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CHAPTER III

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ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953

Chapter III: INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION PROBLEMS

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Chapter III

INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Nature of the Coordination Function

The Office of Intelligence Coordination, whose formation was first mentioned on December 1, 1950,¹ stands in a sort of transitional position between the pre-1951 method of coordination by inter-agency committee and the method adopted in 1954 when the function was transferred to the office of the DCI.² In the interim between these dates, the Office of Intelligence Coordination had been at first a quasi-independent Agency office devoted to matters of coordination; then in a staff relation to the Deputy Director (Intelligence).³ Wherever the coordination office (or committee) was organizationally placed, however, its duties did

¹ The first announcement of the new OIC seems to have been on December 1, 1950, when OIC was listed inconspicuously in General Order No. 38 (Secret), "Designation of CIA Officials." See also 25X1A [redacted] Dec. 1, 1950. Presumably, OIC's name, if not its charter, had been decided on earlier--perhaps some time late in Nov. 1950.

² On July 1, 1954, OIC was abolished, and most of its functions were transferred to a Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination in O/DCI [redacted] [redacted] Feb. 15, 1954.) Mr. Reber was made [redacted] on the same date. Other functions were transferred to OME, OCI, and OIR by [redacted]

³ OIC was one of the offices responsible to Loftus E. Becker as DD/I from January 1952. Becker regarded OIC as a special staff, but did not absorb it into the office as he had considered doing. (See interview with Becker, April 18, 1955, in O/DCI [redacted])

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not vary greatly because they were in effect prescribed by one of the most important clauses in the legislation on which Central Intelligence was based.

If Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 is followed from paragraph (a) to paragraph (d), omitting the qualifications of the Director, it reads: "There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency . . . for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security." In like manner, President Truman's letter establishing CIG¹ had directed: "that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed, and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." In both, the primary purpose of Central Intelligence was made clear: to harmonize intelligence activities.²

To do this under the concept of a "Group" pure and simple was one thing; to do it after a full-fledged Agency had grown up was another. Under a "Group" plan, it would be the duty of the Director, as an expert in the intelligence field (presumably assisted by a staff of other intelligence experts) to discover how

¹ President's letter of Jan. 22, 1946. See Chapter I, Annex A, above.

² Among the various definitions of "coordinating" in the Webster Collegiate Dictionary, the one most applicable to the word used in this chapter is: "harmonious adjustment or functioning."

the existing intelligence system could be improved in the directions suggested by the law and interpreting directives. Then, when the Director had decided what was needed for improvement, he could translate his decisions into proposals which, when approved by the directing authority, would be placed in force within all relevant intelligence organizations. In this way, without essentially disturbing the structure for intelligence already in existence, a more systematic use of this structure could be developed, the end product of which would be the sort of intelligence needed for purposes of "national security".

That any such method of "coordination" would depend heavily on staff work would be evident. It would be theoretically possible, but manifestly impractical, for the Director to make proposals without first making sure that they would be workable within the departments to be affected; hence, the establishment of a special committee made up of the actual chiefs of the intelligence departments (IAB/IAC) to facilitate the Director's problem of consultation.¹

The development of a Central Intelligence Agency implied something more, the difference being that between what is characteristic of a planning organization and what is characteristic of a functional organization. As soon as the Group became an Agency and

¹The IAB was authorized in para. 7 of the President's letter of Jan. 22, 1946, cited in Chapter I, Annex A, above.

began to perform functions in its own right (though still in the context of a multilateral system) coordination would come about through action as well as through supervision and planning.¹ Central Intelligence was directed, for instance, to "correlate and evaluate" national security intelligence. As soon as this began to happen, those doing it were necessarily "coordinating" intelligence activity almost in their every act. Likewise, as soon as any activity of Central Intelligence had been authorized as a "service of common concern,"² those directing the "service" would be carrying on coordination in their own field. Part of the coordination problem would then be concerned, not with harmonizing the activities of three agencies (State, War, and Navy) as seems at first to have been contemplated, but five--State, War, Navy, Air, and CIA. Hence, coordination would involve a watch-dog function in which someone in authority would attempt to make sure that the various aspects of intelligence being actually carried on in a more or less coordinated fashion by CIA and the others, would not be in conflict among themselves.

As will be shown, the first organizational method (The

¹"Became an Agency" in the sense outlined in Chapter I, above. The problem here discussed began soon after Vandenberg became Director rather than later with the passage of the National Security Act.

²See National Security Act, Sec. 102, Para. (d) (h), cited in Chapter I, Annex D, above.

Central Planning Staff) of dealing with inter-agency coordination followed the Group idea within a context that had not varied far from "Group" principles, while the second (ICAPS/COAPS) was essentially unrealistic as applied to the actual problem at hand. The third (CIC) was formed in recognition of the coordination problem as it had developed by 1951, though still governed by the same general requirements, in force since 1946.

Coordination Under CIC

The first Director of Central Intelligence responded to the coordination requirement by establishing what he called the Central Planning Staff,¹ which should formulate the recommendations that he would make, through the Intelligence Advisory Board, to the National Intelligence Authority. According to the Second Directive for the Central Intelligence Group, approved by the National Intelligence Authority on February 9, 1946,² the Central Planning Staff was to "assist the Director in planning for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security" Admiral Sowers further commented on this description on March 4 to the extent of saying: "It is my feeling that, as a general rule, the Central Planning Staff should take the active leadership in

¹For CIC organization see Chapter I, above, including Annex B.

²See Chapter I, above, especially Annex C.

arranging and conducting interdepartmental conferences, studies, or surveys which are designed to coordinate foreign intelligence activities A member of the Central Planning Staff should assume the role of Coordinator of such affairs and should participate in all meetings and other activities connected therewith."¹

A proposed second NIA Directive specified, with respect to the coordination function, that the staff "will perform detailed tasks of coordinating national intelligence activities other than research and the production of central intelligence reports."²

Three points of some importance with respect to the initial concept of coordination may be derived from these documents. First, the Chief of the Planning Staff reported to the Director; while each member, although all were drawn proportionately from the intelligence departments, assisted the chief rather than acting as representative of any particular department. Second, Admiral Souers clearly thought of the Staff as a flexible group which, "as a general rule," should take the lead in "coordination of intelligence activities": in other words, the Staff's duty would be to help bring about what could, in the last analysis, be done only by acquiescence of all elements making up the Group.

25X1A ¹Procedure Memorandum to the Central Planning Staff from its [redacted]

²"Pentative" draft of NIA Directive No. 2, (undated and never adopted) in O/PPI [redacted]

Finally, it can be seen that from the beginning, a fundamental split was accepted between coordinating intelligence "activities" (the prerogative of the Planning Staff) and coordinating intelligence reports and estimates (the prerogative of the Reports Staff).

How successful the Central Planning Staff idea might have been will never be known because this group was disbanded four months after establishment while it was still in a highly experimental stage of development. Even in this short time, however, it managed to explore the field of needed coordination and discover many of the principal topics worthy of further exploration and eventual agreement.¹

Vandenberg's Concept

In June 1946 General Vandenberg liquidated the Central Planning Staff by assigning its members to other duties within the Group. In July he formed a staff of his own for coordination, which was called the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS).² The result of this move might have been no more than a personnel shift incident to a change of administration. Actually, however, it introduced a new method of coordination which was in general retained by Admiral Millenkoetter but

¹ For a partial list of these, see Chapter I, above, p. 6, note 1.

² ICAPS was made effective as of July 20, 1946, by OIG Directive No. 14, of July 19, 1946, copy in O/DCI/

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altogether abandoned by General Smith.

The reasons for Vandenberg's action are not altogether easy to fathom, but in appearance, at least, they were primarily personal ones having to do with the new director's concept of his office. A summary of General Vandenberg's answer to the question put to him in 1952--"Why did you establish ICAPS?"--reads as follows:

He read the question and then he said, "What in hell is ICAPS?" I /the interviewer/ said: "You established the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Policy Staff." He then said, "Oh, yes, I remember." His remembrance runs something like this: He was having trouble with the representatives of the Services on the Intelligence Advisory Board because he insisted that as DCI he was individually responsible. The President had chosen him, given him an order. It was his duty, if he were to hold the office, to take the responsibility. In short, the Board was advisory. But he was having so much trouble with them that he thought it might be wise to have their representatives work with him preparatory to the formulation of his opinion. I said, "Well, you mean that you would let G-2 and ONI, through representatives, share in helping you make up your mind so that when you came to the top intelligence officers (IAB) they would already know through their representatives what had entered into your thinking?" He said, "Yes, that's just about it."¹

According to the tone of this interview, General Vandenberg would seem to have adopted a sort of compromise. As the President's appointee, he intended to make such recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority as he thought proper. But NIA-1 (above) prevented him from doing so without reference to the IAB.

¹ Interview with General Vandenberg, March 17, 1952, in O/DCI/ files.

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Furthermore, even apart from WIA-1, it might have appeared injudicious to him to forward recommendations to the Authority which had not been endorsed by the Board, inasmuch as recommendations affecting the whole of the intelligence structure to be coordinated, made without a fair knowledge of most parts of it, would be almost sure to elicit objections that would be unanswerable apart from such knowledge.

A staff which collectively represented knowledge of all U. S. intelligence organizations constituted an answer. With such a staff, Vandenberg could discuss any proposals he had and find out what IAB objections would be. Within their own departments, the staff members could then discuss the proposals as Vandenberg had outlined them, could discover any further outstanding objections, and could make clear to the agencies what the Director wished to do and why he wished to do it. Consequently, when one of the Director's proposals was prepared for consideration by the Intelligence Authority, any dissents on the part of the IAB would only be such as had been foreseen and were answerable.

If this was, in fact, something like General Vandenberg's idea in establishing the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, it might have been a workable one, especially if the assumption were accepted that the Director of Central Intelligence took individual, not collective, responsibility for the actions of the Group.¹

¹ See Chapter I, pp. 11-19, above, for discussion of Vandenberg's concept of individual responsibility and authority.

Vandenberg's committee, as has been said, consisted of one member each from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, plus one from the Army Air Force, the State Department representative being chairman.¹

The members were appointed by their parent departments, but reported directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. On July 22, 1946, a statement of the Staff's responsibilities was issued as follows:

1. The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff acts for the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of all intelligence activities related to the national security, and in the preparation of recommendations regarding the establishment of overall policies and plans to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

2. In discharging these responsibilities this staff will maintain continuous supervision of the planning and coordination of the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Group. It will focus its activities on the coordination of the intelligence activities of the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments and individuals concerned, to assure that:

- a. The facilities of each activity are adequate to discharge its responsibilities;
- b. All appropriate fields of intelligence endeavor are adequately covered;
- c. The facilities of the Central Intelligence Group

¹Originally it was a four-member committee. The State Department chairman was added later, the regular State Department member being retained. Among the members of ICAPS, 1947-50, were Donald Edgar, Prescott Childs, and Shane McCarthy (State); Col. John B. Sherman, Col. Charles C. Blakeney, and Col. Henry M. Zeller (Army); Capt. H. C. Doan, Capt. E. Watts, and Capt. Ward Gilbert (Navy); and Col. William G. Clinch (Air Force). See file on IAC Standing Committee, in O/XI

are operating to provide the best possible service to the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments and individuals concerned;

d. Raw information from all sources and activities is received by the Central Intelligence Group and, where appropriate, promptly distributed to the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments and individuals concerned;

e. The intelligence requirements of the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments and individuals concerned are adequately met;

f. Methods, procedures and controls are adequate within the Central Intelligence Group and the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments for the expeditious collection and integrated research and evaluation of information, and for the prompt dissemination of strategic and national policy intelligence.¹

Historical records examined do not disclose the origin of this statement of functions, nor how it came to be accepted. It would appear, however, to have been developed by the Staff itself, and endorsed by the Director. There is no evidence of approval by the Intelligence Advisory Board as such.

The approach it outlined was in the nature of a new departure. Whereas Admiral Souers' Planning Staff had undertaken studies of specific inter-agency intelligence problems with a view to making recommendations which the Authority might or might not approve, ICAPS was to "focus its activities on the coordination of the intelligence activities of the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments and individuals concerned to assure that" certain

¹Organizational chart of CIG, July 22, 1946 (C); in Chapter I, Annex B, above.

things were done. Furthermore, ICAPS was to "maintain continuous supervision of the planning and coordination of the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Group."

The extent of the Staff's authority to do what its charter called for was, of course, another question. If the Director were actually to "act for" or as "executive agent"¹ of the NIA, then ICAPS might, with approval of the Director, actually accomplish changes designed to bring about "adequacy" and efficiency in the total intelligence operation. Otherwise, ICAPS, as a corporate representation of the IAB Agencies, might "focus its activities" and endeavor to "assure" satisfactory performance, but it could not act in confidence that any particular results of its "activities" would be forthcoming.

According to its instructions, furthermore, the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff had a dual function. It not only "assured" satisfactory performance by the Departments of State, War, and Navy, but it "maintained continuous supervision" over the Central Intelligence Group.² Thus ICAPS was placed in the position

¹See Chapter I, pp. 15-18, above.

²OIC had no such broad authority as this, yet was a much more significant factor in internal Agency operations than ICAPS had been. ICAPS was in no position to do what its charter outlined for it to do, while the approach adopted by OIC enabled it to be decidedly influential in directly "supervising" Agency activities.

of attempting simultaneously to represent the interests of several departments as respecting their status under Central Intelligence; to represent the Director of Central Intelligence in his dealings with these same departments; and to exercise supervisory powers over the Central Intelligence Group conceived as something separate and distinct from the rest. Successful performance of such a complicated function would manifestly require great skill and delicate management. Otherwise, the system would have a tendency to break down.

Hillenkoetter's Concept

It began to do so soon after it was inaugurated. The Agencies would not rely on ICAPS actually to represent their interests; nor would they consider it the proper agent through which to deal with the Central Intelligence Group or the National Intelligence Authority.¹ So far as internal supervision was concerned, the Staff lacked the experience and competence needed for

¹ During the period September 1946 - August 1947, the departmental intelligence agencies tended to ignore their spokesmen in ICAPS, especially whenever the study of "a controversial problem" in their relations with CIG/CIA was involved. Instead, they relied increasingly on ad hoc committees established under the IAB to consider such problems. See memorandum by Navy representative in ICAPS (Capt. F. Watts) to Chief of ICAPS, Aug. 8, 1947, and interview with Admiral Hillenkoetter, Dec. 2, 1952, both in O/DCI, [redacted]

such work, and its efforts in that direction tended to aggravate rather than minimize the internal difficulties of the Group. Even as early as May 1947, when Admiral Hillenkoetter took office, there were signs that ICAPS, as a method of intelligence coordination, should be altered in the best interests of this important Central Intelligence Function.¹

Nothing compelled Admiral Hillenkoetter to retain ICAPS. It had no legal standing, nor even the momentum given by long-established custom. It represented merely a choice of method. Hillenkoetter could have adopted a new method but decided instead to go along with the old. His decision is recorded in a memorandum to the members of the IAC dated September 18, 1947.²

The reasoning to be found in this memorandum is interesting in relation to the whole problem of coordination as it developed into grounds for severe criticism in 1949³ and to reorganization in 1951. Stating that adoption of the National Security Act had required a reconsideration of the CIA-agency relationship, the memorandum stated that the Director of Central Intelligence had

¹Various proposals were discussed in memoranda circulated within ICAPS; see O/DCI/ []

²Copy in O/DCI/ [] filed under "Organization--ICAPS." Although the letter was signed by Admiral Hillenkoetter, it was actually written by Donald Edgar, then Chief of ICAPS.

³Particularly that recorded in the Dulles Report; see below.

"decided" to "create" an Intelligence Advisory Committee.¹ At the same time ("after consultation with the IAB") the Director had "determined to continue under the new regime the existence of his Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) with the duties and responsibilities with which it has hitherto been charged."

In describing what were to be the Staff's functions, and in particular its relation to the Director, the memorandum went on to say:

Although its personnel will remain under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence, it is requested that each Intelligence Advisory Committee member consider the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff member assigned from his department as his principal liaison contact in the Central Intelligence Agency on all matters pertaining to interdepartmental coordination and planning. It is desired to utilize these ICAPS members to a greater degree than heretofore in achieving the maximum possible mutual understanding and appreciation of each other's aims and objectives. To this end, it is suggested that they be encouraged to maintain close relationships with their agencies and be called into their staff meetings and conferences on pertinent subjects. In this manner, it is expected that they may present their agencies' views in the Central Intelligence Agency for consideration in advance of the submission of papers to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency's aims to their agencies. It must be understood, however, that although these Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff members will be expected to present their agencies' views in full, they

¹This obviously inaccurate statement is probably understandable by reference to the date of the memorandum. The National Security Act having been recently approved, the status of the Intelligence Advisory Board was in doubt if it had any basis for existence at all. The Intelligence Advisory Committee was not to be authorized for another three months. (NSCID-1, Dec. 12, 1947, in Chapter I, Annex E, above.)

cannot be expected in all cases to support them in the face of conflicts in the interests of the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

As written, this memorandum constituted more than a routine allocation of functions: it seemed to indulge in hints to the IAC members as to courses of action they might adopt in furthering coordination by the ICAPS method. They were to use their ICAPS representatives as a means of understanding each other's problems. They were, in general, to make ICAPS members privy to all departmental aims in order that ICAPS members could present departmental views for consideration by CIA. At the same time, members of the IAC were not necessarily to expect their ICAPS representatives actually to sponsor the views of their own departments, because ICAPS must place the "national intelligence mission" ahead of any purely departmental interest.

Having thus dealt with the character of ICAPS, the memorandum of September, 1947, went on to a discussion of a proposed "Standing Committee." The alleged need for such a committee was based on a complaint that in some past cases, "officers assigned to ICAPS on a temporary basis have not had the background knowledge required for full understanding, and/or were not vested with sufficient authority to act for their chiefs." Consequently, the memorandum proposed "a standing committee composed of permanent representatives of each IAC member plus the members of ICAPS, the Committee to be under the chairmanship of the Chief, ICAPS." The

officers making up this committee being of "sufficient competence to act for their IAC members," it should be possible to reduce "to a minimum the need for detailed discussion at IAC meetings," the memorandum concluded.¹

Thus, there being already a committee nominated by the IAC for coordination purposes, a second of the same general composition was added to do much the same things, with the chairman of the first committee at the head of the second. Under this plan, ICAPS was apparently intended to be a sort of junior committee, which would explore problems and suggest solutions, while the Standing Committee (a more senior group to which greater authority had been delegated) would pass upon items considered to be within its own jurisdiction, and submit the rest to the IAC.

