

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

FILE COPY

CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
THE "NEW CLASS"

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDR Y. KAZNACHEYEV

JANUARY 22, 1960

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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II

FEBRUARY 24, 1960.

RESOLUTION

Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, That the testimony of Aleksandr Yurievich Kaznachejev given in executive session on January 22, 1960, with the consent of the witness, be printed and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
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III

CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The "New Class"

FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:10 a.m., in room 312, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator DODD. Would you stand and raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I do.

Senator DODD. All right, Mr. Sourwine, proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDR YURIEVICH KAZNACHEYEV

Mr. SOURWINE. Your full name?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Aleksandr Yurievich Kaznacheyev.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have testified before this committee on a previous occasion?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, a good deal of the testimony in the previous hearing had to do with matters related to Burma. Much of the discussion today will relate to conditions in the Soviet Union with respect to which this witness is also competent.

To establish that point, sir, you left the Soviet Union in 1957?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, the last time I was in the Soviet Union was in the fall of 1957.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have, since 1957, maintained various contacts with persons more recently from the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, I had many acquaintances that had just come to Burma from the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you therefore discuss conditions in the Soviet Union, as of your own knowledge up to 1957 and from your knowledge of Soviet citizens and others that have been in the Soviet Union since that time?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you an article entitled "Soviet 'Operation Burma'" which bears your byline and which appeared in the January 18 issue of the New Leader, and ask if you wrote that article.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, I wrote this article.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now this is cumulative of the testimony we previously had, but I think it ought to go into the record.

Senator DODD. Very well.

(The document referred to reads as follows:)

[From the New Leader, Jan. 18, 1960, pp. 13-15]

SOVIET "OPERATION BURMA"

(By Aleksandr Y. Kaznachev)

Aleksandr Y. Kaznachev is a young former Soviet diplomat who defected from his post in Rangoon last June. His report on Soviet activities in Burma—and his views on the situation inside the U.S.S.R., which will appear here next week—are of particular interest because, in family background, education, and career, his story is typical of the new Soviet generation. Born in 1932 of parents who were members of the Soviet intelligentsia—his father was an electronics engineer and his mother a doctor—he was graduated from a Moscow gymnasium in 1951. From 1951 to 1954 he studied in the Chinese department of the Ministry of Higher Education's Oriental Institute. After 2 more years of work in the eastern division of the Foreign Ministry's International Relations Institute, he was attached to the Soviet Embassy in Burma in March 1957, as an information officer and Burmese language and area specialist.

In the fall of 1957, while on leave in Moscow, I was informed by high-ranking KGB (State Security Branch) officers that I had been selected to do political intelligence work in Burma. The two men who directed me to join KGB were Vladimir Us and Boris Galashin, whom I knew in Burma as high-ranking Soviet Embassy officers. They told me that I had been selected for KGB since I knew Burma, and the Burmese language. This was a decision that I could not accept or reject. They were only telling me what KGB headquarters had decided.

They had me sign a paper which was an oath to do my best in performing tasks assigned by intelligence superiors and to keep deadly silent about my work. The last sentence of the oath stated that, if I willingly or unwillingly revealed secrets, I should be ready to accept any punishment, including the death sentence. Us and Galashin gave me the false name of Kazakov. After this, they told me what my duties would be for Soviet intelligence in Burma.

I was to translate, from Burmese to Russian, secret documents obtained by the Rangoon element of Soviet political intelligence. I was to develop contacts in Burmese political circles, in order to gather information. This would lead to my developing cooperative politicians, in order to turn them into paid Soviet agents. I was to establish contacts with foreigners in Burma, in order to gather information on the work of foreign Embassies and to penetrate them. Lastly, I was to observe the behavior of other Soviet citizens in Burma and report on them.

I had instructions that my intelligence affiliation should be kept secret from other members of the Soviet Embassy in Burma, including the then-Ambassador Alexei D. Shihorin himself. The KGB is supervised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This organization plants its residents abroad under cover as diplomats, Embassy workers, representatives of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), Sov-exportfilm, Sovinformbureau, and as interpreters or technicians working with Soviet aid projects.

In Burma, the KGB unit's chief was Ivan Vozny, who had the rank of colonel of state security. Boris Galashin, the man who "recruited" me for intelligence work in Moscow, had the cover rank of attaché. He was responsible for my political reliability.

The assistant to the chief of the group was Igor Trushkovskiy. He had the cover job of VOKS representative in Burma and the rank of second secretary and cultural attaché. Two other members of the group were Mikhail Vologzain,

who had the cover job of Sovexportfilm representative, and Dimitry Dityatev, who had the rank of second secretary and was head of the Embassy consular office. There are of course other people, including special technical personnel such as radio operators and code makers, who work only for the intelligence group.

The activities of the Soviet intelligence in Burma are to subvert the nationalist political forces and politicians, gather secret information about the Burmese Government and to carry out special psychological warfare. The group also had the responsibility to observe and report on all Soviet citizens in Burma, to discover the unreliable elements and those that had been influenced by "capitalist" propaganda and surroundings. The group also carries out espionage work by seeking to penetrate foreign Embassies in Burma, especially the American. The KGB in Burma is responsible only to its headquarters in Moscow. The Ambassador himself is kept under constant physical and technical watch, and reports on his activities are regularly sent to Moscow by the group.

This intelligence group works with its agents in the political parties, such as the pro-Communist National United Front. The largest part of my work was the translation of reports and documents of these agents who penetrated the political parties, in addition to governmental departments and the Burmese Army.

The main bases from which the secret intelligence activity was carried out were the offices of the Embassy, VOKS, Sovexportfilm and Sovinformbureau. The group uses three separate units of special radio equipment for its work in Burma.

The KGB element has a special assignment from the CPSU Central Committee to maintain contact with the legal Communist parties above ground and the insurgent Communist underground. These contacts are maintained by exchanges of letters and messages and by secret personal meetings. Personal contacts can be carried out at very high level, such as that between Bobodshan Gafurov, a member of CPSU Central Committee who visited Burma, and U Ba Nyein, a leader of the Communist National United Front. In Burma, I worked as an interpreter at secret meetings between these two men.

One of the most important activities of the group in which I personally participated was special psychological warfare that embraced the entire southeast Asian region. The Rangoon group of the KGB regularly planted in the Burmese press articles prepared in Moscow KGB headquarters. These articles were forgeries about political parties and political leaders of other southeast Asian countries, accusing them of being tools of imperialism, dishonest and corrupt. They were aimed at isolating and liquidating anti- and non-Communist parties and leaders. They were also aimed at spoiling relations between the people of these countries and the anti-Communist world. There were forgeries about the American support of the Indonesian rebels, American bribery of the Indian Finance Minister, frequent violations of Cambodia's sovereignty and Japan's "subversive" activity in southeast Asia. And many, many more.

The complex planting of the articles in the Burmese press worked as follows: Articles in the Russian language were received in Rangoon from Moscow on microfilm, through intelligence channels, and reproduced as photocopies at the Embassy. I translated the articles into English and Burmese. The Moscow articles were then planted in Burmese newspapers, through trusted Burmese agents. It was then my duty to check the articles (in both the Burmese and English languages) against the original Russian text. My notes on the accuracy of the translation and reproductions of any variations from the Russian original were sent back to Moscow, this time through Tass channels. The Soviet Information Service, Tass, Radio Moscow, official Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad, and other newspapers were then obliged to publish and redistribute these materials all over the world as true stories.

The main Burmese newspapers used by the group for this work were the Communist-controlled Mirror and Botataung; the People's Journal, the New Light of Burma, the Path, the Mandalay Ludu, and the English-language Burman were also used. The Dagon Publishing House was also exploited by Soviet intelligence in Burma.

One of the best examples of such fabrications was a pair of articles planted in the Mirror by the Vozny group at the very peak of Indonesian insurgent activity during the spring of 1958. One of the articles reproduced a letter, purportedly from an Indonesian rebel leader named Sjamsuddin to the American Ambassador in Tokyo. The other purported to be from "Admiral Frost," of the U.S. Navy, to another Indonesian rebel leader. At Vozny's direction, I translated both of these "letters" from the Russian-language photocopies into

English, and later checked the articles published in the Burmese-language Mirror against the original Russian photocopies. The Sjamsuddln "letter" was dated March 15, 1958, but was published in the Mirror in May. In it, Sjamsuddln asked the U.S. Ambassador for help and talked of aid for the rebellion from the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. The Frost "letter," which was published in the Mirror in early June, advised the rebels not to surrender and stated that the United States would continue to help them. These articles were signed by the Mirror's "Special Correspondent in Djakarta." These Rangoon Mirror articles were then distributed among Indonesian political circles, played up in the world Communist press, and even republished in an Indonesian-language newspaper, the Bintang Timur, which was also controlled by Soviet intelligence.

This activity of the Rangoon intelligence group is only part of the large Soviet press network throughout all of southeast Asia. In Indonesia, Soviet intelligence uses such newspapers as the Bintang Timur; in India, Blitz and the Delhi Times; in Thailand, La Patrie was used in the same way.

In Burma there is now the celebrated *Kovtunenka* case, which has been going on for many months. Kovtunenka is the Tass representative in Burma who, in the spring of 1959, published an article in the Tass bulletin which said three Burmese newspapers (the Nation, Guardian, and Reporter) were used by the American Embassy to undermine Burma's policy of neutrality. This article was written in Moscow originally, planted in the Delhi Times, and signed by their nonexistent Rangoon correspondent. The article was then sent to Rangoon for distribution through Tass channels. In this case the Soviet propaganda machine did not work well and a definite mistake was made in the last link of the chain. The channel of distribution was not properly selected and the editor of the Nation sued Kovtunenka for defamation of character. Kovtunenka hid out in the Soviet Embassy to escape trial. As far as I know, he is still afraid to come out.

Besides the intelligence group in the Embassy, there are other groups with intelligence duties. The GRU (military intelligence) group is operated by the military attaché group. The former chief of this group was Colonel Stryguine, whose unsuccessful attempt to defect to the Burmese Government is well known. Stryguine's replacement was to be Col. Anatoly Popov, a highly experienced intelligence officer.

Another group is the Referentura, which is responsible to the No. 10 Department of the Foreign Office in Moscow. In this group are intelligence officers such as First Secretary Maksin, and Ambassador's Secretary Aleksandr Razvin, and another section of codemakers and radio operators. The Referentura is responsible for keeping files of all secret documents and communications with Moscow. It also has the responsibility of reporting on the behavior of Soviet citizens in Burma and for technical work.

An economic intelligence service works through its economic advisor, Vasily Panov, who is the representative of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) in Burma. This group has definite intelligence duties.

There is no doubt that the real intention of the Moscow and Peking regimes is to achieve a Communist Burma. The original Stalinist plan for gaining this objective through the armed efforts of the Communist insurgents has definitely failed. The insurrection was started on Moscow's orders in 1948, but the Chinese People's Republic soon appeared and direct control over the Burmese insurgents was passed to Peking. The failure of the insurgency was recognized by Moscow in 1954, and all stress was shifted to bringing the Communists to power by subversion and other "legal" means.

The aboveground Communist parties of the National United Front were assigned the main role in this new approach, while the insurgents had a supporting role. Both were directed and supported by the Soviet and Chinese Embassies. A determined, and to some extent successful, attempt was made to achieve power by parliamentary means in the 1956 general elections, when with the financial aid of the Soviet and Chinese Governments and coercion of the voters by the Communist insurgents, the National United Front won about 40 seats in the Burmese Parliament.

Conditions became quite favorable for the Communists after the 1956 elections, especially after the split of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in early 1958. The split occurred with the aid of Soviet intelligence. This progress for the Communists was interrupted in October 1958, when Prime Minister U Nu transferred the premiership to Gen. Ne Win. Several hundred Peking and Moscow agents were arrested and the Government began to achieve great successes in the liquidation of the Communist insurgents.

Thus, the Soviet and Chinese plans were frustrated. The Soviet Embassy, in reports to Moscow, labeled the Ne. Win Government "proimperialist" and "fascist" and accused it of "liquidating the people's freedoms and rights." The Soviet Embassy was especially angered by the Government's attitude of true neutrality.

As a result of the changed situation in Burma, a new plan has been developed for the Communist achievement of power. Two months prior to my departure from the Soviet Embassy, the Embassy received a document from Moscow that laid down the official line for Soviet action in Burma. According to this directive, efforts were to be made (1) to increase all possible support for the Communist National United Front; (2) to split the leadership of the Burmese Army by all possible means; and (3) to split and weaken the influence of the AFPFL.

