. From the outset, the training program for photographic interpreters was planned to give each individual a maximum of practical experience in all processes connected with the interpretation of aerial photographs, and to develop the team as a working unit. The officers who originally planned the training program believed that operational training with these objectives could not be accomplished in less than three months, basing their estimate upon British experience. The course was devised to train the personnel in the making of aerial maps and related techniques, and included field trips which gave the students experience in recognizing objects as they appear from the air.

c. Early in the training program, the personnel involved was handicapped by a shortage of equipment. Assistance was obtained from the British who turned over to the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment a collection of several thousand photographs taken by the Royal Air Force, which were of great value for instructional purposes. The Home Forces Intelligence Detachment was dependent upon the First Photo Procurement Detachment for a current supply of photographs for training purposes, and the latter was in turn embarrassed by the shortage of photographic materials which existed in the early part of 1944.¹⁵

13. Par 18 is based principally upon "History of Photo Interpretation, Military Intelligence Service, United States Army Ground Forces, European Theater of Operations, World War II," compiled by the Historical Section, MIS, 1945.

14. Hq. Special Troops, ETOUSA, General Order No 4, 6 Sep 1943.

15. On the shortage of supplies, especially grease pencils and acetate, for use by Photo Interpreter Teams, see, in addition to the general work already cited, notes of interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 22 Oct 1945.

There was also a difficulty in the procurement of competent instructors. For some time, the majority of the instructional staff was British and Canadian, but later some American instructors and supervisors were developed by a sort of post-graduate training for some of the most promising individuals who passed through the regular course of training. A good many American officers were placed on detached service for 14 to 30 days with British agencies, such as the Army Photo Intelligence Section, the Central Interpretation Unit, and appropriate branches of the Royal Air Force. In April, 1944, two Photo Interpreter Teams and four additional officers (a total personnel of 16) were sent to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, where they worked for 30 days with photographic interpreters of the American Eighth Air Force on the tactical problems which they had before them. Most of these individuals became instructors in the training program of the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment upon their return to the United Kingdom. Another group of 10 officers went to Italy in May, 1944, for similar post-graduate training.

d. The urgent demand for photographic interpreters forced a curtailment of the training program. Some teams were assigned to tactical units before completion of the first three months' course; those which finished the course were assigned immediately. The pressure for trained personnel forced a reduction in the training period. The course was shortened to eight weeks, but the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, soon ordered that the training period be reduced to 30 days. To meet this drastic measure, the Home Force Intelligence Detachment devised a summation of one week's duration, conceived as a refresher course for what had been studied at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and used the balance of the 30 days' training period for what was deemed the most important in the original training program. The officers immediately concerned with the training program, apparently without exception, have placed on record their judgment that 30 days were insufficient as a training period.

e. Perhaps the outstanding contribution of the research and training conducted by the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment was that they developed the techniques of interpreting aerial photographs to serve the purposes of the Ground Forces.¹⁶ Most of the previous work by both Americans and British had been primarily for the Air Forces.

19. Training of Order of Battle Teams.¹⁷ The Order of Battle School, which began functioning in the European Theater of Operations in January, 1944, passed a total of 1,271 officers and men through its regular courses up to the end of March, 1945, while its mobile field units gave familiarization course to many hundreds more. Included in this number was practically the entire strength of the Order of Battle Teams in the European Theater of Operations, which was, at the later date mentioned, 254 officers and men, and many members of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War and Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams.

a. The ground work of our knowledge of the organization, dis-

16. Interview with Brig Gen G Bryan Conrad, Acting Deputy AC of S, G-2, Hq Com Z, USFET, 1 Nov 1945.

17. Par 19 is based principally upon "History of Order of Battle in the European Theater," compiled by the Historical Section, MIS, no date.

position of units, and methods of operation of the German Army was laid over a period of years by the staff of the Military Attache at the American Embassy, Berlin. The information thus collected became the material of instruction in an informal course of training in Order of Battle which was begun in the fall of 1942 in the War Department at Washington, and of a training course which was begun in the spring of 1943 at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

b. In the course of 1943, research on the German Army had been carried on in the United Kingdom in the Military Intelligence Research Section, London Branch. The Military Intelligence Research Section was a joint British-American enterprise, attached to the American Embassy, London, through the office of the Military Attache. Its primary mission was the exploitation of captured enemy documents, the most important source of information relating to Order of Battle, and in the course of this work it had built up a large library of documents, voluminous reports on the uniforms and insignia of the German Army, charts showing the organization of German divisions, and much other material well designed to become the basis of instructing specialists for operation in the field. The Order of Battle School of the European Theater of Operations was established in close conjunction with the Military Intelligence Research Section, not only because the latter already possessed the materials of instruction, but also because its members were the best qualified instructors available. The Order of Battle School of the European Theater of Operations was opened on 17 January 1944. It continued to operate in the United Kingdom until October, 1944, when it was transferred to France. It was not, during this period, a part of the Military Intelligence Service. When the Order of Battle School was transferred to France, it was activated as the 6857 Order of Battle Center and was assigned to the Military Intelligence Service.¹⁸