Coordination under this system was clearly to be based on multiple delegation of authority. The first delegation (from the National Security Council to the Intelligence Advisory Committee) was not mentioned in the memorandum but must be assumed, since final authority rested in the NSC alone. The second (from the IAC to the Standing Committee) was evidently intended to be broad

¹For further information on establishment and activities of the IAC Standing Committee, see ICAPS papers in O/DCI/HS files. Members of the Standing Committee as of Oct. 1950 were: James C. Reber (CIA/ICAPS), chairman; William C. Trueheart (State); Col. Hamilton Howze (Army); Capt. John M. Ccker (Navy); Lt. Col. J. C. Marchant (Air Force); Capt. R. G. McCool (Joint Staff); Dr. Malcolm S. Henderson (AEC); and Melfert W. Kuhrtz (FBI). See file on IAC Standing Committee, in O/DCI, [redacted]

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enough to relieve the IAC of all but the most urgent decisions;¹ yet it would have meaning only in so far as the IAC chose to give it meaning. But the third delegation (to ICAPS) was of a different and more complicated order. To the Chief of ICAPS the Director of Central Intelligence seemed in large measure to have delegated his own responsibility for the coordination of intelligence activities to the extent that this officer (or members of his staff by sub-delegation) might represent the Director in negotiations concerned with coordination, and would there be empowered to speak for him. At the same time, each other member of the IAC would individually delegate to the member of ICAPS appointed by himself, authority to speak for his own department in negotiations with the Director of Central Intelligence.

Assuming, as the above plan seems to do, that NSC approval was in the nature of a formality, the success of the system described would rest, in the first instance, on the willingness of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to accept it in full with all its implications; and in the second, on the knowledge, skill, and energy of those making up the two working committees. In point of fact, as

¹One of Admiral Hillenkoetter's major purposes was to relieve the IAC of the necessity for frequent meetings. A further move in this direction was the proposed use of "voting slips" to render actual gatherings of the IAC members unnecessary. See, for example ICAPS weekly progress report to DCI, Feb. 11, 1947, in O/DCI [redacted] files.

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has been stated, the IAC proved unwilling to adopt the plan in any serious sense, while the membership of the two committees seems to have left something to be desired.¹

Difficulties and Accomplishments of ICAPS

In the form of memoranda, notes to each other, marginal comments, and formal reports, ICAPS kept a record of its activities over a period of three years. This record leaves an impression of constant frustration with a note of mild bewilderment. The picture seems to be that of five people, in positions assumed to be of great importance, well supplied with secretarial and material assistance, but without enough work to keep them occupied.

Outwardly at least, this would seem little short of extraordinary. According to its charter, ICAPS was expected to take the lead in reorganizing the whole intelligence structure of the United States Government. Such a task could hardly leave time for idleness. Yet the records of ICAPS are studded with such comments as: "Collection Plan for International Conferences and Meetings. (This project at present in the doldrums!)" ; or,

¹ See, for example, Dulles Report (Jan. 1949) pp. 43-45. See also Historical Staff interview with Admiral Hillenkoetter, dated October 22, 24, December 2, 1952, in O/OI [redacted] where he places the blame for imperfect functioning of both ICAPS and the Standing Committee primarily on the attitude of the IAC.

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"wasted the usual amount of time in discussions, conferences, etc."¹

The Staff seems to have made no independent attempt to survey the whole field of intelligence to find what most needed to be done, so that it could arrive at its own concept of what problems it should concentrate on. Rather, it dealt with individual problems that were brought to its attention by persons interested in them. ICAPS could make no recommendation on any of those problems unless it could gain reasonably universal inter-agency agreement on ways of disposing of them. Each of the problems outstanding had a way of becoming enmeshed in inter-agency complications, with the result that no further progress could be made beyond a certain point.

A few excerpts from the records might serve to illustrate the difficulties created by the system.

On the last day of 1946, one of the original military members of ICAPS wrote with what appears to be the enthusiasm generated by a new and untried activity: "Whereas accomplishments in the coordination and planning field have been slow, progress has frequently been achieved in external failures. The very existence of a coordinating activity which brings together the representatives of participating intelligence agencies for roundtable

¹ See weekly progress reports to Chief of ICAPS by ICAPS members, 1946-47, especially entries for Nov. 4, 1946, Feb. 3, 1947; in S/SOI [redacted]

discussions succeeds in acquainting each agency with the special interests, requirements, and objectives of the others. Gradually this process tends to increase confidence one with the other to the end that ultimately interdependence may be achieved. By interdependence the vast volume of useless duplication may be eradicated and essential gaps filled."¹

But three months later, on March 10, 1947, this same member listed only two projects with which he was concerned, indicating that nothing was happening to either. His enthusiasm was obviously less. By August 15 of the same year, he had decided that the ICAPS idea was in general unworkable and was ready to recommend that the Director:

Establish a civilian Executive for Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning to perform those functions of the present Chief, ICAPS, which relate to interdepartmental coordination and planning only. This executive should be responsible directly to the Director.²

By September, 1948, the Chief of ICAPS himself recorded his own summary of the situation when he wrote:

As I see it, ICAPS, when originally constituted was chiefly a planning unit to set up CIG and, subsequently, to help them in the conversion of CIG to CIA For the last few months at any rate, the planning duties of ICAPS have been almost negligible. Planning is

¹Memorandum by Capt. E. Watts, ICAPS member from Navy, to Chief of ICAPS, Dec. 31, 1946, in O/D/I [redacted]

²Memoranda by Capt. E. Watts to Chief, ICAPS, March 10, 1947, and Aug. 8, 1947, in O/D/I [redacted] This latter suggestion seems to anticipate the method later adopted by the Smith Administration by some three years.

limited because it's being done by CIA units themselves With the Standing Committee members as buffer states in the IAC agencies, there is duplication, i.e., expensive, more or less, to the extent of double salaries for a single job. ICAPS members coordinate with the Standing Committee members who in turn do most of the coordinating within their own agencies The work here in ICAPS is of some usefulness to CIA and the Agencies and is very pleasant and agreeable, but I do think it is an expensive operation which could be handled by one or two officers plus a couple of clerks, instead of the present complement of six officers and five clerks. What Col. Halversen and a secretary do with the Joint Chiefs 100 per cent of the time is something I have never yet been able to find out.¹

It would be far from correct to say, however, that nothing was done during the period of "ICAPS" and the Standing Committee. Actually--in terms of the completely uncoordinated situation that existed before 1946--a great deal of useful coordination was accomplished in the period 1946-50. Whether or not ICAPS was responsible for this accomplishment, it inevitably had a part in negotiating the various agreements.

Aside from National Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos. 1 and 3, which set the conditions and defined the terms under which a generally coordinated intelligence system should operate, ICAPS took a part in negotiating twelve NSC directives dealing with federal espionage and counter-espionage abroad; national objectives

¹Memorandum by Prescott Childs, Chief, ICAPS, to members of ICAPS, Sept. 13, 1948, in O/OI [redacted] Colonel Joseph Halversen, technically attached to ICAPS, was at this time acting as liaison officer between CIA and the JCS. (See also Historical Staff interview with [redacted] Feb. 17, 1955, in O/OI [redacted])

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in field collection; monitoring of foreign wireless and radio; domestic exploitation of intelligence sources; biographical intelligence; communications intelligence; scientific and technological intelligence; protection of intelligence sources and methods; avoidance of publicity for intelligence activities; and exploitation of defectors within and outside the United States. The Staff also helped negotiate eight sub-directives (NSCIDs) dealing with: the nature of procedures to be followed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee; procedures to be followed by CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies in the production and coordination of intelligence estimates and reports; detailed national intelligence objectives in field collection with priorities; responsibilities of field representatives in the collection and dissemination of intelligence; and establishment of inter-agency committees for scientific intelligence and defectors.¹

Coordination was also accomplished during this period, of course, through the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency itself. The Office of Collection and Dissemination was a partial realization of what had long been an intelligence dream: a central repository and index to information previously scattered and inaccessible.² The Contacts Division of the Office of Operations, if

¹For texts of agreements, see NSCIDs 1-14 and DCIDs 1/1-14/1, in O/DCI

²See Chapter V, below.

nothing more, brought into focus activities previously vestigial and without common guidance.¹ The Basic Intelligence Division of the Office of Reports and Estimates represented a practical means of producing an indispensable form of intelligence that could never have been accomplished by any one agency or without central supervision.²

The above selective enumeration is intended only to be suggestive of the fact that the period even up to 1949 was not unproductive of coordination. It does not take into account what was not accomplished that might have been called for, or the manifest imperfection in some of the coordination that was attempted.

The Dulles Report's Analysis of Coordination

That these omissions and imperfections did not escape notice was exemplified in the Dulles Report, when it appeared in January 1949. The Report said frankly that the Director had given insufficient attention to coordination of intelligence activities. ICAPS, it said, was "staffed by individuals whose experience with problems of intelligence organization is not extensive, and, lacking a clear and firm mandate, has failed to undertake a broad and effective program." The Report listed scientific intelligence,

¹ See Chapter IV, below.

² See Chapter VII, below.

communications intelligence, domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence, and espionage and counter-espionage abroad as fields in which coordination had not been successful.¹

The Dulles Report was mainly concerned, however, with coordination as it affected production of national intelligence estimates because, as the Report explained, ". . . the consideration of estimates should reveal the deficiencies and overlaps as well as the accomplishments in intelligence."² These estimates were in a sense the end-product of Central Intelligence and thus the raison d'être of "coordination of intelligence activities." Unless coordination were successful here, the end-product would be faulty; by the same token, coordination must be carefully and expertly handled by Central Intelligence if satisfactory national intelligence estimates were to be produced. Hence, in the eyes of the Dulles Committee, the essence of the "coordination of intelligence activities" problem was to be found within the "correlation and evaluation of intelligence" problem. Bound up closely to both, furthermore, was the third Central Intelligence function having to do with establishment of "Services of Common Concern."³

¹Dulles Report (Jan. 1949) pp. 48, 55-60, 125-26.

²Ibid., p. 61.

³See National Security Act, Section 102, para. (d) (h).

With all this in mind, it is not surprising that the Dulles Committee in its analysis of coordination should have considered the Office of Reports and Estimates as the "focus of confusion"¹ in all of central intelligence, for in this one activity were to be found coordination in all its forms as well as various services of common concern—but so constituted under the circumstances of 1948 that instead of working harmoniously in the inter-agency structure, they clashed with inter-agency activities at numerous points. This did not seem to be "coordination of intelligence activities." If anything, it was the reverse.

In essence, however, as the Dulles Committee undoubtedly realized, the ultimate origin of this confusion was certain directives approved by the National Intelligence Authority in 1947, but never formally rescinded thereafter.² It was by custom stemming from the authority of these directives that the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (1) produced as well as coordinated intelligence estimates; (2) conducted "intelligence research" of numerous types, most of them being duplicated elsewhere; (3) produced "current intelligence"; (4) produced various kinds of "reports" as well as estimates; and (5) engaged in various kinds of "services of common concern" not all of which had been

¹ See Historical Staff interview with [redacted] in O/DCI [redacted]

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² Primarily NIA's 1 and 5. See Chapter I, above Annex C.

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authorized by the National Security Council.

The basis for publishing written opinions based on intelligence (OSI estimates) was, of course, the clause in the Security Act regarding "correlation and evaluation of intelligence," which had been regularly so interpreted. Allowing that this was what the clause meant, the question still remained of what part, precisely, Central Intelligence should take in producing these opinions. With some variations, CIA had inclined toward the position that it should unilaterally write the estimates with the proviso that any of the IAC members should be given a chance to object if they liked.¹ Such a position would have been improbable, however, had it not been for the fifth directive of the National Intelligence Authority which permitted the Director of Central Intelligence to carry on independent research whereon estimates might be based. This directive, broadly interpreted by General Vandenberg,² had enabled him to establish an office theoretically capable of arriving at opinions applicable to national policy with little if any outside aid. The result was two coordination problems of major proportions: the one having to do with the validity of the estimates themselves; the other with the duplication of research facilities that had

¹The right of the IAC to enter dissenting opinions is in para. 5, NSCID-1; the standard procedures for CIA production of and IAC review of intelligence reports, in R.I.D.'s 3/1 and 3/2 (see O/D/I [redacted]). A study of records of actual coordination of estimates (in O/D/I [redacted] files only) indicates the attitude referred to.

²See Chapter I, above, pp. 19-24.

resulted from this relatively uncoordinated "service of common concern."

Production of "current intelligence" was another case in point. The Office of Reports and Estimates produced current intelligence in four or five separate forms,¹ its authority deriving ultimately from NIA Directive No. 2² There were two outstanding problems with respect to this production, meanwhile, which never had been successfully coordinated. One lay in the fact that each agency under the IAC produced its own current intelligence, resulting in duplication, particularly with the State Department, regarding current political intelligence; the other in the fact that CIA current intelligence, although it often contained quasi-official opinions, was not (because for practical reason it could not be) "coordinated."³

It cannot be said that the Director, through his coordinating apparatus, had altogether neglected these coordination problems before 1950; but neither can it be said that any concerted effort had been made to solve them. Generally speaking, the Office of Reports and Estimates had been permitted to discharge the Director's responsibility for coordinating reports and estimates and to engage

¹See Chapter VIII, below.

²Reaffirmed in NSCID-3 and DCID 3/1.

See Chapter VIII, below. The lapse of time between receipt of material on which the current intelligence publications were based and the deadline for publication was not sufficient to permit useful, full-scale inter-agency conferences on particular items to be published.

in "services of common concern" as it saw fit. No effective attempt had been made to curtail the independent research activities of the Office of Reports and Estimates or to harmonize them with similar efforts among the IAC member agencies.¹

All in all, therefore, it might be said that the basic functions of Central Intelligence had become concentrated in one office, where they were handled more nearly as if CIA were a separate and independent organization than an entity concerned with harmonization of the total intelligence complex of the Government. It was upon such points as these that the Dulles Committee focussed its attention when it reviewed the progress of CIA coordination in 1949. The Report offered a method of reform through reorganization of the Office of Reports and Estimates² which included also a "Coordination Division" to take the place of ICAPS and the Standing Committee.³

The correction of the fallacy said to be represented in ORE is treated elsewhere in this study. As to ICAPS, the only important changes made in that staff in response to the recommendation, however,

¹ Surveys of the effectiveness of the current intelligence publications had been made in 1947 and 1948 (by OCD) but had been inconclusive in nature and result. No similar survey had been attempted on reports or estimates.

² No real reorganization of ORE was undertaken, however. See Chapter I, above, pp. 48-51.

³ Dulles Report (Jan. 1949) pp. 61-62. See also Chapter II, above.

consisted in renaming it the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (COAPS) on September 30, 1949, and revising its "mission" to state that the Chief of COAPS, "as a staff officer . . . is charged with advising Agency officials on the effectiveness and improvement of the substantive operational performance of Agency activities, and with coordinating these matters with other government agencies."¹ Although this statement in itself represented a modification of its former terms of reference, COAPS remained approximately what COAPS had been in nature and purpose. It was still a species of inter-agency committee, lacking the full confidence of its principals. Its membership remained the same. In short, the situation with respect to coordination of intelligence activities when General Smith became Director on October 7, 1950, was not greatly different from what it had been on January 1, 1949, when the Dulles Report was submitted to the National Security Council.

Establishment of the Office of Intelligence Coordination

In view of the nature of the new administration and its particular commitment to the Dulles Report,² it was obvious that changes would be made in this sector of Agency activities. The changes made in the coordination staff were not, however, exactly

¹See files of folder marked "CIA-CIC Predecessors."

²See Chapter II, above.

as forecast. The recommended "Coordination Division", which would have been a much strengthened COAPS and would have taken charge of some of the functions being carried on by the Office of Collection and Dissemination, was not formed. Instead, the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff was allowed over a period of two months to develop into the Office of Intelligence Coordination, an organization which differed in many particulars from its predecessor but lacked some of the characteristics of the Coordination Division that had been proposed.¹

The ultimate reason why the Office of Intelligence Coordination developed as it did would seem to have been the enormous pressure of events upon the Directorate in the fall of 1950 and the early months of 1951, which left insufficient time for immediate establishment of a fully integrated organization in every part of Central Intelligence. The dissolution of the Office of Reports and Estimates alone was causing so much disruption in the intelligence (as opposed to the administrative and operational) wings of the Agency that it may have appeared wise to go more slowly in reorganizing any part that appeared less in need of immediate and radical revision. To have revised COAPS immediately in exact accordance with the Dulles Report's recommendations would have meant somewhat disruptive changes in the Office of Collection and Dissemination as well. Hence the immediate treatment accorded to

¹See Dulles Report (Jan. 1949) pp. 60-64.

the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff was essentially a stop-gap procedure, causing as little immediate upset as possible but looked on as temporary until more careful consideration could be given to the problem of the staff work underlying the Director's recommendations for intelligence coordination.¹

Fortuitous circumstances also favored this type of development. In October 1950, Prescott Childs, who had been Chief of ICANS/COAPS since October 1947, was scheduled to return to duty in the Department of State. The Department had, in due course, appointed as his successor James O. Reber, who reported to Admiral Hillenkoetter on October 1 in the belief that he was simply to carry on the usual duties of his predecessor.²

At a meeting on October 18, the new Deputy Director (Mr. Jackson) and the new Chief of COAPS (Mr. Reber) discussed ways and means of furthering inter-agency coordination with respect to previous inadequacies and new policies, and found themselves to be in general accord. Largely on the basis of plans arising out of this conversation, a considerable revision of the old coordination staff was undertaken.³

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³Ibid.

The first move was, in effect, to dispense with the Staff altogether. Its military members were ordered back to duty with their parent services, while the State Department member was transferred within CIA.¹ Then, by Regulation [redacted] the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff became the Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC).²

The new Office occupied a position in CIA's reorganized headquarters somewhere between the decentralized pattern of inter-agency intelligence leadership as it developed in 1951 and 1952, and the centralization called for in the single Coordination Division recommended by the Dulles Report. Although OIC was called an Office, it was closer to being a "staff" in that it served the Director's office and the Assistant Directors as an advisory, fact-finding and management-consultant group on various kinds of inter-agency problems of an organizational, administrative, or procedural character. Excluded from its responsibilities--as had been the case with COAPS--were the "substantive" problems of harmonizing divergences in intelligence opinions and evaluations in drafts of national intelligence estimates. After January 1951, OIC's

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[redacted] who went to the new Training Division. No formal announcement of these transfers seems to have been made. According to [redacted] (see interview, previously cited), it was his own decision to give up the COAPS representatives, who had become by late 1950 a "less than vestigial" remnant of the preceding administration.

