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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ISA/OFEDA

4 September 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chairman, Steering Group  
FROM : Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Ancillary Measures  
SUBJECT: Report and Recommendation on Measures Short of Terminating  
Aid to Achieve the Objectives of the Battle Act

1. The Ad Hoc Working Group has extensively investigated the subject problem. It is believed that most of the major actions which could be taken have been discussed by the Group. It is concluded that the application of ancillary measures would promote the objectives of the MDAC Act. The measures which would appear to be most effective, and which could be feasibly applied are:

- MSA counter part funds control
- Watch lists
- Off-shore procurement contracting
- Export licensing control

These measures are discussed briefly in the appendices to this Memorandum. The greatest benefit would derive from using such measures as positive incentives rather than as punitive actions. In other words, presentation to friendly countries of an incentive possibility would be more likely to produce beneficial results, in terms of concrete action on the part of a friendly country, than the withholding or reduction of benefits to such a country.

2. Recommendations. The Working Group recommends that serious consideration be given to the application of ancillary measures in connection with the administration of the Battle Act. For this purpose, the following steps would appear to be necessary as a minimum:

- a. Agreement in MDAC to the use of programs which are believed to be appropriate in conjunction with the MDAC administration.
- b. Establishment of a permanent Working Group for the formulation of recommendations to the Steering Group in connection with exception cases or negotiations with individual countries.

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c. Agreement by agencies administering programs which are suitable that such programs will be coordinated through the Working Group on Ancillary Measures with other Battle Act activities.

d. Establishment of liaison with the programming elements or other relevant sections of administration agencies so that the Ancillary Working Group is familiar at all times with the progress of the various actions which are usable in connection with the Battle Act.

e. Liaison with Economic Defense Panels and other organizations familiar with various activities under the Battle Act at the Country level.

f. Membership of the Working Group on Ancillary Measures should consist of those agencies represented on the Ad Hoc Group, plus the Department of State.

#### General Analysis

3. One of the principal difficulties of the Battle Act as a means of achieving economic defense objectives is that termination or threatened termination of all aid tends to jeopardize one of the principal objectives of our foreign policy. It is virtually impossible to apply the penalty provision of the Act to a major aid-recipient area without some adverse effect on the contribution which the country is making or has promised to make toward the mutual defense effort. In some cases, the effect of applying the Battle Act penalty may be political, but in others it may directly diminish the tangible ability of a country to muster the necessary industrial and economic strength to fulfill its commitments. The same difficulty was found in some degree to be present in many of the less stringent measures which might be applied to achieve the objectives of the Act. Reducing foreign aid, for example, or adjusting foreign aid expenditure programs would interrupt the benefit which foreign aid funds are intended to produce and may be as drastic as total withholding of aid. Where military equipment is directly involved, it is obvious that any interruption or diversion from a planned build-up program interferes not only with the contribution of the individual country affected, but also with the overall military plan. With respect to the licensing of strategic equipment other than military, the withholding of such equipment may interfere with a country's ability to produce the necessary armament to fulfill a mutual defense commitment.

4. It would seem that the above problems can be partially overcome through a more careful application of appropriate measures and their careful coordination. It may be more effective to subtly apply pressures of a less drastic nature than to terminate all aid. This can be achieved by delaying tactics and other indirect means which may impress a friendly country with the seriousness of the U.S. position on strategic controls without setting off a reaction which, in effect, diminishes the ability and the willingness of a friendly country to continue its defense effort. The application of this technique obviously requires imaginative and well-coordinated efforts by the entire U.S. governmental administrative machinery. Hence, closely coordinated programs would have to be set up.