The final goals of Peking and Moscow in southeast Asia are the same, although there are some differences in their tactics. Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia are considered to be in China's sphere of influence, while the Soviet sphere of influence includes India, Ceylon, and Afghanistan. Moscow's immediate interest is to have Burma as a weak but friendly neutral, with the Communists working slowly toward achieving a Communist government by parliamentary methods. The rebellion is considered a lost cause by the Soviet Government and even harmful to Soviet interests. The Chinese generally don't believe in the usefulness of neutrality and have therefore maintained support of the Communist insurgents and kept the Burma border problem unsettled.

While the Soviet Government hopes to seize Burma's hand in order more easily to seize its throat, the Chinese Communists endeavor to seize Burma's throat directly. The result is the same.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. This is the first part of my statement that I made at a press conference in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. I show you a photostat of an article which appeared in the Sunday Times of London, December 6, 1959, entitled "Voice Out of Russia."

I ask if you have been given an opportunity to read this article?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, I read this article in the Washington Post.

Mr. SOURWINE. This article was subsequently reprinted in the Washington Post?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does this document seem to you to be authentic?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I think it is the original document. The author looks to be perhaps a teacher in high school, a member of the intelligentsia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, in large part, endorse what the writer of this article says from your own observation?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may go into the record.

Senator DODD. It may.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

[From the Sunday Times, Dec. 6, 1959, p. 11]

VOICE OUT OF RUSSIA: "WHAT I WANT THE WEST TO KNOW"

A REMARKABLE DOCUMENT REACHES THE SUNDAY TIMES

An extraordinary and revealing document has reached the Editor of the Sunday Times from the Soviet Union. The message that accompanied this moving essay simply said the writer wished to offer an honest answer to the fundamental question always in the mind of foreigners who talk with Soviet citizens, but hardly ever answered with complete candor: What do the Russian people really think and feel about life in the Soviet Union?

The Editor has reason for believing that this document, which was transmitted through channels that must remain secret, is au-

thetic. He is aware that the writer belongs to a class favoured under the Soviet regime, that his contribution to Soviet life is important, and that he was born after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. It is presented to our readers as a personal expression of faith from behind a Curtain which, although lifted a little of late, still stops the free interplay of minds.

"At that time nobody had heard of the Communists or Socialists or of the so-called levellers in general. All the same they existed—in vast numbers, moreover."—M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, the 19th-century Russian satirist.

A French writer once said that Russia is a land of steppes in which stands the Asiatic capital of Moscow—and Moscow itself was often thought of as being a town with a large number of churches.

It was to one of these churches that my grandmother used to take me as a child of five. I remember my feelings of terror at the stern faces of the congregation, at the darkness and gloom of the church.

It was a world which seemed to have slipped out of time and to have stopped. It seemed that these same old women must have prayed for the defeat of Napoleon in 1812.

This ancient bygone world, which has been declared extinct a thousand times and yet which always appears again from somewhere, does not unite all Russian people. But it reminds every individual of something inside him, and of the fact that, like it or not, he is a Russian and can never be anything else.

It is not easy to describe this "Russianness." Less than 100 years ago Russia ceased to be a serf-owning State. The feudal system left as its legacy masses of wretched, downtrodden peasants, a large class of officials corrupted by arbitrary rule, police officers, spies, bailiffs, bloodsucking merchants and other riffraff who despised the People because they had come from their ranks and knew that the People had no mysterious potential still to be awakened.

They despised their masters—the Russian nobility—for their idealism and lack of practical sense.

This last class—the Russian aristocracy—were the smallest, but their role in our Russian history is enormous. Just as Athens (which in ancient Greece was smaller than Nizhny, in provincial Russia) appears to our imagination as an immense town, a whole world, so the Russian aristocracy, which was a thousandth part of the population, seems to us to have been the basic factor of Russian life.

Within this class an extraordinary, original Russian culture was created—a culture which gave us such masterpieces as "War and Peace" and "The Brothers Karamazov." I have mentioned only two works, probably the best known in the West, but there are innumerable other masterpieces of literature, art and music created by Russian aristocratic culture. And if one remembers that in the narrow circle of this aristocracy the majority spent their time looking after their estates or living largely abroad, or spending their time in high living, then you can see that Russian culture was created by a handful of people.

BOUNDLESS LOVE OF FREEDOM

But there is nothing strange or surprising about this. Think again of the ancient world. Desperate and enterprising people, fleeing from vast Eastern despotisms, settled down on the wild shores of the Balkans. These were fierce and brave people, not averse to pillage and looting; but the main thing about them was their boundless love of freedom. Once free, these martial people created the Aegean culture which then became Hellenic culture—a culture on which the whole of our civilization is founded.

How many times has mankind been told by philosophers and poets that if man were made free his talents would blossom and his power become boundless! But one must accept this with the whole of one's heart, for sometimes material success, the wealth of the State and the unity of the People seem more important than freedom. Everyone must understand for himself that if there is freedom, there will be everything.

If you are not entirely convinced, but need facts to persuade you, look at the example of Russian history.

IDEAS BEGAN TO STIR

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russian autocracy had great power and importance in world affairs. After the reform of Peter the Great

and the brilliant age of Catherine, the Russian nobility tried to adopt European education and lustre. Coarse pleasures and merrymaking no longer satisfied them once they had savoured Western culture. The needs of the developing intellect were such that ideas of humanism and freedom began to stir.

Of course the nobility, while paying lipservice to fashionable sentiments about pity for one's fellow humans, continued to maintain themselves in idleness at the expense of a horrifying poverty among their serfs; but the ideas circulated and many took them seriously.

The young and ambitious Alexander I flirted with democracy and saw himself as the Enlightener of the People. One way he saw to win over the more civilised among the nobility was to found a lycée in Tsarskoe Selo. It was built in the immediate neighbourhood of his palace, and it was Alexander's idea that the children of noble landowners, having graduated from the lycée, would provide an intellectual and loyal support for the Throne.

TO WIN THEIR DEVOTION

How naïve were even kings in those days! Alexander imagined that the mere fact of his benevolence and the proximity of his Royal person would be enough to win their devotion to the Crown for the rest of their lives. He did not concern himself about the education and indoctrination given by the lycée.

And so, in the shaded parks of Tsarskoe Selo, there grew up an atmosphere of exceptional freedom of thought. Separated from their parents and the realities of life on feudal estates, left almost to their own devices, at liberty to read books, hold discussions and parties, stimulated by freethinking, progressive teachers, these young men did not develop in the way Alexander intended, but in the way human nature always does if it is given a free choice.

There was much these young hearts did not understand; they lived in a world of fantasy and bookish ideals. But from this unreal world emerged the most real thing in the world—the free human spirit.

Neither before nor since have there been such conditions for the free development of the personality as when the lycée was founded. Russia could not miss such a moment. Pushkin appeared. You English cannot know what Pushkin is for us. He is our pride, our hope, and our love. He is the Sun of our art, and without him there would have been neither Tolstoy nor Dostoevsky; for it was Pushkin who gave impetus to slumbering Russian thought, fertilised Russian culture, and by his genius gave this culture its direction.

It is Pushkin who makes us feel that Russian man is infinitely gifted and can create treasures of the intellect if only he is left in peace by the hundred-headed Hydra that constantly claims its tribute, freezing his soul with its vile, brutish demands.

Perturbed by the bright light of dawning freedom, the Hydra bestirred himself and Pushkin was destroyed. He lived only thirty-seven years, but each day of his life means more to us than any of Suvorov's victories.

The Hydra "restored order" in the lycée (and in the whole of Russia) and waited to see what would happen. This is what happened. It proved impossible to stem the feelings awakened among Russian people of culture. The rich noblemen did not wish to return to barbarism; some realised that the pleasures of civilisation were finer than the orgies of their forbears; others, having tasted the joys of creative activity, could no longer do without them. So the nobility became freethinking, and the Hydra-State had no choice but to appease the noble caste on which it depended, together with the martinet's discipline, and more towards freedom of publication, open frontiers, and the elimination of extremists by court procedure instead of by secret terrorism.

It was this group of internally free Russian noblemen that created our culture. Within the limits of this group there was freedom and freedom of thought. People spoke about what they wanted and thought about things that seemed important to them. Their opinions were guided by their consciences. On this ground grew up those flowers of art which still fill the world of culture with their fragrance. All this would have been splendid if this small free world of the well to do had existed on the moon. But it was on the earth, and existed side by side with an unfree, materially wretched world, inhabited by an anonymous grey mass of people. This malodorous world not only fed the noblemen, it nurtured their art with popular talent. They could not close their eyes to this. Like a tuber cut off from the sun, the small, creative caste of noblemen in Russia stretched out its shoots towards the masses, coalesced with them, and distributed among them the jewels created in freedom.

And what of the Hydra? First we have to know what the Hydra is. Is he Tsarism, the Communist Party, or the State in general?

We Russians are specialists on the Hydra. Although he watches us constantly and thinks he knows all our thoughts, we know more about him than he knows about us. The Hydra, you see, is phenomenally dull witted, whereas we are quick witted and have an artistic flair. We realised a long time ago that however he disguises himself—as Nicholas I, as Arakcheev, Stolypin, or Pobedonostsev, whether he has a gendarme's cockade, or a general's epaulettes, whether he calls himself a party member, a monarchist, a Communist, a democrat, an instrument of authority, a dissident, a progressive, an old Bolshevik, a devil, or an angel—the Hydra is always the Hydra.

It is because of the Hydra that only scoundrels may walk the earth while everybody else hides in corners; that only scoundrels go unafraid, while the rest walk in terror; that only crooks and traitors may count on praise, while everybody else is expected to give thanks for the privilege of not being in gaol.

"RENDER UNTO CAESAR"

Christ says: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." We Russians understand this in our own way. In these words we hear an admission that we should not concern ourselves with the ordering of our own lives: the Hydra looks after this for us. And even if we tried to do it ourselves, the Hydra would push us aside with his dirty paw and say: "Don't meddle in the affairs of Caesar. After all, I have left a few small joys for you and I have promised you more to come; soon there'll be enough maize, for instance. What else do you want, new impressions?"

"Enough of that," we would reply. "Not long ago our fathers got new impressions and studied the geography of the northern and eastern regions * * *"

[Translator's note: i.e., the concentration camps of the Far North and Siberia.] If one were to allow open competition between honesty and crookedness, could honesty win? The honest use only honest methods, whereas the crooks use every weapon. The honest hesitate and doubt, while the crooks undermine them; the honest, even if they win, are forgiving, whereas the crooks, when they win, torment you till only pride prevents you from crying out.

The crooks rage, shout at the top of their voices, blackmail, hoot, threaten, lie, and then laugh in your face and try to hit you from behind, or while you are sleeping. At last you grow tired of this orgy at your expense, you say "to hell with it," and render unto Caesar what is Caesar's.

Then, if you behave yourself for a long time, the crooks may even pat you on the cheek with their greasy hands, saying: "Don't forget, carp, there is a pike in the pond."

NO CLEAR ANSWER

Forgive me for this historical digression. Without understanding the recent past you could not understand Russia's present.

Yes, present-day Russia concerns practically the entire Western World, but if you were to ask each individual what precisely it is that concerns him, the majority would not be able to give a clear answer. I think the main question for people from the Western World is: "Why don't the Russians live as we do, and why do they want everybody to live as they do?"

In talking of present-day Russia I shall take these questions as my starting point. You can learn about external aspects of life in Russia from your correspondents and tourists. But the internal life of the Russians—these people who resemble all others in the world in their spiritual qualities, their desires, their good and bad points—sometimes escapes the observer.

Nevertheless, despite the way in which the visiting foreigner is dazzled by the Bolshoi Theater, by the round of receptions, by university visits, by trips to Sochi, to Yalta, and by other steps taken to entertain and divert him, the intelligent traveler notices that people in the U.S.S.R. are reluctant to state their opinions, and that his attempts to meet the people "off the record" and to get to know what they think are thwarted. A vacuum forms wherever he tries. Is this to be ascribed to the mistrustfulness of the Russians?

Suppose you had been arrested in 1937 for the least misdemeanor, or more probably for none at all, but just because of an anonymous denunciation, or because of the need to keep up a quota of arrests. Suppose you had been tortured, sent to forced labor for life, indeed, had been eliminated as a human being. And suppose this had happened not only to you, but to millions of your fellows.

CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

9

Incidentally, many of the people arrested then—and although only a small proportion survived, even this number adds up to a great many—are now returning home. These are the so-called rehabilitees. They are broken, ill, scarcely really living, just dragging out their last days. Once these were loyal party people, good engineers or honest soldiers. Here, surely, is a subject for a film. An old wreck of a man returns and is given a chit for an apartment by the same local party secretary who once tormented him and then avoided him like the plague when he was arrested. When he moves into his new apartment the old man puts his felt boots (a typical feature of concentration camp dress) into the corner, just in case.

DOMINATED BY CROOKS

Suppose, after the war, you had again been reminded of the existence of the "pike in the pond," suppose it had been dinned into your head every day and every hour that you must not speak with foreigners because they are spies, that you had read repeatedly in the newspapers about slanderous books on your country published abroad by tourists and correspondents—would you, after all this, throw yourself on the neck of a complete stranger and pour out all your thoughts without the least idea of the use to which he might put them?

To understand what is going on in Russia one must take as one's starting point the fact that our social life is dominated by universal crookedness. Just try to understand this and everything will be clear to you.

[From the Sunday Times, Dec. 13, 1959, p. 11]

VOICE OUT OF RUSSIA—2: FIGHTING THE HYDRA

This is the second part of a remarkable document which came through secret channels out of the Soviet Union. A message with it simply said that it was an honest attempt to answer the question: What do Russians really think and feel about life under Khrushchev?

Before deciding to publish this "testament of faith," the editor was at pains to satisfy himself that it is authentic. He also submitted it to Dr. Ronald Hingley, the expert on Russian affairs, who writes: "This fascinating document rings completely true; indeed, to many Western readers it may give a healthy shock. Many of us brood on Soviet intentions but * * * we can easily lose sight of the fact that ordinary Russians cannot speak. Here is one who has spoken."

Boundless crookedness—triumphant, cynical and hypocritical—that is Russia today. Sometimes it becomes supercrooked and begins to reveal its own dark deformities. This was so in the case of the scandalous "Khrushchev letter"¹ on Stalin's crimes. Khrushchev was Stalin's political accomplice all his life.

Then there were the revelations about the monstrous, debauched life of Beria. I can imagine how Western people could be led astray by such matters as these. All his life Beria was proclaimed, not least by Khrushchev, as a devoted servant of the people, a Leninist, a saint. And then, suddenly, we have "the vile crimes of Beria * * *." These things can be explained only by the rule of crookedness.

The reason is simple. All these revelations, appeals to the people, economic reforms, 7-year plans, conquest of the virgin soil, innumerable resolutions of the Supreme Soviet and sessions of the Council of Ministers, do not have as their basic aim an improvement in the life of the people. They are fundamentally serving the strategy of the ruling group which strives to strengthen its power, remove possible rivals, and seize all key positions.

When Khrushchev published his semisecret letter on Stalin's atrocities, he was not moved to do so by feelings of righteous indignation, but by the fact that Stalin had left behind him a vast personal bureaucratic apparatus, which possessed enormous strength and which had claims to the succession. The

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Khrushchev's "secret speech" on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 was read out at semipublic meetings in the form of a "letter" from the Central Committee. Hence Russians refer to the "secret speech" as "Khrushchev's letter."

parallel apparatus of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev controlled, had to discredit this hostile apparatus and destroy it.

Khrushchev's letter, though unparalleled in its cynicism, served his personal aims well. A little earlier, after Khrushchev had courted the old Government oligarchy, they joined forces with his Central Committee and together they removed their most dangerous common enemy, Beria.

The creation of the Regional Economic Councils was of no benefit to the people, but they were needed by Khrushchev to drive the last stake into the grave of the Government oligarchy. New, unknown people arose; all who had been powerful to any extent were brushed aside and eliminated.

THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE

All this may be elementary. The English after all are not children in political matters. But why then do they not understand what is going on in Russia today?

What is taking place in front of our eyes is a most normal thing in Russian life—the reshuffling at the top of the powers of crookedness. One set of crooks (even viler ones) step into the shoes of others, and in this internal struggle they constantly appeal to the people, make declarations and revelations, organize meetings, discussions of Central Committee secret letters, etc. (and it makes you sick, I can tell you). Although the people realize that Beria's apparatus was smashed once it had begun to threaten members of the Central Committee themselves, they know that something could arise to take its place. And, since the physical conditions of Siberia are very well known to them, the people take a very lackadaisical view of these discussions and meetings. Something more about the attitude of the people of Russia to internal politics must be said later on.

When it comes to external politics, we have a special factor. The Western World exists and has no intentions of disappearing, but the Hydra of the State wants it to disappear. The stupid one-track mind of the Hydra is fixed on the West and utterly perplexed by it.

The Government crooks rule everything inside Russia. They even believe that ordinary citizens have come to love them, have given them their blessing and imagine that it is impossible to live in any other way but this—namely, standing at attention before the crooks. But, lo and behold, somewhere else on this planet, people do not stand at attention but behave as they wish, express their thoughts, argue, write good books, make good films, travel abroad, are sad or happy, commit good and bad deeds, and all this happens not under the oppressive stare of crooks but in freedom.

HATRED OF NEIGHBORS

The Soviet rulers, who are champions of intrigue, who have learned the ultimate wisdom of how to sneak up to a man behind his back and crack his skull with a brick, suddenly go out into the world and discover that it is not primitive like theirs but vast and complicated in its liberty.

Imagine a scoundrel who by intimidation and violence has possessed and dominated a woman. With blackmail and threats he has made her forget the past and forced her to believe that he, the scoundrel, behaves like this not because he is a scoundrel, but because this is the nature of things. And suppose another man suddenly moves in next door, a man who speaks freely, thinks deeply about matters of life and death, indulges in speculation and dreams; a man who is, in fact, free. Would not the scoundrel feel hatred for this neighbor? Would he not want to isolate him? Or make him also live the life of a scoundrel?

People in the West, do not overestimate the strength of these crooks. They have terrorized everybody in our country, but for this very reason they themselves are frightened of everything. They are accustomed to hypocrisy from the day of their birth and know very well how to deal with other scoundrels, but they do not understand the psychology of freemen and therefore fear them. Having almost achieved their dark dream of creating a kingdom in which the dead eye of the Hydra dominates everything, the crooks suddenly notice one incomprehensible detail which stubbornly threatens and casts doubts on all their efforts.

This detail is the law of the complementary by virtue of which the Western World begins to value and safeguard its freedom all the more as it understands more fully the power of the Hydra in Russia.

The crooks realise instinctively that the whole of mankind will never submit to the Hydra and that the free ideology created by the Hellenes, the English, French, Russians, and the Americans is indestructible. Therefore the crooks try to adapt themselves to the existence of the West. This is why the Hydra's efforts to play up to the West and camouflage himself before the eyes of the West are second only in importance to his efforts to consolidate his power in Russia and the subject countries.

Throughout practically the whole of Russian history there has been an enormous expenditure of money and effort to show a good face to the West, although the futility of this is obvious. I, for one, do not believe that the present clumsy efforts of official Soviet propaganda or the activity of certain of your fellow-traveller writers can deceive anybody in Europe or America. So why does the Hydra try so hard?

I think that the dull brain of the Hydra has given birth to a phantasmagoric dream: "Since the West will not disappear, can't we come to an agreement with it, whereby it would leave us alone, not abuse us, not make invidious comparisons between itself and us, and pretend not to see us?" Then the crooks would be able to triumph completely in one country and they would be prepared to give the West something in return for closing its eyes.

But the West will just not stop thinking and saying things which disturb the Hydra. The West will not compromise with its conscience and close its eyes by agreement with the Hydra; the West does not believe any of the Hydra's assurances, because it knows that the basic feature of the Hydra's external policy is unprecedented hypocrisy.

And again the Hydra rages, threatens, writes notes only to stop short and realize that he is not faced by the Russian man-in-the-street who can be manipulated at will, but by Englishmen or Americans who disregard threatening notes. Then the Hydra begins to play up to the West, plead with it, and spends the people's money without permission on support for such dubious persons as Nasser; he covers his claws with gloves and fawns on them. But these external policies always fail and, thwarted, the crooks again turn their eyes to Russia and think, "Here anyway my eyes can rest, here everything is clear and smooth."

But is it?

"In the whole world there are only two forces: the sword and the spirit, and in the long run the spirit always triumphs over the sword."—Napoleon.

Do not think, inhabitant of the West, that life under the Hydra is in any way attractive or exotic. It is in general a rather boring business. Beginning with the morning paper and ending with the late news on television, if you live in Russia you are dogged by the eye of the Hydra, his lies and his vileness. At a meeting, at your work, you are addressed by people whom you know perfectly well to be the greatest of crooks but who, because of this, have power, and you must listen to them. When you go on a trip abroad you are briefed by surly, stupid, and dangerous idiots.

You meet an old friend with whom you have discussed from time to time the views of the Hydra, and he tells you that he has joined the party. Then you begin to speak to him in newspaper language, and although he notices this, he is not embarrassed, but regards it as normal.

I have no time to describe in detail the average life of the average Russian. For this a novel would be needed and a better writer than I. How do we Russians stand it, you ask? Of course we are fed up. More than we can say, we would like to look at a world free of lies and crookedness and show it to our children.

NO RESPECT FOR KHRUSHCHEV

But how do these feelings of ours affect the course of events? This is how: The present Russian Government has not the slightest authority among the people. Anecdotes about Khrushchev, Furtseva, and the others, have become almost a sign of good form in the most varied circles. If Stalin was feared, he was also respected (and many believed in him); Khrushchev, even if he is feared a little bit (he is an expert with the brick) is not in the least respected. It is impossible to respect him.

There is a mood of great lassitude among the masses. Everybody attends to his own business and everybody hopes for something. This inertia has even begun to worry the people at the top. They now organize countrywide discussions and they call on the people to help the Government to improve the economy, the administration, help in technical development, and in general to be more active. But the people do not lift a finger.

No, Hydra, we were active, we believed in ideals, but Stalin sent 5 million people to their graves for being active. We really thought that we were moving towards a free life, toward communism. We believed our leaders, but Khrushchev, with his shameless hypocrisy and his ability to go back on his own words, has shown us that we can believe only in ourselves. Since they have assumed charge of our souls and our lives, let them take charge of everything else too. We shall work if they force us; when they pay us our money, we shall take it.

The complete collapse of the Hydra's authority has enormous consequences. In the first place war has become impossible. The people will sweep the Hydra away if he risks such a monstrous adventure. In conditions of atomic war with the dispersal of ground forces, nobody would fight when he was away from the Hydra's eyes.

In the second place the ruling clique themselves are beginning to understand that they have gone too far in their crookedness and their cynicism and even some of them are probably sick and tired of their Hydra existence. After all, they spend their lives destroying rivals, cursing and swearing at people and exiling them to the far ends of the country. They come home late from work and spend their leisure hours in wild orgies. By the age of 45 they get heart disease, but what sort of a life is it? You die and nobody remembers you, because all the others will be crawling on their bellies in front of your successor.

SEEDS OF REVOLT

We Russians don't know how to live properly, but we are beginning to understand this more and more. The seeds sown in this giant people by a handful of its free representatives have been scattered far and wide. You cannot see these seeds but they have not died. They live in the womb of the people and are maturing.

These seeds live in the qualities of the Russian people, in their calmness, in their incapacity for the trivial, in their scepticism, in their disbelief in words, in their deep conviction that the newspapers tell only lies, in their patience and fortitude, in their preparedness for great deeds and for hardship in the name of truth and justice, in the name of a great cause which they cannot find, in their contempt for the Hydra, and finally in their unshakable belief in their own strength and in the idea that they are worthy of a better life, a free life.

Knowing the mood of Russians in all groups of society, I think that there is a possibility of our society evolving. Perhaps some role will be played in this by the expansion of China; if we have to choose between China and Europe we shall unhesitatingly choose Europe. Perhaps there will be some new people at the top (Khrushchev is mortal, after all), perhaps there will be a gradual Europeanization owing to the extension of tourist and cultural exchanges. I don't know. But perhaps sooner than you think, you in the West will see a Russia that will bring you not fear but light.

Mr. SOURWINE. To clear up a couple of points remaining from the last hearing, would you expand somewhat on what you told us about the relationship between you, as a Soviet representative in Rangoon, and the people of Burma?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I was recruited into a criminal organization, the Soviet intelligence service, and given definite obligations to spy on the Burmese people.

