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PRL (Guide No. 164)

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# PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL)

## EASTERN EUROPE

(1 SEPTEMBER - 31 DECEMBER 1959)

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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OCI/CIA  
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FOREWORD

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2. Coordination with the Department of State includes the PRL's for all the world areas: (a) the USSR, (b) Eastern Europe, (c) Western Europe, (d) Near East/Africa, (e) Far East and (f) Latin America. As a result, the PRL's include current intelligence requirements from the Intelligence and Regional Bureaus of the State Department, as well as those from the CIA Offices of Current Intelligence (OCI), Research and Reports (ORR) and Scientific Intelligence (OSI). In addition, the PRL's include major intelligence deficiencies noted in the Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) approved by the US Intelligence Board (USIB)--the principal governing body for US intelligence, comprised of the heads of all US intelligence agencies under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
3. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total, present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any single collection facility. However, to the extent that the collector has a capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will provide effective guidance for current intelligence reporting. For those collectors who may not have access to background information, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of the requirements.
4. To facilitate and possibly expand the use of the PRL, all items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN (S/NOFORN), CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN), OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).
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  - or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and Distribution (ICD), Department of State.

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ALBANIA

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Communist Party and Governmental Activities

The Albanian Workers Party, led by Enver Hoxha, continues to follow hard-line policies without evoking any noticeable internal party opposition. The party leadership and general policy line appears to have been approved by Soviet Premier Khrushchev during his first visit to Albania from 25 May to 4 June 1959. Khrushchev probably told the Albanians that increased efforts should be devoted to building up the country. Although the marginal improvement in living conditions has probably given the regime some degree of popular support, the party stands ready as always to meet any popular opposition with strict, repressive measures. (C)

a. According to some refugee reports, some degree of dissidence continues to exist within the party's ranks, despite the repressive measures exercised against alleged Titoists in recent years. Does Titoism in any form in fact exist within the party? Is there any dissidence, not connected with Titoism, in the party? Is there any disagreement over economic policies? (C)

b. In a 24 June 1959 speech in Gjirokaster, Hoxha attacked both "old" and "young" intellectuals, claiming the former retained "old petit-bourgeois tendencies" and "opportunistic and revisionist tendencies." The latter, apparently, do not care what happens to the state. How widespread is this attitude, and precisely in what questions or fields of endeavor (e.g., social, political or economic) does the bourgeois attitude of the intellectuals clash with Communist policy? Among what segments of the Albanian "intelligentsia" is this attitude found? Why? What punitive measures are being taken? (C)

c. Before anti-Yugoslav polemics receded prior to Khrushchev's visit, there were a number of trials of alleged Yugoslav spies. Among the "spies" were two Roman Catholic priests. There have been subsequent reports that several Catholic clergymen have been imprisoned. Is there any evidence that other Catholic clergymen have been arrested in addition to the two? Has the regime launched an anti-Catholic drive recently? (C)

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ALBANIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. d. What is being done, or scheduled in the near future, in the matter of eliminating bureaucracy? Of decentralizing the economic and/or political structure? What is the degree of corruption practiced by civil servants? What is the extent of loyalty to the Communist government of civil servants? Report on the success or lack of success in implementing the decree making compulsory 30 days of labor a year for Albanian officials? (C)

e. Detailed information is desired on the day-to-day operation of the governmental system, including the organizational setup of the various ministries? What is the relationship between the central organs in Tirana and the corresponding organs on the local level? (C)

f. Although Albania has not decreed a "leap forward" or a formal speed-up, as have other Satellites, plans for economic development over the next few years call for a significant advance. Are there any evidences that the regime is intensifying political repressions concurrent with raising economic goals? Does the regime anticipate expanding the role of the trade unions? (C)

2. Soviet Control and Security

a. Does the USSR allow Albania less autonomy for making internal decisions than it does to other Satellites? Has the degree of Moscow control changed significantly in the last year? Have there been any changes in the composition or responsibilities of the Soviet advisors? (C)

b. How is Soviet control effected and which personalities are directly involved? Does the Soviet Embassy play a substantial part? Is Soviet Ambassador Ivanov exerting a stronger influence in Albania than his predecessor, Krylov? (U)

c. Information is needed on the various security and police organs, including border guards: precise organizational setup of the Directorates of State Security, including charts, leading personnel and total strength, liaison among each other and with the military forces. (U)

d. What is the attitude of the people toward security police and other organs of repression? (U)

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ALBANIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. e. What areas of resistance exist within the country? How is resistance manifested, and is it of real concern to the regime? (U)

3. Popular Attitudes

a. Is there any evidence that Albania intends to reorganize its school system along "polytechnical" lines similar to the Soviet educational program? If changes are contemplated in the school system, what is the reaction of the educators, parents, students? What is the reaction of urban as contrasted to rural populations? (C)

b. Do the Albanians feel they are being exploited by the USSR economically or politically? What is the real feeling about Soviet control in general? What is the popular reaction to the economic speed-up? What is the popular reaction to statements that Soviet missile bases may be installed in Albania? To what extent has the regime succeeded in obtaining popular support for its anti-Yugoslav campaign? To what extent is this support, if it exists, based on traditional animosities toward the Yugoslav people? To what extent has the regime's ideological position influenced popular support? (C)

c. What is the popular conception of the US? Is there any popular sentiment for establishing relations with the US government? What is the attitude manifested toward repatriates returning from the US? (C)

d. Did Khrushchev's visit influence popular attitudes toward the regime in any way? Toward the USSR? Toward Italy, Yugoslavia, or Greece? (C)

e. On 27 April 1959, the government announced a series of price cuts, and an increase in the agricultural delivery prices. Taken together, both moves have improved the living standards of the farming population and may have the effect of encouraging greater agricultural production. To what extent have these moves influenced popular opinion? To what extent have they stimulated increased production? (C)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Although Tirana and Ankara agreed to resume diplomatic relations in June 1958, it was not until 26 June 1959 that Turkish Minister-designate Hasan Nurelgin arrived in Tirana. Since Albania

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ALBANIA (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

does not have relations with Greece and since Yugoslavia has withdrawn its head-of-mission, Turkey is thus the only non-Bloc Balkan country with which Albania has "normal" relations. Any information about Nurelgin's treatment, the treatment of his mission, and the treatment afforded the Albanian mission in Ankara, is desired. (C)

2. Since mid-June 1959, Albania's anti-Yugoslav attacks have revived, although they have not attained the high intensity of attacks prior to Khrushchev's visit. What is the extent of harassment of Yugoslav diplomats in Tirana? Will Tirana revive the practice of attacking Tito personally? Any information concerning the apprehension, trial, and disposition of alleged Yugoslav spies is of interest. Also we would like information on any border incidents. (C)

3. Relations with Greece--not official since World War II and never very cordial--deteriorated during the past few months. There was a border incident on 30 March 1959, and the imminent installation of NATO missile bases in Greece has strained matters further. The trial of Manolis Glezos has also occasioned bitter Albanian comment. Will low-level agreements--such as, the agreement to exchange the remains of soldiers who fell in World War II--continue to be reached? Does Tirana plan an approach to Athens for bettering relations in accordance with the spirit of its propaganda statements about reaching a Balkan accord? What will Tirana do in the way of pressuring Greece to attend a Balkan conference? Will Tirana let the propaganda drive abate? (C)

4. What is the current attitude of the regime toward resuming relations with the US? (C)

C. MILITARY

1. The USSR has apparently established a submarine base in Vlone Bay. Reports indicate the existence of substantial military construction on Sazan (Saseno) Island. (S)

a. Information on the existence, extent and purpose of this work would be very useful. (S)

b. Information on the deployment of additional Soviet units to Vlone Bay and the plans for operations from this base are required. (S)

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ALBANIA (Continued)

C. MILITARY (Continued)

1. c. Information on the installation of defensive equipment, such as SAM sites, would also be helpful. (S)

2. Information concerning current military construction at Vlone, Skrapari, and Breshen is requested. (C)

3. Reports of Soviet missile bases in Albania have been received. (S) Information is needed on any activity in regard to missiles such as:

a. Description of missile objects observed; (C)

b. Destination and/or direction of movement of objects; (S)

c. Date and location of sightings. (S)

4. Information is needed on the number of Soviet and/or Satellite military advisers and whether there has been an increase or decrease in recent months. (U)

5. Continuing information on morale and reliability of the armed forces is needed. (U)

6. Information is needed on the structure, equipment, strength of composition of the armed forces is needed. Have new T/O and E's been instituted recently? (C)

D. ECONOMIC

1. Allegedly the 1960 goal to have 70% of the arable land in collectives and 15% in simple type cooperatives for a total of 85% had not been fulfilled as of June 1959. At this time there was reported to be 76.2% of the arable land in the collective sector. Little effort has apparently been made to extend the collectivized area during the past 6 months, especially for the simple type cooperatives. (C)

a. What factors influenced the regime to slow down during 1959? (C)

b. Also, why has the consolidation or merging of collectives been halted--a policy opposite of that being followed by other Satellites? (C)



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ALBANIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

2. Chrome Ore, Iron - Nickel Ore. Annual iron-nickel ore production is expected to reach 200,000 tons by 1960 and 500,000 tons by 1965. Czechoslovakia, in addition to furnishing aid for development of these mines, currently imports the ore and processes it for nickel content. The planned construction of a nickel recovery plant in Slovakia by 1962 indicates that the Albanians will probably continue to export the raw ore without domestic processing. Production of chrome ore is also expected to reach 500,000 tons by 1965. (OUO) Information is needed on the following:

a. Albanian intentions concerning the construction of a processing plant for either chrome ore or iron-nickel ore. (C)

b. Actual or planned investments in chrome ore and iron-nickel ore mining by Albania; investments in iron-nickel mining by Czechoslovakia. (C)

c. Accurate current estimates of reserves of chrome ore; of iron-nickel ore. (C)

3. Soviet Credits. In early July 1959 it was announced that Albania had received another Soviet credit, valued at 300 million rubles, "to finance the construction of industrial and other projects."

a. Report additional details, e.g., time period during which credit will be drawn on, repayment terms, projects involved, etc. (U)

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BULGARIA

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Bulgarian regime is currently immersed in efforts to step up enthusiasm to meet the 1959 economic targets of the "leap." Despite these efforts of the past few months, widespread opposition to the program continues to exist, apparently reaching the highest ranks of the party. The most significant development of the period under consideration was the central committee plenum of 9 July 1959, which disclosed that the regime was seriously concerned with the status of the "leap" in the fields of construction, industry, labor payments, internal trade, and livestock production. Plenums have been scheduled monthly from October 1959, through February 1960, at which these areas of concern will be discussed. An editorial in the June 1959 issue of the party's theoretical monthly Novo Vreme strongly condemned continuing opposition to the program, hinting that several trusted party members may be cracking under the strains imposed by the high targets. (C)

1. Party Problems

a. What is the extent of "disagreement" within the top party and governmental ranks over the "leap?" Is there disagreement between the central committee and the politburo, or within one or the other bodies? What are the attitudes and loyalties of the party rank-and-file? (C)

b. To what extent are the following an explanation for the disagreement? Personal intrigue? Old political alignments? Belief in the infeasibility of the program? Excessive physical and/or mental strain on the apparatchiki charged with carrying out the program? Basically, is internal disagreement one of policy (extent and direction of the "leap") or of personality, or of both? (C)

c. What individuals are involved in the disagreements? Will any or all of them be purged in the near future? Was Georgi Tsankov's failure to put in a public appearance from the 5 April 1959 elections up to the time the delegation to Poland returned on 2 July 1959 related to the disagreements? (C)

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BULGARIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. d. To what extent do the current disagreements, if they do exist, reflect differences of opinion concerning Communist China's "leap?" Is there any pressure in the party leadership to expand the "leap?" Is there pressure to incorporate more "Chinese" features? (C)

2. Political Power

a. What are the current comparative standings of Vulko Chervenkov, Dimitur Ganev, Anton Yugov, and Todor Zhivkov? How does the 6 May 1959 appointment of Chervenkov to head the new State Scientific Council affect his position? To what extent would a failure to meet the "leap" goals for 1959 affect Zhivkov's leadership of the party? What is Zhivkov's current relationship with Khrushchev and/or other Soviet leaders? What is his relationship with Chervenkov? (C)

b. We desire all information relating to the current status of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. We are also interested in any changes in the functions and status of the Fatherland Front. (C)

3. Soviet Delegation to Bulgaria

In view of the evidences of disagreements within the Bulgarian party, the Soviet delegation -- which may be led by Khrushchev -- is likely to play an instrumental role in settling internal Bulgarian conflicts. TASS announced acceptance of the Bulgarian invitation on 16 March 1959 but declined to state who would be on the delegation or when it would visit Bulgaria. There is evidence the Bulgarians expected Khrushchev to stop off on his return from Albania in June 1959, but he visited Budapest instead. There is current speculation that the visit will occur over the 9 September 1959 holiday, although no official announcement has yet been made. Concerning the role which the delegation could play in Bulgarian politics, it would be useful to know any details on the following: (S)

a. What have been Moscow's attitudes toward the leap forward and the reorganizations? (C)

b. To what extent has it supported these programs? (C)

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BULGARIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. c. Has there been any discernable change in their attitudes since the leap was formulated in November 1958? (C)

d. To what degree would the Soviets permit a purge of the ranks of the BCP? (C)

4. Education

The 3 July 1959 extraordinary session of the National Assembly passed into law an educational reform bill largely patterned on a draft proposal of the April 1959 BCP central committee plenum and on the proposals made by Zhivkov to the Youth Union congress in December 1958. Modeled on the polytechnical reforms made in the USSR this last year, the Bulgarian reform will not be completed until 1964 or 1965 and will require a considerable expansion of physical facilities. (C)

a. What has been the popular reaction to the reform? In particular, how have parents and students greeted the reforms? Is there any difference in reaction between the countryside and the towns and cities? (C)

b. What has been the reaction of regional (Okrug) party and governmental committees, who will bear the brunt of the expansion program? (C)

5. Soviet Control and Security

a. What are the channels of Soviet political control of Bulgaria? Who in the USSR exercises supervisory authority for that country? (U)

(i) Is there any difference in the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria than toward the other Satellites? (U)

(ii) Can any Bulgarian personalities be identified with specific Soviet personalities? Which Bulgarians, if any, act as liaison between the Soviets and the Bulgarians? (U)

(iii) What is the role of the Soviet Ambassador in Sofia? (U)

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BULGARIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

5. a. (iv) What is Chervenkov's current status vis-a-vis the Kremlin? (U)

b. TASS announced on 16 March 1959 that a Soviet party-governmental delegation would visit Bulgaria although no date was mentioned. Because there have been rumors of Soviet dissatisfaction with features of Bulgaria's "leap", it is possible that this delegation may be of unusual interest. In connection with their visit the following would be of interest: (U)

(i) Which collective farms did the delegation visit? (U)

(ii) What leaders were detailed to escort the delegation around Bulgaria? (U)

(iii) What Soviet criticisms, if any, were voiced about Zhivkov's theses or about other developments in Bulgaria? (U)

(iv) What statements, if any, were made by the delegation members about Bulgaria's position vis-a-vis other Satellites in the matter of "building socialism?" (U)

c. Information is desired on the security apparatus--its organization and functions, and its relationship with the party and the USSR. (U)

6. Popular Attitudes

a. What is the popular attitude toward increased pressures generated by the "leap forward?" Is there any resistance or sabotage to increased production norms? Any and all details are desired. (C)

(i) What is the popular attitude toward the administrative reorganization initiated partly as a means to eliminate bureaucracy? (U)

(ii) Is there any truth in rumors of food shortages approaching famine in some areas and cities? (C)

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BULGARIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

6. b. How is the mass "voluntary" labor program regarded by the people? What means have been devised to evade conscription on "voluntary" labor teams? How is the projected expansion of youth labor brigades working out in practice? (U)

c. Is the popular attitude one of optimism or pessimism toward the targeted production hikes for 1959-61-65 called for by Zhivkov? What is the popular conception of the standard of living in the USSR? In other Satellites? In West Europe? In the US? (U)

d. Is the regime still dissatisfied with the attitudes of the youth? If so, what steps is the regime taking to try to remedy this situation? (C)

e. What has been the reaction of the population to the reestablishment of US-Bulgarian relations? (U)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. During his visit to Albania in May-June 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev again raised the issue of calling a Balkan conference to create a denuclearized Balkan and Adriatic zone and possibly to conclude pacts of nonaggression between the Satellite and non-Satellite countries of the area. (U)

a. What new concessions to Greece over the question of reparations due Greece is Sofia prepared to make in the hope of bringing Greece to the conference table? (C)

b. Comment on a change or anticipated tactical adjustment in Soviet and Bulgarian plans for a Balkan "Free Zone"? What has been the reaction to Khrushchev's statements that missile bases may be set up in Bulgaria should Italy and Greece persist in their determination to set up NATO bases on their territory? (C)

2. What are the attitudes of the party leaders toward Tito as a person and toward what he symbolizes? Of the party rank-and-file? Among the populace? (C)

a. Is there a popular distinction made between Tito, his leadership group and the mass of the Yugoslav people? (U)

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BULGARIA (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. b. What is the popular attitude toward the "Macedonian question?" (U)
- c. What is the popular attitude toward the dispute with Yugoslavia? (U)
3. What is the opinion of the party leadership toward the Berlin crisis? Of the rank-and-file? Of the people as a whole? (U)
  - a. Has the regime been able to engender any real enthusiasm among the people for the Soviet position? (U)

C. MILITARY

1. Any recent evidence of the appearance of Soviet missile equipment in Bulgaria? Details. (S)
2. Information is needed on the level of training being conducted by the armed forces. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? Was a large-scale command post exercise held this year? (C)
3. What is the current strength of the armed forces? What is the break-down by service? (U)
4. Have the tables of organization and equipment been revamped within the past two years? How do they compare with Soviet T/O & E's? (C)
5. What is the current political training in Bulgarian units. Is there resentment between commanders and political officers? (C)

D. ECONOMIC

1. Collective Farms
  - a. We would like more information on the current organization and number of Bulgaria's amalgamated collective farms (TKZS). (C)
  - b. Are there now, or were there at any time, full-blown communes in Bulgaria? (C)

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BULGARIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

1. c. Are the district (Obshtina) Peoples Council and the TKZS managing council one and the same body, or are they separate and distinct bodies? (C)

2. Soviet Credits

No information is currently available concerning the \$84.8 million credit Bulgaria is supposed to receive from the Soviet Union in 1959. Report any details concerning this credit. (C)

3. Bulgarian officials have announced that between November 1958 and June 1959, irrigation construction had been completed on 153,000 hectares. Is there evidence of this new construction in rural areas? If so, was it used for the growing of crops in 1959? (OUO)

