

4 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Geographic Research

SUBJECT: Change in Projects and Activities, 1 July 1956 -
31 December 1959

1. Following is a summation of changes in Geography Division projects and activities during subject period, by manyear allocations.

a. Projects and activities initiated

- ✓ (1) Production of geographic intelligence in support of unconventional-warfare planning -- 2.2 manyears (project in abeyance following completion of basic phase, December 1959).
- ✓ (2) Production of geographic intelligence in support of Air Force "Safe Area" program -- 0.4 manyears (project at halfway stage; programmed effort will be completed on or about June 1960).
- ✓ (3) Production of USSR city plans (jointly with D/GC) -- 1.5 manyears.
- ✓ (4) Production of Geographic Intelligence Memorandum -- 0.5 manyears.
- X (5) Production of CIA part of map and chart appraisal component of NIS Chapter I Annual program; coordination of all parts -- 0.3 manyears.
- 25X1B0c ✓ (6) Production of geographic intelligence support in the fields of guided missiles and atomic energy, to include support to related [REDACTED] -- 1.3 manyears.
- X (7) Production of boundary problem section of Department of State "Boundary Inventory File" -- 0.4 manyears.
- X (8) Substantive review of TAB Country Studies prepared by Target Analysis Branch, PMD, DD/P -- 0.08 manyears.
- X (9) Sponsorship of Africa Roundtable -- 0.08 manyears.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Change in Projects and Activities, 1 July 1956 -
31 December 1959

X (10) Sponsorship of Southeast Asia Discussion Group --
0.08 manyears. 25X1A2d2 25X1A2d2

X (11) Project [REDACTED] (assistance to [REDACTED] -- 0.3
manyears (in abeyance since June 1959).
25X1A2d2

X (12) Project [REDACTED] -- 2.0 manyears (in abeyance).

b. Projects and activities abolished

✓ (1) Production of evasion and escape geographies -- 2.6
manyears.

c. Projects and activities increased

✓ (1) Production of geographic intelligence on Africa --
1.0 manyears.

✓ (2) Production of geographic intelligence on the Antarctic,
IGY, and related scientific programs -- 0.5 manyears (increase
presently cancelled by project cited in para. 1. c.(3), below).

✓ (3) Production of geographic intelligence in support of
operations, Latin America -- 2.5 manyears (includes 1 manyear
borrowed from O/Ch/G; temporary, possibly permanent, cut back
of 1 manyear previously assigned to Europe; and 0.5 manyear
assigned to Antarctic, IGY, and related scientific programs).

d. Projects and activities cut back

✓ (1) Production of geographic intelligence on Europe --
4 manyears (includes 1 manyear temporarily assigned to project
cited in para. 1. c.(3), above).

✓ (2) Production of geographic intelligence on Latin America --
1.5 manyears (applies to activities not duplicated by project
cited in para. 1. c.(3), above).

2. Additional to the above are important shifts that do not repre-
sent changes in a formal sense. These are, with guesses as to the man-
years involved under conditions of the moment:

a. Projects and activities increased

(1) Direct operational support of DD/P on the Far East
and Near East -- 0.5 manyears.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Change in Projects and Activities, 1 July 1956 -
31 December 1959

- ✓ (2) Production of geographic intelligence for the National Intelligence Estimates program -- 0.3 manyears. 25X1X4
- 25X1X4 ✓ (3) Basic guidance for covert programs related to [redacted] (reflects acceleration of programs following transfer of supervisory responsibility to D/GL) -- 0.2 man years.
- (4) Support of OTR and FSI training programs -- 0.2 manyears.

b. Projects and activities cut back

- ✓ 25X1X4 (1) Direct operational support of DD/P on Europe [redacted] -- 0.3 manyears. 25X1X4
- ✓ 25X1X4 (2) Direct operational support of DD/P on the USSR [redacted] -- 0.8 manyears. 25X1X4
- ✓ (3) Accomplishment of geographic intelligence maintenance on all regions (represents not a withdrawal of effort, but a steady decrease in the adequacy of the available effort to process, digest, and file the growing volume of incoming documents that have geographic intelligence significance) -- 2.6 manyears.

3. I should like to note those aspects of this rather complicated picture which seem to me to be most significant -- which are, in effect, the meaningful conclusions to be drawn. They are as follows:

a. Our projects and activities are more oriented toward the expressed needs of planners, estimators, and operations; there is also some increase in the integration of work effort with that of the ERA.

b. The Division has been drawn increasingly into projects and activities on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The shift has been achieved by reducing production and maintenance work in non-Bloc areas, such as Indonesia, Latin America, Western Europe, [redacted] 25X6A
We do not, as a result, have the balance or breadth of capability that we formerly had.

c. Projects and activities initiated or increased exceed those abolished or cut back. In part, this reflects an increased efficiency which results from accumulated experience and sophistication. For the most part, however, it reflects an increasing imbalance

~~SECRET~~


SUBJECT: Change in Projects and Activities, 1 July 1956 -
31 December 1959

between work to be done and people to do it. Personnel cutbacks exceed the savings that may be attributed to increased efficiency; they similarly exceed savings that may be attributed to increased sophistication in research planning and direction. The difference has been made up by reductions in the level of intelligence maintenance and self-initiated work and a slow down in the rate of accomplishment of requested projects. Since some projects -- like the NIS, Latin American operations, GM's, and Soviet guided missile work -- cannot be slowed down, the slow down is painfully apparent where it applies (support of M/AG, boundary inventory file, all contingency planning support). In the case of the reduction of potential self-initiated work, ignorance is bliss and perhaps only we realize the costs involved. For the record, however, they include the continued delay of needed environmental analysis on such areas as Communist China, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa. This gapitis is not new, but represents an enlargement of a condition that had already developed by July 1956.

d. The increasing inadequacy of the resources we can devote to intelligence maintenance represents a change that is of fundamental importance. As you know, geographic information differs from that in other research spheres in that it is basically cumulative; we are not presented with tables or handbooks which we can discard each fiscal year. Any increase in the volume of incoming information creates much greater problems for us than for, say, economists. The occurrence of a very substantial increase over the past three years, combined with an absolute inability to assign manpower to deal with it, means that the Division is now afflicted with a weakness that is vital. Our ability to respond quickly, comprehensively, and reliably is being eroded. I don't know now how the problem will be dealt with; in truth, I'm not sure that there is any solution except in the form of augmented staffing -- part of the problem rests in the very Draconian measures that were taken with respect to Latin America and Western Europe.

4. Going back over our records, I find that the present Division authorization is 20 percent under that of November 1955 (actual reduction in ceiling, I know, has been 11 percent). I would estimate that this represents a fair statement as to the difference between currently available resources and those required for the Division to do its December 1959 job adequately. In an inverse sort of way, it is this change which I find to be outstanding.

25X1A9a


Chief, Geography Division

~~SECRET~~