What I want to make clear here is how I actually fulfilled those obligations.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. My main obligation was to translate documents obtained by the intelligence service. My assignment was to do this technical job.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you did it?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I had to do this technical work. This was my everyday work and I had no way of avoiding it. Some of the knowledge I have about the work of Soviet intelligence was acquired in the process of this work—translation of intelligence documents.

The rest I obtained while acting as translator in secret conversations between KGB officials and Burmese Communist agents. Another of my obligations which I was constantly forced to fulfill was to get information on political parties. However, I did everything I could to avoid reporting on my Burmese friends.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you are telling us you were deceiving your intelligence chief from the beginning so as to protect any confidential relationships you had with the Burmese people?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I had very many acquaintances among the Burmese people. Some of them were my real friends, and I never reported anything about them. I carefully concealed from intelligence my real attitude toward Burma and the Burmese people. I concealed the names of all my real friends, and this was not at all easy to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was right from the beginning of your work in Burma?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. After beginning my work for intelligence it was some time before they began to press me to start operational work—getting information. At first I was entirely confined to the technical work of translating documents. This period lasted for approximately 5 to 6 months and it was during this period that I established my attitude toward Burma and the Burmese people and acquired many good friends. So, when my chief started to press me to do operational work, I found a way to avoid actually doing it. I have to add here that other of my acquaintances in Burma were people from the pro-Communist parties. I met them at the Embassy receptions and in the offices of the Soviet Embassy. They were very friendly to me because I was Soviet and they gave me their information quite voluntarily. That information I reported directly to intelligence.

Those people were quite aware of what they were doing and were just using me to transmit their messages and reports to the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are saying is that where a Burmese friend of yours spoke to you in confidence, you respected his confidence?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I did this because I despised the Soviet regime and had long since become disillusioned with communism.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your loyalties were to your Burmese friends?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, I had many difficulties in getting acquainted with the Burmese.

As a rule, the Burmese were refusing to establish more or less constant contacts with me and to meet me more than once, but usually they changed their minds after they found out that I really wasn't a Communist and in no way tried to use them for getting information but was just seeking their friendship for the sake of friendship.

I enjoyed their company. I liked to study their language, culture, and so on, through them.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you went to Burma, you had been instructed to make contacts for information purposes?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the same time you had been warned not to go too far in making such contact because of the danger of ideological contamination.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That didn't apply to you as an intelligence agent?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. This warning was not applied to me as an intelligence agent. Before recruiting me into the intelligence organization, I was carefully checked. My record was clean. Actually, at that time I was nearly the only one in the Soviet foreign service who knew the Burmese language well. So my bosses had confidence in me and trusted me. They knew I was sometimes quite critical about Soviet life but they thought my criticism was healthy criticism aimed at improving the position of the Communist regime.

Mr. SOURWINE. The warning about danger of ideological contamination was applied, generally, to the staff of the Embassy?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes it is applied, generally, to all people. Here is a great contradiction of the Soviet diplomatic system. On the one hand, all members of the staff of the Embassy are constantly forced and asked to get as many contacts as possible within the local population, to mix with Burmese at every opportunity and to make friends, especially in political circles, army, and business groups. Of course, the members of the Embassy were ordered to make friends with the local population—not for the sake of friendship, but in order to get valuable information, spread Communist ideas, and Soviet propaganda. At the same time, the Soviets in Burma were instructed not to go so far in these fraternizations as to become intimate with their Burmese contacts. A warning was constantly repeated not to trust anybody, to be very careful, and to be very cautious about foreign intelligence services and provocateurs. We were also warned to remember constantly about the capitalistic surroundings and capitalistic propaganda. The Soviets who have not been recruited into intelligence as a rule do not like these warnings and restrictions. They know that without becoming really friendly with people, it is impossible to spread Communist ideas and Soviet propaganda and to get really valuable information. They want to avoid complications and, as a rule, avoid any contacts at all with the local population.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the way to stay out of trouble?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. They tried to walk away from any troubles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in discussions with us, you have told us about the master race psychology of the Soviet representatives who go to foreign countries. Would you tell us about that here for this record?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party spare no efforts to indoctrinate all Russians with the idea of so-called "Soviet patriotism." The education of Soviet youth and all other people in the Soviet Union is carried out under the officially adopted slogan: "The last Soviet man stands two heads higher than the first man from a capitalist country." The teaching of "Soviet patriotism" is evil and even criminal. It propagates the idea of superiority of "Socialist nations" and the inferiority of "capitalist nations." The people, especially the youth, in the Soviet Union are taught to look down on all "bourgeois" nations as second class and inferior.

The effect of this teaching is that when many Soviet people come abroad they have some prejudice against people in capitalist countries and it takes time—and more than this, definite courage and determined effort—to overcome these prejudices. I am going to state that these

prejudices are purposely cultivated and strengthened by Soviet propaganda and the officials of Soviet Embassies.

When I came to Burma, my first step was to ask the people around me what the country was like—what did they think about the Burmese people, their customs, traditions, culture, and so forth. As a rule, it was implied that the country was very poor, nothing was interesting, the people were lazy, poor, and superstitious.

Mr. SOURWINE. Uncultured?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The general idea in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon is that the Burmese people are uncultured and the authorities in the Embassy carefully encourage this idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us of an incident in which a Burmese student had married a Russian girl. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. One of three Burmese students studying at Moscow University married a Russian girl. I met several Russians who knew this Burmese student and his Russian wife very well. They told me the girl was a very good wife. They are very happy in their life. They already have a child.

Once I was present in the Ambassador's office when the question about this Russian girl marrying the Burmese student was discussed. The Ambassador was enraged and referred to the girl as a prostitute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because she married a native of an inferior nation?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I think he felt this. Later, I met another Burmese student who had just returned from Moscow. This was in June 1959, just 2 days before my defection. He told me that this Russian girl had refused to follow her husband to Burma because she had been threatened by Soviet authorities.

I'll give you another example. I know another Burmese student in Moscow. His name is Maung Maung Oho. He was invited to teach Burmese at the International Relations Institute where I studied. He was very friendly with Russian students and the Russian students liked him in the same way. They visited his room in the hotel and tried to help him in his life in Russia.

It was soon found out by the institute authorities and all students of the Burmese group were briefed to avoid any nonofficial contact with this Burmese and even threatened with reprimands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Because the institute authorities didn't like their students to be really friendly with the Burmese. They were afraid that Soviet students would be told the truth about life abroad by the Burmese student. Officially, the Soviet propaganda referred to Burma in such a way that the majority of the Soviet people think that Burma has become some sort of Peoples' Democracy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You, yourself, became friendly with a great many Burmese, did you not?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I had very many good friends in Burma.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spent a good deal of your free time with the Burmese people?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I spent practically all my free time with my Burmese friends. The working day in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon was from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. After 2 p.m. I usually started a completely new life. I visited my friends. They often invited me to their homes. I adjusted to the Burmese way of life to a considerable

degree. Sometimes, Burmese told me they forgot I was a foreigner. I hated being in the Soviet Embassy, as the whole atmosphere there was tense and unfriendly. My real life started only when I was with my Burmese friends.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made friends with them?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I made many very good and even intimate friends among the Burmese. I believed in them; they respected me and were very sympathetic toward me. Several of my friends knew about my plans to defect for 5 months before I acted. I practically put my life in their hands and they didn't betray me. More than this, they tried to help me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this friendship with Burmese cause you any trouble with the Soviet people?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Very few in the Soviet Embassy knew about my real life. My boss in Soviet intelligence knew only that I often met Burmese, but as long as I appeared to be doing my job, he was satisfied and didn't control my life much. As for other Soviets, I had some friction with them on this ground. When they referred to the Burmese in a condescending and even insulting way, I tried to explain to them that they were wrong. I got the reputation in the embassy of being too pro-Burmese. I know that one of them, Professor Garshkov, who had been sent to Burma by the United Nations, reported to Moscow about me. He wrote that I liked Burma too much and had become infected by capitalistic surroundings and that, in general, there was something suspicious about me.

So whenever I referred in a friendly way about Burma to the Soviets, it was understood there was some suspicion around me. To be nonsuspicious you should have an unfriendly attitude.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us before that the isolation of the Soviet Embassy people was aggravated by the attitude of the Burmese themselves; that they didn't like Communists and were reluctant to contact Soviet representatives.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you expand on that?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I personally met many difficulties in getting acquainted with the Burmese.

My special efforts helped me. I tried to be sincere and open with my Burmese friends and that opened the doors of their homes and even their hearts to me.

From the very beginning, I found that the average man in Burma hated the Communists. The Burmese Communist insurgents, supported by their foreign masters, have been attempting to destroy the country for more than 10 years by carrying on what the Soviets call a "civil war." They have killed thousands, destroyed people's property, etc. This personal experience of the Burmese people with the evils of communism is supported by what can be observed of the Communist governments in the Soviet Union and China. The Burmese people well remember Hungary and are especially conscious of Tibet.

So the situation is such that, on the one hand, personnel from the Soviet Embassy are not willing or are prevented from, fraternizing with the local population and, on the other hand, there is no great desire on the part of the local population to fraternize with the Soviets.

Mr. SOURWINE. In connection with your description of relations between Soviet personnel and the local population, would you like to make some comment about the book "The Ugly American"?

Mr. KAZNACHBYEV. Yes. The book, "The Ugly American," is in my understanding a very useful book. Its value is that it stated that the struggle between communism and the free world for the underdeveloped countries is not only political and economic but also moral. I am convinced that in this moral struggle the Soviet Communists and Communists in general are losing.

The weak point of this book is that the authors were not correct in estimating the appeal and abilities of Soviet officials. My own experience showed that the author's evaluation was wrong.

For instance, I was the only member of the staff in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon that could read and speak the native language. Nobody else in the Embassy could do it.

Secondly, as I have previously stated, the whole system of the Soviet foreign service is such that it prevents people from fraternizing, making good contacts, and working with the native population.

This book made a sensation by stating that the level of the work of the Soviets is very high. It is said in the book that all of the Soviets know the customs of the country in which they work, that they knew how to appeal to the souls of people, that they know native languages, and so on.

I shall give you one example directly contradicting the description given in one chapter of the book. In this chapter a description is given of a Soviet Ambassador to a Buddhist country. The book relates that when the Ambassador arrived in the country, he did exactly the right thing by immediately approaching the chief Buddhist monk in that country, and then acted in such a way that he won the monk over to his side.

I, myself, was present at a talk between high Soviet officials and a group of very influential monks in Burma. It was in 1958 when the Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Burma. They visited Mandalay, which is the center for Burmese Buddhists. The Soviet delegation was invited to meet a group of high-ranking Buddhist monks in the Mandalay Hill Pagoda. The delegation was accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador. When the Soviet officials arrived at the Pagoda, they were invited to sit. On the advice of the Ambassador they refused. They were offered some food, which they also refused to eat, because it was not good for Soviet stomachs. The Soviet parliamentarians and the Soviet Ambassador did not make the slightest effort to show their respect for the old monks and the customs of the country. Quite to the contrary, all their behavior was disgraceful. It was an insult to the monks and the Burmese.

One member of the Burmese Parliament immediately mentioned it to the Soviet Ambassador, but the Ambassador replied to him with irritation, "What for we will be sitting? In Russia, when we want to show our respect to somebody, we stand."

Mr. SOURWINE. He was willing to show his respect for the Burmese in Soviet fashion but not in Burmese fashion?

Mr. KAZNACHBYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. Now, in the book, "The Ugly American," who was the ugly American? Some particular character? Or

was that a term applied generally to the American people in this part of the country or the American officials in this part of the country?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I think that, as I understood the title of the book, the ugly American was applied to one American that was ugly in appearance but beautiful in his actions.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Definitely, there are Americans who, due to their ignorance, bring harm to the free world cause. The most harm to U.S. prestige is caused by the many American films and cheap books. They misrepresent the American people, show the whole life in the U.S.A. in an ugly way. Communist propaganda exploits this. As a result, many of the native population think that what American films and books show is the real face of America. Also noticed is the fact that your people do not mix with the natives as much as they should. The middle classes in Burma constitutes about 70 to 80 percent of the whole population. These classes are out of the reach of Soviets because of security considerations. But at the same time I noticed no effort is made by Americans to reach this large part of the population. In my opinion, what is needed for victory in the moral struggle with communism for the minds of the millions of people in the young countries of Asia is the controlled distribution of American films and books in these countries.

