

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

DATE: October 14, 1959

FROM : RFB/XR - N. A. Pelcovits

STATE DEPT

SUBJECT: West Point Seminar on Gaming

Last week in New York I asked Bryce Wood of the Social Science Research Council about the outcome of a West Point seminar on gaming. He informed me that the West Point seminar on gaming was not held as originally scheduled. Instead at the Conference on the Social Science and National Security Policy, held at the United States Military Academy, June 17-19, under the auspices of the Committee on National Security Policy Research of the Social Science Research Council, an afternoon session was devoted to gaming techniques as a "media of instruction." This session, chaired by Paul Nitze, featured a discussion led by Hans Speier of RAND, which discussed the experiences at the RAND Corporation in developing gaming techniques in national security policy. I attach an off-the-record summary of the proceedings of the conference.

Speier's observations were largely based on his article in World Politics under the title of "Some Observations on Political Gaming." The main theme developed by Speier was that gaming is not a substitute for, but a supplement to analytical technique and a useful tool in teaching. RAND experience indicated that political gaming should not be designed to predict behavior, but rather to determine how to make maximum use of empirical data and specialized skills in focusing on a problem. The session also heard from Harold Guetzkow on gaming exercises at Northwestern held for undergraduates and junior executives; Warner R. Schilling about a gaming exercise at Columbia which emphasized a sense of the pressure of time in making policy decisions and the fact that many problems cannot be satisfactorily solved; and Lincoln Bloomfield and Norman Padelford who discussed two M.I.T. games focused on the Berlin crisis. The essential difference between the RAND game and the Northwestern experience was noted: the first game gave the players a full appreciation of the complexity and dynamics of international politics through role-playing, while the second was more concerned with conveying to students the theory and structure of international politics.

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Auth: DDA REG. 77/123

Date: 4 Oct 78 By: JLL

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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

CONFERENCE ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

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Held at
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York
June 17-19, 1959

under the auspices of the
Committee on National Security Policy Research
of the Social Science Research Council

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Social Science Research Council
230 Park Avenue
New York 17, New York

PROGRAM

(All conference sessions held in Thayer Hall, United States Military Academy)

Wednesday, June 17
12:30 p.m.

Luncheon, Hotel Thayer

2:30-5:15 p.m.

Traditional Disciplines and a New Policy Field

Chairman

H. Field Haviland, Jr., Brookings Institution

Discussion Leaders

William F. R. Fox, Columbia University

Charles Hitch, RAND Corporation

Commentators

Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council

Morris Janowitz, University of Michigan

Klaus Knorr, Princeton University

Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army

6:30 p.m.

Dinner, Hotel Thayer

8:00-10:00 p.m.

Renewal of Discussion

Discussion Leader

Harold D. Lasswell, Yale University

Thursday, June 18
9:15 a.m.-12:00

Courses on National Security Policy: Specialized Courses and University Seminars

Chairman

Col. G. A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy

Discussion Leaders

Lt. Col. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., United States Military Academy

Harry L. Coles, Ohio State University

John W. Masland, Dartmouth College

Commentators

Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., University of California, Berkeley

William Emerson, Yale University

Lt. Col. Wesley W. Posvar, United States Air Force Academy

12:30 p.m.

Luncheon, Hotel Thayer

2:30-5:15 p.m.

Gaming Techniques as Media of Instruction

Chairman

Paul H. Nitze, Foreign Service Educational
Foundation

Discussion Leader

Hans Speier, RAND Corporation

Commentators

Harold Gustzkow, Northwestern University

Warner R. Schilling, Columbia University

5:30-7:00 p.m.

Reception, Ballroom, Hotel Thayer

7:15 p.m.

Dinner, Hotel Thayer

Evening

No conference session scheduled

Friday, June 19

9:15 a.m.-12:00

Assimilation of National Security Problems
into Established Courses in the Social Sciences

Chairman

John W. Masland, Dartmouth College

Discussion Leaders

Holbert N. Carroll, University of Pittsburgh

Samuel P. Huntington, Columbia University

Arthur Smithies, Harvard University

12:30 p.m.

Luncheon, Hotel Thayer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Willard F. Barber, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State
 Lt. Victor Basiuk, U.S. Naval War College
 Ross N. Berkes, School of International Relations, University of Southern California
 Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley
 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Alastair Buchan, Institute for Strategic Studies, London
 William M. Capron, Department of Economics, Stanford University
 Lt. Col. John W. Carley, Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy
 Holbert N. Carroll, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh
 Harry L. Coles, Department of History, Ohio State University
 Stetson Conn, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army
 Robert H. Connery, Department of Political Science, Duke University
 Matthew Cullen, Ford Foundation
 Royden Dangerfield, Associate Provost and Dean of Administration, University of Illinois
 William Emerson, Department of History, Yale University
 William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
 Capt. Robert Gard, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
 Alfred Goldberg, Air University Historical Liaison Office, Department of the Air Force
 Fred Greene, Department of Political Science, Williams College
 Major Abbott C. Greenleaf, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
 Harold Guetzkow, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University
 Paul Y. Hammond, Department of Political Science, Yale University
 H. Field Haviland, Jr., Brookings Institution
 Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council
 Roger Hilsman, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress
 Charles Hitch, RAND Corporation
 Malcolm W. Hoag, RAND Corporation
 Capt. Edwin B. Hooper, U.S. Naval War College
 Samuel P. Huntington, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
 Morris Janowitz, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan
 W. W. Jeffries, Department of English, History and Government, U.S. Naval Academy
 Lt. Col. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
 Charles P. Kindleberger, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 William R. Kintner, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
 Klaus Knorr, Center of International Studies, Princeton University
 Harold D. Lasswell, Law School, Yale University
 Capt. Francis W. Laurent, Law School, University of Wisconsin
 Col. G. A. Lincoln, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
 Gene M. Lyons, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
 William W. Marvel, Carnegie Corporation of New York
 John W. Masland, Department of Government, Dartmouth College