² See Chapter III, page 1, note 1, above.

charter also excluded inter-agency matters other than those "on which the individual offices were not coordinating their own affairs."¹

In spite of the radical personnel change that occurred with the elimination of ICAPS, some continuity was preserved in the retention of Mr. Reber, who served continuously as head of COAPS and OIC during the whole Smith administration. On December 13, 1950, Reber was made "acting" Assistant Director,² his title being made permanent on May 22, 1951.³

The organizational position, functions, and scope of authority of OIC were redefined and settled upon sometime in January 1951, after a period of administrative uncertainty and organizational experimentation. During that period, covering the first weeks of General Smith's new administration, it appeared for a time that the COAPS staff would not only be liquidated, but that it would not be replaced at all by any other coordination staff. As has been noted before, Mr. Jackson took charge of inter-agency negotiations, especially with the State and Defense Departments soon after he took office, and COAPS was evidently by-passed if not ignored completely during those first weeks. In addition, Jackson centralized in his immediate office the control and clearance of "policy" contacts and liaison between

¹ Statement by Reber, acting AD of OIC, in minutes of DCI's staff conference, Jan. 15, 1951, SC-M-5 (Secret), in O/DCI, [redacted]

25X1A [redacted] (Secret) Dec. 13, 1950.

25X1A [redacted]

IA and the other intelligence agencies, and he even took over, from COAPS, the handling of the agenda for the forthcoming IAC meetings.¹

Sometime in November 1950, however, this initial organizational experiment began to be reversed. Inter-agency problems began once again to be delegated to particular operating offices. In the same direction, the IAC secretariat functions were returned to COAPS, from which, in turn, they were inherited by the Office of Intelligence Coordination.

Meanwhile, during October and November, before OIC had been established, Reber explored the possibilities of reviving the now dormant IAC Standing Committee, and of "really putting it to work as a staff for IAC matters,"² (presumably with OIC,) instead of abolishing it, as was actually done later, in April 1951.³ Some thought was also given, early in 1951, to expanding OIC's functions rather than contracting them. Thus, Reber was told, sometime early in January 1951, and apparently by Jackson, to "modify" the draft of his charter to cover "only" those inter-agency problems "on

¹See Chapter II, above.

²Reber's statement to DCI's staff conference, Jan. 12, 1951, quoted in memorandum for record on that conference, by [redacted]

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³The IAC formally ordered the Standing Committee abolished April 2, 1951, with "the approval of all members of the Standing Committee". See IAC minutes, April 2, 1951, IAC-M-24 (Secret) in O/DCI [redacted]

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which the individual offices were not coordinating their own affairs." Jackson cautioned Heber and the other Assistant Directors, however, that OIC was not to be narrowly restricted--"that he thought it was important for OIC to be cognizant of all inter-agency matters" even though that office would not be expected to control the staff work on all of them.¹

Once established on a reasonably well defined basis, OIC went to work on dozens of major projects for improving the committee structures, the liaison arrangements, the exchange relationships, and the other organizational and procedural mechanisms for promoting and facilitating inter-agency cooperation and for reducing those "normal fears and ambitions" of separate agencies that retarded cooperation.² Whatever the mechanisms involved, they were all appropriate organizational tools, in the Agency's day-to-day business, for helping to harmonize conflicts in intelligence opinion in various types of intelligence products; to reduce barriers against the freer and more efficient exchange of intelligence information among the member agencies; to reconcile competing needs and conflicting interests for particular types of intelligence; and to detect and correct gaps and deficiencies in the Government's

¹Minutes of DCI's staff conference, Jan. 15, 1951, previously cited.

²See Annex F, below, for texts of OIC's "Status of projects progress reports," Jan., March, April, and June 1951, and OIC's "first annual report" to DCI, Oct. 5, 1951.

intelligence assets. In this continuous concern, which affected all components in the Agency, OIC's function was essentially a management and administrative job.

In addition, from time to time OIC also was assigned other functions, that were, strictly speaking, outside the field of inter-agency coordination. Thus, it handled various kinds of intramural problems, especially during 1951, when there was no separate Deputy Director overseeing the overt offices.

One notable example was the Agency's expanding "external research" projects among the numerous non-governmental social-science institutions, which were contributing increasingly to the Agency's intelligence research and production programs. In this field, which in its external contractual aspects was handled principally by the State Department,¹ OIC became, in 1951, the chief coordinator within CIA, especially on behalf of the overt offices. Later, in 1952, this responsibility was divided between OIC and the new office of Deputy Director for Intelligence, first with respect to the new Center of International Studies (CENIS) at

¹The State Department had established, in 1947-48, an "External Research Staff" which CIA subsidized and regarded as a "joint CIA-State Staff." ([redacted] Secret, Oct. 8, 1952, and [redacted] March 20, 1953.) In March 1951, this joint staff was conducting an inventory of research facilities in ninety leading colleges and universities.

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Cambridge, Massachusetts, and later, in 1953, on other projects as well.¹

Nature of the New Office

The Office of Intelligence Coordination was in no sense an inter-agency committee. Whatever may have been the previous employment of any member, they now represented the Director of Central Intelligence alone. They officially constituted an office, but this Office, numerically, was smaller than many Agency branches.² Their job was to analyze problems, seek agreement, and aim toward contractual relationships which would be satisfactory to all parties involved, and workable with respect to Central Intelligence and its contemporaries.

It was clearly recognized by the new administration and the new coordinator that the NSC was the final authority in coordination; that the DCI could only make recommendations to the NSC; and that the IAC or its equivalent was an essential element in the

25X1A [redacted] evidently assisted in planning the "Cambridge Research Center" in 1951. (See minutes of DCI's staff conference, June 18, 1951, SC-M-22 in O/DCI, [redacted] In March 1952, 25X1 [redacted] now renamed "Center of International Studies" (CENIS), at M. I. T. Beginning about May 1952, CIA's research requirements for CENIS were being handled 25X1A by the DD/I, with the "assistance" of OIC. [redacted] May 5, 1952.

25X1A [redacted]

formation of such recommendations. Whether or not the IAC thus became a "Board of Directors" with a power of veto over the Director's actions; or whether the IAC was in an advisory capacity only to the DCI, was an academic question.¹ The Director theoretically could, but in practice would not make recommendations for intelligence coordination apart from consultations with the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The part played by the IAC, whether or not desirable, was inevitable. It was within this Committee, and there only, that successful coordination (up to the point of NSC approval) could take place. When, by [redacted] (revised) of January 19, 1951, the Office of Intelligence Coordination was required to furnish a Secretary for the IAC, the idea was more than merely to have a functionary furnished to the Committee to keep its minutes. Having the chief of the coordination staff in this position was itself an important factor in coordination. To a large extent, in fact, OIC's function was to provide necessary staff work for the IAC relative to coordination of intelligence "activities". In this respect, OIC simply took over the theoretical functions of ICAPS and the Standing Committee.

In addition, however, like ICAPS, OIC had internal as well as external responsibilities and it was largely for this reason that the status of the coordination group was changed from that of "Staff" to that of "Office" and that of its head from "Chief" to

¹See Chapter I, above.

"Assistant Director." This change gave the coordinator sufficient standing within the Agency to carry on intra-Agency business there. He had sufficient access to be able to understand the problems of any part of the Agency likely to be affected by arrangements being made with external agencies and could speak with the authority of an Assistant. It was not necessary for him to possess command authority over any part of CIA because in the nature of the coordinative process, as conceived under the Smith administration, the goal was not to impose a preconceived plan, but to discover a universally agreeable one. Obviously, should it become necessary to impose a plan upon reluctant segments of CIA, the Director would do so.¹

In discharging his responsibilities under these circumstances, the CIA coordinator obviously had to depend almost exclusively on negotiation. The purpose of the negotiations was generally to bring about a meeting of minds by helping various intelligence officers to understand each other's problems through perceiving the significance of their individual operations in the broad context of Central Intelligence. Mr. Heber summed up the new concept of the coordinator's duties in a "Rationale" published on January 19, 1951, as follows:²

1. The basic function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to harmonize the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the Government, so as

¹ See Historical Staff interview with [redacted] Feb. 16, 1955 25X1A
in O/R I/AS files.

25X1A See [redacted] (revised) Jan. 19, 1951 in O/R I [redacted] 25X1

to produce the best intelligence opinion for the guidance of policy makers. This is the function of COORDINATION which is accomplished by CIA at the national level in a threefold manner:

a. By advice and recommendation to the NSC in national security matters necessary to the effective operation of the Federal intelligence system affecting national security.

b. By the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security (production of national estimates) and the appropriate dissemination of these products.

c. By performing, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, services of common concern.

2. Accordingly, as an integral component of the responsibility of each of the Offices of CIA, each Assistant Director carries on coordination in conducting his normal operations. Hence, the Assistant Director for Coordination must realize that his function is to help the Assistant Directors in solving any of their operating problems in this respect. Thus the AD's and the other agencies should come to expect from the Office of Intelligence Coordination advice and assistance in the solution of problems that are without precedent, or of those which would not be handled in the normal operating channels, or when the so-called "normal operations" become snarled and to some degree non-productive.

3. Since one of the chief mechanisms whereby the DCI engages in and achieves coordination is the Intelligence Advisory Committee, a primary function of the AD/IC, therefore, is to assist in making the IAC effective. This embraces the major function of agenda preparation; preparatory work, as well as the provision of routine secretariat services.

4. Another medium through which the DCI will express his views on coordination, not only intra-agency but also inter-agency, will be the regular staff meetings of the Assistant Directors. To make these meetings most productive the AD/IC should be assigned similar

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responsibilities as are conducted for the IAC, as well as furnishing the necessary secretariat services.¹

5. Thus, from the IAC meetings and the CIA Staff meetings will evolve the prototypes for coordination throughout and among the departments and within CIA itself. The meetings can set the framework and develop the atmosphere under which the Assistant Directors and their staffs can work most profitably together and with their opposite numbers in the agencies.

6. To adequately effect coordination the AD/IC should develop an intimate knowledge of the functions and activities of the IAC agencies as well as of CIA. The AD/IC should systematically solicit the reactions of the agencies on the effectiveness of CIA's performance. The IAC Progress Report can be made useful in this regard since its preparation at once becomes the excuse for the Office of Coordination to inquire about the major problems and simultaneously produces the necessary information for the AD/IC to evaluate what action he can take either in the field of advice or assistance or as responsible liaison officer.²

7. Inevitably as one systematically seeks to uncover the problems as well as achievements in the field of coordination, he will formulate ways to solve difficulties either as things are or as they might be. He will also see the outline of problems for which provision has not yet been made in the organization of CIA to bring about new arrangements either between agencies or within the Agency to meet the problems in its planning. The association between planning and coordination is intimate and effective coordination necessarily leads to planning.

¹The DCI conducted regular staff conferences with the Assistant Directors beginning December 18, 1950, but the secretariat was provided by his immediate office staff rather than by OIC. See "SC-M" minutes, Dec. 1950-Feb. 1953, in O/DG [redacted]

²Originally (January 1951), the Deputy Director, William H. Jackson, had planned that progress reports would be prepared by a Historical Branch to be organized in OIC. In practice, however, they were produced, instead, cooperatively by the operating offices and OIC, with general supervision and final revision in the Director's office. See especially the progress reports to the NSC for Aug. 2, 1951 (IAC-D-29), April 23, 1952, Aug. 15, 1952 (IAC-D-55), and Feb. 6, 1953 (IAC-D-55/3), in O/OI [redacted]

Ten months later, in a report to the Director, Reber stated that "experience of the past year has confirmed the validity of the principles of coordination on which we have been operating." He then submitted the following observations:

a. OIC must achieve coordination (short of the NSC) by leadership, stimulation, and persuasion.

b. The primary role and expert knowledge of the agency substantively responsible for a particular problem should be recognized.

c. Actual coordination on specific problems should be decentralized whenever possible to the individual offices and agencies having functional responsibility.

d. The DCI, however, retains a general supervisory role over all the coordination processes. AD/IC is responsible for assisting the DCI in this role.

e. The effectiveness of coordination depends on the relations of the intelligence chiefs themselves, particularly in the IAC.

f. In order to solve relationship problems, a flexible, practical attitude is far superior to the legalistic, doctrinaire approach.

The Assistant Director added what he regarded to be the best approach to coordination:

Finding the problem; defining it sharply; discussing it freely and in a friendly way with the parties concerned--separately or together; formulating a draft recommendation; further discussion and persuasion; agreement or decision; implementation--involving the slow changing of attitudes; periodic checking to be sure the arrangements are in fact satisfactory.¹

¹Progress report by AD of OIC to DCI, Oct. 5, 1951, "Report on Coordination" (Secret) in O/DCI/ [redacted]

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Achievements of OIC

The above summary of what might be called a philosophy of intelligence coordination is included here to demonstrate what was undoubtedly the principal change that occurred in connection with the organization of OIC. It was, in short, more than anything else an altered approach to an unchanged problem and an adoption of more realistic methods of doing what had to be done in any case. Its essence lay in a realization that coordination--as the central intelligence system had developed over a period of five years--could not come about except through agreement, and that agreement must be negotiated because it could in no way be forced. Aside from this cardinal difference, the type of work done by the intelligence coordinators of 1950-53 was not much different from that done in preceding years.

For example, eight major problems were of concern to the Central Plans Staff in 1946, still of concern to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff during 1947-50, and still faced by the Office of Intelligence Coordination from 1951 to 1953. They dealt with: (1) rationalization of foreign collection of intelligence abroad by five or more agencies for a single purpose;

(3) central control of collection and central filing of information; (4) National Intelligence Requirements (intelligence objectives for field guidance); (5) production of basic intelligence;

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(6) the USCIB; (7) scientific intelligence; and (8) psychological warfare, both with regard to intelligence support and from an operational point of view.

Others that engaged the attention of at least two of the three coordination staffs in existence from 1946-1953 were counter-intelligence, exchange of intelligence production [redacted]

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As to the particular accomplishments of the particular coordination system that functioned between 1950 and 1953, they will appear in almost every part of this study. As has been pointed out, it was the intention of the coordinator under this system to aid others in aspects of the coordination process where he could be of service, rather than to attempt to bring about solutions through his own effort. Consequently, the part being played by the Office of Intelligence Coordination in various adjustments that were taking place in intra- and inter-agency relations throughout the Agency will not always be evident. It should be recognized, however, that the guiding hand of OIC was present in most of the developments that will be described below.²

¹ See records of CPA, ICAPS/COAPS, and OIC in O/DCI/[redacted] in O/DCI/[redacted] Further details, Chapters IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, below.

² A few examples might be cited as: Chapter IV below, where OIC was instrumental in bringing about the solution of the OC problem; Chapter VI, where the work of OIC was of considerable importance in the reorganization of SIC; or Chapter VII where OIC participated in formation of the [redacted] system.

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Nevertheless, a brief summary might be in order--written by those in the best position to know the problems of OIC--to show what, in essence, were the problems met and the problems solved by the coordination system inaugurated by General Smith. Such a summary follows:¹

The achievements of the Office of Intelligence Coordination can be divided into the following general categories:

1. Regularization of certain IAC practices and the IAC structure
2. Intelligence publications
3. Advice on and the negotiation of NSCIDs and DCIDs
4. Resolution of jurisdictional problems among agencies regarding intelligence activities and stimulating cooperative action to meet urgent intelligence needs.
5. Relations of services of common concern to the rest of the community and provision of guidance to those services
6. Support for DDP and psychological warfare.

First, as to the IAC, its major activity as far as its meetings were concerned, was in consideration and approval of National Intelligence Estimates. More than any single thing, the use of the IAC for approval of estimates furthered the development of an intelligence community. The weekly meetings of the intelligence chiefs for this purpose, the necessity for give and take, General Smith's happy sense of balance in recognizing the other's responsibility while seeing clearly his own--all of these things provided a new basis and method for cooperation.

25X1A ¹ Adapted from a Memorandum signed by [redacted] to Historical Staff, May 12, 1955, in O/DCI [redacted] For list of projects undertaken by OIC, see Annex F, below. For list of projects of IAC, for which OIC provided the secretariat, see Annex M.

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
However, it would be misleading to assume that the IAC's function in coordination was confined to estimating. A review of the IAC documents will show that half are non-estimate in character and deal rather with intelligence activities. It is in this area where the Office of Intelligence Coordination, through its mission in part as secretary and in part as coordinator, made its primary contribution in at least two ways: First, in the careful review of non-estimate papers going to the IAC and making suggestions to action offices for the clear presentation of problems and solutions; and second, in that on frequent occasion the coordination responsibility on an inter-agency problem was assigned to OIC, not as secretary but as the Director's principal assistant for coordination of federal intelligence activities. A list of those of the problems which fall into the latter category is as follows:

Dissemination of National Intelligence

IAC Progress Reports to the NSC

Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods

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In carrying out these coordinating assignments as well as others which were not handled as IAC problems, it was OIC practice to work closely with the offices in the Agency having the greatest interest and responsibility toward the solution of the problem rather than taking the matter out of their hands. OIC's detachment from direct responsibility on the one hand and its opportunity to observe the attitudes and philosophy of the DCI at IAC meetings on the other hand, at times prompted solutions which appeared to the CIA offices to be a surrender of DCI responsibility. Accordingly, OIC not infrequently

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appeared to the offices to be leaning far too much in the direction of the interests and rights of the other agencies at the Agency's expense although OIC preferred to consider this aspect as one of recognition of interests whether CIA's or others'. However, this provided more acceptability for the propositions which the Agency sponsored in negotiations with the other agencies. In certain cases disagreement with the other CIA offices was ameliorated by extended discussions over a period of time. In other instances it provoked the offices to circumvent OIC. This is particularly true of the Office of Current Intelligence which in USCIB matters as well as others preferred to and in fact did deal directly with the DCI, DDCI, or subsequent to its establishment, the Office of the DDI. This is also true but less so with regard to the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Greatest cooperation was achieved with ORR, OO, and OCD. While there were no great difficulties with ONE, OIC made relatively little contribution to ONE's coordinating role simply because they did it so well.

As far as FI is concerned (formerly OSO) OIC made practically no contribution because (a) the top authorities did not, for whatever reason, prefer that OIC should be called in to play a role and (b) the security and other devices available to FI were sufficient to permit them to handle their problems as they desired. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] At the request of the DDCI, OIC assisted in the agreed activities problem. In the case of requirements this may possibly be explained by the fact that FI was frustrated in its own handling of that problem. In the case of intelligence support, it was due to (a) that the office established in DDP for intelligence support was based on a plan drawn up by OIC, at the request of DDP, (b) that its leadership was drawn from the DDI area and (c) that leadership fully agreed with the OIC proposal and the methodology which it recommended.

A further indication of the scope of activities carried on by OIC during the period covered by this study may be seen in its official project list which is appended in "Annex F" below.

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CHAPTER IV

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ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953

Chapter IV: THE CONDUCT OF OVERT COLLECTION

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Chapter IV

THE CONDUCT OF OVERT COLLECTION

So far as its day-to-day work was concerned, the Office of Operations (OO) was little affected by the reorganizations that took place in the Central Intelligence Agency between 1950 and 1953. No part of the Office of Operations was abolished during this period, nor was any new part added (except to the extent that greater emphasis was placed upon certain non-overt activities.)¹

In general, during the Smith Administration, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] continued to collect, and headquarters to disseminate intelligence from non-governmental institutions and individuals; [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] while the linguists of the Documents Division continued to make available the results of their studies of printed material in foreign languages.