It is also most necessary to develop personal contacts with the middle classes, and increase the attention devoted to them. Special attention should be given to the students. They are the first target of the Communists. Ten to fifteen American students, well prepared and responsible in their behavior, if sent to the Burmese universities, could do a tremendous job and have a big effect. I want to state that potentially all the people in Asia are against communism and are on the side of the democracies and the West. The West should help them to escape communism. As for failures of the Communists in their moral appeal to the Asian people, this is not due to personal mistakes and inefficiency but, instead, is due to the general evilness of communism. The name "the Ugly Soviet" in the direct meaning of this phrase can, with complete justification, be applied to the Soviet officials in these Asian countries.

Mr. SOURWINE. To clear up another point: In your earlier testimony, you told us it was Soviet strategy to encourage a neutrality policy in Burma.

Will you explain just what you mean by a neutrality policy in that sense?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. The Soviet Government is not interested in real neutrality for Burma but what they call friendly neutrality.

Mr. SOURWINE. And what does that mean?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. To Soviet officials, there is a big difference between the terms, "friendly neutrality" and "real neutrality." By "friendly neutrality" they understand a leaning of the government of the country toward the Communist bloc, opening the doors to Communist propaganda, to Communist infiltration and subversion. In short, under this "friendly neutrality" term, the Communists understand the neutrality of governments in definite countries to be neutral between the real interests of these nations and international communism. This is tantamount to indifference to the fate of their own country.

Here I think it is useful to mention that, in the beginning of 1959, the Soviet Government was very much concerned about the strong desire of the Burmese Government of General Ne Win to establish law and order in the country and wipe out Communist insurgency. The Soviet Government was irritated by the determined desire of the Burmese Government to have normal economic relations with all countries, as opposed to Communist attempts to tie up the Burmese economy.

In the Embassy's annual report to Moscow in February 1959 the Soviet Embassy in Burma declared that Prime Minister Ne Win was destroying democracy and liquidating peoples' freedoms and rights. In that report it was emphasized that relations between Burma and the Soviet Union had deteriorated since Ne Win came to power and that the outlook for improving relations in the immediate future was not good. The Soviet hostility toward the Ne Win government was caused especially by the Burmese Government's new, more correct, and more realistic understanding of neutrality. It was no surprise that the Soviet Communists and their stooges in Burma immediately opened a campaign against the new Burmese Government. They based their campaign on the alleged threat of Ne Win's government to abandon Burma's "traditional" policy of neutrality, accusing him of a desire to bring Burma into SEATO and generally labeling it pro-imperialist. The Burmese Government was labeled by the Communists as "fascist" and as "hostile" to the Soviet Government. So, in the eyes of the Soviet Government, there is a great danger of Burma completely shifting away from the policy of "friendly neutrality" to a policy of real neutrality.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that brings us up to date as far as the matters relating to Burma are concerned.

Now calling your attention to this article from the London Times, a copy of which you read in the Washington Post, do you agree with the author of that article that American tourists and official visitors from the United States do not get the real reactions of the Russian people, despite the desire of the Americans themselves to be sincere and warm in their contacts?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, in stressing this point, I think that this article is especially valuable.

On my own, I often tried to stress, in talks with Americans, that what they think is sincere talk when they meet Soviet people, is in fact not sincere. It is very rare, even amongst Soviets themselves, for them to speak openly with one another. The Soviet people for a long time have been living under great stress and repression. The people are taught by all their experience to be mutually suspicious. All the changes in the name of the secret police, MGB, KGB, etc., in reality means nothing else but a change of name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that people know that they are living in a police state despite the changes in the name of the secret police?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, the people know it very well and act automatically because they were brought up in such a system.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have been conditioned to secrecy?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I think that if the author of that article was approached in Moscow or anywhere in the Soviet Union and asked to repeat the same things, I don't believe he would dare to do this.

Mr. SOURWINE. He does it only through the cloak of anonymity, to be published in a foreign country?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, the anonymity of his article speaks for itself. American tourists after a short visit to the Soviet Union publish articles or make irresponsible statements on how open the Soviets were with them and how the Soviets say they like their Government and the Communist system, that they are energetically working for communism and to complete the creation of a Communist society in the Soviet Union. All these statements would be at least laughable to every Soviet citizen. Soviet citizens are extremely sophisticated about life. They know that if they speak openly and honestly with foreigners and their names appear, they will be punished accordingly. You can be sure that nobody in the Soviet Union will dare to reveal his real thoughts, real ideas, or real attitudes toward the Soviet system in public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember in conference with us since the last hearing that you told us the Soviet people hate the regime, generally speaking, but are passive about doing anything about it because their main desire is to live and work without disturbance; they don't want to attract attention to themselves?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It is only partly true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Explain it fully, please. Make it true.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. There is a definite group among the Soviets, especially within the elder generation, who were taught by their life experience to avoid cautiously any political talks or actions. Many of them were deluded by bright Communist promises during the Communist revolution in 1917 and the years afterward. Many of them really believed that the Communist regime would bring them to the new classless society, to a happy and peaceful life. When they realized that all these promises of the Communist leaders were nothing but a fairy tale, it was too late. Long years of suppression, concentration camps, purges, especially terror of the bloody Stalin period, convinced some of them that nothing can be done about it, that it is much safer to put all their efforts into the struggle for survival.

But I am going to say that the new generation in the Soviet Union is a little different. They don't want to live like their fathers. They want to live useful lives, to become masters of their lives and not slaves. It is not surprising that anti-Communist ideas appeal primarily to young people and that open actions are taken against the regime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do the Soviet people regard the Soviet Government as representing them, as being their Government?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do they regard it?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. They regard the Soviet Government and the Communist Party as "they" and all the other people as "we." "They" is the new class of which the higher Communist Party leaders and Soviet Government officials are representative.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are Soviet elections free?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. What the Soviet Government calls elections is in reality a comedy aimed at providing a camouflage of legality to an unlimited role by a small group of top party leaders and highest

Government officials—the new class. I'll give you one example showing the real nature of the elections in the Soviet Union.

In 1958 I worked as an interpreter for the Soviet Parliamentary Delegation that visited Burma. Among the delegates was a member of the Supreme Soviet, the First Secretary of Smolensk Region Communist Party Committee by the name of Pavel Ivanovich Doronin. Once, in the presence of one other member of the delegation, a writer Babayevskiy, the Soviet Ambassador to Burma, the first secretary of the Embassy, and me, Doronin complained of the difficulty of his job. He recalled the story of a recent election, nomination of a member of the Supreme Soviet from Smolensk City. Before the election, according to Doronin, all secretaries of regional party committees from the whole Soviet Union are usually summoned to party headquarters in Moscow. There, they are instructed who should be elected in each region, which region should elect a worker, peasant, member of the intelligentsia or a nonparty member. Doronin was told that a representative of the local intelligentsia should be elected from Smolensk.

On his return to Smolensk, he discussed this order with other political secretaries and they chose a teacher from a high school known for his calmness, passivity, and obedience. This teacher was elected by 99 percent of the votes. Everything was OK. This new parliamentarian went to the first session of the Supreme Soviet with a report in his pocket, supposedly his own but in reality prepared by a party committee. On arrival in Moscow he attended briefings, rehearsals of the upcoming session. At these meetings every member of the Supreme Soviet was instructed when and what to say, and who might make what criticism, when to applaud, what question to ask, and so forth. This delegate from Smolensk dutifully followed all instructions until the budget for schools was discussed. He decided on his own to make some remarks and even express unplanned criticism. Immediately after the session, Doronin was again summoned to Moscow to explain the incident involving his man. Soon it was announced that this unfortunate teacher had become ill and the doctors recommended long treatment in some sanatorium in the Crimea. He asked to be allowed to resign from his Supreme Soviet post because of bad health. A new man was elected.

These last few sentences are an almost exact repetition of Doronin's words which he expressed with laughter and open cynicism.

You can imagine how really representative a Soviet parliament is when it is elected in such a way. The Communist Party boasts that a majority in the Supreme Soviet are workers, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia, with an especially great number of women. Maybe this is true, but the question is how they were elected and how successfully they can defend the interests of their people and the country. Can a plain worker or peasant or even a member of the intelligentsia find the way through mounds of figures and complicated government documents? Even for people with special education it is not easy to see the Soviet Government's real nature behind these figures and documents.

The Soviet Parliament is only a voting machine that automatically approves and says everything that the Communist Party leaders order it to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any knowledge of the Soviet voting procedure?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. As a member of Komsomol, while studying at the institute I was obliged to work as an agitator for different elections. I worked on this job for 5 years.

Usually I was given several houses which I had to visit at least once a week, keep a list of voters, give them lectures on the Soviet Government policies and decisions, to assure that all of them came to elections and voted. As a rule the voters were passive and showed no interest in the elections.

When they came to the polls, at least 50 percent of the voters don't even know for whom they are going to vote though there is only one candidate.

Everybody understands that these elections are just a comedy and a trick.

Definitely these elections could give a possibility for people to express their general dissatisfaction with the Communist rule, but the Soviet Government carefully destroys all such possibilities. I know that sometimes the following voting mechanism is used:

Every voter is registered under his serial number; every ballot also has a serial number. When a voter receives a ballot, one of the members of the election commission puts the voter's serial number next to the ballot number. After that, the voter is free secretly to vote as he pleases.

Normally such mechanism is not needed because people are taught pretty well by their past experience and vote automatically without any interest. There are other methods used by the Communist Party in finding those who oppose them.

It is no surprise that 99 percent approve of the Communist candidates.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your father was a scientist?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with the attitude of the Soviet scientists and technicians?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Soviet scientists have a fairly exclusive position in Soviet society.

Soviet scientists are to some extent immune from suppression and are given more or less a free life and more important, a better standard of living.

It is generally thought in the Soviet Union that to become a scientist is a way to escape from a bad reality. But scientists cannot be considered to be a part of the new class.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say they can or cannot?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. Cannot?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Cannot be considered.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are not a part of the ruling class?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No. In the book, "New Class," Djilas described the new class in the Soviet Union. This description is very true although I cannot agree with Djilas on some points. I cannot agree with his estimate of how big this new class is. In my understanding this ruling class is quite small. It starts from secretaries of regional party committees and reaches at the top the Central Committee members and members of the Soviet Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the new class and in your judgment is entirely a political structure?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. This is entirely a political structure.

Mr. SOURWINE. It doesn't depend upon brains or education or training?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No. It depends upon complete devotion to the selfish interest of the ruling group, the new class, as contrasted to the real interests of the country and the people. The policy of the Soviet Government serves the interests of the ruling new class, not the real interest of the country.

I can say here that the majority of members of the Soviet Communist Party cannot be considered to be real Communists and members of the new class.

The majority of those in the Communist Party are forced to join the party and they have practically none of the special advantages which the members of the new class have.

Mr. SOURWINE. How does one become a member of this new class?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. This new class is a very well protected and tight group and to get into it is not so easy.

Only the more prominent crooks and individuals who ruthlessly fight for the maintenance of the rule of this new class are admitted into it.

It is exclusive to such an extent that even children of members of the new class are encouraged to marry one another.

Mr. SOURWINE. Within the class?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Within the class.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that the Soviet Union has developed some sort of a hereditary aristocracy?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, it is practically so. For instance the children of members of this new class are sent to special schools that are closed to other normal people. They are given preference in filling the highest offices and have the most responsible jobs which are denied to others.

They are encouraged not to mingle too much with people outside and actually all of them are united by the common fear of the people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the favor of a member of the new class mean a great deal to the ordinary Soviet citizen?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Excuse me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Can the friendship or favor of a member of this aristocracy, this new class, mean a great deal to an ordinary Soviet citizen?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't think so?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. To every Soviet citizen, a prominent member of the party or high government official is the same as a member of the dreaded secret police. The favor of a member of the new class can mean something from an economic point of view, but definitely disgraceful in the eyes of all honest people just as friendship with a member of the secret police.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say then that since the power of this new class is used almost entirely to feed on itself to promote the interest of the people within this class, it is a self-perpetuating group which uses its power for its own aggrandizement?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. In my understanding, it is so. Once a definite group of people gets itself into power it tries by all means to preserve its position and uses various methods to do this.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it is primarily concerned with preserving its own power and its own rule?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. This is the main concern of the new class in the Soviet Union. One of the main weapons this class uses is the Communist doctrine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Explain that.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. The Communist doctrine is used by this class to force the people to submit to their rule, to forget their freedoms and their rights, in order, as officially stated, to create a full Communist society but, in reality, to preserve forever the rule of one party dictatorship, the rule of this new class.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean they confuse the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the hereditary aristocracy?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. The term "dictatorship of the Proletariat" was used by the new class up to 1952 to deceive the people. In reality the term means nothing else but "dictatorship of the New Class." This was such an obvious lie that it could deceive nobody. At the 19th Party Congress in 1952 this term was abolished. The new class now tries to avoid any mentioning of the word dictatorship. This cannot deceive the people. Everybody in the Soviet Union understands that the system we have in the Soviet Union is open and complete dictatorship of the New Class.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying the people of the Soviet Union understand who their real rulers are?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, they understand it pretty well. Early in the morning, between 7 and 8 o'clock, on the streets of Moscow you can find swarms of people dressed in unshapely dresses, looking gloomy and tired. They are going to the workshops, factories, and so forth. These millions are ironically or mockingly referred to as "The People-Masters of the Country."