c. During its operation in the United Kingdom from January to October, 1944, the Order of Battle School gave two principal courses of instruction, namely, a nine days' basic course in Order of Battle and a six days' course in the interpretation of captured enemy documents. The basic course in Order of Battle covered all the subjects needed by an Order of Battle Team operating in the field. Great stress was placed upon a mastery of the organization of the principal types of German divisions, and the location and strength of German units. Students were trained in the interpretation of raw intelligence received at the front, and were given practical experience in its reduction into usable Order of Battle information. The course further included intensive training in the recognition of German weapons, uniforms, insignia, and military signs and symbols. Some training in the use of captured enemy documents was included. The training course in Enemy Documents was taken by a relatively small number of intelligence specialists, mostly members of Order of Battle and Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams. Only students having a good reading and fair speaking knowledge of German were admitted. The course consisted of background lectures and practice in the techniques of developing intelligence from captured enemy documents, intensive studies of certain types of documents, especially the German soldier's pay-book, and German military terminology and abbreviations.

18. Hq MIS, ETOUSA, General Order No 25, 25 Oct 1944.

d. After the Order of Battle School was moved to France, it became more and more a school for specialists, its period of instruction being lengthened by retaining students in a holding pool while they had the opportunity to gain practical experience by engaging in the research and publication work carried on at the school. After removal to France, the school continued to train personnel other than members of specialist teams largely through the agency of two Mobile Order of Battle Familiarization Units.

CHAPTER 3

ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY

SECTION 1

ADMINISTRATION

20. Interrelation of Administrative Problems of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, and Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The administrative problems of the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were closely related to those of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service. In analyzing the major administrative problems experienced by the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams, it is therefore necessary to discuss them from the standpoint of both Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, and the specialist teams.

21. Assignment to Special Troops. Upon activation, the Military Intelligence Service was assigned to Headquarters, Special Troops, European Theater of Operations.¹ From the administrative standpoint, this assignment proved disadvantageous, for the following reasons:

a. A large number of reports pertaining to administrative details were required of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, by Headquarters, Special Troops.

b. The correspondence of the Military Intelligence Service was routed through Headquarters, Special Troops, resulting in unnecessary delay.²

c. The personnel of Headquarters, Special Troops, was not familiar with the subject matter contained in the correspondence of the Military Intelligence Service, and consequently were slow in processing it, causing additional delays.

To avoid these inconveniences, the commanding officer of the Military Intelligence Service requested that his unit be relieved from assignment to Special Troops, but remain attached for rations and quarters.³ Shortly thereafter, this request was approved and the Military Intelligence Service was assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.⁴

22. Shortage of Personnel in Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service. Upon separation from Special Troops, the Military Intelligence Service found itself with additional administrative duties to perform and an inadequate staff with which to perform them. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, European Theater of Operations, disapproved a request for additional personnel,⁵ and Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was obliged to perform its administrative duties with limited personnel and with the aid of team members who were temporarily present awaiting assignment to operational units.

1. See "History of MIS," Chap 4.

2. The following portion of a letter from the Office for the AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, serves as an illustration:

"Over my desk today are several requests for leaves for officers assigned to Censorship Detachments. Their routing has been through the Base Censor's Office to the Theater Censor; from him to Mili-

23. Supervisory Functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations. In supervising the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams, it was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, to:

- a. Determine the number of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams required for the European Theater of Operations.
- b. Requisition a sufficient number of teams from the War Department through channels, and phase them to arrive in the European Theater of Operations according to the flow of troops.
- c. Issue all directives and fix the policies as to the employment of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.
- d. Supervise the training of teams.
- e. Maintain operational control of teams in the field.

24. Administrative Functions of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service. From the beginning of its existence, Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was responsible for all the administrative affairs of the detachments and specialist teams. Upon arrival from the United States, personnel of the specialist teams was attached to the Field Interrogation Detachment, Photo Interpretation Center, or Order of Battle School for training until such time as they were attached as a team or as reinforcements to a field unit by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations. Orders were issued by Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, concerning travel, assignment, promotions, and reductions of all its personnel upon the recommendations of the detachment commanders and officers in charge of teams. Weekly and monthly personnel and study reports were submitted by each detachment and team to Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, which retained extracts of the service records, 201 files and locator cards of all assigned personnel. As the number of units assigned to the Military Intelligence Service increased, administrative functions of the Headquarters became more complex.

25. Confusion as to Division of Authority. Although the division of responsibility between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, and the Military Intelligence Service was clearly defined as between those two authorities,⁶ there were frequent misunderstandings on lower levels for the following reasons:

- a. G-2 officers of combat units were not fully acquainted with the details of the division of responsibility between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, and the Military Intelligence Service, and often dealt directly with the latter without going through G-2 channels.

Footnote 2, Contd.

tary Intelligence Service, to G-2, to Commanding Officer, Special Troops. All this has taken in the neighborhood of at least a week" (Ltr, AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, to Commanding Officer, MIS, 27 Dec 1943).