All this, however, was being done during the year 1951 in an organizational context that technically subordinated the Office of Operations to the Deputy Director for Plans and in the midst of a controversy over this organizational placement. It was not until March 1, 1952, that the Office of Operations was officially

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separated from the Deputy Director for Plans and placed under the Deputy Director for Intelligence, thus bringing a settlement to the controversy which, in effect, restored the status quo ante.¹

However unimportant this organizational shifting may have been with respect to the functioning of the Office of Operations, the experiment had a bearing on the broader problems of how "overt" collection could best be fitted into the organization of CIA. For as a result of the experiment--temporarily at least--a long-continued dispute was decided between those who believed that OO--because its business was collection--should be combined with other services of collection even though the latter were clandestine; and those who contended that the peculiarities of overt collection required that it be kept separate from clandestine activities. The decision in this case was in favor of the latter. The reasons for it can best be seen in terms of the background against which it was made.

Origins of the Office of Operations

By 1950, the Office of Operations had become a fully developed activity of Central Intelligence, supervising the work of

25X1 three distinct components: the Foreign Documents Division,

25X1 ²

25X1 ¹ See CIA

25X1 ² OO had originally been called "Branches" in accordance with Agency usage. The term "Division" was adopted in 1949.

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Its chief was one of five Assistants (including the Assistant Director for Special Operations) reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence.¹

Although circumstance, as much as design, had dictated this form of organization, the 1950 structure had been by no means illogical. The three seemingly dissimilar units within the Office--whatever may have been the reasons for placing them there--all fitted a common pattern. In a sense they had fallen together by chance; yet all of them, before 1951, had been tried in another Agency organizational relationship where it had not been considered appropriate to retain them.

The oldest of the components under the Office of Operations, STATSPEC [redacted] had been already five years old when it became part of the Central Intelligence 25X1 Group. In its original form it had been organized [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] as the need became evident for systematic coverage of 25X1 foreign propaganda engendered by the war. Under the general 25X1 auspices [redacted] it had grown 25X1 during the war into an operation [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] which included [redacted] and 25X1C had working arrangements [redacted]

¹ See Annex B for 1949-1950 organization charts.

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Its findings had been published and distributed for intelligence and other purposes within the wartime government.¹

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At the end of the war, the [redacted] service had faced a problem common to many war-born agencies, of whether it should be abolished, or if retained, under what auspices. The War Department provided a temporary solution by taking the service over in a caretaker capacity on December 30, 1945. It was transferred to the Central Intelligence Group by an NIA directive dated June 29, 1946.² It was assigned at first, within CIG, to the Office of Collection, but was made part of the Office of Operations on October 17, 1946.³

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Finally, [redacted] [redacted]

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[redacted] was given special status by the National

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Security Council [redacted] as a "service of common concern."

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[redacted]

The Foreign Documents Division (FDD) might be said to have had a two-year history before it became part of the Central Intelligence Group on December 1, 1946.⁵ It had originated in

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[redacted]

² See NIA-4. in Annex C, below.

³ See below, pp. 9-10

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⁴ [redacted]

⁵ See History of Foreign Documents Division, prepared by OO in 1952, pp. 1-2 in O/DCI, [redacted]

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various activities established during 1944-1945 by the Army and Navy to make systematic use of the documentary material being captured from the Germans and Japanese. By April 1946, these activities had been merged under the name of the Washington Document Center which the Central Intelligence Group acquired by agreement among Army and Navy authorities and the Director of Central Intelligence on December 1, 1946. From that date until December 31, the Documents Division was assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates.¹

At this time, FDD was primarily custodian of a huge mass of captured material (for example, during six months after the Japanese surrender 650,000 documents were sent to Washington from Tokyo alone.)² Although the chief concern of the Documents Center was with sorting and translating this material, it was already so constituted as to be convertible into an intelligence facility specializing in foreign documentary sources. It was thus a service of potential concern to more than one intelligence agency which could properly be managed by Central Intelligence. Although there was little protest against the transfer of this activity to CIG, agreement as to its status was not sufficient to permit establishing it as an official "service of common concern,"

¹ See Memorandum AB/ORE to Chief ICAPS, Oct. 1, 1946, in O/DCI/ [] files, under "ICAPS-1946"

² FDD History (previously cited) p. 2.

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25X1 as was done in 1947 [redacted] Many proposals were advanced for a similar directive to clarify the status of the Documents organization, but none of them was authorized until March 1953.¹

25X1 Unlike the other two, which came full-grown into Central Intelligence, [redacted] developed as part of the Central Intelligence Group. This is not to say that the idea was unprecedented: before and during World War II, numerous intelligence agencies had directed their efforts toward collection from domestic sources. Indeed, one cogent reason for the establishment of domestic collection as a centrally directed service lay in the wartime overdevelopment of under-directed activities in this field. It was in recognition, first of the fertility of the domestic field for collection of foreign intelligence, and second of the dangers inherent in promiscuous exploitation of this field, that plans [redacted] 25X1 began to be developed very soon after authorization of the Central Intelligence Group.

25X1 These plans were within the context of collection in general, rather than for "domestic" or "overt" collection as a separate activity. The elements [redacted] were originally a part of the Office of Special Operations (OSO).

¹ See NSCID-16, dated March 7, 1953, in Annex E, below.

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Within OSO--as it was planned in skeleton form early in 1946 primarily for collection of intelligence abroad--was to be a

25X1 Deputy whose specialty was to be collection from sources within the United States.

25X1A
from July 11 to October 17, 1946, made a study of possibilities for domestic collection and produced recommendations for directives which would permit centralization of domestic collection under CIG. In accordance with these recommendations, and after considerable argumentation among the agencies concerned, agreement was reached on a directive called "CIG 15" which allowed for the establishment of domestic collection under a species of central control.¹

25X1A did not favor inclusion of domestic collection within OSO. It was his belief that this activity should be kept separate from its foreign counterpart for much the same reasons advanced by the advocates of this theory five years later. He does not seem to have pressed this point, however.

25X1 Had it not been for subsequent events,

25X1 the Office of Operations might well have been merged from the beginning with the Office of Special Operations,

25X1 ¹ See History prepared by OO, 1952, pp. 1-8, in O/DCI See also HS files relating to CIG Nos. 12 and 15.

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while the other two units of the eventual Office carried on their activities as parts of the Offices of Reports and Estimates and Collection and Dissemination or elsewhere.¹

All of the reasons for the actual development of a separate headquarters to guide the three activities just described are not completely clear. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that they were associated with the decision made in the summer of 1946 to acquire the services of Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert for the Central Intelligence Group.

25X1 Apparently, Messrs. [redacted]
approached General Sibert on the subject of becoming Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence while Sibert was chief of Intel-
25X1 ligence for General McNarney [redacted] It would also seem
25X1 that at a meeting of Military Attaches [redacted] during the
same summer, General Vandenberg, then Director of Central Intel-
ligence, asked General Sibert "to come to Washington to supervise
the collection of foreign intelligence information in the newly-
formed CIG."² The plan, in other words, was evidently to
give General Sibert a position of considerable responsibility

25X1 ¹ See Historical Staff interview [redacted] May 26,
1952, in O/DCI/[redacted]

² *Ibid.* See also History of OO/C (1952) Chapter I, p.1, in
O/DCI/HS files.

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within the Group. Reasons seem to have developed before the General's arrival in Washington, however, that modified this intention both regarding the Deputy Directorship and the position as head of all overt and covert collection.¹

25X1 Although a part of the problem seems to have concerned General Sibert personally, there was also to be considered the question of whether or not overt and covert collection should be under the same management. According to one source, this subject was discussed [redacted] "but it was decided to postpone a decision until General Sibert came on duty."² The decision may have been based upon a determination by General Vandenberg in favor of separate direction of the two types of collection, or upon a desire to limit General Sibert's duties, or both. It would appear meanwhile that Colonel Donald H. Galloway, who was the first chief of collection activities under the Group, argued successfully before General Vandenberg against placing General Sibert in charge of the combined activities.³

Outwardly at least, the final decision in this matter appears in a "CIG Administrative Order" entitled "Activation of the Office of Operations." This order, signed by the Deputy

X1 25X1A ¹ Ibid. See also Historical Staff Interview with George Carey, May 17, 1955, in O/DCI [redacted] Also HS Interview with [redacted]
25X1A [redacted] dated November 10, 1952.

² OO/C History, 1952 (previously cited), Chapter I, p.1.

X1 25X1A ³ See Historical Staff interview with [redacted] Nov. 10, 1952, in O/DCI [redacted]

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Executive for Personnel and Administration on October 17, 1946:

25X1 (1) "Activated" the Office of Operations [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] and "[redacted]

STATSPEC [redacted] (2) "relieved" the [redacted] Deputy Staff "from assign-

25X1 ment to the Office of Special Operations," [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]

[redacted] On

the same day, General Vandenberg approved not only the appointment of General Sibert as chief of the new "operations" office, but that of Colonel Galloway as chief of the office of "special operations." Thus, as of October 17, 1946, the separation of overt and covert collection functions within Central Intelligence became a fact.¹

25X1C Precise reasons for [redacted]

the Office of Operations do not appear from records consulted.²

The rather rudimentary and tentative nature of the Office of Collection at this time may have been a reason. The fact that "collection" as intended for this office and "collection" as

¹ See CIG Administrative Order No. 22, Oct. 17, 1946, in O/DCI [redacted] files.

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25X1C [redacted]

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25X1 practiced [redacted] were two different things may have had a part.¹ It is conceivable that expansion of the new office to be directed by General Sibert was thought advisable in view of broader responsibilities that had evidently been considered for him before his appointment. At any rate, the consolidation was directed by the Order of October 17, 1946, and, as has already been noted, the Foreign Documents Division became part of the Office of Operations upon its transfer from the Office of Reports and Estimates on December 31, 1946.²

Salient Developments to 1949

25X1 The immediate result did not appear homogeneous. [redacted]

25X1C



25X1 The [redacted] unit on the other hand (the word
25X1 [redacted] was very soon dropped)³ was in blueprint form in the

¹ Collection and Dissemination were separate offices at this time. See Chapter V, below.

25X1A ² See memorandum signed by [redacted] Executive for Personnel and Administration, CIG, Dec. 31, 1946 (retroactive to December 1).

³ See CIG Admin. Order No. 37, Nov. 22, 1946, in O/OCI [redacted]

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25X1 fall of 1946.

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25X1

[Redacted]

¹ It thus presented an organizational problem essentially unrelated to those of its two counterparts.

There were legal problems also to be worked out. The

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[Redacted] documents activities now belonged properly to the Central Intelligence Group; yet the Group had no particular license to operate them beyond the agreements of transfer.

Similarly--beyond the tentative agreement contained in "CIO-15"²--the Group had no real license to engage in domestic collection.

It would be desirable, in other words, to give official recognition to all OO activities as "services of common concern,"

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properly so designated by competent authority.

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[Redacted]

Another

NSCID authorized domestic collection as a common service in February 1948. Exploitation of foreign documents, however, was not similarly authorized for another five years.³

STATSPEC

[Redacted]

¹ See below, pp. 17-18.

² See above, p. 7.

³ See NSCID's 6 and 7, in Annex E, below, and Footnote 1, p.6, above.

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information to meet the needs of all Departments and agencies in connection with the National Security"; while the other authorized dissemination to the same. There seems to have been no great problem in the negotiation of this agreement.

Direct domestic collection of intelligence was another story. Even before formal authorization had been received from the National Security Council, CIG had secured agreements regarding domestic collection that were temporarily workable but considered less than satisfactory. It was evident from the beginning that the [] work of the Office of Operations could not proceed successfully until CIG could be sure of willingness on the part of other governmental agencies to concede this function to Central Intelligence without serious reservation.¹

Behind the agreements and disagreements that went into the formation of a directive for central domestic collection were certain more or less irreducible realities. In the first place, it was manifestly true and generally uncontested that the United States contained a rich "domestic" source of intelligence. []

[]

¹ See material relative to CIG Orders Nos. 10, 11, 15, and 16; OO History [] (1952), and Historical Staff study on moves leading up to acceptance of [] all in O/DCI, []


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
25X1



At the same time, it was true, if less manifestly so, that domestic collection was a process calling for careful coordination if not complete centralization. What had happened with respect to domestic collection during the war had convinced observers that continuation of uncontrolled interrogation in time of peace would not only lead to confusion and duplication but might result in drying up the source. There was reasonably general agreement, therefore, that measures should be taken to ensure orderly procedures with respect to such collection. There was no such general agreement, however, that exclusive "exploitation" by Central Intelligence was the answer. Another answer would be continued exploitation by each agency according to its needs with central supervision to whatever extent proved necessary.¹

25X1 Furthermore, in the case of domestic collection of foreign intelligence, there was jurisdictional conflict 

25X1  Internal security was the exclusive prerogative of the Department of Justice, exercised through this Bureau. Although the law specified that Central Intelligence should conduct no "internal investigations," the FBI feared conflict with its own internal security programs if Central

25X1 ¹ See the History of  (1952), Sections A and B, in O/OCI  files.

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Intelligence were permitted to operate at all within the United States. To take care of this difficulty, understandings were reached whereby Central Intelligence would not approach individuals or groups of concern to the Bureau's internal security programs without first consulting the FBI.¹

25X1 The National Security Council Intelligence Directive dealing with domestic collection accorded CIA the right to collect foreign intelligence at home, to keep a file and to disseminate the resultant information. Other agencies could continue their contacts with domestic sources with proviso that Central Intelligence should be kept informed.² This agreement proved sufficiently comprehensive to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to embark on an enterprise which in time provided intelligence of value to all intelligence agencies including CIA.

At the time when the NSCID for domestic collection was approved, however, the Office of Operations had been doing work now officially assigned to it for more than a year. First under General Sibert, and (after June 1948) his successor, Mr. George G.

¹ Ibid. See also material relative to CIG Order No. 12, in O/DCI

² For NSCID 7, see Annex E, below.

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Carey, an organization for domestic collection had been rapidly developed.¹

The first step had been to organize a catalogue of domestic sources. After experimenting with rather too elaborate plans for a "Central Register," [redacted] devised a method whereby prime reliance was to be placed on [redacted] themselves for discovery of where the real potential lay; and on the actual test of experience to determine which sources were truly productive for what types of information. The results of such determinations were

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recorded by machine [redacted] generally known as the "Index." [redacted]

It was not until August 1948 that the Index was finally lodged within and under the control of the Office of Operations. There had been, in the first place, a long and intricate argument among the various intelligence agencies over the proper placement of the Index within the government; followed by another within Central Intelligence, as a result of which the Index had initially

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¹ Mr. Carey became Assistant Director on June 14, 1948, and held the position through the administration of General Smith and thereafter, [redacted]

Deputies under Mr. Carey were: [redacted] and [redacted]

² See OI History of OOI [redacted] (1952) Sec. C, in O/DCI [redacted] See also Chapter V, below, p. 12.

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25X1 been placed [redacted]
where filing and machine indexing were normally done. Finally, it
had been conceded that this particular register belonged solely to
the Office of Operations.¹

The second requirement for domestic collection was a system

25X1 for gathering information. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

¹ See OO History of OO [redacted] (1952). See also briefing paper
prepared for DCI for presentation to NIA, February 12, 1947, in
folder "CIA-OIC predecessors," in O/DCI/SA [redacted] and material
relative to CIS Order No. 12, in O/DCI [redacted]

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[redacted]

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25X1 [] collectors might use it to the best effect; the other
 "Control" which was chiefly devoted to preliminary analysis and
 25X1 processing of intelligence reports [] The
 25X1 movement of the latter was toward a [] organization, with
 25X1 specialists in [] foreign intelligence to analyze []
 reports with respect to their significance for the Central and
 other intelligence agencies.¹

Within the limits so far noted, the Office of Operations
 had the beginnings of a coherent, governable enterprise. Its
 primary function was collection of foreign intelligence.² In
 this respect it was differentiated from its counterpart in CIA
 (the Office of Special Operations) not through the type of intel-
 ligence it collected, but through the means by which it did the
 collecting. This method was called "overt" because it involved
 no attempt to hide the fact that information was being collected
 25X1 for intelligence purposes. []

25X1 [] FID
 translated books, most of which were freely available to the
 25X1 public. Agents [] normally approached

25X1 ¹ See OO [] History (1952), Section C, Para. 12 ff., in O/DCI [] 25X1
 files.

25X1 ² In the sense that the functions [] just
 mentioned were primarily editorial and not to be confused with the
 analysis of intelligence collected, which was a function of other
 CIA/IAC offices.

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American citizens frankly to gain information known to be wanted by CIA, and imparted on a voluntary basis only.¹

It was true, nevertheless, that the information collected

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[redacted] involved special problems after collec-

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tion. For one thing, what sources told [redacted] was intended for their ears alone and must be kept secret for that and other reasons; for another, the sources themselves normally demanded anonymity. In the matter of protecting information and sources, therefore, the Office of Operations resembled a covert more than an overt organization and to that extent, was similar to the clandestine offices.

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¹ That OO was dependent on inspiring confidence is shown in the OO [redacted] Collector's Manual": "No contact has to give you information. All information that the Agency receives comes to it either voluntarily or for some sort of adequate return. No contact is required to devote a minute of his time to you or your work unless he wishes to." See Manual, p. III-1-1, in OO files.

² For copy of NSCID No. 7, see Annex E, below.

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By the end of 1948, with the establishment of these two activities, the essential organization of the Office of Operations

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was complete



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These, together with FDD, were

regularly producing intelligence information.³ This was processed in each Division by an editorial-analytical section devoted to pro-

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cessing raw material received



(or in the case of

Documents Division from its translators) with a view to making it

available and useful to consumers of intelligence.⁴

¹ See below, pp. 50-51.

² See below, pp. 42-44.

25X1

³ FDD also had a [redacted] activity during this period ([redacted] [redacted] exploiting Soviet material in the Hoover Library at Stanford) which, however, was terminated in 1948. See OO History of FDD (1952), p. 20, in O/DCI/[redacted]

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⁴ See Annex B, below.