At 10 or 11 o'clock on the streets of Moscow you will see big, expensive cars, bringing well dressed, usually fat, and haughty looking people to their offices. They, in the same cynical way, are referred to as "The servants of the People."

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this true to life?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, it is just taken from everyday Soviet life.

Mr. SOURWINE. To return to the question of Soviet scientists, do you recall explaining to us in conference why, although many Soviet scientists want to do everything they can to benefit their country, the regime itself prevents the country from securing the best benefits of scientific progress?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, it is very true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Explain that for the record; how this comes about.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Normally, all scientists and the members of the technical intelligentsia are honest people and want to work, not only for their own benefit but for the benefit of their country.

They try their best in making creations that can serve and benefit their country. The only thing is that their product is used by the government, not for the benefit of the country but quite on the contrary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are scientists given complete control of scientific programs?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No, they do not. All Soviet scientists work under the direct control of the party and its secret police, the KGB. The Soviet scientists are working only on projects that are chosen by the Soviet leaders. All scientific programs directly serve the interests of the regime, strengthen the position of the Soviet Government in the cold war, provide the Communists with means to make their propaganda, and so forth. No scientific program that doesn't directly promise to promote the interests of the new class can be approved.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that nonscientific people will have the last word in a scientific project?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't think so. The Communist Party prevents scientists from good work.

Senator DODD. I was going to point out something for the record. I think he answered your question negatively briefly and then answered it affirmatively.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we go off the record?

Senator DODD. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible for one or more scientists to circulate petitions in the Soviet Union against official Government policy?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No, this is completely impossible. Scientists in the Soviet Union, like other people, do not enjoy fundamental rights and freedom. It is true that scientists in the Soviet Union live in better material conditions than other groups of people. Nowadays they are allowed more freedom in experimental and theoretical work, but this freedom doesn't carry over into politics. For, if any scientist should make a petition against the government, be sure he will be arrested and properly punished irrespective of his brilliant scientific achievements.

Even in their work, that would be considered purely scientific in other countries, they must be careful not to come into conflict with official Marxist-Leninist dogma.

I know of one case when one scientist invented a vaccine that would increase very highly the fertility of cattle. His invention proved to be very successful and requests from all over the Soviet Union came in for it. But in his theoretical work for making this vaccine, this scientist expressed ideas contrary to the officially adopted theory of Academician Lysenko. As a result, this unfortunate scientist was expelled from all his posts, prohibited from scientific work, and even deported to Siberia. Production of his vaccine was stopped.

Krushchev admitted this case at one of the sessions of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences 3 years ago. According to his own estimates, the damage to Soviet agriculture amounted to no less than 2 million rubles.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that, for scientists in the Soviet Union, academic freedom is bounded by the requirement that there be complete maintenance of the position in accordance with the Communist line.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, this is so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you spoke of scientists having better living conditions than others.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The word better is a comparative word.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of living conditions do scientists have?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Scientists are paid better and get better housing than other people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are the living conditions of the other people?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. There is a great difference between other people and scientists and at the same time between scientists and the New Class.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, let's put it this way. You were the son of a scientist. What were your own living quarters in Moscow?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I'll try to give you a comparative picture of the difference in the living conditions of plain people, scientists and the people close to the New Class. Until 1957, my family was living in a room of 15 square meters in a big communal flat. There was my father, my mother, and myself. Even that tiny room was not private because it was passed through by other families to reach their rooms.

Only in 1957, my father, on the personal insistence of the President of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Mesnyanov, was given a small separate one-bedroom apartment. The separate one-bedroom apartment is considered to be more than good for the average Soviet scientist.

As for other people, I can tell you about the family of my wife. There were 3 different families, altogether 9 people, living in an 18 square meter room. These conditions were considered to be very good.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Very good because the house was good and the room was comparatively large. It should also be mentioned that there they lived not in a separate apartment but in a big communal flat where there were approximately 9 or 10 such rooms. For all of the people, 50 or 60, there was 1 tiny bathroom and 1 kitchen. These were considered to be normal conditions.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have just said that 3 families with 9 persons lived in 18 square meters?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is two square meters per head.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Now I will give you the third example that will illustrate how big the difference is in the position of the New Class and all the other people. I had a girl friend who worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee. She was only 19 years old. She had had very little education and her job in the Central Committee was most insignificant. She was a courier. She transferred papers from one office to another.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was a messenger?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. She was only a messenger. She was an unimportant person but she was a direct servant of the New Class and therefore was close to the New Class. When she was admitted to work in the Central Committee, she was immediately given an apartment of two rooms. At the same time she was allowed to enter special stores reserved for the people from the New Class and their servants. She had free transportation, free visits to the sanatoriums, et cetera. This young girl, practically a nobody, was living in conditions equivalent to those enjoyed by high ranking scientists only because of her position close to the New Class.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would appear from your testimony that although scientists are given better living conditions than other people in the

Soviet Union, these conditions are still below those of even the servants of the New Class.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. There is this great difference between the standard of living of the millions and the very small group of the New Class and their servants.

Mr. SOURWINE. There can be no privilege, as I understand it, of privacy in the living conditions that you describe.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No; no privacy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't these kind of conditions breed conflict, one family with another?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Oh, yes; and very great conflicts. The Soviet courts are filled with cases of quarrels between neighbors. Such cases have become so numerous that recently the Soviet Government decided to create a special Comrades court or Communist society court to try all these communal flat and family cases. More than 90 percent of the city population in the Soviet Union live in extremely overcrowded and unhealthy conditions. What the Soviet Government tries to do to settle this problem is as a drop in the sea. At the same time all the national resources and riches are used for preparation for hot war, waging the cold war, making propaganda, et cetera, and are used for the selfish interests of the regime. The housing problem has become a national tragedy in the Soviet Union, especially for the Great Russian nationality. The immediate result of such living conditions in the Soviet cities is a very low rate of birth.

For instance, I myself have no acquaintances or friends in Moscow who have three or four children. I never saw such a family. I can more or less accurately state that 30 percent of the city population can afford to have two children; 50 percent can afford to have only one child; and 20 percent can't afford to have even one child. These figures, by the way, are generally known in the Soviet Union although treated as a secret by the Soviet Government. Such a condition means quick decrease in city populations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now we had a discussion in conference about the Great Russian population in the Soviet Union. Do you remember telling us about that?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us for this record?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I think that the question about the position of the Great Russian nation in the Soviet Union is very closely linked with what I have said about living conditions in the Soviet cities.

Today approximately 80 percent of the Great Russian population is living in cities under the conditions I have already described. You understand, of course, that there can be no natural growth within this 80 percent of the Great Russian population.

The other 20 percent of the Great Russian population lives in villages but Russian villages are the poorest in the Soviet Union—for a long time they were the most exploited. Soviet statistics are notoriously falsified but even false statistics cannot hide the fact that Great Russian villages are the poorest in the Soviet Union. If you come to the famous Moscow Agricultural Exhibition, you can see figures pertaining to annual average peasant incomes in different republics and regions in the Soviet Union. According to these Soviet statistics openly displayed at the exhibition, in 1956 the average peas-

ant family income was: Georgia, 70,000 rubles; cotton growing republics in central Asia such as Uzbekistan, 40,000 rubles; regions populated by Great Russians, only 10,000 to 15,000 rubles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are these statistics true, about Georgian and central Asian incomes?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No; I do not believe these statistics. The only thing I want to stress is that even the Government can't hide the fact that Russian peasants are in the worst conditions in the Soviet Union. The Russian people, especially the intelligentsia, are pretty well aware of this situation and discuss it. The common conclusion is that the Great Russian population decreased approximately 10 to 15 million in comparison with the prerevolutionary period and is decreasing now at an extremely rapid rate of 5 to 6 million every 3 or 4 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the total Great Russian population of the Soviet Union; if you know?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. There are no direct figures published in Soviet official documents because such information is considered to be extremely secret.

In 1913 the Great Russian population was 77 million. Now it is somewhere near 60 million. During the entire Soviet period, the proportion between the various nationalities changed considerably.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it change?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. According to official documents, the Great Russian population constituted 50 percent of the population of the Soviet Union in 1919. Nowadays it is estimated to be no more than 30 percent. This change happened due to the fact that 80 percent of the Great Russian population lives in cities and only about 20 percent in the villages. At the same time about 70 percent of the population of other nationalities in the Soviet Union live in villages and only 30 percent in cities. The result of this is that the other Soviet nationalities are growing. The Georgian population in 1913 was 1,500,000; nowadays it is at least 4 million. The birth rate is also very high in the central Asian republics. I point out here only the most striking figures but a closer investigation will give an even more serious picture of the decline of the Great Russian population.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if your figures are correct, then the Soviet Union's population in 1913 must have been approximately 150 million; is that right?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; in 1913 it was about 150 million.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of which 75 million or 50 percent were Great Russians. Now your population is 200 million?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Approximately 200 million.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is true because of both the decrease in the number of the Great Russians and the increase in the population of other nations within the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; that is true.

Senator DODD. We will recess now until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator DODD. We will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDR YURIEVICH KAZNACHEYEV—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Are the figures with regard to populations put out by the Soviet Government or are they withheld from publication?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Within the period of Soviet rule in the U.S.S.R., there has never been an accurate listing of the population figures for the various nationalities within the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. They do print figures for the entire Soviet Union?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; they publish these figures.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do they print figures for the populations of cities?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. They publish populations of cities and populations of villages and professions.

Mr. SOURWINE. From which it is possible for one to add up cities and villages and come up with a pretty good estimate?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; such an estimate plus the figures of losses during the First World War, Revolution, the Civil War, and the Second World War. You then add the figures for the number of immigrants after the Revolution and subtract the figures for the victims of collectivization, concentration camps, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. The estimate you are giving us is based on the best figures available?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, the best figures that were available to me when I conducted research on the subject while still in the Soviet Union. What I want to accomplish by bringing these facts to your knowledge is the lack of any basis for the claims often made in the West that the Soviet Communist Government represents mainly the interests of the Great Russian people over those of the other Soviet nationalities. Also unjustified are the statements made in the West that Soviet foreign policy and the expansionist tendencies of Soviet communism serve the interests of Great Russian imperialism. I want to state here that those who propagate these ideas consciously or unconsciously help the Soviet Communist rulers to camouflage the real nature of their policy of divide and rule within the Soviet Union and the divide-and-rule tactics of Communist imperialism in its efforts to expand its control over peoples outside the Soviet Union.

The Communist regime in the Soviet Union is the enemy of all the nationalities within the Soviet Union and of the Great Russian nationality first of all. And, in its own turn, the Russian nationality is enemy No. 1 of the Communist regime. The cause of all people in the Soviet Union is common: to free themselves from Communist tyranny. The freedom of any of these people separately is impossible without freedom at the same time for the other peoples, especially the Great Russians.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will remember we had discussions in the staff conference on the subject of what publications are read in the Soviet Union. For one thing, I believe you said the American Daily Worker is not circulated in the Soviet Union; is this right?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, it is right. Even in the Institute of International Affairs where I studied, students could get the British Daily Worker but not the American Daily Worker.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why is this, if you know?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I personally had a chance to see several times the American Daily Worker, and I think the main reason is that,

maybe unintentionally, the American Daily Worker shows the real—some items of the real picture of life of the American people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even though the Daily Worker is edited to reflect the Communist line—

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is also edited to be read by Americans?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. So that it can go only so far in these lies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any American periodicals permitted to circulate in the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The magazine Amerika is permitted by the Soviet Government for circulation in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, to what extent does this actually circulate? Can it be bought freely on the newsstands?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. To some extent, yes, it can be bought at several points in Moscow. I personally know that some 20, 30 copies appear at several points in Moscow. They immediately are bought, and the official price is 5 rubles, but people, immediately near a kiosk, a magazine newspaper kiosk, sell this magazine Amerika for 10 rubles.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said the official price is 5 rubles?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. People pay as much as two dollars and a half?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, and the fact is that very many people want to buy this magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did we set that relatively high price or did the Soviet Union set it?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't know exactly how this price was set.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event it doesn't prevent people from buying the magazine?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It doesn't prevent people from buying and even paying double the official price. It shows the interest for this magazine is very great. I know that people hunt for copies and ask their friends and relatives to get copies, and at the same time I know that the Soviet Post Office Department sends over half of the copies back to the American Embassy stating that people do not want to read their magazine. That is completely not true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are copies of this magazine circulated through the mails within the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I do not know. I know that this magazine is sold, can be bought in several places in Moscow, at newspaper stalls, and it is distributed by several departments, especially political, such as Tass and the Soviet Foreign Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you send American publications through the mails in the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't think so. First of all, foreign exchange is not available to any Soviet citizen. American publications can reach some people, but mainly this is technical literature subscribed for through official channels and for official purposes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I can go down to a newsstand and buy a copy of Soviet Russia Today, which is the Russian-published American periodical, and carry it under my arm in complete freedom.