3. Ltr, Col W R Philp, Commanding Officer, MIS, to AC of S, G-2 ETOUSA, 30 Dec 1943.

4. Hq ETOUSA, Troop Assignment Order No 2, Par 2, 5 Jan 1944.

5. Ltr, AC of S, G-1, ETOUSA, to MIS, 19 Feb 1944.

6. See "History of MIS."

b. Officers of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, frequently visited combat units and made commitments concerning the attachment of specialist teams that were beyond their authority and without the previously expressed approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations.

26. Consolidation of the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, with the Military Intelligence Service. The confusion as to the division of authority was corrected in February, 1945, when the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, was consolidated with Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, by a directive issued by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations.⁷ At the same time, the operational control of the Military Intelligence Service was delegated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, to the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service. This change had the effect of combining administrative and operational control under a single commander. All matters relating to Military Intelligence Specialist Teams and intelligence training, which had previously been routed through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, were subsequently sent directly to the Military Intelligence Service, resulting in a more efficient administration and better operations. Shortly after this consolidation, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, published the following memorandum defining the administrative responsibilities of the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service:

"As Commanding Officer of Military Intelligence Service, you are charged with the command and administrative responsibilities of specialist teams assigned and attached to that headquarters as follows:

- (1) Those assigned units not attached to field forces or Communications Zone Sections are completely under your control for both command and administration, including training.
- (2) Those units assigned to Military Intelligence Service and attached to field forces for operational duty are your responsibility for initial supply and assignment. When items for re-supply are requested by units in the field, you will make every effort to assist them by providing such re-supply."⁸

Thus, for the first time in the history of the Military Intelligence Service, its operational and administrative functions came under the control of a single commander and the limitations of his responsibilities, as regards the detachments under his command, were clearly defined.

27. Division of Authority Over Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in the Field.

a. When Military Intelligence Specialist Teams had completed their training and were sent into the field, their personnel continued to be assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, but the teams and the individuals who composed them were attached for duty with combat

7. Directive, AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, to Commanding Officer, MIS, 25 Feb 1945.

8. Memorandum by AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, 27 Feb 1945.

units or Sections of the Communications Zone. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, retained jurisdiction over teams and individuals to the extent, if necessary, of recalling them and attaching them for duty with some other unit, as well as to provide reinforcements as needed by teams in the field. Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, also continued to perform certain administrative functions for the personnel attached to combat units, for it retained and processed extracts of the service records and 201 files of all its personnel in the field, and maintained a locator card file. Moreover, the Military Intelligence Service retained an absolute veto power over all promotions and demotions of individuals.

b. In theory, all other elements of command and administration came within the jurisdiction of the unit to which the specialist team was attached. Thus, the team was under the operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which it was attached. The unit to which a team was attached further had the responsibility of providing the team with such replacements and repairs of its supplies and equipment that it might need, and with rations and quarters. Moreover, the operational unit had the power of initiative as respects the promotion and demotion of members of teams.

c. It was inevitable that this division of authority would lead to misunderstanding and friction, both on the higher plane of operational control and in matters of administration. The blame for the difficulties which arose in the field rests partly upon the units to which specialist teams were attached, and partly upon the teams themselves. On the one hand, the personnel of the operational units did not always fully understand the scope of their authority over the personnel of specialist teams. Some used poor judgment in the employment of specialist teams, which brought prompt outcries from the specialists that their rights were being invaded. On the other hand, some members of specialist teams did not hesitate to capitalize upon their position to increase their liberties. Although well aware of the controls to which they were subject, some team members were guilty at times of using improper channels for official communications and reports.

d. In the administrative field, the principal difficulties were related to questions of promotions and demotions, delays in the routing of correspondence and supplies. With reference to the last of these, it may be said that specialist teams, from time to time, attempted to obtain supplies directly from Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, instead of from the units to which they were attached.

28. Promotions and Demotions. In August, 1944, the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service, published and distributed to commanders of Army Groups, Armies, Corps, and Divisions a letter stating the following policy governing the promotion of commissioned and enlisted personnel of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.⁹

a. Officers. Promotions were initiated in compliance with Theater regulations by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the organization to which the team was attached, and were sent directly to the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service.

9. Ltr, Commanding Officer, MIS, to Adjutant General, ETOUSA, 15 Aug 1944.

b. Enlisted Men. Promotions were initiated by the Officer-in-Charge of the team and were forwarded through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the organization to which the team was attached directly to the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service. The recommendation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which the team was attached was absolutely necessary before a team member could be promoted.

29. Delays in Correspondence. A long delay in correspondence to and from Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was created when the 12 United States Army Group issued a directive to its armies stating that all correspondence pertaining to specialist teams would be sent through command channels.¹⁰ This directive, and the fact that Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was always a great distance to the rear, meant that 30 to 34 days were required for correspondence to make the round-trip between Division, Corps, and Army Headquarters and Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service. In case the correspondence related to a need for reinforcements, it likewise required approximately 30 days from the time the requisition was initiated until they were delivered. This directive was later rescinded, and units sent correspondence relating to all routine matters directly to Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, through G-2 channels.