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STATSPEC For the first time [redacted]

STATSPEC [redacted] employees felt that their work was being done
25X1 toward a coherent and understandable goal. [redacted] collectors
usually, if not always, knew what to collect and why it was to be
collected. Their work was naturally improved thereby. Similarly,
home office analysts and editors knew what was wanted and thus had
a basis to guide their analysis.¹

Each Division issued its material in the form of "publica-
STATSPEC tions." Those of the [redacted] Documents Divisions were
largely in the nature of support and background material. The
25X1 reports [redacted] on the other hand, were usually
parallel or supplementary to those received from the Office of
Special Operations and the foreign collection services of other
25X1 intelligence agencies.² [redacted] reports [redacted]
25X1 were regularly evaluated for OO [redacted] thus giving further guid-
25X1 ance as to the desirability of material being collected as judged
by the office primarily concerned with "national" intelligence.³

25X1 ¹ See OO History of OO [redacted] (1952), in O/DCI/[redacted]

25X1

² See below, pp. 76-80.

25X1 ³ During this period, the Office of Reports and Estimates pro-
vided this service for both OO and OSO. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

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The organization in general, as it existed in 1949, was undoubtedly imperfect as was to have been expected after only two years of experimentation; yet the feasibility, if not the desirability of "overt" collection, as practiced under the direction of a centralized office in coordination with the total intelligence organization of the government had been demonstrated.

Proposals and Counterproposals of 1949-1950

25X1 The Dulles Report, when it appeared at the beginning of 1949, recognized all this and conceded that [redacted] "seems to have successfully initiated the handling of these [collection] problems and to have gained the confidence of the agencies it is serving." Similarly, the Report stated that [redacted]

STATSPEC [redacted]

STATSPEC [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] the Foreign Documents Division, although not officially recognized as such, was a "unique common service."¹

The Dulles Committee, however, questioned the organization of the Office of Operations as a whole. This Office, it said, "consists of three distinctive activities which represent useful and recognized functions in their own field but have no particular relation to each other." The Report recommended, therefore, that

25X1 [redacted] be integrated with the Office of Special

¹ See Dulles Report, pp. 95-101.

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Operations and the Office of Policy Coordination, under single over-all direction (Operations Division) within CIA." As to the other two units of the Office, the Committee recommended that

25X1 [redacted] be made part of the proposed

25X1 Research and Reports Division if one is created," and that [redacted]

STATSPER

25X1 [redacted] it should probably be administered

by the new Operations Division, but its product should be currently available for analysis in the new Research and Reports Division."¹

These recommendations were consistent with the view expressed in the Dulles Report that the "operating" services of common concern by their nature, should be kept separate from the coordinating functions, to "... meet the criticisms frequently voiced, and with a good deal of merit, that it is essentially unsound to combine in a single intelligence agency both secret operations and over-all coordinating and estimating functions." The recommendations also accorded with the requirements set in the introduction to the Report that the "operating functions . . . should have common direction at some point below the Director of Central Intelligence."²

25X1 In this view--where the cardinal point was to keep secret operations compartmented from other Agency activities--the work [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] seemed inappropriately placed in a position

¹ Ibid. pp. 104, 105

² Ibid. p. 10

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divorced from the Office of Special Operations which was carrying
 25X1 on secret collection [] if not the Office of Policy Coordina-
 tion which was engaging in secret operations. In the words of the
 Report:

25X1 "(3) [] the Office of Special
 25X1 Operations are [] intelligence collection operations
 25X1 and are, to a large extent, guided by the same collection
 requirements of the various Government agencies. They
 should serve their consumers in a coordinated manner;

25X1 "(4) [] has to some extent, the same
 security problems of protecting sources as the Office of
 Special Operations;

25X1 "(5) There is a closer relationship between []
 25X1 [] the Office of Special Operations and Office
 25X1 of Policy Coordination than there is between []
 25X1 [] the other two branches with which it is now
 associated under the Office of Operations." ¹

The Director of Central Intelligence, acting on the advice
 of his Assistant for Operations, was resistant to these suggestions.
 In the course of the "Comments" he forwarded to the National
 Security Council on February 28, 1949, he rejected Dulles Com-
 mittee's proposals regarding OO, with exception of a clause which
 had suggested that "More active efforts should be made to exploit
 25X1 intelligence from [] individuals
 in the United States."

The Agency's case for rejection was based on a denial of
 the Dulles Committee's premises--that the three units of the

¹ Ibid, p. 100.

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Office of Operations had "no particular relation to each other";
25X1 and that the activities of the [redacted]
Office of Special Operations were so closely related as to require
unified control. In point of fact, according to the "Comments",
all three of the units under the Office of Operations were alike
in that they were engaged in "overt" collection of intelligence,
frequently acquiring the same information from different sources--
which was itself a reason for keeping them under common management.
On the other hand, they did not engage in research, analysis, or
evaluation and were therefore unrelated to "over-all coordinating
and estimating functions."¹ So far as collection was concerned,
25X1 it was quite as necessary for [redacted] the Office of Operations
to maintain their relation to the Central Intelligence Agency
openly as it was for those of secret intelligence collection
25X1 abroad [redacted]

Furthermore, according to the Director's "Comments" it was
especially necessary for the Office of Operations to handle its
25X1 relations with domestic sources on an overt basis [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] because, (as the Dulles Report had itself stated):
"These sources do not wish to be embroiled in anything that
resembles espionage despite their eagerness to place at the disposal
of the Government information which they acquire in their normal
course of business." Finally, because "Administrative arrangements

¹ See footnote 3, p. 23 above.

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25X1 for the domestic [redacted] and the foreign operations of the Office of Policy Coordination and the Office of Special Operations are completely different," attempted integration of the three would result in "extreme administrative complications."¹

25X1 The Agency could not agree [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The result would only be to make the Documents Division an adjunct to a particular CIA office rather than--as it should be--a supplier of information to all parts of the government needing such information. The rebuttal maintained in this connection that FDD had actually been at one time attached to the Office of Reports and Estimates whence it had been removed, in part, because of the tendency to use it exclusively in support of ORE's particular work.²

STATSPEC Similar disagreement was expressed [redacted]

STATSPEC [redacted] The Committee's implied suggestion that this activity be removed from Central Intelligence entirely, was rejected on grounds that, as an obvious service of common concern, it was more appropriately placed in Central Intelligence than it could be in any other part of the government. Placement within Central Intelligence under a "division engaged in the direct supervision and control of all covert activities" was rejected on

¹ DCI Comments on Dulles Report of Feb. 28, 1949, pp. 29-30 in O/DCI/ER.

² See above, p. 4-6.

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grounds that the combination of covert activities with the overt
STATSPEO work [redacted] "would so over-load the policy-
making officials of that office with major decisions in unrelated
fields that adequate guidance would be most difficult."¹

In spite of the Agency's objection, the National Security
Council (with one exception) chose to accept the recommendations
25X1 of the Dulles Committee. [redacted]

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STATSPEC Had it not been for the exception [redacted] the Office
of Operations, as such, might well have been dissolved during 1951.

STATSPEC's matters stood, however, [redacted]

STATSPE [redacted] could not, by Security Council order, be made part of
secret intelligence; did not properly belong in any of the various
other components in existence or in the making; had no good
authority for being shifted outside of Central Intelligence; and
in short, could only remain where it was until satisfactory
disposition could be discovered and authorized.

The Foreign Documents Division had been recommended as part
of "the proposed Research and Reports Division if one is created,"
but on the assumption that ORR would take the form specified by
the Dulles Committee. The form actually to be taken by ORR would

¹ Ibid., p. 33

² NSC 50. p. 10, para. 6-b

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25X1 make this integration less appropriate.¹ If the main concern of ORR were to be with [] intelligence on the Soviet area, assimilation of FDD might be of questionable value not only for FDD but for ORR as well.

The Director's Decisions on OO, October-December 1950

25X1 By July 1950, a few weeks before General Smith was nominated to succeed Admiral Hillenkoetter as DCI, the controversial issue of merging OO [] with the two clandestine groups (OPC and OSO), raised by the Dulles Group the year before, was still unresolved. Hillenkoetter's original position in opposition to the merger remained essentially unchanged. He commented to his Executive (on July 6) that the subject of [] status was one "that we have argued over and discussed in the [National] Security Council and in the various Boards, and they have directed that it be so incorporated." How then, he added, "are we going to get around this?"²

25X1 ¹ Dulles Report p. 83. See also Chapter VII, below. When it was decided to emphasize [] intelligence on the Soviet area as the main concern of ORR, it became evident that FDD might complicate ORR's own problems as well as involving the danger that FDD might become specialized in the same field.

25X1A ² Memorandum by Hillenkoetter to the Acting Executive []
 25X1A [], July 6, 1950, Secret; in O/DDS, filed under "O&M". The occasion for his comment was a proposal of the Management Advisor,
 25X1 James D. Andrews, to reorganize certain activities of OO []
 25X1 [] Hillenkoetter commended Andrews
 25X1 for his "very fine decision" [] but asked, "How are we
 25X1 going to get around this []?" Ibid.

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In subsequent weeks the NSC endorsement of the merger, previously expressed [redacted] was withdrawn. By September 1, 1950, it was reported that the NSC had ordered that the merger be "indefinitely suspended."¹ Whether this change of viewpoint in the NSC was based on new facts or arguments presented to it,² or (more likely)³ whether it was timed to give an opportunity to the new Director (General Smith) to re-consider the matter independently, was not indicated.

¹ The CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952, dated September 1, 1950, reported (to the President and others) that, while "cover support" activities had been "reorganized" during the year ending June 1950 in order "to facilitate" a merger of OPC, OSO, and [redacted], "further action" on the merger "has been indefinitely suspended by the National Security Council." See "Introductory Statement" to that budget estimate (Secret), p. 11, appended to CIA Comptroller's "Historical Notes . . . , "1945-52, [redacted] in O/DCI/[redacted]

² For example, on August 11, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a formal proposal (not to the NSC, but to the Secretary of Defense), that as a war time mobilization plan, all of CIA's "covert activities" be transferred to JCS in wartime. Hillenkoetter, told of this proposal by General Magruder (of the Office of the Secretary of Defense) and asked for his "informal" views, rejected this proposal (on August 16), on two major counts: (1) that the proposal was a "unilateral" one that had not been coordinated with the State Department and other non-Defense members of the NSC; and (2) that the proposal would leave [redacted] "out on a limb" if (under [redacted] now "dormant") it would be merged into CIA's covert operations group (See correspondence in O/DCI/[redacted] Subsequently, on November 17, somewhat the same proposal was made to the new Director, General Smith, asking him to discuss it with the other departments and agencies and make "recommendations to the NSC." (Ibid.)

³ By September 1, Smith's appointment as DCI had been confirmed by Senate. He was probably given an opportunity to reconsider the merger proposal, judging from the tone of his presentation to the NSC (on October 12) and to the IAC (on October 20), where he spoke of coming to a "decision" implying that he (as the new Director) had been expected to assume the prerogative. (See footnote 1 p. 32)

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In any case, within a few days after actually taking office as DCI, General Smith came to a decision categorically rejecting the controversial recommendation of the Dulles Survey. On October 12, at what was apparently his first appearance at a meeting of the National Security Council, he took occasion to discuss the Dulles Report in general and the OO-GPC-OSO merger in particular.¹ While he regarded the recommendations in general (insofar as they were endorsed by the NSC) as a "directive" which he intended to carry out "promptly," he singled out the merger recommendation as the one objectionable item in the Report, and this he proposed to set aside.

A consolidation of the several types of CIA operations was "neither practical nor advisable," Smith told the NSC at that meeting. The problem, he said, was not one of reorganization but essentially one of better "coordination" within CIA; and "coordination of these offices . . . could be achieved by more effective cooperation without actual merger," he predicted.

Smith's plan not to reorganize was approved by the NSC at that meeting,² and a few days later, on October 20, he reiterated his decision to the departmental intelligence chiefs, in a meeting

¹ A summary of General Smith's remarks at the NSC meeting of October 12 is contained in the minutes of the IAC meeting of October 20; see IAC-M-1, Secret, in O/DCI/HS files.

² Ibid.

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of the IAC.¹ In effect, he concurred with the judgment of his predecessor, and the issue appeared to be closed.

By early November 1950, however, it was evident that the status of the Office of Operations was once again an issue,² and within a few weeks, General Smith modified his initial decision against reorganization by establishing a new position of Deputy Director for Operations (DD/O), who would be responsible for all types of CIA operations and under whom would be grouped the three offices involved--OO, OSO, and OPC. This move was not, strictly speaking, a reversal of his initial decision of October 12, but

25X1 a modification of it. Thus, the entire Office of Operations, [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted] was to be transferred to the new DD/O. Next, instead of a "merger" (literally) of OO with OSO and OPC, they were to be simply re-grouped under the new Deputy, but left essentially undisturbed and intact, on the organization chart at

¹ Ibid. The minutes reveal no dissent to his position on the part of the IAC members.

² For example, by November 8, 1950, the Office of Operations was conspicuously absent from a proposed organization chart which showed all the other overt offices (that is, the production offices, along with OGD and an Office of Coordination) placed under a new Deputy Director for "National Estimates." (Copy of chart in DD/S, filed under "O&M-5".) Aside from the technical detail of the Deputy Director's title, this grouping was exactly the pattern which was put into a few weeks later, under the senior Deputy Director, William H. Jackson. [redacted]
 25X1A The omission of OO from his purview is significant in suggesting that OO's status was once again in doubt, if not already shifted to the jurisdiction of a proposed Deputy Director for Operations. No corresponding chart is available (for that exact date) for the DD/O's group, but within three weeks such a grouping, too, was decided on, with the announcement of a new position of DD/O.

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least, as separate operating units. Nevertheless, all types of CIA operations were to be included under the DD/O's purview: overt, covert, and semi-covert operations; collection operations, both overseas and in the United States, as well as the expanding variety of non-intelligence operations overseas. On December 1, General Smith announced the establishment of the position of Deputy Director for Operations,¹ and on January 4, 1951, he announced the appointment of Mr. Allen W. Dulles to that position.² With that appointment, the position was renamed the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P).

General Smith's change of viewpoint about the consolidation of the overt and covert operational offices, from late October to late November 1950, is difficult to explain. One reason for the change may have been the increasing need for closer collaboration among the three operational offices

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

¹ The new position of Deputy Director for Operations (still vacant) was announced on December 1, 1950, in a list of key officials in CIA. See [Redacted] (Secret) in O/DCI/[Redacted]

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² Mr. Dulles' appointment as DD/P was announced on Jan. 4, 1951, by General Order No. 40 (S). He had been on duty, however, since as early as Dec. 18, when he was present at the Director's Staff Conference. According to one newspaper report (Drew Pearson, in the Washington Post, Dec. 16), he was already on duty on December 15.

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³ Revised draft of OO's history [Redacted] May 28, 1952, Secret, p. 40, in O/DCI/[Redacted]

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25X1 the value of [redacted] assets [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] with foreign connections were of new and
25X1 inescapable importance. In October 1950, inter-office negotiations
were in progress for modifying the rigid compartmentation between
OPC, OSO, and OO in the handling of such "cover support" problems.¹
By November 24, an "agreed position" had been arrived at by the
Assistant Directors involved,² but the wording of the agreement
sounded less like a procedure for intimate collaboration among
them than a statement of the problem and a recognition of the dilemma
involved. The agreement spoke of harmonizing two premises: (1) the
"right" of the clandestine offices to "withhold operational details"
25X1 [redacted] and (2) the "desirability" of giving
25X1 [redacted] "sufficient information" so that it could assist
"effectively" and evaluate the "source jeopardy" in each contact
25X1 involved.³ [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1 Another contributory factor, [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] which may have influenced General Smith's

¹ Ibid., p. 39.

² Ibid., p. 40.

³ Ibid.

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revised decision to re-group OO, OPC, and OSO under a single Deputy was the need for coordination between overt and covert collection programs. Under the long-standing NSC directive on espionage (issued in December 1947),¹ the Director of Central Intelligence was charged not only with covert collection but also with responsibility for "coordinating overt and covert collection."

25X1 In practice, however, the two types of [] collection, insofar as they were conducted by CIA, had been handled separately, by

25X1 OO and OSO. The [] programs of the State and Defense Departments, were also administered separately, with some coordination

25X1 [] but without the benefit of any Government-wide system of coordination in which CIA participated directly. In the fall of 1950, there appeared to be two main aspects of the problem calling for solution: (1) coordination of collection

25X1 requirements; and (2) the coordination of collection efforts []

25X1 [] Both of them had been singled out by CIA, in September 1950, as problems calling for attention during the forthcoming year.²

As to the coordination of collection requirements, some

¹ NSC Intelligence Directive No. 5, Dec. 12, 1947, in Annex E, below.

² CIA "Statement of Management Improvement Activities," forming part of "Introductory Statement" to CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952, dated Sept. 1, 1950; appended to Comptroller's "Historical Notes . . . , 1945-52," in O/DCI []

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five problems were listed in CIA's prospectus of September 1.¹ Plans were under study, during that summer, to centralize the function of collection requirements in the Office of Reports and Estimates,² but with the liquidation of ORE, in November 1950, and (with it) the emergence of four separate production offices in CIA, it was necessary to reconsider the whole problem of how to coordinate collection requirements. In this changing administrative situation, General Smith expected that the several production offices would be the primary ones concerned with developing (under OIC's leadership)³ a common, workable requirements control system;

¹ "Introductory Statement" to CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952 (previously cited), pp. 12-14. These problems all related to the "improvement of . . . guidance for the collection effort," with the aim of avoiding "non-productive or misdirected efforts inherent generally in purely opportunistic collection action."

² See Management Officer's "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions," draft dated July 3, 1950, and reviewed by Admiral Hillenkoetter, July 6. (In DD/S, filed under "OAM-5".) ORE's Requirements Staff, it was recommended, was to take on this function, then handled by OGD's Liaison Division. ORE was expected to coordinate requirements with the other production office (OSI) and with the two collecting offices (OO and OSO). Hillenkoetter said the plan was "interesting," but postponed acting on it pending comments from the Assistant Directors concerned.

³ Beginning in December 1950, OIC undertook to collaborate with the other offices in a survey of the collection-requirements system. Among its proposals, in 1951, was a "CIA Requirements Committee" and a "National Requirements Board." One committee was actually established, for covert collection requirements in particular: the Interagency Priorities Committee of the IAC.

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but he evidently also expected that the collectors would have a voice in that system,¹ and presumably a new Deputy Director, responsible for overseeing both overt and covert collection, might facilitate a solution.

As to the parallel problem of coordinating collection activities [redacted] this matter, too, was singled out in September 1950 in CIA's list of unresolved organizational problems.² Admiral Hillenkoetter had only recently been persuaded, however, not to venture into that field for the time being. [redacted]

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[redacted] Within a few months, however, the need for overseas coordination was once again opened, this time with the new

¹ For example, the IAC Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC), established later (in July 1951) for reviewing covert collection requirements, was headed not by a representative of the production offices but by a representative of the DB/P.

² It was a problem of "improving coordination of the [redacted] effort, particularly in overt foreign posts." See CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952, dated Sept. 1, 1950 (previously cited), p. 14.