4. Below normal precipitation in the spring of 1959 has extended the adverse effects of the 1958 drought especially in east Bulgaria. Rains occurring in late May and early June have benefited spring sown crops but are probably too late to benefit the fall sown crops. How do 1959 yields of wheat, rye, and barley compare with 1958? What is the present condition of fall harvested crops (corn, cotton, tobacco, sunflowers, and sugar beets) compared to 1958? What is the condition of hay fields and pastures? (C)



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Party and Government

a. Internal Party: Articles in May 1959 in Czechoslovak Communist Party journals indicated that the new cadre policy was causing some difficulties. The attempt to hold individual supervisors responsible for cadre policies has resulted in irregular practices or failure by some functionaries to assume responsibility. (U)

(1) Report all disagreements over cadre policy, difficulties encountered in practice, and partisans in the party for and against the new procedures. (U)

b. Leadership: Interior Minister Barak, who was recently named deputy premier, now appears to occupy a leading position in the party and government. Who is supporting Barak in his recent ascendancy? (S)

(1) With whom is Barak most closely associated? (S)

(2) Is Barak's ascendancy related to Siroky's reported decline? (S)

(3) Report all information on Barak's relations with other top Czech leaders. (S)

c. Party Goals:

(1) Since the party's 11th congress, official Czech journals have been urging a struggle against "remnants of the defeated bourgeoisie" and efforts to create in Czechoslovakia a "unity of interests between the collective and the individual." (U)

(a) Do these pronouncements presage an even harsher program to liquidate middle-class elements than is already in practice? (U)

(b) How does the populace view future prospects after these pronouncements? (U)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. Party and Government (Continued)

c. (2) Recent articles in the Communist press indicate that an important goal is to bring more workers and collective farmers into the party. This problem is not new, but the articles indicate that long efforts to get these elements to join the party have been unsuccessful. At the same time the party journals are complaining that too many persons from other social elements are being recruited. (U)

(a) Has this effort resulted in more workers and peasants being brought into the party in recent months? (U)

(b) Is this policy receiving wholehearted support from party functionaries? (U)

(c) If there is opposition to this policy, from whom is it coming? (U)

(d) Are non-worker or non-peasant elements being removed from party membership? (U)

d. Youth: The Czech youth organization was brought under direct party control in 1958 and since that time has done nothing more specific than to revert to the earlier labor brigade program. (U)

(1) How is direct party control working out? (U)

(2) Has it succeeded in stimulating the moribund organization in any way? (U)

(3) Has the organization enjoyed any success in its new program? (U)

2. Soviet Control and Security

a. As Czechoslovakia and other Bloc areas, notably Bulgaria and China, near their announced goal to "complete the building of socialism" and move on to "build Communism," Soviet pronouncements on their progress become increasingly important in gauging the standings and differences among the various Communist countries. Whereas Czechoslovakia was to be the second after the Soviet Union to

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. Soviet Control and Security (Continued)

a. (Continued)

"complete socialism," recent pronouncements, though differing with each other, either claim that all the Satellites will develop simultaneously or place Bulgaria next to the USSR. (U).

(1) Report all such statements and any indications that the Soviet attitude toward Czechoslovakia's progress toward socialism and Communism is changing. (U)

(2) Report also the Czechs' reaction to their apparent downgrading. (U)

b. How has the new international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, been used by the Soviet party to exercise control over the Satellites? What disputes and problems have arisen over editorial and publication policies? Over substantive material to be published? (U)

c. All identity cards in Prague were exchanged for new ones prior to 31 July 1959. (U)

(1) Did the regime order this exchange to effect better control over the populace?

(2) Was this exchange related to efforts to force some Prague citizens to take up work in the provinces? (U)

(3) Has the regime encountered any difficulties in the exchange? (U)

(4) Has the exchange brought to light persons who were living illegally in Prague? Were these persons prosecuted? (U)

(5) Are identity cards to be exchanged elsewhere in Czechoslovakia? (U)

d. (1) What does the planned Bloc economic integration foreshadow for Soviet control over Czechoslovakia? (C)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. Soviet Control and Security (Continued)

d. (2) How have Czech party members reacted to the proposed integration? (C)

(3) Have there been any behind-the-scenes disagreements, either over principle or procedure? (U)

e. How does the Soviet Union presently control Czechoslovakia? Have control channels changed since October 1956? (U)

f. (1) In what areas does the Czechoslovak party have exclusive policy-making and implementation authority, as distinct from matters clearly directed by the USSR? (C)

(2) To what degree does the Soviet Union control the guide Czech foreign policy, and how is this supervision exercised? (U)

g. How reliable do the Soviets regard the Czech party and its front organizations, the security apparatus, and the populace as a whole? (U)

3. Popular Attitudes

a. How do the industrial workers feel about the wage reforms now being carried out? What resistance has been exhibited? How, where, and how many people were involved? How was it settled by the regime? (U)

b. (1) How do collectivized farmers feel about the regime's decision to increase the collectives' "indivisible funds" and cut individual earnings? (U)

(2) What is their attitude toward "incentives" to turn over to the collectives privately owned livestock and private plots? (U)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. Popular Attitudes (Continued)

c. Evidence has been reported that intellectuals who were forced into production work in the factories during 1958, while at first looked upon with contempt by the workers, have now gained both their confidence and their respect. Since these intellectuals oppose the regime for the most part, such a development, if widespread, could lead to coordinated opposition to certain party policies. Since students are now to be brought into the factories on at least a part-time basis, a third potential anti-regime group is introduced. Report any information on these trends and their influence upon party circles. (U)

d. What is the present Czech and Slovak attitude toward the West, and the United States in particular, with regard to: (1) Western military, scientific and economic strength relative to Soviet accomplishments in these fields, and (2) the possibility that the Free World may directly or indirectly liberate Czechoslovakia from the Kremlin's domination? Does anyone place his hopes upon gradual reform through evolution? (U)

e. What is the present Czech attitude toward West Germany? What is the popular reaction to regime propaganda on German rearmament? (U)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Several Czech leaders have visited the Soviet Union recently, viz, Foreign Trade Minister Krajcir and Deputy Premier Simunek in June 1959 and Novotny in late July 1959. While Novotny was said to be on vacation, Simunek and Krajcir were apparently discussing trade matters. Novotny's trip could have been for the purpose of holding talks with Soviet leaders. (U)

a. Report any information concerning discussions between the Czech and Soviet leaders. (U)

b. How do Czech leaders feel about: (1) current relations in general with the Soviet Union, (2) current trade relations with the USSR, and (3) the Kremlin's policy on Germany? (U)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. The Sudetan German rally in Vienna on 16-17 May 1959 has caused a deterioration in Czech Austrian relations. (U)

a. Why has this rally become such a long-standing issue to the Czechs? (U)

b. Has the Czech attitude on this question affected trade or other relations with Austria? (U)

C. MILITARY

1. Any evidence of the appearance of Soviet missile equipment in Czechoslovakia? Details. (S)

2. Information is needed on the level of training being conducted by the Armed Forces. Maneuvers and command post exercises should be reported immediately. (C)

3. What is the current strength of the Armed Forces? What is the break-down by service? (C)

4. Have the tables of organization and equipment been revamped within the past two years? How do they compare with Soviet T/O and E's? (C)

5. Describe the political training in armed forces units. Do commanders feel that political workers are infringing on their perogatives? (C)

6. What new equipment has been received by troop units? (C)

D. ECONOMIC

1. Recent decrees announcing changes in the marketing and pricing of agricultural produce are aimed at stimulating collective farm output. These decrees will now make the private plots of members less valuable as part of the government's policy to force the members to work harder on the collective. Has there been any indication of peasant resentment to this policy? (OUO)

2. The government has recently been propagandizing that the collective members should till their private plots jointly. What success has the government had an in what areas? (OUO)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

3. USSR - CSR Trade: Economic plans provide for an increasing orientation of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade toward the USSR. Report any indication of developing friction between the two countries attributable to this trend. (C)
4. CEMA Specialization: According to CEMA plans for Bloc-wide division of labor and specialization, Czechoslovakia will have to undertake certain changes in its industrial structure. There is a possibility that the USSR will assist Czechoslovakia in this task by extending a long-term loan. Report any significant developments in this respect. (C)
5. Western Credits: Some Bloc countries have recently been successful in obtaining private credits from Western sources. Report on similar endeavors and achievements of Czechoslovakia. (C)
6. Credits to Bloc: Czechoslovakia has become important as a source of credit for less developed countries of the Bloc. Report terms and other details of credits extended by Czechoslovakia to other Bloc countries. (C)
7. Pipelines. A Soviet-European Satellite crude oil pipeline has been widely discussed recently. It is reported that a southern branch of this line will lead from somewhere in the USSR, through Chop, to Bratislava. (C)
  - a. What is the planned route of this line? (C)
  - b. If there is to be a branch into Hungary, where will it originate? (C)
  - c. What is to be Czechoslovakia's share of the cost of building this pipeline? (C)
8. Chemical Equipment. Czechoslovakia, which is one of the major producers of chemical equipment in the Sino-Soviet Bloc and which is to provide a substantial amount of equipment for the Soviet Chemical industry during the current Seven-Year Plan, has recently concluded a trade agreement with UK and is currently negotiating the purchase of chemical equipment from Canada. (C)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

8. a. Information is desired on the chemical equipment which Czechoslovakia is importing from UK, giving the type, capacity, value, as well as information regarding import of technology. (C)

b. Report Czechoslovakia's success or failure to procure chemical equipment from Canada, giving value, type, and capacity, as well as information regarding import of chemical technology. (C)

c. Report on Czechoslovakia's progress on meeting its chemical equipment commitments to the Soviet Union and the possible impact of these commitments on the growth and development of the Czechoslovak chemical industry. (C)

9. Planned Steel Projects. Czechoslovakia plans to build a large iron and steel complex near Kosice in Slovakia. A recent report states that work at the project site has not begun. (C) Information is needed on the following:

a. What proportion of the total volume of construction planned for 1959-1965 is to contribute to this industrialization of Slovakia? (C)

b. In addition to the Kosice plant, what are the major projects in this program? (C)

c. What is the planned investment for this project? (C)

d. What investment or other contributions does the USSR plan to make to this project? (C)

e. When will construction start? (C)

f. Exact location of the project site by geographic coordinates. (C)

10. Nickel Project. Reuters reports that a nickel plant is to be built at Sered (48° 17' N; 17° 44' E), Slovakia, with a completion date in 1962. The plant is to use Albanian nickel ore. (U)

a. What is the planned capacity and investment for this plant? (U)

b. Has construction begun? (U)



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

E. SCIENTIFIC - MEDICAL

1. As of 3 June 1959 Czechoslovakia donated ambulances to Iraq for civil defense purposes. (OUO)
  - a. Has any other Czech medical equipment been donated to Iraq? If so, what type and in what quantity? (C)
  - b. What other medical and/or trade, including technical assistance, has Czechoslovakia provided for Iraq? (C)
  
2. The Department of Microbiology of the Institute of Biology, Czech Academy of Sciences, in Prague has been reported as conducting research in immunochemistry. At the same time, this department has been engaged in continuous bacterial cultivation of unnamed microorganisms. The volume of microorganisms being continuously produced is considerably larger than necessary for immunochemical purposes. (C)
  - a. What organism or organisms are being mass produced? (C)
  - b. Where are the processed organisms being sent? (C)
  - c. To what use are the organisms being put? For example: are the organisms being produced for use in a vaccine producing factory; for BW purposes; or possibly for transmittal to the USSR? (C)
  
3. It is known that Dr. Vilem Skavranek, chief of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Ministry of Health, is employing modern punch card systems for recording epidemiological data. No evidence of this type of system has been observed in similar Soviet laboratories. (C)
  - a. What coding system is being used in the punch cards? (C)
  - b. What kind of machines are employed, how many, and where are they obtained? (C)
  - c. Is there any evidence that other major Institutes and Laboratories intend to adopt these modern methods of data recording? (C)
  - d. Can publications of these data be obtained? (C)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Continued)

E. SCIENTIFIC - MEDICAL (Continued)

4. It has been alleged that the Czech and Slovak Academies of Sciences conduct their research and other affairs independently. Such a situation is inconsistent with established Communist procedure and bears further investigation. (C)

a. What are the administrative lines of authority which govern the two academies? (C)

b. How are the efforts of the two academies planned and executed, and where is the final approving authority vested? (C)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 September - 31 December 1959)

EAST GERMANY

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Party and Government

a. Walter Ulbricht appears to be at the height of his power although his tenure continues to depend on the Kremlin. Ulbricht has taken steps to eliminate his opponents from the top party organs but to date has not expelled them from the party. (U)

(1) Is current opposition to Ulbricht among high party and government functionaries limited to isolated individuals on specific issues or is there a "faction" opposed to him personally, or to his policies? (C)

(2) Information is needed on the current status of Ulbricht's leading opponents, including Schirdewan, Oelssner, Wollweber and Selbmann, and any steps taken to discipline them or, conversely, to improve their position in the party. Also report reliable information on their standing in Moscow. What elements in the party support Schirdewan? Is such support based on clear-cut policy issues, or is it largely personal in character? Is there any reliable evidence of a Moscow or SED plan to "build up" Schirdewan as a "German Gomulka" who might eventually take over from Ulbricht should the USSR withdraw from East Germany? (C)

(3) In the past, Premier Grotewohl and Deputy Premier Rau reportedly have criticized certain of Ulbricht's tactics. Do they continue to offer any opposition, or have they come around completely? What is the state of Grotewohl's health? (S)

(4) Is there any firm evidence that some elements in the State Planning Commission continue to oppose Ulbricht's economic policies? Is this opposition based on general principles or is it limited to particulars? Identify these elements and the issues they have raised. (S)

(5) Indications of a critical attitude of leading intellectuals in the party toward the party leadership should be reported. Which Ulbricht policies do they criticize? Conversely, have they given up their opposition to Ulbricht's leadership? (U)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. Party and Government (Continued)

a. (6) What party leaders (e.g., Matern Neumann, Verner) appear to be emerging as potential successors to Ulbricht? What individuals or groups of individuals are increasing their stature in the party apparatus? Conversely, what elements appear to be slipping from favor? Why? (U)

b. Information is needed on the channels and methods by which the East German party exercises leadership over the "independent" West German KPD. Are there indications of serious factionalism in the West German organization? Are these related to East German factional splits? (U)

c. Information is needed on planned contacts between important East German party officials and leaders of the West German Social Democratic party or trade union organization. (C)

d. What part does the East German party plan in the editing and publication of the international Communist publication, "Problems of Peace and Socialism"? Report meetings held in East Germany and East Berlin and East Berlin which appear to be connected with formulation of an international party line or with the direction of this journal. (See RDG-1036) (U)

e. Information is needed on the functioning of the East Berlin party leadership, including evidence of specific functions of members of the district committee. What is the relationship between the East Berlin party organization headed by Paul Verner and that for West Berlin led by Gerhard Danelius? (C)

f. Report important developments concerning the "bourgeois" parties--the Christian Democratic Union (East), National Democratic Party and Liberal Democratic Party--particularly any move to further reduce their importance or to eliminate their leaders from important "front" positions in the government. (C)

2. Soviet Control and Security

a. Report any steps taken by the Kremlin to change the basis of its control over East Germany, for example, by renegotiating basic agreements such as that of 20 September 1955 or the 12 March 1957 pact governing the status of Soviet forces in East Germany. Any information on the strengthening of Soviet forces should be reported, or conversely, withdrawal of Soviet troops. (C)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. Soviet Control and Security (Continued)

b. What role does the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin play in the formulation of East German policies? Information is also needed on the functioning of Soviet consulates in East Germany. (C)

c. Report immediately evidence that the USSR plans to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, including date and place. Information is also needed on Soviet plans for German reunification or, alternatively, projected steps to emphasize the impossibility of effecting unification with West Germany. (C)

d. We are interested in receiving information on unusual Soviet missions, involving relatively high level functionaries, which may have been sent to advise on the implementation of specific East German policies. (C)

e. Soviet plans to take further steps to formalize the Oder-Neisse border between Poland and East Germany should be reported. (U)

f. Report any significant changes in the East German security structure and leadership (Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Interior). Note any bearing of such changes on the leadership of the East Germany party (e.g., Minister of State Security Mielke is reported to be protege of Ulbricht). (U)

g. What measures are being taken to make flights to the West more difficult? Also report the effect of such measures on the populace. Are increased restrictions being placed on travel to West Germany? Are present restrictions being relaxed? (U)

h. All reliable evidence on popular attitudes (disaffection, demonstrations, sabotage or, alternatively, any tendency to give up resistance to the regime) is desired. If possible, identify resistance leaders. (C)

i. What has been the effect on the morale of the bureaucrats and on the attitudes of various elements of the population of such factors as increased standard of living, Soviet technical and financial aid, the Geneva Conference, the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits, etc? Is there a greater or less tendency on the part of the population to identify its own personal goals with those of the GDR? Has there been any change in views of various groups on the "permanency"

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. Soviet Control and Security (Continued)

i. (Continued)

of the GDR? If the answer is affirmative, why? What are the outstanding grievances of various elements of the population toward the regime. (e.e., foreign control, presence of Soviet troops, economic conditions, lack of political freedom, etc.) What proportion of the population tends to support the regime, for which reasons, as compared with a year, five, or ten years ago? (C)

j. The intellectuals have been a stronghold of resistance to the regime. For this reason, unrest among them and its causes should be reported. What groups and levels of the intelligentsia are particularly affected? Which universities have been centers of disaffection? Which sectors of the intelligentsia are generally loyal to the regime? Have intellectuals been able to exact any specific concessions from the regime? (U)

k. Report any measures taken by the regime to cope with popular unrest by effecting an improvement in the supply of consumers goods or similar measures. (U)

3. Church and Education

a. What steps is the regime taking to sever ties between churches in the GDR and West Germany, and specifically to curtail the control exercised by Evangelical Bishop Dibelius of Berlin over his branch of the Evangelical Church in East Germany? Is the state taking any steps to set up an independent East German Evangelical church? What is the reaction of the churches to these measures? (U)

b. What measures is the regime taking to break the hold of the churches over youth? For Example, report steps taken to make the Jugendweihe obligatory on East German youth, and reaction of the churches to these steps. (U)

c. We are also interested in reports concerning harassing measures by the regime against churches, for example curtailment of its financial resources. (C)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