SECTION 2

SUPPLY

30. The Special List of Equipment for Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.

a. The Special List of Equipment¹¹ authorized for Military Intelligence Specialist Teams was considered adequate for efficient field operations and, with reference to some items, excessive.¹² For instance, it was wasteful to issue binoculars to all members of teams. Teams were authorized one radio set (SCR-511) per vehicle, but these were later returned through supply channels when it was discovered that radios were impractical in team operations. The consensus of opinion among the officers who were consulted in the preparation of this report, and among those who were associated with the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations during the period under consideration, was that a detailed and comprehensive study should be made of the Special List of Equipment authorized for Military Intelligence Teams.

b. The specialist teams were initially supplied by Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, and the units to which the teams were attached assumed responsibility for re-supply. This plan was generally satisfactory. The Officer-in-Charge of each specialist team was supplied with a copy of the Special List of Equipment by Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service. By requisition directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, of the unit to which they were attached team

10. Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 20 Oct 1945.

11. A copy of the Special List of Equipment for Military Intelligence Specialist Teams, dated 18 Aug 1944, Hq Army Service Forces, Washington, DC, is included in this report as Appendix 1.

12. See "A Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Army Groups," and "History of MIS."

commanders were assured of rapid replacement of equipment and supplies authorized by the Special List of Equipment, except for certain items such as special optical and drafting instruments. In order to obtain replacement of such items, it was necessary to requisition them from Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service. It usually required from 20 to 30 days for such a requisition to be processed, due largely to the fact that Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was maintained at a position far in the rear.

31. Supply Section, Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service.

a. The supply section at Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, experienced no difficulty in maintaining a sufficient stock to supply initially all specialist teams as they were sent out to operational units. Replacements of lost, worn, or damaged equipment for specialist teams were available when they returned to Headquarters for reassignment or rehabilitation.

b. The equipment authorized for Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was found to be adequate and, in the case of motor transportation, excessive. On 27 March 1945, Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, returned 37 surplus motor vehicles to the Ordnance Department.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS

32. Organization of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The personnel assigned to Military Intelligence Specialist Teams and the normal duties of each individual are listed below:¹

a. Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Team.

Captain Officer-in-Charge and Chief Interrogator
 First Lieutenant Interrogator
 Master Sergeant Assistant Interrogator
 Staff Sergeant Documents Analyst
 Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist
 Technician Fifth Grade . . Driver

b. Military Intelligence Interpreter Team.

Captain Officer-in-Charge and Chief Interpreter
 First Lieutenant Interpreter
 Master Sergeant Assistant Interpreter
 Staff Sergeant Documents Analyst
 Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist
 Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist and Driver.

c. Photo Interpreter Team.

Captain Officer-in-Charge and Chief Interpreter
 First Lieutenant Interpreter
 Master Sergeant Assistant Interpreter
 Staff Sergeant Draftsman
 Technician Third Grade . . Assistant Draftsman
 Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist and Driver

d. Order of Battle Team.

Captain Officer-in-Charge
 Master Sergeant Order of Battle Analyst
 Technician Third Grade . . Order of Battle Analyst

33. Adequacy of Organization of Specialist Teams in the European Theater of Operations. Representative G-2 officers of the 12 Army Group have gone on record to the effect that the organization of all four types of specialist teams was generally satisfactory.² Interrogator of

1. This chapter is based almost entirely on "An evaluation of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams, European Theater of Operations, United States Army," which is a consensus of opinions of G-2 officers of the following units: 38 Inf Divs, 12 Armd Divs, 4 Abn Divs, 15 Corps, 3 Armies, 4 Base Sections.

2. See the report of a conference with representatives of Army G-2 Sections concerning the organization of Army intelligence, 12 May 1945, contained in "A Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Army Group.

Prisoner-of-War Teams proved to be quite flexible in that they could be and were frequently divided into two groups and attached to separate headquarters for operation. This was usually practiced at division level, where it was often necessary to provide interrogators at regimental, division artillery, reconnaissance, and infantry and armored battalion headquarters. The opinion has been expressed that each Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Team needed at least one additional member to serve in an editorial capacity in the preparation of reports, since it was found that experienced interrogators were required to spend a large part of their time in writing and clerical work. A Military Intelligence Interpreter Team also was often used as two half teams. At Army Headquarters, an Order of Battle Team of one officer and two enlisted men was found to be too small to function on a 24-hour schedule over a long period of time.

