

~~SECRET~~

OCI 2156/59

PRL (Guide No. 164)

Copy No 204

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL)

USSR

(1 MAY-31 AUGUST 1959)

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

OCI/CIA
PRL (Guide No. 164)
USSR
May - August 1959

FOREWORD

1. CIA Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's), which are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in CIA, are designed to point up the information required for current intelligence coverage of significant developments during the 4-month period covered by each PRL.

2. Coordination with the Department of State was initiated in 1958 and now includes the PRL's for all the world areas: (a) the USSR, (b) European Satellites and Yugoslavia, (c) Western Europe, (d) Near East/Africa, (e) Far East and (f) Latin America. This coordination on all the world areas has strengthened the value of the PRL's since they now include current intelligence requirements from the Intelligence and Regional Bureaus of the State Department, as well as those from the CIA Offices of Current Intelligence, Research and Reports and Scientific Intelligence. In addition, the PRL's include major intelligence deficiencies noted in the Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) approved by the US Intelligence Board (USIB)-- the principal governing body for US intelligence agencies under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency.

3. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total, present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any single collection facility. However, to the extent that the collector has a capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will provide effective guidance for current intelligence reporting. For those collectors who may not have access to background information, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of the requirements.

4. To facilitate and possibly expand the use of the PRL, all items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN (S/NOFORN), CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN), OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).

5. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed to:
- a. Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019 Que Building, Code 163, Extension 2181;
 - or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and Distribution (ICD), Department of State.

25X1A9a

Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA

PRL (Guide No. 164)
USSR
May - August 1959

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Foreword	i
Table of Contents	ii
USSR:	
I INTERNAL	1
II FOREIGN POLICY	11
III ECONOMIC	21
IV MILITARY	37
V SCIENTIFIC	45
SOVIET BLOC:	
I POLITICAL	59
II ECONOMIC	65
III MILITARY	73

PRL (Guide No. 164)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 May - 31 August 1959)

USSR

I. INTERNAL

A. Party and Government

1. The only topic on the agenda of the special 21st Party Congress, held from 27 January to 5 February 1959, was the Seven-Year Plan. The issue of the "anti-Party group" was raised again, however, and the names of Pervukhin and Saburov were linked with the "group" for the first time publicly. The attacks varied in severity from speaker to speaker. (U)

a. Were the differences merely variations on a theme, or did they represent real conflicts of view between members of the upper party hierarchy or individual Congress delegates? The Congress took no further official action against the members of the "anti-Party group" despite the verbal attacks. (U)

b. Are any further moves against them contemplated? Is there any likelihood that they will be brought to trial? (U)

c. Conferences between key Soviet officials and members of the 70 foreign delegations to the Congress took place during and after the Congress. Information (other than appeared in the Soviet press at the time) is desired on the participants, especially on the Soviet side, and the specific points of discussion. Were there any other unpublicized proceedings connected with the Congress? (U)

d. The next regular Party Congress has been scheduled for 1961. According to the Party rules it should be held early in 1960. Why was it postponed? (U)

2. Are there currently any signs of discord or conflict within the Presidium and Secretariat of the CPSU? (U)

a. Who among the members of these bodies has the greatest influence with Khrushchev? (U)

3. Existing evidence suggests that each member of the All-Union party secretariat has a fairly well-defined field of responsibility. Brezhnev, for instance, appears to be concerned, among other things, with political work in the armed forces; Ignatov currently with agriculture. It is probable, in this connection, that each secretary oversees the work

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

A. 3. (Continued)

of one or more of the departments of the central committee's apparatus. We are interested in any information on this break-down of responsibilities, particularly the following: (U)

a. Aristov appears to be concerned with party cadres in the Russian republic. Is he also responsible for party cadres in the other republics? If not, who is? (U)

b. Does Kirichenko have any specific areas of responsibility, or is he acting as Khrushchev's second in command on the secretariat with general responsibilities for all matters involving the secretariat? (U)

c. Does Suslov have any direct responsibilities in particular fields of internal affairs? (U)

d. Brezhnev's speech at the 21st Party Congress dealt almost exclusively with the metallurgical industry. What are his responsibilities in this field? (U)

4. Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee occur at irregular intervals and are seldom announced in advance. (U)

a. Any indications of forthcoming plenums, as well as any information about the business of such meetings and the role of the Central Committee in policy making that does not appear in the Soviet press? (U)

5. Yu. V. Andropov, Ya. I. Kabkov, V. N. Malin, A. L. Orlov, and B. N. Ponomarev have been identified as heads of departments in the Central Committee apparatus. (U)

a. What are the titles and functions of the departments they head? (U)

b. Who are the organizational heads of the following departments: Party Organs for the Union Republics? Machine Building? Transport and Communications? Trade, Finance and Planning Organs? (U)

6. On 20 March 1959 I. I. Kuzmin was relieved as USSR Deputy Premier and simultaneously replaced as Gosplan chief by A. N. Kosygin. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

A. 6. a. Any further information regarding these changes? Kuzmin was appointed Chairman of the State Scientific-Economic Council, formed on 28 February 1959. (U)

b. Additional data regarding the functions of this council and what the assignment means for Kuzmin's career is desired. (U)

7. V. Ye. Semichastny was replaced as All-Union Komsomol First Secretary on 25 March 1959. (U)

a. What are the reasons for the change? (U)

b. What is Semichastny's new assignment? (U)

8. In recent months there have been shake-ups in the party and government leadership in the Turkmen Republic (December 1958), Moscow Oblast (March 1959), and the Uzbek Republic (March 1959). (U)

a. What are the causes and repercussions of these changes?
(U)

9. K. Ye. Voroshilov, nominal President of the USSR, was seriously ill in February and March 1959. Information on the current state of his health or any indication of his possible replacement are desired. (U)

10. A collective farm congress to revise the collective farm statutes was scheduled last year to take place "early in 1959". As of April 1959 the Congress had not taken place nor received further publicity. Has the Congress been postponed? If so, why? (U)

11. A selected few collective farms are experimenting with a guaranteed annual wage for their members in lieu of the labor-day payment. Information is desired on the implementation of this system and reaction to it at official levels and among the peasantry. (U)

12. There have been obvious signs of disagreement between Moscow and Peiping with respect to the Chinese Communist Commune. Since December 1958 the Chinese have, at least overtly, reduced the ideological pretensions with which they had originally surrounded the commune development. Concrete information as to the steps by which this reconciliation or compromise between Moscow and Peiping was reached would be of great value. Information on the attitude of ranking Soviet officials toward the commune or other specifically Chinese Communist developments is of continuing interest. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

A. 13. We are interested in:

a. The exact nature of the "Instructions to Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, issued in 1957, together with the 1958 revision; Instructions to Komsomol Organizations of the Army and Navy; Regulations on Military Councils; Regulations for Marxist-Leninist evening universities and other schools in the armed forces; and Regulations for Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy. (C)

b. The reason(s) behind the change in title of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense to Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and whether this indicates a change in the subordination of the directorate; (U)

c. The extent of party and KGB control in the armed forces; specifically, the relationship and areas of responsibility of the Chief Political Directorate, the Administrative Department of the CC/CPSU, the Military Councils, the KGB Special Sections, party organizations in the armed forces, local party organizations, political officers, and the military commanders; (S)

d. The impact and significance of the recent policy that not only shall the military commander be politically trained, but that the political officer receive military training. (U)

e. The present jobs of Army Generals A. A. Luchinskiy and I. A. Serov and of Colonels General M. A. Shalin, I. Z. Susaykov, and S. M. Shtemenko. (U)

f. The present status of the GRU and the name of its chief. There have been reports that it is being reduced in force or re-organized. (S)

B. Security

1. All information concerning the jurisdiction of the KGB and the MVD and their domestic and foreign activities would be of value. (U)
We are particularly interested in the following things:

a. Any information indicating KGB coordination and/or control of satellite security services; (U)

b. KGB operations and responsibilities inside the USSR;

(U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

B. 1. c. jurisdictional subordination and personnel strength of the civil police (militsiya) and the internal troops; personnel strength of the border troops; (U)

d. the identities of top and second echelon officials assigned to the central KGB in Moscow; e.g., the names of deputy chairmen and other top officials in addition to Lunev who has recently been again identified as First Deputy Chairman. (U)

e. What is the present status of the KGB? Any indications that its powers are being reduced? That it is being reorganized? What significance is attached to the appointment of Shelepin as Chief of the KGB? (U)

2. The system of controls which are exercised over the travel and movement of Soviet citizens is an important indicator of the internal situation in the USSR. Information of this nature would be of great value. (U)

3. A number of measures adopted recently are designed to reduce in various ways the incidence of social evils and petty crime, particularly drunkenness, "hooliganism, and speculation. There is a continuing need for information on the causes of such phenomena, their prevalence, and the effectiveness of the measures taken to overcome them. (U)

a. What is the working relationship between the worker's militia and the regular militia? (U)

b. To what extent have the former taken over duties of the latter? (U)

4. Opportunities to observe tension between various national groups and mistreatment of minorities have grown as Soviet political controls have become somewhat loosened. There are continuing reports of nationalistic sentiments in various areas, discrimination against Jews, and anti-Semitic feelings. These subjects bear further watching to determine whether the regime is making any progress in its proposed efforts to correct violations of "Leninist" nationality policy committed under Stalin. (U)

a. Are any new measures being taken to reduce tensions between Russians and local inhabitants in minority areas? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

B. 4. b. Is there any evidence of a change in the regime attitude towards manifestations of national sentiment among minority groups? (U)

c. A process of Russification of minority cultures has been taking place for many years, attested by various economic as well as potential factors. To what extent is coercion part of this process? (U)

5. The proposals for the reorganization of the educational system on 16 November 1958 included a provision that in minority areas, parents should be allowed to choose individually whether their children will attend Russian-language or minority-language schools. Study of the alternate language would then be undertaken voluntarily only by those children who felt they could carry the extra work load in their studies. (U)

a. How is this provision being received in the minority areas? (U)

b. Are parents concerned at having to choose for their children between knowledge of the mother tongue and future professional advantages in knowing Russian? (U)

c. Which language seems to be the one chosen in the end? (U)

6. Little current information is available concerning Soviet labor camps. (C)

a. How many camps presently exist, and where are they? (C)

b. What is their population? (C)

c. How many and what categories of persons are presently being sent to labor camps? (C)

d. Is the labor camp system being dissolved? (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

C. Intellectual Expression, Education, and Religion

1. Controls on literature, art and other forms of intellectual expression have continued tight in 1959. There is evidence, however, that many intellectuals still oppose, if only passively, present controls. A regime spokesman at the RSFSR Writers Congress in December complained that Pasternak's fate "had disoriented even some progressive writers, sowing in their hearts doubts about the correctness of our decisions". Complaints about the persistence of "erroneous ideological attitudes" on the part of many writers and about the continued silence of many senior writers "whose voices should have been heard" have also been frequent at the regional writers congresses. (U)

a. What are the attitudes of individual intellectual and cultural figures toward the Party's cultural policy? (U)

b. Is the opposition of intellectuals crystallized against specific elements of control such as freedom to travel or censorship of foreign literature? (U)

c. What are the regime's methods of reaching and persuading intellectuals to recant and reform? (U)

d. In what social sectors did the Pasternak affair arouse interest and what were the reactions? (U)

e. What types of Soviet citizens have actually read Dr. Zhivago and what are their reactions? (U)

f. What modern Soviet novels and poetry is the Soviet public reading? Which ones do they like? Why? (U)

2. Although intellectual disaffection among university students has evidently abated considerably since the late 1956-early 1957 period, the increase in foreign students visiting the USSR under exchange agreements and the continued insistence on ideological conformity may combine to produce new manifestations of intransigence and rebellion. (U)

a. Any information on the state of mind among young Soviet intellectuals is desired. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