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25X1 administration and now with respect to overt activities [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

In that area the Office of Operations had been assigned the
25X1 task of establishing and operating [redacted] The

Assistant Director of OO had canvassed the situation in November

25X1 and found that [redacted]

there existed "a large uncoordinated effort" involving some six
different U. S. agencies, which were engaged in various "non-
clandestine intelligence activities," and among which he had

25X1 observed "duplication and overlapping in the Scientific [redacted]

and political fields."² Here was "a unique opportunity" for CIA
"to exercise its coordination responsibility," he reported to the
Director's office early in December.³ While OO's proposal was
rejected by the Deputy Director, William H. Jackson,⁴ as being

¹ See below, pp. 44-52.

² Memorandum by George G. Carey, Assistant Director, OO, to
OIC, Dec. 7, 1950. (In O/DCI, [redacted] with DCI's staff conference
minutes of Dec. 18, 1950, SC-M-1.)

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25X1	[redacted]	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]	[redacted]

³ Ibid.

⁴ At the DCI's staff conference on Dec. 18, Jackson said that
"he did not believe it was CIA's function to try and coordinate
other intelligence agencies abroad, and that he thought a CIA
25X1 [redacted] would have a full-time job
coordinating CIA's own activities." (SC-M-1, Dec. 18, 1950, Secret,
in O/DCI, [redacted])

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outside CIA's responsibility, the problem persisted, and subsequently it was handled by the new Deputy Director for the operational offices, Allen W. Dulles.¹

Along with these several specific issues in the fall of 1950, outlined above, in which overt and covert operations seemed to be closely interrelated, there was a final, compelling factor which was of obvious importance in General Smith's revised decision about the Office of Operations late in 1950: the selection and appointment of Mr. Dulles to serve as one of his Deputies. Aside from the theoretical compartmentation of overt and covert operations, and aside, even, from specific issues between them that might have been harmonized by other measures, the appointment of Mr. Dulles provided General Smith with a man, who by his extensive experience, his personal interest, and his wide reputation was "the collector," and for whom, ultimately, the "overt" and "covert" sides were merely aspects of a broader viewpoint. With Mr. Dulles' capacities for handling operational problems, furthermore, General Smith also was confronted by his objective and considered judgment, expressed through his chairmanship of the Dulles Survey Group the year before, that national security would best be served by grouping overt operations with clandestine activities. In this sense, it was inevitable that the experiment that Mr. Dulles recommended in 1949 would at least be given a test in the months ahead.

¹ Mr. Dulles himself later was a principal negotiator in the deliberations with the State and Defense Departments that culminated in the agreement (of September 1951) by which CIA assumed coordination responsibilities for both overt and covert intelligence activities

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Status of the Office of Operations in 1951

The result of the above decisions appeared in "CIA

25X1A [redacted] when it was published on January 19, 1951. In the accompanying charts, the Office of Operations as a whole, including all its pre-1951 divisions, was placed under the Deputy Director/Plans where it became a separate component along with the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination, 25X1 the Assistant Director for Communications, and [redacted] the Operational Aids Division, and "Covert Training."¹

25X1A Under [redacted] the Assistant Director for Operations was "charged with the direct collection of intelligence information from primary overt, non-governmental sources," (domestic contacts, [redacted] and foreign documents). In addition, he was to conduct "research analysis of Soviet and Satellite materials," and "interrogation of political refugees

25X1 [redacted] He was to "analyse, select, and edit intelligence information resulting from collection action, and prepare information for publication." He was also to provide and arrange for intelligence presentations, interrogations, and briefings in the Agency for authorized individuals." These had been approximately his duties

25X1A ¹ CIA [redacted] revised), as approved by the DCI January 19, 1951. So listed in organization chart; see Annex B.

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25X1A [redacted] when he had
been independent of covert activities.¹

Even the "additional" duties just mentioned did not represent an important modification of OO's functional responsibilities. "Presentations, interrogations, and briefings" referred to a routine function temporarily inherited from the Office of Reports and Estimates.² "Research analysis of Soviet and Satellite materials;" and "interrogation of political refugees" had both been established as part of OO before the Smith Administration took office. The origins of these two activities were thus unrelated to those of the new clandestine-operational wing of the Agency, but when OO became part of DB/P, they took on new significance.

25X1 The first of the two [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] had become the equivalent of a fourth division of the Office of Operations. This Staff originated, so far as CIA was concerned, in discussions going back to the early days of the

¹ As approved by the DCI (Admiral Hillenkoetter) as of this date. See Annex G below.

² ORR Operating Instruction No. 16 (January 29, 1951): "The Presentation Section of ORR . . . has been transferred to the Office of Operations, [redacted] where it will continue to handle interrogations The notification of motion picture film showings has been taken over by Operations Staff of OCD." (See folder "ORR Operating Procedures-Instructions--1949," in O/DCI/[redacted])

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Group, regarding the analysis of Soviet-manufactured products with a view to inferring from the composition of the end-product whatever seemed justified concerning the system that produced it.¹ In answer to the demands for intelligence made during 1949-1950, the Director of Central Intelligence, on July 26, 1950, had approved a limited operation aimed at deriving intelligence from materials of Soviet bloc origin.²

The Office of Operations had been in a good position to direct this program, for although some of the materials to be examined were collected through covert action abroad, others were
 25X1 acquired [redacted] which came by articles of
 25X1 Soviet manufacture in the normal course of trade.³ Furthermore,
 25X1 [redacted] analysis was for the most part performed by [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted] other government bodies equipped for industrial
 25X1 testing, [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted] The Office of Operations was thus an
 appropriate agent in the work of both acquisition and analysis by
 25X1 virtue of its wide contacts [redacted]⁴

¹ These were in turn based on analysis of enemy war production made by OSS and other agencies during the war.

25X1 ² See O History [redacted] (1952) in O/DCI, [redacted] 25X1

³ Also, of course, during the Korean War by capture of enemy material. See p. 44, below.

25X1 ⁴ Serious consideration was also given to placing [redacted]
 25X1 function in OSI. See memorandum of October 22, 1951, Subject:
 "Placement [redacted] within the Office
 of Operations vs. Placement within the Office of Scientific
 Intelligence," in O/DCI [redacted] under "OO Survey."

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25X1 The whole problem [redacted] however, was not that of its placement within Central Intelligence. It also involved an interagency coordination problem.

According to the first plans for the Staff, this problem was to be handled by a group under the Scientific Intelligence Committee,¹ called the Joint Soviet Materials Intelligence Committee. This group was in technical charge of coordinating "Soviet" activities from August 1950 to May 23, 1951, but made little progress toward integrating military and civilian work in this field. The species of impasse that resulted from abolition of the Joint Soviet Materials Group in May was ended by agreements of July 1951 under

25X1 which Central Intelligence [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] was given representation on three joint military committees, for exploiting captured enemy personnel, documents, and materials. Under this agreement a

25X1 member of the [redacted] staff of OO became an "adviser" on the

25X1 Joint Materials Intelligence Agency (JMIA) [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]²

The interrogation of political refugees from the Soviet bloc countries [redacted]

¹ For OSI's part in this problem, see Chapter VI, below.

25X1 ² As a part of this same agreement, OO [redacted] furnished a "Deputy
25X1 Director" [redacted]
25X1 and FDD provided a "Deputy Director" [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] See above, Chapter II.


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25X1 [] represented the second function that was assigned
to the Office of Operations during the last months of Admiral
Hilleketter's administration. Along with that "collection" task,
25X1 which was initially confined to interrogations []
25X1 [] OO was given the further task, essentially adminis-
25X1 trative and "logistical" in nature, []

25X1



25X1 The handling of defectors by the U. S. intelligence agencies
needed "better coordination," [] so
the Dulles Survey Group had recommended early in 1949. In subse-
quent months, several steps were taken by CIA in cooperation with
25X1 the other agencies involved []

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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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SECRETThe Controversy of 1951-1952

25X1A The new status of the Office of Operations, promulgated in was not wholly new, of course, but rather a return to the status quo of 1946 when domestic collection had been planned as one of the functions of the Office of Special Operations.¹ The difference lay in the fact that the 1946 experiment had been ended before it was possible to put it to any test. The time had now arrived to see how well combined collection would work out in actual practice. The two basic objections to the new system were unchanged: that "overt" collection might suffer through being made subordinate to (and therefore devoting an excessive amount of time to) the needs of the clandestine services; and that the usefulness of the overt collection system might be impaired through association with clandestine ventures. In general, it seems to have been the conviction of the Office of Operations that such obstacles as these made the new association unwise, while the non-OO elements of DD/P were of the opinion that other advantages to be gained through the new dispensation would be sufficient to override all objections.

Even after the new alignment had been for some time an accomplished fact, the Assistant Director for Operations (Mr. Carey)--was not convinced of the advisability of the change. During 1951, he made continual oral representations to the Deputy Director for Plans (Mr. Dulles); the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Mr. Jackson); as well as to General Smith, himself whenever

¹ See p. 7, above

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he had an opportunity to speak with him. At one point, after such an interview, General Smith remarked in some exasperation that he believed he would remove the Office of Operations from "DD/P" and place it directly under himself as something neither overt nor covert rather than have to be faced continually with the problem of what to do with OO. In a sense, of course, something like Smith's suggestion was carried out in 1952 when OO became part of DD/I.

According to Mr. Carey, subordination of domestic collection to foreign operations had resulted in excessive demands by the latter upon the former. The Assistant Director estimated as of 1951 that his Office was spending about 70% of its time in various types of support for DD/P. Manifestly, if this were true, it left only 30% for activities in support of the non-clandestine offices in and out of CIA. In 1952, the volume of cases [redacted] in support of the clandestine offices was estimated as somewhere in the neighborhood [redacted]. During 1952, it was stated definitely that: "the [redacted] are now devoting more than 40% of their time to this activity."¹

There were signs, furthermore, that some of the clandestine offices saw, in the Office of Operations, an opportunity to gain

¹ For above, see Historical Staff Interview with George G. Carey, May 17, 1955, and OO History [redacted] (1952) in O/DCI [redacted]

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even more support for their activities than was being furnished already. In October 1951, for instance the Acting Assistant Director for Special Operations proposed, in effect, that the Foreign Documents Division should cease to provide translation services to agencies other than CIA and devote itself primarily to CIA's immediate work.¹ The proposal presumably was made, however, without reference to the history of FDD which though it had never been made officially a "service of common concern" was certainly acquired from the War Department with something of the sort in mind.²

At the beginning of 1952, after a full year of trial, the dispute over the appropriateness of the OO-DD/P relationship had grown to a point where it seemed to require positive action. It had been a matter of concern to General Smith as has been indicated. It had been (as the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Frank Wisner) stated in a memorandum of January 10, 1952), ". . . the subject of lengthy but inconclusive discussion as between [redacted]

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¹ See proposal from [redacted] to Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (Acting AD/SO), dated October 8, 1951, in O/DCI [redacted] files, among other things, that:

"(1) FDD serve exclusively as a foreign documents exploitation service for CIA and only as an office of central record of foreign language documents for all non-CIA agencies and departments which it is now servicing.

"(2) FDD translation units serve exclusively as a translation service for CIA with the exception of serving non-CIA agencies in a limited number of rare languages."

² See above p. 4-5, and footnote 1, p. 4.

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25X1A Dulles, Hedden, Kirkpatrick, [] and the undersigned." ¹ Much of the reasoning that led to final disposition of this dispute was undoubtedly oral and unrecorded, but some of the major points were reflected in various written documents.

In an informal, undated memorandum, probably written about
 25X1 October 1, 1951, for example, []
 25X1 [] explained at some length for the benefit of the
 25X1 Deputy Director, Mr. Jackson, how the "four distinct missions" []
 25X1 [] had been acquired and how they had been dis-
 25X1 charged. In the course of the explanation, []
 25X1 []
 25X1 [] explained what appeared from
 that vantage point to be the main fallacies in arguments favoring
 subordination of "overt" to "covert" collection. He wrote, in
 part, as follows:

" . . . I am also convinced that direct connection between our operations and those of the covert offices would be detrimental both to our primary mission and to the Agency as a whole. There are two broad reasons for this: (1) we are the only element of the Agency in continuous touch with the public, and our completely reasonable and overt purposes are known and approved, and (2) we are a permanent and accepted establishment []
 25X1 [] and not subject to changes which would
 25X1 inevitably come [] in the event of
 25X1 major international political changes.

"To amplify the first: our sales talk to the
 25X1 thousands of [] leaders around

¹ Memorandum, DD/Plans to AD/O, Jan. 10, 1952, in O/DCI []
 Filed under "OO Survey".

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the country has emphasized the fact that we have no police powers, that we have no interest in subversive matters, that we have no intention of making spies of American citizens and expect their inquiries on our behalf to be strictly limited to their own normal interests, that we are after perfectly reasonable foreign information as distinct from intelligence," and that there is no element of the devious or cloak-and-dagger about us To put it in other words, we are the face of the Agency and I think that it is very important that we keep it clean.

"To a large degree, this open and above-board reputation is the reason we are in such demand by the covert offices. It is easy to forget that covert operations are thoroughly distasteful to the average high-level citizen, and I do not think that the covert offices could get the complete cooperation of industry if the various cases were not presented by men of established reputation as a necessary exception to their usual interests. Under the direction of the covert offices, the tendency would be to minimize the overt operation in favor of the urgent needs of the covert; with the result that our continuous contact would be to a large degree lost, together with our present control of the methods [redacted] I am eliminating the whole subject of the covert mentality from this, as too broad and too intangible, but it is certainly a factor."¹

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These points, if well taken, would throw grave doubts upon the wisdom of the 1951 status of OO under the "DDP". Any such method of governing intelligence could clearly be self-defeating.

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In accordance with [redacted] view, the [redacted] could

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give service to the two main elements of "DDP" without taking a risk that the peculiar contribution of which it was capable would be impaired.

Regarding the other two main divisions of the Office of

STATSPEO

Operations-- [redacted] Foreign Documents--Mr. Carey

25X1

1 [redacted] to William H.

25X1

Jackson, undated, (probably early Oct. 1951) [redacted]

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[redacted] in O/DXI [redacted] under "OO Survey."

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dealt with the question in a memorandum of October 1951 addressed

25X1A [] In this case, it had been proposed that [] be
STATSPEC assigned [] while FDD should go to
25X1 the Office of Collection and Dissemination. Mr. Carey's reaction
was negative in both cases, and his conviction was reaffirmed that
both belonged properly in the Office of Operations.

STATSPEC With respect to [] it was pointed out that the Division's
mission under "NSCID-6" was an overt one which would be damaged by

25X1 association [] The study concluded that: "Since

STATSPEC the organization and functions [] are based on its mission of
intelligence information collection; and since the aspects of

25X1 operation [] are simply the
tools with which the mission is performed, it is concluded that

STATSPEC [] is properly placed under an office engaged in overt intelli-
gence collection."

The argument regarding the Foreign Documents Division was
similar in stating:

"a. FDD is basically an office collecting and pro-
ducing intelligence information.

b. As such, it must logically be assigned to an
office with similar functions.

c. OOD is basically an ancillary or supporting
service office.

d. With the split between overt and covert col-
lection FDD is logically assigned to the Office of
Operations.

e. The translation service function of FDD is an
appendage for the sake of economy and efficiency.

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STATSPEC f. The relationship between FDD [] is great and requires close coordination.

g. The relationship between FDD and OGD is relatively small and normal to the intelligence process.

h. Overall FDD is assigned best organizationally in the Office of Operations.¹

25X1 Another proposal whereby the [] would be assigned to the Office of Scientific Intelligence was rejected by Mr. Carey
25X1 on grounds that the work [] fitted that of the Office of Operations but not of the Office of Scientific Intelligence except superficially; and that it was particularly important to remember
25X1 that [] examined Soviet materials for the benefit of many groups in and out of the Agency other than the Office of Scientific Intelligence. To make this recommendation all the more persuasive, the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence himself concurred in full.²

On DD/P's side of the debate, the recorded arguments are to the effect that the activities of the Office of Operations are "operational" and at least "semi-covert" and that "they have little in common with the research and processing activities of the balance of the organization." DD/P used the authority of the Dulles Report for example: "As stated in the Dulles Report, 'It is not accurate

25X1A ¹ Memorandum from George G. Carey to [] Oct. 8, 1951, with enclosures on [] and FDD signed by []
STATSPEC and [] respectively; in OI files.

25X1 ² Memorandum by AD/SI to [] Special Assistant
25X1A and Senior Consultant to the DCI, Oct. 22, 1951, Secret, in
25X1A [] "O Survey" file, in O/DCI []

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
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25X1 to regard the work [redacted] as overt.' Its relations
 with its sources must be conducted on a highly confidential basis
 and the greatest discretion exercised in the handling of these rela-
 25X1 tionships. To the extent that the facilities [redacted] have
 been and are used in the future for operational support, added
 emphasis is given to the above statement."

Where the work of domestic collection and of foreign collec-
 tion and operations conflicted, thus engendering embarrassing pos-
 sibilities; or where they ran parallel with beneficial possibilities

25X1 for both, DD/P's answer was a single "chain of command." [redacted]

25X1



The view was also expressed by those interested in covert work
 that the Office of Operations could best serve their special needs if
 it were under their jurisdiction.²

¹ Memorandum from Frank G. Wisner to George G. Carey, Jan. 10,
 1952, Secret, in O/DCI [redacted] under "OO Survey"

25X1A ² See memorandum from [redacted] to Frank G.
 Wisner, DD/P, Nov. 19-21, 1951, Secret, in O/DCI [redacted] under
 "OO Survey."

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Outcome of the Controversy

The various arguments regarding the 1951 status of the Office of Operations were considered between August 24 and Novem-

25X1A ber 10 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]

As a member of the committee which had endorsed the very recommendations that had led to making the Office of Operations

25X1A part of the clandestine apparatus, [redacted] would be unlikely to recommend a change in the 1951 status unless he had been

25X1 genuinely persuaded that such a change was required. [redacted]

25X1A [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Finally, having conducted a "broad and general" survey of the Office of Operations during the three months after serving his active relationship to the Agency, Mr.

25X1A [redacted] was in position to speak with some authority on the subject.

His report left no doubt that in his opinion the Office of Operations should not be "organizationally associated with the

25X1A covert offices under the jurisdiction of the DO/P." [redacted]

25X1 view, "The principal strength of [redacted] OO, with

¹ See Chapter II, above.

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its sources, arises from the overt nature of its operations

It is therefore anomalous that this division be organizationally part of the covert divisions." Regarding the argument that the work of the Office of Operations was in necessary support of covert

25X1A collection [] maintained that "it is the overt nature of the activities of OO which make this support possible in the first place;" and that such support would by no means become impossible if the two types of activities are organizationally

25X1A separated. Indeed, [] "... it would probably strengthen and expedite such support operations if OO were organizationally independent because it would make less frequent and more difficult the short-cutting by covert agencies through direct

25X1A communication with well-developed OO contacts" [] added that divergencies between administrative functions made common administrative handling of the Office of Operations and the covert offices inappropriate; and that supervision of both would place too great responsibilities upon the Deputy Director (Plans).