Can a Russian buy a copy of Amerika and carry it under his arm in complete freedom?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I know it is a fact that all Russians that buy Amerika, at the same time buy a Russian newspaper and immediately wrap it—

Mr. SOURWINE. And wrap the magazine in the newspaper?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, and wrap the magazine in the newspaper.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

You gave us some information on the subject of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. Is religion free there?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. On paper, yes. But in reality religion and the church are considered by the Soviet Government as enemies of their rule.

In the Soviet Union any movement and any organization, if not Communist, is inevitably thought to be anti-Communist and, first of all, it should be applied to religion and the church.

Those people who go to church and worship there, and have some other ideas that are not Communist and which are not considered to coincide with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine are practically rejecting this official doctrine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can a person who regularly attends church services be a member of the Komsomol, the Young Communist League?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No, it is impossible, and if such a member of Komsomol is found visiting a church he would be expelled.

Mr. SOURWINE. And if you are not a member of the Komsomol in the Soviet Union you cannot get a higher education?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. And many employment opportunities are barred to you?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The higher jobs and especially now, with the new educational system introduced by Khrushchev, universities and institutes are completely closed to non-Komsomol members.

Personally I entered the Komsomol 2 months before applying to the institute, and I found that approximately 30 percent of the other persons who applied to the institute also entered 2 or 3 months before submitting their application.

Practically, the Komsomol is a compulsory organization, and I don't think even the term "organization" can be applied as more than 90 percent of the youth are members of the Komsomol. It is compulsory—just as it is to be a Soviet citizen or submit to being drafted into the Soviet Army.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are definitely second-class citizens if they don't belong to the Komsomols; is that right?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. There are also some citizens who refuse to join the army because of their religious beliefs. But they are arrested and prosecuted under Soviet law.

If you refuse to be a member of the Komsomol you cannot be prosecuted by law, but you would be persecuted. You will be deprived of the possibility to receive a higher education and to work in many, many fields.

The net result would be that you would be restricted to being a very low paid worker or a peasant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Soviet Government show discrimination toward or against any particular religious groups?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. The Soviet Government especially worries about Baptists—

Mr. SOURWINE. Baptists?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Seventh-day Adventists and Witnesses of Jehovah.

I think that these sects are more appealing to the Soviet people because of conditions in the Soviet Union.

Another point is that it is not as easy to control them as, for instance, the Russian Orthodox Church. Their supervision is not as centralized as that of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Russian Orthodox Church is well controlled by the Soviets?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. That is a very well known fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would appear, you say, that the Soviets are worried about this or that religious sect; it would appear then that in spite of all of this repression and discrimination against religion there is still some lure for youth in what religion holds out in the Soviet Union; is this right? Young people are still being brought to churches, to religion in Russia?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; and I think it is especially true now.

For the last decade the Soviet Government was especially worried by the fact of the growing revival of religion in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think there is a religious revival there?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I think there is a process of religious revival. The main reason of this revival is, I think, the growing dissatisfaction among Soviet people, especially among the youth.

Marxist-Leninist official doctrine is not appealing to minds, hearts, and to the souls of people, especially of the young generation. They are looking for something else to substitute, to fill this vacuum, and many of them turn to religion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the Soviet Union has recently renewed its drive for atheism. I suppose that is a counter to this religious revival that you speak of?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke of the special privileges accorded to the new class or to the higher members of the political regime of the Soviet Union. Do the Soviet people generally resent these special privileges?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. The Soviet people understand what is going on.

Mr. SOURWINE. But they don't object?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Of course they do, they resent it, and they understand that factories, plants, land, and resources all belong not to the people, as it is claimed by official Soviet propaganda, but actually belong to that new class. Industrial development in the Soviet Union is aimed to benefit this new class, not the people.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a general thing, do Soviet officials trust one another?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Because of the resentment on the part of the people, there can be some unity within this class. However, also a constant struggle for the preservation of its rule in the country goes on not only outside of but also within this class. Besides purges, which

occur quite often in the Soviet Union, and finding scapegoats, I also can state that distrust of each other within this class includes spying and surveillance of even such high-ranking officials as ministers.

I had one friend who told me he was working on the installation of listening devices in all rooms, in all apartments of houses where Soviet ministers and very high government officials are assigned to live.

When my father got an apartment he was openly warned by the previous tenant that there were listening devices installed in the apartment and that he should, therefore, be careful.

Mr. SOURWINE. Listening devices are built into the apartments before they move people in?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then they are assigned to apartments?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It makes it easier for Big Brother, doesn't it?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, and people are very well aware of this and behave accordingly.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the attitude of the average Soviet Government official, bureaucrat, toward his work? Is there incentive or are they eager to do the best possible job or do they have a different attitude?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Speaking about Soviet bureaucrats, I think the Soviet Union is a very notorious and famous place for black-marketing and corruption not only on a small scale with consumer goods but on the Government level as well.

For instance, it is a very well known fact that in the Soviet Union every director of a plant must use the black market to provide his plant with raw materials or to organize the delivery of the production of his plant, and so on.

The most widespread and often used method is forging official documents of plants and factories.

According to Soviet law every plant can allow 5 percent of its production not to be of good quality. Usually directors of plants try to lower this 5 percent to 2 or 3, but in official documents they state that they had 5 percent of bad production. In reality they have 2 or 3 percent of good production free in their own hands, and they exchange this production freely, without the knowledge of the Government, with other plants for raw materials or other things.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is really a system of private bribery between the top-ranking bureaucrats of the Government—

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). And among them?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, this is practically bribery, black marketing, and corruption on a government level, because—

Senator DODD. How does a plant director get the money to pay the price for material on a black-marketing basis?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It is through the exchange of goods.

For instance, one plant produces machines or, say, cars. The director of this plant states in his official report that 5 percent of his production was bad and this portion of the production was scrapped. But in reality only 2 percent was scrapped, the other 3 percent of his produc-

tion he sends to other plants in exchange for their products, products that he cannot get through official channels.

Senator DODD. That really isn't a matter of profit to the director.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No, it is not always a matter of profit; it is a matter of running his enterprise more or less efficiently.

Senator DODD. Would you call that corruption?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It is corruption on the highest level.

Senator DODD. Well, who is corrupted? How does it hurt anybody?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. This practice cheats the people—and the interests of the country are cheated because the Government, the Communist Party, cannot organize the running of industry in a normal way.

Senator DODD. The only thing falsified are the facts. If he uses the material in the production of the product, there is no harm really done, is there?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It is extremely harmful.

Senator DODD. How?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Especially in the Soviet Union, under a system where the economy is supposed to be very highly planned, it disrupts the plans created by the Government bodies, and every such act of one plant creates a chain reaction.

Senator DODD. What does it come out to? How does it do any harm? If they make a good product in sufficient numbers and they are sold at the same price or a fixed price, where is the damage?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It can bring very great damage to all the economy. It is very harmful for the Soviet Union to have millions, even billions, of rubles frozen in very slow construction, to send equipment for big plants to completely different parts of the Soviet Union and to forget about them.

A quite good example, in 1956, as stated in an official Government report on the 7th of November, I don't remember who stated it—in only 1 year, and in only one industry, in the building industry, the Soviet Government lost 20 million rubles. This loss was the result precisely of this type of practice, the result of private actions of each director of a plant.

Senator DODD. This rather interests me. I cannot follow it.

Let us take a given industry. You name an industry where you think this might go on. What one have you got in mind?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't know the name, but I remember that last year there was a case of the director of one plant producing gage instruments.

Senator DODD. I don't care about the name of the company but the type it makes; we will take a gage company.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. It was a factory producing precision instruments.

Senator DODD. Who are these sold to? What becomes of them after they are made, produced in the factory?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. He puts in his official report to the Government, to the Ministry, that 5 percent of his production was scrapped. But in reality this bad production was only 2 percent, so 3 percent of his production, annual production of his plant, was free in his hands and at the same time this plant was suffering from lack of cars.

Senator DODD. Automobiles?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Automobiles.

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. So he sent his deputy director to another plant where they had more than enough automobiles, and they concluded an agreement. They gave them this 3 percent of their production, and that plant provided them with automobiles.

Senator DODD. Well, all right, But nobody gets hurt. Who gets hurt by this?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Nobody gets hurt in this small case, but in the last analysis Government planning bodies get a wrong figure and when multiplied many times it produces a completely distorted picture.

Senator DODD. Wrong statistics?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Wrong statistics.

Senator DODD. That I can understand.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Future plans are then based on these wrong statistics, and as a result such wastes as this 20 million rubles occur.

Senator DODD. I am frank to say I don't understand that. I think it is just a matter of shifting figures and a kind of barter that is apparently, as you intend us to understand it, and it doesn't seem to me to be anything except a false picture statistically. But I thought you were telling us there was so much corruption and black marketing. This is not really black marketing.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Maybe it is not precisely black marketing.

Senator DODD. Maybe we didn't understand it.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. But to some extent it is also definitely black marketing of a type characteristic for the Soviet Union.

Another example, for instance, is that, in all plants, salaries of workers are higher than officially decreed. My uncle is head of two big workshops in an aircraft manufacturing plant, and he often used to speak about these details.

Officially a worker at his plant could get no more than 800 rubles. But they know that if a worker gets 800 rubles, he will work very badly and they will have a lot of trouble.

By the way, 800 rubles for hard work is very little. So the director of the plant pays his workers 1,000 rubles. But to the Government he reports that his workers get only 800. This practice is widespread in the Soviet Union in all plants.

Senator DODD. I suppose in perishable commodities like clothing there could be a black market, as we understand it; is that true?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. By the way, the ordinary type of black marketing is also very widespread in the Soviet Union. It is due to bad organization. For instance, a car that costs 25,000 rubles in Moscow will cost 30,000 or 40,000 or 50,000 rubles in Georgia. The black marketeers take advantage of this difference. The black market became so widespread that recently the Government issued an order prohibiting the selling of cars.

Senator DODD. That also interests me. I suppose it is our difficulty in understanding. But in a wholly controlled economy I should think it would be very difficult to get cash on the black market. The most, I assume, you could get would be another commodity. Wouldn't that be true?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Excuse me?

Senator DODD. In the Soviet Union your whole economy is controlled, is it not?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.

Senator DODD. There is not much of a free market.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; and exactly this overwhelming control of the economy is the great obstacle to the development of the economy. Khrushchev decided that setting up economic regions and decentralizing the economy into economic regions was one of the measures needed to overcome this difficulty.

Senator DODD. Go ahead.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I am not an economist, and for me it is difficult to be precise.

Senator DODD. I was trying to get an understanding myself about it. Maybe there are some differences in the operations of a black market in a controlled economy.

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. Perhaps I used the words "black market" incorrectly.

Senator DODD. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to ask: Do you think a majority of the Soviet people would vote for the Communist regime if given the opportunity?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I think that if really free elections were to be held in the Soviet Union, and the people were sure of the secrecy of their votes, the overwhelming majority would vote against the present Communist Party dictatorship.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you give us an insight into the feelings of the people in the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. People in the Soviet Union, just as people in other countries, look for a prosperous life and want to live in peace without constant fear of atomic war. The idea that man cannot be happy by "bread alone" is especially true and vital in the Soviet Union.

People feel very acutely that they are deprived of the basic human rights and freedoms.