C. 3. Under the new Soviet law on education published 25 December 1958, the much publicized goal of universal ten-year education has been dropped in favor of universal 8-year education. The vast majority of 15 and 16 year olds will go into production work upon completion of the 8-year general school. Adolescents with the will and stamina can continue their education in evening or correspondence courses and these that last the course can eventually go on to higher educational institutions. Boarding schools are to be increased in number and are to be established on both an 8 and 11 year basis, with greatly increased polytechnical training. The problems of special schools for children gifted in the arts and sciences and of language training in minority areas (see B-5) had both aroused special public interest, as indicated by letters carried in the Soviet press, and no decision on either point was announced in December. (U)

a. How is the proposed reorganization being received by the public? (U)

b. Is opposition or approval centered in any identifiable social sector? (U)

c. What changes in the social studies and humanities curricula are planned? (U)

d. Has any decision been reached on the special schools and language training problems? (U)

e. Can any individual or social sector of Soviet society be identified with a stand pro or con either of these issues? (U)

4. The regime cited as justification for the reorganization of education the distaste shown by many of the younger generation for manual labor and the "difficulties" experienced in finding jobs for secondary school graduates. (U) We need information which indicates:

a. Any additional concerns which prompted these changes. (U)

b. Amplification of the "difficulties" cited by the regime in finding jobs for secondary school graduates. (U)

c. Any further light on Soviet youth's attitude toward manual labor. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

C. 5. There have been several references in the Soviet press in recent months to difficulties experienced in persuading management in industry to accept as workers minors whose right to special working conditions is protected by law. The proposed educational reorganization suggests that this problem will be complicated by additional provisions for time off from work for individuals who work and study, either in the form of a shorter work-day or of a three-day work week. (U)

6. The educational reorganizations proposals also include changes in the vuzes (higher educational institutions). Students are to combine work and study for the first two to three years of their courses, and it has been recommended that qualified professionals in industry and agriculture be released part-time from their jobs to teach while teachers are periodically to leave their teaching to work in the "national economy." (U)

a. What are the reactions to students and teachers to these proposals? (U)

b. What are the detailed arrangements for "combining work and study" by students and for the exchanges of personnel between industry and agriculture and the vuzes? (U)

7. In an article in the British periodical New Statesman of 21 February 1959, a French professor who had lectured at the University of Moscow in October 1958 reported that at that time Soviet students were much exercised about a new work on the poet Mayakovsky which included many hitherto suppressed poems and showed that he had strongly resisted regime censorship. According to the article, the new work was published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and was entitled Fresh Light on Mayakovsky. (U)

a. What was its effect on students and intellectual circles? (U)

b. Is there any evidence that the regime may be preparing to allow publication of any other hitherto suppressed work or to revise its official opinion on any other literary works? Whose? (U)

8. A few scattered reports have been received concerning allegedly inadequate knowledge of Russian on the part of "many" university students, nationality unspecified. Moreover, speakers at the recent writers congresses have been more than usually caustic concerning grammatical errors made by writers in their finished work. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

C. 8. a. Is there any evidence that these complaints go beyond the usual ones of professors that their students have been badly prepared and of critics that writers are an illiterate lot? (C)

9. In early March 1959 the Soviet Union celebrated the 100th anniversary of the birth of the Jewish short story writer, Sholem Aleichem, by the issuance of a new stamp in his honor and announced plans for the publication of a new edition of his works in Yiddish, the first Yiddish language publication in the USSR since 1948. (U)

a. Was this edition of Aleichem's work actually published? (U)

b. What was the extent of public interest in it? (U)

c. Is any further publication in Yiddish being planned? What? (U)

d. Is there any other evidence of a possible shift in the regime's attitude toward Jews? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY

A. General

1. Any indication of Soviet intentions to take unilateral steps? (U)
2. Soviet moves to extend assistance in the atomic energy field to non-Communist states, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the reactions and attitudes of prospective recipient countries. (U)
3. Behavior of Soviet Bloc personnel at the UN, particularly statements on disarmament questions and the possibility of UN consideration of the Berlin and German questions. (U)
4. Similarities or divergencies noted in Soviet and Communist China propaganda, behavior at international meetings, and general attitudes toward the US. (U)
5. Information that the USSR is seeking to establish diplomatic relations, negotiate trade agreements, or establish informational or permanent trade representation with additional countries. (U)
6. Soviet interest or activity of any type in the Arctic and Antarctic, particularly Soviet reaction to US proposals for an international administrative arrangement for Antarctica. (C)
7. Any amplification of the Soviet "peaceful economic competition" program or evidence of price cutting on capital goods, with special interest in evidence of intra-Bloc competition or collaboration on bids for development projects in underdeveloped areas. (U)
8. Evidence of Soviet economic pressure upon Finland, Austria, the UAR, Afghanistan, or other countries with close ties to the USSR. (U)
9. Soviet approaches to Socialist parties abroad including proposals for contacts and invitations to Moscow. (U)
10. Soviet intentions in negotiations for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests under international control. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

B. Western Europe

1. Information on Soviet Bloc security measures to strengthen the Warsaw Pact or carry out other measures threatened to counter West German rearmament including the building of missile bases in the Satellites. (U)

2. Any reports of Soviet pressure on Poland to support Soviet foreign policy and to adopt more orthodox measures in domestic policy. (C)

3. Changes in Soviet terms for a German settlement and indications of changes in tactics on the German question, particularly revisions in Soviet relations with East Germany. (U)

4. All developments regarding the sealing off of West Berlin from East Berlin, closing the East-West German border, Soviet moves to alter the juridical position of the three Western powers in Berlin and harassments of Allied and West German rail, highway, or air access to West Berlin. (U)

5. Evidence of increasing Soviet efforts to draw Scandinavian countries away from their present Western orientation toward a more neutral course with closer ties with the USSR. Indications of Soviet attempts at a Baltic Neutrality (Security) Pact. (U)

6. Indications of continuing party contacts between the Bloc countries and Yugoslavia. Any sign of a breakdown in state relations or economic boycotts between the Bloc countries and Yugoslavia. Resumption of anti-Yugoslav broadcasts beamed to Yugoslavia. Reports of Soviet attempts to isolate Yugoslavia further from the Satellites. Information on the previous history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the factors that led to the break. (U)

7. Evidence of Soviet attitude toward De Gaulle regime, particularly Soviet position on the Algerian conflict. Soviet instructions to the French Communist Party on policy toward De Gaulle. (U)

8. Soviet proposals for European security schemes including the Rapacki plan and Soviet tactics in advancing these plans. (U)

9. Reports of Soviet instructions to West European Communist parties and the latter's tactics in the campaign to prevent the building of missile bases there. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

B. Western Europe (Continued)

10. Overtures to Italy, particularly proposals concerning Italy's inclusion in an "atom-free zone" or possible participation of Italy in any new summit conference. (U)

11. Soviet overtures to Spain, particularly proposals for trade expansion. (U)

C. Asia-Africa

1. Indications of modification of the "peaceful coexistence" policy toward Asian neutrals, or of Soviet disillusionment with the political results of the policy: (U)

a. Evidence of greater reliance on local Communist parties in achieving Bloc goals. (U)

b. Details of Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Asia; comments of Soviet officials on this subject, as well as evidence that Moscow intends to initiate negotiations with Asian governments on this question. (U)

2. Information on the status of relations between Moscow and Peiping, particularly with reference to the question of primacy of interest in Far Eastern Satellite matters. Material covering the relations of the USSR and Communist China with North Korea, Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Any evidence that the USSR does, or does not, desire to promote Communist China's relations with non-Communist Asian countries, and efforts to secure more widespread recognition of/and admission of Communist China to the United Nations. (C)

3. Indications that the USSR is discussing on a bilateral basis terms for an Arab-Israeli settlement with the countries concerned. (U)

4. Evidence of Soviet support for certain personalities or factions in Communist China. (U)

5. Japan -

a. Evidence of Sino-Soviet tactical or policy coordination to discredit the Kishi government on trade, nuclear or fishery issues--a campaign which began prior to the Japanese elections in May 1958. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

5. b. Evidence of specific Sino-Soviet guidance to Japanese Communist Party on such questions as American forces and bases in Japan and a nuclear-free zone in Asia. (U)

c. Efforts by Soviet officials to impress the Japanese with the possibility of extensive trade expansion and Japanese participation in the economic development of Siberia. (C)

d. Soviet proposals and expected negotiations for a cultural agreement with Japan. (U)

e. New or revised Soviet proposals for a civil air agreement which might be expected to meet previous Japanese objections. (U)

f. Evidence that the USSR might allow fishing rights to the Japanese in hitherto restricted areas of the Kurils, as hinted by a Soviet Far Eastern Service broadcast to Japan on 26 September 1958. (C)

6. Indonesia -

a. Evidence of Soviet intentions to fulfill the economic and technical assistance agreement with Indonesia, or of new moves to counter recent improvements in US-Indonesian relations. (U)

b. Evidence of direct and/or increased Soviet contacts with the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) or of Bloc propaganda or other moves calculated to discredit Sukarno or Indonesian military leaders. (U)

c. Expansion of Soviet scientific or cultural activities or exchanges. (C)

d. Evidence of additional arms supplies to Indonesia by any Communist state. (S)

7. Progress in the implementation of Soviet technical assistance program in Ceylon, projects under consideration, and any efforts of Soviet officials to influence Ceylonese long-range planning. (C)

8. Evidence of overt Soviet encouragement or political support for the CPI and particularly for the Communist Government of Kerala implying or stating criticism of the internal policies of the Indian Government. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

9. Progress in negotiations with Nepal to implement Soviet offers of economic assistance, especially in the field of civil aviation. (C)

10. Pakistan -

a. Soviet efforts to stimulate Soviet-Pakistani trade through direct overtures to private interests. (U)

b. Soviet efforts to develop economic and cultural contacts in East Pakistan. (C)

c. Soviet efforts designed to foment domestic opposition to Pakistani-US defense ties. (C)

11. Travel of Soviet personnel in Kashmir, and attempts to develop direct contact with Kashmiri groups and individuals. (S)

12. Afghanistan -

a. Progress in implementation of Soviet economic projects, particularly the Salang Pass road, improvement of the port of Qizil Qala, and oil exploitation around Sar-i-Pul. (U)

b. Details on the Soviet military assistance program: equipment supplied; role of Soviet military instructors and advisers; tactical exercises involving use of Soviet weapons. (S)

c. Information on the possible establishment of a second Afghan airline and the projected Soviet role therein. (S)

13. Iran -

a. Evidence of increased Soviet-directed subversive activity in Iran, including support for the Tudeh Party and/or any other groups opposing the Shah's regime. (C)

b. Soviet efforts to encourage opposition to the Shah in the Army. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

13. c. Information on any form of Bloc economic pressure on Iran, such as, failure to negotiate a trade agreement in April, withholding deliveries on usual purchases, disruption of construction on the two sugar factories being built by Poland in northeastern Iran, etc. (C)

d. Evidence of Soviet military activity on Iran's northern border designed to create "war-of-nerves" against the Shah's regime. (C)

e. Any evidence of Soviet moves to end pressures on Iran and improve relations with the Tehran government. (C)

14. Contracts of Soviet officials with private Turkish business interest designed to step up Soviet-Turkish trade or to sell Soviet factories and machinery. (U)

15. Contacts of Soviet officials with private Israeli businessmen pointed toward a resumption of trade. (U)

16. UAR -

a. Implementation of Soviet-UAR economic projects, including, in particular, details of negotiations on the first phase of the Aswan High Dam. (U)

b. Details concerning the establishment of regular commercial air service between Moscow and Cairo and of negotiations to buy late model Soviet passenger aircraft for Misrair. (S)

c. Details of any evidence of Syrian Communist Party relations with Soviet officials. (S)

d. Any information on friction between USSR and UAR over ideological questions and Soviet policies in Middle East, particularly Iraq. (C)

17. Greece -

a. Soviet approaches to Cypriot leaders. (U)

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

17. b. Soviet approaches to private Greek firms designed to push sales of Soviet goods in Greece. (U)

c. Attempts by Soviet officials to keep alive the nuclear scare in connection with NATO bases in Greece. (C)

18. Arabian Peninsula -

a. Any attempt by Bloc officials to establish diplomatic, economic, or cultural contacts, either formally or informally, with Saudi Arabia. (U)

b. Developments in the implementation of Bloc economic and military assistance programs in Yemen, and the movements of Bloc personnel to and within Yemen. (S)

c. Efforts to influence internal developments or Yemeni foreign policy on the part of Soviet officials or technicians. (S)

d. Attempts to develop Soviet-Yemeni cultural relations. (U)

19. Efforts to develop regular Soviet-Sudanese economic relations, especially any Soviet effort to influence Sudanese policy through manipulation of its cotton purchases. (C)

20. Efforts of Soviet officials to establish direct contact with Libyan officials and commercial interests with a view toward establishing regular economic and cultural relations. (U)

21. Iraq -

a. Soviet efforts to negotiate a civil air agreement with Iraq. (S)

b. Special interest in Soviet efforts to establish commercial or cultural centers other than in Baghdad. (S)

c. Evidence of Soviet equipment and military advisers in Iraq, and information on the relations of such personnel, as well as UAR military training advisory personnel, with Iraqi officials. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

21. d. Details of any evidence of Iraq Communist Party relations with Soviet officials. (S)

e. Details of any evidence of Kurdish relations with Soviet officials. (S)

f. Any evidence that Soviet officials are in a position to exert controlling influence in Iraqi Government decisions. (C)

22. Morocco -

a. Any Soviet activities directed against the maintenance of US bases in Morocco. (S)

b. Any Bloc offers of economic aid, arms, etc., to Morocco. (S)

c. Any information on relations between USSR and Moroccan Communist parties and other parties and groups. (S)

23. Tunisia -

a. Any Bloc offers of arms, economic aid, etc., to Tunisia. (S)

b. Any Soviet or Bloc activities to undermine Bourguiba's regime. (S)

c. Relations between USSR and Tunisian Communist party and other political parties and groupings. (C)

24. Algeria

a. Any Soviet or Bloc activities to cooperate with and support the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) and its provisional government. (S)

b. Any evidence of Bloc military support, arms, advisers, etc., to the FLN. (C)

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

24. c. Any Soviet or Bloc activities connected with the Algerian CP or other groupings. (S)

d. Evidence that the USSR or any Eastern European government intends to extend diplomatic recognition to the Algerian Provisional Government. (U)

25. Libya -

a. Any Bloc offers of arms and economic aid. (S)

b. Any Bloc activities directed against the US base in Libya or the Libyan regime. (S)

26. Sudan -

a. Soviet attitude toward the new regime: Bloc offers of support and approval, or, conversely, and Bloc activities to undermine the regime. (S)

27. Africa South of the Sahara -

a. Bloc support of regimes in Ghana, Guinea and Liberia; including offers of arms and economic aid, and conversely any Soviet efforts to undermine any of these regimes. (S)

b. Soviet support, overt or covert, to movements for independence or "national liberations" in British, French, Belgian, or Portuguese colonies, trusteeships; particularly Soviet attitude to Cameroon independence movement. (C)

c. Activities of Soviet or Bloc fishing vessels off West Africa, particularly the ports of call and shore activities of the personnel. (U)

28. Ethiopia, Somaliland, Eritrea -

a. Soviet or Bloc attitude and actions in regard to Ethiopian-Somali and Ethiopian-Eritrean relations. (S)

b. Offers of assistance to above countries or groups. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

28. c. Sign of increase in Soviet propaganda or subversive activity in area. (S)

d. Soviet overtures toward Emperor Haile Selassie before, or during, his forthcoming visit to the USSR. (U)

D. Latin America

1. Any indications of Soviet efforts to promote neutralism in Latin America and any reference to the area as a possible "peace zone." (U)

2. Any approaches to Latin American nations for establishment or reestablishment of diplomatic relations. (U)

3. Any implementation of Soviet willingness to extend economic aid to the area. (U)

4. Any evidence of Soviet contacts with, or instructions to, Latin American Communist Parties. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC

A. Policy, Planning, and Theory

1. Soviet General Economic Policy

The best available indicator of Soviet general economic policy is contained in the Seven Year Plan for Economic development (1959-1965), adopted in February 1959. The plan, reportedly filling 28 volumes, has been made available to the West only in the summary version published in 8 pages of Pravda. Furthermore, as late as mid-March 1959, an annual plan for 1959 has not yet been published. (U)

a. Any additional information about economic goals for 1965, about the annual phasing of the Seven Year Plan objectives, or about the progress of plan fulfillment in the early stages of the plan, will be helpful in filling out present knowledge of Soviet economic policy. (U)

2. National Economic Planning

a. Any information on the actual working, in terms of the Seven Year Plan, of the new procedures for the planning of investment whereby detailed investment plans are to be made up locally to comply with control figures for production passed down from the center. (U)

b. Information relative to problems arising in connection with the census of fixed capital now scheduled for as of 1 January 1960. (U)

c. Current changes in categorizations of investment, in connection with the 1959 budgets, either USSR or republic. (U)

d. New changes in economic administrative regional boundaries, their consolidation, or creation of echelons between the sovnarkhozy and RSFSR Council of Ministers should be reported. (U)

e. Any information about the supply sales--snab-sbyt--system, and especially any changes introduced as a result of the reorganization of industrial management. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

A. Policy, Planning, and Theory (Continued)

3. Economic Theory

The proposed formation of an Academy of Economics suggests that the role of economists in economic planning and decision making may be enhanced. (U)

a. Information regarding current discussions on problems such as criteria of investment choice, price policy, programs and incentives for technologic innovation, and the adequacy of existing value measures of performance should be reported because they highlight current problems and may indicate the probable direction of future policy. (U)

b. Under present circumstances information on the background of individual economists is of increasing importance, hence biographical and career dates should be reported. (U)

B. Agriculture

1. Information is desired on total sown acreage in the USSR and the acreage devoted to the various crops in 1959. (U)

2. What are the crop prospects in the Soviet Union in 1959, especially in those areas in which prospects are either substantially above or below average? (U)

3. Are there indications that the administration of Soviet agriculture may be decentralized in the near future and the Ministry of Agriculture abolished? (U)

4. How much gain in efficiency is being realized in Soviet agriculture by collective farm ownership and operation of their own machinery as opposed to MTS ownership and operation of the machinery? (U)

5. What prices are to be paid by the state in purchasing the various agriculture products from collective farms in 1959? (U)

6. To what extent is the two-stage method of harvesting small grains decreasing harvesting losses? (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

B. Agriculture (Continued)

7. The seven-year plan (1959-65) makes reference to a proposal "to make better use of highly fertile land in the zone of stable rainfall" in the European USSR (U).

a. Does this imply the initiation of a specific program to accomplish this end (e.g. a program similar in scope to the new lands program? (U)

b. Or is the proposal purposely only in vague, general terms with no particular large scale program being planned? (U)

8. The seven-year plan makes reference to the necessity of achieving increased labor productivity in agriculture. (U)

a. Do the Soviets expect to reduce the Soviet agricultural labor force substantially in the near future? (U)

C. Agricultural Machinery Production

1. The Soviet Seven Year Plan stipulates the ever-increasing employment of mechanical means in the harvesting of agricultural crops. Yet, the production of corn harvesting combines has steadily and inexplicably declined in the face of a quantitatively inadequate park of these machines. The USSR produced 19,000 and 12,400 corn harvesting combines, respectively, in the two six-month periods of 1957. In 1958, only 6,100 units were produced, at least 6,000 of which were produced in the first six months. The acreage devoted to corn, meanwhile, continues to increase. The possibility exists that the reduction in combine output reflects unsuspected shifts in priority between machines for agriculture and machines for other purposes rather than a temporary cessation of production pending the development of a more satisfactory model.

a. Information which might provide an explanation for use in the agricultural machine building contribution to the forthcoming Soviet NIE is desired. (U)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

C. Agricultural Machinery Production (Continued)

2. The Soviet Seven Year Plan did not provide quantitative output data for any major type of agricultural machine except grain combines (400,000 units). Khrushchev stated in December 1958 that plans for agricultural machinery production awaited estimates of agriculture's requirements. He did not indicate just when the estimates would be completed. (U)

a. Do unit production plans now exist for other major types of agricultural machines such as combines for corn, sugar beets, and ensilage crops, cotton pickers, and tractor-drawn and tractor-mounted plows, drills, cultivators, and movers? (U)

b. Seven Year Plan data on these and other agricultural machines is desired as quickly as possible after it becomes available. (U)

D. Chemicals and Chemical Equipment Production

1. A part of the credit for the successful launching of the Soviet earth satellites and moon rocket has been given to the development of synthetic fuels. (U)

a. What fuels and oxidizers are used in Soviet missiles--particularly in the Soviet ICBM and satellite types? (U)

2. Khrushchev has stated several times in recent months that the USSR has ample supplies of atomic bombs and would stop production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. (S)

a. Because chemical inputs offer one of the best indicators of output of fissionable material, information is desired on production and consumption of the following key materials: fluorspar, hydrofluoric acid, fluorine, lithium ores and compounds, metallic calcium and calcium chloride. (S)

3. The USSR has started to export fluorspar to Japan. (C)

a. What grades and amounts are being shipped? (C)

b. Is there any evidence of additional Soviet trade in fluorspar or other raw materials that may be used in the Soviet atomic energy program, such as, lithium ore or high purity calcium chloride? (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

D. Chemicals and Chemical Equipment Production (Continued)

4. The USSR plans to invest over 100 billion rubles in the development of the chemical industry in the new Seven Year Plan (1959-65). Trade agreements with several Western countries have been concluded. (C)

a. Will part of this total be used for the development of support industries, such as, chemical machine building, and if so, how much? (U)

b. What part of this total investment is intended for the purchase of chemical technology and equipment from the West? (U)

c. From the Bloc? (U)

5. Strenuous efforts have been made by the Soviets in recent months to obtain chemical technology and equipment from the West. (S)

a. What kinds of chemical plants and processes are the Soviets trying to purchase? (S)

b. What are the annual production capacities? Where will the plants be installed in the USSR? (S)

E. Electronics Production - and Automation

1. Recently the Soviet press announced the creation of a State Committee for Automation. This state committee will probably take on some or most of the responsibilities of the abolished Ministry of Instrument Building and the Means of Automation. (U)

a. What actually are the responsibilities of the State Committee for Automation in respect to the production and development of electronics automation equipment, including electronic computers (planning of production, controlling production plants)? (S)

b. What is the Committee's relation or comparison with the State Scientific-Technical Committee and with Gosplan? (U)

c. Also, responsibilities of the new State Scientific-Economic Council and the Commission for Current Affairs? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

E. Electronics Production - and Automation (Continued)

2. In the Seven-Year Plan announcement of November 1958, value figures were given for the planned production of instruments, including computers. (Instruments: 1965 18.5-19.2 bil.R., 1958/65 2.5-2.6 times; including computers: 1965 2.0-2.1, 1958/65 4.5-4.7 times). (U)

a. What portion of these figures are for electronic instruments and electronic computers? (U)

b. Do the figures include research and development in addition to production costs? (U)

c. What do the terms instruments and computers include? (U)

3. In connection with inter-Bloc coordination and specialization planning through CEMA, information is required on special allocations of responsibility for the production and development of electronics products to the individual Soviet Bloc countries, and their successes and failures in each endeavor. (U) Information on the coordination of electronic computer production and development is desired, particularly progress in development of the allocation to East Germany of perfecting input systems for electronic computers for the USSR. (S)

F. Electric and Nuclear Power Production

1. In January 1959, the Ministry of Electric Power Stations was abolished, but no mention was made by the Soviet press of new arrangements for planning and control of electric power production. (U)

a. Information is desired on changes necessitated by abolition of the Ministry, and on the present system of planning and control. (U)

b. Information also is desired on the reasons for abolishing the Ministry at this time. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

F. Electric and Nuclear Power Production (Continued)

2. Recent Soviet pronouncements on the nuclear power program indicate that large nuclear power plants are under construction, or planned, at Voronezh, Beloyarsk (Urals), Leningrad, and "somewhere in Siberia," and do not mention a "Moscow area" site as earlier reported. A Soviet map of proposed high voltage electric transmission lines shows that a location appearing to be at or near Mozhaisk will be an important junction of several high voltage lines, suggesting that a large electric power producer or consumer will be located at or near this small town, about 100 kilometers west of Moscow. (U)

a. What are the planned target dates for initial and full operation of the nuclear power plants under construction? (C)

b. Is there a nuclear power plant under construction near Mozhaisk? If not, what large electric power consumer will be located near Mozhaisk? (C)

G. Fissionable Materials

Soviet Premier Khrushchev told Senator Humphrey in December 1958 that the Soviet Union has so many weapons in stockpile that production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes could cease and that some existing weapons would be dismantled.

a. Is there any evidence that the Soviet fissionable materials program has slowed down? For example, are there any indications of slowing down or stopping construction of fissionable materials production plants? (U)

b. Has the search for and/or the procurement of uranium ore been cut back? (U)

c. Have there been large scale shifts in personnel from military connected to purely civilian or scientific pursuits? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

H. Geographic - Time Zones

In March 1957 a new system of time zones was instituted in the Soviet Union. Recent monitoring of local broadcasts indicates that the time zones actually in use in European Russia differ in many places from the zones which were published two years ago, although no revision has been announced. It is requested that information be obtained on the current relationship of local time to Moscow time for any city in the zone between 38°E (approx. Moscow) and 50°E. (C)

I. Guided Missiles Deployment

The current international situation is infused with questions relating to capabilities and intentions to use guided missiles. Under such circumstances the chances of a break in formation is probably greater than otherwise. (C)

1. Recent information indicates that possibly a new type surface-to-air missile is being phased into the Moscow SAM defense system. (C)

a. Any confirmatory evidence of the possible production and/or deployment of this new weapon is urgently needed. (C)

2. Recently, information has become available indicating that there are 10 new assembly and/or storage type buildings at a Moscow SAM site (NINW-1) which are similar to two new buildings located at the Istra missile support area. This information is the first evidence of possible "on-site" storage or assembly of missile at any of the Moscow sites. (S)

a. Any information indicating completion or construction of similar storage or assembly areas at other Moscow SAM sites is urgently needed. (S)

3. Information concerning the support of guided missile launching facilities by any mode of transport or the use of mobile launching facilities (trains, motor vehicles, etc.) is critically needed. (C)

a. Photos and detailed descriptions, including markings, of transport equipment concerned are urgently needed. (C)

b. Information on initial and operational costs of this equipment is also required. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

J. Insurance - East/West Trade

The Soviet firm Ingosstrakh reportedly is expanding its insurance and reinsurance operations in Western Europe. Recent reports state that the premiums charged by Ingosstrakh and Ingosstrakh-backed Free World agencies are so low that they are believed to be non-profitable. (C)

a. Provide the names of Free World firms backed by Ingosstrakh. (C)

b. What rates are charged by Ingosstrakh and the Ingosstrakh-backed firms? (C)

c. Provide information that may explain the motivation for charging rates considerably below established premiums. (C)

d. Provide information that may confirm or deny the use of the insurance business for commercial or industrial espionage purposes. (C)

e. Provide information linking these insurance activities with illicit East-West trade. (C)

K. Motor Vehicles Production

Articles in Soviet newspapers and periodicals of December 1958 and January and February 1959 have indicated that new plants are being built, and production of vehicles is being shifted on a major scale in accordance with the directives of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65). It is desired that information on the new location for the production of heavy diesel trucks, formerly made at Yaroslavl', and on the new plant for passenger car production at Zaporozh'ye, and on the new vehicle plants in East Siberia be obtained. (C)

L. Nonferrous Metals Production

1. The Seven-Year Plan indicates plans to increase the output of aluminum, magnesium, and titanium--all metals with potential applications to the Soviet missile program. Aluminum, however, was reported to be in short supply by a speaker at the 21st Party Congress. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

L. Nonferrous Metals Production (Continued)

1. a. Evidence of the level of actual or planned increase in magnesium and titanium is needed. (C)

b. Any evidence to support claim of aluminum shortage. (C)

c. Also specific evidence of applications of any of these light metals in the Soviet economy. (C)

d. Particular emphasis should be given to substitution of aluminum for copper, but need specific examples. (C)

2. According to the Seven-Year Plan, Soviet production of copper in 1965 will be 1.9 times that of 1958. Kazakhstan is one of the most important copper producing areas in the USSR. It was stated for the Sixth Five-Year Plan that Kazakhstan would produce 54 percent of the country's blister and 33 percent of the country's refined copper. (U)

a. Evidence of the percent of the USSR's total output of both refined and blister copper to be produced by Kazakhstan in 1965. (C)

b. Also need indication of the amount of new capacity to be build during the Seven-Year Plan for the production of refined copper and blister copper. (C)

M. Naval Vessel Construction

1. Submarine construction developments: The "Z" "W" and "Q"-class submarine construction programs have ended. A new class, the "F"-class, is now building in the Sudomekh Shipyard in Leningrad. It is probable that other new submarine construction programs are also underway in other areas of the USSR. (S)

a. Information on new submarine construction projects in the USSR is urgently required. This information should include details of numbers of units building, types of propulsion and weapons systems. (S)

b. Are there any indications of nuclear-powered submarines under construction at Severodvinsk or other ship building centers? (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

M. Naval Vessel Construction (Continued)

2. Possible Guided Missile Cruisers: There are indications that the Sverdlov cruiser program has come to an end. Several of the last hulls built in this program have been maintained in an unfinished state in the Leningrade area. There is speculation that work on these ships has been suspended until suitable guided missile installations are available. (C)

a. Information concerning the future of these ships is desired. (C)

N. Transportation

1. Rail

A total budgetary capital investment of 209-214 billion rubles has been recently announced under the Seven Year Plan for transport and communications. No breakdown was given either by year or mode for transport with the exception of a 110-115 billion ruble figure for the seven year railroad total. (U)

a. Further breakdowns, both by year and mode of transport are required. (U)

2. Air

Recent reports of travellers to, from, and within, the USSR give repeated evidence of failure of Aeroflot to maintain schedules on both international and internal flights. It is not altogether clear whether these circumstances are the result of a general below-standard performance on the part of the Tu-104, of lack of patronage, of poor maintenance or of some other cause. The total number of flight cancellations or major delays on main routes for any recent period, moreover, is not known. (U)

a. Collective performance data of recent vintage on Soviet high speed commercial is desired, together with major causes of delays and aborts. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

O. Aircraft Production and Deployment

1. Soviet Heavy Bombers:

a. The BISON four-engine jet heavy bomber was first displayed in Moscow in 1954 and the BEAR turboprop heavy bomber in 1955. Combined production of the two aircraft is estimated to be only about 140-150 aircraft as of mid-1958. Production of the BEAR is believed to have ceased by early 1957 and production of the BISON currently appears virtually to have ceased. Information is needed on possible continued production, movements and introduction into units of these aircraft. (S)

b. Information is needed on a very large jet aircraft observed at Moscow/Fili airfield in the latter half of 1958 which has been designated BOUNDER. Attention should be directed to unusual technical characteristics, especially the propulsion system. Information is needed on production, testing, movement and introduction into operational units. (S)

2. Soviet Twin-engine Jet Medium Bomber:

a. BADGER - Still being introduced into operational units. Information is needed as to whether these BADGERS represent new or modified aircraft and, particularly, if they appear to be modified as tanker aircraft. (S)

b. Information also needed on introduction into units other than those of the Long Rang Air Force. (S)

3. Light Bombers:

Current information is needed on possible production and introduction into units of new-type light bombers including BLOWLAMP and BACKFIN. (S)

4. All Weather Interceptor:

It is considered probable that the Soviets are engaged in some stage of production activity on a new all-weather interceptor. This aircraft, probably designed the YAK-27, has been reported since 1956 but has not been sighted by western observers. (S)

Information is needed on series on prototype production of this aircraft and its introduction into units. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

O. 5. New Attack Aircraft:

Foreign visitors to the 1956 Air Show were also shown a static display of aircraft which included two new attack aircraft, both described as very crude in appearance. A twin-jet ground attack aircraft, since designated BRAUNY, was described as similar to but larger than the USAR B-26, with slightly swept wings and four-inch rockets mounted under each wing. Current data needed. (S)

6. New Supersonic Fighters:

Two new families of fighters, including both sweptwing and delta-wing aircraft were displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Since that date none of these aircraft have been sighted by Western observers. (S)

a. Any new evidence on these aircraft? (S)

b. The smaller delta-wing with pointed wing tips was designated Fishbed A and the clipped wing version of the same aircraft, Fishbed B. These aircraft were characterized by extensive use of wing fences. The swept-wing version of this fighter, designated Faceplate, has no wing fences. Any new data? (S)

c. The larger, more advanced, delta-wing fighter, designated Fishpot had no wing fences visible. The swept-wing version of this aircraft, designated Fitter, has two wing fences on each wing. Any new data? (S)

d. There is no firm information concerning which of these aircraft the Soviets intend to mass produce. Information on Soviet production intentions, testing, actual production of these aircraft, and their introduction into units is needed. (S)

7. Other Fighters:

The first line Soviet fighters Fresco (MIG-17), and Farmer (MIG-19) are being phased out of production. Accurate information on the phase out of production of these jet fighters is needed. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

O. 8. New Transports:

(1) CAMP - A twin-turboprop assault transport, designated CAMP (AN-8), was displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Although it has not appeared in numbers since then, a model of an AN-8 with a different fuselage was on display at the Brussel's World Fair. Information is needed which will clarify which model may be going into production. Information also is needed on actual production and introduction into service. (2) CAMEL - the twin-jet CAMEL has been in service on Aeroflot lines since 1956 and also now flies on international routes. Information is needed on the number now in service with Aeroflot and with the military. Information also is needed on production of this aircraft. (3) CAT - at least three different versions of the CAT (AN-10) have been reported since this aircraft first was displayed at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957. The AN-10A reportedly is an 100 passenger version and the AN-16 is a 130 passenger version. Information is needed on production and introduction into service. (4) COOKER (TU-110) - this four-engine jet transport has been derived from the older twin-engine jet CAMEL. Although first displayed to the public at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957, the aircraft has not been seen in numbers. Information is needed on the possible production and introduction into service (5) COOT (IL-18) - this four-engine turboprop transport was displayed for the first time at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957 and is believed currently to be in series production. Information is needed on possible variants of the aircraft, production, and introduction into service with Aeroflot or the military. (6) CLEAT - the existence of the CLEAT (TU-114) first was confirmed by photos in the Soviet press on 3 November 1957. The aircraft, a very large four-engine turboprop, apparently has been derived from the BEAR heavy bomber. Two versions, the TU-114 and the TU-114D, have been shown since November 1957. The latter aircraft in appearance is very similar to the BEAR and apparently has a small passenger capacity. The TU-114, although probably derived from the BEAR, has a larger fuselage and can carry from 120 to 220 passengers. Information is needed on possible production of one or more of these models and on introduction into service. (7) CLOD (AN-14) - this short haul, twin-engine piston transport completed its first test flight in March 1958 and is believed to be scheduled for series production. Information is needed on production and introduction into service. (S)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC (Continued)

0. 9. Helicopters:

Information is needed on the production site of the Hook (MI-6) helicopter which was first observed in late 1957. Information is also desired on the production site of the small KA-18 (HOG), which the Soviets have stated will enter mass production at an early date. (C)

Intelligence concerning production of the Horse (YAK-25) remains obscure. Only a few of these helicopters have been observed since it was first sighted in the 1955 Air Show. Information concerning both production and the production site of these helicopters is needed. (C)

10. Aerial Refueling:

Information is needed on Soviet development of aerial refueling techniques and equipment, including the development of new tanker aircraft and/or the modification of known aircraft such as the BISON, BADGER, and the BEAR for tanker use. (S)

11. Unidentified Aircraft:

In June 1958 an unidentified aircraft of double delta configuration was seen flying near Ramenskoye Airfield. The aircraft was moving very rapidly and, although no engines were seen, the sound seemed to be that of a standard jet engine. The size of the aircraft was estimated tentatively to be slightly smaller than that of BACKFIN. Further description of the aircraft is needed. Information also is needed on testing, possible production, and introduction into units. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. MILITARY

A. Missiles

(See also: USSR IV. Military, Section C, Army, Tactical Missiles; USSR, III. Economic, Section I., Guided Missiles Development; and USSR V. Scientific, Section D, Guided Missiles)

1. Information is urgently needed on the production, testing, operation use, and technical characteristics of guided missiles in all categories: surface-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface and air-to-air. (S)

2. Surface-to-Air Types

a. Information on the air defense missile sites in the Moscow area including construction, training, and operational employment, and indications of alert. (S)

b. A more flexible type of SAM system is expected to be deployed at major target cities, possibly utilizing missiles of the type appearing in the Moscow 1957 parade. (S) Existence of defensive missile sites have been reported since 1956 at Leningrad and Baku. Report any evidence of existing missile defense facilities or related construction at these, or other areas likely to be defended. (S)

d. Second generation surface-to-air missiles were observed in the 7 November 1957 Moscow parade. Report evidence of deployment of this missile into the Moscow SAM system. (S)

3. Air-to-Surface Types

a. The USSR is believed to be engaging in a comprehensive development program for air-to-surface missiles including cruise-types. Report evidence of testing, training and operational deployment of this category of missiles. (S)

4. Surface-to-Surface Types

a. Short-range surface-to-surface missiles. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. MILITARY (Continued)

A. Missiles (Continued)

b. Information on longer range surface-to-surface types is also a priority requirement. (S)

5. Air-to-Air Types

a. The USSR has a military requirement for air-to-air missiles, although little is known about their state of development. Information on the development, testing, training and operational use of such missiles is urgently needed. (S)

B. Air

(See also USSR, III. Economic, Section O, Aircraft Production and Deployment)

1. Soviet Space Research Program: (a) The Soviet Union is known to be engaged in a well-planned, high priority space flight program, although little is known about the locations of the development and test facilities engaged in this program or the experimental vehicles themselves. It is accepted that the USSR will soon attempt the launching and recovery of a large animal-bearing artificial earth satellite as a progressive step in the Soviet space research program. Any information regarding such preparations or intentions is very valuable. (b) Information concerning the research and development, testing and configuration of any Soviet manned high-altitude research vehicles is urgently needed. (S)

2. Automation in Air Defense: It is believed that the USSR has underway a program to develop an automatic air defense system similar in concept to portions of the US SAGE system. Any information on such operational facilities as control points, lines of communication, and equipment likely to be associated with such a system, together with any ideas on Soviet doctrine for its employment would be of value. (S)

3. Air Defense for Key Target Areas: The USSR has assigned a composite of conventional antiaircraft forces, fighter aircraft and in the case of at least Moscow, a surface-to-air missile complex to defend critical target areas. Continued surveillance of these areas for signs of exercising the equipment, or alerting personnel would be of value. Any information on how the Soviets intend to employ defensive weapons is of extreme importance. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR

IV. Military (Continued)

C. Army

1. Tactical missiles

a. There is a great need for any information on missile units. What are their size, organization, subordination, equipment, and role in the parent organization? (S)

b. Are surface-to-air missile units being assigned to tactical units? How are they integrated into the local air defense plan of the parent unit? Describe their organization and equipment. (S)

c. Are medium and long range rocket and missile units attached to forward armies during the offensive? How are these missile units grouped (by battalion, regiment, or division)? What tactical and/or strategic missions are assigned to this type unit? (S)

d. Have IRBM bases been established in satellite areas? Have plans been made and areas surveyed for the employment of mobile IRBM launchers in Satellite areas? (S)

2. Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O & E's)

a. How do current (T/O & E's) differ from previous tables for similar units? How many types of divisions are there in current T/O & E's? Do plans exist for additional types of divisions or will some of the current types of divisions be abolished? (S)

b. Is the tank regiment in the various divisions identical? Is the motorized rifle regiment in the various divisions identical in organization and equipment? (S)

c. What air units (both fixed and rotary wing) are organic to the various divisions? (S)

d. Has the breakthrough artillery division been abolished or replaced by rocket and missile units? (S)

3. a. Equipment

Tanks, assault guns, and tracked vehicles

(1) Has a new miniature or light tank been developed or placed in production? (S)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. MILITARY (Continued)

C. Army (Continued)

3. a. (2) Has the T-54 tank been redesigned with a new type turret and increased frontal armor? What modifications have been made to the original production model? How is the T-54 tank prepared for deep-water fording? Describe the infra-red equipment provided with this tank. (S)

(3) Has a larger gun been placed on the PT-76 tank? What other changes have been made in the basic amphibious tank? (S)

(4) What type assault guns are currently in production? Has the T-54 chassis been adapted as an assault gun carriage? Are assault guns being phased out in favor of heavy tanks? (S)

(5) Is there a new amphibious personnel and equipment carrier larger than the K-61? (S)

(6) To what extent have tracked prime-movers replaced wheeled vehicles? (S)

b. Artillery

(1) Has the new large self-propelled cannon (approx. 300 mm) been introduced into operation units? Describe the recoil mechanism and loading apparatus of each of these pieces. What is the range for the various types of shells for this weapon? (S)

(2) To what extent has the M-1955 203 mm gun-howitzer been introduced into operational units? (S)

(3) Has an antiaircraft gun larger than the dual 57 mm been mounted on a tracked prime-mover? Describe the off-carriage radar for the self-propelled antiaircraft weapons. (S)

c. Small arms

(1) Is a new family of small arms currently under development to replace the post-war weapons currently in the hands of troops? (S)

(2) Are new recoilless rifles currently being developed? (S)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. MILITARY (Continued)

C. Army (Continued)

4. Political training

a. Has the amount of political training for enlisted men and officers been increased in the past two years? How are these periods of training scheduled? Who conducts this training and who is required to attend? (S)

b. At what levels of organization is there a deputy commander for political affairs? What is his status relative to the commander? Are many former political deputies now commanding units? Are commanders attending special courses to qualify them as political deputies? (S)

c. At what levels of organization do military councils exist? What is their function and membership? (S)

d. Describe the party organization in units below division. What is the relationship between the political deputy and the party secretary? What is the relationship between the military party organization and the local civilian party organization? (S)

4. Is the Main Political Administration directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense? What is its relationship to the central committee? (S)

D. Navy

1. Movement of Submarines: Large numbers of Soviet long range submarines can operate effectively only from bases in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. (S)

a. Information is needed on the deployment of such submarines from the Black Sea or Baltic Fleets to northern or Pacific waters or between the Northern and Pacific Fleets. (C)

2. Surface Operations in Open Waters: The major Soviet surface fleets operate either in the restricted waters in which they are stationed, as in the case of the Black and Baltic Sea Fleets, or in waters adjacent to Soviet territory. (S)

a. Information is desired on exercises by Northern and Pacific Fleets in waters at some distance from Soviet territory. (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. MILITARY (Continued)

D. Navy (Continued)

3. Amphibious Training: The Soviet Navy is believed to have only a limited capability for amphibious operations. Such exercises have been reported infrequently. However, within the past year two new classes of amphibious vessels have appeared in the Baltic Fleet area.

a. Submarine participation in these maneuvers is of interest. Include what role the submarine took in these exercises. (S)

4. Long Range Submarines: The Soviet Navy's long range submarines appear to have extended their operations to areas outside of Communist-controlled waters. (S)

a. We are interested in information concerning Soviet submarine patrols in international waters and the reasons for these patrols. (C)

5. Fleet Exercises: The specific themes of Soviet tactical and fleet exercises are unknown. Intensive training is usually conducted by Soviet naval units during the summer months, ending by October. (S)

a. Information is needed on the type of exercises undertaken by the Soviet Fleet, and on the proficiency achieved in such exercises. Submarine maneuvers are of particular concern. (C)

6. Atomic Warfare Training: Due to the development of nuclear weapons, it would seem likely that the Soviet Navy would be receiving training in at least the defensive aspects of atomic warfare. (S)

a. Among the indicators of this type of training would be: lectures, issuances of pamphlets, washing down or decontamination of vessels, installation and practice in the use of sprinkler system. (C)

7. Submarine Construction Developments: The "Z" "W" and "Q"-class submarine construction programs have ended. A new class, the "F"-class, is now building in the Sudomekh Shipyard in Leningrad. It is probable that other new submarine construction programs are also underway in other areas of the USSR. (S)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 175)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. MILITARY (Continued)

D. Navy (Continued)

7. a. Information on new submarine construction projects in the USSR is urgently required. This information should include details of numbers of units building, types of propulsion and weapons systems. (S)

8. Possible Guided Missile Cruisers: There are indications that the Sverdlov cruiser program has come to an end. Several of the last hulls built in this program have been maintained in an unfinished state in the Leningrad area. There is speculation that work on these ships has been suspended until suitable guided missile installations are available.

a. Information concerning the future of these ships is desired. (S)

9. Naval Weapons and Ships to Non-Bloc nations: The USSR has transferred a number of warships and naval weapons to non-Bloc nations. (S)

a. Information on further transfers of this nature are of interest. (S)

10. Scrapping or Mothballing of Warships: The USSR has scrapped some ships and apparently placed some small ships in mothballs. (S)

a. Further information on this subject is desired. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959USSR (Continued)V. SCIENTIFICA. General

Although the development of Soviet science has been progressing with astounding rapidity in the last few years, the XXI Party Congress in January 1959 laid even more emphasis than before on the importance of science for the material progress to be achieved under the seven-year plan. Soviet leaders aim to overtake and surpass the most advanced Western countries in all fields of basic and applied science. Meanwhile, they plan to concentrate on certain priority subjects, such as: increasing the supply of energy, particularly through controlled thermo-nuclear reaction; advanced theoretical physics; study of outer space; computers and automation; radio electronics; metallurgy and chemistry, especially synthetic materials; experimental biology, biophysics, and biochemistry. Unstated publicly, but understood, is continued attention to all science which supports the development of weapons. The new scientific program also calls for persistence in solving problems of planning and coordination of scientific activities and of geographical dispersal of institutions. (C)

1. Any recent evidence of new Russian goals, progress, success and failure? (U)
2. Specific information as to the intensity of current political, economic and military support to basic and applied science in the USSR. (C)
3. What is the competence of scientific and technical manpower and assignments, particularly in the field of specialization in basic and applied science and for specific ministries and subordinate institutes? (U)
4. Any new projects, planned or under study? (U)
5. Recent changes in Soviet scientific and technical policies or plans. (U)
6. Evidence of increased Soviet emphasis on the application of scientific and technical assets to develop new or unique methods of aggression, new or improved weapons and new or improved defensive measures. (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

A. 7. Increased Soviet efforts to raise scientific and technical standards within the USSR to provide capabilities for continued advances in the basic and applied sciences and thereby the potential for scientific and technical productivity. (C)

8. Data on increased scientific and technical spending above levels previously planned. (C)

9. Any evidence of major changes or advances (break-through) in the fields of priority scientific interest. (C)

10. Current Soviet scientific and technical aid programs to Free World nations. (C)

11. Any details of specific scientific and technical projects of the new Seven Year Plan (1959-1965), particularly those assigned to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Medium Machine Building (AE ministry). (C)

B. Civil Defense

The third phase of the Soviet Civil Defense program was scheduled to begin on 1 January 1959 and continue through 1960. Reports indicate that the 2nd phase, which emphasized 22 hours of instruction for every Soviet citizen above 15 years of age was scheduled to end on 31 December 1958; many rayons and oblasts, according to these reports, had not completed these 22 hours and some had not even started as of November 1958. (S)

1. Is there any evidence to show that Soviet Civil Defense authorities have begun the third phase of the CD program? (C)

2. If the 3rd phase of this program has begun, what are the details of instruction: (C)

a. Number of hours of instruction? (C)

b. Amount of time in training devoted to (1) BW defense (2) CW defense (3) Atomic Warfare defense? (C)

c. Specific age level of student participation in this program? (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959USSR (Continued)V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

B. 3. Do the Soviets propose to complete the 2nd phase of CD training in areas which have not started it? (C)

C. Electronics

Since the end of World War II Soviet leaders have recognized that electronics research and development is one of the principal foundations of modern military and civil power, and they have placed the highest priority on the development of militarily important electronics equipment and electronic instrumentation for scientific investigation relating to other important areas (nuclear techniques, guided missiles, and earth satellites, geophysical exploration, etc.). The Soviet Union is now one of the world leaders in electronics, having already achieved parity with the US and other leading nations in some fields.

As a result of the high emphasis they have placed on electronics (in terms of priority and allocation of personnel and resources), it is expected that the Soviets will continue to produce results in this field at an increasing rate. Most electronics research of military and strategic significance is controlled by the military but other important efforts are undertaken by the Academy of Sciences USSR, Soviet security organizations, and the State Committees responsible for radio electronics, defense technology, aviation technology, shipbuilding. As such, all information related directly to important Soviet electronics objectives is subject to rigid and effective security controls. The main concentrations of Soviet research and development facilities are located in: Moscow, Leningrad, Khar'kov, Gor'kiy, Novosibirsk, and Tomsk. Experimental and testing programs are often carried out in remote areas or in secure coastal areas. (S)

1. Information is especially desired on:

a. New electronic air defense equipment (long-range radars, high-speed, high-capacity communications and data processing equipment, etc.). (S)
25X1D0a

b. [REDACTED] circular antenna arrays, including accurate description, location, information on operating organization and personnel, and function of the array in each case. (S)

2. Specific information is desired on:

a. The organization, direction, and trends in current computer research, development, and production; and on applications of present Soviet computers. (S)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

C. 2. b. Projects developing in acoustical detection devices for submarines, aircraft and/or missiles. (S)

(S) c. Infrared development, either scientific or military.

d. Soviet comments on the use of infrared, either by the Soviet Bloc or by the West. (S)

D. Guided Missiles

1. The USSR is known to possess a large and dynamic program for the research and development of guided missiles and space satellites. In the past three years, the Soviets have displayed their proficiency in these fields with the successful firing of ICBM missiles to ranges of at least 3,500 miles, the launching of three artificial satellites and the showing of four types of guided missiles in the November 1957 Parade in Moscow. In addition, the USSR has announced that it fired a number of meteorological rockets in the Arctic, in the Antarctic and in central Russia, where a high altitude record for a single stage rocket was attained. German scientists recently returned from the USSR have also indicated that the USSR has a very advanced missile program which is capable of developing the most modern type of missiles and which holds a position of the highest priority. (S)

a. Current data is desired regarding the Soviet guided missile program, including: organizations, facilities, policy and plans in the research and development of guided missiles, earth satellites and space travel. (S)

2. Recently a number of leading Soviet scientists were elected to membership or corresponding membership in the Department of Technical Sciences; thirteen of these have been identified or associated with the Soviet guided missile program. These persons are: V. P. Barmin (Launching and Handling Equipment), V. N. Chelomey (Guidance and Control), V. P. Gluhko (Liquid Rocket Engines), G. V. Kisaun'ko (Guidance and Control), S. P. Korolav (Ballistic Missiles), V. I. Kuznetsov (Guidance and Control), S. A. Lavochkin (Surface-to-Air and Air-to-Air Missiles), A. L. Mints (Guidance and Control), V. P. Mishin (Ballistic Missiles), V. V. Novozhilov, G. I. Petrov (Earth Satellites), N. A. Pilyugin (Guidance and Control), A. A. Raspletin (Guidance and Control), M. S. Ryazanskiy (Ballistic Missiles), V. V. Struminskiy, A. S. Zaymovskiy. (S)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

D. 2. a. What scientific advances by these individuals warranted their being elected to the Academy of Sciences? (S)

b. In what type of work have they been engaged for the past five years? (S)

c. With what institutes or establishments are these persons affiliated? (S)

3. The following installations are among those believed to be engaged in the research of guided missiles or guided missile components: Institute of Mechanics, AS, Institute of Automatics and Telemechanics, AS, Moscow Higher Technical School, im. Bauman, Academy of Artillery Sciences, Institute of Machine Studies, AS, Institute of Mineral Fuels, AS. (C)

a. What have been the missile-associated activities of these establishments in the past five years. (S)

b. Who are the leading scientists at these establishments? (S)

c. What publications have these establishments published in the past five years. (S)

d. In what current projects are they engaged? (S)

e. With what other organization and installation are they associated? (S)

f. What facilities (laboratories, design bureaus) do these establishments maintain or control? (C)

4. In 1955, the Soviets announced the formation of an Inter-agency Commission for Interplanetary Communications whose object was the establishment of a manned space station around the earth and space flight. Numerous persons associated with this Commission have evidenced considerable knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program and have made statements regarding possible Soviet attempts at flight into space, such as trips to the moon. (C)

a. What is the exact function of this Commission in research and development of earth satellites, space stations and space travel? (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

- D. 4. b. Who are the members of the Commission? (C)
- (C) c. What is the internal organization of the Commission?
- Commission? (C) d. What establishments are engaged in projects for the
- Commission? (C) e. What current projects are being worked on by this
- f. Is the Commission associated with any military organization which is involved in the development or procurement of guided missiles? If so, identify. (C)
5. The Soviets have made numerous statements regarding their capability to utilize guided missiles in the event of hostilities. (C)
- a. What is the policy of the USSR in the location and disposition of missile launch areas? (S)
- b. What is the military thinking regarding the future of short range ballistic missiles in military stockpiles? (S)
- c. What is the current Soviet military thinking in terms of defensive surface-to-air missiles against low-flying aircraft? (S)
- d. What are the Soviet requirements for air-to-surface missiles? (S)
6. Observation of a modified surface-to-air missile was reported during September-October 1958. (S)
- a. Report any evidence of deployment concept of the missile in the USSR. (S)
- equipment? (S) b. What are its technical characteristics and associated
- c. Report evidence of missile testing or production. (S)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

D. 7. Evidence has been obtained indicating that Plant 292 in Saratov was engaged in the Soviet SAM ancilliary equipment production and research. (S)

a. Has this Plant continued in the missile support equipment program? (S)

b. If so, what is their present contribution: who are the associated suppliers and consumers? (S)

E. Organization of Science

1. It is believed that the CPSU Central Committee apparatus includes a Scientific Department. (U)

a. Who is the present head of this Department? (U)

b. To what extent and in what ways do Soviet scientists influence the decisions of the top party and government leaders? (U)

2. On 20 January 1959 Meditsinskiy Rabotnik reported that the Council of Ministers, USSR, issued a decree changing the function and structure of the Ministry of Health. It is claimed that this was done to expand the rights and increase the responsibilities of the union republics for directing public health and to improve the structure and curtail the number of subordinate units of the Ministry of Health USSR. (U)

a. In what specific respects have the rights of the union republics been expanded? (C)

b. What responsibilities of the union republics have been increased over what they have always been? (C)

c. Specifically, what previously subordinate units have now been curtailed as a result of the reorganization? (C)

d. What organizational changes other than in item c have occurred in the Ministry of Health USSR as a result of the reported structure change? (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

F. Geophysical, Astrophysical, and Space Sciences

1. During the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and since the successful launching of "Sputnik I," the USSR has demonstrated spectacular interest in advancing Russian knowledge in geophysics, astrophysics, and space science. All are fields of science that provide basic knowledge having military applications. (C) Current data is desired on:
 - a. Developments in Soviet weather control, numerical weather prediction using computers, or long-period weather forecasting. (U)
 - b. New Soviet electronics, optical, photographic, or radioastronomical equipment suitable for rocket and satellite tracking. (U)
 - c. Soviet plans for space research including information on vehicles, scientific instrumentation, personalities, organizations, and ground facilities. (U)
 - d. Developments in Soviet astronomical research related to space investigations including celestial mechanics as applied in calculating trajectories to the moon and planets. (U)
 - e. Soviet advances in the development of seaborne and airborne gravimeters. (U)
 - f. Indications that Soviets are using particular seismic stations for detection of Western nuclear tests. (U)
 - g. Developments in Soviet geomagnetic instrumentation, particularly magnetometers of all types as utilized in space exploration. (U)
 - h. Soviet efforts to drill deep holes (25-50 thousand ft. depth) through the earth crust. (U)
 - i. Soviet oceanographic surveying including specific areas involved and types of observations being conducted. (U)
 - j. Current operations of the Soviet research submarine "Severyauka." (U)
 - k. Current Soviet Arctic and Antarctic expeditionary activity. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

F. 1. 1. Current aspects of Soviet research in geological mineral exploration and mapping including specific areas and types of deposits discovered. (U)

m. New Soviet geochemical prospecting techniques and areas being prospected using these techniques. (U)

n. Indications of Soviets having transportation and construction problems in permafrost areas of USSR and developments in Soviet research on permafrost. (U)

o. Soviet participation in International Geophysical Cooperation (IGG) - 1959. (U)

G. Nuclear Power and Nuclear Research

1. At Geneva the Soviets repeatedly mentioned an experimental reactor test center located somewhere on the Volga or Kuybyshev Sea in Ul'yanovsk Oblast. (S)

a. What is the exact location of this test center? (S)

b. How many reactors are now in operation or under construction? (S)

c. What were/will be the dates of operation of each of the reactors? (S)

d. Are there chemical processing plants for nuclear fuel in this center? (S)

e. Is there an experimental area which is isolated from the other areas? (S)

f. What are the details and salient features concerning the center? (S)

2. One of the outstanding areas of Soviet metallurgical interest as shown at Geneva in 1958 was in the development and testing of plutonium and plutonium alloys. Although it is claimed by the Soviets that such research is performed in the Moscow area, there is ample reason to believe that development involving any significant quantity of plutonium is carried on elsewhere. (S)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

G. 2. a. Current information on research centers and personnel concerned with metallurgy of plutonium is very much needed. (S)

3. At Geneva Emelyanov spoke of a Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, implying that Beloyarsk was in the Urals. Details of a coal-burning thermal power plant at Beloyarsk 50 Km East of Sverdlovsk have appeared in the Soviet press. (S)

a. Is the nuclear power station to be attached to, or part of the thermal power plant at Beloyarsk or is it a separate entity? (S)

H. Scientific and Technical Assistance Program

1. The Russian nuclear electric power program has been widely advertised by the Soviets at home and to Bloc and non-Bloc countries through the Soviet technical assistance program. Some Satellites, as well as Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India, have accepted technical assistance, materials and suppliers for nuclear electric power plants under the Soviet program. (C)

a. The technical details of present and future Soviet developed nuclear electric power facilities at home and abroad are desired as well as plans for technical improvements. (U)

2. In March 1956, eleven Sino-Soviet Bloc nations (USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia) signed an agreement to unite their efforts for nuclear research and organized the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. North Vietnam became a member in September 1956, and it is probable that other Bloc and neutral countries will be invited to participate in the Institute. For example, Egypt and Yugoslavia, with which the USSR already has nuclear cooperation agreements, may be asked to join. Invitations to India, Burma, Afghanistan, the Arab Countries and the Scandinavian countries are also considered likely. (C)

a. What new member countries have been received in the institute? (C)

b. Is there any evidence that the agreements are not being fulfilled? (C)

c. What research projects are under study? (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

H. 2. d. What projects are being planned, and what is the degree of success or failure? (C)

e. Are any defense or classified projects being studied? If so, give details. (C)

f. What Soviet scientific and technical aid is being granted to the Soviet Bloc countries? (U)

g. What are the actual numbers of Soviet scientific and technical personnel involved? (U)

h. What actual assistance has been given, as distinct from broad commitments expressed in aid agreements? (U)

i. Any indication of Soviet intentions to extend scientific and operational assistance in the nuclear energy field to non-Communist states, particularly Asia and Latin America. (U)

j. Any suggestions that the USSR is seeking to establish scientific and technical relations or training programs with additional countries in the underdeveloped areas. (U)

k. All Soviet approaches to scientific and technical personnel, including proposals for contracts and invitations to visit and study in the USSR. (U)

3. There is considerable exchange of delegations and specialists of countries of the Middle and Far East and other underdeveloped areas in Africa and South America with those of the USSR. (U)

a. On 15 October 1958 a group of medical specialists visited New Delhi, India to help develop the drug and pharmaceutical industry of India. (U)

(1) What were their recommendations? (C)

(2) How many plants will be established? (C)

(3) What drugs and pharmaceuticals will be produced? (C)

(4) Will the plants be manned by Soviet technicians? (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

- H. 3. a. (5) Are East Indians being trained in the USSR to operate the plants? (C)
- (6) What quantities of production are planned? (C)
- (7) How is construction of plants to be financed? (C)
- (8) In what ways is Soviet medical aid to India being publicized? Is there much publicity about this aid within the USSR? (C)
- (9) What is the organizational structure of the governmental which sets the policy, establishes priority, and implements the aid program? (C)

b. A Russian team, invited by the Government of India, arrived in New Delhi to establish a model pediatric hospital. Soviet experts, to be present for 2-3 years were to provide specialized training in all branches of pediatrics. (U)

- (1) Have any current references been made in the Soviet press to the operation of this hospital? (C)

c. A seminar for foreign medical specialists and public health experts which lasted over a month was held in the USSR in October 1958. The seminar was designed to acquaint visitors with all facets of medical and public health activities in the USSR. (U)

- (1) Have similar seminars been held in recent months? (C)

d. A trade agreement was signed between Iraq and the USSR on 11 October 1958. The USSR is to supply among other things, pharmaceuticals to Iraq. (S)

- (1) Have pharmaceutical consignments been shipped? If so, what kinds of pharmaceuticals and in what quantity? (S)

e. On 10 February 1959, the USSR donated medical equipment for an eye hospital in Damascus. (C)

- (1) What quantity and type of equipment were donated? (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

H. 3. f. A 97-bed, Soviet-operated hospital was in operation in December 1958 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (C)

(1) What types of services are offered? (C)

(2) Has the Soviet press carried any references to services of hospital? (C)

g. The Ethiopian Government has accepted a Soviet offer to establish a school for hospital technicians in Addis Ababa. (S)

(1) Has the school been established? (S)

(2) Are Soviet instructors used? (S)

(3) Are Ethiopian students being trained in the USSR? (S)

h. A Soviet delegation arrived in Libya in February 1959 to examine the Libyan aspects of the Soviet proposal to construct two 50-bed hospitals to be located in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. (S)

(1) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the construction of these hospitals? (C)

i. The Soviets began construction of a hospital located in Taunggyi, Burma, in 1958 and expect completion to be in 1961. Burmese personnel are to be trained in the USSR in preparation for staffing the hospital. (C)

(1) Are any Burmese being trained in the USSR? (C)

(2) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the construction of their hospitals? (C)

j. The Soviets began construction of a hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in 1958 and completion is expected to be in 1960. (C)

(1) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the construction of their hospitals? (C)

k. Nepal has under consideration a 50-bed Soviet gift hospital project offered to the King during his visit in June 1958 to the USSR. (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

H. 3. k. (1) Has offer been accepted? If so, have proposals for construction been made? (C)

(2) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the offer to build the hospital? (C)

1. In the latter part of 1958, 15 Nepalese students accepted medical scholarships for study in the USSR. (U)

(1) Are any Nepalese medical students being trained in the USSR? (C)

(2) Have references been made in the Soviet press to the training of Nepalese medical students? (C)

I. Social Science

The reports of the 21st Congress CPSU and of the preparatory sessions preceding it indicated a serious desire on the part of the Soviet leaders to develop a "new Soviet man" and to utilize social science research in liberating the oppressed of Africa and in achieving a World Communist State. (C)

1. What role did science play in formulating the education reforms? (C)

2. How much influence is exerted upon Soviet political leaders by social scientists in the USSR? (C)

3. What, if any, ties exist between the research of the Africanists in the Academy of Sciences, USSR and the recent uprisings in Africa. (S)

4. Do the opinions of social psychologists play a role in programming the missile and space programs in the USSR? (S)

5. What is the degree of influence of the Academy of Social Sciences on the national and international policies of the USSR? (S)

S E C R E T

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 May - 31 August 1959)

SOVIET BLOCI. POLITICALA. Soviet-Satellite Relationship

Soviet efforts since the fall of 1956 to reassert the USSR's unquestioned leadership of the Communist Bloc and to reinforce Bloc unity have by now attained a large measure of success. The stability of the individual regimes has been shored-up and strengthened to the point that a sequence of events such as occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956 is not likely to develop at the moment. Although Tito has long been read out of the Communist Bloc and the Yugoslavs have been at least ostensibly isolated ideologically, Moscow has also made efforts not to incur the unfavorable propaganda effects which resulted when the campaign was carried to much greater lengths during the 1948-53 period. With the application of political and limited economic pressure on the Yugoslavs, however, the Bloc's campaign has necessarily spilled over into the state sphere, and certain Bloc members (i.e., China, Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) continue to take the lead in bitter polemics with Belgrade. Relations have been "frozen" with China and Albania, but neither the Bloc countries nor Yugoslavia appear to desire to initiate a complete break in relations. Moreover, most of the Bloc countries continue to maintain at least trade ties with Belgrade. Within the Bloc, the most glaring divergency continues to be Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka's determination, reaffirmed at the March 1959 Polish Party Congress, to maintain a degree of independence, especially in dealing with Polish internal policies. (C)

Despite the improved stability of the Bloc regimes, there are two recent developments which are likely to exacerbate political tensions within many of these countries. The theses for the Soviet Seven Year Plan and Khrushchev's speech to the 21st Soviet Party Congress both reveal a new surge forward, based on the premise that the Soviet Union has reached a new stage of Communist development--that of "all-out building of a Communist society." The impetus of this surge has already been reflected in the Satellites, especially in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but more recently in Hungary, where Kadar's previous rather moderate approach to internal economic problems has been all but scrapped. This new surge is likely to be reflected increasingly in the Satellites and cause exacerbation

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

I. POLITICAL (Continued)

A. Soviet-Satellite Relationship (Continued)

of popular hostility to the regimes. Furthermore, the fact that Poland is demonstrably not playing its part in this campaign may result in renewed friction in its relations with Moscow. (C)

1. Evidence of increased pressure by the Bloc on Poland to greater conformity. (U)

2. Evidence of renewed internal difficulties caused by a step-up in the pace of "building socialism." (U)

3. Evidence that the USSR continues to permit one or another of the Satellites some autonomy in internal policies. Is there any evidence that the continued tension over Berlin is having any effect on the degree of autonomy permitted various Satellites? (U)

4. Evidence of Soviet plans to reduce further its troop strength in the Satellites, or conversely that the USSR has no plans along this line whatsoever. (U)

5. Evidence that the number of Soviet officials in a given Satellite is increasing or decreasing, and why. (U)

6. Evidence that the Satellite regimes are reverting in any way to the traditional hostilities that have long afflicted the area.

7. Concerning such organizations as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, what role is played by the Satellite representatives in these organizations? Are they rubber stamps, or are they in fact permitted to take an active part in the organization's activities, particularly in the discussion and formulation of policies? (U)

8. What is the organizational structure of the new theoretical journal? What degree of influence do the various Satellite countries exercise on editorial policy and how? (U)

B. Communist Party Stability

1. Factionalism within the Satellite parties--brought into the open with the 20th congress of the CPSU and the de-Stalinization campaign--remains a serious problem for

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

1. POLITICAL (Continued)

B. Communist Party Stability (Continued)

the Satellite leaders. It may be exacerbated further by the new "surge" forward in the Bloc. We need evidence of growth, or continuation, of this factionalism within Satellite parties or between parties. (U)

a. Report evidence of disaffection or reluctance among party leaders and members to go along with new party or Bloc directives. Report evidence of moderate elements' efforts to force greater liberalization than the regime leaders and/or Moscow desire. (U)

b. Identify the leaders and groups and outline the arguments each side puts up to justify its position. (U)

c. Report evidence of Moscow's concurrence in, or disapproval of, specific Satellite changes in policy. (U)

d. What are the specific reasons for dismissal of Satellite officials? Is factionalism involved? (U)

2. What has been the effect on the Eastern European Communist Parties of the Soviet campaign against Yugoslavia? We are particularly interested in any evidence of a change in the leadership of the Satellite parties as a result of too close connections with Tito. Evidence of the existence of party ties and relations between the Yugoslav Party and the Satellite Communist Parties. Evidence of deliberate Satellite efforts to reduce Party contact with Yugoslavia to a minimum as well as evidence of efforts to reduce governmental (including economic) ties with Yugoslavia. (U)

3. What effect is Poland's national Communist government having on the other Satellites? Of particular interest would be any evidence of Satellite efforts to undermine or otherwise weaken the Gomulka regime. (U)

4. To what extent has Khrushchev's assumption of the Soviet premiership affected the doctrine of "collective leadership" in the Satellites? Is there collectively in the leadership in reaching decisions, or is there one man rule? Is the method of decision-making a reversion to the pre-June 1953 period, or was no change ever apparent? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC

1. POLITICAL

C. Communist Party Organization

There are great gaps in our knowledge of the set-up within the central organization of Satellites Communist parties. Gaining a clear picture of the whole central structure and operations of the party is of obvious importance. (S)

1. What reorganizations and personnel shifts are planned in the central structure and why? What reorganizations have been carried out but not publicized? (U)

2. What is the structure and function of the central organization? We are especially interested in the relation of the foreign section to other Communist parties and the relations of sections to appropriate ministries in the government. What is the position of the central party organization in the process of policy-making and government administration? (U)

D. Government

All Satellites now operate on a government setup in which the premier and deputy premiers constitute an inner cabinet on the highest level of government. To what degree do they actually operate as an inner cabinet, and what is their effectiveness and jurisdiction? (U)

1. What are the given ministries controlled by each deputy premier? What is his relationship to the ministries under his jurisdiction? Report any concrete example of policy control over ministries. (U)

2. To what extent do the premier and his deputies constitute an actual organization (i.e., regular meetings, a secretariat, etc.)? (U)

3. Evidence of plans to decentralize government structure. Is reorganization proceeding along the lines recently adopted by the USSR? What has been the effect of such reorganizations on regime's effectiveness; on internal party factionalism? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

I. POLITICAL (Continued)

E. Security and Resistance

1. What are the existing relationships between and among Soviet and Satellite security services? Is there an over-all inter-Satellite security organization? (U)

2. What overt and covert resistance is there evidence of? How is overt discontent manifested (i.e., strikes, spontaneous demonstrations, etc.)? Dates, places, size of groups involved, and how settled by the regime. (U)

3. Report instances of relaxation of or revision to, previous hard internal security policies. (U)

4. Is there evidence within any Satellite of key groups cooperating to resist regime policies, such as, workers with intellectuals, students, journalists, peasants, etc?

