

~~SECRET~~

24 OCT 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Report on the CIA  
Training Program

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 5 Oct. 1960 to D/Sec fr DD/S,  
subj: "Responses of DD/S Office Heads and  
Staff Chiefs to the Inspector General's  
Report on Training in CIA"

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. Enumerated below are the Office of Security's reactions to the subject report presented in the manner suggested in the referenced memorandum.
3. Office of Security Reaction To The Contents Of The Report As A Whole:

Extremely well written, the Inspector General's report does three things: projects an image of CIA's over-all training program; effects an evaluation of its effectiveness; and finally, by thirty-six specific recommendations, prescribes remedies for the perceived ills in the current training efforts. By employing an ambitious research approach, an impressive volume of factual material on CIA training has been surfaced. By using a sound outline and clear exposition, the mass of facts emerge in a tightly organized package that effectively portrays the over-all anatomy of CIA's training program and successfully identifies many of its strengths and weaknesses. In its third dimension, prescribing remedial actions, the report appears to enjoy uneven success.

While many of the recommendations, particularly those stressing the need for greater definition of training objectives and requirements, now and in the future, seem of obvious value, certain others, notably in the area of the JOT Program, appear highly suspect and in some cases totally objectionable.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The report tends to communicate a kind of pro-Office of Training bias. This statement is not meant to depreciate at all the excellent record of the Office of Training or of Colonel Matthew Baird over the last ten years. It is rather to suggest that there is a "consumer side" to the report's implied criticism that the consumer is to blame for the absence of a general conviction on the place of training in career development. The consumer might well assert that the lack of solid evidence on the real value of certain CIA training offerings has contributed as much to the current ambiguous situation as anything else. Until controlled validation studies are conducted which clearly relate successful performance in a training situation with successful performance on the job, the current and distressing ambivalence on the "place" of training, at least some kinds of training, will continue. ? X

The above point might be restated as follows. The IG report seems insufficiently probing in the all-important area of training evaluation to determine training validity. The report properly notes with alarm that the lack of stable doctrine decreases training course validity. Yet it makes no mention of the fact (documented by countless experimental researches in government and industry) that even where course content is sound--it teaches what it should teach for the job ahead--and even where the students learn what is taught, the training may still be a failure in that the learning is not converted into on-the-job behavior.

All of this may explain why some Agency supervisors remain unconvinced that this course or that course adds any significant increment to the productivity, creativity, job satisfaction, or motivation of a subordinate. No amount of random generalization (often sounding suspiciously like a plea for training for the sake of training) will change this skepticism found in such supervisors. What will change this attitude is hard evidence, acquired only through rigorous validation studies which correlate training courses with job performance. Such evidence does not come cheaply nor easily. That the IG report fails to recommend the mounting of many such studies appears to be a curious omission and a serious weakness in the final product. X

The IG report on CIA training is, the above statements notwithstanding, a provocative, stimulating document. It cannot

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

help but prompt serious thinking and action on matters deserving such. The adoption of certain of its recommendations will produce marked improvements. What the report does to promote further research and study, self-analysis and self-examination within the Agency may be, however, its greatest value.

4. Office of Security Reactions To Eight Specific Recommendations:

a. It is recommended that:

The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program. (Page 24)

Office of Security Reaction:

This appears to be a completely sound recommendation. Any study which could lead to improvements in the recruitment, assessment, training, and utilization of clerical personnel must be encouraged and the Office of Security is ready to assist in the execution of such a study if such OS participation is appropriate.

b. It is recommended that:

The Director of Training experiment with the concept of a board of overseers composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to improved communication with and indoctrination of consumers, and to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum and enrollment. (Page 40)

Office of Security Reaction:

This is an excellent recommendation. The Office of Training needs as much contact with the consumers as possible. Only through such contacts will significant

SECRET

SECRET

strides be made in the development of so-called "training doctrine"--which answers the question of what to teach. In addition, such contacts facilitate feedback to OTR to help measure the validity of course content and the efficacy of teaching methods and techniques.

c. It is recommended that:

The Director of Training confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g., International Communism, could be handled by OTR for the reservists. (Page 52)

Office of Security Reaction:

This is an excellent proposal. Any efforts to have CIA reservists effect annual tours of training duty which support long-range Agency goals would appear irrefutably sound.

d. It is recommended that:

(a). The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP. (Page 92)

(b). The Director of Training establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief, JOTP, should chair the panel. (Page 92)

(c). The Director of Training should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above. (Page 92)

Office of Security Reaction:

The Office of Security stands resolutely opposed to recommendations (a) and (c) listed immediately above.

SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied