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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE

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
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
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Date completed: 23 June 1953

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SUMMARY

At the request of the delegate from the United Kingdom, the Palestine question was brought before the United Nations for official consideration during the First Special Session of the General Assembly, which convened 28 April 1947.

From that date until 11 December 1948, the General Assembly, after lengthy deliberation, passed several far-reaching resolutions affecting Palestine, its people, and its future. Chief among these resolutions was the Plan of Partition, passed by the Assembly 29 November 1947.

Deliberations in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the various committees revolved around three basic alternative proposals:

1. To create an independent unitary state in Palestine.
2. To partition Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab.
3. To create a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, pending a final settlement mutually determined by and acceptable to both Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine.

During the deliberations, the initiative was taken and held by Communist delegates from the USSR and Poland who assumed the task of influencing the Assembly to adopt resolutions the Communist bloc sponsored.

On major issues the Communist position was directly opposite to that of the Arab States. Whereas the Arab States wanted the Assembly to pass a resolution for creation of an independent unitary state in Palestine, the Communists championed passage of the Partition Plan; and whereas the Arab States favored studying the trusteeship proposal submitted by the United States during the Second Special Session, the Communists raised vehement objections, allegedly because the proposal would nullify the Partition Plan.

The records of the United Nations reveal beyond any doubt that the Communist delegates were responsible for (1) passage of the Partition Plan, (2) defeat of the various Arab States' proposals on the Palestine question, (3) defeat of the US proposal to create a temporary trusteeship, (4) survival of the Partition Plan during the Second Special Session, and (5) present conditions in Palestine and consequent instability throughout the Arab East.

COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE

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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE

PART ONE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT

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SECTION THREE: REVIEW AND CONCLUSION

SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT

BACKGROUND

On 2 April 1947 Sir Alexander Cadogan, head of the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations, sent a letter (document A/286) to Dr. Victor Chi Tsai Hoo, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which he requested, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the question of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly. The letter also asked that the Secretary-General summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine.

On 22 and 23 April 1947, the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia sent almost identical letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations* each requesting inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly namely, "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence."

Following the approval of the majority of United Nations members to hold a special session for discussion of the proposal by the United Kingdom, the first special session in the history of the United Nations met in New York 28 April to 15 May 1947. The Palestine question was thus officially brought before the United Nations for deliberation on 28 April 1947.

* Documents A/287, A/288, A/289, A/290, and A/291 respectively.

I. THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
28 April - 15 May 1947

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

On 1 May 1947, the General Assembly approved the United Kingdom's request to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly and to call a special session to constitute

and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session, of the question of the future government of Palestine. On the same day, however, the Assembly rejected a proposal by the Arab States to include the following item in the agenda of the First Special Session: "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence."

On 5 May 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution submitted jointly by Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Argentina, Yugoslavia, and Uruguay. This resolution directed the First Committee to permit the Jewish Agency for Palestine to state its views on the Palestine question.

A chronology of important events in the First Special Session of the General Assembly leading to the adoption of the joint resolution follows:

A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE *

1. The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and Declaration of its Independence

On Tuesday, 29 April 1947, during the 28th meeting, Mahmoud Hassan Pasha, head of the Egyptian delegation and the only Arab member of the Committee, proposed that the Committee begin considering the Arab States' request to include the following additional item in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly: "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence."

On Wednesday, 30 April 1947, during the 31st meeting, the General Committee, after considerable deliberation, rejected the Arab States' request by vote of 8-1, with 5 abstentions.

a. The Arab Position

Although the Egyptian delegate was the only Arab member on the Committee, the other Arab States in the UN were allowed to participate in the deliberation. All of them, without exception, fought hard for inclusion of their sponsored item. (pp. 13-16; 19-25; 27-28; 29-37; 54; 68; 70; 80)

* Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume II, General Committee, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 29 April - 7 May 1947

b. The Communist Position

The Communist bloc, represented on the Committee by the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, did not launch a direct attack on inclusion of the Arab proposal for termination of the Mandate and declaration of Palestine independence. Instead, they shrewdly attacked from the flank, by professing that no decision on the subject should be taken prior to hearing the Jewish point of view.

In expressing the Polish delegation's opinion on the proposed inclusion of the item Mr. Winiewicz (pronounced Viniyayvitch) stated:

"However, the Polish delegation experiences great difficulty in reaching a decision on the inclusion of the suggested item, as formulated in our agenda, at the present state of this Assembly's deliberations. The difficulty arises out of the fact that the Egyptian proposal, and others, suggest in a most decisive form the termination of the Palestine mandate, even before we have heard the opinion of the most interested party, the Jewish people, for which the mandate in Palestine provided special rights.

"We cannot, therefore, vote for the inclusion of this additional item at this special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. We shall abstain from voting, urging at the same time that this committee should take up as soon as possible the admission of a Jewish representative body for consultation with this Assembly." (pp. 16-17; 29 April 1947)

Mr. Gromyko (USSR) on the other hand, attempted to embarrass the Arab States' representatives without showing his hand when he asserted:

"The representatives of the Arab States have said that they do not insist on a vote on their proposal at this meeting. Thus, it seems to me that we have no reason at present to vote on this proposal for it is as if this proposal did not, as it were, exist at the present meeting.

"I think this is the only explanation which corresponds to the situation which has arisen. If this is so, I would ask the representatives of the Arab delegations and the representative of Egypt in particular, to give a definite reply. I consider that the proposal cannot be put to a vote at the present moment and that it does not, as it were, exist at this stage.

"Of course, I reserve the right to define my position in regard to the vote when this proposal is discussed again, if it is discussed again and in the place where it is discussed." (pp. 79-80; 30 April 1947)

c. The Communist Voting Record

The item was voted on by show of hands, and therefore no record is available to indicate how each Communist member voted. However, statements by each Communist member lead to the conclusion that the Communist bloc did not vote for the item but that, on the contrary, the only vote cast in its favor was by the representative from Egypt.

d. The Outcome

The rejection of the Arab-sponsored item was followed on 30 April 1947 by adoption of the following compromise proposal, submitted by Mr. Aranha (Brazil), which received eleven votes in favor, with three abstentions:

"The General Committee,

"Having considered the item of the supplementary list entitled 'The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence' submitted by the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria,

"Reports that it decided not to recommend that item be placed upon the agenda of the General Assembly as a separate item, but

"Recognizes that the terms of reference for the special committee on Palestine will not exclude the possibility of this or any other solution which may be found appropriate." (p. 71)

2. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly

On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 32nd meeting, Mr. Winiewicz, head of the Polish delegation, proposed that the General Committee recommend adoption of the following draft resolution (document A/BUR/79/Rev. 1):

"The General Assembly

"Resolved to give careful consideration to the point of view of the Jewish people on the Palestine question,

"Decides to invite the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the General Assembly for consultation."

Later, during the same meeting, Mr. Winiewicz accepted a Czechoslovakian amendment (document A/BUR/80) rewording the second paragraph of the Polish resolution as follows:

"Decides to invite the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly for the purpose of expressing their views on this question."

a. The Arab Position

The Arab States, represented on the Committee by Mahmoud Hassan Pasha, (Egypt) objected to having Jewish organizations appear before the plenary meetings of the United Nations or before any of its main committees, on the premise that, according to the United Nations Charter, only representatives of States are allowed to appear before the United Nations General Assembly. However, they did not object to such organizations appearing before sub-committees. (pp. 114-116)

b. The Communist Position

The Communist bloc, represented by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR, argued that the Jewish Agency for Palestine was an internationally recognized body, that its opinion should be heard before the General Assembly since the Jewish population of Palestine should be given consideration.

The following excerpts from a statement made by Communist delegates expose their views on the subject:

Mr. Winiewicz (Poland)

"May I here mention that the Jewish population of Palestine has been connected with the Palestine problem since the mandate was established. As early as 1908 the Zionist Organization in Palestine embraced upon the work of practical colonization of that country and of its development. The Palestine Office was founded in Jaffa at that time and was the forerunner of the present Jewish Agency in Palestine. For this reason we think the Jewish population of Palestine also should be heard." (p. 89; 2 May 1947)

Also:

"We have to hear not only the representatives of the Arab countries who present the Arab point of view, but we must also hear the Jewish point of view." (pp. 89-90; 2 May 1947)

"May I repeat, we of the Polish delegation cannot imagine how this General Assembly could pass sound judgement on this problem without hearing the views of the representative Jewish body when preparing the terms of reference for the committee proposed by the United Kingdom and now being discussed by the General Assembly." (p. 90; 2 May 1947)

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"When I speak of inviting the representatives of the Jewish organizations, I have in mind primarily an invitation to these representatives to attend the General Assembly, that is, the plenary meetings. The Soviet delegation does not accept the point of view that the representatives of the Jewish organizations can be permitted to be present, let us say, at the First Committee but at the same time cannot be permitted to attend the General Assembly's plenary meetings where they would be given an opportunity of expressing their views on this question. Such half-hearted decision would be especially unjust from the point of view of the Jewish population in Palestine, which is vitally concerned in this matter." (p. 110; 2 May 1947)

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 33rd meeting, and after considerable debate, the Polish resolution as amended by Czechoslovakia (document A/BUR/80) was voted on and rejected by vote of eight to three, with three abstentions. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR, the only Communist members on the Committee, cast the three votes favoring adoption of the resolution.

d. The Outcome

Rejection of the Polish resolution as amended (document A/BUR/80) was followed by adoption of the US resolution (document A/BUR/81) as amended by the United Kingdom.

3. Referring Jewish Requests to First Committee

On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 33rd meeting, while deliberating the Polish draft resolution calling for the invitation of the representative

of the Jewish Agency to appear before the General Assembly for consultation, Mr. Warren Austin, head of the US delegation, proposed, through a draft resolution (document A/BUR/81), that the Polish draft resolution as amended (document A/BUR/80) be reworded as follows:

"The General Committee,

"Having considered the communications referred to it by the President of the General Assembly from the Jewish Agency and other organizations requesting that they be permitted to express their views on the Palestine question,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that it refer these communications to the First Committee for its decision."

During the same meeting the United Kingdom representative, Sir Alexander Cadogan proposed, and Mr. Austin agreed, that the second paragraph of the US draft resolution be reworded as follows:

"Recommends to the General Assembly that it refer these communications, as well as any communications of similar character which may be submitted to the special session, to the First Committee for its decision." (p. 105)

a. The Arab Position

The Arab states approved and supported the US proposed resolution because they believed that the US recommendation was in conformity with the charter. (p. 116)

b. The Communist Position

Throughout the deliberations, the Communist delegates maintained that it was necessary to invite the Jewish Agency for Palestine to testify before the General Assembly, that not to do so would be unjust. Their stand is best revealed by the following excerpts from two statements made by Mr. Gromyko (USSR) and Dr. Fiderkiewicz [pronounced: Feederkayvitch] of Poland:

Mr. Gromyko:

"We heard the statement of the representative of the United States of America, Senator Austin. He submitted a resolution to us which not only makes no provision for inviting the Jewish organizations to the General Assembly's plenary meetings but does not provide for inviting representatives of the Jewish

organizations at all. The resolution merely states that statements and documents received from Jewish and other organizations should be transmitted to the appropriate Committee of the General Assembly. The transmission of documents to the appropriate Committee is practically a technical operation. Apart from this, delegations have received at least the main statements of organizations which have made requests. Therefore, the solution offered by the resolution does not get us much further; it does not constitute the slightest progress in any way." (pp. 110-111; 2 May 1947)

Dr. Fiderkiewicz:

"I understand the difficulties which the representative of the United States is experiencing with regard to our resolution. Nevertheless, the Polish delegation does not see much possibility of solving the problem before us and arriving at a decision on the resolution, after due consideration by the Committee, without a Jewish voice being heard before the Assembly.

"Sending the matter to the First Committee for consideration would serve only to prolong the situation for the present, and no one knows for how long. That is why the Polish delegation regrets that it cannot accept the proposal of the United States representative." (p. 118; 2 May 1947)

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 33rd meeting, the General Committee, by show of hands, voted to adopt the US proposal as amended 11-0, with three abstentions. Although the vote was not recorded, the negative Communist attitude toward the US proposal would indicate that they did not support it.

d. The Outcome

Following the adoption of the US resolution as amended, the General Committee submitted a report to the General Assembly, (document A/299) containing the following resolution:

"The General Committee,

"Having considered the communications referred to it by the President of the General Assembly from the Jewish Agency and other organizations requesting that they be permitted to express their views on the Palestine problem,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that it refer these communications, as well as any communications of a similar character which may be submitted to this special session, to the First Committee for its decisions." (p. 126; 2 May 1947)

B. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS *

1. The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the Declaration of its Independence.

On Thursday, 1 May 1947, during the 71st Plenary meeting, the Arab States' item, "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence", which they had wanted included in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, was reintroduced by the President of the Assembly, Mr. Aranha (Brazil) for further discussion and final decision.

a. The Arab Position

The position of the Arab States' representatives on the inclusion of their proposed item was similar to that adopted by them in the General Committee.

b. The Communist Position

Throughout the deliberations, the Communist bloc did not show its hand, and not one of its representatives voiced an opinion on this item. The Communist bloc remained silent on this issue despite previous assertions by Messrs. Winiewicz and Gromyko in the General Committee meetings. The former had stated that his delegation could not vote for inclusion of this item in the agenda of this special session; the latter had warned that he reserved the right to define his position in regard "to the vote when this proposal is discussed again, if it is discussed again and in the place where it is discussed."

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Thursday, 1 May 1947, during the 71st meeting, the item sponsored by the Arab States was rejected 24--15 with 10 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia voted for the item, Czechoslovakia and Poland abstained.

* Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 28 April - 15 May 1947

d. The Outcome

As result of the negative vote, the Assembly adopted the following agenda and referred it to the First Committee for further deliberation:

"Item 1. Constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for consideration of the question of Palestine at the second regular session." (p. 60; 1 May 1947)

2. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly

On Saturday, 3 May 1947, during the 73rd Plenary meeting, Dr. Fiderkiewicz (Poland) delivered a lengthy statement in which he defended the Polish delegation's negative attitude on the report of the General Committee (document A/299). He also resubmitted the Polish resolution, as amended by Czechoslovakia, (document A/BUR/80) inviting representatives of the Jewish Agency to appear before the General Assembly after declaring:

"The Polish delegation regrets that it must oppose the report of the General Committee; it asks this Assembly to reverse the decision of the General Committee by voting in favor of the Polish resolution." (p. 71)

On Monday, 5 May 1947, during the 75th meeting, Mr. Gonzalez Fernandez (Colombia) presented the following joint resolution for adoption, (document A/305) submitted by Chile, Uruguay, Byelorussian SSR, Yugoslavia, and Argentina:

"The General Assembly resolves,

"1. That the First Committee grant a hearing to the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before the Committee;

"2. To send to that same Committee for its decision those other communications of a similar character from the Palestinian population which have been received by this special session of the General Assembly or may later be submitted to it." (p. 100)

a. The Arab Position

The Arab attitude toward this question remained unchanged.

The only Arab delegate who expressed his delegation's opinion on the

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issue was Mr. Zeineddine, (Syria) who reiterated the views expressed previously in the General Committee, to the effect that, according to the Charter, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, since it did not represent a State, was not entitled to testify before the General Assembly.

b. The Communist Position

Undismayed by defeat in the General Committee, the Communist delegates, Messrs. Fiderkiewicz (Poland), Gromyko (USSR) and Kosanovic (Yugoslavia) consumed much of the Assembly's time in arguing that the Jewish Agency for Palestine should be invited to testify before the General Assembly on the Palestine question. Highlights of their statements on this issue follow.

Dr. Fiderkiewicz:

"... the arguments in favor of barring the Jewish Agency from the plenary meeting which promise eventual support for its being heard by one of the committees, are not convincing to our delegation. I cannot understand what type of procedure can be adopted by the committee to which the Agency's request is referred. As I stated yesterday, we do not find anywhere in the rules of procedures, nor especially in the Charter, any rule to prohibit the hearing of the Jewish Agency or any other representatives before any organs of the General Assembly. The lack of such a prohibition would be quite sufficient to justify the adoption of the resolution proposed by the Polish delegation, as amended by the Czechoslovak delegation." (p. 70; 3 May 1947)

Mr. Gromyko:

"Concerning the resolution which is under discussion at the present meeting of the General Assembly, and which was adopted yesterday by the General Committee, I must state that in the view of the Soviet delegation this resolution is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory, in the first place, because it does not provide for an opportunity for representatives of Jewish organizations to express their views at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

"In the second place, it is entirely unsatisfactory for the further reason that, in speaking of the First Committee as a possible place where representatives of Jewish organizations can or might express their views on the Palestine problem, the resolution completely omits to say that the representatives of these organizations should be invited. The resolution merely says that communications and documents received from Jewish organizations should be referred to the First Committee, which would take the necessary decisions. In other words, the resolution contains the General Assembly's recommendation to refer documents from Jewish organizations to the First Committee." (p. 82; 3 May 1947)

And again,

"The Soviet delegation, as in the General Committee, will support the proposal, which we discussed yesterday at the meeting of the General Committee, to admit representatives of Jewish organizations to the General Assembly, to the Plenary meeting, in order that they may be given an opportunity to set forth their views on this question, which has become, and is continuing to become, more and more acute." (p. 82; 3 May 1947)

Mr. Kosanovic (Yugoslavia):

"The Yugoslav delegation believes that the General Committee missed an opportunity in dealing with a problem which was not necessarily complicated, and which had no political implication.

"That was the question of hearing before the General Assembly those who, in every sense of the word, are directly concerned with the solution of the Palestinian problem, and without whose participation the terms of reference for an investigating commission could not be made explicit.

"Listening very carefully to all the speeches in the General Committee, I was under the impression that there was no difference in the expression of understanding among us for those who were the first victims of nazi crime; but the rejection of the proposal of the Polish delegation, amended by the Czechoslovak delegation, to give an opportunity to the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to expose their views before the General Assembly, was a great disappointment. Not only was the proposal rejected, but we have before us a resolution proposed by the majority of the General Committee which tries to solve a problem of principle with meaningless technical expedience.