F. Popular Attitudes

This type of information should be reported either on a national or a regional basis. Listed below are general categories with some representative examples. (U)

1. Attitudes toward government economic policies: How have farmers reacted to renewed collectivization drives? Workers to new norms, wage-scales, and the general increase in the economic tempo, work-time, etc? (U)

2. Attitude toward Western powers and hopes of liberation. (U)

3. West German rearmament: Do the people accept the governmental line on the dangers of West German rearmament? What is the attitude toward Khrushchev's proposal to create an international "free city" of Berlin? Has fear of war among the population increased? What is the popular view of current negotiations for banning nuclear weapons tests? (U)

4. What is the present attitude of the former left social democrats and non-Communist collaborations? How do they view their position as a result of the developments in Poland and Hungary and the campaign against revisionism? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

1. POLITICAL (Continued)

F. Popular Attitudes (Continued)

5. What is the attitude toward the establishment of the commune system in China? Is this regarded as a model for emulation by other Communist regimes? Does the popular attitude differ from the official attitude on this question? (U)

G. Treatment of Minorities

National minorities within the Satellites present the governments with continuing and insoluble problems. Policies toward them are of continuing interest. (U)

1. Report any observable changes in official policy toward national minorities since the Hungarian and Polish events. (U)

2. What is the present status of local Jewish communities? What is the current opinion of government and party policies and their attitude toward Zionism, and emigration, and Israel? (U)

3. Current statistics on numbers of minority groups--particularly Jews--remaining in the Satellites. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC

A. Agriculture

1. Crop prospects for 1959 in the Satellite countries will be important during the reporting period, and information on such prospects, especially for grains, will be needed. (U)

2. Additions to, or subtractions from, state reserves of foodstuffs have been used at times to make adjustments in consumption. Is there any evidence of recent changes in these state reserves? (S)

B. Chemicals - Fertilizer

1. Has CEMA become a more effective organization since the May '58 Moscow meeting? In what way and in which areas? What definite accomplishments in Bloc division of labor, or cooperation can be attributed to CEMA? How do the Satellites evaluate its work? (U)

2. The Working Group of the CEMA Committee for the Chemical Industry met in Warsaw in February 1959 to establish requirements for equipment and machinery in the mineral fertilizer industry during the period 1961-1965. (U)

a. What are the requirements of the member countries? (U)

b. Where will the equipment and machinery required by each country be produced? (U)

C. Civil Defense Activities

The approach of warm weather and the currently tense international situation make probable the conduct of more civil defense activities and consequently more chances of observation. (C)

1. Report all civil air alerts or instructions. (C)

2. Identify fully organizations and personnel operative roles. (C)

3. Describe or obtain photographs of all facilities and individuals - tools, vehicles and communications. (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

C. Civil Defense Activities (Continued)

3. Describe or obtain photographs of all equipment used--personal, individual, tools, vehicles and communications. (C)

4. Ascertain whether population moved to shelter, was evacuated, or did not participate. (C)

5. Smoke, blackout or camouflage measures. (C)

D. East/West Trade

1. For Economic Espionage

Many Free World training firms are known or suspected to be connected with Soviet Bloc organizations. For example, a West German East-West trader Richard Fleschner (AKA Salzberg) has recently been arrested by West German authorities for economic espionage activities on behalf of the USSR. (C)

a. Identify Free World traders and trading firms used by the Soviet Bloc to collect intelligence or associated with espionage activities. (C)

b. Provide information on their activities on behalf of the Soviet Bloc; for example, are they used to collect intelligence, as an agency for providing funds for Communist activities, for procuring strategic materials, or for serving as propagandists for advancing Communist objectives. (C)

2. In Boron

The most frequently reported commodity involved in illicit East-West trade during the past year has been borax (boron) and boron ores. The USSR and each of the Satellites, with the exception of Albania, have been reported interested in obtaining large quantities of these embargoed materials in spite of extravagant claims of Communist Chinese production. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

D. East/West Trade (Continued)

2. a. Indicate the extent to which Bloc demand for boron has been satisfied by these illegal shipments. Are Bloc procurement efforts being coordinated within the USSR or elsewhere? Determine current military use of boron within the Bloc and quantities required. (C)

b. Provide any information which might indicate future Bloc efforts to obtain Free World boron. Such information might involve Bloc procurors or end-users, emphasis on acquiring U.S., Turkish, Argentine, Italian or West German supplies, the identity of Western processors or manufacturers whose products have been obtained, Bloc contacts in the Free World which assist in the boron procurement effort, etc. (C)

3. In Copper

In August 1958 COCOM removed the embargo against the export to the Soviet Bloc of copper in all forms. Prior to this, forms other than bare wire (6 mm and under) were embargoed. It is possible that the Bloc in general, and the USSR in particular, might shift purchases of copper from semimanufactured wire to the less expensive primary forms, e.g., cathodes, wirebars, ingots, etc. (C)

a. Data on all exports of tin to the Free World by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. (C)

b. Any indications that an exporting country is acting as a re-exporter or transhipper of tin for another Bloc country. (C)

E. Electric Power Production

There are preliminary plans under the alleged sponsorship of CEMA, to integrate the European Satellite countries with an interconnected electric system. The possibility also exists for international exchange of power between Western European countries and Bloc areas. (C)

1. Give details of current plans for the development of a new high voltage (over 200 kilovolts) transmission system in the European Satellites. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

E. Electric Power Production (Continued)

2. Is CEMA actually involved in this project? To what extent, and in what way? (C)

F. Ferrous Metals Production - CEMA

1. CEMA is apparently becoming more active in the planning, particularly the long range planning, of the ferrous metallurgical industries of the European Satellites. (S)

a. Report any current indications of CEMA recommendations having been made a part of an individual countries' plans for its metallurgical industry. (C)

2. Give any current information relating to CEMA's plans for the development of raw and alloying materials sources in Free World and underdeveloped countries. (C)

3. Report information concerning the specialization of the various aspects of the iron and steel industry among CEMA countries, including rolled steel products, raw materials, alloy materials, foreign trade, metallurgical equipment, and alloy and special steels. (U)

G. Guided Missiles Deployment

Confirmation of the existence and locations of Soviet guided missiles in any of the eastern Satellite countries, including the GDR, is a current priority requirement due to the Soviet ultimatum concerning the status of Berlin. None of the numerous reports of guided missiles in the GDR, in particular, as well as in the other eastern European countries, has been confirmed, nor is it known whether the Soviet Union will deploy short and medium range missiles in the forward areas from fixed or mobile launch sites. However, on the basis of all available information it is currently hypothesized that the Soviet Union will use tactical surface-to-surface missiles and possibly surface-to-air missiles, in the GDR at the least and that the deployment system will be a mobile one. This means that the missiles and support equipment will be rail or truck mounted and either stored in a secure area in the GDR to be operationally deployed from

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

G. (Continued)

previously surveyed areas, or moved into the GDR from the Soviet Union immediately prior to any possible operational activity. Accordingly, the following requirements are submitted for the current quarter: (S)

1. As much coverage as possible should be made of all of the major rail and road entries into the GDR from the Soviet Union in an attempt to identify the transport of guided missiles into the country. This would include the major routes across Poland and possibly Czechoslovakia. Such transports would include long, probably tarpaulin covered objects, on long flatcars or truck trailers, extra security precautions such as armed guards, road patrols at railroad stations or road depots and crossings, possibly fire-control type radar and closed equipment and personnel cars or trucks. An IRBM-size missile (approximately 80' long) would require a six-axled truck trailer transport or a corresponding long railroad flatcar or group of joined flatcars, and would be more likely to be accompanied by liquid-fuel carriers characterized by frosted valves and fittings. Photographs should be taken of all such transports whenever possible and at the least the types and dimensions of all units should be reported. It should be attempted to report the exact location of the transport when sighted, and its destination when possible. (C)

2. The establishment of any new, heavily secure areas suitable for storing the described missiles and support equipment, should be reported. Such storage areas might also be found in established GSFG installations or at airfields. The exact location and all pertinent logistic activity at such areas is required. (C)

H. Petroleum Production

Plans have been mentioned concerning construction of a pipeline from the USSR (Baku Region) to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in order to supply large amounts of crude oil to these countries. Details are desired on the size and capacity of the pipeline, the proposed routes, the estimated dates of the completion to each country, the suppliers of the pipe, and whether CEMA is involved in this project, and in what way? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

I. Telecommunications

Recent information indicates the possible completion of the construction of a coaxial between Moscow and Kiev which will eventually be connected with Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin. (S/NOFORN) The completion of this cable would substantially increase the circuit capacity available for telecommunications between these cities and would be an important step in integrating Sino-Soviet Bloc telecommunications systems. (S/NOFORN)

1. Confirmation of the completion of the cable to Kiev and its specific capacity is desired. (S)

2. What are the current plans for the construction of this cable to Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin? (S)

J. Trade and Finance

The November 1958 issue of Vunshna Turgoviia (Sofia) stated Bulgaria is subcontracting, possibly on credit, for the USSR in the latter's credit agreement with Egypt. As this example is cited as a form of intra-Bloc cooperation, report any details on this or other instances of European Satellite subcontracting for the USSR in the Bloc's penetration effort. (U)

K. Transportation

1. Rail

a. There have been many recent indications that all European Satellites are revising their rail freight tariffs to conform to a uniform scale of rates and patterned after the tariff structure of the USSR. This may indicate further efforts to integrate the European Soviet Bloc economy. Report all supporting evidence which would tend to confirm or deny that such action is underway. (C)

b. There have been recent indications that all European Satellites are endeavoring to divert short and medium distance traffic from rail to highway transport facilities thereby relieving the heavily burdened railroad system. Report any evidence of measures being taken to implement this plan and any indication of success or failure of the plan. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

K. Transportation (Continued)

2. Sea

Information is required of the following:

a. Names of Soviet vessels calling at Albanian ports, with precise cargo data including origin of the cargo. (C)

b. Names of Soviet vessels calling at Middle East and Indonesian ports, with cargo data and with particular reference to cargo originating at the Soviet ports of Nikolaev and Odessa. Precise reporting of deck cargo is also desired. (C)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

III. MILITARY

A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity

1. The Warsaw Pact

a. How is the headquarters of the Pact in Moscow currently organized? What are the staff sections of the headquarters? How many Satellite officers are assigned to the staff in Moscow? What are their positions? (C)

b. Are there regional headquarters for the Pact? Where are they located? Who commands them? (C)

c. Is combined air defense a function of the unified command? How is coordination accomplished in this field? (C)

2. Training

a. Is combined training now being scheduled? On what scale are these maneuvers to be executed? What is the role of each participant? (C)

b. How frequently are combined command post exercises (CPX) held? What are the scale and scope of these exercises? (C)

c. How many officers from each of the Satellites have been trained in the USSR? At what schools is this training given? How many are currently enrolled? Are special courses arranged for Satellite officers? (C)

3. Advisory Groups

a. How many Soviet personnel are there in the Advisory Group in each of the Satellites? What function do they perform at the Ministry of Defense level? (C)

b. At what levels in the chain of command are advisory personnel assigned? What is their relationship to local commanders? (C)

4. Soviet Equipment in Satellites

a. (1) What missiles have made their appearance in the Satellites? (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
May - August 1959

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

III. MILITARY

A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity (Continued)

4. a. (2) What missiles are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites in the near future? (S)

b. What efforts have been made to coordinate armament production in the Bloc? What role is Czechoslovakia playing in armament development? (C)

c. What post-war models of equipment are scheduled to be delivered to the Satellites? Does antiaircraft armament have priority over other types? (C)

d. What naval vessels are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites (particularly Poland and East Germany)? (C)

e. What aircraft are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites in the near future? (C)

5. Reduction in Strengths:

a. Any recent and significant reductions in strength? (C)

b. Which service (Army, Navy or Air Force) has been most affected by such reduction? (C)

SECRET

JUL 9 1 30 PM '59

SECRET