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Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army
Paul H. Nitze, Foreign Service Educational Foundation
Robert J. Nordstrom, Committee on Defense Studies, Ohio State University
Raymond G. O'Connor, Department of History, Stanford University
Charles P. O'Donnell, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State
Norman J. Padelford, Department of Economics and Social Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall Research Foundation
Lt. Col. Wesley W. Posvar, Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy
Laurence I. Rachay, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
Harry Howe Ransom, Defense Studies Program, Harvard University
Emmette S. Redford, Department of Political Science, University of Texas
Vincent P. Rock, U.S. Office of Civilian Defense Mobilization
Col. E. L. Rowry, National War College
Thomas C. Schelling, RAND Corporation
Warner R. Schilling, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University
Hans Speier, RAND Corporation
George A. Steiner, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles
Kenneth W. Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation
Lt. Col. Jiro Tokuyama, Columbia University
Paul P. Van Riper, Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University
Major Gen. Robert J. Wood, Deputy Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Afternoon Session, June 17Traditional Disciplines and a New Policy FieldPanel Chairman, H. Field Haviland, Jr.

The Chairman of the panel reminded the conference that historically there has been a deep interest in military affairs. Problems of war and defense were a major concern in former periods of history, although this concern dwindled in the years prior to the First and Second World Wars. Today, however, we must become interested in the problems of security. There is a kind of imperative behind our discussions.

William T. R. Fox:

Mr. Fox observed that the conference would be directed toward the problems involved in the development of a new field of research and teaching activity. Today we would be asking why we are thus concerned and what the future looks like; tomorrow we would look at the introduction of this field into teaching and research programs.

There are three patterns of civil-military relations which are somewhat distinct from one another. There is, first, the tradition that is found in English-speaking countries where civilian perspectives on military affairs have been based on the experience of relatively low levels of peacetime mobilization. This contrasts with the second pattern, which is found on the European continent where there has historically been a relatively high level of peacetime mobilization. The third pattern is found in those countries where governmental succession is highly dependent on the control of military power.

In the English-speaking countries, civilians have generally been concerned with the control of the military. This they have sought to achieve through constitutional safeguards and through the starvation of the military services during peacetime. What made this possible was a reliance on industrial and military potential rather than on forces-in-being. In this atmosphere any interest in war revolved around the problems of stamping it out; for example, the establishment of the World Peace Foundation early in the century and the terms of Andrew Carnegie's will establishing the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reflected this kind of hope and interest. Where there was an interest in the history of war, it was in the battles fought or in the impact of war on society.

This trend of interest in the Anglo-Saxon countries should be contrasted with the mandate of the Committee on National Security Policy Research and the reasons for holding this conference. The problem of

civilian control is still one of concern but there are other issues: the problem of achieving competent civil control; the problem of gaining maximum security at minimum cost in terms of values and resources; studying military history from the viewpoint of the development of policy and the decision-making process.

During the last decade there has been a rediscovery of the dual nature of civil-military relations, an awareness of both the internal and external threats to a free society. Pendleton Herring's book, The Impact of War, for example, demonstrated that defense was possible within a democratic framework; whereas Harold Lasswell's National Security and Individual Freedom demonstrated that democracy was possible while defending ourselves.

The study of national security policy as it has evolved, has two main parts. First, there are the problems of American government: how to improve the skills and attitudes of policy makers; how to organize government to work toward a concert of judgment; how to get the "right answers" accepted as policy; and how to develop public understanding in this complicated area. Behind these questions is an understanding that military policy lies in an area between the objectives of foreign policy and the means of economic resources.

The second part lies in the field of international relations. It includes three basic changes in the structure of international politics. First, there is the change in the special insular condition of the Anglo-American countries. From this a new time factor has developed. No longer is it possible to mobilize after a crisis, nor to maintain a low level of peacetime mobilization. A second change relates to what Walter Millis calls the hypertrophy of general war (and beyond this, to the need to keep general war hypertrophic for any potential opponent). A third basic change in the structure of international relations comes from the change in the status of Afro-Asian nations, now subjects rather than objects of international politics.

These changes have forced the United States to undertake a high level of peacetime mobilization, a deep commitment to allies, and an extensive program of economic and military assistance. All three of these undertakings are evident in the relations of the United States with Europe and produce complex problems for study. These problems might be considered to fall into four major categories: the problem of standardization; the problem of determining what is a fair share of the total obligation; that of determining a balance of force within the alliance; that of decision making.

Beyond the problem of the Western alliance are those that develop out of American relations with the rest of the free world. These might be separated into three major categories: relationship of foreign economic aid to American national security; the problem of dealing with neutralism or a drift toward alliance with the Communist powers; and the problem of balancing the merits of local strength against a reliance on atomic power.

Beyond the external problems that the United States has to face in relation to the Western alliance, to the rest of the free world, and to the Communist powers, there are the complex issues that develop out of the interrelationship of foreign and domestic policies. The complexity and scope of these problems emphasize the need for defining the field of national security and developing a theory. This must be done, moreover, while resisting the demands put on scholars by policy makers in the pursuit of answers to short-term problems.

General Discussion

The question was raised as to the wisdom of looking at Anglo-American traditions in national security as an entity. It was pointed out that during the Revolutionary period Americans were as realistic about these problems as they have been unrealistic at other times and that a similar diversity is true when one studies the British experience.

In response, it was suggested that during the latter half of the 19th century the British experience paralleled the American experience in many ways. There was little coordination between the Army and Navy, British military organization bore little relationship to the European political situation, and there was a low level of peacetime mobilization. Moreover, as late as the 1890's there was sharp opposition in Britain to the creation of a general staff. Only the conduct of the Boer War brought pressures for change just as the criticism of the conduct of the Spanish-American War laid the foundation for the Root reforms in 1903. While it is true that British insularity broke down before that of the United States, there continued to be a reliance on the navy as a means of defense beyond the territory of the Isles themselves.

A good deal of interest was directed toward the problem of security and the military in developing areas. It was suggested that research was needed to isolate the conditions under which it is possible to have security without the security forces themselves becoming a threat to internal institutions. Case studies of present conditions in Southeast Asia and Latin America are useful, but it was also suggested that a theoretic analysis of these situations was also greatly needed.

Charles Hitch:

In drawing attention to the relationship of economics as a traditional discipline to the issues of national security policy, Mr. Hitch noted that at present very little research and writing are being done by economists in this field. The teaching of national security policy within the setting of economics is therefore made difficult by the lack of pedagogical materials.

Following both World Wars there was some interest shown by economists in a narrow set of problems generally involving mobilization and economic stabilization measures and controls. These kinds of studies, however, are

no longer particularly relevant in view of the changes in the technology of war. There is a new set of problems which revolves around the necessity of maintaining large and competent forces-in-being both as a deterrent to war and as a requirement for waging war should it break out.

This is not to say that the threat of mutual annihilation has completely outmoded the possibility of general war. The problems of general war, limited war, and cold war, are all very much with us. One factor that is constant to all these problems is the need for a continual state of mobilization. Another common factor that must be understood is that economists cannot solve their part of the problem in isolation because of the integral relationship of economic, political, social, and military aspects.

There are, for practical purposes, two general definitions of economics. The first relates economics to the economy and emphasizes the study of institutions and groups such as markets and consumers. A second definition, one that is particularly applicable to problems of national security, relates economics to "economizing." Within this second definition of economics the speaker suggested a number of areas where economists might well contribute to the resolution of problems in national security policy:

(1) Much can be done on the analysis and measurement of economic strength for war. Prior to the present situation a good deal of attention was given to economic potential. The idea of potential is no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the experience of economists in this area can be useful to the present problems of seeking to determine what kind of economic strength is important and how it can be measured. There are other questions where the experience of economists would be valuable: What is the significance of the increase in the Soviet national product as compared to that of the United States? What is the relevance of European integration to Europe's economic strength in terms of national security?

(2) A second area of concern is the relation of large defense budgets to the national economy. What, for example, are the implications of defense expenditures in terms of tax policies? What are the implications for a free enterprise economy when such a large bite of the national spending is being taken out of the free market? Even though previous experiences enable economists to contribute to answering these questions, there is reason to think that a good deal of economic theory will have to be rethought in order to be completely pertinent to the issues involved.

(3) What factors are involved in determining the size of the national security budget? Resources cannot help us achieve absolute security. We can only buy relative security. What is this level of relativity? An answer presupposes an exercise of judgment toward which economic theory can contribute.

(4) There are also questions involving the use and management of defense resources. The Department of Defense is like a large company that is buying people and materials but producing a commodity for which there is no market. Despite this basic difference between defense and industrial

expenditures a good deal of economic theory can help meet the problems of efficiency and management in the defense budget if it is adapted to the issues involved. Much recent writing by political scientists has assumed that there is basic conflict between military doctrine and economic pressures. Most of this thinking stems from the need to make strategic decisions on the basis of the size of the defense budget. If, however, the basic problem of the size of the military budget is decided upon, then from that point on there need be no conflict between economic and military capabilities.

(5) A good deal of economic theory is also applicable to the development of institutional arrangements designed to promote efficiency. In the economy this is done by seeking to improve the environment within which institutions operate. For example, antitrust techniques are designed to improve market situations so that they might operate to the fullest advantage of the whole economy. In the area of national security policy similar relationships might well be determined. Now, for example, can budget and accounting techniques be improved? Now might it be possible to move from thinking in terms of maximizing budgets to making the most of budgets?

(6) Problems involving military research and development, particularly in relation to research and development in other areas of the economy, is another area where economists might profitably labor.

(7) The experience of economists would also be pertinent to problems involving military logistics.

(8) A good deal of economic theory is applicable to the problem of military alliances. Now is it possible to take best advantage of a division of labor within an alliance? Of differential cost factors? A good deal of thinking already available in theories of international economic trade might be put to use in this respect.

(9) The tactics of economic warfare of earlier periods are perhaps no longer relevant to problems of national security. Nevertheless, there are still grave problems of economic competition, of denial of resources, and of competition for neutrals through means of economic aid programs which are relevant to the cold war.

(10) There are also economic issues involved in the problem of disarmament and the limitation of weapons. What arrangements can be made that will be mutually advantageous to all parties? A good deal of economic theory is, in fact, devoted to this kind of problem.

(11) Despite the radical changes that military technology has made on war and security, problems of mobilization are still important under particular contingencies.

(12) Finally, the problems of civil defense involve a myriad of economic issues, including the need for dispersing industrial capacity, rebuilding economic enterprises after attack, and restoring the kind of communication that is necessary within an interdependent economy should it be disrupted by attack.

In summary, it was suggested that this variety of issues involved problems of grand strategy as well as lower-level problems to which economists could profitably contribute their experience and skills.

Morris Janowitz:

Mr. Janowitz emphasized the contribution that sociologists might make to the solution to national security problems in three areas:

(1) More work needs to be done on a concept of professionalization, particularly with respect to military officers. Although a good deal of material is available on the development of the military profession, it is necessary to be cautious in projecting past behavior into the future. There is also a need to look at the problems involved in competing professional demands on available talent, on the rate of turnover within the military profession, and the pertinency of these trends to the problem of creativity within the military profession itself. A question which might well be asked is: what will be the make-up of the military profession in ten years when selective service is no longer available? The speaker pointed out that although probably 100 or more studies are being done on changes in the medical profession, only two or three are devoted to the military profession.

(2) Also, little work is being done in analyzing differences in formal and informal organization among the military. The problem involves recognizing the gap that can exist between formal and informal organizations and the tensions that are exerted as a result of such differences. This has sharp relevancy and application to limited war situations. Here differences within a command structure can have great impact on important decisions that have to be made on the spot without referral to higher authority.

(3) There is, finally, the study of social change, in which a good deal more work is being done, particularly in relation to area study programs. Here the relation of the military as an instrument of social change is being examined. It is, however, possible to consider this area of study in a larger world sense and examine military and economic aid programs as instruments of social change.

Klaus Knorr:

Mr. Knorr commented on Mr. Hitch's list of subjects suggested for study by economists. He was impressed with the length of the list, but noted both that it could have been longer and that little research had been done. There are fascinating problems for economists to study: the impact of defense on the market; the impact of changing technologies; the absence of market choice and the substitution of government regulations for free choice. There are also the many problems involved in studying the rate of economic growth of the Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly because of the pressures that this growth will permit the bloc to exert in world politics.

Considering the urgent nature of these questions, there might be several explanations why so little work was being done by economists in this area. Some of these reasons could be deduced from the nature of the issues that need study:

1. Many of the issues can be undertaken with available conceptual tools and on the basis of nonclassified documentation that is readily available.
2. A number of issues, however, cannot be studied without access to classified data or an inner knowledge of the operations. Such issues, for example, fall within the category of achieving efficiency in using and managing defense resources.
3. A number of the issues cannot be tackled through the use of traditional concepts but require conceptual innovation.
4. As was pointed out earlier, almost all the issues are more than economic issues and therefore require a joint approach in cooperation with other disciplines.
5. Finally, there is a whole range of issues, such as problems of grand strategy, in which economists may not have any special competence but are as well-equipped as others to deal with the basic factors involved.

In summary, therefore, many economists have been reluctant to engage in work in the area of national security policy because of the need for conceptual innovation or the need for classified information or personal and close knowledge of the operations. Yet even where these particular differences have not been important, the fact remains that national security has simply not been a concern of economists just as it has not been a concern of society in general. Indeed, it might be said that more teaching in this area is needed to stimulate more research just as more research is needed to provide the tools for teaching.

Louis Morton:

The speaker referred to a remark made at the conference* sponsored by the Committee in 1957 that the advent of the nuclear age made all of military history prior to 1945 irrelevant to present problems. While this observation was questionable, it did illustrate the kind of problem that historians face in the national security area. There is great reluctance on the part of historians to move into the field and even those who do begin to work on military history have the problem of finding issues for study that are, in fact, relevant to present conditions. This problem can

* "Report on the Conference on National Security Policy: Problems of Research and Teaching." [Dartmouth College, June 24-26, 1957], ITEMS, Sept. 1957, pp. 29-32.

be solved, however. There are historical examples of deterrents in a study of British sea power, and also examples that relate the rationality of decision making to the conditions under which war has broken out in the past.

But even if a historian does enter the field and does find an issue which he thinks bears great relevancy to present problems, he must still face the problem of classified information. This problem is particularly difficult for one whose work must of necessity be based on the record.

Evening Session, Wednesday, June 17, 1959

Renewal of Discussion

Pendleton Herring:

Mr. Herring suggested that there were two sets of conditions for developing a new policy field. First, particular attention has to be given to focus and definition. Second, consideration has to be given to the matter of content, to sources that are available, and to appropriate methods. Concentrating principally on the matter of focus, he noted that national security is literally everywhere. But rather than making the task easier, the pervasiveness of the subject made the problem of focus more difficult. In the past the focus was generally on peace and the methods of settling disputes through peaceful means rather than war. Today the problem of security is integral to society itself. Yet there is a paradox in the situation. When we talk about security we are not only talking about military power. A myriad of factors are involved including ideological competition and economic aid. But beyond this, even when military power is thought to be the "trump card," we have come to a situation where it is almost impossible to play our trump and use military force.

The complexity of the security problem emphasizes the need to avoid a narrow view of the subject field. Essential to the very understanding of the nature of the security problem is an acknowledgment that it goes far beyond a consideration of military problems. And yet because there is disagreement as to the scope and limits of the subject area, the role of the scholar becomes more important.

Security policy is dynamic and feels the impact of constant shifts in the domestic and international environment. The individual investigator has to challenge the vested interests in this kind of situation, to seek out the real security problem that is at issue, and to deal in what is essentially an unorthodox area of investigation, often by using unorthodox methodology. However true it is that action must often be taken on an interdisciplinary basis, it is essentially the role of the individual scholar to get to the core of the problem and keep us constantly aware of what the true issue is.

Harold D. Lasswell:

Mr. Lasswell suggested a gap between the summary of research questions and the present state of the discipline thus far discussed, and the problems of teaching. What is this gap?

While there are different methods of thinking about problems and their solutions, there are several points involved in the process and these points might well be related to the problems involved in thinking through issues of national security:

1. Goal values: Thus far there had been no discussion of underlying principles. It seemed at times as though the goals to be achieved were completely understood. Is this the case?

2. Trends: While there has been some discussion of historical developments, there has been little discussion of summarizing the course of past events in relation to goal values.

3. Scientific analysis: Here we are concerned with the conditions affecting the variables in the problems we seek to solve. The two main speakers during the afternoon session formulated areas where scientific investigation could be undertaken. Yet here, too, there was an assumption rather than an assertion that scholars should be involved in the totality of the problems under study.

4. Projections: Here we are concerned with what is likely to happen in terms of preferred goals. Here, too, assumptions rather than assertions have been made on the probable future sequence of events.

5. Alternatives: It may be considered that the function of those engaged in research in this area is to accept and aid national security policies. If this is so, it is only one function, and one that assumes the goals of national policy to be preferred. It does not, however, exhaust the task of the research scholar who must also present alternatives to national policy.

The problem of alternatives forces us to ask a good many questions. Illustrative of these are: How is it possible for a disunited world to become united through voluntary means? How can elites in the United States and in the Soviet Union take measures to delimit current tensions? What are the conditions under which such expectations might be entertained by the Soviet elite?

It might well be asked whether American universities now provide the environment within which these broader problems of security that go beyond the national concern, can be investigated. Have universities tended to dismiss their unifying responsibility that comes from a common intellectual frame of reference? If they have, this common reference may now come from the element of violence in our society and the problems that it poses for all.

General Discussion

During the discussion considerable attention was given to the problem of focus. It was suggested by several that the speakers had thus far made the subject area seem so vague and unformulated that it appeared to be "unteachable." Several expressed concern with stretching the security definition so far beyond the problems of defense that it covered all of human activity and made it difficult to handle for both research and teaching.

To the contention that the Soviet threat was the key to the focus, the response was made that even without the Soviet threat the impact of new technology on the structure of international politics has been so forceful as to open new areas of investigation beyond those covered by the traditional disciplines.

The difficulties in defining the focus of the subject area were related to the problems involved in getting more scholars interested in research and teaching in the area. One realistic suggestion was that more scholars would be willing to work in the field if the demand curve were "moved farther to the right." There was, as another speaker suggested, a reciprocal relationship between an increase in interest and the movement of the demand curve. With more interest in the problems of national security, the demand would be greater. There was general concurrence that there was no lack of student interest in problems of national security.

Morning Session, June 18

Courses on National Security Policy

Panel Chairman: Colonel George A. Lincoln

The Chairman opened the discussion of teaching in national security policy. Three particular teaching experiences were to be presented within a general framework of eight points suggested by the Chairman:

1. Objective
2. Contents
3. Methods
4. Materials
5. Targets
6. Teachers
7. Future--stability and longevity
8. Curriculum

Lieutenant Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr.:

The cadets at West Point are college students with three fifths of their curriculum devoted to courses in the sciences and mathematics and two fifths to courses in social studies and the humanities. There are

several unique features of the West Point program. Generally there is an attempt to keep classes small, from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 15. The class periods are generally longer than those in other institutions, lasting 80 minutes with a good deal of stress being placed on the daily preparation for class-section work.

In the courses on international relations and national defense considerable use is made of visual aids and of the technique of role playing. Because the curriculum at the Academy is generally prescribed and few electives are offered, the background of students is well known and is generally uniform when they enter the courses under discussion here.

The two courses particularly pertinent to the subject area under discussion are (1) the Economics of National Security, and (2) National Security Problems. The first is compulsory for all cadets; the second is an elective. In both courses, however, the principal objective is to stimulate interest in the subject matter. There is not time to offer the cadets a full understanding of the material involved. Most of them will, it is anticipated, take up these same subjects when they enter the War College. But in the twenty-year interval between their Academy experience and their War College participation, it is hoped that they can be encouraged to read and think about national security issues in their broadest perspective.

The course in the Economics of National Security was described. In 3 introductory lessons there is an attempt to discuss the need for a balance between military and economic strength and to analyze the basic problems of economic mobilization. This is followed by 5 lessons generally devoted to the organization of mobilization machinery through an analysis of the budget process and the experiences of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. The following 8 lessons are devoted to a study of key resources, including transportation, manpower, and materials, and involve an examination of the problems of diverting resources to defense purposes. The course concludes with 2 lessons devoted to the impact of technology and the organization of research and development, and a final lesson relating all these problems to strategic issues.

The course on National Security Problems builds on the earlier course. After a general introduction, considerable time is allowed for a study of the organization of the Defense Department and the National Security Council. This is followed by a block of studies devoted to strategic concepts, including deterrence, containment, liberation, and fortress America. This, in turn, is followed by a study of regional security organizations, and then of the role of collective security as implemented through the United Nations. The course ends with a discussion of the cold war, including problems of psychological and economic warfare and the nature of the ideological struggle.

As in other Academy offerings, both courses are taught by dividing the cadets into small groups. Visual aids, case studies, and guest lecturers are used extensively. For the course in the Economics of National Security, a special text prepared by Colonel Lincoln and his

associates is used. For the smaller class in National Security Problems, selected readings are assigned in a number of books written during the last five years, which are placed on reserve.

In addition, students are encouraged but not obliged, to write book reviews and to keep a clipping file on the basis of which they may later write an analysis of the particular issue they have been following. Beyond the courses, cadets are encouraged to write their senior research essays in the field of national security policy.

Harry L. Coles:

The Ohio State University program of defense studies is supported by funds provided under the terms of the Mershon grant to promote and encourage efforts in civilian-military training. From this point of view, Ohio State has all the problems of other institutions but one: funds. A University committee was appointed to develop a program, and its report to the president in 1957 suggested a four fold program:

1. The Mershon Institute of Advanced Studies
2. A national security policy seminar
3. A program of special conferences in the national security area
4. A program of scholarships and fellowships.

The first suggestion has not been approved but the last three have, and projects have been undertaken in all three areas. Among these have been the pilot project to experiment with civilians teaching in the AFROTC program, a seminar in military history instruction for the Army ROTC, conferences during the past academic year on logistics, aggression, and civil-military relations, and the first appointment of Mershon scholarships and fellowships.

The national security seminar is attended by seniors and graduate students, including those who hold Mershon scholarships and fellowships. They come from a variety of disciplines, extending beyond the social sciences to the physical sciences and into graduate programs such as law. The content of the seminar is worked out by a faculty committee, and the principal discussions are led by guest lecturers each week. Generally speaking, the seminar surveys the threats to the United States and the free world, the response to these threats, and the organization of efforts to implement this response.

In the Ohio State experience great benefit has derived from reliance on guest speakers. The members of the seminar prepare for the discussion by reading literature either written by the speaker or involving the subject that he will discuss. The formal seminar is followed by informal social meetings where faculty and students have opportunity to continue discussion of the subject. There are also weaknesses in an over-reliance on guests, for it may lead to fragmentation of the subject matter, a lack of depth and of continuity in its development, and repetition of background material from week to week. It has been decided therefore in the

future to make less use of guest speakers and to have more presentations by members of the seminar.

With regard to content and materials, the general frame of reference of approaching national security from a challenge-response basis has perhaps led the seminar into too many different fields. The need for a sharper focus has become clear. Similarly, while there has been in recent years no lack of material, much has been found to be highly specialized and difficult to relate to the subject matter. Here, too, focus is a distinct problem, and if a special journal in the field were established it might help to define the area of interest and develop bibliographic "control."

Through its seminar, the Ohio State committee has also hoped to arouse such interest in national security that the area may come to be related to courses in the traditional disciplines. Nevertheless, in awarding research support, it is thought that emphasis should be on individual projects rather than on cooperative efforts. The committee is very much aware of the danger of becoming overly concerned with present problems. Universities are not equipped to solve these problems and should not attempt to organize themselves to do this job. Their task is to educate the decision makers of the future.

John W. Masland:

Mr. Masland described the Dartmouth seminar in national security policy as for seniors in an undergraduate liberal arts college. Originally the seminar grew out of the research interests of members of the Department of Government, who sought to relate these interests to their teaching. They did not wish to limit students to the problems of military education, but to give them a broader view of national security policy. Beyond this, the seminar also stems from an effort to stimulate in students an awareness of the possibilities of public service careers and an understanding of problems of public policy.

The focus of the seminar has been on military affairs as related to other fields, such as constitutional law and international relations. Since the seminar has originated, it has been found that students now come into the class better prepared to cope with the problems presented. This may well be an indication of the increasing interest and concern within our society about problems involved in national security policy. Moreover, there has been an increasing proliferation of materials that can be used so it is now possible to be selective about assignments.

During the recent academic year, the seminar opened with a critique of the new book by Walter Millis and Harvey C. Mansfield, ARMS AND THE STATE. These followed an analysis of strategic concepts and a study of the problems of defense organization. This year a good deal of attention was given to the sociology of the military. Through the participation of members of the staff of the American Universities Field Service, it was possible to devote time to the role of the military in other countries,

particularly Latin America and the Middle East. The seminar this year for the first time included a discussion of science and public policy, particularly as it related to the national security area.

Although several guests conducted meetings of the seminar, the principal work of presenting and discussing problems lay with the students, who presented papers after analyzing particular areas in which they were interested. For the past several years it has also been possible for one or two members of the seminar to continue an interest in the area by participating in the summer internship program conducted in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Lieutenant Colonel Wesley W. Posvar:

A course in defense policies was offered at the Air Academy this year for the first time, on an experimental basis, as a prescribed course in the senior year for all cadets. While it is similar in concept to the course in National Security Problems at West Point, cadets at the Air Academy are exposed to more courses in the social sciences prior to the defense study.

Unlike civilian institutions, the service academies have as students men whose professions will involve nearly all of them in the defense area. The objectives of academy programs are therefore different. There is no need for "salesmanship." There is, however, a sense of mission involved in the course and a sense of urgency in impressing the cadets with the need to understand the problems involved. There is no need to spend too much time on factual details except as a means toward shaping attitudes and approach. For example, it is thought that cadets should come out of the course with some skepticism about accepting a rigid definition of roles and missions. There is also a need to impress the cadets with the relationship of national values to national security. Finally, a basic objective of the course is to encourage the cadet to understand that his education is only beginning and that there is a need for continuing self-education in this broad field in which he is to become a practitioner.

During the course of teaching the defense program during the last year there has been an increasing awareness at the Air Academy, as elsewhere, of the need for a sharper focus. The course is concerned, first, with the institutional machinery for formulating policy and, second, with the basic issues and substance of policy making in a world setting. On the basis of the first year's experience, there is a trend toward emphasizing the second area rather than the first. If this is done it will be important that the problems in the first area not be neglected. They can be studied in other courses, and if this can be worked out, the defense course will develop into a study of substantive problems.

One observation made by many cadets at the Air Academy might be significant. They seemed to understand that the defense course offered them an opportunity to examine their profession in relation to the broader issues of national security and, indeed, in relation to society as a whole. From this point of view, the course is of significant influence in the development of a sense of professionalism among the cadets.

Thomas C. Blaisdell:

The course in national security problems at the University of California, Berkeley, is different from those thus far described. It originated largely as part of an interest in government operations rather than in security per se. Despite this difference, the topics for student papers and the materials used in the course are similar to those described elsewhere. While there has been an attempt to stimulate general interest in the subject area, the students who have enrolled in the course have generally been those already converted, including retired Army officers, ROTC instructors, and veterans of the Korean War. Yet, in addition, a number of young men and women have enrolled simply because they are intensely curious about new problems and new challenges for study and research.

In developing the course, it has been becoming increasingly clear that materials and experiences coming out of the Second World War are no longer applicable to the issues that need study. It would seem that a deep re-assessment is needed to relate problems to the future. For example, in the area of manpower a good deal of thought needs to be given to the allocation of scientific and technical talent throughout our society, with emphasis on the portion that needs to be allocated to defense segments. This projection into the future is the most important problem faced in courses in national security policy.

William Emerson:

Mr. Emerson suggested that there were two main requirements for good teaching: the availability of original sources, and well-established points of view set down in secondary sources. If these two requirements are available, students can make intellectual decisions within the area of study and then go further into the problems in accordance with their interests. When these requirements are available, the seminar type of course is possible since the students have the means to provide most of the presentation and stimulation. In the national security area, however, these requirements of original sources and well-established points of view are not really available. Here it is important that the teacher do most of the work, and therefore the lecture method as opposed to the seminar method would seem most appropriate.

What seems to have happened is that national security seminars have been established as capstones for which no preparation or foundation really exists. Advanced seminars might be possible on special problems in the national security area. But it was suggested that the preparation might have to come from courses in existing fields within which national security problems complemented the issues traditionally studied and analyzed.

General Discussion

The discussion included observations on the variety of methods being used, the degree of background needed by the students, and the variety of student interests. It was, for example, pointed out that at Harvard the defense studies seminar is attended by undergraduates, graduates, and students in the professional schools, and that among this group can be found military officers as well as civilians.

The interdisciplinary nature of the subject area was particularly emphasized. This aspect of national security policy, it was suggested, provides a source of difficulty as one notes the general compartmentalization that exists in colleges and universities. Where the task force approach is used in teaching (as, for example, at Ohio State), questions arise as to where the program belongs, what the emphasis should be, and what issues are the most important for discussion. It was noted that the Harvard defense seminar will next year become a regular offering of the Department of Government, with members of other departments assisting on a personal, ad hoc basis.

The variety of approach and participation in courses on national security policy perhaps emphasized again the problems involved in developing a focus and definition of the subject area.

Afternoon Session, June 18

Gaming Techniques as Media of Instruction

Hans Speier:

Mr. Speier discussed the experiences at the RAND Corporation in developing gaming techniques in national security policy. His observations were largely based on his forthcoming article (with Herbert Goldhamer) in World Politics under the title "Some Observations on Political Gaming."

Gaming is not a substitute for, but is a supplement to analytical technique; moreover, it adds another tool to teaching.