"The Yugoslav delegation feels that the safety of this world parliament would not be threatened if we decided to hear a representative of the Jewish organization in the General Assembly. Such a hearing would have a symbolic meaning in the sense that we, the free, peace-loving peoples of the world, after the victory over nazi ideologies, would be identifying ourselves in understanding, in support, and in appreciation, with those who were the first victims of the brutal nazi-fascist ideology of race supremacy and discrimination, with the first victims of gas chambers and concentration camps." (pp. 87-8; 5 May 1947)

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Monday, 5 May, during the 75th Plenary meeting, the Polish resolution, as amended by Czechoslovakia, (document A/BUR/80)

was rejected 39-8, with 7 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia voted for the resolution.

Following this rejection the Assembly voted on and adopted the Joint resolution (document A/305) 44-7, with 3 abstentions.

d. The Outcome

The adoption of the Joint resolution was an obvious victory for the Jewish organizations which had applied for permission to be heard by the Assembly. It was a victory also for the Communist delegates, who strove unremittingly to have the Assembly grant a hearing to these Jewish organizations.

SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Ad Hoc Committee report (document A/516) embodying a draft resolution [181 (II)] recommending partition of Palestine into two separate States - one Arab, one Jewish.

On 11 December 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Committee I draft resolution (document A/776 as amended). This resolution called for establishment of a Conciliation Commission, and resolved that (1) the Jerusalem area be placed under United Nations' control, (2) refugees wishing to return to their homes be permitted to do so, and (3) compensation for lost or damaged property be made by the authorities concerned.

A chronology of important events leading to the 11 December resolution follows, together with examples showing the part played by the Soviet Union and its satellites in the creation of the State of Israel.

I. THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 16 September - 29 November 1947

A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE*

1. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice

On Monday, 24 November 1947, the first draft resolution contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question" (document A/AC-14/32 and Add. 1) was voted on and rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee. This resolution recommended that the International Court of Justice be requested to give an advisory opinion on vital legal questions involving the rights and fate of the indigenous population of Palestine, and also on certain treaties and covenants affecting these people.

a. The Arab Position

Believing that the International Court of Justice is the only legal body qualified to give an opinion on vital legal questions involving the fate of the whole population of a country, the Arab States' delegates fought for adoption of the "First Draft Resolution". (pp. 173-175; 185-186; 194-195)

b. The Communist Position

The Soviet bloc delegates, knowing that adoption of the resolution would end their well-planned scheme for partitioning Palestine, insisted that the UN Assembly was qualified to render its opinion on the Palestine controversy, and opposed the Arab States' desire to have the legal aspects of the matter referred to world's highest tribunal - the International Court of Justice (p. 184). The Communists refused to support the resolution even after it had been stripped of its most pertinent part, as will be noted below.

* Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings, 25 September - 25 November 1947

c. The Communist Voting Record

(1) Paragraph 1 of this resolution's operative part, up to and inclusive of sub-paragraph (g) was rejected by a majority of eight votes, five of which were cast by Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR.

(2) Paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (h) of the resolution, which is the last section of the operative part, was rejected by only one vote, with Byelorussian SSR, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voting against it, and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia abstaining.

d. The Outcome

Rejection of the operative part of the resolution automatically killed the resolution and the hope of the Arabs for a favorable decision by the International Court of Justice and for avoidance of further unfavorable decisions in the future.

2. The Palestine Question, Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons

On Monday, 24 November 1947, the second draft resolution contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question" (document A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) received a tie vote and therefore was not adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee. This resolution contained important recommendations affecting Jewish refugees and displaced persons in Europe, and their rehabilitation, and also affecting the fate of Palestine and its people. It contained three paragraphs recommending that (1) countries of origin be requested to take back Jewish refugees and displaced persons belonging to them, (2) Jewish refugees and displaced persons who could not be repatriated should be absorbed into the territories of Members of the United Nations in proportion to their area, economic resources, per capita income and population, and (3) a special Committee of the General Assembly should be set up to recommend a plan for resettlement of Jewish refugees and displaced persons in their respective territories.

This second draft resolution was not adopted because the Soviet Union and its satellites voted against each recommendation and against the whole resolution, as modified by subsequent amendments.

a. The Arab Position

The Arab delegates fought desperately to have this resolution adopted, since by it resettlement of Jewish displaced persons and refugees in countries other than Palestine would be facilitated and the danger of their threatening influx on Palestine would thus be stemmed. (pp.75; 87-9; 92-4; 100-101; 195)

b. The Communist Position

The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, did not think that increased Jewish emigration to Palestine would be harmful and that Palestine could absorb large numbers of Jewish refugees and displaced persons. (pp. 42-3; 70)

c. The Communist Voting Record

(1) The first recommendation of this resolution was adopted by roll call vote of 17-14, with 23 abstentions. The Ukrainian SSR and the USSR voted against, and Byelorussian SSR; Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia abstained.

(2) The second recommendation was adopted by a roll call vote of 18-16, with 21 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against; Yugoslavia abstained.

(3) The third recommendation was not adopted, having been voted down 18-15, with 22 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia abstained.

(4) The first paragraph of the preamble to the second draft resolution was adopted by show-of-hands vote, 20-10. (No record on show-of-hands voting is available to ascertain how the Soviet bloc voted.)

(5) The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by show-of-hands vote of 17-15.

(6) The third paragraph of the preamble was rejected by show-of-hands vote, 18-15.

(7) The fourth paragraph was rejected by show-of-hands vote, 17-15.

(8) The fifth paragraph was adopted by show-of-hands vote, 18-15.

(9) The sixth paragraph was rejected by roll call vote, 26-11, with 18 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against, and Yugoslavia abstained.

c. The Outcome

The second draft resolution, as amended by rejections, received a tie vote, 16-16, with 23 abstentions, and was therefore not adopted. Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against, and Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia (having been assured of the rejection of the resolution) abstained.

3. Establishment of a Unitary State

On Monday, 24 November 1947, the third draft resolution, contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question" (document A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee. The chief recommendation of this resolution was formation of a provisional representative government in Palestine and establishment therein of a unitary, sovereign state which would have a democratic constitution, with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to it.

a. The Arab Position

The Arab States delegates pinned their hopes on this resolution. If adopted, it would fulfill their dreams and crown with success their efforts to save Palestine undivided. They gave it their whole support. (pp. 10-11; 25; 31; 48; 90; 95)

b. The Communist Position

From the outset, the Soviet bloc insisted on the Jews' right to Palestine. Delegates expressed the opinion that, under prevailing conditions, it would be impossible to get Arabs and Jews to live peaceably together in a single unitary state. (pp. 41; 69; 184)

c. The Communist Voting Record

The third draft resolution was voted down 29-12, with 14 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against, and Yugoslavia abstained.

d. The Outcome

With 12 votes for, and 29 against, and with the Communist bloc having voted against the first two draft resolutions, they clinched the matter by voting against the third draft resolution. It was on this resolution that the Arab States counted in order to stem the tide of Zionism already beating against the shores of Palestine. The rejection left the door wide open for voting on the only remaining alternative--the plan of partition.

4. The Partition Plan

On Tuesday, 25 November 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee climaxed and ended its deliberations on the Palestine question by adopting the draft resolution and partition plan contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question" (document A/AC 14/34 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1 as amended). This resolution recommended the adoption and implementation of the "Plan of Partition with Economic Union" as defined in the remainder of the report, and as amended.

a. The Arab Position

Throughout the deliberations the Arab States' delegates had fought desperately against adoption of this resolution. They warned that its adoption would create an endless problem in Palestine and the Arab World; and to all the world they declared that creation of a Jewish State would create a wave of anti-Semitism which would harm Jewish populations everywhere. (pp. 75; 81-2; 102; 104; 107; 18; 194-5)

b. The Communist Position

The Communists, on the other hand, argued that the Jews were entitled to part of Palestine, that Partition was the only possible solution to Arab-Jewish strife, and that Palestine was large enough to absorb large numbers of the Jewish refugees. Their stand on partition was a logical sequence of statements defending the right of Jews to Palestine and consistent with their voting record in favor of partition and against any other solution.

c. The Communist Voting Record

The partition resolution was adopted by roll call vote, 25-13, with 17 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted for, and Yugoslavia abstained.

d. The Outcome

Adoption by the Ad Hoc Committee of the partition resolution paved the way for its adoption at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 29 November 1947.

B. SOVIET RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS *

1. The Partition Plan

On Saturday, 29 November 1947, at the 128th Plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee (document A/516). In this report the Ad Hoc Committee recommended to the General Assembly adoption of its draft resolution [181(II)] on the future government of Palestine, which embodied a plan of partition with economic union.

a. The Arab Position

The Arabs stood pat on their previous assertions, emphasizing that they would not recognize the resolution if adopted, and would not be responsible for any consequent developments.

* Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 16 September - 29 November, Volume II, 110th - 128th Meetings, 13 November - 29 November 1947.

b. The Communist Position

Unchanged.

c. The Communist Voting Record

The partition resolution was adopted 33-13, with 10 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted for; Yugoslavia abstained.

d. The Outcome

Triumph for the Soviet bloc; shattered hopes for the Arabs; confusion rampant in Palestine. A second Special Session for further consideration of the future government of Palestine was therefore obligatory.

II. THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
16 April - 14 May 1948

BACKGROUND

As a result of the refusal of the Arab States to recognize the 29 November 1947 Partition Plan, and the subsequent deterioration of the situation in Palestine, the US Government representative on the Security Council, at the 275th meeting of the Council, on 30 March 1948, submitted a draft resolution (S/705) requesting the Secretary-General "to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine." This resolution was adopted by nine votes, Ukrainian SSR and the USSR abstaining. Although the Communist delegates on the Security Council abstained, the statement made by the Soviet representative, Mr. Gromyko, following the submission of the US draft resolution, showed that the Communists had opposed the resolution and reconsideration of the Partition Plan of 29 November 1947. Mr. Gromyko stated that the General Assembly's decision in favor of partition of Palestine was equitable, and that the USSR delegation saw no reason for convening a special session of the General Assembly.

Thus, in accordance with the Security Council decision of 30 March, the General Assembly opened its second special session, 16 April 1948.

A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE *

No votes were taken by roll call throughout the 117th-141st meetings; therefore no record is available to show how the Communist bloc representatives voted. However, in statements made by these representatives concerning the alternative plans of partition and trusteeship, their hostility toward the Arabs, their utter disregard for the rights and fate of the indigenous population, and their obvious pro-Jewish sympathies were all plainly indicated.

1. The Trusteeship Proposal

On Tuesday, 20 April 1948, during the 118th meeting of the First Committee, Mr. Warren Austin (US), reviewed the course of events since passage of the partition resolution in the General Assembly and stressed the necessity of a workable solution for the Palestine question. He then circulated, for consideration by the First Committee, a working paper (document A/C 1/277) embodying a draft trusteeship plan for Palestine. In presenting this working paper, Mr. Austin stated that the trusteeship proposed by the US delegation was "an emergency measure to ensure public order and the maintenance of public services," and that the "trusteeship would be entirely without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties or to the character of the eventual settlement." (p. 97)

The plan, as defined in the United States' working paper, (document A/C 1/277) proposed establishment of a trusteeship leading to self-government under UN administration, and guaranteed the territorial integrity of Palestine until such time as it would reach the self-governing stage.

* Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume II, Main Committees, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948

a. The Arab Position

The Arab representatives felt that the US working paper merited consideration, and that trusteeship was much better than partition. Their position was well defined by Syria's elder statesman, Faris El-Khouri, who on Wednesday, 21 April 1948, at the beginning of the 120th meeting, endorsed consideration of the trusteeship working paper by stating that "the new proposal put forward by the United States in the form of a working paper (document A/C 1/277) required study", and that "they (the UN delegates) should be grateful to the United States for preparing a working paper to facilitate this task." (pp. 25-6)

b. The Communist Position

On Tuesday, 20 April 1948, at the beginning of the 119th meeting, Mr. Gromyko (USSR), as senior Communist representative and spokesman for his group, launched a severe attack against the US working paper and any attempts to nullify the partition. He opened his attack by asserting that he (Gromyko) "shared the anxiety felt by some representatives by reason of the fact that the partition had not been carried out, that the Palestinian question was being brought before the General Assembly for the third time and that one Government (the US) was putting forth proposals which had the effect of nullifying the General Assembly's decision, and further, promoted neither the interests of the people of Palestine nor the maintenance of international peace." Mr. Gromyko ended his long-winded speech by stating:

"The USSR delegation would therefore vote against the new United States proposal for the establishment of trusteeship in Palestine."

"The USSR delegation considered that the decision on the partition of Palestine was a just decision and that the United Nations should take effective measures to ensure its implementation." (pp. 17 and 20)

c. The Outcome

On Wednesday, 21 April 1948, Mr. Jessup, (US) in stressing the urgency of the problem before the First Committee and the need for haste in finding a solution, stated that "the draft trusteeship agreement, (document A/C 1/277) submitted by his delegation, contained a number of technical questions which ought properly to be considered by the Fourth Committee." He added that "the United States delegation had circulated a draft resolution (document A/C 1/278) proposing that the draft trusteeship agreement be referred to the Fourth Committee for study and report to the General Assembly." (pp. 26-7)

Following Mr. Jessup's statement, Messrs. Katz-Suchy (Poland), Tarasenko (Ukrainian SSR), Gromyko (USSR), Kaminsky (Byelorussian SSR), Vilfan (Yugoslavia), Houdek (Czechoslovakia), and Panyushkin (USSR), respectively, assailed the trusteeship proposal and Mr. Jessup's suggestion that it be considered by the Fourth Committee. In their individual and repeated statements throughout the deliberations, they made it clear to all concerned that they (the Communist representatives) would not accept any proposal at any time which would modify the Partition Plan of 29 November 1947.

Thus, as result of the adamant position maintained by the Communist representatives concerning the US working paper (document A/C 1/277) the trusteeship question was killed without a vote, by the introduction of watered-down amendments and by passage on 4 May of the Cuban Amendment (document A/C 1/290) to the draft resolution of Guatemala as amended. This amended resolution called for the appointment of a sub-committee composed of the officers of Committee 1 together with representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Guatemala, France, India, the USSR, and the US to formulate and report to the Committee a proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine, taking into account: (a) whether it is likely that such proposal will commend itself to the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, (b) whether it is possible to implement this proposal and make it workable, and (c) the approximate cost of such proposal.

B. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS *

NOTE: The trusteeship plan was not deliberated in the plenary meetings, since the vote on it was blocked in the First Committee.

III. THE THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 21 September - 12 December 1948

RECAPITULATION

Three main proposals were deliberated during the third session of the General Assembly. These were: (1) the USSR draft resolution requesting that all troops of Arab States be withdrawn from Palestine, (2) the Syrian draft resolution recommending that a special committee be set up to prepare proposals for establishment of a unitary state in Palestine on a canton or federal basis, and (3) the new Syrian draft resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on certain legal points affecting the fate of Palestine and its people. None of these resolutions, however, were passed by the Committee. As a result of their rejection, the First Committee submitted its report (document A/776) on the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine. This report of the First Committee contained a resolution calling for establishment of a Conciliation Commission for Palestine with certain definite functions, and responsibility for specific decisions concerning the Holy Places and refugees. This report was debated in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and was adopted on 11 December 1948 by a majority of 35-15, with 8 abstentions.

Although representatives of both the Arab and Communist blocs voted against the draft resolution, as amended, (document A/776), UN records, shown below in chronological sequence, reveal that both sides held diametrically opposite views on this and other resolutions deliberated in the preceding First Committee and Plenary meetings.

* Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948

A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE *

1. Palestine and Removal of Arab Troops

On Thursday, 25 November 1948, during the 212th meeting, Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR) submitted a resolution (document A/C 1/401) recommending "the immediate removal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, the creation of which was provided for by General Assembly resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947, of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel."

a. The Communist Position

In support of his resolution Tsarapkin stated that in his opinion the presence of foreign troops in Palestine was "a hindrance to peaceful adjustment of the situation and that it was essential that they should be withdrawn." He also contended that "their pressure on the territories of the Arab and Jewish States created by the Assembly's resolution 181(II) of 29 November was illegal and unjustified and maintained a tense situation which might lead to further military action." (p. 755; 25 November 1948)

The Communist delegates, in turn, echoed Tsarapkin's claims and endorsed his resolution. Mr. Kiselev (Byelorussian SSR) ventured to clarify the "foreign troops" term by stating that they were the "regular troops of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere" (p. 795; 29 November 1948) But neither he, nor Tsarapkin, or any other member of his Communist group volunteered to state whether or not the Jewish troops, who were not natives of Palestine, were included in the term "foreign troops". Obviously, the actual aim of the resolution was to remove Arab troops from all Palestinian territory and leave what was left of Arab Palestine undefended - an easy prey for the army of Zion.

* Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, Summary Records of the Meetings, 21 September - 8 December 1948

b. The Arab Position

The Arab States' delegates claimed that Arab troops were in Palestine at the invitation of the Arabs living there, to defend the land and people from invasion. They further stated that the real foreign troops were those fighting on the side of the Jews, who were neither natives nor legal residents of Palestine. They opposed the Communist resolution, believing that the subject could best be resolved in the Security Council.

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Saturday, 4 December, after hearing the Communist charges and the Arab rebuttal, the Committee rejected the resolution by a vote of 33-7, with 8 abstentions. Seven of the eight votes for the resolution were cast respectively by Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Yugoslavia.

d. The Outcome

The rejection of the USSR resolution (document A/C 1/401) was followed by a vote on the Syrian resolution (document A/C 1/402) calling for the creation of a unitary State in Palestine.

2. Palestine and the Creation of a Modified Unitary State

On Friday, 26 November 1948, during the 214th meeting, Mr. Faris El-Khouri (Syria) submitted a draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) embodying the following:

"The General Assembly,

"Decides to constitute a Commission composed of five member states with functions:

"To study on the spot and to prepare proposals for the establishment of a single state of the whole of Palestine on a cantonization or federal basis in which all sections of population in Palestine will participate in rights and duties as loyal citizens of a democratic state with wide autonomous privileges in cantons or areas to be assigned to each of them."

a. The Arab Position

In submitting draft resolution A/C 1/402, Mr. El-Khoury

(Syria) expressed the Arab view:

" . . . the proposals under discussion were far from winning the support of the Arabs in Palestine as in the Middle East. Consequently, those proposals could not ensure peace and security in the Middle East. The partition policy of the Assembly had initiated the disasters there and there was no hope of changing the situation if the same policy were continued. In the present circumstances the Arabs could not accept the recommendations before the Assembly."