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5. It was found that many of the measures under discussion have in fact already been applied in connection with economic defense objectives. MSA, for example, in some measure, adjusts aid programs, counterpart programs, priorities action and actions with respect to individual firms in aid recipient countries. These adjustments are in part in accordance with that country's performance in strategic trade with the Soviet Bloc. The Commerce Department, by direction of the National Security Council, issues export licenses according to an established and highly developed procedure so as to assure as fully as possible that shipments from the U.S. do not contribute to the ability of friendly countries to ship strategic items to the Soviet Bloc. This "withholding" procedure is applied somewhat broadly in many instances. For example, in the case of ~~Malaya~~, licenses for sulphur exports have been withheld because of continued exports of natural rubber to Communist-China, ~~by Malaya~~. Similarly, The State Department is currently negotiating with the Ceylonese Government to diminish or completely eliminate rubber shipments to Communist China. As an incentive the Ceylonese are being offered rice from the U.S., economic assistance and other emoluments. The DOD at the contracting level has, on occasion, withheld off-shore procurement contracts from individual firms because of known relations between these firms and the Soviet Bloc.

6. It is impossible to assess the degree to which these measures, as currently applied, have influenced friendly countries in their policies and their actual performances with respect to economic defense activities. The application of these measures is only one of several facets of the U.S. effort and it is not feasible to separate their effect from the effect of related actions. It is notable, however, that, because these efforts are applied through uncoordinated administrative channels and because the affected country is not always made fully aware of the basic policies and purposes of the actions, it would appear that the effect has not been extensive. Closer coordination of these programs would undoubtedly prove helpful in promoting the U.S. policies and interests which are set up for the Battle Act and related legislative and executive policy instruments.

7. Some of the measures reviewed by the Group appear to be equally as, or more drastic than the penalty provided for in the Battle Act. The suspension of foreign aid, for example, as provided for in the Mutual Security Act is hardly different from the penalty of the Battle Act. It is true that resumption of aid under a suspension action would be administratively less difficult than reinstatement of aid after termination under the Battle Act, but the effect on the aid recipient country would be virtually the same. Termination or suspension of military end-items would appear to be more drastic than the Battle Act penalty. A full-scale foreign assets blocking action applied with respect to all transactions between aid recipient countries and the Soviet Bloc would appear likewise to have political repercussions and possibly economic results fully as disrupting, if not more so, than the Battle Act penalty. These actions, therefore, are perhaps not properly within the context of the term "ancillary measures."

8. The group reviewed briefly a number of actions which are not specifically discussed in this report. These appeared, however, to be

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inappropriate in most instances either because their effect would be negligible or because their field was so remotely related to the purposes of the Battle Act that it would be difficult to justify their application in connection thereto. A partial list of these is as follows:

- Tariff and other import controls
- Export-Import Bank loans
- Point-Four Programs
- Panama Canal use

cc to Mr Vergil Salas <sup>106</sup> SF 523395 - OSP Receipt 49176 (to MSA)  
 Mr Maxfield SF 523397 - 49177 (to MSA)  
 Mr Edur Walsky SF 523398 - 49178 (to MSA)  
 5236 memo attached  
 contact sheet

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May 2, 1955

To: DRW - Mr. Sanderson  
DRF - Mr. Fried  
DRN - Mr. Ogburn  
From: DFI - Marion Worthing, OIR Coordinator for East-West Trade  
Sub.: Proposed IR-6911, Foreign Attitudes Towards Economic Defense

A. As part of the Dodge Council's general review of our economic defense policies, OIR has been asked to prepare a paper on "Foreign Attitudes Towards Economic Defense". The request was made by E/ECD as a part of the OIR support program on East-West trade. Mr. Reifman, DFI, will take charge of combing the several sections of the report.

B. This study should cover the following points and utilize all types of source materials.

1. Differences between US and foreign attitudes generally, and, more specifically, between governmental policies on economic defense as the latter are expressed in CoCom and elsewhere.

2. Reasons for the differences. A check list of some of the possible factors should include:

- a. Different assessments of the imminence of war and of Soviet intentions.
- b. Different assessments of the impact of controls on the Bloc.
- c. Different assessments of the facts--intelligence on specific commodities.
- d. An evaluation that prospective trade with the Bloc would be extremely beneficial to the country.
- e. A greater emphasis on the importance of maintaining substantial economic contact with the Bloc as a means of reducing world tension.
- f. Internal pressures in the foreign country from political parties, individual businessmen, or labor.

3. Attitudes of the governments and informed public opinion toward the multilateral system of controls (CoCom and ChinCom). Is there a feeling that this is a genuine multilateral organization, with equal, cooperating members, or that this is primarily a US-dominated group

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with sanctions and inducements imposed unilaterally by the US? Contrast, where appropriate, with attitudes toward NATO, OEEC, and SEATO. What is attitude of country toward sanctions and inducements? How important are these in tightening the control program and in helping or hindering the unity of thought and action of the Free World countries?

C. Countries to be Covered

While coverage of a number of countries is desired, improved quality of the analysis is to be preferred to extending the coverage. As a minimum, the following countries or areas should be covered:

- (1) The major CoCom countries, including Denmark.
- (2) A few European neutrals (Sweden and Switzerland).
- (3) Japan. (Is Tokyo despatch 1151 of April 1 useful?)
- (4) Southeast Asia, perhaps as a unit.
- (5) South Asia, as a unit, with special attention given to India.

Statements on individual countries or areas should be brief--running one to three single-space pages.

D. Miscellaneous

1. The report is due in mid-May. I would appreciate your sending your drafts to Mr. Reifman of this division by May 13.
2. In order to thrash out problems in advance, I would appreciate it if you can have the appropriate analysts meet with Mr. Reifman to discuss the project on Tuesday, May 3, in room 404 at 4:00 p.m.
3. A work jacket for this project, IR 6911, has been sent to your Administrative Officer.

cc: Mr. Reifman  
Mr. Goodkind

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Staff Study No. 11

Draft of May 20, 1955

CFEP, DRAFTING GROUP

ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW

Use of Inducements or Pressures on Free World Countries In Support  
Of the U. S. Economic Defense Program

This draft of Staff Study No. 11 on Use of Inducements or Pressures on Free World Countries in Support of the U. S. Economic Defense Program is transmitted for your use in connection with the work of the CFEP Drafting Group on Economic Defense Policy Review.

In compliance with the request of the Chairman of the Drafting Group, the Executive Secretary, EDAC, is providing reproduction and distribution facilities as a service to further the work of the CFEP Drafting Group.

Irving I. Kramer  
Executive Secretary

Distribution:  
CFEP Drafting Group

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CFEP, DRAFTING GROUP

ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW

Staff Study No. 11  
Draft of May 20, 1955

"USE OF INDUCEMENTS OR PRESSURES ON FREE WORLD COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT  
OF THE U. S. ECONOMIC DEFENSE PROGRAM"

INTRODUCTION

This paper describes the various techniques which the U. S. has used or may consider using to obtain the closer cooperation of other free world countries in the Economic Defense Program. An evaluation of these techniques is attempted, based upon examples shown in Appendix A, and general criteria for their use are suggested.

In view of the many variables present in real situations, no attempt has been made to develop definitive rules for the selection or application of the techniques described. In general, however, it is suggested that it is better to use the "Carrot" of possible benefit rather than the "Stick" of possible loss of benefit or actual punishment, where the alternatives are open.

Study of the various techniques and of examples of their use has also brought out that some of them, whether of a positive or negative nature, are general in impact. They may be used effectively in creating an atmosphere in which agreement to take specific actions can be more readily obtained, but may be quite ineffective where specific acts or items are concerned. Others, on the other hand, may be used so as to bear directly and solely on the particular problem. However, in the latter instance action on specific problems may influence positions of governments, firms or individuals on more general issues both within and outside of the Economic Defense Program.

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The judgment that certain of the techniques described below cannot be usefully employed in solving specific problems of Economic Defense is not to be taken to mean that the action could not or should not be taken in support of other important Government objectives.

#### DISCUSSION OF TECHNIQUES

1. There is reproduced in the Appendix B, a check list of the individual techniques constituting the types of inducements and pressures which have been utilized by the United States up to the present time and including a few which, although not as yet utilized, are theoretically possible.

2. In general, these techniques fall into two categories:

- a. Methods of expanding or contracting U. S. Government procurement of foreign goods and services;
- b. Methods of expanding or contracting the availability abroad of U. S. goods and services.

3. In this first group i.e., expansion or contraction of Government procurement of foreign goods and services, are included the various techniques such as off-shore procurement, stockpiling, the Formosa Clause, and use of the selection of spots for military bases as an inducement. In the second group i.e., the expansion or reduction of the availability of U. S. goods and services, are the techniques such as the making available of short supply items, withholding of export licenses, off-shore bunkering controls, punitive actions under the administrative action program, (although certain of these punitive actions such as the withdrawal of FOA contracts are of the nature included in Item A), denial of visas, financial loans and grants

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(here there will be occasions where this technique will fall into the first category such as the procurement of locomotives in one foreign country for shipment to another foreign country under the FOA program), technical assistance projects, use of agricultural surpluses and health and sanitation projects.

4. Some of these are applicable on a country basis (such as action under the Battle Act or under the Department of Commerce Anti-Frustration policy, i.e., PD 810), while others are directed at an individual or company.

5. It will be noted that some of these techniques involve lines of action undertaken solely in order to obtain greater conformity in other countries with the U. S. Economic Defense policy. Other of the techniques involve already established U. S. government actions which are being undertaken originally for other reasons and where their increased or decreased use in an attempt to obtain closer adherence to the U. S. Economic Defense policy is collateral to their main purpose. It is believed that in general those techniques which are solely applicable to our effort to obtain closer adherence to our Economic Defense policy are generally superior to those techniques which infringe upon other policy objectives of the U. S. Government since, in the latter case, the Economic Defense benefits obtainable may frequently be more than offset by the possible losses to other programs.

6. It will be noted that certain of the techniques are specific in their application in that they are designed solely to meet a given situation while others are much broader in their implications and may have adverse collateral effects. An example of this latter situation is to be found in the possibility that the use of the Battle Act may be more damaging to the military program than the economic defense gain which might result.

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CRITERIA

7. The following are suggested as guidelines for the use of any or all of the techniques discussed above and described in detail in the Appendix. These relate solely to considerations in connection with supporting the Economic Defense Program and in no way are intended to imply that certain of the actions described should not or could not be taken completely apart from that program.

8. Guides in considering possible use of any or all of the techniques described in support of the Economic Defense Program:

- a. Is there an economic defense problem warranting special attention?
- b. Would the use of one or more of these techniques be effective in producing a net gain to the Economic Defense Program? (continue use of any particular technique only where past results in somewhat similar circumstances justify its continued or expanded use).
- c. Would the net gain to the U. S. outweigh the resulting costs to other U. S. programs and objectives?
- d. If the particular problem permits a choice between the use of inducements or pressures, costs permitting, it is preferable to use inducements. (Inducements of relatively high cost to the U. S. to be employed only on determination that the objective cannot otherwise be attained by means such as mild pressures).

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CONCLUSIONS

9. The techniques described in the Appendix are of varying degrees of usefulness in influencing other countries and their nationals to cooperate more closely with the U. S. Economic Defense Program.

10. With reference to East/West trade there is a broad field of items where trade interests conflict with security objectives. These items shade from those of minor strategic importance to others approaching the importance of items directly related or principally used for military materiel production. In this area some of these techniques are being or can be used to influence other free world countries to support the U. S. views of an adequate Economic Defense Program.