When RAND was beginning its work in this area, antecedents were found in experiments carried on prior to the Second World War by the German General Staff, and by high Japanese authorities. Research has also indicated that the Soviets may well be using this technique as a method of predictive research.

The RAND game was designed to simulate the complexities of the international situation. Three elements were involved: (1) there were governments represented by individual players; (2) "nature" was represented by an individual or team for the purpose of manipulating all factors not under the control of particular governments; (3) a group of umpires was organized.

Under the rules of the game, all teams but the United States were to be guided by predictive behavior, that is, what they thought the government they represented would do under certain conditions. The United States team, however, was to be guided by optimum behavior in order that it would not be inhibited by restrictions stemming from a knowledge of the nature of the United States government, its operations, and procedures. The major function of the umpires was to question the plausibility of moves. The individual players could, however, challenge the judgment of the umpires in order to maximize discussion and analysis and derive analytical experience in the process.

Altogether, the RAND Corporation organized four games, the last two of which lasted one month each. The last game, moreover, was highly organized on a full-time basis and included the use of special consultants, a large secretariat, the preparation of a scenario, and the development of strategy papers by each team. The focus of the game was on the American-Soviet tensions in Western Europe.

In playing the game, six major considerations were taken into account:

1. An effort was made to minimize formality in order to maximize the freedom of action on the part of the players.
2. It was important that the incompleteness and incorrectness of information available to governments be conveyed realistically.
3. Contingency factors had to be taken into account.
4. Plausibility had to be insured.
5. A major effort was to be made to clarify issues raised during the course of the game by general discussion, by restricting the number of teams, and by seeking highly competent members to participate.
6. The need to explore alternate strategies was emphasized.

The RAND game offered the staff an appreciation of the difficulties of prediction. Political gaming should not be designed to predict behavior but rather to determine how to make the maximum use of empirical data and specialized skills in focusing on a problem. Indeed, it should help to stimulate discussion and joint analysis of the issues by specialists in a number of disciplines.

Political gaming can, however, also supplement historical experience as a test for assumptions over and above self-questioning. By their own inventiveness, players provide an insight into the need for contingency planning. At the same time, they clarify issues for research and open up new areas that might not otherwise have been exposed.

As an educational device, gaming provides three major advantages:

1. It offers a lively setting for students and gives new interest to facts and principles.

2. It provides an overview of a political situation and by emphasizing the many dimensions of a problem offers valuable training in politics.
3. It offers new insights in the pressures and uncertainties of the policy making process.

The speaker emphasized the range of variables that might be employed in gaming. Situations might be real or might be devised to stimulate new insights that would be lost were the game involved in a situation resembling reality. Tempo, scope, and participation might also be adjusted to enrich the experience. The use of foreign specialists is also a possibility. Finally, parallel games might be played to offer comparative experience for analysis.

Harold Guetzkow:

Mr. Guetzkow discussed gaming as employed at Northwestern both for undergraduates and junior executive policy-makers. He suggested that simulation is actually involved in lectures and seminars where operational situations are presented through verbalization. But where gaming techniques such as that described are used at the undergraduate level, a good deal of structure and formalization is needed because of a lack of competence and experience on the part of the players.

Students engaged in simulation exercises have been encouraged to analyze actions taken in an effort to understand the underlying processes involved. By using an abstract model rather than an actual situation, the analysis of process is transferable to any number of situations. The technique has offered students the opportunity to sense the importance and liveliness of the foreign policy process.

Warner R. Schilling:

A gaming exercise carried out at Columbia University differed from the RAND game in three ways: (1) all states were represented; (2) an attempt was made to simulate the total problems of the world and not a particular issue; (3) force was not ruled out as an alternative.

The game was set up so that events took place about a year ahead of the date of playing. As in the RAND game, there was an attempt to insure that information available to states would be incomplete and incorrect. The scenario was so devised that each state had a number of alternative strategies and also had a number of small side-problems to deal with. The same game was played at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and West Point as well, in order to see if there were any advantages to be had by comparing the behavior of the players.

Some of the conclusions that might be drawn from the Columbia experience follow:

1. The players found how difficult but necessary it is to make choices on the basis of inadequate information.
2. The players very quickly acquired a sense of the pressure of time and events as they act on policy makers.
3. States have a lack of complete control over events.
4. There are great difficulties in trying to adhere to a fixed strategy.
5. Many problems cannot be satisfactorily solved.
6. There is a need for good organization and negotiating techniques if any attempt is to be made to find a consensus.

The Columbia experience showed that the students playing the game had definite images of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Accidental events and fortuitous timing proved to be important, and the players willing to take a risk had a clear advantage over others. Throughout the exercise, there seemed to be an unwritten understanding among the players that war between the great powers would not break out. They were, nevertheless, quite ready to accept the intrusion of coups, revolutions, and assassinations.

The speaker emphasized the need for the instructor to conduct himself so as to avoid inhibitions among the players arising from the instructor-student relationship. It is also important to understand that the behavior of the individual players often has a greater importance than the behavior of the states they are representing. The idea of playing the same game at three institutions offered interesting comparisons for the students, although it did not seem to add much to the game itself.

Lincoln Bloomfield:

Two games had been played at M.I.T. during the past year. The first was a game played by senior professionals, and the second was a student exercise, both drawing on the RAND experience. In general, the speaker suggested that there were three uses to gaming: (1) as a teaching device, with role-playing comprising the essential value of the exercise; (2) as a training device for junior foreign service officers, with role playing only a means to an end; (3) as a device for predictive research.

As a result of the M.I.T. experience, the speaker suggested that the technique was a great success as a teaching device. The United Nations had proved to be a good setting for the game since a maximum number of people could be used. There had proved to be an advantage in having a single focus upon which all players would concentrate. The speaker also suggested that more be done to explore the relations between war games and political exercises. For planning and research purposes, it might be profitable to have a policy planning staff, a single thinker, and a game, all working simultaneously on the same issue.