* * * * *

"Even if the Assembly were to adopt a resolution along the lines proposed, the question of its implementation arose. Such a decision would have to be forced upon the Arabs and the Assembly was not competent to make compulsory recommendations."

* * * * *

"This proposal would assure that all minority rights would be confirmed. The division into cantons enjoying a large measure of autonomy would provide for local administration by the people in accordance with their own interests."

* * * * *

"The Syrian proposal would ensure the security of the Holy Places by placing them under the administration of those who would respect them. Moslem, Christian and Jew could be sure of access to them under a cantonal or federal regime. Under this plan, too, the Arab refugees would have the necessary assurances if they were to return to their homes. Thus the Palestine problem could be solved without any difficulties or dangers, either in the present or in the future." (pp. 781-2; 26 November 1948)

b. The Communist Position

The Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) was a great concession by the Arabs in their attempt to solve the Palestine question. But the Communist delegates knew that its adoption would quash their plans, upsetting their calculated scheme to create an ever-smoldering inferno in Palestine which would render the whole Arab East a prey to Communism. The Communist delegates therefore opposed the

resolution, stating that its adoption would nullify the Partition Plan.

Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR) led the attack on the Syrian draft resolution, declaring:

"As to the Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/402) it would put the Assembly right back in the position in which it had been before the adoption of the November resolution. It was well known that the Assembly, during its first special session had considered at length the proposal for a unitary State and had rejected it as impracticable. There was no reason to re-examine the proposal, and the Committee could not possibly entertain such a suggestion in view of the fact that the Jewish State had come into being in conformity with the Partition Plan, and could not be liquidated." (p. 820; 30 November 1948)

The other Communist delegates to a man agreed with Tsarapkin's stated views and one by one asserted that the Syrian draft resolution was not acceptable.

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Saturday, 4 December 1948, the Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) was rejected by vote of 26-14, with 8 abstentions. The Communist bloc - Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia - voted solidly against the resolution, as was expected.

d. The Outcome

Rejection of the Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) by the First Committee led to a vote on the same resolution as amended by el Salvador, (document A/C 1/405) recommending that the International Court of Justice review and give an opinion on certain legal questions pertaining to the status quo in Palestine.

3. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice

On Wednesday, 1 December 1948, Mr. Faris El-Khoury (Syria) submitted a draft resolution (document A/C 1/405) requesting the International Court of Justice, under Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV of its Statute, to give legal opinion (1) on the power of the Assembly, under the Charter, to partition Palestine in order to create within its

borders a sovereign Jewish State against the wishes of the majority of the Palestine population, and (2) on the international status of Palestine upon the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948. The resolution further stipulated that the Secretary-General would supply the Court with documents pertinent to this matter, and that the parties concerned, Arabs and Jews, might submit to the Court, through the Secretary-General, the representations they deemed necessary in order to clarify the question.

a. The Arab Position

This resolution followed a lengthy statement by Mr. Eban (Provisional Government of Israel) to the effect that the State of Israel claimed full rights over the entire territory assigned to it under the resolution of 29 November, and that the territories seized by Israeli forces, in addition to those claimed by the Partition Plan, were "a fit matter for negotiations, in which the various claims of the State of Israel should receive due consideration." (p. 832; 1 December 1948)

In submitting this resolution, Mr. El-Khoury (Syria) declared:

"The Arabs would never yield to any proposal to lay down the boundaries of a separate Jewish State. The General Assembly had no power to delimit the frontiers of any country whatsoever without the consent of the inhabitants. Therefore, it could not do so without exceeding its powers.

"The Syrian delegation had submitted a proposal noting that the General Assembly was not 'competent under the Charter to divide States'. If any of the delegations had doubts on the question, the General Assembly should seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as suggested in the new Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/405)." (p. 833; 1 December 1948)

The Arab delegates had been hopeful that the First Committee would pass the Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) directing the preparation of proposals for establishment of a unitary State in Palestine. But that resolution met with solid opposition from the Communist bloc, causing the Arab delegates to submit draft resolution A/C 1/405, in case their first draft resolution was not adopted. They felt that this

resolution would very likely be adopted, inasmuch as during an earlier session of the General Assembly, twenty delegations had voted in favor of consulting the International Court of Justice, and six members of the Security Council had subsequently voted the same way.

b. The Communist Position

None of the Communist delegations, apparently, thought it necessary to repeat their already stated, negative views concerning the new Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/405). Instead, they concentrated on defending the USSR draft resolution (document A/C 1/401) calling for removal of all foreign (i. e. Arab) troops from Palestine.

c. The Communist Voting Record

Having disposed of all other outstanding resolutions, the First Committee, on Saturday, 4 December 1948, by tie vote of 21-21, with 4 abstentions, rejected the Syrian draft resolution as amended by El Salvador. The Communist bloc voted solidly against this resolution.

d. The Outcome

Following its rejection "Mr. El-Khoury (Syria) stated that he reserved the right to re-submit his resolution concerning consultation of the International Court to the General Assembly and have it voted upon again." (p. 933; 4 December 1948) With the rejection of the USSR draft resolution (document A/C 1/401), and the two Syrian draft resolutions (documents A/C 1/402 and A/C 1/405 as amended) the First Committee ended its deliberations on the Palestine question and forwarded its report to the General Assembly (document A/776) for consideration.

B. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS *

1. The Conciliation Commission

On Saturday, 11 December 1948, during the 184th meeting, Mr. Sarper (Turkey) Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Committee on the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,

* Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September - 12 December 1948

and the accompanying resolution.

The resolution included in this report (1) called for establishment of a Conciliation Commission having certain definite functions; (2) resolved that the Holy Places in the Jerusalem area and elsewhere in Palestine be accorded adequate protection; (3) resolved that the Jerusalem area "should be placed under effective United Nations' control"; (4) resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes be permitted to do so, and that compensation should be paid (a) for the property of those choosing not to return, and (b) for "the loss or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

a. The Arab Position

In the first Committee meetings, Arab delegates had repeatedly emphasized that they opposed any resolution or action which might support implementation of the Partition Plan, and since the operative part of this resolution is based on the findings expressed in its preamble, which refer to the partition resolution, the Arab States apparently saw no need further to elaborate on their position and felt that their negative vote would suffice.

b. The Communist Position

The Communist bloc representatives opposed the adoption of the resolution not because they shared the Arabs' views but because they believed that it modified the Partition Plan, and, presumably, because the Assembly rejected the Polish proposal (document A/804). Adoption of this proposal would have increased the membership of the Conciliation Commission from three to five, and would have enabled the Communists to plant two of their agent-representatives on the Commission.

Messrs. Zebrowski (Poland) Houdek, (Czechoslovakia), and Vyshinsky (USSR) consumed almost the entire time allotted for deliberation of this resolution in asserting their belief that only by adhering to the provisions of the Partition Plan of 29 November would an equitable solution for the Palestine question be possible. However, Mr. Vyshinsky, in

attacking the report of the First Committee revealed the true cause for his opposition when he stated:

"The resolution before the Assembly provided for a conciliation commission composed of three member states. In the First Committee the USSR delegation had stated that it was not opposed in principle to such a commission. But the commission should consist of more than three members; five might be a better number, because less pressure could be brought to bear on a commission composed of a larger number of members; a membership of five would be more likely to achieve greater objectivity. It would be an advantage if the principle of geographical distribution were applied in the selection of members. That was another argument in favor of a membership of five rather than three. The USSR delegation was not, therefore, in favor of such a small number. A larger membership would be more desirable in order that the commission might really be a conciliation commission and be enabled to extend its conciliatory efforts to all aspects of the matter, including the General Assembly's resolution (i. e. the partition resolution).

"The commission should consist of representatives of states which were not prejudiced against that resolution (i. e. the partition resolution). To appoint representatives of states which were hostile to it from the outset would complicate the situation and indefinitely postpone a final settlement from the point of view of everyone, and particularly that of the Arabs and Jews." (p. 987; 11 December 1948)

c. The Communist Voting Record

On Saturday, 11 December 1948, during the 186th Plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted Committee I draft resolution (A/776 as amended) by vote of 35--15, with 8 abstentions. Both Communist and Arab States' blocs voted against the resolution, but, as stated before, for different reasons, but not because of mutual support.

d. The Outcome

Adoption of this resolution, which the Communists thought compromised the partition resolution, gave the UN authority to establish the Conciliation Commission. It also gave to the Arab States and to the Arabs of Palestine a favorable decision on the basis of which they could demand (1) compensation for Arab property seized by the Jews, (2) that

refugees wishing to return to their homes in the new Jewish state be permitted to do so, and (3) that Holy places under Jewish control, such as those in Nazareth, be accorded adequate protection.

SECTION THREE: REVIEW AND CONCLUSION

I. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

This chapter is devoted to reviewing the most important actions taken in the United Nations General Assembly, and to analyzing the position adopted by the Communists on the Palestine question from 28 April 1947 to 11 December 1948.

A. SUMMARY REVIEW OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

From 28 April 1947 to 11 December 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations deliberated the Palestine question and the recommendations and proposals pertaining to it. Several far-reaching resolutions were passed, affecting Palestine, its people, and its future. Much the most important of these resolutions was the one passed on 29 November 1947, recommending that Palestine be partitioned into two sovereign states.

The following is a tabulation of the most important items and proposals concerning the Palestine question on which action has been taken by the General Assembly. The tabulation also shows the positions adopted by the Communist and Arab blocs:

1. Inclusion of the following additional item in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly: "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence."

- a. The Arab bloc favored the inclusion, and accordingly voted for it in both the General Committee and in the Plenary meetings of the First Special Session.

- b. The Communist bloc declared opposition to the inclusion in the General Committee, but abstained from voting. In the Plenary meetings of the First Special

Session the Communist bloc failed to voice its opinion, but, when voting, some of its members voted for the inclusion and some abstained.

2. Invitation to the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to testify before the Assembly on the question of Palestine.

- a. The Arab bloc was against this Communist-sponsored proposal. Accordingly, it opposed and voted against it in the General Committee and in the Plenary meeting of the First Special Session.
- b. The Communist bloc, supported the invitation in the General Committee and the Plenary meetings of the First Special Session, voting for it in both the General Committee and in the Plenary meetings.

3. Reference of the Palestine question to the International Court of Justice for an opinion on vital legal questions affecting Palestine and its people.

- a. The Arab bloc sponsored this proposal and voted for it in the Ad Hoc Committee in the Second Session; in the First Committee, ~~and~~ in the Third Session.
- b. The Communist bloc opposed the proposal, and accordingly voted against it in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second Session, and in the First Committee during the Third Session.

4. Restriction of immigration of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to Palestine and proportionate resettlement of the majority of these groups throughout the world.

- a. The Arab bloc approved the proposal, voting for it in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second Session.
- b. The Communist bloc was against the resolution as a whole, and, accordingly, withheld support when most of its members, principally the USSR, voted against it. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia abstained.

5. Establishment of a unitary or federated State in Palestine.
 - a. The Arab bloc favored this proposal, and voted for it in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second Session, and in the First Committee during the Third Session.
 - b. The Communist bloc opposed this proposal and accordingly voted against it in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second Session and in the First Committee during the Third Session.
6. Partitioning of Palestine
 - a. The Arab bloc opposed this resolution, voting against it in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the Plenary meeting, during the Second Session.
 - b. The Communist bloc favored partition and, with the exception of Yugoslavia which abstained, voted for it in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the Plenary meeting during the Second Session.
7. Establishment of a temporary trusteeship over Palestine.
 - a. The Arab bloc was not opposed to studying the proposal. No vote was taken on the subject, however.
 - b. The Communist bloc was opposed to the proposal even to studying it. However, no vote was taken.
8. Removal of Arab troops from Palestine.
 - a. The Arab bloc was opposed to this Communist-sponsored proposal, and, accordingly, voted against it in the First Committee during the Third Session.
 - b. The Communist bloc, sponsor of and driving force behind the proposal, voted for it in the First Committee, during the Third Session.
9. Establishment of a Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
 - a. The Arab bloc opposed creation of a Conciliation Commission, on the ground that it partly facilitated implementation of the Partition Plan. Accordingly, they voted against the proposal in the Plenary meeting during the Third Session.

- b. The Communist bloc also opposed creation of a Conciliation Commission. Its opposition was based on the belief that a commission would modify the Partition Plan, and, apparently, because membership on the commission was not increased to the number desired by the Communist bloc. Accordingly the Communist bloc voted against creation of the Conciliation Commission.

B. ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC ON PALESTINE

Communist representatives in the General Assembly plainly manifested their adherence to their adopted principle that the end justifies the means. Throughout the most important part of the deliberations on Palestine, Communist representatives maintained a consistent, well-contrived policy aimed at certain definite objectives, and took deliberate steps, ingeniously and carefully calculated, toward achieving these objectives.

1. Declared Communist Objectives Before and During the Deliberations

The declared objectives of the Communists on Palestine, before and after the question was brought before the United Nations, varied scarcely at all. Before the question was considered by the United Nations, Communist mouthpieces in Moscow and throughout the Arab World loudly proclaimed that they had no personal ambitions in Palestine whatsoever, that their sole objective in that area was to bring about the realization of the national aspirations of the people of Palestine through termination of the Mandate over Palestine and declaration of its independence. During the deliberations, Communist representatives in the General Assembly reiterated their comrades' past views on Palestine with scarcely perceptible modification. Instead of using the words "people", and "population" they used "peoples" and "populations". This seemingly slight modification, apparently harmless on the surface, was in itself a very significant one, since it signaled a departure from the often declared Communist ~~objective~~ objective to a new and radical one. The change from the singular to the

plural revealed that the Communists no longer maintained their stated objective, and that their newly adopted twin objectives (the creation of two independent States in Palestine) allegedly stemmed from their recent discovery that two separate peoples inhabit Palestine, and that consequently these two peoples form two separate nations, each of which is entitled to separate independence.

2. Major Steps by the Communists to Achieve their Objectives

The first step by the Communists toward achieving their objectives in Palestine was to install themselves as arbiters of the Palestine question. This they achieved by placing on the record statements to the effect that the Communists had always stood for the fulfillment of national aspirations of all peoples, and that only in this light would they discuss the Palestine question.

The second step was to prevent inclusion of the Arab-sponsored item ("the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence") in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, without giving the impression that the Communists were opposed to the substance of the item, since such an impression would harm reputation, arrogated to themselves, as champions of independence for all nations and peoples. In this they succeeded magnificently. In their arguments before the General Committee, they made it clear to all concerned that they were opposed only to the inclusion of the Arab proposed item in the agenda of the First Special Session, and that exception had not been taken to substance of the item. In the Plenary meetings when the substance of the item was under discussion, they refrained from expressing their opinion on the issue, choosing to split their vote by having some support the already doomed item, and some abstain. This they did after having declared a few days earlier in the General Committee that they were experiencing great difficulty in reaching a decision, and that, therefore, they could not vote for inclusion of this additional item at that special session of the General Assembly.

The third step was to create confusion in the General Assembly and thus prevent it from taking decisions which might obstruct or hinder the achievement of Communist objectives. This day did vehemently opposing adoption of any solution concerning Palestine prior to hearing the views of the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the Palestinian question. From the start they kept on hammering out their point until a favorable decision was given them.

The fourth step was (1) to define for Assembly members the national aspirations of the people of Palestine and how such aspirations might be fulfilled, and (2) to convince the majority of the members that the Communist point of view on Palestine was unchallengeable. This they achieved by haranguing the Assembly members with trick arguments, such as freedom from British imperialism was the main aspiration of the peoples of Palestine, that such an aspiration might be fulfilled by abolishing the Mandate and granting national independence to the Arab and Jewish peoples, that these peoples constitute two separate nationalities each of which was entitled to its own state.

The fifth step was to beat down and suppress, by slander or intimidation, any opposition to the Communist plans and point of view. This they achieved by continuously reminding the Assembly of the persecution the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis, of the present plight of Jewish refugees and displaced persons in Europe, and by stamping the Western powers, as imperialists, with selfish, even fiendish ambitions for Palestine and the Middle East.

The sixth step was so to contrive that the General Assembly would adopt the Communist plan for Palestine or a solution similar to it. This they achieved almost automatically, since after the successful execution of the first five steps, all opposition to the Communist plan became weak and non-effective.

3. Survey of Communist Behavior in the General Assembly

An exhaustive examination of the official records of the United Nations General Assembly, covering the period 28 April 1947 to 11 December 1948 - the period during which the most important decisions on Palestine were taken - revealed that representatives of the Communist bloc:

- a. displayed unified total prejudice in favor of the Jewish minority in Palestine, and of the Jewish position on the Palestine question,
- b. paid only lip service in support of the aspirations of the Arab majority, as defined by the legal representatives of this majority;
- c. sponsored, and/or supported by votes every measure favored by the Jews and their representatives;
- d. opposed, and/or sabotaged every measure sponsored and/or favored by the Arab majority or Arab representatives in the United Nations;
- e. opposed and sabotaged every compromise solution proposed for the Palestine question, after the Partition Plan had been hastily adopted on 29 November 1947.

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

The findings and conclusion reached as result of the study of the Palestine question are based on the records of the General Assembly, on the Palestine question and other supporting evidence. They were arrived at only after thorough examination of the United Nations records on Palestine, of every recorded statement made by Communist representatives in the General Assembly, and of all the votes cast by these representatives on major proposals and draft resolutions.

A. FINDINGS

The Communist representatives in the General Assembly, beyond any doubt or question, exercised great influence in shaping the United Nations decisions on Palestine during the deliberation of the Palestine question.

The magnitude of the role played by Communist representatives in the United Nations, and the effect of this role on the deliberations and their outcome, can best be outlined by the question and answer method as given below:

(1) Were the Communist representatives in the General Assembly instrumental in shaping the United Nations policy on Palestine, and in passage of the resolutions on Palestine?

The answer is Yes! Communist representatives in the General Assembly were instrumental in shaping the United Nations policy on Palestine, and in passage of the most important resolutions on Palestine. The United Nations records of the historic deliberations substantiate this answer.