34. Deployment of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The Military Intelligence Service Specialist Teams were attached to operational units, and their deployment to the various echelons is indicated in Table III. Representative G-2 officers of the 12 Army Group have expressed the opinion that the number of specialist teams attached to the various echelons was adequate, except that they believed two Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams to be insufficient for a division.³

TABLE III

DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST TEAMS

Unit	No. of teams attached				
	IPW	MII	PI	OB	Total
Infantry, Armored, and Airborne Divisions	2	1	1	1	5
Corps	3	2	4	1	10
Armies	4	3	4	1	12
Army Groups	0	2	5	1	8
CHANOR Base Section	2	8	0	0	10
SEINE Base Section	1	5	0	0	6
OISE Base Section	4	5	0	0	9
United Kingdom Base Section	2	0	0	0	2
Continental Advance Section	3	0	0	0	3
Advance Section, Communications Zone	0	15	0	0	15

Key to abbreviations used in Table III:

IPW Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War
 MII Military Intelligence Interpreter
 PI Photo Interpreter
 OB Order of Battle

3. See "A Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Army Group."

35. Duties of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.

to:

a. The duties of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams were

- (1) Interrogate enemy prisoners-of-war and report all information obtained to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
- (2) Co-ordinate with Order of Battle Teams by furnishing them military information concerning the enemy.
- (3) Report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, any prisoners-of-war who possessed vital technical, tactical, or strategic information.
- (4) Identify and report any important enemy documents found in the possession of enemy prisoners-of-war.
- (5) Attend daily briefings directed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

to:

b. The duties of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams were

- (1) Provide commanders with competent and trained interpreters.
- (2) Provide liaison with Allied Armies, resistance groups, and civilian agencies.
- (3) Assist Military Government and G-5 Sections when necessary.
- (4) Report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, all military information obtained from documents and the interrogation of civilians.

c. The duties of the Photo Interpreter Teams were to:

- (1) Procure aerial photographs.
- (2) Prepare photo overprints and overlays of enemy defense plans, positions, and installations.
- (3) Prepare terrain estimates from aerial photos.
- (4) Identify and locate enemy materiel.
- (5) Report the condition of roads, bridges, and railroads.
- (6) Construct aerial photo mosaic maps.

d. The duties of Order of Battle Teams were to prepare, upon request, reports covering the following subjects pertaining to the enemy forces:

- (1) Strength and location.
- (2) Types and number of weapons and status of equipment and supply.

- (3) State of training and morale.
- (4) Changes in organization and commanders.
- (5) Troop movements and changes in deployment.

Inasmuch as personnel properly trained to process documents were not attached to units below Army level, Order of Battle Teams attached to Corps and Division had, as a secondary mission to process and evaluate all documents captured from the enemy.

36. Variety of Services Performed by Personnel of Teams.

a. The evidence tends to show that the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were not often diverted from the duties for which they were trained. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams, however, were frequently used to reinforce the other specialist teams in emergencies. Because of their linguistic qualifications, Military Intelligence specialists of all categories were called upon quite often to serve as interpreters and translators. Their most important work of this kind was done for the Counter Intelligence Corps, G-5 Sections, and Military Government. Military Intelligence Service personnel also served as interpreter-translators in such non-intelligence activities as liaison, billeting, procurement of supplies, and interpreting at civil and military courts. G-2 officers have stated that they used specialists, other than the Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams, in these non-intelligence functions only when their services were not required in their specialties. Combat units reported various other uses for linguists of the Military Intelligence Service, such as the criminal investigation of civilians, organizing civilian law-enforcement agencies, screening German prisoners-of-war for discharge, and negotiating for the surrender of German towns.

b. The Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French) attached to Base Sections found that their duties consisted primarily of interpreting for Counter Intelligence Corps agents, the majority of whom did not speak French. The Military Intelligence Interpreters assisted in surveillance, sabotage cases, security surveys, loyalty investigations, arrests of French collaborationists, and in the capture of German soldiers who had concealed themselves behind our lines, and they aided the appropriate authorities in the apprehension of black-market operators. They also interviewed French civilians to determine those acceptable for employment with the United States Forces and they scanned French newspapers for matters of political and economic interest.

c. German-speaking personnel from Military Intelligence Specialist Teams of all four categories were also called upon to translate and interpret for the Counter Intelligence Corps, G-5 Sections, and the Military Government authorities. After the cessation of hostilities, many Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were regularly assigned to missions of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

37. Quantity of Combat Intelligence Produced by Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The consensus of opinion among G-2 officers was that approximately 58 per cent of all combat intelligence gathered by the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations was the product of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The proportion of intelligence obtained by the different types of teams was estimated to have been as follows:⁴

-
- 4. Order of Battle Teams do not appear in this list because they

Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams	36%
Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French).	4%
Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (German).	3%
Photo Interpreter Teams	15%
Total by Military Intelligence Specialist Teams	58%
Other Sources	42%

The authorities believed that these figures were about equally valid for Army, Corps, and Division levels. Certain factors peculiar to the European Theater of Operations influenced the effectiveness of the different kinds of specialist teams. The overwhelming success of the Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams may be attributed, not only to the high level of skill that they revealed, but also to the fact that large numbers of prisoners were taken, many of whom were not security conscious and were eager to volunteer information. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French) obtained some information concerning the enemy from the French Forces of the Interior and other resistance groups, but found that the average French civilian possessed little knowledge of military importance. While the German civilian was usually better versed in military matters, fewer informants were available because of the enemy policy of evacuating German civilians. Photo Interpreter Teams were dependent in their production of intelligence upon a continuous supply of photographs, and there were times when conditions beyond their control, such as weather, brought their work to a standstill.