4. Berlin

a. Report immediately any reliable information indicating plans to transfer Soviet controls over Allied access to Berlin to East German authorities. Report any specific steps the GDR regime takes to incorporate East Berlin in East Germany; also, any reliable information concerning Soviet intentions to withdraw its Kommandatura from Karlshorst. (S)

b. Report measures designed to sever links between West Berlin and West Germany and to make West Berlin more dependent on East Germany. These may take the form of overt harassment of may be more subtle, involving, for example, offers of supplies of West Berlin or inducements such as an increased opportunity to travel in East Germany. Also report steps, if any, the regime is taking to prepare for later harassing measures in West Berlin. (U)

c. Report all indications that controls at the sector border are being increased or any interference with communications between the two halves of the city. (U)

d. Any Soviet or East German interference with Western transportation or communications facilities should be reported. (U)

e. Report any unusual criticism of Western "spy" activities in West Berlin. (U)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. East Germany has shown major interest in gaining a foothold in the unaligned countries of Asia and Africa for the dual purpose of extending its influence and seeking diplomatic recognition of its "sovereignty." (U)

a. Report any preparations by East Germans to attend any meetings of international organizations to which they do not belong or any related efforts to gain prestige or recognition through contracts with such organizations. (C)

b. Report the sending of missions--whether trade or diplomatic--to countries with which East Germany has no relations. (U)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. c. Also report special missions being sent to countries with which East Germany has trade relations. (U)
2. Steps taken to convert trade missions in the UAR, India, Burma, Iraq, Guinea, Finland or other countries, into full diplomatic missions should be reported. (U)
3. Report any moves to improve East German relations with Yugoslavia or conversely any deterioration of such relations. Evidence is also needed on the activities of the East German Legation in Belgrade. (U)
4. East Germany has staged a continuing campaign to develop connections with the Scandinavian countries for political and economic reasons. Report missions by high-level East Germans to these countries, including objectives and success. Also report attempts to conclude commercial agreements with Scandinavian governmental organs with the intention of securing some measure of recognition of East German "sovereignty." Efforts to induce the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) to conclude agreements involving permission for the East German Interflug airline to land in Scandinavian countries, or to induce SAS to inaugurate service to Schoenefeld airfield in East Germany should be reported. (S)

C. MILITARY

1. Many reports have been received of the withdrawal of Soviet forces and administrative units from East Berlin. The Bernau-Wandlitz area is most popularly suggested as the destination of the Soviet Kommandatura. Relative information would be appreciated. (S)
2. Many reports have been received on numerous sites on the autobahn system where the center strip is being paved. Two purposes have been suggested: auxiliary landing strips and missile launching strips. (S)
  - a. Is there any reliable information on the number and purpose of these strips? (S)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. During the past few months there have been several reports of the transporting of missiles by road and rail in East Germany. If true, this is the first appearance of Soviet missile equipment in any Satellite country. This activity is of particular significance in view of recent events in Berlin. The following information is urgently needed on any such sightings in any of the Satellites: (S)

- a. Description of objects observed; (S)
- b. Destination and/or direction of movement; (S)
- c. Date and location of sighting. (S)

4. Information is needed to the level of training being conducted by the Armed Forces. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? Was a large-scale command post exercise held this year? (C)

5. What is the current strength of the Armed Forces? What is the break-down by service? (C)

6. Have the tables of organization and equipment been revamped within the past two years? How do they compare with Soviet T/O & E's? (C)

7. Have recruiting efforts been meeting with added resistance? In the introduction of compulsory military service contemplated in the near future? (C)

8. What weapons and equipment have been turned over to the East German Army by the Soviet Forces in Germany? What items have been received direct from the USSR? (C)

9. How large an antiaircraft force is contemplated for the East German Army? How will it be integrated with the Soviet Air Defense System? (C)

10. How many hours per week are devoted to political training? What is the role of the political officer in military units? (C)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC

1. The most important agricultural development that requires watching and current reporting on is food shortages. Shortages of meat have been reported continuously in scattered areas of GDR since early 1959. The current outlook for summer crops is not favorable, particularly feed and forage crops. In turn, this outlook will have an unfavorable effect on meat and other livestock product supplies this winter. Any information confirming or disproving the speculation outlined above during the current reporting period would be useful. (C)

2. East German authorities have claimed a gradual increase in the number of West Germans migrating to the GDR. For instance, the Ministry of Interior reported that 3,740 entered the East Zone during the first two weeks in July 1959. Information is needed on the accuracy of these figures, as well as data on sex, age, occupation, and other characteristics which would affect manpower supply in East Germany. (C)

3. E - W German Transportation. Transportation services between East and West Germany and in particular between West Germany and West Berlin have been subjected to harassment in the past. In view of the present situation regarding Berlin, harassment may become more severe. (C)

a. Report all observations or evidence of attempts to restrict transportation services or to impose controls that are contrary to normal practice and existing agreements. (C)

4. Telecommunications. In conjunction with the Berlin situation in March-July 1959, reports indicate that certain Soviet telecommunications facilities located in East Berlin/Kalshorst would be relocated outside East Berlin. (S)

a. Have any Soviet telecommunications facilities been relocated outside of East Berlin/Karshorst? If so, where are they located? (S)

5. Danube-Older Canal Project. References to the Danube-Oder canal project have sharply decreased in recent months. (C)

a. What is the current status of this project? (C)

b. What role does it play in the general plans for construction of canals in East Germany? (C)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

6. St. Egidien Nickel Plant. The completion date for the Saint Egidien Nickel Plant (50°47'N; 12°38'E) has been variously reported as 1961, 1962, and 1963. Upon completion, this plant is expected to provide for all domestic requirements of nickel and a surplus for export. Information on planned and actual investment and production is desired as well as a firm date for completion of this plant. (S)

7. Seven-Year Plan Draft. Drafting of the Seven-Year Plan 1959-1965 is known to be underway. What is planned regarding the expansion of facilities, future production and investments? What are the plans to assure the raw material supply for expansion of the industry? What are the import goals for iron ore, metallurgical coke, pig iron, finished steel? (S)

8. Chemical Equipment. East Germany, which is the largest Satellite producer of chemical equipment and which is expected to provide a substantial amount of equipment for the Soviet chemical industry during the current Seven-Year Plan, has recently concluded a trade agreement with UK and is currently negotiating with Imperial Chemical Industries for the purchase of industrial equipment. Among other items, East Germany is interested in obtaining a polyethylene plant, as well as equipment for producing ethylene. (C)

a. Information is desired on the equipment which Great Britain is to export to East Germany under the current trade agreement, giving type, capacity, units, and value. (C)

b. Report East Germany's success or failure to procure industrial equipment from ICI, giving value, type, and capacity, as well as information regarding export of chemical technology to East Germany. (C)

c. Report any information on extent of chemical equipment and plant which East Germany is to supply the Soviet Union during the current Seven-Year Plan. (C)

9. USSR - GDR Economic Cooperation. During June of this year a high level East German delegation visited Moscow; closer economic cooperation between the two countries was one of the topics discussed. In reporting on the trip, Grotewohl referred to certain documents which had been signed at this meeting but no details were related. Report any information concerning the nature of the commitments made, particularly any long-term credits which the USSR may have made available to East Germany. (OUO)

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EAST GERMANY (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

10. Lauta Aluminum Project: An aluminum reduction works was scheduled to be constructed at Lauta (51°30'N; 14°07'E) by late 1958. Failure to complete the project to date is indicated by recent reports concerning importation of equipment to be used in the reduction plant. (S)

a. What is the expected date for completion of construction? (S)

b. What is the expected production during the first year of operation? (S)

c. Will alumina for the operation of this plant be supplied by the aluminum works at Lauta? What additional imports of bauxite and alumina are planned because of the increased aluminum production facilities? (S)

11. Borax Procurement. An attempted diversion of 6700 tons of Turkish boracite is one of the latest evidence of East German efforts to obtain embargoed chemicals and raw materials from the West. This attempt was frustrated by joint Greek, Turkish and U.S. efforts. Several other attempts have recently been made to procure borax and boric acid as well as other embargoed commodities from the West. In these latter efforts agents in West Berlin appear to have been utilized for negotiations with East German trading agencies. (C)

a. Report existing East German plans to obtain borax from the West. Include quantities required, probable sources, and techniques for procurement. Determine the destinations and/or end-use of the borax in East Germany. (C)

b. Identify the West Berlin agents used by the DIA Complex to obtain embargoed goods. Describe their methods of operation and identify firms associated with them. (C)

E. BLOC MEDICAL AID

1. As of June 1959 East Germany had granted Iraq a medical scholarship for the forthcoming scholastic year. (U)

a. Has Iraq delegated a student to accept the scholarship? If so, what is the student's background and what courses does the student plan to take? (U)

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## PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 September - 31 December 1959)

HUNGARYA. INTERNAL AFFAIRS1. The Party

Janos Kadar's position as First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party appears to have been bolstered, at least for the time being, by the unexpected visit of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to Budapest on 4-6 June 1959. While the exact reasons for Khrushchev's brief visit are not clear, it is probable that he sought to heal rifts which had opened in the politburo and central committee in party plenary sessions in December 1958 and March 1959 during debates on agricultural collectivization. Kadar's opponents may have used the draft of the Soviet Seven Year Plan and the 21st CPSU Congress in the party plenums to argue against his "centrist" domestic and party policies in favor of a harsher line. In retrospect, it now appears that the decision of the December 1958 plenum to resume collectivization represented temporary setbacks for Kadar, who argued that Hungary lacked the agricultural machinery necessary for widespread collective farming. In January 1959, Kadar, together with Ferenc Muennich and top ideologist Gyula Kallai, attended the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow. After his return, he directed a cessation of the collectivization drive at the March 1959 plenum and proceeded with a scheduling of a party Congress for the latter part of November 1959. Hard-liners may have been instrumental in achieving an industrial speedup of token proportions at the March session. (C)

While in Budapest, Khrushchev met privately with Kadar and politburo members Muennich, Apro, Feher, Fock, Marosan and Somogyi. Muennich, Feher, and Somogyi are generally thought to support Kadar, while Apro, Marosan and Fock are hardline, ambitious contenders for primacy within the leadership. Khrushchev probably sought to impose some degree of unanimity in advance of the Party Congress, which will have to resolve controversial problems dealing with party organization, industrialization, agricultural collectivization and the lines of a new educational reform. What remains to be seen is whether Khrushchev also endorsed whatever plans Kadar may have for a "purge" of his opponents within the party apparatus under the guise of preparations for the Congress, i.e., verification of party membership, the election of delegates and the appointment of standing committees, etc. (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. a. Kadar's Status:

(1) Report any indications of change in Kadar's position within the Hungarian leadership. What effect did Khrushchev's visit have on the extent of opposition to Kadar? What policies, if any, are advocated by Kadar's opponents? (C)

(2) To what extent should changes toward a more "orthodox" internal policy be attributed to a gradual evolution in Kadar's own thinking? To pressure from Moscow and/or local adherents of "Stalinist" policies? (C)

b. Factionalism:

(1) Apart from the question of Kadar's leadership, what factionalism is there within the party? Are there clearly defined factional alignments within the Central Committee or the Politburo? (C)

(2) The Chinese Communist experience with communes had made enough of an impression on the East European parties that certain local "Stalinists" have used the Chinese example to pressure for changes in the prevailing party policies. What is the extent of "Chinese influence" in the Hungarian party? Who have been its chief proponents? On what issues have they raised it? (C)

c. Party Policy: In the most authoritative exposition of the current Bloc line on internal development and the long-term consequences of the recent Soviet Party Congress yet heard in Budapest, Gyula Kallai, in a speech to cadres of the central committee's political academy on 29 May 1959, laid down a blueprint for what the regime hopes will be the course of future Hungarian developments. Kallai's lecture was a call for increased political activity and professional, political and ideological training at all levels of Hungarian society and in all spheres of economic endeavor. He called for an educational reform--patterned after the Soviet model--to "bridge the gap between education and production and between theory and practice." Socially useful labor must become the keystone of education. (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. c. (1) To what extent is the regime likely to implement Kallai's proposals at the Party Congress or in National Assembly laws? The areas include educational reforms, increased trade union activity, a further reduction of the private trade sector and further collectivization of agriculture.

d. Rakosi-ites:

(1) What is the current status and political influence, if any, of individuals associated with the former Rakosi regime, e.g., Hegedus, Hidas, Szalai, etc.? Is it likely that they will be assigned positions of authority or responsibility in either the party or the government? (C)

(2) Are they being held in "reserve" by the Soviets as a form of pressure on Kadar and the incumbent leadership? There have been unconfirmed reports that Khrushchev does not want "an emigration in Socialism" and that he would prefer that those of the pre-revolt leadership who sought refuge in the USSR in October-November 1956 return to Hungary in retirement. (C)

(3) Does the "Hungarian colony" in the USSR maintain correspondence with any of their former associates in Hungary? If so, what are the subjects of this correspondence? (C)

e. The Congress:

(1) Report any and all changes in the party's composition or organization prior to the congress. (C)

(2) What topics for discussion are most likely to be included on the agenda for the Congress? (C)

(3) Which party officials are charged with the responsibility for drafting the agenda? (C)

(4) Are there any indications that the Congress will be used as a forum for promulgating major shifts in the party's current policies as suggested by Gyula Kallai on 29 May 1959. (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. f. Communist Youth Organization: What steps is the regime taking to build up the Communist youth organization? With what success? (C)

2. Government

a. Describe the organization and/or functions of the various ministries. What is the degree of effectiveness of the Party Secretariat branches located within each ministry? (C)

b. (1) What is the chain-of-command from the central government to the local organs? How effective is the structure? (C)

(2) Are there any indications that the organization of "cooperative villages" and "cooperative districts" during last winter's collectivization drive heralds a major administrative re-organization of Hungary's county system? (C)

(3) Recent changes in the charters granted local peoples' councils suggest that these quasi-legislative organs now enjoy considerably more competence in local affairs than previously. How effective are these councils? (C)

(4) What roles do local party secretaries and other party functionaries play in the day-to-day business of the councils? (C)

(5) Is it true that respected non-party figures have been brought into the councils as a means for enlisting popular support? If so, has their presence on the councils had the effect of vitiating party control on the local level? (C)

c. (1) What measures are being implemented to effect a decentralization of industry? (C)

(2) What effect have these measures had on the morale of civil servants? Industrial bureaucrats and technicians? (C)

(3) What is the general level of morale? (C)



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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. d. (1) Is there evidence of factionalism within the top leadership of the trade union organization? If so, who are the dissidents? (C)

3. Soviet Control and Security:

a. Colonel General T. F. Shtykov, full member of the Soviet central committee and former party secretary for Primorski Krai, has succeeded Y. I. Gromov as Soviet Ambassador to Budapest. Shtykov, unlike his predecessor, has not been too closely associated with the central Soviet party apparatus, despite his high-level party posts, nor is he so obvious a symbol of Soviet control over its Satellites. His widespread experience in party administration will be helpful to the Hungarian leadership on the eve of its first congress since the 1956 revolt and suggests that henceforth Moscow intends to exercise more of a tutorial, than a direct, control over the decisions and activities of the regime. That this "tutorial" control may already be appearing in USSR-Hungarian relations is suggested by a reported reduction in the number of Soviet "advisers" attached to various Hungarian state ministries after Gromov's departure. (C)

(1) Has the appointment of Shtykov, resulted in any change in USSR-Hungarian relations? (C)

(2) Has there been any confirmation of the withdrawal of any Soviet "advisors?" (C)

(3) What changes, if any, are likely to be effected within the Soviet control apparatus as a consequence of the change of ambassadors? (C)

b. (1) What is the chain of command for the transmission of Soviet orders to the HSWP central committee? (C)

(2) What role does Janos Kadar play? (C)

(3) To what extent does the HSWP currently exercise control over its internal policies? (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. c. What is the present leadership and organization of the security police (BACS)? What is the organization and control of the border guard? (C)

d. Regime figures insist that the trials of "counter-revolutionaries" have been completed, but unconfirmed reports suggest that such trials continue. (C)

(1) What types of trials are being held by the regime? (C)

(2) What other coercive or "administrative" measures is the regime invoking against "counter-revolutionaries" and other political offenders? Are concentration or forced labor camps being closed? (C)

e. What is the nature and extent of internal and foreign travel controls? (C)

4. Religion: In June 1959, Karoly Olt was appointed President of the State Bureau for Church Affairs, and the Bureau was transferred from the Ministry of Culture and made accountable directly to the Council of Ministers. The appointment of Olt, a stolid, unimaginative party careerist, is thought to presage an increasingly harsh regime policy toward organized religion, particularly toward the Catholic Church and its Hungarian hierarchy. To date, the regime has aimed, on the one hand, at persuading responsible church leaders to lend their support to its general economic and political program--thus compromising them in the eyes of their followers--and, on the other, to disabuse the population, particularly the youth, of religious ideas, particularly by stressing an increasingly vicious anti-religious propaganda campaign in the party press. Regime officials condemn the fact that so many high-ranking people, including some party members, still practice religion. While stressing the need for "scientific, atheistic instruction" to overcome the influences of religion, it has sought to replace religious ceremonies with party rites having an almost sacerdotal character. "Socialist weddings," for example, are now held in local party offices, and boys and girls undergo a "consecration" when they are initiated into KISZ, the Party's youth organization. The regime-controlled religious press and many of its clerical frontmen stress the "social content" of religion. Newly-ordained priests and ministers have been advised to give up their "old impressions" and preach the Gospel in the light of Socialism. (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

4. a. Information on the current whereabouts of the various bishops should be reported, together with reports of the number of episcopal posts, vicarates or other ecclesiastical offices which are currently vacant or likely to fall empty for one reason or another. (C)

b. Note regime progress or failure to achieve progress in the socialization of religious ceremonies. How, if at all, are the Hungarian bishops reacting to the regime's policy of substituting "socialist ceremonies" for the Church's sacramental system? Is an open split similar to that which exists between the Church and state in East Germany likely to develop? (C)

c. Reliable information bearing on any regime plan to try Cardinal Mindszenty -- probably in absentia -- is of great importance. (C)

d. Equally important, is there any indication that the regime may use the Cardinal as "bait" for negotiations with the Vatican, or evidence that such negotiations are underway or have been suspended? (C)

e. Does the regime intend to take stern measures to curtail the practice of religion by party members or people employed by the government? (C)

f. Is there confirmation of the Vatican charge that the regime is foisting "advisers" on the Catholic Bishops? (C)

5. Popular Attitudes

a. What steps are anti-regime elements currently taking to express their opposition? How effective are they? (C)

b. Are there any indications that individual writers are giving in to regime threats to blandishments to produce party line material? Report specific cases of published material of this type. (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

5. b. (1) Are there signs that the regime intends to adopt a more forceful "persuasion?" There have been reports that Kadar has sought personally to convince some of the more prominent writers such as Dery and Hay that they should support the regime by participating in the formation of a new Writers' Union which is to replace the post-revolt Literary Council which proved a failure. Report any developments such as the arrests of writers, releases from prison, etc. (C)