Nowadays, in the Soviet Union, more and more people understand that it is exactly the Communist one-party dictatorship--the Communist regime--that prevents people from living under decent conditions. They understand that it is a policy of the Soviet Government that keeps the world under constant danger of atomic war. One of the main desires now among the members of the intelligentsia, who should be the leaders of the nation, is to limit the control of the Communist Party. The main thing they want is to be given a free hand in running their own fields of work in a way they feel will be most beneficial to the people and the country.

They see that interference and control of the Communist Party is not only not beneficial but harmful to the country.

For an example: In September of last year in the Soviet newspaper Pravda I read an article depicting this harmfulness. In one region of Khazakstan, due to the hard labor of many thousands of people, a good crop of wheat was ready to be harvested, but the secretary of the party regional committee, without consultation with agricultural specialists and against the demands of the peasants, personally issued a command order to postpone the harvest. In several days there came heavy rains that badly damaged the crop.

This is one example of how one powerful party official destroyed the results of the work of thousands of people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you experience a concentrated training in Marxism when you attended high school and college? Will you describe your courses?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Marxism-Leninism is a compulsory subject for all students in the Soviet Union. It consists of four main courses that are studied to different degrees according to the nature of the institute. These courses are: "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," "Political Economy," "Dialectical Materialism-Marxist Philosophy", and "Historical Materialism", which is Marx's interpretation of history. At the institute I studied in, the subject "Marxism-Leninism" was the most important. In courses of political economy were studied all of the economic theories, but the aim of these courses was to criticize from the standpoint of the Marx's economic theory. The course of "Dialectical Materialism" was especially expanded. During this course were studied history of philosophy, eastern philosophy, and modern philosophic schools in the West, but again the stress was put on criticizing the others' philosophies. Generally the whole subject was considered to be quite interesting by students. They readily accepted the philosophic and scientific part of all this teaching and just rejected the dogmatic part. Generally this course trained their brains to think, to see to the roots of events and things, and find their own attitude to everything around them. Often students used knowledge acquired in this subject for criticism of Soviet reality and for understanding the real nature of the Communist regime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you join the Communist Party as the result of this intensive indoctrination?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I never joined the Communist Party. I was a member of the Komsomol, which in no way can be considered synonymous with the Communist Party. Nowadays the Komsomol is a compulsory organization which embraces more than 90 percent of all Soviet youth. Their participation is as compulsory as participation in Soviet trade unions, which embrace nearly 100 percent of the Soviet population. The people that refuse to join the Komsomol are prohibited from getting a higher education and are entirely confined to the lowest groups of workers and peasants. I joined the Komsomol 2 months before applying to the institute. If I hadn't done it, even my application to the institute would not have been considered.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to ask one more thing. What is the philosophy of those who joined the Communist Party?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. To a great extent, participation and membership in the Communist Party is as compulsory as participation in Komsomol which I described above. Those who refuse to join the Communist Party are prohibited from scientific work, from many teaching professions, from becoming an officer in the Army, and many Government jobs are not available to them. Most of the members of the party are forced to join. The other members join the Communist Party looking for promotions, for special benefits and privileges given party members. Only an insignificant minority of party members are deluded people that, in spite of reality, still take Communist lies seriously.

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38

CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. SOURWINE. Senator, I have nothing else.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, gentlemen. It was very interesting.

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

| A | Page |
|--|------------------|
| Academician Lysenko..... | 25 |
| Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R..... | 26 |
| Afghanistan..... | 5 |
| AFPFL. (See Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League.) | |
| Alexander I..... | 7 |
| American Daily Worker..... | 29, 30 |
| American Embassy (Moscow)..... | 30 |
| American periodicals..... | 30 |
| Amerika (magazine)..... | 30, 31 |
| Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL)..... | 4, 5 |
| Arakcheev..... | 8 |
| Asia..... | 3, 4, 18, 28 |
| B | |
| Baptists..... | 32 |
| Beria..... | 9, 10 |
| Big Brother..... | 33 |
| Bintang Timur (Indonesian-language newspaper)..... | 4 |
| Blitz and the Delhi Times (Indian newspaper)..... | 4 |
| Bolshevik revolution..... | 6 |
| Bolshoi Theater..... | 8 |
| British Daily Worker..... | 29 |
| "Brother Karamazov, The"..... | 6 |
| Burma..... | 1-4, 12-19, 21 |
| Burman (English-language Burmese newspaper)..... | 3 |
| Burmese Army..... | 3, 5 |
| Burmese Parliament..... | 4, 17 |
| C | |
| Caesar..... | 8 |
| Cambodia..... | 3, 5 |
| Catherine (of Russia)..... | 7 |
| Ceylon..... | 5 |
| China..... | 5, 11, 16 |
| Chinese Embassy..... | 4 |
| Chinese People's Republic..... | 4 |
| Communist doctrine..... | 24 |
| Communist National United Front..... | 3-5 |
| Communist one-party dictatorship..... | 36 |
| Communist Party of Soviet Union, Central Committee of..... | 2, 3, 10, 22, 26 |
| Communist regime..... | 36 |
| Communist society court..... | 27 |
| Comrades court..... | 27 |
| D | |
| Dagon Publishing House (in Burma)..... | 3 |
| Daily Worker: | |
| American..... | 29, 30 |
| British..... | 29 |

| | Page |
|--|-------------------|
| Delhi Times (newspaper)----- | 4 |
| "Dialectical Materialism--Marxist Philosophy"----- | 37 |
| "Dictatorship of the New Class"----- | 24 |
| "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"----- | 24 |
| Dityatev, Dimitry----- | 3 |
| Djakarta----- | 4 |
| Djilas----- | 22 |
| Dodd, Senator Thomas J.----- | 1 |
| Dostoevsky----- | 7 |
| F | |
| Foreign Ministry's International Relations Institute----- | 2 |
| Foreign office in Moscow, No. 10 Department of the----- | 4 |
| "Friendly neutrality"----- | 18 |
| "Frost, Adm.," of U.S. Navy----- | 3 |
| "Frost letter"----- | 4 |
| Furtseva----- | 11 |
| G | |
| Gafurov, Bobodshan----- | 3 |
| Galashin, Boris----- | 2 |
| Garshkov, Professor----- | 10 |
| Georgia (Russia)----- | 28, 35 |
| Georgian population----- | 28 |
| GKES. (See State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.) | |
| Great Russian population----- | 27-29 |
| GRU (military intelligence)----- | 4 |
| Guardian (Burmese newspaper)----- | 4 |
| H | |
| Hingley, Dr. Ronald----- | 0 |
| "Historical Materialism"----- | 37 |
| "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, The"----- | 37 |
| Hungary----- | 16 |
| Hydra----- | 7-12 |
| I | |
| India----- | 4, 5 |
| Indian Finance Minister----- | 3 |
| Indonesia----- | 4, 5 |
| Institute of International Affairs (Russia)----- | 29 |
| International Relations Institute----- | 15 |
| J | |
| Japan----- | 3 |
| K | |
| Kaznacheyev, Aleksandr Yurlevich: | |
| Testimony of----- | 1-38 |
| Left Soviet Union in 1957----- | 1 |
| Articles by----- | 2-5 |
| Former Soviet diplomat-defector----- | 2 |
| Attached to Soviet Embassy in Burma----- | 2 |
| Alias Kazakov----- | 2 |
| KGB (Soviet secret police)----- | 2, 3, 13, 19, 25 |
| Khazakstan----- | 86 |
| Khrushchev----- | 9, 11, 12, 31, 36 |
| "Letter"----- | 9, 10 |
| Komsomol----- | 22, 31, 37 |
| Kovtunenko case----- | 4 |
| L | |
| La Patrie (Thailand newspaper)----- | 4 |
| London Times----- | 19 |

INDEX

41

| M | Page |
|---|-------------------------|
| Maksin, First Secretary----- | 4 |
| Mandalay----- | 17 |
| Mandalay Hill Pogoda----- | 17 |
| Manadalay Ludu (Burmese newspaper)----- | 3 |
| Mandel, Benjamin----- | 1 |
| Marxism-Leninism----- | 37 |
| Marxist-Leninist: | 31, 32 |
| Doctrine----- | 25 |
| Dogma----- | 26 |
| Mesneyanov----- | 19 |
| MGB (secret police)----- | 2 |
| Ministry of Higher Education's Oriental Institute, Chinese Department of----- | 3, 4 |
| Mirror and Botataung (Burmese newspaper)----- | 2-6, 15, 16, 19, 21, 35 |
| Moscow----- | 27 |
| Moscow Agricultural Exhibition----- | 15 |
| Moscow University----- | 15 |
| N | |
| Napoleon----- | 11 |
| Nation (Burmese newspaper)----- | 4 |
| Ne Win, General----- | 4, 5, 19 |
| New Class----- | 22, 24, 26, 27 |
| "New Class," book by Djilas----- | 22 |
| New Leader (publication)----- | 2 |
| New Light of Burma (Burmese newspaper)----- | 3 |
| Nicholas I----- | 8 |
| Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952----- | 24 |
| Nyein, U Ba----- | 3 |
| O | |
| Oho, Maung Maung----- | 15 |
| P | |
| Panov, Vasilly----- | 4 |
| Path (Burmese newspaper)----- | 3 |
| Peking regimes----- | 4 |
| "People-Masters of the Country, The"----- | 24 |
| People's Journal (Burmese newspaper)----- | 3 |
| Peter the Great----- | 6 |
| Pobedonostsev----- | 8 |
| "Political Economy" course at Russian institute----- | 37 |
| Popov, Col. Anatolyy----- | 4 |
| Pravda----- | 36 |
| Presidium of the Academy of Sciences----- | 25 |
| Pushkin----- | 7 |
| R | |
| Radio Moscow----- | 3 |
| Rangoon----- | 2, 3, 12, 15, 17 |
| Razbin, Ambassador's Secretary Aleksandr----- | 4 |
| "Real neutrality"----- | 18 |
| Referentura group----- | 4 |
| Regional Economic Councils----- | 10 |
| Reporter (Burmese newspaper)----- | 4 |
| Russian Orthodox Church----- | 32 |
| S | |
| Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. E----- | 6 |
| SEATO----- | 19 |
| "Servants of the People, The"----- | 24 |
| Seventh-day Adventists----- | 32 |
| Shiborin, Alexei D----- | 2 |
| Siberia----- | 8, 10, 24 |
| Sjamsuddin (Indonesian rebel leader)----- | 3 |

INDEX

| | Page |
|--|--|
| Sjamsuddin "letter" | 4 |
| Smolensk region | 21 |
| Sochi | 8 |
| Sourwine, J. G. | 1 |
| Southeast Asian Treaty Organization | 4 |
| Sovexportfilm | 2, 8 |
| Soviet Ambassador | 17 |
| Soviet Army | 31 |
| Soviet Embassy | 2, 4, 5, 13, 15, 18, 19 |
| Soviet Foreign Office | 80 |
| Soviet Government | 22, 23, 27, 31, 83, 84 |
| Soviet Information Service | 3 |
| Soviet intelligence | 2, 4 |
| "Soviet 'Operation Burma' " | 2-5 |
| Soviet Parliamentary Delegation | 21 |
| "Soviet patriotism" | 14 |
| Soviet Post Office Department | 30 |
| Soviet Russia Today | 30 |
| Soviet scientists | 24-28 |
| Soviet Union | 1, 16, 20, 21, 23-25, 27-30, 32, 34-36 |
| Sovinformbureau | 2, 3 |
| Stalin | 9, 11, 20 |
| State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) .. | 2, 3 |
| State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) | 4 |
| Stolyin | 8 |
| Strygulne, Colonel | 4 |
| Sunday Times of London | 5 |
| Suvorov | 7 |
| T | |
| Tass | 3, 4, 30 |
| Tibet | 16 |
| Tokyo | 3 |
| Tolstoy | 7 |
| Trushkovskiy, Igor | 2 |
| Tsarskoe Selo (in Russia) | 7 |
| U | |
| U Nu, Prime Minister | 4 |
| "Ugly American, The" | 17 |
| Us, Vladimir | 2 |
| Uzbekistan | 28 |
| V | |
| "Voice Out of Russia": | |
| Article in Sunday Times of London December 6, 1959 | 5-9 |
| Article in Sunday Times of London December 13, 1959 | 9-12 |
| VOKS. (See State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.) | |
| Vologzhanin, Mikhail | 2 |
| Voznily group | 3 |
| Voznily, Ivan | 2 |
| W | |
| "War and Peace" | 6 |
| Washington Post | 5, 19 |
| Witnesses of Jehovah | 32 |
| Y | |
| Yalta | 8 |
| Young Communist League | 31 |