11. Clearly those techniques listed as inducements which provide alternate markets for the materials or products for which restrictions on sale to the Soviet Bloc are desired, are the most effective as they lessen the pressures to ship such items to the Bloc. Off-shore procurement in connection with FOA or defense programs <sup>1/</sup>(5,6 & 7); and/or increased stockpile procurement (4 & 15), provide such free world markets and can be very effective tools in support of this program.

12. The pressures which could be related directly to the Economic Defense Program mostly are the reverse of those described above. In general, it is preferable to take such actions only as a last resort; rather using the implied threat of the use of such techniques than actually employing them.

<sup>1/</sup> These numbers relate to the items in the attached Appendix A, which provides examples of the particular techniques.

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13. In this category falls: Withholding export licenses (18, 23); reducing availability of short-supply items (24, 19); curtailment or withdrawal of off-shore purchasing (16, 22); and reducing stockpile purchases (21, 26).

14. Another pressure technique is the withholding of export licenses for specific commodities (19, 23), where the country of destination is shipping the same item to the Bloc or shipping a strategic product made therewith or therefrom.

15. Reference should be made to the actions taken under the inter-agency "Administrative Action Program" (28, 29). Here where it is determined that individuals are negating the objectives of the U. S. Defense Program various disciplinary actions are taken until agreement is obtained from the individual for conformance with that program. Related to this is the denial of visas (27), to persons who flagrantly disregard the objectives of the U. S. security program and as a result cannot expect such considerations.

16. Two other techniques listed: Treasury overseas bunkering regulations (31); and the Formosa Clause (30), are aimed at hampering the transport of items to the Bloc or precluding the use of ships by the Bloc where such ships are gainfully employed in carrying aid goods to friendly areas.

17. With these points in mind it is believed that the following techniques are those most advantageous in that they attack directly the problem confronting us and also in that they are less likely to have undesirable indirect reactions.

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- a. Procurement (5,6,22,16)
- b. Stockpiling (4, 15, 21, 26)
- c. Availability of short-supply items (19, 12, 24)
- d. Withholding of export licenses (23, 28, 18, 20, 25)
- e. Formosa Clause actions (30)
- f. Bunkering restrictions (31)
- g. Punitive actions under the administrative action program (28, 29)
- h. Denial of visas (27)

18. On the other hand, the following types of actions are felt to be of less value because either they do not directly address themselves to the problem at issue or because they may have indirect reactions of an unfavorable nature:

- a. Financial loans and grants (1, 2, 3, 14, 17)
- b. Technical assistance (3)
- c. Military bases (7)
- d. Agricultural surpluses (9)
- e. Health and sanitation projects (10, 11)
- f. Disposal of military surplus materiel (8)

APPENDIX A

Listing techniques and examples of each.

APPENDIX B

Check list of techniques

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Appendix A

Examples of Pressures or Inducements which have been, or may be used, to obtain foreign support of the U. S. Economic Defense Program.

1. Inducements which may be offered to countries or individuals to persuade them to cooperate with the U. S. Economic Defense Program.

a. Country-wide

(Examples of aids and grants)

1. \$10 million has been made available to Japan in the form of a grant for the support of defense production industries.
2. Approximately \$45 million has been used to finance the transportation, relief and resettlement of refugees from North Vietnam to Free Vietnam.

(Example of technical assistance)

3. Afghanistan. An American technical advisory group, called the Helmand Valley Advisory Service, has been created to assist the Afghan administration in all phases of engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation, community development, public administration, and training, in connection with the Helmand Valley Development program. A Community Development Training School and Demonstration Farms have also been established in the Helmand Valley.

(Example of increasing stockpile procurement)

4. It has been suggested that Turkish cooperation in the denial of borax to unfriendly countries might be improved by arranging to purchase from Turkey, for the U.S. Strategic Stockpile, quantities of chromium or copper greater than would otherwise be acquired from this source, in such fashion as to be of more benefit to Turkey than the sale of this material in the open market.