(2) The difficulties being encountered by other segments of the intellectuals and professional classes, e.g., doctors, lawyers, musicians are also of interest. (C)

c. Details would be of great interest on the reaction of the peasantry to the regime's current agricultural policies. Also of the workers to the recent step-up in industry and the reintroduction of the Stakhanovite production system. (C)

d. What are the main lines of the regime's repatriation campaign? What reception is it according returning refugees? Any notable increase in the number or complexion of redefections should be noted. (C)

e. What is the popular reaction to US policy toward the Hungarian Government? Is the Hungarian populace much concerned by Hungary's current status in such international organizations as the United Nations or the International Labor Organization? How closely does the "man in the street" follow press or radio reports of Hungary's reception in such international organizations? (C)

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS

1. United States-Hungary relations have been further strained by the recent imposition of travel restrictions on American diplomats in Hungary and the reciprocal action taken by the U.S. Hungary had warned that if the United States persisted in taking the offensive against Hungary in various international organs, such as the UN or ILO, relations between the two countries would be adversely affected. Consistent with its firm, if unsuccessful, stand on the ILO meeting, the regime's overall foreign policy appears to have become more aggressive. In addition to restricting the activities of American diplomats, the regime has expelled a British diplomat and squabbled with both the French and Italians on the question of visas. (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS (Continued)

Hungary may well attempt to exert pressure during the next few months with the view to forestalling debate on the Hungarian question during the 14th session of the General Assembly. Given the likelihood of a General Assembly debate on Hungary in an already strained atmosphere, it is not inconceivable that the regime might decide for reasons of prestige to sever relations with the United States. What concessions might the regime be prepared to offer as a means of ameliorating relations with the United States? What pressures may be anticipated from the Hungarian side? What "line" are the Hungarians pushing in advance of the UN session? (C)

a. Report on efforts of Hungarian diplomats in Western Europe and elsewhere to "sound out" officials of local foreign offices on the positions which their delegations are likely to take in the event of a General Assembly debate. (C)

b. Are there any indications that the wives or children of Hungarian diplomatic personnel stationed in Washington or at UN Headquarters in New York are not returning to the United States after their summer vacations at home? Have any Hungarian diplomats booked advanced passage from the U.S. to return to Europe, in anticipation of a break-down in diplomatic relations? (C)

2. Bloc Relations:

a. Report in detail all information concerning contacts between Hungarian party leaders and particularly those of Poland, China and Yugoslavia. (C)

b. Report Hungarian contacts with other Bloc countries. Information is needed on the nature and extent of government, party and economic relations. (C)

c. Information concerning political and/or economic relations with uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa, and particularly with Arab countries, is also desired. (C)

C. MILITARY

1. Any recent indications of Soviet troop withdrawals? (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

C. MILITARY (Continued)

2. Any evidence of the appearance of Soviet missile equipment in Hungary? In the event that missile equipment has been seen, please report: (S)
  - a. Description of objects observed; (S)
  - b. Destination and (or direction of) movement of such missiles; (S)
  - c. Date and location of such sightings. (S)
3. What is the current strength of the armed forces? (C)
  - a. What is the break-down by service? (C)
4. Information is needed on the level of training being conducted by the armed forces. (C)
  - a. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? (C)
  - b. Was a large-scale command post exercise held recently? (C)
5. Have the tables of organization and equipment been revamped within the past two years? (C)
  - a. How do they compare with Soviet T/O & E's? (C)
6. Describe the relationship between Soviet units and Hungarian units. (C)
  - a. At what levels are combined training exercises held? Do the Soviet provide demonstration units for training periods? (C)
  - b. How does the number of advisors per unit compare with the number before the rebellion? (C)
  - c. Are there plans to reduce the number of advisors? (C)

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HUNGARY (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC

1. During the next six months it is likely that the Hungarian party will introduce policy directives aimed at strengthening the collective farms and may even attempt to enlarge the total collective area. The policy changes, if any, are expected to follow the Moscow line and include agricultural pricing changes as well as organizational changes. Information on changes in the volume of agricultural investments and its use for construction and farm machinery purchases and the importation of additional farm equipment from the USSR will provide important indicators of pending policy changes in agriculture. (C)

2. A Budapest radio report in June 1958 mentioned a further credit of 140 million rubles extended by the USSR to Hungary in addition to the 300-million-ruble Soviet credit granted in December 1957. Information confirming this reported loan is needed as no further mention of it has been seen. (C)

3. A 110-million-ruble loan to build a chemical factory in the Tisza area of Eastern Hungary was announced in the newspapers in November 1958. Did this refer to the use of previously announced credits, or was it a new loan? (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 September - 31 December 1959)

POLAND

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Party

a. Party policy: The Third Congress of the PZPR held in March 1959 clearly was a triumph for Gomulka. Gomulka emerged from the Congress with his power strengthened and consolidated, in full command of the Polish party for the first time. He reiterated his determination not to deviate from his policy of no compulsory collectivization of agriculture, a continuation of the truce with the Church, and adherence to principles of legality with no return to secret police methods. During Khrushchev's visit to Poland from 14 to 23 July 1959, the Soviet leader openly gave his approval to Gomulka and his policy of independence in internal affairs. We need information on any differences of opinion within the top echelons of the party on the major points of party policy, such as relations with the Church and collectivization. Are there any pressures within the party for further limitations on personal freedoms and freedom of the press, for a harsher policy toward the Church, or for stepping up the powers and activities of the police? Who advocates such policies? What is Gomulka's method of dealing with the questions? Are any fundamental shifts in party policy imminent? What are they? (C)

b. Leadership: To what degree has Gomulka been able to strengthen the party leadership, especially at the lower levels? Has the prestige of the party and its functionaries been enhanced at the grass-roots level? What degree of influence is still maintained by the opposition? At what levels? Who are leaders in the opposition? What influence did Khrushchev's endorsement of Gomulka have on the opposition within the party? On the Polish people? (C)

(1) What is the politburo's current alignment on important party policies? What is Kliszko's relation to Gomulka, and where does he stand on the basic issues? Has his influence increased significantly since his elevation to the politburo? Are there any indications that Rapacki's influence is waning or that he may be replaced? How secure is Cyrankiewicz's position? What is behind the persistent rumors that he will be demoted? Will the outcome of the Berlin crisis have a significant bearing on Rapacki's and Cyrankiewicz's positions? (C)

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. c. Central Apparatus: We need information on the organization of the party apparatus at all levels. Information is desired on appointments to key positions in the apparatus. What effect have the extensive changes had on the party apparatus and its functioning? The party apparatus at the local level was long one of the weak links in Gomulka's control of the party organization. Has he succeeded in strengthening the party leadership and placing men loyal to him in the key positions in the countryside? (C)

d. Role of the ZSL and other Parties: Are the collaborating parties being brought under greater control by the PZPR, or are they showing some signs of independence. Are any changes in the role or structure of these parties contemplated? The ZSL reportedly was gaining in popularity at the expense of the PZPR, especially in the countryside. What is the current situation vis-a-vis these two parties? How much collaboration is there between the ZSL and the PZPR? What was accomplished by Ignar in his recent visit to the USSR? Is he more or less a top leader of the PZPR? Has there been any significant change in the attitudes of the people toward the non-Communist parties? (C)

e. The Party and the Workers: What is the attitude of the workers toward the PZPR? How has the law which established workers' self government and sharply limited the authority of the Workers' Councils been implemented? How has it affected worker support for Gomulka? Report any instances of friction between the workers and the party. What are workers' major grievances? (U)

f. Party Policy toward the Intellectuals: Has the party taken any steps recently to tighten control over writers, economists, journalists, educators, or other intellectuals? How have those affected reacted? (U)

(1) Has censorship been tightened significantly in recent months? In what ways? What groups have been affected most? How secure is Antoni Slonimski's position as head of the Polish Writers' Union? (U)

(2) To what extent does the party interfere in the operations of institutes of higher learning? How much propaganda is contained in school curricula at all levels? Information is needed on any plans to re-introduce courses in Marxism-Leninism on a compulsory basis in universities and other schools, and on the student

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

reaction to such plans. Is there resistance among teachers to party efforts to use the school system as a means of political indoctrination? How is such resistance manifested? (C)

g. Party Policy on Agriculture:

(1) On several occasions Gomulka has called for a more rapid development of the agricultural sector than had previously been envisioned. By increasingly heavy investment, mechanization, greatly expanded building and credit plans, as well as by greater party activity through the agricultural circles, the regime hopes to increase production and lay the basis for establishing some rudimentary form of agricultural collectives. He and Khrushchev during the latter's tour of Poland in July 1959 pointed out that, while collectivization is the best form of agricultural organization and will come eventually, it must be voluntary and not forced. What has been the reaction of farmers to the attempts to speed up the process of socialization through the agricultural circles? To Khrushchev's statements? How have local PZPR and ZSL party officials reacted? How much enthusiasm for the agricultural circles has been generated? (C)

(2) The announced program requires an extensive and well organized mechanism to put it into operation, yet the party is still weak in the countryside, the peasantry is largely hostile to the concept of the circles, and the network of circles is still in the embryo stage. There is also a paucity of equipment which complicates the problem. Will the party be able to organize the personnel and create the machinery necessary to implement the program? Have Gomulka's assurances that he does not intend to collectivize agriculture in the foreseeable future reassured the peasants and made them more willing to join the circles? Do the peasants fear that if they join the circles this will be the first step toward collectivization and that they will soon lose their independence? (C)

(3) What has been the peasantry's reaction to the announcement that compulsory deliveries are to be continued for another seven years in order to pay for the new agriculture program? (C)

(4) What is the peasant reaction to the regime's plan to eliminate approximately 300,000 horses by 1965 to step up efficiency through mechanization and to relieve the farmers of the

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

need to utilize so much land to produce feed for the horses. Does the average peasant fear that by giving up his privately owned source of draft power he will be forced into dependence on the state and thus be unable to resist further pressures toward collectivization? (C)

2. Government

a. Role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs:

(1) Information is needed on the organization of, modus operandi, of, and the channels of party control over this ministry. Any increase in this ministry's power and authority, as well as any increase in summary or arbitrary trials, or trials for alleged political offenses should be reported. Information is needed on the effects on the administration of justice and any changes resulting from the new law regulating the courts, the judiciary, and attorneys, especially defense attorneys. (U)

(2) Biographic data is needed on Minister of Internal Affairs Wladyslaw Wicha and his deputy ministers. Report also on their functional jurisdiction and their political orientation. (U)

(3) Have security controls been reduced to stepped up significantly? To what extent could the regime rely on the various security forces in putting down popular disturbances? (U)

3. Soviet Control and Security

a. Channels of Party Control: The once important role of the Soviet ambassador to Poland has been circumscribed since Gomulka's return to power in 1956. Information is needed on the means by which Moscow now attempts to exercise control over Polish affairs. All consultations between Polish and Soviet leaders should be reported in detail. (C)

(1) While Gomulka has moved in the direction of Moscow, especially in matters of foreign policy, he has not made any concessions on the major points of his domestic policies. Any pressures on Poland for changes in domestic affairs, or policy changes as a result of Soviet pressures on Gomulka should be reported. (C)

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. a. (2) During Khrushchev's July 1959 visit to Poland he repeatedly spoke on topics which have a special appeal for the Polish people. In none of his utterances was there any indication of pressure on Poland to adhere more closely to the Soviet pattern, and he categorically rejected the thesis that Poland occupies a special place because of differences in approach to internal problems. When Gomulka declared that "only we are responsible for everything that goes on in this country," Khrushchev nodded as if in agreement. The Soviet leader also stated that the Polish party need not follow the example of the Soviet party in every detail in seeking a solution of internal problems and endorsed Gomulka's policy of voluntary collectivization. Report any instances of Soviet deviations from these general principles and any Soviet attempts to dictate to Poland. (C)

(3) Report any exceptions to the regime claim that all Soviet advisers have been withdrawn from Polish military and security organizations. What changes have been made regarding Soviet economic advisers in Poland? (U)

4. The Church

Despite numerous declarations that there will be no open persecution of the Church there has been a steady though slow deterioration in relations between the Church and the regime. The regime continues to watch Church activities closely, and it has undertaken "educational" work, especially among the youth, in an attempt to counter the influence of the clergy. The regime has made clear on a number of occasions its intention to enforce strictly existing regulations governing Church activities. The regime is threatening to invoke tax laws against the Church in such a way as to severely curtail the amount of money available to it and thus restrict its activities, particularly its social activities and building programs. Initially the regime seems to be concentrating on the religious orders, especially the Jesuits. In the new industrial towns there is usually no space allotted for the construction of a church. This situation recently led to a riot at Krasnik Fabryczny when the faithful attempted to build a chapel without the consent of the authorities. (C)

a. Report any specific actions aimed at restricting Church activities by whatever means. Report any information concerning the regime's long-range plans for dealing with the Church and diminishing its influence, especially the areas of Church activity where the

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

regime will concentrate its efforts. How far does the regime dare go in putting pressures on the Church? Report on the reaction of the clergy and plans, if any, to circumvent the regime's efforts to restrict the Church's activities. (C)

4. b. Are there pressures on party members who participate actively in religious activities? (C)

c. Despite the regime's edict forbidding crucifixes and other religious emblems in schoolrooms, there have been reports that religious items have reappeared in many schools. Report on instances of regime attempts to enforce its ruling against religious emblems in schools, especially at the beginning of the next school year and the reaction on the part of parents. Report any other significant developments in the field of education as it relates to the Church. (C)

d. Information is needed on any disagreement between the Church and the government regarding the appointment or removal of the clergy. The regime has recently attempted to persuade Cardinal Wyszynski to remove Bishop Kaczmarek of Kielce for "open political agitation," but the Cardinal has refused to make such a request of the Vatican. Reporting on this and similar situations is needed on a continuing basis. Information is also needed concerning the regime's attitude toward Cardinal Wyszynski and his activities. Report on the influence of the ZNAK group in the Sejm, among the population, and the degree of cooperation between the Cardinal and ZNAK. (C)

e. Information is needed on the leadership and activities of the organizations of pro-regime Catholics that were formed in an attempt to undermine the influence of the Catholic hierarchy and the Vatican in Poland. Report on the activities of PAX and the Frankowski group. Information is needed on Gomulka's talks with PAX leader Piasecki and his alleged attempts to persuade Piasecki to re-establish the "patriotic priests." Report on Piasecki's reasons for refusing. (C)

f. Report on any local disturbances arising from differences between parish priests and party officials on Church-related matters. (U)

g. Regime efforts to discourage attendance at religious ceremonies, attempts to substitute Communist ceremonies for religious rites, and actions against individual priests or Church members should be reported. (U)

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

5. Youth Organizations

a. Report on the membership figures of the youth organizations in Poland--the Polish Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS), the Union of Rural Youth (ZMW), the Boy Scouts, and the Union of Polish Students (ZSP). Also report on any new youth organizations being formed, their sponsors, the following gained by them, and the dissolution of any such organizations. (U)

b. The attitudes of the youth toward Gomulka and his policies should be reported on a continuing basis. Also report on the party's success or lack of success in inculcating its ideas and principles in Polish youth. (U)

6. Popular Attitudes

a. Gomulka's and Khrushchev's speeches during the latter's visit to Poland in July 1959 were designed to appeal to the Polish people and to convey the idea of Polish independence to them. What were the effects of the many laudatory statements made by Khrushchev on Gomulka's popularity with the Poles? How did the Polish people take the many statements emphasizing the Polish regime's freedom in internal affairs? (U)

b. Information is needed on popular reaction to the regime's policies which directly affect the standard of living. The peasants appear to have been the chief beneficiaries of Gomulka's policies so far, with industrial workers continuing to be disgruntled because their condition has not improved significantly. Attitudes regarding the availability or non-availability of consumer goods, particularly clothing and food, housing and services should be reported. Report reactions to government measures to combat inflation and reduce production costs by the application of more efficient methods and the elimination of unneeded workers. (U)

c. The Polish people are permitted more freedom of expression than in any other Bloc country, even though the regime has attempted to curb what it considers too outspoken criticism of the Soviet Union and the Polish state. How has the curb on criticism affected public opinion of Gomulka? Have any particular groups been alienated? (U)

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POLAND (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

6. c. (1) Anti-regime, and anti-Soviet statements, criticism of conditions in Poland and of regime policies as expressed by party members, industrial workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, youth, and members of religious organizations should be reported on a continuing basis. (U)

(2) More information is needed on the degree and methods of regime control over the press and radio, and how far these communications media can go in expressing criticism of regime policies. Do many Poles feel that Gomulka has abandoned "the Polish road" for security in his own position? Allegedly there is no longer any talk of the "Polish road;" is this true? Which groups of the populace could be counted on to support Gomulka in a showdown with his opponents? For what reasons do people support or oppose Gomulka? (C)

d. What is the popular reaction to the cultural exchange program between the United States and Poland? To the work being done in Poland by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations? To the Polish language monthly Ameryka now being distributed in Poland? What was the popular reaction insofar as friendship with the United States is concerned to Vice President Nixon's visit to Poland? (C)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Relations with Other Satellites

Polish liberalization, especially in the areas of agriculture and the relative freedom of speech, press, and religion is regarded by many of the Satellite governments as setting a bad example. (C)

a. (1) Information is needed regarding any changes in relations between Poland and each of the other Satellites. (C)

(2) Criticism of Polish policies by party and government leaders in the other Satellites and any pressures brought to bear on Poland to conform to the standard pattern should be reported. (C)

(3) What effect did Vice President Nixon's August 1959 visit to Poland have on relations with the other Satellite countries? (C)

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POLAND (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. b. Particular attention should be given to any evidence of changes or new developments in Polish relations with the parties and governments of East Germany, Communist China, and Hungary. (C)

c. Recent unconfirmed reports state that Poland is acting as a go-between in an attempt to patch up the differences between the USSR and Yugoslavia, presumably at the Soviet Union's behest. Report any information concerning Poland's own relations with Yugoslavia and any evidence that Poland is trying to bring about a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR. (C)

d. Were any significant foreign policy discussions held during Khrushchev's July 1959 visit to Poland? What decisions were reached? (U)

e. In most respects Gomulka appears to have lined up with Khrushchev on foreign policy and Bloc affairs, while he continues to work for better relations with the West--especially with the US. Report any evidence of shifts or deviations from this policy alignment. Report any evidence of Polish independence or initiative in foreign policy matters whether it differs from or conforms to the Soviet line. (U)

2. Polish Stature in the International Community

Poland showed a greater tendency to further its own foreign policy objectives in an attempt to increase its stature in the non-Communist world following Gomulka's return to power in October 1956. Information is needed on specific actions taken by the Poles aimed at achieving this objective. Include such matters as official and unofficial trips by leading Polish party and government officials or statements by Polish or foreign leaders which might throw light on this subject. What was the effect of Vice President Nixon's visit to Poland in August 1959 on Poland's prestige outside the Bloc? (C)

3. The Oder-Neisse Line

The inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's permanent Western border is a cardinal point of all the Bloc countries' position on the question of Polish-German relations. Gomulka and other Polish leaders apparently are convinced that continued close relations with the USSR and adherence to the Warsaw Pact are the best



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POLAND (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

guarantees for the stability of Poland's present borders. Khrushchev, during his July 1959 tour of Poland, repeatedly played on the deeply ingrained fear of Germany and of a possible future attempt to change the Oder-Neisse line. He assured the Poles that any future East-West agreement must guarantee that Poland would retain the Western Territories. (C)

3. a. Do any responsible Poles fear that Poland may again be the victim of partition if this should further Soviet ambitions? (C)

b. Poland obviously would like a Western guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line, including a guarantee by West Germany. Would Poland be willing to consider any territorial adjustments as a means of reaching a final settlement of its Western frontier? (C)

c. Were there any private discussions on foreign affairs during Khrushchev's visit to Poland? What effects will the visit have on future Polish policy in the following areas: Bloc foreign affairs; Polish relations with the West; Berlin; a separate peace treaty with East Germany? Did Khrushchev make any specific requests of Gomulka or assign any specific areas of responsibility in foreign affairs to Poland? (C)

4. Polish-West German relations

What was the effect of the reported West German offer to conclude non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia? (C)

a. Would Poland be willing to sign such a pact if it did not include recognition of the Oder-Neisse line? (C)

b. What is behind the strong denunciations of the German Federal Republic by Gomulka and other Poles? (C)

c. Report any evidence of moves by West Germany or Poland aimed at closer relations--either full diplomatic relations or something short of it, such as, an exchange of trade missions? (C)

C. MILITARY

1. Any evidence of the appearance of Soviet missiles in Poland? (C)

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POLAND (Continued)

C. MILITARY (Continued)

2. How much anti-Soviet sentiment is there in the Armed Forces? Are there many incidents between the Soviet Forces in Poland and the Polish Armed Forces? (C)

3. Have Soviet advisers been assigned to Polish units? How many? (C)

4. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? Was a large-scale command post exercise held this year? (C)

5. Have the tables of organization and equipment been revamped recently? (C)

6. What is the current strength of the Armed Forces? What is the break-down by service? (C)

D. ECONOMIC

1. In late June 1959 a new plan was announced for widely using agricultural circles to increase agricultural production while simultaneously laying the foundation for future collectivization. Large grants are to be made to these circles for their joint purchase and use of farm machinery, and for their common investment and effort in promoting land improvement and farm building construction. These grants will be financed by the state's profit on compulsory deliveries, now to be extended through 1965, and placed into an Agricultural Development Fund. (U)

a. What is the initial peasant reaction to this plan? (U)

b. Will industry be able to provide the extra machinery called for by the plan? (U)

c. How does the USSR feel about this plan? (U)

2. USSR - Poland Economic Agreements. In July 1959 Khrushchev headed a delegation visiting Warsaw. There is much interest in knowing if any economic agreements were reached between the two governments during this visit. (S)

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POLAND (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

3. Bloc Trade. During the last quarter of 1959 Poland will be negotiating its trade agreements with Bloc countries. Report any significant developments such as credits or provisions for major changes in the value or commodity composition of trade. (C)

4. Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves. Polish planners have announced the necessity of increasing reserves of gold and foreign exchange. What progress is being made in so doing? (C)

5. Chemical Equipment from West. Poland, like other countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, is placing an increasing emphasis on the development and growth of its chemical industry. To accomplish this end, Poland is attempting to procure chemical equipment, plants, and technology from Western countries. (C)

Information is desired on Polish efforts and successes in procuring chemical equipment, plants and technology from the West, giving value, type, capacity, and country. (C)

6. Strategic Imports from West. Poland has been increasing her imports of strategic materials from the West. Substantial quantities of these materials are obtained on the basis of Polish commitments to utilize the goods for domestic civilian purposes. (OUO)

a. Provide any evidence that Polish imports of strategic materials from the West are being re-exported or diverted to military enduses. (C)

7. Ferroalloys. Poland plans to increase its production of electric furnace steel from approximately 400,000 tons in 1959 to 980,000 tons in 1965 and to 1.3 million tons in 1975. To accomplish these goals, the production of ferroalloys will have to be increased. Some information is available on the Ferrostopow Ferroalloy Plant at Laziska Gorne, but no information is available on the Siechnice Ferroalloy Plant at Siechnice. For each of these plants: How many and what size furnaces are presently in operation? Are these plants to be expanded? What is the present production of the various kinds of ferroalloys and what is the planned expansion? Does Poland plan to build new plants for the production of ferroalloys? (C)

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POLAND (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

8. Oil Pipeline. In connection with the projected USSR-European Satellite crude oil pipeline, Poland is planning to build a refinery at Plock. A recent report said crude oil would come from the Malopolska oilfields in what used to be Polish territory, while another line would be built from Plock to Kaliningrad to carry refined products. (C)

a. Information on the cost and planned date of completion of this refinery would be useful. (C)

b. Information on the route of the pipeline(s) would be very valuable. (C)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 September - 31 December 1959)

RUMANIA

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Factionalism and Party Discipline: Reports concerning factionalism in the Rumanian Workers (Communist) party (RWP) have been fewer in the last quarter, and all indications point to the continued preponderance of Gheorghiu-Dej as firm leader of the party. No major shakeups in party organization or personnel structure have taken place in the last quarter, and presumably the RWP has busied itself with preparations for its third congress, scheduled for later in 1959, perhaps in December. On the other hand, the question of party discipline remains open, and there are no signs of diminution of the widespread dissatisfaction and apathy which has been manifested among the lower levels of the RWP. Many local party organizations and officials continue to be severely criticized, and some have been punished, for formalistic approaches to their work. Bureaucratic behavior and a lackadaisical dissatisfaction with the way in which its political and economic policies are being implemented suggest that the problem of party discipline remains as serious as it was in the past. (S)

a. If factionalism exists, it would probably have flared up at the 13-14 July 1959 Central Committee plenum, during which Gheorghiu-Dej after a stress on the "successes" of the 1955-1960 economic plan, announced dramatic wage increases, reduced income taxes, and increases in pensions, as well as cuts in the prices on 2,600 unspecified items, to take effect on 1 August 1959. These measures, if implemented, are designed to mitigate adverse public reaction to political repressions and the increased pace of economic expansion. Reports of the meeting are scanty. Were there any other reports presented at the plenum, particularly on the internal political situation, or the coming party congress? Was there any evidence of factionalism at the plenum, such as, adverse comment, or strong reaction to the economic step-up and political repressions, or the proposed wage increases, and other ameliorations? Were there any protests over the increased wage and pension expenditures on the grounds that such funds will probably have to be taken from the funds previously allocated under the 1959 budget and thus will result in some hinderences to the current

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RUMANIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. a. economic step-up program? Was there any objection to the ideological and practical pressures which will be necessary to increase labor productivity in order to make up at least part of the funds necessary for the wage increases? (C)

b. Any information on the exact date or agenda for the forthcoming party congress would be of highest importance. Indications on how the Rumanians plan to complete the building of socialism by 1956 which will undoubtedly be the major topic at the congress will also be of great interest. (C)

c. Is there a locus of resistance to party directives, or any indication that anti-party sentiments tend to polarize around specific issues? Are there any indications of a party clean-up at lower levels in anticipation of the congress? Have local party members and aparatchiks received new incentive and stimulation by the party's goal to complete the building of socialism by 1965? What is their reaction to the tremendous effort it will take on their part? Has there their traditional apathy dulled them from stimulation over the relative nearness of a long-standing goal? (C)

2. Party Organization: What are the specific areas of responsibility within the Politburo of the Rumanian Workers' Party? What are the executive offices or departments within the central committee? Who are their chiefs? What areas do each of the Central Committee secretaries supervise? How were their duties reshuffled after the removal of Iosif Chisinevski, in view of the fact that his position as secretary was left vacant? Has there been any reorganization of the party apparatus on low levels in preparation for the congress? How has the addition of a party organized placed in charge of each collective farm affected party organization in the countryside? (C)

3. Soviet Control and Security

a. In 1956 Gheorghiu-Dej was quoted as having stated that Khrushchev's behavior had confused many people. What are the feelings of the Rumanian leaders toward Khrushchev? How did they react to Khrushchev's statement in Poland on 21 July 1959 that the Central Committee of the CPSU realizes that the Polish party cannot exactly follow Soviet practice in building socialism? Do they find applications of this statement useful for Rumania. (C)

RUMANIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. b. How is Soviet control exercised over Rumania?  
(C)

c. Have any changes resulted from the withdrawal of Soviet-troops? (C)

d. Are any basic changes foreseen in Soviet-Rumanian control mechanisms at local and national levels? Do Soviet advisors still control the production of uranium, gold and silver? (C)

e. What relationship exists between top Rumanian leaders and the top Soviet Party leaders? What is the role of the Soviet Ambassador? (C)

4. Internal Discipline: On 21 July 1958 strong modifications of the penal code were promulgated. A further revision of the penal code and a limited amnesty were announced on 21 January 1959 and a decree on "preventive control" of state property and institutions was made public on 1 February. Since mid-1958, the regime has made widespread arrests for both political and economic reasons. The campaign appears to be motivated primarily by a desire to improve internal discipline in preparation for the campaign to complete the building of socialism by 1965 and to remove corrupt and unreliable elements. The US legation recently reported that the widespread arrests and trials have spread terror among certain segments of the population. (C)

a. What other considerations prompted the regime to undertake a "clean-up" campaign at this time? (C)

b. In which geographical areas, minority and professional groups, or social strata have such arrests taken place? (C)

c. Are juridical proceedings involved, or have these cases been resolved by administrative methods? (C)

d. There are indications of renewed activity of the "people's courts" operating in factories and other socialized institutions, to protect against dishonesty, waste, theft and inefficiency. Are there any indications that their powers are to be expanded to include the passing of prison sentences? Are the

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RUMANIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

4. d. "people's courts" really functioning as the regime would like them to, or are they merely another "paper organization" with no real significance? (C)

5. Religion: Rumanian Orthodox Patriarch Justinian Marina is reportedly pessimistic over the future of the church in Rumania. The Patriarch reportedly has an "assistant" assigned to him by the regime as his "boss" on many church matters and is said merely to sign church decrees issued by his aide. Justinian has voiced concern over property belonging to the monasteries, which he claimed the regime has been working to nationalize since 1958. There have been reports that a large number of clergymen of all denominations were arrested in the latter half of 1958 and that the head of the Lutheran Church in Orasul Stalin (Brasov) was allegedly executed at that time for treason. Other reports stated that Justinian himself was under house arrest and that his personal secretary and physician were apprehended. A show trial of two Catholic priests was held around the end of 1958 and rabbis have been reportedly arrested in Bucharest during the past spring. (S)

a. Why is the regime conducting a campaign against religion at this time? What is the situation of the monasteries? Has there been a real effort to nationalize their properties? (C)

b. Are there indications that any of the various churches have been encouraging resistance to the regime? Which ones? (C)

c. Are there any indications that Patriarch Justinian is to be replaced? Was the Lutheran Church leader indeed executed in Orasul Stalin? (C)

6. Exodus of Jews: From May 1958 to March 1959 approximately 17,000 Jews emigrated from Rumania to Israel. In response to Arab pressure, the regime denied a "large-scale" exodus from Rumania on 25 February 1959 and stated that the Jews who were leaving were being permitted to go for "humanitarian reasons." From that time on, the number of immigrants decreased sharply. There are approximately 14,500 visaed Jews in Rumania without employment, housing or regular personal identification papers. Only 132 immigrants have arrived in Israel from Rumania since March 1959. In all, only 550 visas have been received for revalidation by the Israeli Legation in Bucharest since March, and since 23 June 1959 even this small flow has ceased. (C)



RUMANIA (Continued)A. Internal Affairs (Continued)

6. a. Is this a temporary or permanent halt? What prompted the regime to halt the exodus at this time? (C)

b. Have there been consultations between Moscow and Bucharest on this subject? What was the main reason for the beginning of the exodus? (C)

c. Immediate information on any resumption of the exodus is desired. (C)

7. Minority Policies: The Rumanian regime announced the amalgamation of the "Bolyai" (Hungarian) and the "Babes" (Rumanian) universities in Cluj on 3 July 1959. The new university is designed to "struggle to eliminate national isolation" and contribute to the spread of a Rumanian national identity. In addition several Magyar institutions, such as, theaters and cultural centers have been either closed or amalgamated. Hungarian secondary schools will reportedly be amalgamated with their Rumanian counterparts. Rumors of the expulsion of "unreliable" Hungarian university students and of suicides among professors opposed to the amalgamation have also been reported. (C)

a. How much further does the regime intend to integrate the Magyar minority into Rumanian life? What are the next steps to be taken? (C)

b. What are the real reasons behind these moves? (C)

8. Local Government: During May 1957 top party leaders led by First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej and Premier Chivu Stoica visited the Black Sea Coast, the Ploesti area, and the city of Craiova. After visiting various economic enterprises and construction sites, they made concrete suggestions and criticisms of the local scenes and of the efforts made by local party and government officials to fulfill their plans. Concurrently, Rumanian press organs began a campaign of criticism of the local People's Councils calling for an end to laxity and formalism, strongly suggesting that decisions should be followed through to their successful implementation. On 21 April 1959 Petre Costache was removed as Minister of Problems on Local Organs of State Administration, and to this day no successor has been announced. (C)

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RUMANIA (Continued)

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

8. a. Why were these top level visits made in the midst of a large flurry of important visiting Chinese and Korean delegations? (C)

b. Do the visits, coupled with the other facts above, suggest any change in the status of the people's councils? (C)

c. Is Rumania preparing to emulate more closely Soviet-style decentralization of governmental affairs? Will the local councils be held solely responsible for economic failures within their areas? (C)

9. Popular Attitudes:

a. Continued reporting is needed on morale in general, and on public opinion regarding international events, regime tightening, the proposed new economic plan, and the general domestic situation. (U)

b. Recently, Gheorghiu-Dej and other regime spokesman have indicated that socialization of agriculture has been most successful in the Constanta, Calati, Timisoara, and Craiova regions, while important success had been achieved in the Iasi, Bucharest, Orasul Stalin, Oradea, Suceava and Hungarian Autonomous regions. (C)

(1) Has the continued collectivization campaign stimulated any disturbances among Rumanian peasants? Is there particular discontent in certain areas? What methods are being used to induce peasants to join cooperatives and collectives? What motivated the recent amalgamation of certain collectives in Rumania? Soviet influence? Chinese influence? Bulgarian influence? (C)

(2) What has been peasant reaction to the March 29, 1959, decree calling for the virtual expropriation of all agricultural land not farmed by owners (particularly that of kulaks), land left uncultivated, land not included in official land-registers? Has expropriation begun? Under terms of a decree now in preparation which virtually provides for a leasing arrangement, how much are peasant owners given for the land they lose? In terms of the new decree, what is the distinction between a "middle peasant" and a "kulak?" (C)

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9. c. Are there indications that the regime's current campaign against ideological backsliding, petty thievery, embezzlement, bureaucratism and official corruption may have heightened anti-Communist sentiment among party, military, diplomatic, academic or church groups? Are popular grievances chiefly economic or political in nature? (C)

d. What is the effect of the Jewish emigration on the Rumanian people? Is it merely accepted or popularly supported? Do Rumanians feel that the country is gaining or losing by it? Has the exodus aroused any particular sentiment among various levels of society, party, or other groups? What is the feeling of the Jews still in Rumania? Do they look to the future with confidence? Do they wish to emigrate? How does the Rumanian populace feel about those Jews who remained? (C)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What are Rumania's relations with the Warsaw Pact organization? What results have occurred from the various meetings of the Political Consultative Committee of the Pact? Are there any indications which tend to confirm or deny the rumors which report the transfer of the Warsaw Pact Headquarters to Bucharest--specifically in the old Ministry of Internal Affairs building? (S)

2. What are the real attitudes of the Rumanian leaders toward Poland and Gomulka? Politburo member Petre Borila spoke cordially about Rumanian-Polish relations at the Third Congress of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party in March 1959, while attacking "revisionist" Yugoslavia. The Polish National Day celebration in Bucharest on 22 July 1959 were attended by a total of eight regular and alternate politburo members, and numerous articles and editorials stressed Rumanian-Polish cooperation within the Soviet camp. (C)

a. What are the real attitudes toward Yugoslavia and Tito? Do the lengthy and disparaging references to Yugoslavia in Gheorghiu-Dej's report of 6 March 1959 on the 21st Congress of the Soviet Party indicate pressure put on Gheorghiu-Dej at the Soviet Party Congress? Has Gheorghiu-Dej's position been compromised by his admittedly warm relations with Tito and the Yugoslavs in the past? (C)

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RUMANIA (Continued)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. Following Khrushchev's visit to Albania in late May and early June 1959, the Rumanians again renewed their proposals of an atom free zone in the Balkan-Andriatic area, and a request of a guarantee of such an agreement by the "great powers." The Soviet Union followed with identical notes to Italy, France, Britain, the US, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Turkey, Rumania, and Bulgaria restating this proposal. This was the first involvement of the Western "Big Three" nations in this proposal. Since then, Rumanian propaganda, as well as that of the entire Soviet Bloc has pushed the idea vehemently, particularly toward Greece and Italy. (C)

a. What were the reasons for these actions at this time? Does the initiation of the Soviet note mean that Rumania has been removed as a front for the USSR in Balkan affairs. If so, why was this done? (C)

4. What is Rumania's role in Bloc penetration efforts against underdeveloped or so-called "neutralist" nations? (C)

a. How is this mission accomplished? (C)

C. MILITARY

1. What elements of the Soviet forces in Rumania have not been withdrawn to the USSR? Where did those who were withdrawn go? Are some former Soviet officers with ethenic Rumanian backgrounds now integrated into the Rumanian armed forces? (S)

2. Any evidence of the appearance of Soviet missile equipment in Rumania? Details. (S)

3. What is the current strength of the Armed Forces? What is the break-down by service? (S)

4. Information is needed on the level of training being conducted by the Armed Forces. (S)

a. What was the scale of the most recent maneuver? (S)

b. Was a large-scale command post exercise held this year? (S)

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RUMANIA (Continued)

C. MILITARY (Continued)

5. Have the tables of organization and equipment been revamped within the past two years? How do they compare with Soviet T/O and E's? (S)

D. ECONOMIC

1. The government, in a move obviously designed to increase the collective sector by reducing the influence of the kulak element, decreed in March 1959 that all land worked by hired labor, sharecropped or rented, land of uncertain ownership, and uncultivated could be incorporated into the State sector. As a result of this decree how much land has been taken by the state? (OUO)

2. The number of meat animals and meat products has been declining since 1955. Major factors influencing this decline are collectivization, lagging fodder production, and unfavorable prices paid for livestock products. Are there any indications that the regime may try to increase meat production by temporarily halting collectivization and/or revamping their marketing and pricing systems for livestock products? (OUO)

3. USSR - Rumanian Credits. The USSR indicated in 1958 that it would extend a new credit to Rumania. So far no announcement has been made that such a credit actually has been extended. Information on the existence of such a new loan, including terms, is desired.

4. Credits from West. Rumania has recently been successful in obtaining long-term private credits from Western sources. Information on endeavors to obtain additional loans is desired.

5. New Plans and Goals. Currently there are some indications that Rumania may abandon the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-60) in favor of the Six-Year Plan (1960-1965) (U)

a. Give any information which tends to confirm these indications.

b. Give any production goals for 1965 announced for the ferrous metallurgical industry. (U)

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RUMANIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

6. Chemical Equipment from West. Rumania is attempting to develop a petrochemical industry. However, it is a relatively small producer of chemical equipment and must depend upon outside sources of supply. (C)

Information is desired on Rumanian efforts and successes in procuring chemical equipment, plants, and technology from the West, giving value, type, capacity, and country. (C)

E. MEDICAL

On 6 June 1959 the Iraq health minister received the Rumanian ambassador to discuss the exchange of doctors between the two countries. (U)

1. Was an agreement made concerning the exchange of physicians between the two countries? If so, how many physicians are involved and what are their assignments? (U)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 September - 31 December 1959)

YUGOSLAVIA

A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Party and Government

There has been no significant change in the Yugoslav-Bloc dispute since the promulgation of the Yugoslav party program in April 1958, although there was a temporary abatement in polemical exchanges concurrent with Soviet Premier Khrushchev's late May-early June 1959 visit to Albania and Hungary. Despite limited state and commercial ties, the Yugoslav party, however, continues to be isolated, for all practical purposes, from the Communist world. (C)

a. What evidence is there regarding a pro-Soviet faction within the party? Within the army? How has it reacted to recent events, and has its size, influence or composition been altered? Have there been any recent defections? What has the regime done to tighten party loyalty? (U)

(1) What evidence is there that the stability of the leadership of the Yugoslav party has been affected by the developments with the Soviet Union? What leadership problems confront the Yugoslav party? Who are the major contenders for top posts and what support do they have? Have personal maneuvering and strivings at the upper levels threatened the stability of the party? What would be the impact on the party if Tito stepped down from some of his positions in favor of younger men? What is the regime's plan regarding the succession to Tito following his death? What evidence is there regarding a deterioration in the state of Tito's health? (U)

(2) To what extent have the supporters of leading contenders crystallized into factions? What alliances possibly exist between the leading contenders and their supporters, and what is their common denominator--nationality, religious background, geographical location, economics? Do the factions or alliances at their present stage presage the form they will take in the event of a split and struggle for power in the leadership after Tito becomes incapacitated or dies? (S)

(3) Are there any factional differences within the Yugoslav party over questions of economic decentralization or agricultural policy (particularly policy toward private peasants and socialization of agriculture)? Has factionalism resulted or been

YUGOSLAVIA

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A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. Party and Government (Continued)

a. (3) (Continued)

exacerbated over questions of what to do in the realm of de-centralization in view of the Bloc's attacks on Yugoslavia's internal system? If so, what has been the position of the top leaders during the process? (U)

b. The question of Milovan Djilas' imprisonment continues to be of interest because it limits the possibility of the Yugoslav party's developing closer relations with the Western Socialist parties. (S)

(1) Has there been any change in Djilas' status? What is the current status of any support for Djilas both within and outside the party? Has the regime's treatment of Djilas done much to reassure the more doctrinaire Communists about the future course of the party's development? What impact has "The New Class" had on the Yugoslav party? Is there any evidence that the Yugoslav party is doing some second thinking about Djilas and his ideas now that its dispute with the Bloc appears irrevocable? How is this thinking manifested? What is the current state of Djilas' imprisonment? (U)

(2) To what extent are the currently admitted difficulties concerning party apathy and failure to appeal to youth increased by the influence of Djilas and "Djilasism?" (U)

(3) What is the current status of Dedijer? (U)

c. Tito has claimed a successful solution of the "nationalities" problem, a problem which historically has stood in the way of Yugoslavia's union and development, nevertheless, indications are that the problem, although somewhat reduced, continues and possibly is increasing. (C)

(1) In what areas and how severe is the "nationalities problem?" Specify among what ethnic groups it exists, toward what other groups animosities are directed, and if feelings vary by economic, social, and age groups. (U)

(2) What are the regime's efforts in mitigating the problem? How effective are these? (U)

(3) How effective have been the Albanian and Bulgarian attempts to rekindle separatist feeling among the Macedonian and Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia? Can illustrative incidents be cited? Is there any evidence of Hungarian activity in the Vojvodina? What countermeasures has Belgrade taken? (U)



YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

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A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. Party and Government (Continued)

c. (4) In the event of Tito's death how will the "nationalities" problem be affected? Will it be intensified? (U)

(5) How much do religious differences and government policy toward the various religions tend to intensify the "nationalities problem"? (U)

d. Church and state:

(1) Do top church leaders give any indication that closer relations are possible with the regime? If so, what do they consider as essential to reach a compromise? Which prelates of the Roman Catholic Church favor improvement of relations with the regime? What has the regime's reaction been to the 1 July 1959 message of Pope John XXIII to Cardinal Stepinac which told the Cardinal that it was "better to suffer than to commit injustice? How will this message effect the regime's relations with the Vatican? (U)

(2) The Serbian Patriarch German made a tour of the Mediterranean patriarchs during April and May 1959 and was well-received. Has the success of German's trip resulted in any improvement in relations between the Serbian Church and the regime? Is the regime apt to rely on other Church leaders as goodwill ambassadors? (C)

(3) How has the establishment of the seimi-autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church--a move designed to get Macedonian support for Tito--been received by both Macedonian and Serb clergy and laymen? (C)

2. Popular Attitudes

a. Most of the relevant reports conclude that the majority of the Yugoslav people oppose Communism and certain of its policies. President Tito, however, appears to have considerable personal popularity as a national symbol, and the continuation of the regime's dispute with Moscow apparently helps its position vis-a-vis the public. The illegal emigration of Yugoslav nationals has shown a sharp decline this year. (S)

(1) What is the extent of anti-Communist feeling? How much does the intensity and extent vary by economic groups? By social groups? By nationality? By religious belief? What is the nature of these feelings? Specify when possible which policies receive the greatest criticism. Is popular dislike for the regime likely to increase if internal reforms are not pressed forward? (U)

YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

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A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. Popular Attitudes (Continued)

a. (2) Is such dissidence as exists directed against the central government, the party structure or against local officials and party functionaries? In view of the persistent rumors that Kardelj and Rankovic are to assume increasing responsibilities as the aging Tito prepares for the future, what is the respective popularity of these men? (U)

(3) Are existing anti-regime attitudes of a passive complacent nature, or are they manifested in overt actions? What indications are there of spontaneous outbreaks or organized resistance movements necessitating police countermeasures? Have there been any recent overt expressions of popular discontent over regime actions such as recent property nationalizations? Over recent price increases on some basic items? (U)

b. Opinion on Foreign Relations:

(1) How does the average Yugoslav feel about the regime's relations with the USSR? To what degree does popular opinion determine the course of Yugoslav foreign policy? Is there much popular enthusiasm for improved relations with Greece? Italy? (C)

(2) How much popular support does the regime garner from its anti-Bloc stand and to what degree is its stand taken to obtain popular support? What are the attitudes toward the US, its policies, and intentions? Is the public aware of US assistance and, if so, what is the impact of this aid on popular feeling? Does Tito's professed policy of independence and alliance with unattached states as India, Burma, and Egypt arouse much public response? (C)

(3) Would the regime receive popular support under the following circumstances: Combined Soviet-Satellite attack? Soviet supported Satellite attack? Yugoslav attack on Albania? Yugoslav support of military effort in any other part of the world? (Differentiate between economic and social groups whenever possible in discussing such questions.) (C)

B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. There has been a continuing trend toward a more neutral line in foreign policy, and Belgrade is trying to promote closer relationship with the "neutral" countries and a more active role for this group in international affairs, although Yugoslavia tends to take positions similar to those of the USSR on most foreign policy issues. In its current dispute with the Bloc, Belgrade has continued

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B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (continued)

1. (Continued)

to charge misrepresentation and falsification of Yugoslavia's aims and policies. Formal state relations, however, are still maintained; although relations with Albania and Red China are particularly strained. Intergovernmental contacts are fairly minimal, but mutual trade has increased within the past year. (C)

a. We are interested in all information pertaining to any contacts between the Yugoslav party and Communist parties of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We are likewise interested in contacts between semi-official party delegations, such as those of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), and trade union delegations. Were the Yugoslavs in any way apprised of the inner workings of the 21st Soviet Party Congress? Other Bloc Party Congresses such as the Polish and Bulgarian? In what areas is the Bloc unable to isolate the Yugoslav party? (U)

b. The Yugoslavs maintain that Khrushchev is being forced closer to their "revisionist" concepts both by internal and external developments, and that there are more differences within the Bloc in economic policy than between Yugoslavia and the USSR. (C)

(1) What is current Yugoslav appraisal of internal developments in the USSR? (C)

(2) Do the Yugoslavs consider that they have any friends in the higher echelons of the Russian party? (C)

c. We are interested in all Yugoslav information on Soviet-Satellite relations. (U)

(1) Any comments on Belgrade's views concerning the extent to which internal developments and external pressure from the Chinese Communists effect Soviet determination of the policies of international Communism. (C)

(2) How do the Yugoslavs evaluate the present state of internal Soviet-Bloc relations, both over-all, and country by country? (U)

(3) What do they think fundamental Soviet aims and motivations are with respect to these relations? (U)

(4) How do they foresee Soviet-Polish relations? (U)

(5) Do they foresee any developments in other Satellites which will cause a radical change in Soviet policy with such a country? (U)

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B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. d. We are likewise interested in all information pertinent to Yugoslav bilateral relations with each Satellite, including any non-public negotiations. (U)

(1) Although ideological differences prevent any effective rapprochement, what efforts are being expended by either side to improve state relations? Have the official attitudes modified as a result of recent negotiations which may lead to improved state relations particularly with the USSR? (U)

(2) What is the Yugoslav attitude toward the internal events in each country? How much do they attribute any changes going on in the Satellites to direct Soviet intervention? Specifically, report on the status of Yugoslav relations with Hungary? Comment on any "status" of Kadar and the minds of the Yugoslavs. (U)

(3) How much do they attribute to their own example? To their own influence and actions directly in the satellites? (U)

(4) Yugoslav-Chinese Communist relations are currently in a state of virtual suspension. Communist China is a frequent target for criticism in the Yugoslav press, particularly the commune system and Red China's lagging economic development. Does Belgrade hope for any improvement or is it content with the current status of relations? What are Yugoslav views concerning Communist China's current and future role in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, especially in ideology? How responsible do they hold Peiping for the dispute with the Bloc? What are Yugoslav views on the status of Tibet? On the treatment of the Tibetan populace? (U)

e. Has there been any change in the number of Bloc personnel in Yugoslavia as a result of their current differences? How are such people regarded by the Yugoslav populace? What official treatment do they receive from the Yugoslav regime? Have Bloc personnel maintained espionage contacts with Yugoslavs? Were there any pertinent revelations from the recent trials of Albanian spies? (U)

f. Belgrade has no diplomatic relations with Bonn because Belgrade is not willing to agree to a change in its present diplomatic relationship with Pankow. Under which circumstances would Belgrade be willing to change its policies in this sector? (U)

g. What is Yugoslav opinion on the Soviet intent to establish missile bases in Albania? In other Satellites? (C)

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B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. Because of Yugoslavia's ideological isolation from the Bloc, Belgrade has attempted to improve its standing with the West. Blanket condemnation of all Western efforts toward lessening world tensions has been abandoned in favor of criticism of both East and West, although each sometimes receives Belgrade's mid approval. For example, Belgrade viewed both Khrushchev's proposal for an atom free zone in the Balkans and Nixon's visit to Moscow, as well as the prospective Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange visits, as constructive contributions to lessening world tensions. (U)

a. To measure cooperation with the West, it would be particularly useful to know the degree of cooperation shown Western officials or Western-sponsored undertakings. (U)

(1) Has there been any noticeable change in official contacts? (U)

b. Yugoslavia has shown a renewed interest in strengthening and expanding its ties with the Western Socialist parties. Vice President Edvard Kardelj, for example, made an early summer (1959) tour of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Yugoslav efforts, however, will be frustrated by the continued detention of several old socialists for anti-regime activities. What concessions will Belgrade be willing to make towards free expression in order to improve relations with European socialists? What is the likelihood of amnesty for the Socialist leaders imprisoned in February 1958? (U)

c. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic's June 1959 visit to Athens and the signing of twelve bilateral agreements is indicative of Yugoslavia's desire to maintain its strong ties with Greece. (U)

(1) What is being done to preserve and develop military relations with the Greeks? (U)

(2) While Yugoslavia has expressed disinterest in reviving the military provisions of the Balkan Pact are there any concrete actions it has taken to implement the economic and cultural features of the Balkan Pact? (U)

(3) Does Yugoslavia have any desire to expand its relations with Turkey? (U)

d. How do Yugoslav officials view their improving relations with Italy? (U)

e. Yugoslav attacks on the Austrian and Italian governments for their failure to curb so-called fascist and revanchist organizations reflect concern over discrimination against Yugoslav minorities. What other reasons, if any, are behind Yugoslav sensitivity to action by these two neighbors? (U)

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B. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. f. During July and August 1959 a large Yugoslav economic and cultural delegation toured Latin America. What future does Yugoslavia see for trade, economic and cultural cooperation and trade with Latin America? (U)

3. The Uncommitted Nations:

a. We are interested in all information commenting on Yugoslavia's increased ties and influence with the uncommitted Asian and African nations. (U)

(1) Has it encouraged any others of these nations to resist association, either political or economic, with the Sino-Soviet Bloc? If so, why?

(2) Comment specifically on relations with Egypt's Nasir and Iraq's Qasim. (U)

b. What is Nehru's present attitude towards Tito? How much stock does he now place in Tito's views on developments in Eastern Europe and the USSR? (U)

c. What are the views of leading Yugoslav officials on the prospects and desires for a grouping of such states into some form of "third force," even if not so named? How much do the Yugoslavs think they could exercise leadership over such a group? (U)

d. Does the regime harbor any concern over Soviet aspirations in the "uncommitted" areas? What evidence is there to show that Yugoslav activities are connected (or opposed) to Soviet activities in those areas, particularly in Ethiopia? (U)

e. What plans does Belgrade have for further, more formal recognition of, and cooperation, with the FLN-sponsored Provisional Government of Algeria? (U)

C. MILITARY

1. Are the Yugoslavs seeking arms from foreign sources? If so, where? (C)

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C. MILITARY (Continued)

2. In view of the heterogenous origins of Yugoslav materiel, how well is this equipment maintained? (C)
3. Current indication of Yugoslav preparations to reorganize its ground forces. (U)
4. Any recent data on:
  - a. The organization of Defense Ministry headquarters; (U)
  - b. The activity of leading military personalities. (U)
  - c. The activities of the recently established People's Army Council for Scientific Work. (U)
5. Any significant changes in the strength and disposition of the armed forces? (U)
6. Yugoslavia's air defense capability is currently regarded as poor. (S) Any efforts being made to improve it? (S)
7. Current information on levels of training, particularly on atomic-biological-chemical warfare training. (C)
8. Current civil defense measures and training. (C)

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D. ECONOMIC

1. The Yugoslav economy is unique in that it represents a complicated composite of certain structures of Western capitalism, Soviet Communism and an independent form self-proclaimed as Yugoslav "socialism." The Yugoslavs are apparently experimenting with ideas hoping to hit upon a combination suitable to their problems and objectives. (U)

a. What actual freedom of action is allowed individual enterprises under the government's decentralization program? To what extent are the workers councils involved in the actual running of the enterprises and has the worker's attitude towards the regime changed as a result of their establishment? How has the decentralization program affected production and the ultimate standard of living? Has any competition between firms developed? To what extent is the regime justified in complaining about "localism?" Has decentralization allowed local enterprises profit at the expense of the country as a whole? What was the purpose of establishing a Common Reserve Fund for industry, mining and construction? Has it prevented the elimination of uneconomical enterprises? (U)

2. Yugoslavia's agricultural system remains little changed since the peasants were allowed to leave the agricultural collectives in 1953. Vice President Kardelj recently reaffirmed that, while socialization is still its objective the regime does not intend to use administrative pressure to achieve it. At this stage, Belgrade is satisfied to encourage contractual arrangements between the private peasants--who farm over 90 percent of the land--for buying their seed and marketing their product through the cooperatives. In this way, it hopes to modernize significantly Yugoslav agriculture and to allay peasant fears about socialization. The regime is making investment funds available to the private peasants and is using this year's all time record results, especially in wheat and rye production, as proof of the superiority of its socialist system. (C)

a. How did the peasants react to Kardelj's agricultural thesis? Did they feel reassured because he pledged there would be no regime pressure to join collectives, or did they become apprehensive over the desire for eventual socialization? How do the peasants like the idea of intensified cooperation between themselves and the General Agricultural Cooperatives? (C)

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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

2. b. To what degree was the record harvest the result of current regime policy? Are there any indications that it will change? Will investment in the private sector be curtailed? Will it be broadened? (C)

c. Could the increase in peasant expenditures for investment on private holdings in 1958 as compared with previous years reflect increased peasant confidence in his future as an independent producer? Will this investment continue to grow? (C)

d. Is the regime's policy leading to a breakdown of traditional peasant concepts, such as, producing primarily for private consumption? Is there more interest in associating with the cooperatives because of the advantages to be derived from planting their better seed and using their machinery? How successful is the regime with the cooperatives? Are they becoming a more significant factor in rural life? (C)

e. Has the record crop in 1959 created any serious problems for the regime, such as, limited storage facilities, transport deficiencies, inflationary pressures caused by increased peasant purchasing power? (C)