25X1A [] recommendation, therefore, was that the Office of Operations "be placed organizationally directly under the proposed DD/I, when appointed, and pending his appointment, under the DDCI alongside ORR, OCD, etc." With respect to the DDI part

25X1A of the plan, [] "it is essential to protect the continued existence of the overt functions of OO that an officer of equal rank with DD/P be responsible for OO and in a position to

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defend its functions and independence before DCI if at any time the covert demands threaten to overwhelm it."¹

25X1A Mr. Wisner, in forwarding the results of the [] survey to Mr. Carey, some two months after it had been completed, took exception to most of what it said. He felt, for reasons

25X1 already noted, that the functions []

25X1 [] were correctly placed under him; rejected [] point

25X1A about administrative anomaly as not valid "under recent decisions;" expressed a willingness to accept combined responsibility for overt and covert operations on grounds that Mr. Carey's organization was so "smooth running" as to require relatively little of his attention; and disclaimed the assertion that the Office of Operations would need a "protector" to prevent its being "overrun by covert operations."²

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Mr. Dulles) remained unconvinced by the survey. In a memorandum to Mr.

25X1A [] Dulles wrote: "I am still of the opinion however, that it would be preferable to leave OO where it is, at least until we have a Deputy for Intelligence, and to build up adequate support in O/P in case that office is not sufficiently staffed to handle OO at the moment. As a matter of fact, when I

25X1A ¹ For [] Survey Report, November 1951, see his "draft" memorandum to DCI on "Office of Operations," Nov. 13, 1951, Secret, in O/DCI/[] filed under "OO Survey."

² Memorandum from Frank G. Wisner to George G. Carey, Jan. 10, 1952, previously cited, above.

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was DD/P,¹ I found that OO ran smoothly and did not require much work on my part. When we have a Deputy Director for Intelligence, we might reconsider the matter, and if this new Deputy Director went along with the recommendation of the report, I would certainly not oppose the change even though I still feel there are advantages in having the collection offices under one deputy and the production offices under the other deputy."²

Mr. Carey, on the other hand, concurred "in all the recommendations set forth in [redacted] report" with minor exceptions.

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25X1A

¹ Dulles held this position from Jan. to Aug. 1951.

25X1A

² Memo from Allen W. Dulles, DDCI, to [redacted] (S) in O/DCI [redacted], filed under OO Survey.

³ Memo from George G. Carey to DCI, Jan. 14, 1952, in O/DCI [redacted] filed under "OO Survey"

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The final decision in the controversy was reached on February 12, 1952, at a conference between the Deputies for Central Intelligence, Plans, and Operations. at which it was agreed that the DD/I would prepare for DCI approval: ". . . a paper the effect of which will be to: (a) transfer the Office of Operations, except 25X1A [redacted] from the jurisdiction of DD/P to DD/I with the understanding that after six months this action will be reviewed;

25X1A [redacted]

On February 28, 1952, General Smith signed an Agency "Notice" which stated:

1. Effective 1 March 1952, the Office of Operations will be removed from the supervision of the Deputy Director (Plans) and placed under the supervision of the Deputy Director (Intelligence).

25X1

[redacted]

3. Deputy Director (Plans), Deputy Director (Intelligence), Assistant Director for Operations, and Assistant Director for Special Operations will issue whatever instructions may be necessary to implement these changes."²

After the relationship between OO and DD/P had been thus severed, the Office of Operations was not only back to the approximate

25X1 ¹ Memorandum for record [redacted] O/DDP, Feb. 13, 1952, in O/DCI [redacted] filed under "OO Survey"

25X1 ² [redacted] among records of Management Staff, in CIA Records Center.

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organizational position it had occupied from 1947-1951, but still in the same "anomalous" position which had disturbed critics for some years in that it seemed to be a "collecting" organism functioning alongside the "coordinating" offices of the Agency.

One factor that probably helped to support this apparently illogical scheme of organization was the relative degree of satisfaction expressed over the way in which the Office of Operations had discharged its responsibilities. As has just been noted, both Mr. Wisner and Mr. Dulles, though they had favored retention of OO within D/P, had commented favorably on O as a "smooth running" activity. Historical records consulted have not disclosed opinions contrary to those of Mr. Wisner and Mr. Dulles, nor any important evidence of dissatisfaction with the intelligence and

STATSPEC information disseminated by the [redacted] Foreign

Documents Divisions during twelve and eight years respectively;

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

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SECRETInternal Organization of OO, 1950-1953

In contrast to the changing organizational position of the Office of Operations in relation to the Director and his several Deputy Directors, outlined above, there was relatively little change in the internal organization, management, and procedure of that Office between October 1950 and February 1953, or in any of the constituent parts just listed. There were many changes, to be sure, in the day-to-day work of OO, which reflected the changing needs for its services by the production offices, the clandestine groups, and the administrative staffs of CIA, as well as by the intelligence agencies on the outside. But in its internal organizational structure there was an essential element of continuity.

The first note of continuity was in the person of the Assistant Director himself, George G. Carey, who had headed OO since 1947 and who continued to serve in that capacity uninterrupted during General Smith's directorship, and under his successor as well. His relationship to General Smith's Deputies, furthermore, was not essentially different in 1951 and 1952. Whether under the Deputy Director for Plans (Jan. 1951-Feb. 1952) or under the Deputy Director for Intelligence (thereafter), the Office of Operations seemed to be relatively autonomous. The approval of Mr. Dulles

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and Mr. Wisner has just been noted; likewise, OO apparently enjoyed the confidence of the DD/I, Mr. Becker. Thus, in a lengthy list of problems confronting the DD/I during the year 1952, not a single one related directly to the continuing programs of the Office of Operations.¹

25X1

The general structure of OO's headquarters organizations also remained essentially unchanged from late 1950 to early 1953. Six major elements continued undisturbed on the organization chart: the immediate office of the Assistant Director and his Deputy Assistant Director;² a Planning and Coordination

¹ Descriptive list of nine "major" projects and numerous "minor" and "miscellaneous" projects of DD/I, Jan.-Oct. 1952, compiled by for DD/I; copy in "OIC Planning Book," in O/DCI/SA/

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Division, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Domestic Operations, 1950-1953

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The growth of [redacted] services to CIA and the IAC agencies between October 1950 and February 1953 can at least be indicated, if not evaluated, by a brief statistical appreciation of some of the major aspects of its collection and support work during that period. The variety of contacts

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[redacted]

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In addition, [redacted] were added, in 1951, pp. 18-19.

[redacted] See above,

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established with individuals and organizations in the United States, the flow of intelligence information collected from them and edited and disseminated, and the increase in operational-support cases handled for the clandestine offices and others during that period all suggest something, at least, of the nature and scope of the

25X1 problems [] and something of its accomplishment in meeting the changing needs among the Government's national security organization which it served as a service of common concern.

25X1 The [] register of individuals and organizations, which comprised the Division's basic index to "sources of foreign intelligence potential" in the United States, had already totalled

25X1 something over [] contacts by July 1, 1950. By the end of February 1953, the register had almost doubled in size, reaching

25X1 the total of [] sources available to CIA in the United States.¹

25X1 Almost [] of these contacts were individuals, while the rest (more than 25% of the total) were [] of intelligence

25X1 interest. All of them, furthermore, were analyzed and machine-indexed, as before according to the variety of subjects and areas of intelligence interest which they reflected. Most of the

25X1 established contacts were [] known and evaluated both

¹ Except as indicated otherwise, all figures cited here and later, for July 1, 1950, are from the "CIA Summary of Operations," Fiscal Years 1948-50, dated Oct. 2, 1950; and all figures cited for 1952-53, are from the [] "Monthly Operational Reports" (Secret). (Copies in O/DCI/[])

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25X1 by OO, [] headquarters office []
 25X1 the rest []
 25X1 were [] [] The
 25X1 expansion during the intervening 2 1/2 years was a gradual and
 25X1 cumulative one, averaging about [] recorded per month,
 25X1 and [] items of additional information a month available
 on old sources already registered previously. The rate of growth,
 finally, did not seem to change appreciably as between the period
 of DD/P control (in 1951) and the DD/I period (in 1952). From
 25X1 July 1950 to February 1952, for example, about [] a
 25X1 month had been added to the OO, [] register, while during the next
 25X1 twelve months, the average was []
 25X1 The emphasis of OO, [] work between 1950 and 1953
 as before, was, of course, on private individuals and non-governmental
 organizations and institutions throughout the United States, in
 accordance with the long-standing directive of the National Security
 Council in 1948,¹ and the scope of that work is suggested in the
 growth of the source register, mentioned above. In practice, how-
 25X1 ever, OO, [] also maintained regular contact with a variety of
 25X1 Government [] offices as well, primarily as a service to CIA's
 own collection and operational programs, but ultimately of some
 25X1 IAC-wide interest as well. []
 25X1 []

¹ NSCID No. 6, Feb. 12, 1948 (Secret), in O/DCI []

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There seemed to be no intra-CIA jurisdictional issue on the matter of Governmental contacts, handled by OO, although OGD's Liaison Division, in Washington, was responsible for maintaining what, in effect, was a contact register of Government officials and offices, both of IAC and non-IAC agencies, in the Washington area.³ For a time, in fact, from late 1950 to mid-1951, the OO [redacted]

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¹ The FBI [redacted] was also part of OO [redacted] security channels in clearing contacts. Originally it was necessary for OO to seek FBI (and CIA Security Office) clearance on all contacts, including proposed contacts. This practice, with respect to proposed contacts, was soon changed, however, as being an "unrealistic" one, in favor of a local check [redacted]. There was no essential change, however, in the clearance procedure (through CIA Security Office and FBI) for contacts with whom actual security-classified requirements were to be discussed. (See OO History [redacted] original draft, 1952, p. 17.) This practice prevailed between 1950 and 1953.

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² See OO History of OO [redacted] (original draft, 1952, Secret), [redacted] passim, and OO [redacted] "Monthly Operational Reports," 1952-53 (Secret, in O/DCI [redacted]).

³ On OGD's Liaison Division, see Chapter V, below.

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
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Among OO, [] varied activities in exploiting its growing number of contacts, the actual [] collection of foreign intelligence information from domestic sources remained its first obligation, under the NSC directive to the DCI, and one that was increasingly productive, in its operations between 1950 and 1953.

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¹ See OO History [] (original draft, 1952), Secret, pp. 62-63, in O/DCI []

X1

² Ibid.

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³ Memorandum by George G. Carey, AD of OO, to DCI, Jan. 14, 1952 (Secret), commenting on [] survey report on OO (of Nov. 1951); in O/DCI [] filed under OO Survey. Mr. Wisner, DD/P, commented shortly before (Jan. 10) that "a good working procedure" had only "recently" been established, under which OO [] whenever it had a [] in mind, would check with [] [] to see whether the contact "can be approached without duplicating existing lines," and then act accordingly. (Memorandum from Wisner to Carey, Jan. 10, 1952, Secret, in Ibid.)

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25X1 While the volume of non-collection support problems handled by OO [] increased significantly, there seemed to be no corresponding decrease

25X1 [] of reporting, judging from a review of the quantity of information reports produced and disseminated to the research and estimating groups in CIA and the other intelligence agencies.

25X1 The long-established and massive series of [] reports continued to grow, and with it two other series were established in 1951 and 1953 for the dissemination of its interviews, interro-

25X1 gations, and documentary information []

25X1 []

25X1 [] Still another series []

was established early in 1953 in order to segregate and handle separately certain kinds of foreign intelligence information that was considered of specialized interest to one or a limited number of consumers.¹

¹
25X1 "History, [] Office of Operations," undated
25X1 (about Aug. 1954), prepared by OO (Secret) pp. 5, 6, 7; copy in
25X1 O/OCI, [] In mid-1952 OO [] began a system of "advance dissemination, by teletype, of information requiring "priority handling" because of "its importance or timeliness." These special reports were called [] (Ibid., p. 6)

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In terms of volume of reports collected, edited, and disseminated by OO [] a new high of about [] reports a month, achieved by 1950,¹ was consistently maintained during the next two and a half years. Never did monthly production decline appreciably from that average, and during many months in 1951 and 1952, the average was considerably higher. From January to December 1951, for example, something over [] reports a month were collected and disseminated;² and in January and February 1952 (the last two months of DD/P's supervision over OO) the figure reached [] reports a month.³ During the next twelve months, March 1952 to February 1953 (the first year under DD/I supervision) OO [] produced more than [] reports a month.⁴ In all, almost [] reports were disseminated during the period from October 1950 to February 1953.⁵

¹ About [] reports were issued from January to July 1950. The average in 1949 had been about [] a month; in 1948, about [] (See CIA "Summary of Operations, Fiscal Years 1948-50" dated Oct. 2, 1950, (Secret), especially chart entitled "OO [] Reports Prepared. . ."; copy in O/DCI [])

² From Jan. to Nov. 1951 the total was [] reports; for Dec. 1951, [] reports. (See OSO study, "Role of . . . CIA . . . in Collection," Nov. 30, 1951, [] p. 26, and OO "Monthly Operational Report," Dec. 1951, Secret; both in O/DCI [] files.)

³ Ibid.

⁴ OO [] "Monthly Operational Reports," Jan. 1952-Feb. 1953 (Secret), in O/DCI []

⁵ Total estimate computed from various sources cited above.


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25X1 In subject-matter coverage, [redacted] reports col-
lected between 1950 and 1953 included items on every major foreign
25X1 area and on every major topic of intelligence interest. [redacted]

25X1



25X1 [redacted] Furthermore, as in 1950, the reports collected
continued to represent the product of two parallel collection
approaches: (1) "directed" collection, based on specific require-
ments levied by or for the production offices and agencies; and
(2) "spontaneous" collection (sometimes also called "opportunistic"

25X1 collection), based on an informal acquaintance by the OO [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] with the general needs of the intelligence research
components. Both in 1950 and 1953, slightly less than 50% of the
reports collected were the result of "directed" efforts,² yet,

25X1 ¹ OO [redacted] "Monthly Operational Report", Feb. 1953 (Secret), and
CIA "Summary of Operations," Fiscal Years 1948-50 (Oct. 2, 1950,
Secret), both in O/DCI/[redacted]

² Ibid.


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25X1 regardless of which type of approach was used, more than 90% of the completed reports in each category were normally evaluated by the consumer as having various degrees of "value," thus attesting (it would seem) to the ability of OO [redacted] to understand the continuing and changing needs of the entire intelligence organization, and to take the initiative in utilizing domestic sources that seemed to have an intelligence potential.

25X1 Parallel with OO [redacted] collection operations, summarized above, were the various "support" services which it was called on to provide in increasing volume, between 1950 and 1953, to the numerous operational, intelligence, and administrative projects of the Agency, through its network of private sources in the United States. [redacted]

25X1



25X1 While OO [redacted] did not, of course, handle directly all details of the Agency's many and varied transactions with private organizations and individuals, it did have continuing responsibility,

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25X1 [redacted] for supervising arrangements
 for all except the most sensitive contacts with them. Under a
 long-established Agency regulation, which remained in force between
 1950 and 1953, "no employee of the Agency . . . [was] . . . per-
 mitted to approach any non-governmental individual or organization
 25X1 within the United States on official business without [OO] [redacted]
 25X1 approval."¹ Along with this rule, the Director regarded the OO [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted] chiefs as his personal representatives in their
 respective areas, "comparable in status to the senior CIA repre-
 25X1 sentatives [redacted]"²

25X1 Late in 1952, General Smith re-affirmed this policy of OO [redacted]
 control over the Agency's domestic contacts. The Assistant
 Director of OO had complained to him that there were "too many
 cases" where exceptions were being made to the rule that non-
 25X1 governmental contacts should be handled by the OO [redacted]
 25X1 and he reported further that the [redacted] chiefs "feel very
 strongly their responsibility as your personal representative in
 25X1 their areas."³ In a meeting [redacted]
 in 1952, General Smith re-affirmed their position as Agency-wide

25X1
 25X1 ¹ Paraphrased in memorandum [redacted] Chief of OO [redacted]
 25X1A to [redacted] on "Contact
 Division operations," undated (about Oct. 1, 1951), Secret, in
 O/DCI [redacted] filed under "OO Survey." The basic regulation was CIA

25X1A [redacted]
 25X1 ² Quoted in OO [redacted] monthly Operational Report, Oct. 1952, (Secret,
 Nov. 12, 1952), in O/DCI/[redacted]

³ Memorandum by AR/O to DCI, Oct. 18, 1952, Secret, in O/DCI [redacted] 25X1
 filed under "OO"

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representatives in their areas, and ordered that OO enforce compliance with the basic Agency regulation on domestic contacts, in collaboration with the Deputy Directors concerned. It was imperative, he said, that [redacted] chief be kept informed of all Agency contacts in his area, but that each representative's "exact knowledge of details" of a given Agency transaction in his area would have to depend on "a realistic application of the 'need to know' principle."¹

25X1 The pattern of OO [redacted] work on "support" projects
 25X1 varied from case to case [redacted] With respect
 to the Agency's personnel recruitment and supply procurement
 offices, for example, the general pattern was described in the
 25X1 following terms, late in 1951, by the chief of OO [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted]

25X1 ¹ [redacted] Monthly Operational Report, Oct, 1952, Secret, previously cited.

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25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Similarly, OO [] provided various types of support assistance to the intelligence production offices, in addition to handling their many collection requirements. On behalf of the Office

25X1

of Scientific Intelligence, for example, OO [] organized and handled

25X1

arrangements for the frequent meetings of the []

25X1

[] beginning early in 1951.² For the Office of

25X1

National Estimates, OO [] was the intermediary, in 1951, in arrang-

25X1

ing for guest lecturers from private [] institutions to

participate in ONE's internal training programs.³ The Office of

Research and Reports, similarly, had internal training programs

25X1

in which OO [] assisted, [] [] []

25X1

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In this case OO [] arranged with various industrial firms, in 1952,

25X1

to provide brief periods of training to selected [] analysts

25X1

in need of "first-hand familiarity with various types of industrial

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25X1

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25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

² The [] was organized as a group of "top ranking scientists [] who were asked to brood on, and consider, certain major problems of scientific intelligence that from time to time pre-occupy the AD/SI." (OO History [] May 1952, Secret p. 81; in O/DCI, []

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³ Memoranda by ONE to Project Review Committee, March 5, 1951, (Secret) and May 29, 1951 (Secret), in ONE "chrono file."

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25X1 activity."¹ Finally, OO [] assisted the Office of Current Intel-
ligence, beginning in August 1952, in making arrangements for
intelligence briefings to be presented periodically to the two
Presidential candidates (General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson)
and later, in November and December, to the President-Elect.²

25X1 Most of OO [] support work was conducted, however, on
25X1 behalf of the DD/P group []

25X1 []

25X1 []³ In statistical terms alone, the increased workload
25X1 in this particular activity between 1950 and 1953 was impressive.

25X1 By mid-1950 OO [] was handling [] such cases a month, already
25X1 a substantial increase over the year before, and one which (accord-
ing to one outside observer in CIA) was threatening to make the

25X1 [] support function "a serious competitor to [OO's] proper col-
lection function."⁴ Between January and June 1951, the workload

25X1 almost doubled, averaging [] a month received [] a month
25X1

25X1 ¹ OO [] Monthly Operational Reports, June 1952 and January 1953
(Secret) in O/DCI []

² OO/C Monthly Operational Reports, Aug., Nov., and Dec. 1952
(Secret) in O/DCI []

25X1 ³ In addition to assisting the DD/P's operational projects
25X1 directly, OO [] served DD/P []
25X1A beginning late in November 1952, principally in the [] area.

25X1 See OO [] Monthly Operational Report, Nov. 1952 (Secret, Dec. 11,
25X1 1952), in O/DCI []

⁴ Memorandum by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, entitled
". . . Historical Review . . . , 1946-1950" p. 14, undated (about
Nov. 21, 1951); prepared for draft of CIA progress report to NSC;
copy in O/DCI [] under "General Counsel."

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25X1A completed;¹ and by the end of the year the [redacted]

25X1 for example, was spending about 50% of its time [redacted]²

With the transfer of OO from the DD/P group to the DD/I group, in

25X1 March 1952, the [redacted] workload declined to some extent.

Thus, from December 1951 to February 1952, the monthly average was

25X1 down [redacted] completed, while the following twelve months (March

25X1 1952-February 1953), it declined further, [redacted] a month.³

25X1 Whether OO [redacted] was a component of DD/P or of DD/I, its work-

25X1 load [redacted] was nevertheless a substantial

one,⁴ and the pattern of its support activity for them seemed to

be essentially similar, and with somewhat the same problems.

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[redacted]

25X1 ¹ Memorandum by Chief, OO [redacted] to AD/O, July 18, 1951, Secret, in

O/DCI [redacted] filed under "OO Survey."

25X1 ² OO History [redacted] about May 1952 (Secret), p. 29; in O/DCI [redacted] files

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25X1 ³ OO [redacted] Monthly Operational Reports, Dec. 1951-Feb. 1953 (Secret),

passim, in O/DCI [redacted]

25X1 ⁴ More than 90% of [redacted] "operational" cases

in 1952, continued to come from DD/P requesters. The remaining 10%

25X1 represented chiefly DD/A and DD/I needs, and was actually less than

25X1 OO [redacted] non-DDP workload late in 1951. (See OO [redacted] Monthly Operational

Reports, Dec. 1951-Feb. 1953, passim, Secret, in O/DCI [redacted])

In 1953 operational or support cases of all kinds accounted for 27%

of the total workload of the field offices; the other 73% being

largely devoted to collection (See OO memorandum, "Implementation

25X1A . . . of the [redacted] Survey", undated, about Nov. 1, 1954, Secret,

in OO files.)

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Although OO [] was in the DD/P group in 1951, there remained occasional problems of "mutual confidence at the working level," it was reported,² and various attempts had been made to correct this situation, including the exchange of key personnel.³ Similarly, in 1952, after OO had been separated from the DD/P group, there remained cases of "uncoordinated approaches" to non-governmental sources by DD/P personnel, "climaxed" by a formal representation by the Assistant Director of OO to the DD/P

25X1A ¹ Memorandum by [] to Frank G. Wisner, DD/P, Nov. 19-21, 1951, Secret, in O/DCI [] filed under "OO Survey." [] was arguing, in this memorandum, for "placing [] under DD/P command." In a later comment, after the DCI's decision to remove OO from the DD/P group, Mr. Wisner praised the judgment of OO [] as being "the best judge of the possible harm to his client." (Wisner to Carey, Feb. 1, 1952, in Ibid.)

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² Memorandum by George G. Carey, AD/O, to DCI, Jan. 14, 1952, Secret, in Ibid.

25X1 ³ In July 1951, the chief [] told his [] officers that a "most significant personnel change" has been the DCI's recent appointment []

25X1 "This alters our plan," he went on, "to establish a []

25X1 [] liaison office within OSO, as [] had suggested. Instead, [] will be permanently assigned /from OO/ to the OSO staff most directly concerned with our operations." (OO [] Newsletter No. 29, April-July 1951, Secret, in O/DCI [] filed under "OO Survey") Subsequently [] was made head of a new [] Division in DD/P, established early in 1952 as part of the internal reorganization of the DD/P group. (See OO [] Monthly Operational Reports March and April 1952, Secret, in O/DCI []

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
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(late in October 1952), calling his attention to an "apparent violation" of the Agency regulation on contact control.¹

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Such changes in policy and procedure as were made did not, furthermore, seem to be directly related to OO's changing organizational position, first as a separate office in 1950, then as an office in the DD/P group in 1951, and finally as an office in the DD/I group, after February 1952. While it seemed incongruous,

25X1 ¹ OO Monthly Operational Report, Oct. 1952 (Secret, Nov. 12, 1952), in ibid.

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STATSPECA In 1951, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] it was evidently only

STATSPECA theoretical objection. In practice, [redacted] continued to be admin-

25X1 istered separately [redacted] during that period as before. Nor were there any major changes in its operating policies, after February 1952, that could be attributed directly to

STATSPECA the transfer of OO to the DD/I group. [redacted]

STAT [redacted]

STATSPECA [redacted]

STATSPECA The operations [redacted] between 1950 and 1953 continued to

25X1 represent both a problem of mass and quantity [redacted]

STAT [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

STAT ¹ [redacted] Dec. 12, 1947 (Secret), in O/DCI [redacted] The

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25X1 [redacted] was specifically excluded from [redacted] responsibility by the NSC. See Office of Current Intelligence, Chapter VIII, below.

STATSPECA ² Estimate by [redacted] at OTR orientation conference, Feb. 12, 1951; disc recording, (Secret) in OTR files.

³ These and other figures below, for Oct. 1950 are from the CIA "Statistical Summary," Oct. 1950 (Secret), in O/DCI [redacted].

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[Redacted]

Some of its special studies, furthermore, represented research that figured directly in the regular programs of the intelligence

STATSPEC production offices. By 1952 [Redacted] was regularly making such studies at the request of the Office of Current Intelligence, the agencies and offices concerned with psychological warfare operations, and

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the Office of National Estimates.¹ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Translation and Exploitation of Foreign-Language Documents, 1950-53

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The operations of the Foreign Documents Division [Redacted]

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[Redacted] were

essentially confined to headquarters. FDD had had no field activity

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¹ OO memorandum, "Implementation . . . of the [Redacted] cited above.

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² Ibid. The inauguration of this abstract-card system was prompted by a survey by ORR which [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was "not available through other sources." (Ibid.) The card system was not new to the Agency, however. The Foreign Documents Division (see below) had employed that method as early as 1947.

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since 1948,¹ and during the period 1950-53, except for occasional

25X1 temporary-duty assignments of its linguist-analysts [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] and a few

STATSPEC survey trips by the chief² and other personnel, FDD's activities

25X1 were concentrated entirely in Washington.³ [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] FDD was nevertheless

still so far removed from its customers in the production and

25X1 operating offices [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

¹ See footnote 3, p. 22, above.

² John J. Bagnall continued to serve, between 1950 and 1953, as the chief of FDD. He had been with the division since its beginnings in 1946, as first the Deputy Chief (Dec. 1946) of the Washington Document Center, and then variously as deputy chief, acting chief, and chief [redacted] (March 1947-June 1950). On June 11, 1950, he was formally designated chief of FDD. His deputy during the period 1950-53 (and before that, since January 1949) was

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[redacted] (OO History of FDD [cited p. 47, p. 55.]

³ In 1952 CIA attempted to establish a number of FDD linguists

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[redacted] posts, [redacted]

[redacted] (OO memorandum "Implementation," undated, about Nov. 1, 1954, Secret, p. 13, in OO files; and memorandum by AD/O to DCI, Jan. 14, 1952, Secret, in O/DCI [redacted] filed under "OO Survey.")

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⁴ [redacted] (OO History of FDD, previously cited, p. 32.)

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The principal continuing activity of the Foreign Documents Division, between 1950 and 1953 as before, was to support CIA's production and operational offices with a variety of translation, abstracting, and research services on newspapers, periodicals,

STATSPEQ and other foreign-language documents

25X1 together with occasional "reverse" translation service, that is, rendering English texts into Russian and other foreign vernaculars. Along with this intra-CIA service, which was usually called the "exploitation" of foreign documents, and which dominated its workload, was FDD's closely related service to the IAC agencies generally, conducted not under formal NSC charter,¹ but as the continuation of informal experiments begun between 1947 and 1949. This took three principal forms: (1) undertaking occasional translations and research analyses directly for IAC agencies at their request; (2) disseminating its completed products as widely as possible, regardless of origin, to all interested IAC agencies, as well as to authorized non-IAC agencies participating in the intelligence effort; and (3) serving as a coordination mechanism, through a central index in particular, by which CIA sought to reduce needless duplication of translations and exploitation

¹ CIA's inter-agency responsibilities for foreign documents (other than captured documents) were defined, for the first time by NSC on March 7, 1953, in NSCID No. 16, and included functions which were subsequently divided, within CIA, between OO/FDD and OGD. (See also chapter V, below, on OGD.)

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projects on particular documents or types of documents of overlapping interest to the several intelligence agencies involved. Finally, and incidental to these translation and research services, FDD also provided (until 1953)¹ a number of library services on its holdings of foreign-language material, such as assisting in the formulation of procurement and collection requirements, cataloging, indexing, and listing publications received, selecting publications for re-storage in other libraries and document depositories, and providing general circulation and reference services on its holdings to its CIA and IAC clientele.

Between 1950 and 1953, FDD's exploitation of foreign-language publications almost doubled, in terms of the volume of summaries and analyses produced. Thus, [redacted] a month were being completed and disseminated in October 1950; in 1951 the monthly average was up to [redacted] and by the end of 1952, it was up again [redacted].² The chief area of interest continued to be the USSR, but all other major foreign areas,

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¹ In 1953 most of these library functions were transferred to OCD (to the CIA Library), as part of a reorganization that followed the issuance of NSCID No. 16 (cited above). Subsequently, the CIA Library established a branch library [redacted] located on FDD's premises [redacted] (See also chapter V, below, on OCD.)

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² CIA "Statistical Summary," Oct. 1950 (Secret), and OO History of FDD, 1952 (Secret), pp. 56-60, both in O/DCI/[redacted] and OO Monthly Report, Sept. 1952 (Secret), in O/DCI/ER.

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Soviet-dominated and others,¹ continued to be represented in the regular and special requirements which FDD's analysts were called on to fill.² Similarly, all major types of intelligence subject matter were being regularly covered. [redacted]

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[redacted]³ The finished reports prepared by FDD were compiled in various forms, some for broad dissemination throughout CIA and the IAC agencies, and others tailored for specific customers. [redacted]

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[redacted] Other smaller

¹ CIA needs for FDD assistance on non-Soviet areas was illustrated by the establishment, in June 1951, [redacted] at the request of the Office of Research and Reports. (See OO history of FDD, 1952, Secret, p. 19, in O/DCI, [redacted])

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² CIA "Statistical Summary" Oct. 1950; OO history of FDD, 1952; and OO Monthly Report, Sept. 1952; previously cited.

³ Ibid.

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⁴ The [redacted] had been published since March 1947. The style [redacted] may have originally intended as a label for "Washington Document Center," the predecessor of OO/FDD.

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report series begun before 1950 were continued, notably its "Periodic Abstracts--Scientific" which appeared about every two weeks. Some of its products continued to be disseminated in card-abstract form, for the convenience of specific customers; others were in graphic form; and by 1953, several additional periodic compilations on the Soviet Bloc areas were in production.¹

Translations of foreign-language publications (in verbatim, excerpt, and summary form), as distinct from intelligence exploitation, continued to form a substantial part of FDD's normal activities. In October 1950, translations accounted for [redacted]

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[redacted] the reports produced by FDD, while late in 1952, [redacted] pages a month were being translated, or more than 50% of the Division's total output.² All but about 11% of this translation work, in 1952, was in response to CIA's internal needs

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divided about equally between the production offices in the DD/I group and the operational offices [redacted] Since each of

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¹ These new FDD report series included by 1953, six of economic interest (monthly, bi-monthly, semi-annual, and annual), five of general scientific interest, "trend" reports on some 30 fields of specialized scientific interest, and one monthly compilation of military information, primarily for the Service Agencies. (See OO memorandum, "Implementation . . . [redacted] . . .," undated (about Nov. 1, 1954), Secret, in OO files.)

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² CIA "Statistical Summary," Oct. 1950, Secret (in O/DCI/[redacted] files); and FDD "Statistical Report," Sept. 1952, Secret (in O/DCI/[redacted] filed under "OO.")

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³ The needs of the covert offices under DD/P accounted for most of FDD's translation work in 1951, totalling about [redacted] month in Sept. 1951. A year later, after the transfer of OO out of the DD/P group, FDD's translations for them were [redacted] a month. (See memorandum [redacted] Secret, "Translation Service," and OO Monthly Report, Sept. 1952

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Secret, both in O/DCI/[redacted]

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the other intelligence agencies had its own translation service, in some form or another, and since all of the intelligence collecting and producing components in and out of CIA, furthermore, were normally staffed with analysts who had some degree, at least, of linguistic proficiency, FDD's translation service was hardly a central pool for all IAC translation needs, nor was any attempt made to establish one in CIA. Even within FDD there was no separately organized translation "branch," as such, since all of its analysts normally handled both exploitation and translation projects.

In practice, FDD continued to be selective in serving CIA and IAC translation needs. Linguists in additional, rarer languages were recruited, to an extent that by the end of 1951 its

25X1 language capabilities had increased [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] For requesters outside CIA, FDD confined its service (by Agency regulation) to documents in the rarer languages and documents that had a substantive interest to CIA, and according to priorities that were not in conflict with CIA's own workload.² Meanwhile, FDD in 1951 also had recourse to additional help to meet

25X1 ¹ OO History of FDD, 1952, Secret, pp. 36, 61. Two figures for 1951 are given: [redacted] (p. 61).

25X1 [redacted] FDD had the further capability of "reverse" translation, from English into the foreign vernacular. (Ibid.)

25X1A ² CIA [redacted] Secret, April 1, 1951, and Jan. 12, 1952.

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the increasing workload, through the establishment of two supplementary translation services for handling items of lower security sensitivity: an unclassified project under contract, approved by

25X1 [redacted] In November 1950; and (after May 1951),

a "linguist pool" made up of temporarily-assigned personnel, "provisionally cleared" (that is, awaiting full clearance), who

25X1A were housed in a separate area [redacted].¹ The volume of customer requirements, especially for translations of classified material, nevertheless, continued to increase, and normally

25X1 exceeded FDD's capacity. During the month of September 1952, for

25X1 example, [redacted] were translated, as against [redacted]

25X1 requested during that month, and a backlog [redacted] on hand
at the end of the month. Of this backlog, 60% represented pending requests of the DD/I offices; 31%, the needs of the DD/P offices; 2%, the needs of DD/A and other administrative and support offices; and 7%, the needs of the IAC agencies.²

As a by-product of its translation and exploitation work, FDD continued to provide, between 1950 and 1953, an informal

¹ OO History of FDD, 1952, Secret, p. 34, in O/DCI, [redacted] 25X1
The combined needs of ORR, OSI, OSO, and OPC for unclassified translations, which prompted the commercial contract, were estimated [redacted] for 1951. Under that contract, translations were produced at [redacted] with two employees in FDD serving as middlemen. (Ibid., p. 18.) 25X1

² Percentages computed from FDD "Statistical Report," Sept. 1952, Secret, in O/DCI, [redacted] filed under "OO". X1

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inter-agency coordination service designed to reduce unnecessary duplication in document translation and exploitation projects among the intelligence agencies, and especially to conserve FDD's resources. This coordination service took the form of two inter-agency indexes, one in card form and the other disseminated periodically, in which FDD recorded its own projects and as many of those of the other agencies which came to its attention: (1) a "Document Exploitation File" (the "DEX), which had been begun late

25X1 in 1948 as a card index and which, by 1952, covered some [redacted]

projects, cross-referenced by author, area, and subject; and (2) the "Consolidated Translation Survey" (the CTS), which consisted of a monthly listing of translations completed and in progress, including both regular projects and (in a monthly supplement dating from early 1950) those that were especially sensitive.¹ The value

25X1 of these tools in day-to-day coordination is suggested by the fact that, between July and December 1951, for example, [redacted]

inquiries were made to FDD on proposed translation projects, of which more [redacted] were cases where duplication was clearly avoided.²

25X1 ¹ OO History of FDD, 1952, Secret, pp. 31, 41, 42. The "supplement" [redacted] was designed in March 1950, to permit the regular listing [redacted]

25X1C [redacted] had "no comparable listing," but were planning to establish one comparable to FDD's consolidated Translation Survey;⁵⁴ the DCI reported to the IAC agencies in March 1950. (Memorandum by DCI to IAC members, March 2, 1950, Secret, in O/DCI [redacted] filed under "CIA-IAC Misc.")

² Ibid., p. 42.

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In 1952 this "anti-duplication and information service" was expanded,¹ and in 1953, they were formally recognized in the inter-agency negotiations leading to the NSC directive on foreign-language publications, issued in March 1953.²

Summary

Whether by official decree or not, the components of the Office of Operations were all in practice "services of common concern." Each Agency under Central Intelligence participated in the work of domestic collection through the "NSCID-7" Committee and representatives [redacted]

STATSPEC [redacted] through similar committees.³ The [redacted]

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STATSPEC [redacted] provided a service not only to

25X1 intelligence and non-intelligence agencies of the government [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The Foreign Documents Division (even before it was officially made a service of common concern) filled requests not only for all parts of CIA, but for

25X1 other agencies as well. Information developed by [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Divisions were of course, available on an inter-agency basis.

¹ OO Monthly Progress Report, May 1952, Secret, in O/DCI, [redacted]

² NSCID No. 16, Secret, March 7, 1953.

³ See NSCID-7 and DCID 14/1 in Annex E.

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This would seem to be in accordance with Section 102 of the National Security Act which states: ". . . it shall be the duty of the Agency . . . to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."¹

The Office of Collection and Dissemination, which will be considered next, presented another opportunity to centralize intelligence as a similar and perhaps even more vitally integrated common service, but the same degree of cooperative activity had not been achieved in this field, by 1953.

¹ See National Security Act, Section 102, para. (b) (4) in Annex D.

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