3°. Quality of Intelligence Produced by Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. In the opinion of the majority of the G-2 officers consulted, the Prisoner-of-War Teams produced, not only the greatest quantity, but also the most valuable information. The Photo Interpreter Teams were rated second, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, and as the most reliable source. One weakness of the intelligence furnished by the Photo Interpreter Teams was its frequent lack of timeliness. Information obtained from French and German civilians was of small value when compared to these two major sources. Although nearly every G-2 officer consulted granted that, at some time during operations, the Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams had made some contributions of value, the majority of intelligence officers interviewed as a basis for this report considered them to have been limited almost wholly to the function of interpreting. Although Order of Battle Teams were not intelligence collecting agencies, they were, in the opinion of a majority of the G-2 officers consulted, the most valuable teams of the Military Intelligence Service.

Footnote 3 (contd).

were not, properly speaking, sources of intelligence. They processed information furnished by other agencies.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION 1

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of this study, The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, has reached the following conclusions:

1. The Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were extremely valuable to all commands to which they were attached.
2. The policy of attaching, rather than assigning, Military Intelligence Specialist Teams to operational units proved to be a mistake. Numerous disadvantages flowed from the anomalous status of the specialist teams.
3. The experience demonstrated the need in Military Intelligence work of specialists of the following types:
 - a. Interrogator of prisoners-of-war.
 - b. Interpreter and translator.
 - c. Interpreter of aerial photographs.
 - d. Order of Battle analyst.
 - e. Analyst of enemy documents.
4. The lack of basic military training and a certain ineptness in caring for themselves in the field on the part of some members of specialist teams undermined the usefulness of such teams and created friction with the personnel of the units to which they were attached.
5. Intelligence specialists needed to have the training they received in the United States supplemented by indoctrination and practical experience in the European Theater of Operations.
6. The period of training required, respectively, by interrogators of prisoners-of-war, Order of Battle analysts, and Military Intelligence interpreters was so brief, and the training had so much in common, that results would be better if all such specialists were required to take the same training within their respective language groups. In that case, the personnel would be interchangeable and reinforcements in emergency situations would present less serious problems. Further specialization would be a natural development from work in the field.
7. A training period of at least three months' duration is desirable for interpreters of aerial photographs.
8. The shortage of personnel for service in specialist teams was more apparent than real, and was due for the most part to administrative delays and confusion arising from the attached, rather than assigned, status of the specialist teams and the failure of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, to advance promptly enough with the progress of combat units.

9. The Tables of Organization for specialist teams were, on the whole, adequate, except that Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams did not have sufficient technical assistance for the preparation of their reports.
10. Two Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams per Division were inadequate.
11. One Order of Battle Team per Army Headquarters did not, in practice, provide sufficient personnel to operate on a 24-hour schedule over long periods of time.
12. Insufficient personnel was provided at Division and Corps Headquarters for the efficient processing of captured enemy documents.
13. The practice of promoting members of specialist teams to the first three noncommissioned grades, before they had proved their worth in their specialty was undesirable.
14. The Special List of Equipment authorized for specialist teams was excessive in some particulars.
15. There was much misunderstanding as to the functions and capabilities of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.
16. The organization of the Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations, was a wise move in the circumstances. Some decentralization of administrative control in the G-2 Section was necessary, due primarily to the lack of planning and preparation, and the creation of the Military Intelligence Service was a practical solution which served a useful purpose at that time.
17. The consolidation of the Military Intelligence Service and the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, was desirable.

SECTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, makes the following recommendations:

1. That all Military Intelligence Specialist Teams be assigned, rather than attached, to the G-2 Section of the operational units with which they work, thus being organic with such units.
2. That the necessity and value of the following specialists in Military Intelligence work be recognized on a permanent basis, and that steps be taken in accordance with other recommendations contained herein to procure and train personnel for the following:
 - a. Interrogator of prisoners-of-war.
 - b. Interpreter and translator.
 - c. Interpreter of aerial photographs.
 - d. Order of Battle analyst.

e. Analyst of enemy documents.

3. That all personnel accepted for service in Military Intelligence in any of the above-mentioned specialties be required to complete basic military training or its equivalent, and, to obtain some experience in living and working under field conditions, such as may be obtained in the training maneuvers of combat units.

4. That, insofar as practicable, all Military Intelligence specialists who are to work with combat units be assigned to such combat units in the United States in time to serve with such units in field maneuvers.

5. That personnel accepted for service in Military Intelligence as interrogators of prisoners-of-war, Order of Battle analysts, and Military Intelligence interpreters be required to take a common course of training, within their respective language groups, consisting of instruction in all three of these specialties.

6. That specialist teams be given tours of duty in foreign countries in time of peace.

7. That the number of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams attached at Division level be increased from two to four.

8. That editorial personnel be added to the Table of Organization of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams.

9. That the number of Order of Battle Teams attached to each Army Headquarters be increased from one to two,

10. That intelligence specialists should not be promoted to high non-commissioned officer grades upon graduation from the Intelligence School, but only after having proved their ability as a member of a specialist team.