3. Some evidence of the re-establishment of somewhat greater central control over the Yugoslav economy has been observed. Joint commissions under the Federal Executive Council and National Assembly have been set up to undertake extensive studies of the economy and have made recommendations for improvements. The Federal Chambers (Trade, Agriculture, etc.) have been given increased authority. More recently the Secretariats for Finance and Trade have been granted greater administrative powers. Nevertheless, the economic responsibilities of the local units of government and enterprises have continued to expand as administrative functions have been pushed further down the hierarchy. The National Bank's tight control over financial matters has been somewhat relaxed as many of its functions in the field of foreign trade and investments have been given over to specialized banks established to service these fields. (U)

a. How have local groups, such as, workers' councils and people's committees, reacted to centralization moves? How will it affect popular attitudes toward the regime? Have communes aroused any real popular enthusiasm? (U)

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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

3. b. What are the private views of officials toward the whole program of the economic structure and how it should be organized? Is the prevailing view one favoring centralization or decentralization? (U)

c. How rigid is the economic control exercised by such organizations as the National Bank, the Communist Party apparatus itself, etc.? (C)

d. Condemnation of economic excesses and the demand for a more active role for trade unions in protecting the workers' interests has continued. Vukmanovic-Tempo was named to take over the unions in an effort to strengthen their role. What evidence is there regarding the regime's true intent to strengthen their role? Is this development, in fact, an initial step in the curtailment of the activities of workers' councils? (U)

e. On 30 June 1959 the Federal Executive Council adopted a new bill relating to the financing of housing construction. Under the provisions of this bill part of the contribution formerly paid by the various enterprises to the general housing fund will be paid directly to the workers in the form of increased wages. The workers' rents are to be raised by a proportionate amount. The idea behind this move may be to provide more funds for direct payment of rents and maintenance and to encourage less expensive and quicker construction of new dwellings, especially by the workers themselves. (U)

(1) What has been the public reaction to this bill? Are there any indications that the workers will attempt to save the increase in wages instead of paying higher rents? (U)

(2) How has this new bill effected housing construction? Has any appreciable number of workers been encouraged to build dwellings with their own resources as a result of this bill? (U)

4. The dispute with the Bloc has jeopardized Yugoslavia's economic relations with some members of the Bloc. Despite curtailment in Bloc credits, aid in developing nuclear research facilities apparently will continue. Belgrade has signed 1960 trade agreements with Bloc members. Belgrade has also indicated that the Bloc is not exporting all the commodities it wishes to receive, and is not accepting goods which it has in the past and for which Belgrade has no alternate markets. (C)

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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

4. a. How serious is the deterioration of trade with the Bloc? Does it actually expect that the 1960 trade agreements will be kept? We are interested in receiving any information on the details of the trade negotiations and unpublicized aspects of the agreements. How well are the new trade agreements being implemented? Give any examples of keeping the letter of the agreements but violating fair trade practices. (C)

b. Is the regime particularly worried about the economic integration now going on in the Bloc under CEMA auspices? Are the Yugoslavs attempting to multilateralize their trading arrangements with the Eastern Bloc countries (with or without other non-Bloc countries)? What is the significance of the longer-term trade agreements recently signed with East Germany and Hungary? (U)

c. What evidence is there that Soviet Bloc technicians related to industrial developments are still in Yugoslavia? Have the Yugoslavs tended to limit the numbers of such? How many and what types of such technicians have arrived? Are their activities limited or placed under surveillance in any way? Are Yugoslav technicians still going to the Bloc? (U)

d. Give any evidence of Yugoslav shipment of Soviet Bloc war material to Near Eastern or other non-Bloc countries. (C)

e. We are interested in Yugoslav actions designed to increase the usage of Rijeka as a transshipment port for Bloc trade. What will the eventual capacity be upon completion of the current expansion project there? What is the status on the development of the Koper-Capodistria port development scheme? (U)

f. For several years Yugoslavia has been attempting to conclude negotiations for the development of its Majdanpek copper area. An agreement was concluded with the French firm COMPADEC for a \$40,000,000 credit. What is the current status of this project? Is there any mining activity currently under way at this location? (C)

g. Credit talks with Czechoslovakia in early July 1959 were broken off by the Yugoslavs because of Czech refusal to negotiate. What are the results of Yugoslav-USSR talks in July 1959 in Belgrade regarding Soviet credits suspended in 1958? What further moves will be made by Yugoslavia to replace developmental loans canceled by the Bloc? Will Belgrade attempt to renegotiate US credits, no longer needed to import wheat--a result of the record 1959 harvest? (U)

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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

5. The most recent Yugoslav Quarterly Debt Statement covering the first quarter of 1959 (TOICA A-116, 7/27/59) indicates continued utilization of the Soviet \$110 million investment credit and the Czech \$50 million investment credit during the first quarter of 1959. How is this continued utilization explained in view of the termination of these credits before January 1, 1959? (C)

6. Yugoslavia has recently announced the development of an oilfield near Sisak, Croatia which will reportedly raise Croatian oil production to nearly 1,000,000 tons of crude oil per year within the next few years. (U)

a. What is the state of the development of this field? What pipeline facilities or other transportation systems are to be provided? How will the oil be refined? (U)

b. What role will the oil produced at this field play in the Yugoslav economy? What types of oil products will the Yugoslavs manufacture from this new oil source? What customers will be sought to purchase these petroleum products? (U)

7. For the second time in less than a year, a Yugoslav end-use certificate, or a forgery of same, appears to have been used in an attempted diversion of strategic goods to the Bloc. The last instance involved 10,000 tons of Turkish boracite. US export licensing officials and members of several COCOM delegations have expressed great concern over the possibility that Yugoslavia may be used as a transshipment point for the diversion of embargoed goods to the Soviet Bloc. It is, generally speaking, impossible to conduct effective end-use checks in Yugoslavia. As a result, Free World licensing officials are frustrated in their attempt to establish the bona fides of questionable transactions. (S)

a. Provide any indication that strategic Free World goods are being transshipped to the Bloc via Yugoslavia. Provide examples of transshipments with details. (S)

b. Determine the techniques used to avoid Yugoslav transshipment controls. Ascertain the volume and type of goods being transshipped. (S)

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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

D. ECONOMIC (Continued)

8. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), US aid may be terminated if recipient countries export specified strategic materials to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Yugoslav export statistics show large quantities of cable and wire being exported to the Bloc. It is possible that some of these exports may be embargoed communication cable. (S)

a. Identify the wire and cable being exported to the Bloc. Provide all available details which may aid in identifying the cable. (S)

b. Report any other Yugoslav exports of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc. (S)

E. SCIENTIFIC

Information on the amount of scientific research and its place on the national science in Yugoslavia is limited and sketchy. There is a small, but active chemical industry for which some research and development is performed. Information is therefore needed to determine the scientific capabilities and level of technology within Yugoslavia. (C)

1. To what extent does the Yugoslavian Government appreciate that economic advance through industrial expansion depends on scientific research? (C)

2. What emphasis, encouragement, and annual financial support does the government give to science? (OUO)

3. What is the overall national organ for the direction and control of science, its subordination, organization and other missions? (OUO)

4. To what extent in terms of scientific manpower and annual expenditure does industry conduct scientific research in its own facilities, and to what extent and in what manner does industry support research outside its own laboratories? (OUO)

5. What amounts and what kinds of research and development are conducted by the higher educational institutions, the academies of science, the research institutes, and industrial enterprise. (OUO)

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YUGOSLAVIA (Continued)

E. SCIENTIFIC (Continued)

6. To what extent and in what manner is the exchange of scientific information, within the country and with foreign countries, implemented and how applied? (OUO)

7. To what extent does native scientific research and development depend on foreign assistance? (OUO)

8. How large numerically is the annual output of graduates and post-graduates in each of the natural sciences? (OUO)

9. Which sciences are receiving heavy emphasis in the higher educational training program and in the recruitment of qualified scientists for current research activity? (OUO)

10. What specific research projects in the basic sciences (Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, Geology, Geophysics, Seismology, gravimetry, geodesy, geomagnetism, meteorology, and oceanography) are being investigated? Name the scientists engaged and give his affiliation. (OUO)

11. What is the economic and social position of scientists and engineers? (OUO)

12. What relationship exists between the current need for and availability of trained scientists and engineers in Yugoslavia? Are there fields in which shortages or surpluses exist? (OUO)

F. MEDICAL

As of February 1959 there were 15 Yugoslav physicians in Ethiopia. In Addis Ababa Yugoslav physicians are on the staff of the Imperial Military Hospital, St. Paul Hospital and Rav Desta Hospital. Yugoslav medical personnel are also attached to the Haile Selassie Hospital, a hospital in Jima and Dessye. (OUO)

1. Have additional Yugoslav medical personnel been employed by Ethiopia? (C)

2. What other medical aid or trade including technical assistance has Yugoslavia provided for Iraq. (C)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 September - 31 December 1959)

SOVIET BLOC

I. POLITICAL

A. Soviet-Satellite Relations

Soviet efforts since the fall of 1956 to reassert the USSR's unquestioned leadership of the Communist Bloc and to reinforce Bloc unity have by now attained at least the minimum success desired by Moscow. The stability of the individual regimes has been shored up and strengthened to the point that a sequence of events such as occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956 is not likely to develop at the movement. Soviet Premier Khrushchev indicated in Poland in July, 1959, that he is following a pragmatic approach in Eastern Europe, which permits him to support simultaneously such diverse Communist leaders as the moderate Gomulka and the over-zealous Zhivkov. Soviet support, however, is contingent upon a Satellite regime's ability to maintain order, willingness to conform to an ideological line acceptable to the Kremlin, and efforts to further Soviet foreign policy objectives. (C)

Although Tito has long been read out of the Communist Bloc and the Yugoslavs have been at least ostensibly isolated ideologically, Moscow has also made efforts not to disrupt state relations unnecessarily in order not to incur the unfavorable propaganda effects which resulted when the campaign was carried to much greater lengths during the 1948-53 period. With the application of political and limited economic pressure on the Yugoslavs, however, the Bloc campaign has necessarily spilled over into the state sphere, and certain Bloc members (i.e., China, Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) continue to exchange polemics with Belgrade. Relations have been "frozen" with China and Albania, but neither the Bloc countries nor Yugoslavia appear to desire to initiate a complete break in relations. Moreover, most of the Bloc countries continue to maintain at least trade ties with Belgrade. (C)

Within the Bloc, the most glaring divergency continues to be Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka's determination, reaffirmed at the March 1959 Polish Party Congress, to proceed toward socialization at a slower pace and to maintain a degree of independence, especially in dealing with Polish internal policies, a policy now publicly endorsed by Khrushchev. (C)

SOVIET BLOC (CONTINUED)

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I. POLITICAL (Continued)

A. Soviet-Satellite Relations (Continued)

Despite the improved stability of the Bloc regimes, there are a number of recent developments which are likely to exacerbate political tensions within many of these countries. The theses for the Soviet Seven Year Plan and Khrushchev's speech to the 21st Soviet Party Congress both reveal a new surge forward, based on the promise that the Soviet Union has reached a new stage of Communist development--that of "all-out building of a Communist society." The impetus of this surge has already been reflected in the Satellites, especially in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but more recently in Hungary, where Kadar's regime shows signs of abandoning its previously moderate approach to internal economic problems. This new surge is likely to exacerbate popular hostility to the regimes, becoming a source of serious internal party disputes in some of the Satellites, particularly Bulgaria and Hungary. Furthermore, the fact that Poland is demonstrably not playing its part in this campaign may be the source of new frictions within the Bloc. (C)

1. Evidence of pressure by the Bloc on Poland to greater conformity. (U)
2. Evidence of internal difficulties caused by a step-up in the pace of "building socialism." (U)
3. Evidence that the USSR continues to permit one or another of the Satellites some autonomy in internal policies. Is there any evidence that the continued tension over Berlin is having any effect on the degree of autonomy permitted various Satellites? (U)
4. Evidence of Soviet plans to reduce further its troop strength in the Satellites, or conversely that the USSR has no plans along this line whatsoever. (U)
5. Evidence that the number of Soviet officials in a given Satellite is increasing or decreasing, and why. (U)
6. Evidence that the Satellite regimes are reverting in any way to the traditional hostilities that have long afflicted the area. (U)
7. Concerning such organizations as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, what role is played by the Satellite representatives in these organizations? Are they rubber stamps, or are they in fact permitted to take an active part in the organization's activities, particularly in the discussion and formulation of policies? (U)
8. What is the organizational structure of the new theoretical journal? What degree of influence do the various Satellite countries exercise on editorial policy and how? (U)



SOVIET BLOC (CONTINUED)

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I. POLITICAL (Continued)

B. Communist Party Stability

1. Factionalism within the Satellite parties--brought into the open with the 20th congress of the CPSU and the de-Stalinization campaign--remains a problem for the Satellite leaders. It may be exacerbated further by the new "surge" forward in the Bloc. We need evidence of growth, continuation or discrimination, of this factionalism within Satellite parties or between parties. (U)

a. Report evidence of disaffection or reluctance among party leaders and members to go along with new party or Bloc directives. Report evidence of moderate elements' efforts to force greater liberalization than the regime leaders and/or Moscow desire, or efforts of conservative elements to improve stricter policies. (U)

b. Report effect on morale of party (and government) bureaucrats of major internal or external events, purges, rehabilitations, Geneva Conference, U.S.-USSR exchanges of visits, etc. (C)

c. Identify the leaders and groups and outline the arguments each side puts up to justify its position. (U)

d. Report evidence of Moscow's concurrence in, or disapproval of, specific Satellite changes in policy. (U)

e. What are the specific reasons for dismissal of Satellite officials? For recantations of prominent persons formerly purged? Is factionalism involved? (U)

2. What has been the effect on the Eastern European Communist Parties of the Soviet campaign against Yugoslavia? We are particularly interested in any differences of opinion among the Satellites regarding Tito and in any evidence of a change in the leadership of the Satellite parties as a result of too close connections with Tito. Evidence of the existence of party ties and relations between the Yugoslav Party and the Satellite Communist Parties. Evidence of deliberate Satellite efforts to reduce Party contact with Yugoslavia to a minimum as well as evidence of efforts to reduce governmental (including economic) ties with Yugoslavia. (U)

3. What effect is Poland's national Communist government, publicly endorsed by Khrushchev, having on the other Satellites? Of particular interest would be any evidence of Satellite efforts to undermine or otherwise weaken the Gomulka regime. (U)

4. What effect is Khrushchev's remarks in Poland denigrating communes having in the Satellite parties? (U)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

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I. POLITICAL (Continued)

B. Communist Party Stability (Continued)

5. To what extent has Khrushchev's assumption of the Soviet premiership affected the doctrine of "collective leadership" in the Satellites? Is there collectivity in the leadership in reaching decisions, or is there one-man rule? Is the method of decision-making a reversion to the pre-June 1953 period or was no change ever apparent? (U)

6. Has Khrushchev's designation of Kozlov as his successor had any effect on Satellite parties? (S)

C. Communist Party Organization

There are great gaps in our knowledge of the setup within the central organization of Satellite Communist parties. Gaining a clear picture of the whole central structure and operations of the party is of obvious importance. (S)

1. What reorganizations and personnel shifts are planned in the central structure and why? What reorganizations have been carried out but not publicized? (U)

2. What is the structure and function of the central organization? We are especially interested in the relation of the foreign section to other Communist parties and the relations of sections to appropriate ministries in the government. What is the position of the central party organization in the process of policy-making and government administration? (U)

D. Government

1. Some Satellites now operate on a government setup in which the premier and deputy premiers constitute an "inner cabinet" on the highest level of government. To what degree do they actually operate as an inner cabinet, and what is their effectiveness and jurisdiction? (U)

2. Have the announced intentions of some Satellites to strengthen the local councils been implemented? (C)

3. What are the given ministries controlled by each deputy premier? What is his relationship to the ministries under his jurisdiction? Report any concrete examples of policy control over ministries. (U)

4. To what extent do the premier and his deputies constitute an actual organization (i.e., regular meetings, a secretariat, etc.)? (U)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

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I. POLITICAL (Continued)

D. Government (Continued)

5. Evidence of plans to decentralize government structure. Is reorganization proceeding along the lines recently adopted by the USSR? What has been effect of such reorganizations on regime's effectiveness; on internal party factionalism? (U)

E. Security and Resistance

1. What are the existing relationships between and among Soviet and Satellite security services? Is there an overall inter-Satellite security organization? (U)

2. What overt and covert resistance is there evidence of? How is overt discontent manifested (i.e., strikes, spontaneous demonstrations, etc.)? Dates, places, size of groups involved, and how settled by the regime. (U)

3. Report instances of relaxation of, or reversion to, previous hard internal security policies. (U)

4. Is there evidence within any Satellite of key groups cooperating to resist regime policies such as workers with intellectuals, students, journalists, peasants, etc.? (U)

F. Popular Attitudes

This type of information should be reported either on a national or a regional basis. Listed below are general categories with some representative examples. (U)

1. Is there any sign of an increase in the people's acceptance of the system and the regime brought on, for example, by better living conditions? Or is there a decrease occasioned by such things as increased secularization measures? To what extent are the people influenced by Soviet boasts of growing strength? (C)

2. Attitudes toward government economic policies--How have farmers reacted to renewed collectivization drives? Workers to new norms, wage-scales, and the general increase in the economic tempo, work-time, etc.? (U)

3. Attitude toward Western powers and hopes of liberation. (U)

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I. POLITICAL (Continued)

F. Popular Attitudes (Continued)

4. West German rearmament: Do the people accept the governmental line on the dangers of West German rearmament? What is the attitude toward Khrushchev's proposal to create an international "free city" of Berlin? Has fear of war among the population increased? What is the popular view of current negotiations for banning nuclear weapons tests? (U)

5. What is the attitude toward the establishment of the commune system in China? Is this regarded as a model for emulation by other Communist regimes? Does the popular attitude differ from the official attitude on this question? (U)

G. Treatment of Minorities

National minorities within the Satellites present the governments with continuing problems. Policies toward them are of continuing interest. (U)

1. Report any observable changes in official policy toward national minorities, particularly as a result of the new drive toward Communism. (U)

2. What is the present status of local Jewish communities? What are the current regime policies toward Zionism, emigration and Israel? (U)

3. Current statistics on numbers of minority groups--particularly Jews--remaining in the Satellites. (U)

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SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

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II. ECONOMIC

A. Agriculture

The results of the 1959 harvest should become available during the last quarter of 1959. Yields per hectare and total production data for grains, potatoes and sugar beets are needed for each Satellite. It is especially important to obtain as early as possible information on the Rumanian and Bulgarian wheat harvest--both areas estimated to have experienced spring droughts. (C)