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(Example of off-shore procurement)

5. The U.S. Armed Forces buy approximately \$200 millions of goods and services abroad, per year, for subsistence and maintenance of troops and installations. It is suggested that the placement of contracts for such items might be used to increase cooperation with the Economic Defense Program.
6. The FOA sold U.S. coal to private individuals in France and with the francs bought cement in Tunisia for shipment to Iran; tires and tubes in France for Turkey; logs in French West Africa for Israel.

(Establishment of US bases abroad)

7. The US has expended approximately \$250 million in Germany and \$100 million in Italy, as well as large sums in other countries, for the construction of military bases. It has been suggested that the location of bases and the letting of construction contracts may be used, to some extent, to obtain greater cooperation with the US Economic Defense program.

(Disposal of military surplus materiel)

8. The U. S. Armed Services possess thousands of tons of surplus materials of many kinds, which may be disposed of locally. The sale of such surplus material should be confined to countries which maintain satisfactory controls over the movement of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc.

(Disposal of agricultural surplus commodities)

9. The 1956 budget estimate of MSA proposes that \$30 million in agricultural surplus commodities be given to India, and that the



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sales proceeds of these commodities be used for agreed economic development purposes such as local costs of irrigation, flood control and power. Such aid might also carry a condition relating to the Economic Defense program.

(Health and sanitation programs)

10. Through the work of the Iran-US Public Health Cooperative, malaria has been brought under control and should be virtually wiped out within a few years, and serious epidemics of contagious diseases are now less frequent.
11. Substantial progress has been made in malaria control in Indonesia. For example, in one area sample tests on infants made before the program was undertaken showed that 30% had malaria. Two years later, a similar test showed no cases of malaria.

(Increasing availability of items in short supply)

12. A supplemental allocation of copper alloy scrap was made to West Germany for the second quarter, 1955. It is expected that this allocation will strengthen West German support of the US in COCOM and other Economic Defense activities.

b. Inducements for individuals.

(Loans and grants)

13. \$3 million have been made available for the making of technical surveys and engineering reports for the Tata steel company expansion project, India.
14. A loan of \$1.2 million to the Rio Tinto pyrites mine, Spain, was made for the general purpose of increasing production. The

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licensing of certain equipment for the mine, however, and the final implementation of the loan were held up until it could be ascertained that this development would not increase the availability of pyrites to the Soviet Bloc.

(Increasing Stockpile Procurement)

15. The GSA might direct its purchases toward particular mines or companies, if so directed by ODM, in the interests of the Economic Defense program.

(Off-shore procurement)

16. Both Defense and FOA purchase large quantities of materials and services of many types, in foreign countries, either for use locally or for shipment to some other country. The nature of other business carried on by the prospective suppliers could be taken into account in the placement of FOA or Defense contracts.

II. Pressures which may be exerted to persuade countries or individuals to cooperate with the US Economic Defense Program.

a. Countries

(Curtailement or withholding of US aid)

17. The preparation of an aid program for Ceylon was interrupted because of failure of Ceylon to discontinue its exports to Communist China of rubber and rice.

(Withholding of export licenses)

18. Export licenses were withheld on certain excavating machinery for the UK, under the provisions of PD 810, following upon the withdrawal by the UK Government of assurances with regard to the possible transshipment of such items to the Soviet Bloc.

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Licensing was resumed upon receipt of the necessary assurances from the UK Government.

(Reducing availability of commodities in short supply)

19. Licenses for the export of dusting sulfur required for rubber production were denied to Ceylon, because of the refusal of Ceylon to discontinue its exports of rubber to Communist China. This was unsuccessful as other friendly countries supply the required sulphur dust without demanding discontinuance of shipments of the resulting rubber to Communist China.

(Restricting availability of technical data)

20. The export of technical data relating to metal rolling mills was made subject to obtaining validated export license, and such information is being withheld from the UK pending satisfactory agreement upon the export control of metal rolling mills.