11. That a detailed study be made to determine the adequacy of the Special List of Equipment for Specialist Teams.

12. That basic field manuals in all of the Military Intelligence specialties mentioned in paragraph 2 above be prepared, and that they be made available to all officers to acquaint them with the functions and capabilities of such specialists,

13. That an intelligence service be established to procure, maintain, train, initially supply, and assign intelligence teams to units in the United States and to provide reinforcements for the Theater of Operations.

14. That this intelligence service establish a reception center in the Theater of Operations to receive and provide indoctrination for all intelligence teams and reinforcements, and to attach such teams to operational units for brief periods of combat experience.

APPENDIX 1

Headquarters Army Service Forces
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington 25, D. C.

SFX 400 (16 Aug 44) OB-S-SFMOO-M

EM/ale 2B-939 Pentagon

IMMEDIATE ACTION

18 August 1944

SUBJECT: Special List of Equipment for Intelligence Specialists.

TO : Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation

1. Inclosed for your information and guidance is a copy of special list of equipment for the subject unit.

2. Subject unit is on Movement Orders, Shipment 8158.

By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:

s/ Lester E. Jensen
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
as listed above.

SPECIAL LIST OF EQUIPMENT
for
Intelligence Specialists

Interrogator Prisoner of War Team (IFW)
Military Intelligence Interpreter Team (MII)
Photo Interpreter Team (PI)
Order of Battle Team (OB)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ALLOWANCES</u>				<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>Authorized Teams</u>				
	IFW	MII	PI	OB	
	2-0	2-0	2-0	1-0	
	4-EM	4-EM	4-EM	2-EM	

ARMY AIR FORCES EQUIPMENT

Kit, Interpretation, Photo Type F-2	3	3 per PI Team.
Interpretometer, Photo (Austin) (Item 73)	a	a - 1 per 12 PI Teams (To be issued only when mission involves con- tinuous Engin- eering study).

Rule, Slide, Photo Interpreter	2	2 per PI Team (Authorized only pending inclusion of this item in Kit; interpretation, photo, Type F-2)
Scale, Magnifying, Transparent, Clear plastic, (Austin), 1/1000 foot graduation. (Item 56).	2	2 per PI Team (Authorized only pending inclusion of this item in Kit, interpretation, Photo, Type F-2).

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Alarm, Gas	1	1	1	1	1 per Team
Mask, Gas, Service	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Respirator, Dust, M2	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv when authorized by T of Opns Comdr.

ENGINEER

Alidade, Boxwood, Triangle, 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	2	2	2	1	1 per officer
Board, sketching, w/water-proof cover		2	2		2 per MII Team; PI Team
Tube, tin, or fiber substitute, Map Storage, 4" x 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	1	1			1 per MII Team; PI Team
Compass, lensatic, luminous dial	2	2	2	1	1 per officer
Compass, wrist, water-filled	4	4	4	2	1 per EM
Dividers, Draftsmans Proportional, 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ " w/case				1	1 per PI Team
8" w/case				1	1 per PI Team
Dividers, plain set	1				1 per MII Team
Glass, Reading 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ in, w/case				1	1 per PI Team
Glass, magnifying, self-illuminated w/spare bulb & battery				3	1 per PI Team; per off in PI Team
Knife, Pocket, Engineer, 4-blade, w/clevis	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Measurer, Magnifying (Millimeter) Leitz manufacture, or equal				2	1 per Off PI Team
Measurer, Map	2	2		1	1 per Off IPW; MII & OB Team
Net, camouflage, cotton shrimp 22' x 22'	3	3	2	2	1 per $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck; per $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer
36' x 44'				1	1 per 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck
Pen, Drawing; Railroad 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ in				1	1 per PI Team
Ruling 5 in				1	1 per PI Team
Protractor, Semi-circular, plastic, w/mils	2	2	2	1	1 per officer
Ruler desk, beveled, English Scale 24"				1	1 per PI Team

Scale, Coordinate, Plastic, 1/20000 and 1/62500 gr in yds and 1/25000 and 1/50000 gr in meters.	2			2 per FI Team
Stereoscope, Magnifying;				
Mirror, w/binoculars and case	1			1 per FI Team
Pocket	4			1 per EM in FI Team

MEDICAL

Kit, first aid, motor vehicle, 12-unit	1	1	1	1	1 per four fuel con- suming motor vehicle, or fraction thereof.
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ORDNANCEWeapons and Miscellaneous

Binoculars, M13	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Carbine, Cal .30, M1	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv in lieu of Pistol, Auto. Cal .45 for officers and sub- machine gun, cal .45 for EM.
Gun, Submachine, Cal.45 M3	4	4	4		1 per EM in Teams IPW, MII & FI.
Knife, Trench, M3, w/ scabbard M8	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Pistol, Automatic, Cal .45, M1911A1	2	2	2	3	1 per officer in Teams IPW, MII & FI; per officer and EM in Team OB.
Watch, Wrist, 7-jewel	6	6	6	3	1 per individual
Work-light, detachable w/20 ft cord and 6-volt storage battery	1	1	1	1	1 per team

Vehicles

Trailer, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 2 wheel cargo	1	1	1	1	1 per team
Truck:					
$\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4	2	2	1	1	2 per IPW & MII Team; 1 per FI & OB Team
$1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo			1		1 per FI team (Pending availability truck $\frac{3}{4}$ ton, 4x4 weapons carrier may be sub- stituted).