(2) Would it have been possible to adopt the Partition Plan without Communist initiative, support, and agitation?

The answer is No! Had the Communists only refrained from taking the initiative in proposing the partitioning of Palestine, or had they refrained from giving it their all-out support, and agitating for its adoption, the Partition Plan would most likely never have been debated at length and, in any case, would not have been adopted. The Communists were the first to introduce discussion on the possibility of partitioning Palestine in the Assembly, and were the first to declare that no solution other than partition should be worked out for Palestine. Moreover, among the major and most interested Powers, they were the only ones who (1) insisted that no decision on the Palestine question should be taken prior to hearing the views of the Jews, who, according to the Communists, were the most interested party, and (2) who fought

relentlessly, throughout the deliberations, for partition of Palestine. Furthermore, the Partition Plan would not have reached the Plenary meetings of the General Assembly had the Communist bloc voted in the Ad Hoc Committee on 24 November 1947 either in favor of the report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question, (which recommended that certain legal questions pertaining to Palestine be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion) or against the draft resolution and partition plan contained in the report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question.

(3) Would it have been possible to grant Palestine independence as a unitary State, had the Communists favored such a course of action by the United Nations?

The answer is Yes! It would have been possible to grant Palestine its independence as a unitary State, had the Communists favored such a course of action. Moreover, such a course of action would have been the natural outcome of the deliberations, had the Communists but refrained from attacking such a course, from championing partition, and from insisting that the United Nations, in subsequent decisions, adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of the 29 November 1947 partition plan. The record shows that the Arabs, who constituted the major portion of the population in Palestine, wanted an independent unitary State, and were willing to grant the Jewish minority its original demand for an autonomous status. Moreover, the record indicates clearly that, during the initial stage of the deliberations, the majority of the UN representatives in the General Assembly were inclined to hear the Arab view on the subject, but were not prone to hear the Jewish argument. This was manifested in the General Committee on 2 May 1947 when by vote of 8-3, with three abstentions, it rejected the Polish-Czechoslovakian draft resolution inviting the representative of the

Jewish Agency for Palestine to testify on the Palestine question, and in the Plenary meeting of 5 May 1947, when the General Assembly rejected the reintroduced Polish-Czechoslovakian draft resolution by vote of 39-8, with seven abstentions.

(4) Would it have been possible to place Palestine under a temporary United Nations trusteeship, pending a final settlement to be arrived at amicably between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, had the Communists not vehemently opposed such an action, and any other action that might alter or modify the 29 November 1947 resolution recommending the partitioning of Palestine?

The answer again, is Yes! It would have been very possible to place Palestine under a temporary United Nations trusteeship, and thus avoid the partitioning, had the Communists in the General Assembly been willing to compromise and to give this proposal a chance during the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, which was convened in order to reexamine United Nations decisions in the light of subsequent developments in Palestine, and to recommend new measures aimed at restoring order in that war-torn country. The records show that during this special session, sentiment toward the trusteeship proposal was favorable, even though no direct action on it was taken. The records also show that Communist bloc representatives, during the same session, by long-winded speeches and repeated savage attacks on the trusteeship proposal, managed to kill the proposal by blocking a vote.

(5) Did the Communist representatives in the General Assembly consider the will of the majority in Palestine and the feelings of their Arab and Moslem brethren throughout the world?

The answer is Yes! The Communists did consider the feelings of those hundreds of millions of people, and reacted as only Communists

can. With one exception, (Yugoslavia) they voted for a partition plan to be carried out against the will of the majority in Palestine, and saw to it that the United Nations did nothing to rectify the harm it had done, by sabotaging the trusteeship proposal. As further proof of the Communist attitude toward the will and aspirations of the people, excerpts from a 21 February 1953 Reuters despatch from Belgrade are given below:

"Disclosure that there were strong differences between Yugoslavia and Russia even before the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 has been made by Dr. Ales Bebler, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister and former permanent delegate to the United Nations.

"According to Dr. Bebler's disclosures published here, the first diplomatic differences arose over Trieste in 1946, then over Palestine in 1947, and finally over the Danube Conference in 1948."

Also,

"The following year 1947 came the trouble over Palestine in which Yugoslavia, before the UN General Assembly, advocated a Jewish Arab federation while the Russians favored a purely Jewish state.

"Describing a conference of Iron Curtain delegates at this time, Dr. Bebler recalls: 'When I disagreed . . . with something proposed by the Soviet delegate (Andrei Y. Vishinsky), one of his secretaries . . . began to make signs to me with his hands, tried to convey to me in every possible way that he was trying to remind me of something I was forgetting.'

"Later the secretary told Dr. Bebler he only wanted to warn him not to oppose Mr. Vishinsky. 'He could not even imagine that anyone could disagree with the chief,' Dr. Bebler adds.

"When Dr. Bebler later criticized the Soviet Proposal on Palestine on the ground that it would alienate the Arab-Moslem bloc he was told by Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, Chief of the Ukrainian delegation, that 'two Soviet divisions are a greater revolutionary force than the whole of the Moslem world,' Dr. Bebler recalls. Mr. Manuilsky added: 'The present is a time when only force can decide'."

B. CONCLUSION

Analysis of the position taken by representatives of the Communist bloc in the United Nations, and of the circumstances under which the General Assembly adopted its decisions on Palestine, reveals unquestionably, that

the Communist bloc in the United Nations, led by the USSR, was responsible for (1) passage of the Partition Plan, (2) defeat of the various proposals by the Arab States and other proposed resolutions for Palestine, (3) defeat of the US proposal to create a temporary trusteeship in Palestine, (4) the consequent survival of the Partition Plan, and (5) the present situation in Palestine, and the state of insecurity now prevailing throughout the Arab East.

COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE

PART TWO: EXAMPLES OF COMMUNIST BLOC STATEMENTS

SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT

SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION

SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT

I. THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
28 April - 15 May 1947

A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
GENERAL COMMITTEE *

1. The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the

Declaration of its Independence

Mr. Jozef Winiewicz (Poland):

"The Polish delegation experiences great difficulty in reaching a decision on the inclusion of the suggested item, as formulated, in our agenda, at the present stage of this Assembly's deliberation. The difficulty arises out of the fact that the Egyptian proposal, and others, suggest in a most decisive form the termination of the Palestine mandate, even before we have heard the opinion of the most interested party, the Jewish people, for which the mandate in Palestine provided special rights.

"We cannot, therefore, vote for the inclusion of this additional item at this special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. We shall abstain from voting, urging at the same time that this Committee should take up as soon as possible the admission of a Jewish representative body for consultation with this Assembly." (pp. 16-17; 29 April 1947)

2. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for

Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly

Mr. Winiewicz (Poland):

"We have heard here in this General Committee, and before the plenary session, speeches by the representatives of countries, which are interested in this problem, the Arab States. However, in our opinion, at the present stage of international discussion you cannot divide the problem of Palestine from the problem of the Jewish population. The issue brought before this Assembly is the right of the Arab countries to establish an independent Arab State. It has been brought before us because of the many difficulties that have arisen in settling the problem of the Jewish population of that country.

"May I here mention that the Jewish population of Palestine has been connected with the Palestine problem since the mandate was established. As early as 1908 the Zionist Organization in Palestine embarked upon the work of practical colonization of that country and of its development. The Palestine Office was founded in Jaffa at that time and was the forerunner of the present Jewish Agency in Palestine. For this reason we think the Jewish population of Palestine also should be heard here.

* Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume II, General Committee, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 29 April -
7 May 1947

"I owe you one explanation as to why this problem is a major concern of the Polish delegation. That can easily be explained by the fact that nearly fifty per cent of the Jewish population of Palestine speaks the Polish language and has always shown keen interest in the fate of the Polish people. We cannot forget them in their distress." (p. 89; 2 May 1947)

Also:

"May I repeat, we of the Polish delegation cannot imagine how this General Assembly could pass sound judgement on this problem without hearing the views of the representative Jewish body when preparing the terms of reference for the committee proposed by the United Kingdom and now being discussed by the General Assembly." (p. 90; 2 May 1947)

Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko (USSR):

"The Soviet delegation considers that the question of inviting representatives of one or more Jewish organizations deserves to be considered by the General Committee and the General Assembly. Up to the present, many representatives, in discussing procedural questions, have touched upon questions of substance concerning the Palestine question and, to a certain extent, the question of Palestine's future. We have also heard statements by representatives of the Arab States, who, even in this initial stage of consideration of the Palestine question, submitted their views more or less fully. But neither in the General Committee nor in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly have we yet heard the voice of the representatives of one or more of the Jewish organizations. It well is known, however, that the question of Palestine is largely a question of arrangements which are to be made for the Jews, and that the Palestine question cannot fail to be of interest and even of concern to the Jewish population of Palestine.

"The Soviet delegation, therefore, is of the opinion that it would be unjust to deprive the appropriate Jewish organizations of the right to express through their representatives, their views and their attitude to the Palestine question. This would be equally incomprehensible both to the Jews, including the Jews of Palestine, and to many others, non-Jews." (p. 109; 2 May 1947)

Also:

"When I speak of inviting the representatives of the Jewish organizations, I have in mind primarily an invitation to these representatives to attend the General Assembly, that is, the plenary meetings. The Soviet delegation does not accept the point of view that the representative of the Jewish Agency can be permitted to be present, let us say, at the First Committee but at the same time cannot be permitted to attend the General Assembly's plenary meetings where they would be given an opportunity of expressing their views on this question. Such a half-hearted decision would be especially unjust from the point of view of the Jewish population in Palestine, which is vitally concerned in this matter.

"We heard the statements of the representative of the United States of America, Senator Austin. He submitted a resolution to us which not only makes no provision for inviting the Jewish organizations to the General Assembly's plenary meetings but does not provide for inviting representatives of the Jewish organizations at all. The resolution merely states that statements and documents received from Jewish and other organizations should be transmitted to the appropriate Committee of the General Assembly. The transmission of documents to the appropriate Committee is practically a technical operation. Apart from this, delegations have received at least the main statements of organizations which have made requests. Therefore, the solution offered by the resolution does not get us much further; it does not constitute the slightest progress in any way.

"So far as the particular organizations which have applied to the General Assembly are concerned, the course of the discussion on this question has shown that the Jewish Agency would seem to be a representative organization which can speak in the name of the Jewish population of Palestine.

"If this is so, of course a positive decision can and should be made on the statement of this Agency. If there are any other Jewish organizations whose communications merit attention, the Soviet delegation is ready to take part in the consideration of communications from such other organizations." (pp. 110-111; 2 May 1947)

Dr. Alfred Fiderkiewicz (Poland):

"I understand the difficulties which the representative of the United States is experiencing with regard to our resolution. Nevertheless, the Polish delegation does not see much possibility of solving the problem before us and arriving at a decision on the resolution, after due consideration by the Committee, without a Jewish voice being heard before the Assembly.

"Sending the matter to the First Committee for consideration would serve only to prolong the situation for the present, and no one knows for how long. That is why the Polish delegation regrets that it cannot accept the proposal of the United States representative. It will ask for a vote on the resolution previously submitted." (p. 118; 2 May 1947)

B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS *

1. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly

Dr. Alfred Fiderkiewicz (Poland):

"The Jews deserve the highest consideration. Let us remember that there is no dispute between the Jews and the Arabs. The problem is to solve the Palestine issues for the Arabs and the Jews. We want to make peace in that country. We want to have freedom. The mandate should end.

"These are our reasons for desiring a full and speedy discussion and an approach to the problem from all angles in order to enable us to arrive at a just solution. The Polish delegation regrets that it must oppose the report of the General Committee; it asks this Assembly to reverse the decision of the General Committee /to refer to the First Committee for decision, all communications received from the Jewish Agency and other organizations requesting that they be permitted to express their views on the Palestine question/ by voting in favor of the Polish resolution" /which embodied a decision to invite representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly to express their views on the Palestine question./

"I do not think there is any need for further argument. On behalf of the welfare of Palestine and its people, the Polish delegation asks the General Assembly to vote in favor of its resolution as amended by the Czechoslovak delegation." (p. 71; 3 May 1947)

Mr. Andrei Gromyko (USSR):

"At yesterday's meeting of the General Committee, I had an opportunity of expressing the Soviet delegation's point of view on this matter. I also pointed out that the proposal to invite the representatives of the Jewish organizations to attend the General Assembly deserved attention. What, in fact, is the present position?

"The General Committee considered the agenda for the General Assembly's present session, it considered the question of inviting the Jewish organizations to the General Assembly. During the discussion of these two questions, a number of delegations touched upon the general problems of Palestine from various important angles. This was especially so in the case of the delegations of the Arab States. I am not

* Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record,
28 April - 15 May 1947-

reproaching any delegation at all, and least of all those of the Arab States.

"The Palestine problem has become acute. It concerns the Arab States, and has become the concern not only of the Arab States; as you are aware, it has become the concern of the United Nations as a whole. It is not surprising, therefore, that, even during the consideration of the agenda, certain delegations touched upon some important aspects of the Palestine problem.

"I repeat, I am not about to reproach any delegation; I merely state a fact. Up to the present, however, we have not heard the voice of those organizations which speak for a considerable part of the Jewish population of Palestine. Not a single representative of any Jewish organization speaking on behalf of the Jewish population of Palestine has yet spoken before the General Committee or the General Assembly. Can such a situation, even in the present initial stage, be considered normal in the discussion of the Palestine problem?

"The Soviet delegation maintains that such a situation cannot be considered normal. We cannot overlook -- still less can we ignore -- the fact that if the Palestine problem has arrested the attention of the United Nations, it primarily concerns and, furthermore, alarms the Jewish population of Palestine.

"For this reason, in the interests of an objective and thorough consideration of the Palestine problem, even in this first stage, it would be perfectly just to invite representatives of the Jewish organization to give expression to the point of view of the Jewish population of Palestine. It would be unjust to deprive the Jewish organizations, or organization, of the rights to express their views on this matter." (p. 78; 3 May 1947)

Also:

"Consequently, it is not a question of the United Nations Charter or of its infringement. In the demand to give the Jewish organizations an opportunity to speak at the General Assembly, there is no infringement. As I see it, the talk about infringement of the Charter is out of place. It is not a question of prestige which may be influenced by statements of the representatives of Jewish organizations at the General Assembly; it is not a matter of past practice. But the fact is that, if this question is to be approached justly and objectively, the representatives of the Jewish organizations to the General Assembly should be admitted and given an opportunity of setting forth their views at the plenary session. (p. 80; 3 May 1947)

Also:

"If the General Assembly does not agree to give the Jewish organizations an opportunity to speak at the Assembly -- I mean the plenary meetings of the Assembly -- in order to set forth the views of the Jewish organizations, the latter, and naturally, in particular, the whole Jewish population, and many others, may interpret and understand

this to mean that the United Nations does not wish to give due consideration to a considerable part of the Palestine population. It would not be in the interests of the General Assembly of the United Nations as a whole if such an impression, or even such a conviction, were to be created among the Jewish population, and among others besides the Jewish population. (p. 81; 3 May 1947)

Also:

"Concerning the resolution which is under discussion at the present meeting of the General Assembly, and which was adopted yesterday by the General Committee, I must state that in the view of the Soviet delegation this resolution is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory, in the first place, because it does not provide for an opportunity for representatives of Jewish organizations to express their views at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

"In the second place, it is entirely unsatisfactory for the further reason that, in speaking of the First Committee as a possible place where representatives of Jewish organizations can or might express their views on the Palestine problem, the resolution completely omits to say that the representatives of these organizations should be invited. The resolution merely says that communications and documents received from Jewish organizations should be referred to the First Committee, which would take the necessary decisions. In other words, the resolution contains the General Assembly's recommendation to refer documents from Jewish organizations to the First Committee. I do not think I am mistaken if I say that such an operation as the reference of documents received from the Jewish organizations, or organization, to the First Committee is almost a technical operation and does not advance us a single step towards a definite decision regarding an invitation to representatives of these organizations, with a view to giving them an opportunity to express their opinion on the matter under discussion.

"In the event of the adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly, the First Committee is not even obliged to invite representatives of Jewish organization. On the basis of this decision, the First Committee will be obliged to do no more than receive communications from Jewish organizations. It is clear that the Soviet delegation, being concerned with a just solution of the Palestine problem, could not support such a very general, indefinite and entirely unsatisfactory resolution as that adopted by the First Committee.

"The Soviet delegation, as in the General Committee, will support the proposal, which we discussed yesterday at the meeting of the General Committee, to admit representatives of Jewish organizations to the General Assembly, to the plenary meeting, in order that they may be given an opportunity to set forth their views on this question, which has become, and is continuing to become, more and more acute. (p. 82; 3 May 1947)

Mr. Sava Kosanovic (Yugoslavia):

"The Yugoslav delegation believes that the General Committee missed an opportunity in dealing with a problem which was not necessarily complicated, and which had no political implications.

"That was the question of hearing before the General Assembly those who, in every sense of the word, are directly concerned with the solution of the Palestinian problem, and without whose participation the terms of reference for an investigating commission could not be made explicit.

"Listening very carefully to all the speeches in the General Committee, I was under the impression that there was no difference in the expression of understanding among us for those who were the first victims of nazi crime; but the rejection of the proposal of the Polish delegation, amended by the Czechoslovak delegation, to give an opportunity to the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to expose their views before the General Assembly, was a great disappointment. Not only was that proposal rejected, but we have before us a resolution proposed by the majority of the General Committee which tries to solve a problem of principle with meaningless technical expedience.

"The Yugoslav delegation feels that the safety of this world parliament would not be threatened if we decided to hear a representative of the Jewish organization in the General Assembly. Such a hearing would have a symbolic meaning. It would be symbolic in the sense that we, the free, peace-loving peoples of the world, after the victory over nazi ideologies, would be identifying ourselves in understanding, in support, and in appreciation, with those who were the first victims of the brutal nazi-fascist ideology of race supremacy and discrimination, with the first victims of gas chambers and concentration camps.

"We have before us a principle much more important than the problem of procedure. That is why the Yugoslav delegation is whole-heartedly in accord with the Polish resolution, as amended by the Czechoslovak representative." (p. 87-88; 5 May 1947)

2. Future Government of Palestine

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem.

Such a solution of the problem of Palestine's future might be a sound foundation for the peaceful co-existence and co-operation of the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine, in the interests of both of these peoples and to the advantage of the entire Palestine population and of the peace and security of the Near East.

"If this plan proved impossible to implement in view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs -- and it will be very important to know the special committee's opinion on this question -- then it would be necessary to consider the second plan which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine, and which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous states, one Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine problem would be justifiable only if relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the Arabs and the Jews." (p. 134; 14 May 1947)

SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION

I. THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 16 September - 29 November 1947

A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE *

1. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice

(Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question)

Mr. Semen K. Tsarapkin (USSR):

"It was surprising and deplorable that those powers i. e. the Assembly's powers in regard to the solution of the Palestine problem⁷ should have been called in question. Neither the United Kingdom when it had made its request to the United Nations, nor the representatives who had attended the special session of the Assembly, nor the members of the Special Committee had had any doubts on that score. Such doubts as were being expressed in the Ad Hoc Committee were completely unjustified, because Article 10 of the Charter gave the General Assembly the right and the duty to discuss the Palestinian question. It was in complete accordance with the provisions of Article 10 that the special session had been called, the Special Committee established and the Palestinian question considered by the General Assembly. Any recommendations which the Assembly made would have sound juridicial foundations.

"The doubts expressed by certain States namely, the Arab States and the UK⁷ were based not on legal but on political grounds. In particular, the Mandatory Power was attempting to avoid its responsibilities in the matter

* Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings, 25 September - 25 November 1947

of Palestine and any co-operation in solving the problem, despite the moral and political obligations of a Mandatory Power conscious of its responsibilities.
(p. 184; 24 November 1947)

2. Palestine, Jewish Refugees, and Displaced Persons

Mr. Jozef Winiewicz (Poland):

"The successive commissions of investigation had felt that there were not only Jewish interests but also Jewish rights. Anti-Semitism and the immigration restrictions imposed by certain States which could have accepted Jewish refugees had led the Jews to look towards Palestine, which the Mandate had promised them as an immigration area, but the most rigorous restrictions had been imposed at the very time when the pressure of the refugees was greatest. The case of the Exodus 1947 was both touching and shocking; those who had placed their trust in the international documents concerning the Jewish National Home were now in camps guarded by Germans, many of whom had doubtless taken part in the massacre of Jews.

"The Polish delegation therefore unanimously supported recommendation VI made in Chapter V of the report of the Special Committee, namely, that the General Assembly should undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews would be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency. The Polish delegation considered, however, that the problem could and ought to be solved primarily by Jewish immigration into Palestine. The immediate admission of 250,000 refugees who were awaiting their turn would not have any decisive effect upon the numerical relationship between Jews and Arabs. The United Nations should solemnly repeat the promise made in the Covenant of the League and open the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigrants immediately, while at the same time giving favorable consideration to the suggestion for opening up greater possibilities of immigration for Jewish refugees into other countries."
(p. 42; 8 October 1947)

3. The Palestine Question and the Establishment of a

Unitary State

Mr. Semen Tsarapkin (USSR):

"With regard to the two plans, the delegation of the USSR was in favor of the plan /of partition/ drawn up by Sub-Committee 1 on the basis of the majority plan contained in Chapter VI of the report of the Special Committee, for that plan gave both the Arab and the Jewish people an opportunity to organize their national life as they desired. It was based on the principles of the equality of peoples and the right of self-determination, principles on which the USSR had based its domestic policy and on which it was in duty bound to base its international policy.

"It was in the light of those principles that the USSR delegation found the plan of Sub-Committee 2 /to establish a unitary state in Palestine/ unacceptable, for that plan paid no regard to democratic principles and did not afford the two peoples the opportunity to develop and collaborate in harmony."
(p. 184; 24 November 1947)

4. The Partition Plan

Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR):

"The Jewish people were therefore striving to create a State of their own and it would be unjust to deny them that right. The problem was urgent and could not be avoided by plunging back into the darkness of the ages.

"Every people -- and that included the Jewish people -- had full right to demand that their fate should not depend on the mercy or the good will of a particular State. The members of the United Nations could help the Jewish people by acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter, which called for guaranteeing to every people of their right to independence and self-determination.

"The problem could be solved by clearing away the historical and juridical superstructure and adopting a broad political outlook."
(pp. 69-70; 13 October 1947)

Also:

"The USSR delegation accepted the unanimous recommendations in Chapter V of the report, the most important of which were recommendations I and II. The minority plan had its merits and advantages, since it was based on the idea of creating a single Arab-Jewish State in Palestine. However, relations between Arabs and Jews had reached such a state of tension that it had become impossible to reconcile their points of view on the solution of the problem; the minority plan therefore appeared impractical. In the circumstances, therefore, the Partition Plan proposed by the majority offered more hope of realization."
(p. 70; 13 October 1947)

B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS *

1. Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the

Declaration of Palestine Independence

Dr. Oscar Lange (Poland):

"The Arab people of Palestine, as well as the Jewish people of Palestine, want national independence. They

* Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 16 September - 27 November 1947

want a discontinuation of the Mandate and of the present situation, and the establishment of their national State.

"My delegation and my Government believed for a time, and hoped, that those national aspirations might find their expression in one Palestinian State in which both Arabs and Jews would be equal partners, free to develop their national life. The situation, however, is such that this aim cannot be achieved, at least not at the present stage. We therefore have to establish two States, an Arab State and a Jewish State, to provide for the national aspirations of the two communities which live in Palestine. There is no other way out, and anyone anxious to do justice to the national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs must support this proposal."
(p. 1334; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"I should therefore like to direct to my Arab colleagues the request that, in the very interest of their own Arab brethren in Palestine, they should not block a solution -- the only solution that will give political independence to the Arab people of Palestine within the next year."
(p. 1335; 26 November 1947)

2. The Palestine Question and the Establishment of a Unitary

State

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"The delegation of the USSR thought it would have been advisable to take a decision on the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation [for partition] yesterday. Unfortunately at yesterday's meeting it was decided on the proposal of the French delegation, to postpone the vote for twenty-four hours. The delegation of the USSR saw no sense in this French proposal and we doubt whether the French delegation itself sees any sense in the proposal, to judge by the statements the French representative made yesterday after the meeting of the General Assembly.

"Nothing has changed since yesterday's meeting. This was clear even yesterday: nothing could change in twenty-four hours, if only because this question has been debated and discussed for twenty-five years and has been discussed by the United Nations for at least six months. How could one expect a solution of the question in twenty-four hours? That is why we are now in the same situation as we were twenty-four hours ago.

"The statements made here by the representatives of Lebanon and Syria have not introduced any new factor which could in any way change the situation; there is nothing new in their statements which would affect the position. They mentioned the establishment of a federal state. We referred to this as one of the possibilities at the outset of the debate on this question. The Arab representatives did not wish to discuss the matter. That is their business. They are free to behave as they deem necessary in the discussion of the question.

"To reopen the debate on this question as proposed, for instance, by the representative of Iran, would mean, however, going back at least six months. After the question was submitted to the General Assembly, all kinds of alternatives were studied and, after comprehensive and careful consideration of all the possible alternatives and proposals, the majority of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee came to the conclusion that Palestine would have to be divided into two sovereign, independent, democratic states -- an Arab State and a Jewish State. This decision by the Committee is the result of a thorough, careful and profound study of this question.

"The delegation of the USSR considers that it would be wrong now to set the General Assembly back six months and to begin all over again. I say nothing of the fact that to adopt such a proposal would mean wrecking the settlement of the Palestine problem."
(p. 1422; 29 November 1947)

3. The Partition Plan

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"After the work of this Special Committee had been completed, we were gratified to find that its recommendation, or to be more exact, the recommendation of the majority of the Committee, coincided with one of the two solutions advanced by the USSR delegation at the special session. I have in mind the solution of partitioning Palestine into two independent democratic States -- an Arab and a Jewish one.

"The USSR delegation, therefore, could not but support this alternative which was recommended by the Special Committee. We now know that not only did the Special Committee which studied the problem of the future of Palestine accept the alternative of partition, but this proposal gained the support of an overwhelming majority of the other delegations represented in the General Assembly. The overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations reached the same conclusion as had been reached by the USSR Government after a comprehensive study of the question how the problem of the future of Palestine should be resolved."
(pp. 1358-9; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"The opponents of the partition of Palestine into two separate, independent, democratic States usually point to the fact that this decision would, as they allege, be directed against the Arabs, against the Arab population in Palestine and against the Arab States in general. This point of view is, for reasons that will be readily understood, particularly emphasized by the delegations of the Arab countries. But the USSR delegation cannot concur in this view. Neither the proposal to partition Palestine into two separate, independent States, nor

the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee that was created at the session and which approved the proposal which is now under discussion, is directed against the Arabs. This decision is not directed against either of the two national groups that inhabit Palestine. On the contrary, the USSR delegation holds that this decision corresponds to the fundamental national interests of both peoples, that is to say, to the interests of the Arabs as well as of the Jews.

"The representatives of the Arab States claim that the partition of Palestine would be an historic injustice. But this view of the case is unacceptable, if only because, after all, the Jewish people has been closely linked with Palestine for a considerable period of history."

(pp. 1359-60; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"In connexion with the proposal to partition Palestine, the representatives of some Arab States referred to the USSR and attempted to cast aspersions on the foreign policy of its Government. In particular, Camille Chamoun the representative of Lebanon twice exercised his ingenuity on the subject. I have already pointed out that the proposal to divide Palestine into two separate independent States, and the position which the USSR has taken in this matter, are not directed against the Arabs, and that, in our profound conviction, such a solution of this question is in keeping with the basic national interests not only of the Jews but also of the Arabs."

(p. 1360; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"The delegation of the USSR maintains that the decision to partition Palestine is in keeping with the high principles and aims of the United Nations. It is in keeping with the principle of the national self-determination of peoples."

(pp. 1360-61; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"The solution of the Palestine problem based on a partition of Palestine into two separate states will be of profound historical significance, because this decision will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whom, as you know, are still without a country, without homes, having found temporary shelter only in special camps in some western European countries. I shall not speak of the conditions in which these people are living; these conditions are well known. Quite a lot has been said on this subject by representatives who share the USSR delegation's point of view in this matter, and which support the plan for partitioning Palestine into two States."

(p. 1361; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"The USSR delegation, unlike some other delegations [i. e. the US and the UK], has from the outset taken a clear-cut definite and unequivocal stand in this matter. It is consistently maintaining this stand. It has no intention of manoeuvring and manipulating votes as unfortunately is done at the Assembly, especially in connection with the consideration of the Palestinian question."
(p. 1363; 26 November 1947)

Also:

"Certain manoeuvres which are going on in the General Assembly are understandable, but they cannot be justified. They can confuse and complicate the issue, but they cannot settle the problem of Palestine's future. Once having undertaken this task, the United Nations should settle the problem of Palestine's future. That is precisely why the delegation of the USSR considers that the General Assembly, should, without further delay, take a decision on the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation and proceed to vote on it. For its own part, the delegation of the USSR supports this proposal in the General Assembly, just as it supported it in the Committee."
(pp. 1422-23; 29 November 1947)

II. THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
16 April - 14 May 1948

A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
FIRST COMMITTEE *

1. The Trusteeship Proposal

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"Since the close of the previous session of the Assembly, public opinion, even in the United States, had found that the position taken by that country on the Palestine question had really been directed against the General Assembly resolution. Official denials by the United States deceived no one; it was clear that the United States was preparing to deal a mortal blow to the partition decision and to present a new plan for Palestine. It was claimed that the new plan was better, although in reality the contrary was true. The argument had been put forward that the Partition Plan could not be implemented by peaceful means, but that argument could be sustained only if the Security Council had adopted practical measures for its implementation, and such was not the case."
(pp. 17-18; 20 April 1948)

* Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume II, Main Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April -
14 May 1948

Also:

"The trusteeship plan proposed by the United States was likely to lead to an intensification of the struggle in Palestine; it would create a threat to peace and would increase anxiety in the Near East. Moreover, trusteeship in Palestine was not compatible with the present cultural and political level of either Jews or Arabs. Such a plan was inconsistent with the right to self-determination of the peoples of Palestine and would place that country in a state of virtual colonial slavery, with all the deplorable consequences of such a state."
(p. 19; 20 April 1948)

Also:

"The Arab States and the Arab Higher Committee had adopted a curious attitude in that, although they disliked trusteeship, they were prepared to explore the United States proposals. They had, however, said nothing regarding the substance of the proposals because it was clear that if they favoured trusteeship they would be favouring postponement of independence for Palestine. Thus it would be embarrassing for the Arab representatives to give direct support to the United States proposals. On the other hand, they want to wreck the partition decision and had adopted tactics to confuse the discussion. No doubt they would follow the same line in the sub-committee."
(pp. 135-6; 28 April 1948)

Also:

"The Arabs had indicated their equivocal position and it was unlikely that they would make it any clearer in the sub-committee. The lack of clarity was part of their tactics. The Jewish Agency had rejected the idea of trusteeship and was unlikely to reverse itself in the sub-committee."
(p. 136; 28 April 1948)

Dr. Joza Vilfan (Yugoslavia):

"Yugoslavia was particularly opposed to the principle of trusteeship because, having fought so hard to achieve its own freedom, it sympathized with the aspirations for freedom of all colonial peoples."
(p. 34; 22 April 1948)

Mr. Vasili A. Tarasenko (Ukrainian SSR):

"Moreover, the proposal for a trusteeship system did not remove the necessity of applying armed force. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews wished to be deprived of their sovereignty and at least one of the parties (the Jews) had stated in the Security Council that it was opposed to the trusteeship system. Yet it appeared that the United States was prepared to provide armed contingents to implement the trusteeship, but not to carry out partition."
(p. 39; 22 April 1948)

Mr. Leonid I. Kaminsky (Byelorussian SSR):

"The aim of the trusteeship was to keep Palestine in a state scarcely distinguishable from bondage and to place it under the control of American monopolies. Trusteeship was contrary to the right of the peoples to self-determination; it would intensify the struggle in Palestine and increase anxiety in the Near East." (p. 98; 26 April 1948)

Mr. Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland):

"Establishment of a truce commission (document S/727) could be understood, but not justified, as an attempt to create some sort of trusteeship supervised by States opposed to partition. Such manoeuvres would not settle the problem but would only confuse it." (p. 103; 27 April 1948)

Also:

"The United States representative's explanations would not modify the Polish delegation's attitude on that point, since a trusteeship agreement could not come under discussion before the General Assembly had decided to set aside the solution of partition." (p. 121; 27 April 1948)

Mr. A. I. Galagan (Ukrainian SSR):

"In fact, trusteeship could neither facilitate a solution nor improve the lot of the Palestine people whose progress would be retarded by depriving them of their freedom.

"On the whole, no organ could examine a new decision in the Palestine question as long as the General Assembly's decision has not been annulled by a two-thirds majority.

"The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic would vote against a proposal to examine the United States document." (pp. 126-7; 27 April 1948)

2. The Partition Plan

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"Discussions among the permanent members of the Security Council had revealed that the United States not only did not wish to consider how the General Assembly decision might be implemented but wished to revise that decision. From the very beginning, the representative of the United States had been proposing consultation with the Jews and the Arabs as though no decision had ever been taken on Palestine. He had then tried to prove

that it was impossible to implement partition by peaceful means but he had never mentioned that the Security Council had not exhausted the means available to it to implement the General Assembly decision."

(p. 18; 20 April 1948)

Also:

"The USSR delegation considered that the decision on the partition of Palestine was a just decision and that the United Nations should take effective measures to ensure its implementation."

(p. 20; 20 April 1948)

Also:

"The delegation of the USSR believed that the Assembly could put an end to the bloody conflict in Palestine only by assuring the implementation of partition. Even the opponents of partition must recognize that it was in fact taking place, as was shown by the statement of Senor Azcarate and data submitted by the Jewish Agency, not to mention the numerous reports in the Press. A Jewish State was in existence, in spite of attempts by certain countries to impede the implementation of partition."

(p. 222; 4 May 1948)

Mr. Tarasenko (Ukrainian SSR):

"The decision of the General Assembly of 29 November fully satisfied the interests and national aspirations of both Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It also met the requirements of the Charter. Nobody could accuse the United Nations of having taken its decision with undue haste. All were well aware of the extensive work that had been done by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question which resulted in the adoption by more than two-thirds of the Assembly of the plan of partition with economic union. The Assembly had decided that the solution was the most equitable one and rejected all alternative solutions. The world would have been entitled to expect that the Assembly decision would have been implemented immediately particularly since the situation in Palestine was rapidly deteriorating. Unfortunately, that was not the case. The United Kingdom pursued from the very beginning a policy designed to wreck the Assembly's decision."

(p. 37; 22 April 1948)

Also:

"The United States insisted upon convoking a special session of the Assembly to revoke the partition and to begin a search for an alternative solution. It attempted to justify the modification of its position on the grounds that the Partition Plan could not be implemented by peaceful means. However the Security Council had not taken any measures to implement the Assembly's resolution and it could not be proved that the Partition Plan would require force."

(pp. 38--9; 22 April 1948)

Also:

"The delegation of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic had supported the Partition Plan when it was adopted because it believed that the plan provided the most equitable and just solution of the Palestinian question. A refusal to implement that plan would constitute a serious and irreparable blow to the United Nations."
(p. 40; 22 April 1948)

Mr. Houdek (Czechoslovakia):

"The delegation of Czechoslovakia believed that the solution of partition was the best and most necessarily anti-Arab in character, nor was it irreconcilable with the national and political aspirations of neighbouring Arab countries."
(p. 53; 22 April 1948)

Mr. Panyushkin (USSR):

". . . the Assembly resolution of 29 November constituted a just and correct decision and met the deep-rooted national interest of the Arab and Jewish peoples of Palestine. The decision had not been taken hastily, as some representatives believed. The Assembly had carefully studied the political, economic and other factors before taking its decision."
(p. 71; 23 April 1948)

Mr. Kaminsky (Byelorussian SSR):

"The delegation of Byelorussia had upheld and still supported the partition scheme. It considered that it was essential for the United Nations to carry out the resolution of the General Assembly immediately."
(p. 98; 26 April 1948)

Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland):

"A heavy responsibility had been laid upon every member to help the people of Palestine in resolving a conflict which might be a major threat to international peace. The question should be examined in terms of two peoples of Palestine and not in the light of any military or economic considerations. The time was late and action was called for but first they should hear the views of all Governments."
(p. 101; 27 April 1948)

Also:

"The convocation of the present special session was a cause for anxiety, for it was apparent that it had been called to revise the previous decision. It should be made clear, however, that the resolution of 29 November 1947 was still in force. Until the Assembly, by the necessary majority, adopted another resolution, the decision in

favour of partition remained binding. This situation could not be changed either by the Security Council or by any State, however powerful."
(p. 102; 27 April 1948)

Also:

"The Jewish interests in Palestine were no mere claims but were based on rights, recognized internationally in the Covenant of the League. Jewish demands for statehood were based on international law and could only be confirmed by the Assembly. Moreover, there were hundreds of thousands of Jews seeking to start a new life in the refuge they looked upon as their fatherland. Yet, the Jews were still being kept in German concentration camps."
(p. 105; 27 April 1948)

Also:

"With regard to the Arab objections, no one expected that the Arabs would help enforce partition. They were free to refuse their support, but under the Charter they were obliged to refrain from the use of force to prevent implementation. Any infringement of this obligation should be branded as aggression. The principle responsibility for postponing the implementation of the resolution fell upon those who had weakened the United Nations by trying to change it into an instrument of their own policy."
(p. 105; 27 April 1948)

Also:

"The Polish delegation considered the resolution of 29 November 1947 to be still valid. The Assembly should deal with the situation created by the refusal of the majority of the Security Council to fulfil the Assembly's request regarding implementation. Postponement would lead only to new suffering and increased strife. For the sake of the future dignity of the United Nations, they should act now in the spirit of the Charter and in accordance with the will of the peoples of Palestine. The Assembly had put the Jews and Arabs of Palestine on the road to national independence and could not now force them away from it."
(p. 107; 27 April 1948)

**B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ***

1. Partition Plan

Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland):

". . . after four weeks of discussion, during which numerous delegations had tried to show that implementation

* Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948

of resolution 181(II) on the partition of Palestine was impossible, practical and concrete measures were being taken to implement the resolution. The Polish delegation considered that the creation of a Jewish State in the part of Palestine designated for that purpose, was in conformity with the resolution of 29 November." (p. 39; 14 May 1948)

Mr. Gromyko (USSR):

"The USSR delegation was firmly convinced that in view of the situation in Palestine at the present time there was no reason to appoint a mediator. A feature of that situation was the existence of one of the two States provided for in the General Assembly's resolution: the Jewish State.

"In those circumstances, to impose upon Palestine a provisional regime of a transitional nature would be unjustifiable, to say the least. Even if the draft resolution was accepted, that would in no way affect the partition decision, which remained valid.

"Fearing that the opponents of the partition decision might take advantage of the provisions of the resolution to complicate the existing situation, the USSR delegation would vote against the resolution (document A/552) before the Assembly." (p. 38; 14 May 1948)

III. THE THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 21 September - 12 December 1948

A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE *

1. Palestine and Removal of Arab Troops

Mr. K. V. Kieselev (Byelorussian SSR):

"When the United Kingdom realized that it could not nullify the decision of 29 November, it had attempted to destroy the Jewish State by using armies of the Arab States. When that too failed, the United Kingdom had recourse to a Mediator, in a further attempt to get rid of the Jewish State, the existence of which it regarded as a threat.

"The chief responsibility for the hostilities in Palestine lay with the United Kingdom and with the United States. Long before the end of the Mandate, the Mandatory Power had authorized the entry into Palestine of an Arab Legion which was reinforced by Nazi officers formerly interned in camps in Egypt. After the termination of the Mandate, moreover, British officials had 'voluntarily' offered their services to that same King Abdullah who was to be the chief beneficiary of the Mediator's plan, which had in fact been rejected by the Arabs as well as by the Jews." (pp. 741-2; 24 November 1948)

* Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September -- 8 December 1948

Also:

"In order to thwart those designs, as injurious to the Arabs as they are to the Jews, the United Nations must ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine; and it was incumbent on the Security Council to take steps to prevent the renewal of military action and to restore peace in Palestine."
(p. 743; 24 November 1948)

Also:

". . . so long as foreign troops remained in the territory of Palestine peace could not prevail in that part of the world. The matter the First Committee was called upon to settle was the putting into effect of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947. Part of that resolution had already been carried out by the establishment of the State of Israel within the territorial limits established by the General Assembly. On the other hand, the Arab State had not yet been established; the territory allotted to it was occupied by regular troops of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere."
(p. 795; 29 November 1948)

Also:

"The Byelorussian delegation would support the USSR proposal on the withdrawal of armed troops, because it was of vital importance."
(p. 795; 29 November 1948)

Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR):

". . . the presence of those troops, particularly at this moment when the United Nations was attempting to bring about peace, was a hindrance to peaceful adjustment of the situation and it was essential that they should be withdrawn. Their presence on the territories of the Arab and Jewish States created by the Assembly's resolution 181(II) of 29 November was illegal and unjustified and maintained a tense situation which might lead to further military action."
(p. 755; 25 November 1948)

Also:

"Everyone knew that there were in Palestine foreign troops and military personnel which had invaded the country. The presence of those troops had caused the war, the present disorders and the sufferings of the population; moreover it was an obstacle to the re-establishment of peace, the very object of the General Assembly.

"The USSR delegation had therefore submitted a proposal (A/C 1/401) for the withdrawal of foreign troops and military personnel. At the very time when the United Nations was doing its utmost to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem, the presence of those foreign troops

was particularly inadmissible and might at any moment bring about the resumption of hostilities. The General Assembly should therefore take a decision leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine, and ask the Security Council to take all necessary measures to prevent the resumption of military operations.

"What the USSR delegation had in view was of course the withdrawal of the troops of certain foreign Governments, and there could be no ambiguity or misunderstanding possible on that point. Moreover, no decision would be practicable if the problem of foreign troops was not first settled, for their presence in Palestine was likely to prevent the application of that decision. If the problem of Palestine was really to be solved and peace and security re-established in the Middle East, the first problem to be settled was that of withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine." (pp. 791-2; 29 November 1948)

Also:

". . . the withdrawal of foreign troops was a necessary condition for the establishment of peace and for any settlement of the Palestine question in accordance with the November resolution. The presence of Arab forces in Palestine was a direct violation of the appeal which the Assembly had issued in connection with the November resolution, calling upon all States and individuals to refrain from any acts likely to complicate the situation in Palestine or to hinder the implementation of the recommendation of the General Assembly. From the beginning, the Mandatory Power had attempted to prevent the implementation of partition and the establishment of two independent States. It was significant that the departure of United Kingdom troops had been immediately followed by the invasion of Palestine by Arab forces. The synchronization of those two events showed that the military intervention by the Arab States was part of the United Kingdom plan to prevent the Assembly from carrying out partition. That it had been successful only in preventing the creation of an Arab State in Palestine was due solely to the quick action of the Jewish people in defending the area assigned to them." (p. 799; 29 November 1948)

Also:

"The Committee could not but be aware that the presence of foreign troops in Palestine was an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any peaceful settlement which must be removed if the Assembly was to make any progress." (p. 800; 29 November 1948)

Mr. Lange (Poland):

". . . on 29 November 1947 the Assembly had established the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine. Since then, the Jews had established their

State, but the second part of the resolution had not been carried out because troops from neighboring countries had entered the territory of Palestine that was not occupied by the Jewish armies. The first step in carrying out the resolution of 29 November was the withdrawal of the troops which had prevented its implementation." (p. 796; 29 November 1948)

Also:

"The Polish delegation supported the provisions of the USSR draft resolution concerning the withdrawal of armed forces." (p. 796; 29 November 1948)

Mr. Galagan (Ukrainian SSR):

"The reasoning of the United Kingdom delegation, which held that it would be difficult to define what troops should be regarded as foreign was groundless, as foreign troops in Palestine were those who resisted the implementation of the resolution of 29 November 1947; such, for instance, were the British officers of the Arab Legion.

"The argument advanced by the delegations of the United Kingdom and of the United States to the effect that this question was a matter for the Security Council was not valid either, as those delegations had never asked the Security Council for the withdrawal of troops. Moreover, they had opposed the proposals that had been submitted to that effect. Thus the United Kingdom and the United States had shown that they did not desire the re-establishment of peace in Palestine." (p. 797; 29 November 1948)

Also:

"The presence of foreign troops had been an obstacle to the creation of an Arab State in accordance with the Assembly resolution of 29 November, and constituted an obstacle to the development of the State of Israel. For all those reasons the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supported the USSR draft resolution." (p. 798; 29 November 1948)

Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia):

". . . the withdrawal of foreign troops was an essential prerequisite for the solution of the whole Palestine problem. Those who wished to implement the Assembly's decision on partition could not fail to approve the proposal as it was formulated in the Polish and USSR draft resolutions. Similarly, it was only natural that the withdrawal of troops would be opposed by those delegations which did not wish to see the November resolution implemented. The Yugoslav delegation would therefore vote in favor of the USSR draft resolution." (pp. 798-9; 29 November 1948)

2. Palestine and the Creation of a Modified Unitary State

Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR):

"As to the Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/402) it would put the Assembly right back in the position in which it had been before the adoption of the /29/ November resolution. It was well known that the Assembly, during its first special session, had considered at length the proposal for a unitary State and had rejected it as impracticable. There was no reason to re-examine the proposal, and the Committee could not possibly entertain such a suggestion in view of the fact that the Jewish State had come into being in conformity with the Partition Plan, and could not be liquidated."
(p. 820; 30 November 1948)

Mr. Lange (Poland):

"The Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/402), on the other hand, was unacceptable to the Polish delegation for the simple reason that it ignored the realities of the situation and tried to revert to the conditions as they had existed before the November resolution was adopted and before the State of Israel came into being."
(p. 821; 30 November 1948)

Mr. Galagan (Ukrainian SSR):

". . . the (First) Committee would be quite unjustified in sending a commission to Palestine for the purpose of examining the situation on the spot and drafting proposals for a Federal State. The possibility of creating a single State in Palestine had been fully examined by the Special Committee on Palestine and by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the General Assembly. The Assembly's decision to adopt partition had been taken after a meticulous study of the Palestine question and no one could say that the decision had been taken too hastily. Consequently, the Syrian proposal did not offer a constructive solution. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considered that it was essential, if the Assembly were to maintain its authority, that the November resolution be taken as the basis for any future action, and that all efforts be devoted to the establishment of the independent Arab State for which it provided."
(p. 823; 30 November 1948)

3. The Partition Plan

Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR):

"After thorough consideration, the General Assembly had adopted a decision on 29 November 1947 (resolution 181(II)) regarding the termination of the United Kingdom Mandate and the creation of separate Arab and Jewish States in Palestine. There was no doubt that this was the only right and equitable solution and that it was in conformity with the interests of both the Arabs and the

Jews, both of whom have a right to self-determination. The majority of members of the Security Council, instead of implementing this decision as instructed, was diverted by the United States and the United Kingdom into calling a special session of the General Assembly for reconsideration of the Palestine question. Having rejected the United States suggestions for a United Nations trusteeship, the Assembly, under pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom delegations, created the position of a Mediator, limiting his powers to the strict sense of the word.

"The Mediator, instead of limiting himself to his functions in implementing the truce and in assisting a settlement by peaceful means, went beyond his terms of reference and, in implementing the will of those who shaped his activities, submitted a new plan in an attempt to replace the Assembly's decision of 29 November. This new proposal presented in June would have created a Union in Palestine including Transjordan, and since the latter country was dominated by the United Kingdom, would have given control of Palestine to the United Kingdom. This new plan was rejected by both parties and brought damage to the prestige of the United Nations. When it was later published (S/863), it left no doubt in the mind of the public that the plan had been prepared in the British Foreign Office, and events had borne out this fact. The aims of the United States and the United Kingdom were to prevent the implementation of the 29 November resolution, and it was this policy which had increased the animosity between Jews and Arabs and pushed the latter into military adventures in Palestine. The military operations created a dangerous situation for peace and security in the Near East and led to serious loss of life and to hardship and suffering.

"The proposals contained in the Mediator's report to the General Assembly (A/648) were essentially a repetition of those which had been rejected by both parties in June. The only formal difference was that he now recognized the existence of the Jewish State, which in fact exercised sovereignty over the whole of the territory assigned to it by the Assembly's resolution. The Mediator, however, proposed a reshuffling of territory which would jeopardize the very life of the Jewish State by giving the Negeb (which was two-thirds of the Jewish State) to Transjordan, although he offered the Jewish State Western Galilee as compensation."
(pp. 694-5; 22 November 1948)

Also:

"Events in Palestine had borne out the correctness of the USSR position on Palestine; it had been based on principles in accord with the interests of the people of Palestine, the interest of the maintenance of peace and security, and the provisions of the Charter. The USSR delegation regarded the proposals of the Mediator concerning demilitarized zones as not preventing the possibility of the resumption of military action. In order to establish peace in Palestine it was necessary to

withdraw all foreign armed forces from the territory of the Jewish and Arab States which had been created by the Assembly's decision. The USSR delegation considered that these measures must be taken immediately to prevent any further military action."
(pp. 696-7; 22 November 1948)

Mr. Lange (Poland):

"In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America were primarily responsible for the armed conflict which had broken out in Palestine. The United Kingdom Government had done everything in its power to hinder the implementation of the resolution of 29 November 1947 by tolerating the presence of armed Arab bands and by taking no measures to check the preparation for invasion of Palestine by the Arab states. Trans-jordan, which was financially and militarily dependent upon the United Kingdom, had been in the vanguard in the war. As for the other Arab States, the United Kingdom had refrained from exercising her influence upon them in the cause of peace. The negative attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards the General Assembly resolution had thus given the rulers of the Arab States the impression that it would favor an attempt to oppose the General Assembly's resolution by armed force."
(p. 705; 22 November 1948)

Mr. Galagan (Ukrainian SSR):

"The General Assembly's resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 had met the fundamental interests of both the Arabs and the Jews and, if it had been fully implemented, the Palestine question would now be mainly solved."
(p. 731)

Also:

"The United Nations could not ignore this situation; it must adopt a decision which would ensure peace and the implementation of the resolution of 29 November. The Mediator's progress report suggested a formal peace or an armistice with the creation of demilitarized zones, but the proposal allowed the invading armies to remain in Palestine which was the basic reason for the present tense situation. The Security Council had adopted numerous resolutions, none of which had been capable of bringing about a truce, for they did not provide for the removal of foreign troops and personnel. The Ukrainian delegation shared the views of the USSR delegation that the most effective decision for the General Assembly to take would be to require that foreign troops and personnel be withdrawn as soon as possible. Such a decision would make possible the further implementation of the 29 November resolution and would raise the United Nations prestige throughout the world."
(p. 733; 24 November 1948)

Mr. Kiselev (Byelorussian SSR):

". . . the problem before the United Nations was to implement the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of two independent States." (p. 741; 24 November 1948)

Also:

"As regards the United States, since the decision on the partition of Palestine, its Government had been subjected to strong pressure from military circles and United States oil companies. The United States had then refused to help in the establishment of the new Jewish State, and on the contrary, attempted to wreck the Partition Plan. Indeed, the United States had taken the initiative in calling a second special session and had proposed placing Palestine under a Trusteeship System, while declaring herself the champion of both Jewish and Arab interests. When the proposal for placing Palestine under trusteeship was rejected, the United States and the United Kingdom had proposed the appointment of a Mediator. It was then that, on various pretexts, the British and Americans poured into Palestine, while the United States tried to come to an agreement with the United Kingdom, at the expense of the Jews.

"But even the United States and the United Kingdom had had to take into account the existence of a Jewish State which had proved its right to exist, and which had been recognized, de jure or de facto, by 18 States. Like other States before it, Israel was borne of an armed struggle for liberty and independence." (p. 742; 24 November 1948)

Also:

"The General Assembly should reject the draft resolution of the United Kingdom (A/C 1/394) which was contrary to the decision of 29 November 1947. The Byelorussian delegation was opposed to the transfer of certain parts of Palestine, and in particular the Negeb to Transjordan. Adoption of that proposal would mean placing four-fifths of Palestine indirectly under the control of the United Kingdom." (p. 743; 24 November 1948)

B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS *

1. Partition Plan

Mr. Zebrowski (Poland):

". . . just over a year ago the General Assembly, at its 128th Plenary meeting, had adopted by a very large majority a resolution concerning Palestine which provided for the establishment of two independent States, an international regime for Jerusalem and the economic union binding the two States together. That resolution, if fully implemented and respected by all the Members of the United Nations would have brought in the family of nations two new States and would have advanced the cause of peace and progress in the Middle East.

"The implementation of that resolution, however, was obstructed by the manoeuvres and machinations of certain Powers, led by the United Kingdom and the United States of America."
(pp. 957-8; 11 December 1948)

Also:

"Twice in the course of the past year, the United Kingdom and the United States had tried to use the General Assembly as an instrument for reversing previous decisions. In spite of their abject failure at the second special session during the previous spring, when the United Kingdom and the United States had tried to replace independence by Trusteeship, the same two Powers were again trying at the current session to undo what had already been implemented. Those attempts were obviously no contribution to peace in the Middle East; they would merely fan the flames of war."
(pp. 958--9; 11 December 1948)

Also:

"By voting against the draft resolution (proposed by the First Committee [document A/7767]), the Polish delegation affirmed its support of the resolution of 29 November 1947, as containing the basic principles of the solution of the Palestine problem. That resolution was legally in force and its terms would be binding upon whatever conciliation commission was formed. They provided a foundation upon which the State of Israel and the Arab States could base their direct negotiations for the establishment of a permanent settlement."
(p. 964; 11 December 1948)

* Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I,
Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings,
21 September - 12 December 1948

Mr. Houdek (Czechoslovakia):

"All who had taken part in the General Assembly's dealing with the Palestine question would recall that the Czechoslovak delegation had always advocated the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, and at the same time had manifested its full understanding of the national aspirations of the Arabs. For those reasons, it had supported the appointment of the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine in May 1947 and had taken an active part in its work. In accordance with its basic attitude, it had voted, on 29 November 1947, for the resolution of the General Assembly which had proclaimed the idea of partition. It had foreseen some difficulties as regards its implementation, but had voted in favour of the resolution because it had seemed to offer the best possible solution of the problem under the conditions then prevailing in Palestine. It provided for a Jewish home in Palestine which, as a result of the horrible sufferings of the Jews in the war of extermination planned and carried on against them by the Nazi regime and the associated puppet Governments, had to take the form of a sovereign and independent State. At the same time, although many appeared to have forgotten that fact, the resolution had envisaged the establishment of an Arab State in Palestine, thus meeting the national and political aspirations of the Arab populations of that country."
(p. 965; 11 December 1948)

Mr. Vyshinsky (USSR):

". . . at the first stage of the discussion on the Palestine question, the United Kingdom Government had taken up an attitude which could only be called one of resistance to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947. That attitude had been taken up because it had been claimed that the decision could not be implemented, since it had not been accepted by one part of the Assembly. The United Kingdom Government had maintained that attitude until the second special session of the Assembly, which had taken place in April and May of the current year, that is to say until the time when the Assembly, under pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom, had adopted, on 14 May 1948, resolution 186 (S-2) appointing a United Nations Mediator on Palestine."
(p. 981; 11 December 1948)

Also:

"The United Kingdom delegation had hastened to submit its own resolution at the beginning of the discussion on the Palestine question, with the evident intention of making that resolution a basis for the Committee's handling of the question. It had been based almost entirely on the report of the Mediator and, fundamentally, aimed at considerably amending the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. That resolution had, for example, provided for certain boundary lines; the United Kingdom resolution aimed at revising them and taking from Israel the Negeb territory

which comprised approximately two-thirds of the State of Israel. Such wishes had been expressed by representatives of the British military authorities."
(p. 985; 11 December 1948)

Also:

"The attitude of the USSR delegation toward the Palestine question had been extremely consistent. It favoured the freedom of peoples, and peaceful and friendly relations among nations. The USSR delegation's position was fully in accord with the aims and purposes of the United Nations as set out in the Charter. That was precisely the reason why it still thought that the true solution of the Palestine problem could be achieved only on the basis of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, which provided for equal rights and independent existence for both peoples in Palestine."
(p. 990; 11 December 1948)

2. The Conciliation Commission

Mr. Vyshinsky (USSR):

"The resolution before the Assembly provided for a conciliation commission composed of three Member States. In the First Committee the USSR delegation had stated that it was not opposed in principle to such a commission. But the commission should consist of more than three members; five might be a better number, because less pressure could be brought to bear on a commission composed of a larger number of members; a membership of five would be more likely to achieve greater objectivity. It would be an advantage if the principle of geographical distribution were applied in the selection of members. That was another argument in favour of a membership of five rather than of three. The USSR delegation was not therefore, in favour of such a small number. A larger membership would be more desirable in order that the commission might really be a conciliation commission and be enabled to extend its conciliatory efforts to all aspects of the matter, including the General Assembly's resolution.

"The commission should consist of representatives of States which were not prejudiced against that resolution. To appoint representatives of States which were hostile to it from the outset would complicate the situation and indefinitely postpone a final settlement from the point of view of everyone, and particularly that of the Arabs and the Jews."
(p. 987; 11 December 1948)

COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE

PART THREE: COMPARATIVE RECORD OF ROLL CALL VOTES ON
THE PALESTINE QUESTION

SECTION ONE: FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, 28 April - 15 May 1947

SECTION TWO: SECOND (REGULAR) SESSION, 16 September -
29 November 1947

SECTION THREE: SECOND SPECIAL SESSION, 16 April -
14 May 1948

SECTION FOUR: THIRD (REGULAR) SESSION (PART I),
21 September - 12 December 1948

I. THE GENERAL COMMITTEE *

A. INVITATION TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Proposal of the Polish delegation as amended by the representative of Czechoslovakia (document A/BUR/80):

"The General Assembly,

"Resolved to give careful consideration to the point of view of the Jewish people on the Palestine question,

"Decides to invite the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly for the purpose of stating their views on this question."

Voting Record: (p. 126; 2 May 1947)

For: 3

Czechoslovakia
Poland
USSR

Against: 8

Canada
China
France
Sweden
UK
US

Abstentions: 3

Egypt
India

II. THE FIRST COMMITTEE **

A. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE.

1. Draft resolution recommended in sub-Committee 6 report (document A/C 1/171) on the terms of reference.

a. Motion of the French representative to delete paragraph 5 and its alternative drafts from the resolution:

(i) Paragraph 5, draft a.

"The Special Committee shall bear in mind the principle that independence for the population of Palestine should be the purpose of any plan for the future of that country."

* Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume II, General Committee, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 29 April - 7 May 1947.

** Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume III, Main Committees, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 28 April - 13 May 1947.

SECTION ONE: THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, 28 April - 15 May 1947

I. The General Committee

- A. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency to Appear before the General Assembly.

II. The First Committee

- A. Terms of Reference for the Special Committee.
- B. Composition of the Special Committee.

III. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly

- A. The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the Declaration of its Independence.
- B. Invitation to the Jewish Agency to Appear before the General Assembly.
- C. Creation of a Special Committee to Prepare a Report on the Question of Palestine.

(ii) Paragraph 5, draft b.

"The Special Committee shall be guided by the principle that independence for the people of Palestine should be the purpose of any plan for the future of that country."

(iii) Paragraph 5, draft c.

"The Special Committee shall be guided by the principle that independence for the people of Palestine should be the purpose of any plan for the future of that country."

(iv) Paragraph 5, draft d.

"The Special Committee shall be guided by the principle that independence of Palestine should be the purpose of any plan for the future of that country."

Voting Record: (pp. 299-300; 12 May 1947)

| <u>For: 29</u> | <u>Against: 14</u> | <u>Abstentions: 10</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR |
| UK | Egypt | Czechoslovakia |
| US | Iraq | Poland |
| | Lebanon | |
| | Saudi Arabia | India |
| | Syria | Iran |
| | Turkey | |
| | Ukrainian SSR | |
| | USSR | |
| | Yugoslavia | |

b. Motion of the Australian representative to delete paragraph 6, drafts a and b, from resolution.

(i) Paragraph 6, draft a:

"The Special Committee shall give most careful consideration to the interests of all the inhabitants of Palestine and also to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity."

Voting Record: (p. 309; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 19</u> | <u>Against: 25</u> | <u>Abstentions: 7</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | France | Afghanistan |
| Czechoslovakia | UK | Egypt |
| Ukrainian SSR | US | India |
| Yugoslavia | | |
| | Iran | Poland |
| | | USSR |
| Iraq | | |
| Lebanon | | |

(ii) Paragraph 6, draft b:

"The Special Committee shall give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine, of Islam, Judaism and Christianity."

Voting Record: (p. 309; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 27</u> | <u>Against: 9</u> | <u>Abstentions: 16</u> |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| France | India | Afghanistan |
| UK | Iraq | Saudi Arabia |
| US | Lebanon | |
| | Syria | Byelorussian SSR |
| Egypt | Turkey | Czechoslovakia |
| Iran | | Poland |
| | | Ukrainian SSR |
| | | Yugoslavia |

c. USSR-India amendment to paragraph 7

(i) Original text of paragraph 7:

"The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine."

(ii) USSR-India amendment adding the following to paragraph 7:

"Including a proposal on the question of establishing, without delay, the independent democratic State of Palestine."

Voting Record: (pp. 312-13; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 15</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 12</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | France | |
| Egypt | UK | |
| India | US | |
| Iran | | |
| Iraq | | |
| Lebanon | | |
| Saudi Arabia | | |
| Syria | | |
| Turkey | | |
| Byelorussian SSR | | |
| Czechoslovakia | | |
| Poland | | |
| Ukrainian SSR | | |
| USSR | | |
| Yugoslavia | | |

d. Paragraph 7 (as amended by Polish delegate):

"The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the next session of the General Assembly as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine, including a proposal on the question of establishing, by the United Nations, the independent democratic State of Palestine."

Voting Record: (p. 314; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 10</u> | <u>Against: 25</u> | <u>Abstentions: 18</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | France | Afghanistan |
| Czechoslovakia | UK | Egypt |
| Poland | US | Iraq |
| Ukrainian SSR | | Lebanon |
| Yugoslavia | | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Syria |
| | | Turkey |
| | | USSR |

B. COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. First USSR draft resolution (document A/C 1/177) concerning the composition of the Special Committee:

"The General Assembly resolves that the special committee should consist of those Member States which are on the Security Council."

Voting Record: (p. 344; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 6</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 21</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | UK | Afghanistan |
| Czechoslovakia | US | Egypt |
| Poland | | India |
| Ukrainian SSR | | Iran |
| USSR | | Iraq |
| Yugoslavia | | Lebanon |
| | | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Syria |
| | | Turkey |
| | | France |

2. Alternate USSR draft resolution document (A/C 1/177) concerning the composition of the Special Committee:

"The General Committee resolves,

"That the composition of the special committee should be based on the same principle as the Security Council, namely, the committee should include States permanent members of the Security Council, one State representing western Europe, one State representing eastern Europe, two States representing Latin America, one Arab State, and one State representing the Far East and Africa."

Voting Record: (pp. 344-45; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 6</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 21</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | US | Afghanistan |
| Czechoslovakia | UK | Egypt |
| Poland | | India |
| Ukrainian SSR | | Iran |
| USSR | | Iraq |
| Yugoslavia | | Lebanon |
| | | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Syria |
| | | Turkey |

3. Polish resolution (document A/C 1/176) concerning the composition of the Special Committee:

"The General Assembly resolves,

"That the special committee should be composed of eleven members, as follows: the five permanent members of the Security Council, two countries of Latin America, one of the Arab States, one country of Africa, one country of Asia, one country of eastern Europe."

Voting Record: (p. 345; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 7</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 20</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | UK | France |
| Czechoslovakia | US | |
| Poland | | Egypt |
| Ukrainian SSR | | India |
| USSR | | Iran |
| Yugoslavia | | Iraq |
| | | Lebanon |
| | | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Syria |
| | | Turkey |

4. Australian resolution (document A/C 1/178) concerning the composition of the Special Committee:

"The General Assembly resolves,

"That the special committee shall consist of eleven members, not including the permanent members of the Security Council,"

Voting Record: (pp. 345-46; 13 May 1947)

| <u>For: 13</u> | <u>Against: 11</u> | <u>Abstentions: 29</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| India | Byelorussian SSR | Afghanistan |
| | Czechoslovakia | Egypt |
| US | Poland | Iran |
| | Ukrainian SSR | Iraq |
| | USSR | Lebanon |
| | Yugoslavia | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Syria |
| | UK | Turkey |

III. THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY *

A. THE TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE OVER PALESTINE AND THE DECLARATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE.

1. Inclusion on the supplementary list (a/294) of the General Committee report (a/298), the Item entitled: "The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the Declaration of its Independence," submitted by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in documents A/287, A/288, A/289, A/290, and A/291 respectively.

Voting Record: (pp. 59-60; 1 May 1947)

| <u>For: 15</u> | <u>Against: 24</u> | <u>Abstentions: 10</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | France | Czechoslovakia |
| Egypt | UK | Poland |
| Iran | US | |
| Lebanon | | |
| Saudi Arabia | | |
| Syria | | |
| Turkey | | |
| India | | |
| Byelorussian SSR | | |
| Ukrainian SSR | | |
| USSR | | |
| Yugoslavia | | |

B. INVITATION TO THE JEWISH AGENCY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1. Polish resolution as amended by Czechoslovakia (A/BUR/80):

"The General Assembly,

"Resolved to give careful consideration to the point of view of the Jewish people on the Palestine question,

"Decides to invite the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the Plenary meetings of the General Assembly for the purpose of stating their views on this question."

Voting Record: (p. 114; 5 May 1947)

| <u>For: 8</u> | <u>Against: 39</u> | <u>Abstentions: 7</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | Afghanistan | |
| Czechoslovakia | India | |
| Poland | Iran | |
| Ukrainian SSR | Iraq | |
| USSR | Lebanon | |
| Yugoslavia | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Turkey | |
| | France | |
| | UK | |
| | US | |

* Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948.

2. Joint resolution (A/305) submitted by Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Argentina, Yugoslavia, and Uruguay:

"The General Assembly resolves,

1. That the First Committee grant a hearing to the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before the Committee;

2. To send to that same committee for its decision those other communications of a similar character from the Palestinian population which have been received by this special session of the General Assembly or may later be submitted to it."

Voting Record: (pp. 114--15; 15 May 1947)

For: 44

Against: 7

Abstentions: 3

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia

Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey

India
Iran

France
UK
US

C. CREATION OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO PREPARE A REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

1. Committee 1 Resolution (A/307) concerning the creation of a "Special Committee to prepare for the consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine."

a. Paragraph 1:

"The General Assembly resolves that:

1. A special Committee be created for the above-mentioned purpose, consisting of the representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia."

Voting Record: (pp. 174-5; 15 May 1947)

For: 40

France
UK
US

India
Iran

Against: 0

Abstentions: 13

Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia

b. Preamble and Paragraphs 2 to 9:

"Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has been called into special session for the purpose of constituting and instructing a Special Committee to prepare for consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine,

"The General Assembly resolves that:

* * * * *

2. The Special Committee shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine;

3. The Special Committee shall determine its own procedure;

4. The Special Committee shall conduct investigations in Palestine and, wherever it may deem useful, receive and examine written or oral testimony, whichever it may consider appropriate in each case, from the mandatory Power, from representatives of the Population of Palestine, from Governments and from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary;

5. The Special Committee shall give most consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity;

6. The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine;

7. The Special Committee's report shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not later than 1 September 1947, in order that it may be circulated to the Members of the United Nations in time for consideration by the second regular session of the General Assembly;

The General Assembly,

8. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into suitable arrangements with the proper authorities of any State in whose territory the Special Committee may wish to sit or to travel, to provide necessary facilities, and to assign appropriate staff to the committee;

9. Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of a representative and an alternate representative from each Government represented on the Special Committee on such basis and such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances."

Voting Record: (p. 176; 15 May 1947)

| <u>For: 45</u> | <u>Against: 7</u> | <u>Abstentions: 1</u> |
|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | |
| UK | Egypt | |
| US | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | |
| Byelorussian SSR | Saudi Arabia | |
| Czechoslovakia | Syria | |
| Poland | Turkey | |
| Ukrainian SSR | | |
| USSR | | |
| Yugoslavia | | |
| India | | |
| Iran | | |

c. Resolution as a whole:

Voting Record: (pp. 176-7; 15 May 1947)

| <u>For: 45</u> | <u>Against: 7</u> | <u>Abstentions: 1</u> |
|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | |
| UK | Egypt | |
| US | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | |
| Byelorussian SSR | Saudi Arabia | |
| Czechoslovakia | Syria | |
| Poland | Turkey | |
| Ukrainian SSR | | |
| USSR | | |
| Yugoslavia | | |
| India | | |
| Iran | | |

SECTION TWO: THE SECOND (REGULAR) SESSION, 16 September -
29 November 1947

I. The Ad Hoc Committee

- A. Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question.
- B. Report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question.

II. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly

- A. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question.

I. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE *

A. REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 2 TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

1. First Draft Resolution contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question." (A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) entitled: "Draft Resolution Referring Certain Legal Questions to the International Court of Justice."

a. Paragraph 1 of the operative part, up to and inclusive of sub-paragraph (g) relative to requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on:

"(a) Whether the indigenous population of Palestine has not an inherent right to Palestine and to determine its future constitution and government;

"(b) Whether the pledges and assurances given by Great Britain to the Arabs during the First World War (including the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918) concerning the independence and future of the Arab countries at the end of the war did not include Palestine;

"(c) Whether the Balfour Declaration, which was made without the knowledge or consent of the indigenous population of Palestine, was valid and binding on the people of Palestine, or consistent with the earlier and subsequent pledges and assurances given to the Arabs;

"(d) Whether the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine are in conformity or consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations (in particular Article 22), or are compatible with the provisions of the Mandate relating to the development of self-government and the preservation of the rights and position of the Arabs of Palestine;

"(e) Whether the legal basis for the Mandate for Palestine has not disappeared with the dissolution of the League of Nations and whether it is not the duty of the Mandatory Power to hand over power and administration to a government of Palestine representing the rightful people of Palestine;

* Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly: Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Summary Records of Meetings, 25 September - 25 November 1947 and Annex.

"(f) Whether a plan to partition Palestine without the consent of the majority of its people is consistent with the objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and with the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine;

"(g) Whether the United Nations is competent to recommend either of the two plans and recommendations of the majority or minority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, or any other solution involving partition of the territory of Palestine, or a permanent trusteeship over any city or part of Palestine, without the consent of the majority of the people of Palestine;"

Voting Record: (p. 203; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 18</u> | <u>Against: 25</u> | <u>Abstentions: 11</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | India |
| Egypt | Czechoslovakia | |
| Iran | Poland | UK |
| Iraq | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Lebanon | USSR | Yugoslavia |
| Pakistan | | |
| Saudi Arabia | France | |
| Syria | US | |
| Turkey | | |
| Yemen | | |

b. Paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (h): Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without consent of the inhabitants of Palestine.

Voting Record: (p. 203; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 20</u> | <u>Against: 21</u> | <u>Abstentions: 13</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | Czechoslovakia |
| Egypt | Poland | Yugoslavia |
| India | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Iran | USSR | UK |
| Iraq | | |
| Lebanon | US | |
| Pakistan | | |
| Saudi Arabia | | |
| Syria | | |
| Turkey | | |
| Yemen | | |
| France | | |

2. Second Draft Resolution contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question," (A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) entitled: "Draft Resolution on Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons."

a. First recommendation:

"That countries or origin should be requested to take back Jewish refugees and displaced persons belonging to them, and to render them all possible assistance to resettle in life;"

Voting Record: (p. 204; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 17</u> | <u>Against: 14</u> | <u>Abstentions: 23</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Ukrainian SSR | Byelorussian SSR |
| Egypt | USSR | Czechoslovakia |
| India | | Yugoslavia |
| Iran | US | |
| Iraq | | France |
| Lebanon | | UK |
| Pakistan | | |
| Saudi Arabia | | Turkey |
| Syria | | |
| Yemen | | |
| Poland | | |

b. Second recommendation:

"That those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who can not be repatriated should be absorbed in the territories of Members of the United Nations in proportion to their area, economic resources, per capita income, population and other relevant factors;"

Voting Record: (p. 204; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 18</u> | <u>Against: 16</u> | <u>Abstentions: 21</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | France |
| Egypt | Czechoslovakia | UK |
| India | Poland | |
| Iran | Ukrainian SSR | Yugoslavia |
| Lebanon | USSR | |
| Pakistan | | Turkey |
| Saudi Arabia | US | |
| Syria | | |
| Yemen | | |

c. Third recommendation:

"That a special committee of the General Assembly should be set up to recommend for acceptance of the United Nations a scheme of questions of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories, and that the special committee should, as far as possible, work in consultation with the International Refugee Organization or its Preparatory Commission;"

Voting Record: (p. 204; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 15</u> | <u>Against: 18</u> | <u>Abstentions: 22</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | Czechoslovakia |
| Egypt | Poland | Yugoslavia |
| India | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Iran | USSR | France |
| Iraq | | UK |
| Lebanon | US | |
| Pakistan | | Turkey |
| Saudi Arabia | | |
| Syria | | |
| Yemen | | |

d. Sixth paragraph of preamble only:

"Considering that Palestine, despite its very small area and limited resources, has absorbed a disproportionately large number of Jewish immigrants and can not take any more without serious injury to the economy of the country and the rights and position of the indigenous population,"

Voting Record: (p. 205; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 11</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 18</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | Yugoslavia |
| Egypt | Czechoslovakia | |
| Iran | Poland | UK |
| Iraq | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Lebanon | USSR | |
| Pakistan | | |
| Saudia Arabia | France | |
| Syria | US | |
| Turkey | | |
| Yemen | | |

e. Second Draft Resolution, as modified by previous

amendments:

Voting Record: (pp. 205-6; 24 November 1947)

For: 16

Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen

France

Against: 16

Byelorussian SSR
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
US

Abstentions: 23

Czechoslovakia
Poland
Yugoslavia

(Resolution was not adopted)

3. Third Draft Resolution, contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question," (A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) entitled; "Draft Resolution on the Constitution and Future Government of Palestine." The resolution recommends, chiefly, (1) the setting up of a provisional representative government in Palestine which would assume the powers and functions of the present administration in Palestine, and which would enact an electoral law for establishing a constituent assembly, and hold elections for the constituent assembly; (2) the withdrawal of the troops of the Mandatory Power as soon as the provisional government is installed and within a one-year period thereof; and strict adherence, to certain defined principles, chief of which are: (a) Palestine shall be a unitary, sovereign state, having a democratic constitution with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to the legislature; (b) the constitution shall guarantee the rights of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, educational institutions of their own, subject to normal government supervision and inspection; (c) the constitution shall ensure adequate representation in the legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength; and (d) the guarantee contained in the

constitution concerning the rights and safeguards of minorities shall not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the minority concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives in the legislature.

Voting Record: (p. 206; 24 November 1947)

| <u>For: 12</u> | <u>Against: 29</u> | <u>Abstentions: 14</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | India |
| Egypt | Czechoslovakia | |
| Iran | Poland | UK |
| Iraq | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Saudi Arabia | USSR | Yugoslavia |
| Turkey | | |
| Yemen | US | |
| Syria | France | |

4. Draft resolution and partition plan contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question" (A/AC 14/34 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) as amended. The resolution recommends the adoption and implementation, "with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union" as defined in the remainder of the report and as amended.

Voting Record: (pp. 222-23; 25 November 1947)

| <u>For: 25</u> | <u>Against: 13</u> | <u>Abstentions: 17</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | Afghanistan | France |
| Czechoslovakia | Egypt | UK |
| Poland | India | |
| Ukrainian SSR | Iran | Yugoslavia |
| USSR | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | |
| US | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Turkey | |
| | Yemen | |

II. THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY *

A. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (A/516) on the Palestine question.

In this report, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution "181(II)" on the future government of Palestine embodying a plan of partition with economic union.

 * Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 16 September - 29 November 1947, Volume II, 110th - 218th Meetings, 13 November - 29 November 1947

SECTION THREE: THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION, 16 April - 14 May 1948

I. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly

- A. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10 on the Temporary Administration of Jerusalem.
- B. Draft resolution contained in Report of Committee 1.

Voting Record: (pp. 1424-5; 29 November 1947)

For: 33

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR

France
US

Against: 13

Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen

Abstentions: 10

UK

Yugoslavia

I. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly *

A. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10

1. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10 on "Temporary Administration of Jerusalem" (contained in document A/C 1/298) specifying the type of temporary government to be set up for Jerusalem.

a. Mexican Amendment (document A/C 1/302) to

paragraph 5 of preamble:

"Whereas the maintenance of order and security in Jerusalem is an urgent question which concerns the United Nations as a whole,"

Voting Record: (pp. 33-4; 14 May 1948)

| <u>For: 15</u> | <u>Against: 11</u> | <u>Abstentions: 28</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | India |
| US | Egypt | |
| | Iran | UK |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | Byelorussian SSR |
| | Pakistan | Czechoslovakia |
| | Saudi Arabia | Poland |
| | Turkey | Ukrainian SSR |
| | Yemen | USSR |
| | | Yugoslavia |

b. Mexican Amendment (document A/C 1/302) to

paragraph 6 of preamble to read as follows:

"Whereas Chapter XII of the Charter authorizes and empowers the United Nations to exercise temporary administrative authority,"

Voting Record: (p. 34; 14 May 1948)

| <u>For: 14</u> | <u>Against: 11</u> | <u>Abstentions: 28</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | Iran |
| US | Egypt | India |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | UK |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | Czechoslovakia |
| | Turkey | Poland |
| | Syria | Ukrainian SSR |
| | Yemen | USSR |
| | | Yugoslavia |
| | Byelorussian SSR | |

 * Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948, and Annex to Volumes I and II.

c. US Amendment (A/C 1/304) to article 4, paragraph

1 to read as follows:

"The Government of Jerusalem shall consist of a United Nations Commissioner and such officers as may be appointed by him or by the Trusteeship Council. . ."

Voting Record: (pp. 34-5; 14 May 1948)

| <u>For: 17</u> | <u>Against: 11</u> | <u>Abstentions: 26</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | India |
| US | Egypt | |
| | Iran | UK |
| | Iraq | |
| | Pakistan | Byelorussian SSR |
| | Saudi Arabia | Czechoslovakia |
| | Syria | Poland |
| | Turkey | Ukrainian SSR |
| | Yemen | USSR |
| | | Yugoslavia |

d. US Amendment (A/C 1/304) to article 10, paragraph

2 to replace the words: "shall be paid from a special United Nations operational budget," by the words: "shall be paid from the regular United Nations budget."

Voting Record: (p. 35; 14 May 1948)

| <u>For: 19</u> | <u>Against: 12</u> | <u>Abstentions: 23</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| US | Afghanistan | India |
| France | Egypt | |
| | Iran | UK |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | Byelorussian SSR |
| | Pakistan | Czechoslovakia |
| | Saudi Arabia | Poland |
| | Syria | Ukrainian SSR |
| | Turkey | USSR |
| | Yemen | |
| | Yugoslavia | |

e. US Amendment (A/C 1/304) proposing the addition

of the following words at the end of article 10, paragraph 2:

". . . provided that, if United Nations funds are contemplated, the Secretary-General shall be guided by the procedures which were established by the second session of the General Assembly for defraying unforeseen and extraordinary expenses."

Voting Record: (pp. 35-6; 14 May 1948)

| <u>For: 17</u> | <u>Against: 12</u> | <u>Abstentions: 25</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | India |
| US | Egypt | |
| | Iran | UK |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | Byelorussian SSR |
| | Pakistan | Czechoslovakia |
| | Saudi Arabia | Ukrainian SSR |
| | Syria | USSR |
| | Turkey | Poland |
| | Yemen | |
| | Yugoslavia | |

f. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10 (document A/C 1/298)

as amended:

Voting Record: (p. 36; 14 May 1948)

| <u>For: 20</u> | <u>Against: 15</u> | <u>Abstentions: 19</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | India |
| US | Egypt | |
| | Iran | UK |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | Czechoslovakia |
| | Pakistan | Poland |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | Yugoslavia |
| | Turkey | |
| | Yemen | |
| | Byelorussian SSR | |
| | Ukrainian SSR | |
| | USSR | |

Note: Failing to receive required two-thirds majority, resolution was rejected:

2. Draft resolution recommended in report of Committee 1 (contained in document A/552). The resolution (1) affirms the General Assembly's support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine, (2) calls upon all Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a truce, and (3) empowers a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, to exercise certain definite function.

Voting Record: (pp. 44--5; 14 May 1948)

For: 31

France
UK
US

India
Iran
Pakistan
Turkey
Afghanistan

Against: 7

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia

Abstentions: 16

Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen

I. THE FIRST COMMITTEE *

A. PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR

1. Australian Amendment (A/C 1/408) to revised UK resolution on Palestine (A/C 1/394/Rev. 2).

a. Amendment to paragraph 1:

"Being of opinion that the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 is the basic starting point of settlement by the Assembly of the Palestine question;"

Voting Record: (pp. 859-60; 1 December 1948)

| <u>For: 12</u> | <u>Against: 24</u> | <u>Abstentions: 12</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | Afghanistan | France |
| Czechoslovakia | Egypt | US |
| Poland | India | |
| Ukrainian SSR | Iraq | |
| USSR | Iran | |
| Yugoslavia | Lebanon | |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Yemen | |
| | UK | |

b. Amendment to paragraph 2:

"Being further of opinion that the final settlement in Palestine as regards boundaries should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation contained in the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 but should also take into account subsequent proposals, including those in the Mediator's report;"

Voting Record: (p. 860; 1 December 1948)

| <u>For: 4</u> | <u>Against: 25</u> | <u>Abstentions: 20</u> |
|---------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| | Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR |
| | Egypt | Czechoslovakia |
| | India | Poland |
| | Iran | Ukrainian SSR |
| | Iraq | USSR |
| | Lebanon | Yugoslavia |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | France |
| | Syria | US |
| | Turkey | |
| | Yemen | |
| | UK | |

* Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September - 8 December 1948, and Annex to Part I.

c. Amendment to paragraph 3:

"Noting the establishment since 15 May 1948 of civil and military authority under the Provisional Government of Israel, over substantially the area which, under the resolution of 29 November 1947 was recognized as delimiting the Jewish State in Palestine envisaged in that resolution;"

Voting Record: (p. 860; 1 December 1948)

| <u>For: 11</u> | <u>Against: 25</u> | <u>Abstentions: 13</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | Afghanistan | France |
| Czechoslovakia | Egypt | US |
| Poland | India | |
| Ukrainian SSR | Iran | |
| USSR | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Turkey | |
| | Yemen | |
| | UK | |

d. Amendment to paragraph 4:

"Noting that the establishment of the Provisional Government of Israel and the exercise by it of autonomous defense and administrative functions is in conformity with the spirit and intention of the resolution of 29 November 1947, and that this Government has been described by the Mediator as a 'living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality',"

Voting Record: (pp. 860-1; 1 December 1948)

| <u>For: 12</u> | <u>Against: 24</u> | <u>Abstentions: 13</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Byelorussian SSR | Afghanistan | France |
| Czechoslovakia | Egypt | US |
| Poland | India | |
| Ukrainian SSR | Iran | |
| Yugoslavia | Iraq | |
| USSR | Lebanon | |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Yemen | |
| | UK | |

SECTION FOUR: THE THIRD (REGULAR) SESSION (PART I),
21 September - 12 December 1948

I. The First Committee

- A. Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator.
- B. Withdrawal of Arab Troops.
- C. Creation of a Unitary State in Palestine.
- D. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice.

II. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly

- A. The Conciliation Commission, Holy Places, and Refugees.

2. UK second revised draft resolution (A/C 1/394/Rev. 2),

paragraph 5:

The General Assembly,

"Endorses the recommendation contained in paragraph 4(c) of the Mediator's conclusions concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State or the City of Jerusalem, and instructs the Conciliation Commission, in full consultation with the inhabitants of Arab Palestine, to assist the Governments of the Arab States concerned to arrange for the disposition of this territory in accordance with the aforesaid recommendation;"

Voting Record: (p. 890; 3 December 1948)

| <u>For: 18</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 12</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| UK | Afghanistan | |
| US | Egypt | |
| France | India | |
| | Iran | |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Turkey | |
| | Yemen | |
| | Byelorussian SSR | |
| | Czechoslovakia | |
| | Poland | |
| | Ukrainian SSR | |
| | USSR | |
| | Yugoslavia | |

3. United Kingdom draft resolution (document A/C 1/394/Rev. 2)

as amended:

Voting Record: (pp. 923-4; 4 December 1948)

| <u>For: 25</u> | <u>Against: 21</u> | <u>Abstentions: 9</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| France | Afghanistan | |
| UK | Egypt | |
| US | India | |
| | Iran | |
| | Iraq | |
| | Lebanon | |
| | Pakistan | |
| | Saudi Arabia | |
| | Syria | |
| | Turkey | |
| | Yemen | |
| | Byelorussian SSR | |
| | Czechoslovakia | |
| | Poland | |
| | Ukrainian SSR | |
| | USSR | |
| | Yugoslavia | |

B. WITHDRAWAL OF ARAB TROOPS

1. USSR draft resolution (A/C 1/401):

"The General Assembly,

"Considering that the presence of foreign troops in Palestine prevents the establishment of peaceful relations between the Arab and Jewish population in Palestine, as well as the normal development of the State of Israel and the creation of an Arab State in Palestine,

"Recommends the immediate removal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, the creation of which was provided for by General Assembly resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947, of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel; and

"Requests the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures for debarring a renewal of military activity in Palestine."

Voting Record: (p. 930; 4 December 1948)

For: 7

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia

Against: 33

Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Syria
Turkey
Yemen

UK
US
France

Abstentions: 8

India
Iran

C. CREATION OF A UNITARY STATE IN PALESTINE

1. Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/402):

"The General Assembly,

"Noting that resolution 181(II) of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 was not accepted by the Arabs of Palestine and the neighboring Arab States and gave birth to the disastrous situation in the Holy Land,

"Noting that the recommendations proposed by the Mediator in his part one of the progress report are based on partitioning Palestine between Arabs and Jews, proposal which has been flatly rejected by the Arabs and proved detrimental to the interests of both Arabs and Jews,

"Noting that the General Assembly is not empowered by the Charter to make imperative and compulsory recommendations for splitting countries,

"Noting that the Jewish community now found in Palestine is composed essentially of foreign immigrants and refugees who have no legitimate rights to appropriate a part of the country and establish their sovereignty on it against the wishes of the lawful majority of the people of Palestine,

"Decides to constitute a Commission composed of five Member States with functions:

"To study on the spot and to prepare proposals for the establishment of a single State of the whole of Palestine on a cantonization or federal basis in which all sections of population in Palestine will participate in rights and duties as loyal citizens of a democratic State with wide autonomous privileges in cantons or areas to be assigned to each of them."

Voting Record: (pp. 930-1; 4 December 1948)

| <u>For: 14</u> | <u>Against: 26</u> | <u>Abstentions: 8</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Afghanistan | France | |
| Egypt | UK | |
| India | US | |
| Iran | | |
| Iraq | Byelorussian SSR | |
| Lebanon | Czechoslovakia | |
| Pakistan | Poland | |
| Saudi Arabia | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Turkey | USSR | |
| Syria | | |
| Yemen | | |

D. THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/405) as amended by el Salvador, embodying a decision to refer certain legal aspects of the Palestine question to the International Court of Justice.

Voting Record: (pp. 932-3; 4 December 1948)

| <u>For: 21</u> | <u>Against: 21</u> | <u>Abstentions: 4</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Afghanistan | Byelorussian SSR | UK |
| Egypt | Czechoslovakia | |
| India | Poland | |
| Iran | Ukrainian SSR | |
| Iraq | USSR | |
| Lebanon | Yugoslavia | |
| Pakistan | | |
| Saudi Arabia | US | |
| Syria | France | |
| Turkey | | |
| Yemen | | |

II. THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY *

A. THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION, HOLY PLACES, AND REFUGEES

1. Polish proposal (A/804) to delete from paragraph 2 of Committee I Report draft resolution (document A/776) the words "3" and substitute "5" to increase the membership of the Conciliation Commission. (The resolution contained in document A/776 calls for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission consisting of three State members of the United Nations which will assume the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

Voting Record: (p. 993; 11 December 1948)

For: 6

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia

Against: 47

Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen

Abstentions: 5

India

UK
US
France

2. Joint proposal (A/800/Rev. 1), presented by Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, and New Zealand to delete paragraph 2(c) from resolution of First Committee (document A/776).

Paragraph 2(c) reads as follows:

"To promote good relations between the State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine, and the neighboring Arab States;"

* Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September - 12 December 1948, and Annex to Part I.

Voting Record: (pp. 993-4; 11 December 1948)For: 46

Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen

France
UK

Against: 8

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia

Abstentions: 3

3. El Salvador's amendment (A/801) to Committee 1 resolution (A/776). Amendment calls for extension of UN's supervision of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine (proposed and defined in paragraphs 7 and the second paragraph following paragraph 8 of draft resolution of Committee 1) to include Nazareth.

Voting Record: (p. 995; 11 December 1948)For: 17

Lebanon

Against: 11

Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen

UK
US

Abstentions: 29

Turkey

France

Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
Yugoslavia

4. Committee 1 draft resolution (A/776), as amended. (Committee 1 draft resolution (1) calls for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission having certain definite functions; (2) resolves that the Holy Places in Jerusalem area and in Palestine be accorded adequate protection; (3) resolves that the Jerusalem area "should be placed under effective United Nations control;" (4) resolves that refugees wishing to return to their homes be permitted to do so, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return" and for loss or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

Voting Record: (pp. 995-6; 11 December 1948)

For: 35

Turkey

France

UK

US

Against: 15

Afghanistan

Egypt

Iraq

Lebanon

Pakistan

Syria

Yemen

Byelorussian SSR

Czechoslovakia

Poland

Ukrainian SSR

USSR

Yugoslavia

Abstentions: 8

India

Iran