Norman Padelford:

Mr. Padelford described two M.I.T. games, the first played entirely with M.I.T. undergraduates in which the Berlin crisis was brought into the UN, and the second, an intercollegiate game in which the Berlin crisis was brought before a foreign ministers meeting. He offered several observations on the basis of these experiences:

1. It is beneficial to devote a relatively long period to the game in order to allow students to read themselves into the situation.
2. The length of the game involves, of course, the problem of how much time the instructional staff can devote to working with the students.
3. The choice of the problem is important since the issues involved must be plausible to the student.
4. Ground rules for the game must be well spelled out and understood before the game starts.
5. Good facilities for playing are important in exciting interest in the students and suggesting to them that they are involved in something important.
6. It is useful to bring in outside umpires of some authority and prestige.
7. It is also helpful to have each team draw up a preliminary estimate of the situation and how it will develop.
8. A postmortem gives meaning to the time and effort the students gave to the game and allows them a chance to see the total exercise in perspective.
9. There can also be value in applying the lessons derived in the game to later class sessions.

General Discussion

The essential difference between the RAND game and the Northwestern experience was noted. The first gave the players a full appreciation of the complexity and dynamics of international politics through role playing. The second was not concerned so much with role playing as with seeking to get across the theory and structure of international politics.

Several possibilities for future gaming were suggested. One was to try to set up a game where advantages for one side do not necessarily mean disadvantages for another. Another possibility is to apply the gaming technique to past history with the one important stipulation that states were not to behave as they actually did.

In summary, there seemed to be general agreement that gaming was an exciting teaching device although it could be overdone. It was also pointed out that the real objective of the RAND game was to clarify issues. While a variety of games can be used, the type depends on the objectives. It is clear from the variety of experiences described that it is possible to modify the technique to suit a number of situations and objectives.

Morning Session, June 19

Assimilation of National Security Problems into Established Courses in the Social Sciences

Samuel P. Huntington:

There are four methods whereby national security policy could be incorporated into the established curriculum. In each case two elements are involved: the focus of the course; and the content and material of the course.

There is, first of all, the case of a special seminar in national security, such as the Dartmouth seminar described by Mr. Masland. Here both the focus and the content of the course are wholly devoted to national security problems.

The second method is the offering of a new course related to other courses in the established department. Here the major focus will be on national security matters, although considerable attention might be given to other situations. The content and materials of the course, however, will be devoted to national security matters as related to other situations, either because of the interdependence of the elements or for purposes of comparison.

A third method is the integration of a national security segment into established courses both in focus and in content. This is a particular problem in relation to basic courses in American government, economics, and international relations. The problem is to set aside several class sessions devoted to national security problems. In this respect one of the greatest obstacles stems from the absence of national security coverage in basic texts, particularly for American government courses.

A fourth method is the integration of national security materials to enrich a course where the focus is not particularly on national security. This would be true, for example, in a course in public administration where instances of interservice rivalry provide some of the most exciting illustrations of bureaucratic in-fighting.

Holbert N. Carroll:

Mr. Carroll described the basic American government course at the

University of Pittsburgh and how national security matters have been included in its development. The course runs for two semesters. During the first semester it covers the institutions and processes of American government; during the second, the contemporary challenges to American democracy and the responses to these challenges.

National security matters have largely been included during the second semester in two principal sectors:

(1) One week is largely devoted to the impact of science and technology on government. A good deal of attention is given to the problem of science and public policy, which is considered important because many of the students taking the course are majoring in engineering and will not spend much time in the social science departments as they go on.

(2) A period of four weeks is devoted to problems of national security policy. Attention is given to the changes in the world situation that have led to the new role of the United States. The special problems of this role are studied. An effort is being made to have as many students as possible choose a topic from this section of the course on which to write their research paper.

During these segments of the course, students are being exposed to government documents, congressional hearings, and professional journals that they might not otherwise look into. It has already been found that national security topics first studied in this government course are now being used by the students as a basis for research projects in other courses.

William M. Capron:

While examples from the national security field may be used in courses in economics, the focus of such courses was not necessarily national security per se. The primary task in economics courses is to teach theory. To do this, examples are necessary and important but the examples themselves, whichever field they cover, are not the focus. The speaker suggested courses in which examples from the national security field are particularly relevant. These include international economics, economic development, economic history, and public finance.

It is true that national security matters are now being omitted in economics courses for beginners. There is little being said, for example, on the impact of the defense budget on the economy or the implications of trends in the Soviet economy. The economist is not sure as yet what he has to say about these problems and what particular relevance they have to teaching the theory of economics.

At the graduate level, too, the emphasis is on training good theorists and not specialists in particular economic problems. This does not mean that more and more theses may not and should not be written about national security problems, but such a shift in attention need not require a radical or basic change in the general program of studies for graduate economists.

General Discussion

The general discussion to a large extent reverted to the problem of focus. One participant suggested that the question of survival was at the core of the subject area; another, that the issue of force was at its center. Still another participant suggested that the real problem was developing a theory of power that fits reality; another insisted that no single value theory was valid.

Mr. Fox suggested in conclusion that there was a pattern implicit in the three days of discussion, which he would attempt to make explicit:

(1) The conferees had begun by discussing how changing conditions--in military technology and in world politics--offered increased threats to the relatively unchanged values associated with our democratic way of life. The scholar's responsibility is to define these changed conditions and specify the consequences of pursuing alternative policies suggested to meet the new threats, thus clarifying the choice and increasing the rationality of the process of choosing. The research agenda of political scientists, economists, and academic intellectuals generally were discussed in turn.

(2) The conferees then turned to discuss more specifically and in greater detail the teaching problem in special courses in the field of national security policy. Questions of scope and method, focus and substance were discussed in the light of descriptions of courses and seminars now being taught and distinctive teaching experiments, particularly political gaming and simulation.

(3) Finally, national security was discussed as a problem as broad as society itself and therefore one to be dealt with by assimilating relevant materials into a wide variety of traditional courses. There is a need for historically rooted analysis, for trend projection, and for theoretical exercises to enable the policy-oriented student to transcend his own country and the events of the moment so that he may see the system as a whole and state the conditions under which peace and stability for the whole system might be increased and the territorial power struggle transformed.