Motor Transport Equipment

Axe, Handled, chopping, Single bit, Standard, grade, 4-lb	2	2	2	1	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle
Defroster and deicer, electric windshield	2	2	2	1	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle
Mattock, handled, pick, type II, Class F, 5-lb				1	1 per $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck
Rope, tow, 20' long, 1" diam	2	2	2	1	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle

Shovel, general purpose, D-handled strapback, round point, No 2	2	2	2	1	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle.
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QUARTERMASTER
Individual Equipment

Bag, Canvas, field, OD, M-1936	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv.
Belt, pistol or revolver M-1936	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Cover, canteen, Dismounted, M-1910	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Pocket, Magazine, Double-web, EM-M-1923	2	2	2	3	1 per indiv armed w/pistol
Pocket, Magazine, for Carbine, Cal .30 M1	a	a	a	a	a 1 per Indiv armed w/Carbine
Strap, carrying, General prupose	6	6	6	3	1 per bag, canvas, fld, OD, M-1936
Suspenders, Belt, M-1936	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv

Organizational Equipment

Bucket, Canvas, Water, 18-qt	2	2	2	1	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle
Cabinet, file, wood, 2-drawer, letter size	1	1	1	1	1 per team
Case, canvas, dispatch	2	2	2	1	1 per officer
Chair, folding, wooden	1	1	3	1	1 per team; per off in FI Team
File, paper, clip, wood back	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Desk, field, empty, fiber, Headquarters	1	1	1	1	1 per team
Drum, inflammable liquid (gasoline) with carrying handle, 5 gal.	2	2	3	1	1 per $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck; 2 per $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck.
Goggles, M-1943, w/clear lens	2	2	2	1	1 per motor vehicle driver
Kit, sewing	1	1	1	1	1 per team
Machine, paper fastening, lever or plunger-type, wire staples, preformed, light duty	1	1	1	1	1 per team
Paulin, Canvas, small			1		1 per FI Team
Tent, command post, complete (w/fly-pins and poles)	1	1			1 per IPW and MII Team
Stove, cooking, gasoline, M-1941, one burner	1	1	1	1	1 per team.
Table, camp, folding	1	1	2	1	1 per team, IPW, MII & OB; 2 per FI team
Tube, flexible nozzle	2	2	2	1	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle

Typewriter, portable, w/ carrying case	2	1	1	1	1 per field desk, Head- quarters, 1 add per IFW Team.
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SIGNAL

Camera, PH-324			1	1	1 per PI and OB Team
Flashlight, TL-122-()	6	6	6	3	1 per indiv
Photographic Set, PH-261			1		1 per PI team
Radio Set, SCR-511	2	2	2	1	1 per motor vehicle
Telephone, EE-8	2	2	2	1	1 per motor vehicle
Tool Equipment, TE-33	4	4	4	2	1 per EM
Wire, W-130-A on Reel DR-8	1	1	1	1	1 per team
Speakaphone	1	1			1 per IFW and MI Team.

APPENDIX 2

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 887

12 May 1945

SUBJECT: Employment of Military Intelligence Service
Specialist Teams.

TO : Commanding General,
(Attn: AC of S, G-2)

THRU : A C of S, G-2, Hq ETOUSA

1. This Headquarters is compiling information concerning the past employment of Military Intelligence Service Specialist Teams.
2. It is requested that all G-2's who have employed such teams submit a complete report on their activities, using the following proposed outline as a guide. Any additional information deemed important to make the report more comprehensive may be included.
3. Proposed outline:
 - a. Approximate percentage of Intelligence obtained from (1) IPW Teams (2) MII French Teams (3) MII German Teams (4) FI Teams (5) Document Sections.
 - b. Evaluation of the importance of the information obtained directly from MIS Specialist Teams through (1) Prisoners of War (2) French civilians (3) German civilians (4) Aerial photos (5) Document Sections.
 - c. Qualifications of personnel:
 - (1) Qualifications as field soldiers
 - (2) Qualifications in speciality
 - (3) Qualifications for participation in general intelligence activity over and above their speciality.
 - d. Participation of team personnel in military activity other than intelligence operations.
 - e. Difficulties and problems encountered as a result of the system used for training, attaching and administering Military Intelligence Service Specialist Teams and suggestions as to how such difficulties might have been avoided in the future in the event of similar operations.
4. It will be appreciated if these reports are prepared on a separate sheet of paper and returned to the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service, by 5 June 1945.

/s/ S. A. Harper, Lt. Col.,
for HAMER P. FORD
Colonel, Inf.,
Commanding.