(Reducing stockpile purchases)

21. The GSA might, upon direction from the ODM, reduce purchases for the stockpile from a particular country, if such action seemed in accord with US economic defense objectives.

b. Individuals.

(Curtailment of offshore procurement)

22. During the final year 1955 two offshore procurement contracts totalling about \$25 million were cancelled in Italy by the Defense Department because the Communist labor union gained control in the plants concerned after the contracts had been placed.

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(Withholding of export licenses)

23. Export licenses were withheld from the Italian firm SALEM until the firm furnished information regarding its transactions in molybdenum, and gave assurances that its future activities would be in accord with applicable export regulations.

(Reducing availability of short supply items)

24. The known trading activities of applicants may be taken into account when short supply quotas are allocated among the applicants.

(Withholding technical data)

25. An application was made by several American firms to export technical data relating to metal rolling mills to FIAT, Italy. The advisability of denying this application was studied in view of the large Communist membership in the FIAT labor force and of past trade between FIAT and the Soviet Bloc. It was finally decided to approve the license, in view of the compliance by FIAT with trade controls, during recent years, and of the possession of Defense Department contracts.

(Reducing stockpile purchases)

26. The GSA might, upon direction from the ODM, reduce purchases for the stockpile from a particular company, if such action seemed in accord with US economic defense objectives.

(Denial of US visas)

27. Individuals known to be conducting trade not considered to be to the security interests of the US might be denied visas, for themselves, or for company representatives, thus hindering their business activities.

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(Administrative Action)

28. The denial of offshore procurement contracts and the withholding of US export licenses to the firm of Wheelock, Marden, has resulted in the opening of negotiations with Mr. Marden to obtain adequate assurances that he will comply with applicable regulations with respect to trade with Communist China.

(Administrative Action Watch List)

29. The BFC maintains a file of firms and individuals whose applications for export licenses are either subjected to special scrutiny, or denied without further consideration, in view of known undesirable activities of these firms or individuals.

(Formosa Clause)

30. The Formosa Clause (restrictive charter) was instituted by MSA to insure that foreign flag vessels chartered MSA would not be placed in an advantageous position to trade with Communist China. This clause provides that vessels chartered by MSA may not go to Communist ports within 60 days after discharge of MSA cargo at Formosa. There is a provision for holding back 25% of the freight payment as a means of enforcement.

(Treasury overseas bunkering regulations)

31. Under Treasury Department regulations, American firms abroad may not supply bunkers to vessels bound for Communist China if such vessels are carrying strategic cargo. The vessel Les Glieres, operated by the French line Messageries Maritimes, was denied bunkers under this regulation.

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## CHECK LIST OF TECHNIQUES

<u>INDUCEMENTS</u>	<u>EXAMPLE NO.</u>
Aids and grants (country wide)	1 & 2
Technical assistance (country wide)	3
Increasing stockpile procurement (country wide)	4
Off-shore procurement (country wide)	5 & 6
Military bases	7
Military surplus disposal (country wide)	8
Agricultural surpluses (country wide)	9
Health and sanitation programs (country wide)	10 & 11
Availability of short supply items	12
Loans & grants (individual)	13 & 14
Increasing stockpile individual orders	15
Offshore procurement specific suppliers	16
<u>PRESSURES</u>	
Curtailement or withholding US aids from specific countries.	17
Withholding export licenses for particular country	18 & 19
Restricting availability of technical data to named countries.	20
Reducing stockpile purchases	21
Curtailement of offshore procurement from non-cooperative firms	22
Withholding individual export licenses	23
Reducing availability of short supply items	24
Withholding technical data from individuals	25

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<u>PRESSURES (Cont'd)</u>	<u>EXAMPLE NO.</u>
Curtailling stockpile purchases from specific individuals	26
Denial US visas	27
Administrative action	28 & 29
Formosa clause	30
Treasury overseas bunkering regulations	31

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