B. Air Services

Recent reports indicate a step may be taken beyond the present coordination of Bloc air services. In July 1958, at a conference of the USSR, each of the European Satellite airlines was assigned a role in keeping with the capabilities of the parent company. A report of July 1959 indicates that the Czechs and Poles, members of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) may attempt to obtain rights to fly to the United States via Montreal and to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, respectively. Capital investments necessary to establish the services were to be shared by all members of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA). Such an arrangement would parallel the European Consortium, Air Union, recently launched by four of the five major airlines in the European Common Market countries. (S)

1. Are there any indications of such a Bloc attempt to inaugurate commercial air services to the Western Hemisphere? (C)

C. Arms Trade

For several years the Soviet Bloc has been entering into transactions with underdeveloped countries for arms. Given the political, military and/or economic advantages that might result from these transactions, information is requested regarding any new agreements. The extent in monetary terms of these transactions, the terms, and the equipment involved is also of great interest. (OUO)

D. Civil Defense

The approach of the fall season (commonly used for air defense exercises) and the current international situation make probable the conduct of additional civil defense activities and consequently more chances of observation. (C)

1. Report all civil defense alerts and drills to include identification of personnel participating, description or photographs of equipment used, any movement of the general population, activities of operational groups. (C)

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2. Report, at least in brief, on civil defense instructions or publicity appearing in press, radio broadcasts or exhibits accessible to foreigners. (Determination is sought as to whether such information may be directed in part toward achieving propaganda effects on the West.) (C)

3. Report accomplishments in civil defense training, and goals or pressure to complete training by any given date. (C)

4. Report continuing or new construction of heavy bunker or underground gallery construction for emergency operational quarters for government, railway control points, or communications installations (radio stations and long line terminals). (S)

E. East-West Trade1. Boron

The most frequently reported commodity involved in illicit East-West trade during the past year has been boron (boron) and boron ores. The USSR and each of the Satellites, with the exception of Albania, have been reported interested in obtaining large quantities of these embargoed materials in spite of extravagant claims of Communist Chinese production. (C)

a. Indicate the extent to which Bloc demand for boron has been satisfied by these illegal shipments. Are Bloc procurement efforts being coordinated within the USSR or elsewhere? Determine current military use of boron within the Bloc and quantities required. (C)

b. Provide any information which might indicate future Bloc efforts to obtain Free World boron. Such information might involve Bloc procurors or end-users, emphasis on acquiring US, Turkish, Argentine, Italian or West German supplies, the identity of Western processors or manufacturers whose products have been obtained, Bloc contacts in the Free World which assist in the boron procurement effort, etc. (C)

2. Nonferrous Metals (See also USSR III)

The USSR, by various arrangements, has undertaken to limit its exports of aluminum, lead, zinc, and tin to the Free World in 1959. Information on East-West trade will permit an

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II. ECONOMIC (Continued)E. East-West Trade (Continued)2. Nonferrous Metals (Continued)

evaluation of the extent to which these agreements are kept. However, the agreements made by the USSR to restrict exports in no way limit the trade of the Satellites with the West. Therefore, in order to assess accurately the current and potential position of the USSR in the Free World nonferrous metals markets, it is necessary also to evaluate the extent of Intra-Bloc trade in these commodities and the effect of this trade on total supply. Until such time as the Soviets publish statistical trade data similar to Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1956 god and Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1957 god on a regular basis, information on USSR-Satellite trade will be slight. In view of this, the following information is desired: (U)

a. Any quantitative or value information concerning Intra-Bloc trade in 1958, 1959, or in the future in nonferrous metals or minerals. (U)

b. Any indications that an exporting country is acting as a re-exporter or transshipper to the West of nonferrous commodities for the USSR (or other Bloc country). (U)

c. Information on Soviet purchases in the West of any nonferrous commodities which might indicate some shortage within the Bloc. (U)

F. Ferrous Metals Production - CEMA

1. The Committee on Ferrous Metallurgy of CEMA is becoming active in the planning, particularly in long-range planning, of the metallurgical industries of the European Satellites. (C)

a. Report any current indications of CEMA recommendations having been made a part of an individual country's plans for its metallurgical industry. (C)

2. Give any current information relating to CEMA's plans for the development of raw and alloying materials sources in Free World and underdeveloped countries. (C)

3. Report information concerning the specialization of the various aspects of the iron and steel industry among CEMA countries, including rolled steel products, raw materials, alloy materials, foreign trade, metallurgical equipment, and alloy and special steels. (U)

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II. ECONOMIC (Continued)G. Guided Missiles Transport and Deployment (See also USSR PRL ECONOMIC Section)

1. The deployment of Soviet guided missiles in the European Satellites is regarded as a distinct possibility and current priority information requirement. The deployment of Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missiles in East Germany is now accepted, and it is entirely possible that the SAM has been deployed in other European Satellites as well. It is conceivable that surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) of short (100-mile) range and medium (350-700-mile) range may be deployed in any or all of the European Satellites. A 700-mile missile launched from the European Satellite area could reach most targets in the European NATO countries. Deployment may be to fixed bases where a missile may be stored in the immediate vicinity of fuel storage and other support equipment or it may be mobile and transported by rail or truck from a parent base to pre-selected and surveyed launching sites. The degree of mobility will depend in great measure upon the size of the missile and upon the type of fuel required (liquid or solid). Evaporation losses limit the distance that liquid oxygen can be transported, running as high as 10 percent during a 50-mile journey by road. Solid fuels are sensitive to shock, particularly when subjected to low temperatures. This often results in a fracture of the fuel core and subsequent malfunction. (S)

a. Maximum coverage is desired of all rail and road transport from the Soviet Union into the European Satellites, as well as transport within the European Satellites in an attempt to identify the transport of guided missiles and missile associated equipment and material. Such transports will include long cylindrical objects probably covered with tarpaulins on long flat cars or truck trailers. Armed escorts will probably be noted and extra security precautions will be evident at rail stations and at unloading points. Road patrols may be noted on highway routes. Some short range missiles may be observed mounted on tracked carriers. Because of their height and configuration these will be loaded on flat cars or possibly in closed cars with an unusual shape such as an end extension protruding over an empty flat car. A medium range missile may be as much as 80 feet long and will probably be loaded on two flat cars with swivel attachment to provide flexibility on curves. The location at which observation is made, direction of movement and, if possible, the final destination of the load should be reported. When there are known ammunition, POL, or ordnance equipment storage depots in the vicinity of observation, that information may suggest the location of a launching site. (S)

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II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

G. Guided Missile Transport and Deployment (Continued)

1. b. Special or unusual rail cars and trucks may be observed. This may include covered freight cars with end extensions on one or both ends. If possible, the contents of the car and/or the purpose of the end extension should be determined. The empty weight of the freight car will probably be stenciled on the car and should be reported. Weight of load should also be determined when possible. Tank cars transporting liquid oxygen will probably be of unusually heavy construction with empty weight stenciled or painted on the car. When loaded, these cars will be characterized by frosted valves and pipe fittings. Origin, direction of travel and destination of these cars should be determined. The location of plants capable of producing liquid oxygen should be determined when possible. Plants which produce ordinary oxygen and acetylene gases used in welding are frequently capable of producing liquid oxygen. Photographs should be taken or sketches made of all objects and equipment with estimates of dimensions. Extra wide, extra high and extra long freight cars, particularly those of Soviet construction, may require special routing in the European Satellites to avoid obstructions at stations and bridges or to avoid tunnels. The presence of freight cars and loads which require special routing should be reported. If possible, the location of the obstruction which necessitates a special routing should be determined and reported. (S)

c. The paving of the center sections of divided lane highways suggests the possibility of a launching site for a medium range missile. The exact location of this construction should be reported and the relationship of the location to ammunition storage depots. (S)

(1) The construction of new, even temporary, roads leading into heavily forested areas off the main roads suggests a pre-surveyed launching site and should be reported. (S)

d. Any evidence of deployment of guided missiles in East German Army units or other European Satellite armies should be reported. (S)

2. Air

Recent reports indicate a step may be taken beyond the present coordination of Bloc air services. In July 1958, at a conference of the USSR, each of the European Satellites airlines was assigned a role in keeping with the capabilities of the parent company. A report of July 1959 indicates that the Czechs and Poles,

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II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

G. Guided Missile Transport and Deployment (Continued)

2. Air (Continued)

members of the International Civil Aviation Organization, (ICAO) may attempt to obtain rights to fly to the United States via Montreal and to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, respectively. Capital investments necessary to establish the services were to be shared by all members of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA). Such an arrangement would parallel the European Consortium, Air Union, recently launched by four of the five major airlines in the European Common Market countries. (S)

a. Are there any indications of such a Bloc attempt to inaugurate commercial air services to the Western Hemisphere? (S)

H. Telecommunications

In June 1959 a major conference was held in East Berlin by the Organization for Cooperation Among the Socialist Countries in the Fields of Post and Communications (OSS). The purpose of this conference was to formulate policies and plans for improvement and integration of post and telecommunications in the Soviet Bloc. During the course of this conference, a disagreement arose between the East German and Polish delegation on whether East Berlin or Warsaw would be the location of the main telephone exchange for Bloc traffic to Western Europe. No agreement was reached at the conference on this question.

1. Report activities and agreements of Soviet Bloc countries on the selection of the main telephone exchange for Bloc traffic to Western Europe. (S)

2. Report evidence of agreements reached on the improvement and integration of telecommunications systems of the Bloc countries. (S)

I. Trade Conferences

1. Izvestiya of 9 July 1959 reported a Moscow conference of high-ranking foreign trade officials of all European Soviet Bloc countries. (S)

a. Information is desired on the topics of discussion and conclusions reached. (S)

2. Available reports suggest that another Bloc banking conference will be held later on this year, possibly in Moscow. Among the subjects of discussion may be the desirability of establishing a Bloc bank to extend credit to, and generally facilitate Bloc trade with, the underdeveloped countries. (S)

a. Information is desired on the topics of discussion and conclusions reached. (S)

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III. MILITARY

A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity

1. Surface-to-Surface Missiles

a. Any indications of the assignment of operational control of missiles (IRBM's, ICBM's) to Soviet air field commands in the Soviet Bloc Area? (S)

b. Any evidence of an increasing deployment of mobile surface-to-air missile launching installations? (S)

2. Soviet Equipment in Satellites

a. What types of aircraft are being produced in the Satellites? (S)

b. What missiles have made their appearance in the Satellites? (S)

(1) What missiles are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites in the near future? (S)

c. What efforts have been made to coordinate armament production in the Bloc? What role is Czechoslovakia playing in armament development? Poland? (C)

d. What post-war models of equipment are scheduled to be delivered to the Satellites? (C)

e. What naval vessels are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites (particularly Poland and East Germany)? (C)

f. What aircraft are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites (particularly Poland and East Germany)?

3. Reduction in Strengths

a. Any recent and significant reductions in strength? (C)

b. Which service (Army, Navy or Air Force) is being most affected by such reduction? (C)

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III. MILITARY (Continued)

A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity (Continued)

4. Training

executed? a. On what scale is combined training being  
What is the role of each participant? (C)

exercises (CPX) held? b. How frequently are combined command post  
exercises? (C) What are the scale and scope of these

c. How many officers from each of the Satellites  
have been trained in the USSR? At what schools is this training  
given? How many are currently enrolled? Are special courses arranged  
for Satellite officers? (C)

5. Advisory Groups

a. How many Soviet personnel are there in the  
Advisory Group in each of the Satellites? What function do they  
perform at the Ministry of Defense level? (C)

b. At what levels in the chain of command are  
advisory personnel assigned? What is their relationship to local  
commanders? (C)

6. The Warsaw Pact

a. How is the headquarters of the Pact in  
Moscow currently organized? What are the staff sections of the  
headquarters? How many Satellite officers are assigned to the  
staff in Moscow? What are their positions? (C)

b. Are there regional headquarters for the Pact?  
Where are they located? Who commands them? (C)

c. Is combined air defense a function of the  
unified command? How is coordination accomplished in this field? (C)

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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

A. General

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) on 18 August 1959 noted certain findings regarding US knowledge of Soviet science and technology. Accordingly, USIB recommended that all USIB member agencies "intensify collection and analytical efforts to remedy the deficiencies" listed in this section:

Our knowledge of Soviet science has been greatly expanded over the past few years as the result of increased contacts between Soviet and Western scientists, but gaps in specific areas still exist. (S)

Consideration of Soviet policy, planning, and organization has been hampered by the extensive reorganization of Soviet science, which appears to be still in progress, and by more recent developments (notably the Central Committee plenum in June 1959), the effects of which are not yet clear. While information on Soviet scientific resources has been fairly good, analysis of Soviet expenditures for research and development has been handicapped by the calculated obscurities in the announced Soviet budget. Consideration of Satellite scientific and technical resources and their contribution to the Bloc has been hindered by the lack of recent studies. Similarly, analysis of the value of espionage to Soviet scientific progress has been handicapped by the lack of data on the present scope of Soviet espionage in scientific and technical fields. (S)

More information is needed on Soviet research and development in:

1. Aircraft (including aircraft nuclear propulsion and aircraft production technology); (S)
2. Submarines (particularly nuclear powered and missile launching types); (S)
3. Mines, torpedoes, and anti-submarine warfare; (S)
4. Air transportable ground weapons; (S)
5. BW and CW; (S)
6. Application of infra-red in weapon systems; (S)
7. Industrial technology. (S)

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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL (Continued)

B. Nuclear Energy

1. During 1955 the USSR negotiated agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia for cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. (U)

a. What is the present status of the nuclear energy programs in these countries and the extent of Soviet aid, particularly in respect to the construction of research and power reactors and accelerators? (C)

b. Do these countries have any plans for additional facilities for nuclear research? If so, to what extent will Soviet aid be involved? (C)

c. What are the planned nuclear electric power goals of these countries? What is the extent of Soviet support to these nuclear power projects? Will the USSR receive the irradiated fuel elements from these reactors? (C)

d. Are any of these countries conducting research on nuclear propulsion systems or controlled thermonuclear reactions? (C)

e. What is the annual production of uranium ore in each of the countries and the percent of uranium contained therein? Is all of the ore shipped to the USSR? If not, how much is kept in each country? (C)

2. Each of the European Satellites has issued manuals to its military organization similar to the Soviet publications for training in the defense against nuclear weapons. (S)

a. Does the USSR have any nuclear weapons or weapon storage sites in the Satellite countries? (S)

b. How much training have the troops, both Soviet and Satellite, received in the use of and defense against nuclear weapons? (C)

c. Provide details on the special training and any published atomic effects data involved. (C)

d. Any recent Soviet Bloc developments with regard to BW and CW? (C)

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SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL (Continued)

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C. Astronomy, Space, and Meteorology

The Soviet Bloc countries are supporting the Soviets space program by visual tracking of satellites, by the design and production of instruments and equipment, and by theoretical work in various scientific fields, including astronomy and geophysics. The exact extent, quality, and location of many Bloc support activities are not known, however. In addition, significant Bloc theoretical work relating to the use of computers for weather forecasting and Bloc experiments in weather control may be in progress. (C)

Information is desired on the scientific and technical activities of the Soviet Bloc countries in support of the Soviet space program. (C)

1. What astronomical and geophysical projects and programs, particularly upper atmosphere, earth satellites, lunar, and planetary projects, are being undertaken individually or in cooperation with the USSR. (C)

2. What are the rocket and satellite tracking programs and plans? (C)

3. What astronomical, radio astronomical, and upper atmosphere instruments and facilities are being constructed or planned? (U)

D. Geological Sciences

All of the leading European Satellites have active programs in the geological sciences emphasizing applications in mineral prospecting and capital construction. Continued surveillance of these European Satellite geological applications is necessary since they may significantly affect Satellite economic and military potential. Information bearing on Satellite geological reorganizations, interchange of technical aid, conferences, and general research is thus of value since it indicated current trends of research and development. (C)

1. Report on any reorganization or establishment of new Soviet Bloc geological research facilities. (U)

2. Details are desired on any geological equipment or technical aid sent by one Soviet Bloc country to another or by Soviet Bloc countries to the West. (U)

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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL (Continued)

D. Geological Sciences (Continued)

3. Information is desired on Soviet Bloc activities or plans in the fields of geological mapping, geological and geo-chemical prospecting for minerals, and engineering geological support to capital construction. (U)

4. Report details on any recent or planned Soviet Bloc conferences in the geological sciences. (U)

E. Terrestrial Geophysics (including Seismology, Gravimetry, Geomagnetism, and Geo-electricity)

Soviet Bloc interests in terrestrial geophysics have a variety of applications including: missile and aircraft navigation; detection of military vehicles and of explosion tests, data collection for cartographic and geodetic purposes, and for mineral prospecting. (C)

1. Details on studies made by the Satellite countries are desired, including evidence of any Soviet supervision and assistance. (U)

F. Microbiology

Basic microbiological research in some of the satellites (Czechoslovakia and East Germany) appears to be of a high quality and more refined than similar work carried out in the USSR. An increasing number of important scientific (microbiological) conferences have been held in Czechoslovakia recently. (U) Current information is desired on:

1. The extent, if any, to which the USSR cooperates with the satellite countries in antibiotic research. (S)

2. The extent to which Soviet microbiologists depend upon research conducted in Czechoslovakia. (U)

3. The significance of the increasing number of these scientific conferences being held in Czechoslovakia. (U)

4. Any significant research conducted in basic microbiology in the satellites on fermentation, microbial nutrition, microbial genetics, continuous cultivation microorganisms, or radiomicrobiology. (U)



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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL (Continued)

F. Microbiology (Continued)

5. The status of Hungarian antibiotic research. (U)

6. The extent to which the following research projects are being carried out in East Germany: large-scale production of antibiotics for livestock feed additives as is done in the United States; the application of antibiotics against plant pathogens; and the production of citric acid by submerged fermentation. (U)

G. Space Biology

With the current emphasis on research concerning manned space flights, space biological research designed for the development of a close environment system capable of supplying a space vehicle occupant with food and oxygen along with a complete utilization of the human waste products in the cycle, is increasing in importance. (C) Current data is desired on:

1. Mass culture of unicellular algae under closely controlled environmental conditions (control of light, temperature, gas and mineral nutrient composition). (U)

2. Experimentation with biological closed carbon dioxide-oxygen exchange systems utilizing algae (or other plants) and men (or other animals). (U)

3. Utilization of human waste products (solid, liquid and gas) in the maintenance of algal cultures. (U)

4. Utilization of microorganisms for the conversion of human waste products, under controlled environmental conditions, into materials essential for maintenance of a mass algal culture. (U)

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